Bringing Out the Dead: Curriculum History as Memory

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If there requires further evidence of the rude, undeveloped character of our education, we have it in the fact that the comparative worths (sic) of different kinds of knowledge have been as yet scarcely even discussed—much less discussed in a methodic way with definite results. (Spencer, 1884 p. 10)

Memory is the raw material of history. Whether mental, oral, or written, it is the living source from which historians draw. (Le Goff, 1977/1992 p. xi)

Making fragile the causalities that present themselves as natural and given in daily life is to open spaces for possibilities other than those framed by the contemporary principles of ‘the order of things.’ (Popkewitz, 2011 p. 164)

From this standpoint, reexamination of the historical operation opens on the one hand onto the political problem … and, on the other, onto the question of the subject … a question repressed … through the law of a ‘scientific’ writing. (de Certeau, 1988 p. xxvii)

There are the frameworks we choose to use, like Spencer’s eternal question, and then there are those we do not choose, but which nevertheless operate, some subverting intent and others opening spaces for possibility. If the frameworks upon which we habitually rely serve to divert us from all but dominant forms of memory, then silenced or invisible frameworks become a form of surveillance from beyond the grave. The Reconceptualization of curriculum studies (Pinar & Grumet, 1976; Pinar, 2013) has long acknowledged the necessity of historical perspective for the purpose of revealing the ways in which history is, and has been, used to codify socio-political/ideological contexts. Nevertheless, curriculum history has largely averted poststructuralist deconstruction and has remained firmly wedded to a teleology of reason,
a form of “high modernism” replete with progressive axioms and a linear narrative of struggle and overcoming (Cormack & Green, 2009). Whether this is merely a lag related to curriculum history’s shared sphere with educational history, a field paradoxically noted for its ability to “avoid reflection on the epistemology of science and the sociology of knowledge” (Popkewitz, Franklin, & Pereya, 2001, p. 10) or whether curriculum historians, too, are beholden to what have variously been called salvation stories, (Popkewitz, et al., 2001) and grand narratives (Lather, 2007): both conceptualize history as a way to reconcile the present.

This special issue of the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, titled Difficult Returns¹: Curriculum History Disrupted seeks to engage in a process of disruption and difficult return, that we might find fissures through which to extricate narratives of curriculum history from the tenacious grasp of the typical monumental moments we are all accustomed to: from the Common School Movement to the Committee of Ten; from Brown v. Board of Education to the launching of the Russian satellite Sputnik; and from the era of civil rights legislation and activism to the thunderous backlash of the 1983 presidential commission report A Nation at Risk. We envisioned this issue as an approach to a pedagogy of re-membrance (Hendry, 2011) which challenges us to live not in the past but in relation with the past (Simon, Rosenberg, & Eppert, 2000) with an emphasis on an acknowledgment of the claim that the past has on the present (Popkewitz, et al., 2001). Such an acknowledgement requires an increased level of theorizing regarding the normative tropes of modernism and a sincere grappling with the extent to which linear narratives and positivistic aspirations for a ‘science’ of history have shaped the field. We note, and hope to provide nurturance to, a growing rupture in theorizing about curriculum history (Baker, 2001, 2011; Block, 2004; Hendry, 2011; Kridel & Bullough, 2007; Morris, 2001; Popkewitz, 1997, 2001; Popkewitz, 2011; Trohler, 2011; Watkins, 2001; Winfield, 2007, 2010) which challenges the disciplinary internalization of Enlightenment notions of progress, utopian quest, struggle, and redemption; an internalization which has thus far ensured that, writ large, curriculum history remains thoroughly embedded in a project of “subjugation and erasure” (Hendry, 2011 p. 12).

Our challenge as curriculum scholars is to work towards a rethinking of some of the very notions we have come to rely upon intellectually – those well-worn (inevitably Anglophone, western, masculine, nation-state) grooves which provide such a seamless glide that we hardly know they are there: assumptions and boundaries around our thinking which are themselves the stuff of ideologically generated infrastructure. We seek to disrupt that which we cannot see and to reclaim the very idea of history by transforming its meaning from that which occurred then to an understanding of the way history exists and operates, as a moment of recursive memory, in the minutia of everyday life in the present (de Certeau, 1984). Linearity and progress, embedded as they are within the story of our ‘national unfolding,’ are conceptually bound to accounts of disciplinary evolution, to conceptions of self and identity, and even to what and how we think of the future. These are not mere innocuous tread marks—we contend that they are as blinders on a horse with but one path to plod; they produce a misdirected gaze, one that needs as fuel an identification of/with those pre-ordained monumental events from which we have built our narratives.

Any attempt to move away from the “real” of progressive linearity requires a refracted lens, one that views historical inquiry from multiple disciplinary perspectives. More than that though, there is an internal process of unknotting that we find to be most challenging as we experience our own engagement as co-editors of this special issue— we witness our own inclination to enact the very processes we critique—the search for origins, the privileging of the
present, the desire for a story of struggle and progress—in this way, we begin to recognize, through brief glimpses, the ways in which our own minds and thinking have been bounded and drawn—in other words, we engage in a constant reflexive process that we hope allows some room for insight that exists alongside, and occasionally through, our own internalization of the modernist utopian quest.

We have grouped the submissions to this special issue of the journal into two larger themes, *disruption* and *difficult return*, which we believe illustrate an approach to what Popkewitz (2011) called a “History of the Present” which is concerned with relationships, memory, and an accounting of the “constitution of the subject of the social and educational sciences through a weaving of different historical trajectories” (p. 178). We utilize the notion of disruption, as a way in, and past, the traditional monuments which have characterized curriculum history thus far and introduce a different way to think about history, as a history freed from the constraints of representation and revision and as a history that is cognizant of both social structures and their subversion: in short, we conceptualize history as memory. Following Popkewitz, et al., (2001) who referred to history as “an understanding of the present and of collective memory” we argue that there is virtually no separation between history and memory (p. 4). History as memory, most significantly, acknowledges individual and group agency (tragically lost in many poststructural critiques of modernism, recognized most recently by Pinar, 2013) by obliterating the frames we use to quantify knowledge, and in so doing, history as memory opens up possibilities for multiple ways of knowing, multiple forms of knowledge, and new ways of being in relation with the past.

The first section of this special issue dwells in the moment, resisting the pull and promise of linearity, progress, and resolution. Each of the four submissions (Baker; Jupp; Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández; and Triche) in this section engage in a disruption of the locus of curriculum history as embedded in monumental events/tropes which are indelibly wedded to the Anglophone, western, masculine, nation-state. These authors take us around back, away from the inevitable bloviating bluster in which grand narratives are generally communicated: they call us away from what has become an internalized form of communication in the field, namely the puritan-inspired crisis-speech which resolves the public dialogue into one, monolithic struggle for dominance (McKnight, 2003; Winfield, 2007). The second section (Brass, Davis and Appelbaum, Morton, and Pullman) provides a difficult return to history as a form of relational ethics; a form that instantiates death and explores the evolutionary history of the disciplines as mechanisms for both the formation and maintenance of grand narratives. This section takes up where disruptions leading to a referential coming to terms with 16th century curricular conceptions left off, and focuses on what was lost with the emergence of disciplinary boundaries.

**Disruption and Difficult Return: Monumental Fissures**

The need to disrupt stems from curriculum history’s unseen enactment of a progressive, linear template replete with instances of struggle and overcoming, even as the field of curriculum studies challenged hegemonic forms altogether. Curriculum history has internalized a narrative that traces itself back a mere 150 years to Horace Mann and the common schools, and has been largely dominated by conceptions of curriculum firmly lodged in the social efficiency movement (Winfield, 2007). We do not feel it is necessary to recount the narrative here—it is well known and easily found (Popkewitz, et al. 2001; Kleibard, 1986/1995; Cremin, 1961; Schubert, 1985).
What is less visible are the well-worn mental pathways that this narrative has created and along which much of our own theorizing has travelled, shaping our understanding of language as a form of power, of progress as the unquestioned process, and of the individual as the natural unit upon which the curricular project is predicated (Baker, 2001, 2009; Popkewitz, 1997, 2011). The linear template, along with the poststructuralist analysis that was meant to reconceive, has produced in our thinking an endless array of binaries providing us with conceptual parameters: past/present, right/wrong, quantifiable/emotive, black/white, good/not-good, better/best, masculine/feminine, dominant/non-dominant, hetero/homo, human/animal, rational/irrational, and we could go on. We are confined by these well-worn ruts in other ways as well: on our ever-evolving emphasis on the search for the better theory, the ‘right’ way to analyze; on the relentless focus on text that narrows, confines and codifies what counts as knowledge and delineates forms of knowing; and on an overwhelming blindness to experience and understandings not rooted in the Anglophone/nation-state paradigmatic sphere. We want to be clear: we are not calling for a new approach to history which reviews, recovers, retells, restores, rewrites, or revises the stories we tell. While we applaud any attempt to make visible that which has been suppressed, we hope this special issue of JCT will contribute to a growing discontent (Baker, 2001, 2009; Hendry, 2011; Popkewitz, 1997, 2001, 2011; Willinsky, 1998; Davis, 2004; Winfield, 2007, 2010) with the way history is conceptualized overall.

The necessary distance required by historical inquiry rooted in the linear narrative of progress leaves no room for an accounting of the historicity of the present: the maintenance of distance creates space for understandings and structural arrangements of knowledge that are ideologically imposed, rather than organically emergent from the constant flux that is past/present porosity. Being led astray by our own grand narratives has been a form of comfort, a version of what we needed to hear in order to reconcile the present. As such, release of these and replacement with a vantage point that is within the past, rather than progressed beyond it, might be somewhat traumatic, or what Simon, Rosenberg, and Eppert (2000) have referred to as a “difficult return” (p. 3). We are urged, by necessity and by Simon, et. al., to let go of the adage that we should pay attention to the past in order to avoid repeating any mistakes—an orientation that is, in itself, steeped in the linear, progressive narrative.

Instead, there is an opportunity to engage with remembrance in a way that is deeply autobiographical when we understand collective memories as a series of communicative acts that “recite and re-site what one is learning” about others in a different time and space and also what one is learning “of and within the disturbances and disruptions” that occur personally as we attempt to comprehend historical experience (Simon, et.al. 2000, p. 3). We argue that one approach to reconceptualizing the relationship between the past and the present is to become open to the operation of memory, paying attention to where and how it is inscribed: in physicality, in patterns of thought, in our preference for certain forms of knowing and knowledge over others, and finally, within language, rituals and practices.

Memory as an epistemological tool was first theorized by French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1941/1992) who said that “no memory is possible outside frameworks used by people living in society to determine and retrieve their recollections” (p. 43). Hutton (1993) envisioned the workings of Halbwachs notion of collective memory as sea waves crashing on a rocky shore. As the tide rises, the rocks are immersed in the advancing sea. But with its retreat, what remains of the sea’s presence are only ‘miniature lakes nestled within the rocky formations’ ... with the ebbing tide, only
tranquil pools of recollection are left behind. In them, the past remains alive, but with diminished presence. More conspicuous now are the rocks, the places of memory that shape as well as contain our recollections – these are the social frameworks of our memory. (p. 73)

These frameworks might be thought of as the highly complex social context in which social mores, values, and ideals demarcate the parameters of our thought according to the historically formed attitudes of the social groups to which we relate. They might also be thought of as systems because they “become associated within the mind” (and concomitant nation-state, canonical heritage, and local circumstance) “that calls them up, and because some memories allow the reconstruction of others” (Halbwachs, 1941/1992 p. 53). Pinar (2013) sees the working of collective memory within curriculum studies, although he doesn’t name it as such, noting that “even in claims of the ‘new,’ one hears echoes of the old” and pointing out Grumet’s (2010) observation that curriculum scholars are grappling with the same questions that were asked 30 years ago although we “hear them and answer them differently today” (quoted in Pinar, 2013 p. 57). What this illustrates is that memory work is recursive (Doll, 1993), not progressive, and necessarily so because if we assume to have it all figured out the first time around then we succumb to the mythology of the Enlightenment which presupposes that the application of reason settles all.

The memory work of the authors in this section, widely divergent in time, space, and perspective, nevertheless shares a spirit of disruption long overdue in curriculum history. Conceptualizing history not as a progressive trek towards a reconciled, better future, each paper envisions history instead as a recursion. Dipping in and out, over and above the linear narrative we follow these authors through a disruption of the very notion of quest to a place where we are required to question what is natural, to listen and seek out knowledge and knowers who have been subjugated because they do not help us to make sense of an ideologically imposed present. We are cast out by these authors to see ourselves, our present, through a finely woven sieve that makes impossible the Archimedean point. We learn to live without the comfort of maps, and of points of origin. The spirit shared by all four articles in this section is characterized by their reconceptualization of the practice of history as a form of recursive memory work.

Historical analysis from this vantage point is reflective, often messy and ambiguous and moves beyond the provision of context to which historical perspective is often relegated. In her article The Purposes of History? Curriculum Studies, Invisible Objects and Twenty-first Century Societies, Bernadette Baker (this issue) offers us a hook so that we may join the ride of reflexive disruption of some of the primary categories through which we make sense of the world: through a bricolage of past/present juxtapositions, into the epistemological shifts made visible through the work of William James, to an array of implications for the field of curriculum history. Noting that the traditional quest of “studies of curriculum in Anglophone-dominant sites of production” has been to question knowledge production and the values that drive it, Baker moves “beyond planetary geopolitically-based thinking, a place-knowledge reduction” in order to question the primary categories which are used to tie epistemological debates to human-centric imperatives. Baker begins with four juxtapositions representing a “bricolage of conceptions of history” which disrupt linearity by revealing tropes as they appear through multiple iterations of time and space: past and present, popular and academic culture, and publications and policies.

These juxtapositions are offered as a way to frame an historical inquiry that understands the inextricable nature of the present utilizing a reflexive approach to the past. Such an
approach requires purchase, the edge of the slightest fissure along what is generally highly fortified. It is as Le Goff (1977/1992) says, that “the dialectic of history seems to be summed up in the opposition or dialogue between past and present (and/or between present and past)” and, most importantly, that “this opposition is not neutral but subtends to expresses an evaluative system, as for example in the oppositional pairs ancient/modern and progress/reaction” (p. xv).

Once inside, Baker doesn’t stop. Seeing her way past the blockages and invisibility imposed by, among other things, disciplinarity, text, and the Anglophone-centric, nation-state mediated quest for absolution, Baker goes on to explore the labyrinthine (Baker, 2009) convolutions of what counts as knowing, and how knowledge is kept, as structured by the advent of scientism during the turn of the twentieth century.

Using a lesser-known text of William James titled *Talks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals* (original punctuation), Baker traverses the intermedial spaces explored by James at a time just prior to the disciplinary reign marked by the final separation of religion and science. This schism, operating full tilt in the present but not generally attended to, represents what Popkewitz (1997) articulated as the transference of the mission of societal salvation from ‘divine providence’ to an educational project where “pedagogical knowledge took certain religious views about salvation and combined them with scientific disposition toward how truth and self-governing was to be sought” (p. 143). Highlighting the inadequacy of purely poststructural approaches to history which, laudably, began by moving the project outward from a narrow focus on (constructed) ‘fact,’ but, less-laudably, fail to disrupt an overly-deterministic focus on the subject/object binary and don’t take into account individual agency, Baker extends earlier work (2001, 2009) using James’ twenty-five year grappling with the subjects of child-mind and the ghost in order to “open key points for reconsideration regarding conditions of proof, validation criteria, and subject matters” (p. 2).

It is just this kind of historical disruption that resists the grand narrative (e.g. child-centered education; social efficiency; the work of Dewey, Thorndike, and Hall) that has situated and privileged the scientific contemplation of the child-mind as the nucleus around which curriculum history has swirled—a configuration constructed, articulated, and cemented by the newly emerging early-twentieth century discipline of psychology. Baker permits us the opportunity to step outside of what Popkewitz (2011) called the twentieth century project of social and educational science: to design people in order to plan the future. We are compelled, by Baker, to become cognizant of the linkages that connect “geopolitics, the nature of the human, the clinging to perceptions of rationality, and what become dominant foci” (p. 19). What would happen, we are left wondering, if the unexplainable and invisible were to reassemble memory and the confines within which we inquire?

It is safe to say that within the panoply of historically rooted oppression that plays out on individual, institutional, regional, national, and international levels, interpretations of the past (and thus the present) are socially acquired and used in ways that preserve power stratification. As Le Goff (1977/1992) confirms, “collective memory is not only a conquest, it is also an instrument and an objective of power” (p. 98) subject to modalities of subversion and dominance. James Jupp, in his article *Toward Cosmopolitan Sensibilities in US Curriculum Studies: A Synoptic Rendering of the Franciscan Tradition in Mexico* offers another opportunity to disrupt the progress paradigm through a reconfiguration of the dominant foci of curriculum history: what he calls the Anglophone-centered, Statesian tradition. Engaging in an articulation of “substantive and longstanding traditions of educational and cultural criticism unknown to Anglophone-centric and Statesian curriculum ‘discourses’” through a synoptic rendering of the
Franciscan educational tradition in 16th century Mexico, Jupp employs the notion of cosmopolitan sensibilities to disrupt the locus of textual discourse as primal to the story of curriculum history. Not unlike Baker’s focus on the non-quantifiable world of parapsychology made possible by the pre-disciplinary moment before scientism became gospel, Jupp accompanies us into an intellectual time and space inhabited not only by text, but by spirits and saints, revealing the epistemic violence of a purely Anglo-centric, Protestant privileging of the written word.

What we see in Jupp’s work is the realization of the power of multiple trajectories, coupled with a displaced privileging of the ‘present.’ The site of analysis is a juxtaposition of a 16th century construct as expressed in the early 20th century Mexican Revolution and the multiple recoveries and deployments of an “insurgent ideology” known as mestizaje—a Catholic/Indigenous/white/native hybrid pedagogy of identity that, Jupp shows, emerged centuries later as a driving ideology of the Mexican Revolution. Here we see an historical accounting that deeply contests the undisturbed North American contours of Spencerian white supremacy—exploding out one of the highest peaks of curriculum history. Indeed, an uncritical liberal-progressive rendering of curriculum history would have no room for understandings of indigenous knowledge which might be tainted by western notions of religious conversion, and are especially likely to see the Catholic mission as wholly oppressive and therefore deserving of exclusion. Surging past this ideologically imposed blind-spot, Jupp seeks not to valorize, but rather suggests that the Franciscan tradition represents a form of pedagogy—in a Spanish colonial geographic region whose borders at the time included what is now most of the western United States. This is an approach to history that resists the binaries like missionary/indigenous, Catholic/Protestant, and colonizers/colonized generally imposed upon historical insights. Jupp disrupts this imposition and reveals understandings, both ancestral and present, that are situated outside of the Anglo-Protestant imperative and, thereby, allows for an expanded articulation of what constitutes pedagogy.

Revealing the complexity of an archival record that has been buffeted by five hundred years of power struggles in Mexican history, Jupp opens up previously interred possibilities for understanding: the 16th century Franciscan presence was not privileged by a missionary coupling but was instead engaged in subversion through collaboration with the indigenous Nahua. Jupp resists a “now-tired and ahistorical polemics on the proliferation of new-and better-refined discourses” or what we have referred to as the linear/progressive mandate, by acknowledging, alongside his identification of “five critical progressive through lines relevant to the present [that the] Franciscan tradition paradoxically provides one of the bases for hegemonic mestizaje in the present which requires on-going critique and engagement” (p. 23). Successfully disrupting what colonialism has presented in a static way, Jupp reclaims mestizaje as a pedagogy not of imposition, but of agency—a pedagogy formed of hybridized need, or, a relational pedagogy.

Connecting the 15th century Franciscan tradition development and use of mestizaje and the 20th century iteration of it as a driving ideological force during the Mexican Revolution, we see through Jupp’s unpacking of mestizaje the power of collective memory to work not only in concert with dominant epistemologies, but in contrast as well. The progressive imperative to reconcile the past in order to make sense of the present is disrupted here through a re-siting of the Franciscan educational tradition as a pedagogical means of coming-to-know that challenges us to think beyond notions of discursive proliferation and to open ourselves to alternative collective memories that have been made invisible or have been ignored in the field’s present ‘discourses.’
We are made to dwell on the extent to which historical renderings that excise have been used as an agent of imperialism.

“Memory, on which history draws and which it nourishes in return, seeks to save the past in order to serve the present and the future” Le Goff (1977/1992 p. 99) tells us. But memory, in the collective sense, might also be conceived as a way out of the totalitarian nature of our current system of sense making. As Baker and Jupp have already shown, there is much to be gained from an historical inquiry that is open to the “multiform and fragmentary” nature of what de Certeau (1984) terms “everyday practice.” Even if we are largely wedded, through Enlightenment notions of reason and rationality that elevate textual knowledge over other ways of knowing and restrict who may be categorized as knowers, “the document is not objective, innocent raw material,” Le Goff (1977/1992) tells us, “but expresses past society’s power over memory and over the future: the document is what remains” (p. xvii), but we need not be beholden. Enter the work of Eve Tuck and Rubén Gaztambide-Fernández, who rise to Le Goff’s challenge that we “act in such a way that collective memory may serve the liberation and not the enslavement of human beings” (1977/1992 p. 99) by disrupting and resisting the dismissal of indigenous epistemologies as ‘identity politics.’ Using Natty Bumppo from Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales as allegory in their article Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity, Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández show us the grisly image of the aftermath of the progressive narrative: the blindness of a progressive epistemology that insists always on newness. We wonder whether the quest of the field of curriculum studies, especially curriculum history, may not, on some level, be an acknowledgement of complicity, a constant running from that which was, toward an imagined (promised) reconciliation with a past that is so clearly evident in the present. Pinar (2013) on the other hand, considers the trajectory as not one of complicity or running away but sees the early days of the Reconceptualization as “an internally prompted ethical demand to divest the field of those traces of eugenics that remained” (p. 60).

Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández want us to notice the weaponry we take on the errand: they see the ‘document’ (our symbol, not theirs) as a category and place of knowing whose use and access is premised on membership and alignment with what they call “the project of settler colonialism, premised on white settler supremacy” and, like Le Goff (1977/1992), might now be expanded from text to include “the spoken word, the image, and gestures” (p. xvii). Here we begin to perceive the magnitude of the degree of infiltration of rationality, reason, and science into what has been included in the ephemera of what is worthy of our gaze and consideration. Such a re-membering of the historical project must not be complacent, for, as Le Goff warns, “we must give up the false problematics of infrastructure and superstructure” (p. xix) even as we open ourselves to multiple synchronic poststructural historical projections. What we risk, Le Goff is saying, is a privileging of the ‘new realities’ which have added to economic, political, social, and cultural histories, and what Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández would term as a reappraisal of any attempt to interrupt the project of white-settler supremacy.

Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández theorize the contours of settler colonialism in multiple ways, from the outlining of existing racialized scientism expressed within hegemonic structures and values implicit in the field of curriculum studies, to a thorough explication of what they call the ‘ongoing project’ of colonial settlement. Arguing that while public airing of the white supremacy of imperialist colonial conquest (cf. Willinsky, 1998) and the development of new postcolonial contextualizations (Asher, 2010; McCarthy, 2008; Jankie, 2009; Spivak, 2012) of curriculum may appear to be liberatory, they fail to reconcile present privilege, or what they call ‘settler futurity.’ Indigenous scholarship, the authors show, must contend with an academy
whose own identity has been historically premised on the maintenance of racialized symbolic logics (Winfield, 2007) which expresses itself as an ‘errand into the wilderness,’ (McKnight, 2003) read: theft and occupation. Curriculum history disrupted may tap into a stream of collective memory that allows us to hear indigenous scholars from beyond the rendering of their outcast status—that we may witness the eventual collapse of the “fort” (Donald, 2009) which has made those outside the walls invisible. Clearly, the sanctioned narcissism of the nation-state continues to inform the present through lived lives, and the present reality begins to undulate, for its seemingly fixed shape was an illusion all along.

Considering that there is a danger inherent in contending with a memory we are at least willing to acknowledge, reveals the violence that is historical practice uncritically examined. The distance we muster with regard to invisible and silenced knowers and knowledge, both past and present, brings to bear our own fear of complicity. In order to extricate ourselves from the progressive narrative that absolves, we must engage with the past in a way that is as uncomfortable and unflattering as possible. The closing element of Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández’s exploration is a brief introduction to an approach they call rematriation, defined as the “work of community members and scholars who directly address the complicity of curriculum in the maintenance of settler colonialism” (p. 24). We get no points for not averting our gaze, we are not brave, we are not morally pure, we are not forgiven because we choose to acknowledge our own internalization of the worst that humanity has produced. Rather, Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández tell us, what is called for is an “ethical relationality” that does not deny difference but instead “seeks to understand mutual implication [and] puts Indigenous epistemologies at the forefront [requiring] a more public form of memory” (p. 24). We are drawn away from our linear inclination to an understanding of curriculum history as an ongoing project of re-appropriation of knowledge of all kinds, indigenous and otherwise, where re-appropriation (also a form of collective memory) is to be watched for as it indicates a process of putting back, of reestablishing the borders of comfortable spaces, of prostration to our father’s monuments.

Simon, et al. (2000) offers us a conceptual rendering of remembrance as a difficult return which breaks “with the promise of strategic memorial practice” and focuses on lived lives, specific people and events. “Implicated in this remembrance” they explain, “is a learning to live with loss, a learning to live with a return of memory that inevitably instantiates loss and thus bears no ultimate consolation, a learning to live with disquieting remembrance” (p. 4). As decidedly antithetical to the progressive narrative as this is, Simon, et al. wants us to know that there are risks inherent here, too–melancholia and its attendant powers of privileging this story for that, for example. Nevertheless, “as a difficult return, remembrance attempts to meet the challenge of what it might mean to live, not in the past but in relation with the past” (p. 4) while continuing to acknowledge the claim that the past has on the present.

So normalized in curriculum studies as to be practically unspoken, is the acknowledgement of the extent of the limitation of our gaze which has come about as a result of the positivist paradigm. Control and the subsumation of the divine by science, generally traced to the puritan fear of chaos (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 1995; McKnight, 2003) has defined the borders and parameters of the curriculum history debate throughout the whole of the Reconceptualization. In his article Gabriel Harvey’s 16th Century Theory of Curriculum, Stephen Triche takes up the call to disrupt by tapping in to a stream of collective memory that connects the present with the past and obliterates the narrow understanding of curriculum theorizing as a twentieth century construct whose genesis can be traced to the publication of Franklin Bobbitt’s (1918) The Curriculum. Ultimately, Triche establishes porosity between
Gabriel Harvey’s 16th century publication of *Rhetor* and William Doll’s (1993) four R’s *(richness, recursion, relations, and rigor)* via the theorizing of John Dewey and Alfred North Whitehead. What Triche accomplishes with this disruption of the dominant narrative of curriculum history is the identification of an active alternative to the stream of collective memory that is developmental psychology.

Reading Triche, we are dislodged from the trek that defines the core project of the curriculum as being bound to disciplinarity: reading, writing, and arithmetic are dissolved and instead we are made aware that Harvey’s articulation of *nature, art, and experience* as a “three-fold tool of education” not only survived through the middle ages, but, three hundred years after its publication, Harvey’s *Rhetor* was still the driving force in all Latin based learning environments and furthermore, at the turn of the twentieth century was implicit in the conceptualization of the same liberal arts course of study we operate (supposedly) under today. Triche offers us a different way to think about the disciplines, one that disrupts their imperviousness to community and relationality. Revealed through this tracing of an alternative trajectory of the notion of disciplines is the rigidity inherent in their current manifestation and the degree to which they act as mechanisms to maintain distance and to formulate all of us into *designed* (Popkewitz 2011) disciples, the chosen few destined to uphold the sanctity of the *city on a hill*. Triche’s restoration of Harvey tells us that Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernández’s *rematriation* has been happening all along, only we are blinded by the tyranny of an inscribed pedagogy that transformed Harvey’s *nature, art, and experience* into a “science of humanity” and subsumed them under a planned, discipline-based “developmental sequence” which defined and codified what it meant to be an adult human (Popkewitz, 2011 p. 169). Popkewitz sums it up well, noting that

> The school had a particular place in this governing. The school was to replace the family and the community as the primary influence in socializing children to act as free and self-motivated individuals through the laws of reason. Design brought Puritan religious notions about pedagogy into the curriculum designs about children’s development and growth … Pedagogy was the ‘converting ordinance’, written with an evangelizing and calculated design on the souls of their readers. (p. 170)

The relationship between the present and the past belies a complexity that has, for too long, been taken for granted. The grand narratives occur like mountaintops, or like islands in the ocean, where sub-alpine or submerged knowledge and experience are lost and disregarded. Zerubavel (2003) thought so too, describing a “sociomental differentiation” of *eventful* and *uneventful* periods of history where “history thus takes the form of a relief map, on the mnemonic hills and dales of which memorable and forgettable events from the past are respectively featured” (p. 26). How can we operate outside the collective memory of curriculum history? Re-membrace (Hendry, 2011) brings us alongside the past as members again of ghost communities. Memory and remembrance resist an analysis of history that is of service and instead insists that any conception of the future be pulled through, and remain part of, the past. Without the present as a map or Archimedean point, we are beckoned by the dead to reimagine a history, always there but heretofore unseen, alongside the text. The present becomes spectral, dislodged from its place of privilege, instead oscillating like a burbled pea on the pursed lips of a ghost.
**Bringing out the Dead: Re-turning Curriculum Histories**

This does not mean that history rejects reality and turns in on itself to take pleasure in examining its procedures. Rather, as we shall observe, it is that the relation to the real has changed. And if meaning cannot be apprehended in the form of specific knowledge that would either be drawn from the real or might be added to it, it is because every “historical fact” results from a praxis, because it is already the sign of an act and therefore a statement of meaning. It results from procedures which have allowed a mode of comprehension to be articulated as a discourse of facts.

De Certeau “The Writing of History” (1988, 30)

Words are inadequate to the real. As De Certeau (1988) so eloquently describes in *The Writing of History*, writing, specifically the writing of history, is a form of conquest. History, as a discourse, functions to perpetuate the myth of language as representation. And yet, while language is inadequate, it is the arrogance embodied in representation that has functioned to objectify, to dehumanize and to perpetuate the “epistemic violence” (Spivak, 1988) which has been history. Put more simply, “history is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis” (Jameson, 1981 p.102). History as representation, as knowledge, “is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting” (Foucault, 1984, p. 88). This “cutting” has created the borders and boundaries (Baker, 2009) that sever us, not from the past-this being only a construct of linear time- but from a relationship to the past. As de Certeau reminds us “it is the relation to the real that has changed” (p. 30). The task of history is one of connecting the paradoxical space between the real and discourse, through the relationship “that discourse keeps with the real that is forever its object” (DeCerteau, 1988, p. xxvii). Thus, history is not knowledge to be apprehended but a form of relational “praxis” which seeks not the real but an ongoing relationship with the limits of intelligibility.

How, we ask, do these limits, these borders, become solidified, naturalized and ultimately real? Despite the linguistic turn which has de-naturalized and revealed the textual nature of all knowledge, curriculum history remains as Bernadette Baker (2009) maintains deeply embedded within two historic frameworks of reference, “the singularity of the nation-state as an authentic and sovereign zone of belonging and scaffolding for educational policy and implementation, and of the individualized self as the locus of discrete, unified and coherent consciousness, assessable and quantifiable” (p. xxxiii). To envision curriculum history outside the borders of the nation-state and the individual requires more than a linguistic turn, poststructural deconstruction or de-centering of the subject. This is not to suggest a “next move forward” or more improved “method” of curriculum history. In fact, we maintain that it is these teleological maneuvers that reify the very borders from which we are attempting to extract our selves, our bodies, and our histories. We repeat, there is no new, better or improved way of doing curriculum history. We repeat, there is no new method. History is not a method, but a way of life, of living in relation with the other, the dead and temporality.

Living in relation with the dead (as well as spirits and ghosts), who are always already present, is not a method, but a responsibility to confront the cutting of history. Writing (discourse) history, for de Certeau (1988) is death, it drives spirits “into the dark” and turns them into “severed souls” (p. 1). These souls “find a haven in the text because they can neither speak nor do harm anymore. These ghosts find access through writing on the condition that they remain forever silent” (de Certeau, 1988 p. 2). The past as an “object,” according to de Certeau
“promotes a selection between what can be understood and what must be forgotten in order to obtain the representation of a present intelligibility” (p. 4). Death, as the “other,” legitimates the present through domination. Historiography for de Certeau (1988) thus becomes “an odd procedure that posits death, a breakage everywhere reiterated in discourse, and that yet denies loss by appropriating to the present the privilege of recapitulating the past as a form of knowledge. A labor of death and a labor against death” (p. 5). History as representation (knowledge) functions as a form of repression, distancing us from death and from the dead in order to create a “present” that functions to help us live with what we have lost. We would argue that the present is a poor substitute for the loss of the dead.

The past, understood as place and space (not as time), requires that we bear witness to another relation with time, or “what amounts to the same thing, another relation with death” (de Certeau, 1988, p. 5). The project of taking history out of “linear” time is perhaps one of the most critical and difficult intellectual challenges facing the field of curriculum history. Curriculum theorists (Aoki, 2005; Berman et al., 1991; Huebner, 1975) have problematized the relationship between temporality and education to highlight that the very concept of the “learner” or “learning” is tied to the meaning of time. Learning (like history) “points to the temporality of man, to the temporality of the individual man. Learning has been associated with a change in behavior of an organism” (Huebner, 1999, p. 133). Learning, understood as change, is what makes possible “goals,” “objectives,” and “purposes.” These categories, as Huebner (1999) suggests, “are concerned with society’s existence ‘in time’ and refer to man’s concern for the historical continuity which gives his social forms and institutions some kind of stability” (p. 132). This sense of finite temporality in which time is understood as objective and outside oneself, through which one is always moving makes “Dasein” (being-in-the-world) (Heidegger, 1962) an impossibility. Being in relation (whether as a historian or “learner”) requires that the present be made up of a past and future brought into the moment. As Huebner (1999) suggests “the point is that man is temporal; or if you wish, historical. There is no such “thing” as a past or a future. They exist only through man’s existence as a temporal being. This means that human life is never fixed but is always emergent as the past and future become horizons of a present” (p. 137). History (or learning for that matter), as time, simultaneously hold death and being at bay leaving us to be restless souls forever seeking.

While the linguistic turn in curriculum history has situated the “subject” in language, it is time and space that remain constant and under-analyzed.² As Bernadette Baker suggests (2009) we must be suspect of a narrative framing of curriculum history that is embedded in an “occidentalist preoccupation with a certain series of sociological transformations and categories that enable the social projects of modernity and nationalism to be named, to slide easily by as though obvious, uncontested, and universally understood” (p. xi). The projects of modernity and nationalism within curriculum studies are often taken up as bounded, analytical pathways that travel through time and ultimately function as classificatory regimes of truth. Bound to these formations/preoccupations referred to as modernity, nationalisms and colonialisms, are the “monuments” of democracy, citizenship, and schooling.

Loosening the grip of these monumental narratives is dependent not on reconstruction or even deconstruction, but on a radical reconceptualization of time. As David Scott (2004) maintains “the precise nature of the relation between pasts, presents and futures has rarely ever been specified and conceptually problematized. It has tended, rather, to be assumed, to be taken for granted” (p. 3). Scott subverts this normative view of linear time through his use of “problem-spaces.” A problem-space is a discursive context in which an ensemble of questions
and answers hang around a horizon of identifiable ideological-political stakes. It is very much a context of dispute, a context of rival views, a context if you like, of knowledge and power. Problem-spaces (another way to think about it might be Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope, a time/space matrix) alter historically because problems are not timeless and do not have everlasting shapes. In different historical conditions not all questions or categories may apply, questions may lose their salience. In other words constructing history, as if it has a past, which functions as a reference for some supposed future, assumes a continuity of time and space that do not exist. How might a post-time history be imagined? What is invoked to explain, describe, or map a series of events? What constitutes an event? What classificatory regimes come into play at different moments? What are the politics of causality? Rather than looking at what is, we seek to understand what has fallen away or refused to be categorized.

A “problem-space” history is one that is grounded in re-membrance not representation, reflexivity not linearity, and responsibility not truth (Hendry, 2011). It is necessary to distinguish “reminiscence” from memory or remembering. Reminiscence is the narration or telling of the past (the precursor of “traditional history”). It situates the teller as the subject and the story of history as the object. Memory, on the other hand, is the process of re-membering. Remembering is not only about what gets remembered, by whom, how, and when, but also about the very limits of representation and the resistance to remembering certain events (Simon, et al., 2000). Collective memory work situated in problem spaces thus becomes an interactive, dialogic process between past and present and future. History as problem-spaces disrupts linearity, progress and truth by embracing the work of the historian as one of re-membering. This complexity, as Baker and Heyning (2004) suggest, demands that our historical interrogations of curriculum offer “insights into the ‘conditions of possibility’ for certain discourses to take hold, for questions to be posed as they are currently posed, and for ascertaining when/how things were formulated into being an ‘educational problem’ relative to other timespaces” (p. 29). The complex task of historical interrogation requires a porosity of history in which the contingency of historical events is recognized, but simultaneously acknowledges the indeterminacy of the historical categories that make these historical moments possible (Buck-Morss, 2009).

Disciplining the Disciplines: Unleashing Subjectivity

The taken for granted nature of the “disciplines” as central to curriculum history has been deconstructed to illuminate the ways in which “knowledge” always functions as a form of power (Foucault, 1972; Goodson, 1993; Popkewitz; 1997). Revealed in these works is how the disciplines function to police the borders of knowledge to ensure that knowledge stays in its proper place-rigidly defined, delineated, and confined. This “strangulation” or “circumcision” is critical to maintaining metaphysical conceptions of knowledge as fixed, eternal, and universal. Much recent curriculum history (also sometimes termed cultural history) is devoted to tracing the emergence of the disciplines as critical to the construction of subjectivity (Cohen, 1999; Popkewitz, Franklin & Pereyra, 2001).3 The “dual processes of mental and bodily discipline” emerge in tandem with the rise of Protestantism, the emergence of modern schooling and the secular nation state resulting in the docile body (Hamilton, 2001 p.195). Disciplines do not teach “content,” but instead teach what is possible to imagine and more specifically how it can be imagined. This inscription of borders of thought reifies a modernist worldview in which
education is crucial to the production of reason, progress, the individual and the nation state through the regulation of subjectivity (Miller, 2005; Walkerdine, 1990). Like the articles in the first section that challenge us to chisel away at the monuments of history and shatter the stranglehold of scientism, the next four articles challenge us to reconsider how we might undiscipline curriculum history, making it more unruly, discontinuous, and disorderly as a means of creating spaces for “undisciplined stories” (Buck-Morss, 2009 p. 75).

The last four articles in this issue are concerned not merely with “disrupting” the place of the disciplines in relation to curriculum history, but with interrogating how the “disciplines” have been made a subject of knowledge, thereby obscuring understandings of knowledge as subjectivity. In other words, how have disciplines as subjects of knowledge inscribed subjectivity in particular and peculiar ways? Drawing on a multitude of disciplines (English, Early Childhood, Philosophy, and Higher Education) the central question is not, “How have the disciplines shaped curriculum history?” but instead, “In what ways has curriculum history made possible and impossible the disciplines? What has been lost or made invisible when curriculum history is disciplined by the disciplines?” If history is symbolic as Halbwachs (1952) suggests what do the disciplines symbolize? What is the power they hold over the narratives of curriculum history?

To begin to disrupt the disciplines requires a return to a relationship not only with history, but with knowledge and curriculum. As already noted above, Steven Triche, in his article Gabriel Harvey’s 16th Century Theory of Curriculum does just that. His exploration of experience, art and practice disrupt what can and cannot have a discipline. As Hamilton (2009) reminds us, the very adoption of the term curriculum (at the University of Glasgow in 1633) was predicated on an understanding of curriculum in which “any course worthy of the name was to embody both ‘disciplina’ (a sense of structural coherence), and ‘ordo’ (a sense of internal sequencing)” (p. 11). This binary of external (what was to be taught, the disciplines) and internal (how it was to be taught, method) became the double-edged sword in cutting knowledge and shaping subjects (or subjectivity). A parallel binary that emerged at the time was the conception of the human as having an interior and exterior. Baker (2001) traces this development from the 1600s onward in which “human interiority came in a variety of modern forms: as ideas, mind, reason, conscience, an inner voice, consciousness, a mental capacity, and it eventually took the form of cells and genes. The outside crystallized as the deliberate action of the adult, the rearing environment, pedagogical technique, subject matter, or a combination of the above” (p. 63). The shifting and discontinuous ways in which an “interior/exterior problematic” (Baker, 2001, p. 63) is imagined is central not only to understanding the role of the disciplines as an external “force,” but was critical to a construction of “western” subjectivity as an interiority/exteriority that has functioned as the locus of curriculum.

Prior to this construct of “curriculum,” the length, structure, and sequence of student’s study had been one that was open to negotiation between the “scholar” and the teacher. Teaching, as William Doll (Truite, 2012) maintains, was done via dialogue. With the emergence of the construct of curriculum, teaching and learning are reconstituted from the art of conversation to the art of method. Method, the “way” to teach (ordo) is separated from the subjects (disciplina), the experience which gave rise to them, thus acquiring a “mechanical uniformity” (Doll in Truite, 2012 p. 90) This logic of separation, order, sequence, and rationality solidified as a binary (method and disciplines) functioned to subjugate the curriculum as the disciplines and method, as well as the “teacher as explicator” and “student as learner” (Biesta, 2010). The disciplines, as fixed units of knowledge to be taken in sequential order, had an
internal logic, one that would ensure that students understanding of self was shaped by notions of progression, eventually progress and linearity, thus rendering the disciplines as ahistorical.

A theme that cuts across all four of the articles in this section is the assumed ahistorical and apolitical nature of the disciplines. The taken for granted nature of the disciplines as universal, timeless, and fixed categories has been a “power effect” of curriculum history’s fixation on the disciplines as the history of curriculum. In fact, there is nothing natural or inevitable about this structuring of curriculum history. This is made abundantly clear in Jory Brass’s article Re-Reading the Emergence of the Subject English: Disrupting NCTE’s Historiography, which examines the discipline of English in the United States, interrogating the construction of its history by the National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) in three seminal texts (Applebee, 1974; Hook, 1979; Lindemann, 2010). Drawing on cultural history, Foucaultian archeology and genealogy, and the new curriculum history, Brass deconstructs NCTE’s historiography in order to denaturalize the classificatory regimes that have been critical to constituting NCTE’s sanctioned history. The grand narratives depicted in these works paint a portrait of the history of English education as emerging as a common school subject between the 1880s and 1910s, engaging in a “grand experiment” during the progressive era, followed by a reactionary return to traditional “academic” goals in the 1950s and 1960s, and culminating in “new insights and new courage” that reformed the field to ultimately become more inclusive in its canon. This grand narrative, as Brass maintains, ensures a modernist narrative in which history is governed by a modern teleology of reason, progress and change.

As Brass suggests, this celebratory narrative not only obscures more complicated and disorderly histories of the discipline, but it also shifts our gaze from the ways in which the discipline—as a set of historically constituted ideas—function to constitute the social practices through which individuals construct their identities. In effect, as Brass argues, the discipline of English has little to do with teaching content and everything to do with shaping subject identities. His goal is to “disrupt ‘common sense’ narratives of English’s invention as a literature-based subject to draw attention to a self-disciplinary project in which English curriculum and pedagogy functioned to attune youths’ minds and souls to a range of sociopolitical objectives that were understood as good for the individual and good for society” (this issue, p.XX).

Brass disrupts the grand narrative of English education through a close reading of two influential accounts of English in the profession: Corson’s (1895) The Aims of Literary Study and Chubb’s (1902) The Teaching of English in the Elementary and Secondary School. Within these texts, Brass detects classificatory regimes that have less to do with the acquisition of knowledge and mental discipline (clearly the dominant tropes of this period) but instead construct a cosmology in which educating the soul was more important than disciplining the mind. The “higher purpose” of literary study was to affect the soul and bring it to consciousness in order that it would seek the truth and righteousness. English teachers were not constituted as purveyors of knowledge according to Brass, but as “a lay priesthood called to the cure of young souls” (Chubb, 1902, p. 378).

As Brass maintains, the traditional grand narratives of the history of English education made possible through reason, linear progress, and inevitable change “cannot account for these Christian tropes, rationalities (or spiritualities), and pastoral practices.” (this issue, p.XX) The impossibility of reconciling these two incommensurable narratives is made possible through the dominant tropes of curriculum history’s modernist narratives—reason (not spirit), progress (not chaos), and democracy (not religion). Ironically, as Brass suggests, this modernist narrative of reason (science), progress (change), and democracy (republican citizenship) is deeply embedded
in Protestant rationalities. Drawing on the curriculum history work of Trohler et al., (2011) and McKnight (2003), Brass articulates how the discipline of English was inevitably embedded in Protestant constructs of order, self-regulation, and the public good to construct desirable republican citizens. In fact, the disciplinary moves conjured at the turn of the twentieth century suggest that the emergence of the “discipline” of English at this particular moment had less to do with “text” and instead represented the complex and contradictory tensions between science/religion and individual/community in the ongoing project of nation building (the city on the hill). Consequently, the emergence of English was predicated not only by Christian notions of salvation, but as Brass points out, “secular notions of redemption and progress ordered by scientific knowledge, psychological norms of development and individual autonomy, racial hierarchies, and national imaginaries.” (cite)

In this analysis, the disciplines do not function as “subjects,” but rather “subjectivities” are inscribed in the disciplines, in the very ways in which they suggest we should be in the world - in this case rational, self-controlling individuals with Anglo-American sensibilities. Traditional understandings of the disciplines as self-evident and natural containers for “content” knowledge deflect the ways in which the disciplines are discourses through which power relations are in a continual state of production. What Brass so eloquently does in his article is to focus on how systems of ideas, in this case the discipline of English, changes over time and how that change is related to shifts in power relations. This disruption of curriculum history as usual is central to the “re-examination of language as not only describing and interpreting the world but as constituting social practices and identity (Popkewitz, 1997, p. 138). The disciplines do not “represent” but are the discursive sites through which the knowledge of the self and the world are “cut” and authorized.

This “cutting” of the disciplines is made abundantly clear in Berlisha Morton’s *History as Death and Living Ghosts: The Mislaid Memories of Saint Katherine Drexel*. Her research on Xavier University, founded in New Orleans, in 1915 as the first Black, Catholic University once again challenges the disciplining of curriculum history as well as the field of higher education. Read against and within the discursive spaces opened up by Brass (this issue) through which Protestant tropes of individuality, rationality and the common good are reconstituted in the discourses of English education, it becomes apparent through Morton’s work that the “power” of the disciplines (as new forms of Protestantism) are made possible in part through making invisible not only the role of Catholic education in higher education, but the educational agency of Afro-Catholic-Creoles in Louisiana, as well as the interracial work of the Catholic nun Katherine Drexel. Rarely, do the disciplinary narratives of higher education conjure the “ghosts” of Catholic saints or black Catholics. They do not fit into the Protestant narrative described by Brass (this issue) in which redemption and progress (education) is ordered through knowledge (instead of faith), individual autonomy (rather than community), as well as racial hierarchies and national imaginaries (instead of transnational universalism).

In other words, the disciplines (as well as the disciplining of subjectivities) as we know them are dependent on the “mislaid memories” of Afro-Creole-Catholic counter narratives of Catholic education that do not necessarily privilege knowledge as individual, rational and embedded in the concept of citizenships essential to the construct of the nation-state. In which “nuns” like Katherine Drexel threatened Protestant political culture most obviously on the matter of gender, but also at the intersection of race and gender where many Catholic women religious ministered directly to people of color and brought them into the folds of the church as spiritual equals. For Protestant America, nuns not only belonged to a religion much despised,
“but they also were vowed virgins, strange unnatural creatures in the eyes of a society that prized domesticity and held marriage and motherhood to be a woman’s highest calling” (Rapley, 2011, p. 300). As Morton’s contribution to disrupting curriculum history suggests, the “mislaid memory” of Katherine Drexel signifies not only the invisibility of a Black Catholic institution of Higher Education, but a gendering of curriculum history in which only white, male, Protestants are understood as institution builders.

These “mislaid” memories are situated within a long history of a protest tradition of Franco-Afro-Creole-Catholics in Louisiana (Bell, 1997) in which education (including not only schooling, but catechism, confirmation, baptism) was understood as a universal and “public” right. Under French colonial rule all citizens (including enslaved Africans, Native Americans and Free Persons of Color) were indoctrinated into the Catholic Church through the rituals of baptism and confirmation, both of which required knowledge of the rituals of the Catholic Church, as well as basic literacy skills. Afro-Creole-Catholics traced their intellectual traditions not only to their Catholic heritage, but many were free people of color, a unique social and legal class that stood between the free and slave sectors of the population creating a tripartite racial ontology which resisted the binary of Black/White. Much like the research of Jupp (this issue), Morton’s article highlights how the narratives of curriculum history are dependent on an Anglo-Protestant, bi-racial, and “statesian” teleology that make invisible the problem-spaces in which multiple and conflicting ideologies of education, subjectivity and power would create discontinuity.

Drawing on microhistory to engage in a detailed analysis of the letters written between Katherine Drexel and the Archbishop of New Orleans in regard to the founding of Xavier University, Morton exhumes the complex interplay of race, religion, gender and education in this very specific moment of one particular institution. The disruption to curriculum history occurs less as a result of “putting” Katherine Drexel” into history but in creating a new problem space through which the reader is confronted with the complex ways in which race (especially segregation and desegregation), religion and education functioned in peculiar ways in a particular moment in time. Dominant understandings of race as a binary construct must be suspended and in fact problematized as natural, as well as the relationship between Blacks and Catholicism. These ruptures are critical to re-turning over and over again to highlighting the power effects of the disciplines to regulate what is made visible and invisible particularly in the field of higher education where what is defined as education and who can be educated has been complicit in organizing “our being in the world through the construction of rules of reason, the ordering of the objects of reflection and the principles for action and participation (Popkewitz, et al., 2001, p. 5).

The next article in this special issue, Curriculum for Disobedience: Raising Children to Transform Adults by Peter Applebaum and Belinda Davis, takes up the “Kinderladen” movement in early childhood education in the 1970s to disrupt not only the category of the child, but the narratives of progressive education which have been deeply embedded in the pedagogy termed by many as “child-centered.” Both Morton’s (this issue) as well as Applebaum and Davis’s scholarship confront one of the most naturalized of all concepts in education—that of the “public” sphere. One might ask what Catholic higher education (coded private) in the Deep South has to do with Early Childhood in Germany yet both disrupt not only the narrative of “public” education as the primary site of learning but challenge the deeply embedded assumption of the role of the individual in learning.

Applebaum and Davis provide us with a detailed reading of the “Kinderladen”
movement. However, as they suggest, “this is no matter of simple recuperation. The dynamic experiment’s radical potential in creating space for children developing to challenge societal structures lies dormant. Opening this up as a non-“settled” history, one moreover with no simple alternative future, is one purpose of this piece.” The unsettling of dominant notions of childhood and progressive pedagogies is enacted in a textual collage of print and images that function as an exhibit through which the reader can wander and transverse the territory in any number of ways. This nomadic gaze disrupts not only a tidy, linear reading of the text, but seeks to make the “child” and the “teacher” disobedient to any regimes of truth. The authors resist history as “representation” by provoking us to think about history as “a/r/topography” in which object and analysis, representation and interpretation are blurred. This “use of history” avoids narrative in favor of a visual “living with” history.

The story of the “Kinderladen” movement is meant not to rewrite narratives of parallel histories of early childhood education in Europe and abroad in North America, as this would leave intact, and in fact, reify the discipline of Early Childhood Education. The unsettling that is done is to unleash the child, parent and teacher from the disciplining of the discipline. “Bodies” of knowledge are interrogated as children, parents and teachers are encouraged to “unlearn” the habits of their own authority and hierarchy. Applebaum and Davis envision how Kinderladen pedagogy was aimed at “reinventing” not only the child, but the parent and teacher in order to avoid the social reproduction of the “authoritarian personality.” Much like the work of Ruth Gustafson (2010), pedagogies enacted to disrupt inequality or authoritarianism (the master/pupil relation) are not meant to provide a more “progressive” space but are meant to draw children into verifying their own intelligence and elucidating the relations and possibilities of participating in education. Un-disciplining early childhood education, through the space of the “Kinderladen,” lays bare the taken for granted assumptions about the relationships between parents, teachers, schools, community, child and state. We are left not with alternative understandings of the discipline of early childhood education or “public” education, but are thrust into a unruly space of discontinuity in which the child “can be understood by a complex relationship between subject, time and space that marks the first step in a dance that constantly repositions the child and unsettles the historiographical routines which depict it” (Baker, 2001, p. 53).

“Dancing history” or “historical choreography” emerges out of the doing of history in ways that do not take histories as entirely self-evident as bound in time but as continually moving and shifting through space (Baker, 2001). This is precisely the case with the notion of “critical thinking” taken up in the article Destablizing Curriculum History: A Genealogy of Critical Thinking by Ashley Pullman. This genealogy destabilizes and puts in motion critical thinking as a failed discipline. This exclusion or exiling from the dominant narratives of curriculum history suggests the power of the disciplines to continue to perpetuate themselves through various forms of self-regulation. It is this issue that is addressed by Pullman in her piece on “critical thinking.” Pullman does not ask what is critical thinking, this would assume a stable, constant construct, but instead she addresses the how of critical thinking, through excavating its when. When does critical thinking become a discipline? How is it constituted? These questions are taken up in the context of a first-year philosophy course in critical thinking at Simon Fraser University (SFU) in Vancouver, Canada in two disparate periods of time.

The formation of the course is traced over forty years drawing on archival research. What emerges is not a “story” of a course in critical thinking, but instead an examination of how “disciplines” maintain their boundaries and borders, how they resist cutting. This genealogy examines how in the early sixties a “Reading Service Center” in which “critical thinking”
(Reading and Study 001) was initially conceived as “outside the disciplinary bounds of sanctioned psychology curriculum.” (cite). An attempt was being made to disrupt the disciplines. This rupture could not be tolerated. Psychology, the discipline in which this course became situated, was unsettled by the fact that the course did not fit with the “experimental outlook of the general orientation of the department.” (cite). This incommensurability disrupted the boundaries of the disciplines. The “Reading Service Center” was dissolved, however the subject of “critical thinking” continued to circulate and emerged as Phil XX1 with a “Q” or quantitative designation that fulfills the writing, quantitative or breadth degree requirements of the university. According to Pullman, “Q” courses are understood to assist students to develop quantitative or formal reasoning and to develop skills in practical problem solving, critical evaluation, or analysis. This designation functions to “normalize” critical thinking, taming and harnessing it within the borders of an “official” discipline.

Ultimately, what was intended to disrupt disciplinary boundaries and function as a rogue discipline is “normalized” as a legitimate course. Critical thinking thus functions in the production of the disciplining of knowledge, but also of what counts as an educated subject. In this case, critical over creative thinking is privileged, critical thinking becomes an academic requirement and critical thinking is necessary to the production of the scientific, rational mode of thought that is core of the autonomous, liberated individual of western ontology. As Pullman maintains a genealogy of critical thinking does not suggest a “progressive pathway toward a more ‘educated’ subject, nor does it form a universal narrative; rather, it has a specific relationship with the space and time in which it appeared, and continues to appear.” (cite). By situating “critical thinking” in a problem space, Pullman is able to disrupt linearity by situating discourse within a non-linear, relational system. To read and interpret history through space and time to look for connections and ruptures as opposed to reading for “progress” can provide the generative spaces in which we engage with the past not to re-present it but to engage in the connectivity of complex relationships in which we are inherently woven. As the articles in this section have attested to, our responsibility as curriculum historians is not to read for “truth” or “representation” but to engage in a relational praxis with the dead.

Re-turns/re-cursions/re-fractions/re-membering

I found that the two foundations of Memory—first, its importance in interpreting and appeasing life for the individual, and second its activity as a selective agency in social reorganization—were not mutually exclusive, and at moments seemed to support each other.

Jane Addams (1916)

How do we re-member the dead when “history” as we know it has “cut” us off from the ghosts and spirits that dwell among us? The haunting of ghosts is a continual reminder of history’s dis-ease with the past. Like Jane Addams, Gwendolyn Hall (2005) reminds us of the power of memory in organizing our social frameworks—the monuments to which we have become beholden. This special issue has raised the spectre of the monument in hopes that we might re-fract its gaze to reveal the shadows of humanity. From the shadows, in the grey spaces of in-between, we look to see the invisible, the un-known, the chaos in order to re-member our relation to the past. To return to these spaces, Gwendolyn Hall (2005) suggests that we “must
escape from the linear, mechanistic, logical constructs that prevail in the historical profession and that have little or nothing to do with reality” (p.292). Historians, she maintains, “must learn from the methodologies of quantum physics. Particles have meaning only as they bounce around and interact with each other over time and space. We need to cherish and protect the disorderly and disobedient places where creativity is born. This is the only way we can tap into our well springs of consciousness, conscience, and empowerment” (Hall 2005, p. 292). The well springs of individual and collective memory are critical to the re-organization of the social. History as memory work compels us to re-turn to the past not to re-capture, but to explore relationships that re-turn us to difficult and disorderly spaces. History, in this sense, is not a discipline but a form of relational ethics.

To conceive of history as a form of relational ethics demands “historical remappings as an alternative to the fantasies of monumental histories (Buck-Morss, 2009, p. 79). As articulated by Buck-Morss, a reconfigured or remapped history works through the historical specificities of particular experiences, approaching the universal not by subsuming facts within overarching systems or homogenizing premises but by attending to the edges of systems, the limits of premises, the boundaries of our historical imagination in order to trespass, trouble, and tear these boundaries down (2009, p.79).

As Jane Addams suggests, the role of memory is not one of mere remembering, but one of re-organization. This re-mapping or re-membering connects us across space and time to those ties that remind us of our humanity. History in this sense becomes a form of relational ethics.

The power of remembering (as opposed to representation) is the force that it has to reorganize—to disrupt—our way of being in the world and our relations to others. Memory as repetition, as recursion, as reflexivity is both the doing and undoing of representation. Thus conceived, memory becomes a site for “disturbing conventions.” For Addams, memory as experience is a network of interconnections that provides ruptures and unexpected conjunctures. Experience (or memory) is a web of relationships, or social ethics, that defies the logic of time as linear, of knowledge as representation and of social change as predicated on the resolution of conflict. Our responsibility as curriculum historians and theorists is to “bring out” the dead. The articles in this special issue require us to “let go” and “empty” history of “truth” as a means to embrace historical inquiry as a dynamic, generative process of relationships.

Notes


2 Place is another concept that needs more refined articulation in relation to what constitutes history. This introduction does not allow for a full discussion, but this work has been begun by Casemore (2008), He & Ross (2012), Helfenbein (2010), & Whitlock (2007).

3 We do not have enough space in this introduction to elaborate on the emergence of “cultural history” as a field in relation to curriculum history however, this is also a critical project in relation to the emergence of multiple discourses surrounding “curriculum history.”

4 The terms “student,” “learner,” and “pupil” were all much later constructions that imply not only a concept of education as knowledge to be transmitted, but are rooted in linearity. See Davis (2009) and Biesta (2010).
The work of Caryn Cosse Bell (1997) suggests that the concept of “spiritual universalism” embedded in the Catholicism of French Colonial Louisiana manifested itself in very different epistemological traditions of education that were based in knowledge as communal, holistic, and transnational.

Notions of “public education” have been exclusively relegated to the Anglo-Protestant narrative of the “Common School Movement” thereby excluding alternative theorizing of what constitutes “public” (See Rebecca Scott, 2007).

References


