The Pervert’s Guide to Being a Curriculum Theorist

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The sadness of generations without “teachers.” Our teachers are not just public professors, though we badly need professors. Our teachers, once we reach adulthood, are those who bring us something radical and new, who know how to invent an artistic or literary technique, finding those ways of thinking that correspond to our modernity, that is, our difficulties as well as our vague enthusiasms. (Deleuze, 2004, p. 77)

To hell, to hell with balance! I break glasses; I want to burn, even if I break myself. I want to live only for ecstasy. Nothing else affects me. Small doses, moderate loves, all the demi-teintes – all these leave me cold. I like extravagance, heat . . . sexuality which bursts the thermometer! I’m neurotic, perverted, destructive, fiery, dangerous – lava, inflammable, unrestrained. I feel like a jungle animal who is escaping captivity. (Nin, 1993, p. 101)

Read Before Burning

Censorship reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself. It is a hallmark of an authoritarian regime. Long ago those who wrote our First Amendment charted a different course. They believed a society can be truly strong only when it is truly free. In the realm of expression they put their faith, for better or for worse, in the enlightened choice of the people, free from the interference of a policeman's intrusive thumb or a judge's heavy hand. So it is that the Constitution protects coarse expression as well as refined, and vulgarity no less than elegance. A book worthless to me may convey something of value to my neighbor. In the free society to which our Constitution has committed us, it is for each to choose for himself.

-Justice Potter Stewart, (Ginzburg v. United States, 1966)
HAT SEPARATES humans from animals? Humans have the consciousness to contemplate (a) time and (b) mortality (see Heidegger, 2008). Speech also separates the domain of communication between the human and the animal; one should not take this to mean that animals do not communicate. Communication and speech are not one and the same. We can hear one dog howl and another dog howl in response as communication. Monkeys can communicate mischievous plans to steal bananas, but lack the ability to write a book detailing the molecular structure of banana peels. Perhaps one day the apes will speak and the fiction of Pierre Boulle’s *Planet of the Apes* (1964) will become a Darwinian non-fiction. But the day of formal language as symbols and patterns by animals has not come, especially within the domain of semiotics (Saussure, 2013)—where a symbol or utterance represents a “signifier” that correlates with an idea/thing/representation that is “signified.” We must also understand that semiotics and linguistics are culturally situated and specified. For example, I remember a story my French professor told me about a time when he was overseeing an exam of international students. A female student from the UK in her mid-twenties bent over and asked a male student of similar age, “Excuse, but do you have a rubber?” The male student’s facial expression blushed with confusion. The female student repeated it again and held up the end of her pencil, which was missing an eraser. The male student relaxed and gave her an eraser. It was a simple issue of errant signification between the same languages, albeit under differing cultural and dialect presumptions. In the US, we understand a “rubber” (signifier) as another word for a “condom” (signified); however, in the UK, a rubber (signifier) is an eraser (signified). In psychoanalysis, language is the primary foundation for understanding the unconscious, as well as provoking it.

In Lagache’s introduction to *The Language of Psychoanalysis* (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973), he began:

Aversion to psycho-analysis sometimes takes the form of disparaging comments about its terminology. . . . The shocking thing about psychoanalysis is less its emphasis on sexuality than its introduction of unconscious phantasy into the theory of the mental functioning of man in his struggle with the world and with himself. Now ordinary language has no words to evoke mental structures and tendencies that do not exist for common sense. (p. vii)

Terminology is not necessarily bound to metaphors; however, metaphors are bound to the terminology of psychoanalysis. The language of psychoanalysis obliges one to not only utilize a sexually metaphoric language, but also encourages the deep connection between sexual life and the development of one’s psychical life. Is it an egregious practice to draw analogies from sexual life in all its capacities, positive and negative, because sexuality remains a taboo topic, or, as I have been told, the topics of sexuality are “triggering”? Following the sentiment of dissension given by Justice Potter Stewart above, I believe that, when belief, religiosity, or identity politics prevent the exploration of science, epistemology, literary expression, or theoretical advance at large, such a society is electing a primitive staticity that will encourage the deluge of ignorance, arrogance, and devolution.

Perhaps I am too crass and castigating of oppositional stances that retard, pervert, and even subjugate expression, investigation, and imagination. However, I am not beyond acknowledging and participating in an antinomistic practice of reason—whereby both sides, even in opposition to one another, are equally justified in their claims (see Kant, 1998)—as well as a dialectical split that is referred to as “the universal exception,” in which there is an understanding.
that the act of inclusion is precluded by the understanding of exclusion (see Žižek, 2006a). For example, one has as much merit in critiquing Allen Ginsberg’s *Howl* (2001), Anais Nin’s *Delta of Venus* (1977), or even Eve Ensler’s *The Vagina Monologues* (2008) for being obscene or perverted, as another does to laud these works as immense contributions to literature (poetry, prose, and performance). *Howl* was even put on trial in 1957 for obscenity and the dissemination of perverted filth; however, this perversion stands in contrast to the deplorable socio-cultural and political climate of the 1950s that still confronted oppressive race relations and treatment of women. Yet, today *Howl* is regarded as an influential literary piece (Schinder, 2006). W. H. Auden (1962) said, “The value of a profane thing lies in what it usefully does, the value of the sacred thing lies in what it is” (p. 58). This is where we are in the current epoch of convoluting the sacred and the profane. It is an issue of parallax—“the confrontation of two closely linked perspectives between which no neutral common ground is possible” (Žižek, 2006b, p. 4)—and such subjectivity on the matter will never have a single, agreed-upon trajectory.

To the critics of psychoanalysis and the work of contemporary philosophy, the postmodern era that was so proudly desired has now posed a great challenge. The time of master narratives and the search for a Truth of unwavering and unbending substance has been lost to cultural fornication and dissident ontological protests. Offense is always now taken as a deliberate intention rather than a misunderstanding or perverted/skewed perception of the world. There is little to no escape when it comes to the emotive flux of individuals coddled with the idea that his or her perception matters, or can be contested as a matter of fact. What if sometimes our feelings are wrong? The sojourning individuals who could be diagnosed with a contemporary (albeit expanded conception of) Munchausen Syndrome, flicking hyperbolic utterances here and there, prick the patience of nuance. Even the many people with the propensity to deny aspects or intentions of others—who owe such discontent and contestation to feeling offended—resort to centering themselves as the authorities, even if at an unconscious level, which results in proffering how a thing or issue should be. Joyce Carol Oates said:

> Nearly all critics are conservative if only because they cannot presume to judge art by its own standards if those standards are new: even the most well-intentioned critic carries about with him, unacknowledged, his ideas of what a *novel* or a *short story* or a *play* or a *poem* should be, based upon works he has studied. His instinct is to preserve the past because it is his past; he has a great deal invested in it. The artist, by contrast, really must follow his instinct into areas not yet mined by others—he cannot even console himself . . . that criticism will someday “catch up” with his innovations. What appears as disorder, instability, and frequent madness to the critic is in fact the creative activity itself: it seeks to blossom in inhospitable climates, break free of its confining species, celebrate the individual and the idiosyncratic, even at the cost of official—that is, “critical”—censure. (1983, pp. 3–4)

As Oates pointed out, most critics cannot reconcile his or her history with that of a new history being set forth. Thus, the critic cannot escape the fact that a “parallax gap” may exist, resulting in neither agreement nor concession between creator/artist and reviewer/critic.

The interrogation of metaphors and examples used in Žižek’s work is not as devious as some readers might desire it to be. As Žižek (2005) explained:
Why do I resort so often to examples of popular culture? The simple answer is in order to avoid a kind of jargon, and to achieve the greatest possible clarity, not only for my readers but also for myself. That is to say, the idiot for whom I endeavour to formulate a theoretical point as clearly as possible is ultimately myself: I am not patronizing my readers. (p. 56)

Although the critique of outrageous antics may be invoked here, one cannot deny that in the current era we have a culture of outrage that thrives on the loud and obnoxious. Accordingly, the extreme becomes the norm by which to execute one’s point of view or political challenge. It would be rather amateurish to simply explain Žižek’s examples as cheap seduction, placating plasticity, or taking the stage as a gesture with no intent but to provoke for the sake of provoking. If this is one’s position, then one’s mind and intellectual ability have been eclipsed by cultural gesticulation and atrophy of the senses, and have fallen into the decay of decadence. As a philosopher and cultural theorist, I neither ask for permission nor seek forgiveness when I write. Perhaps such promiscuity will forever imprison me in The Intellectual Red Light District (Garcia & Holland, 2009), but I will at least live while others will dwell in the corridors of academia and hipster coffee shops suffering from Cotard’s Syndrome. In expressing such prefacing thoughts, I ask that the reader endure or indulge the following essay, and conclude by burning the essay from one’s mind, or relishing in burning the essay’s thoughts into it.

Foreplay: Buggerying Theory

In Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences, Slavoj Žižek (2004) critiqued Gilles Deleuze across an array of areas, but one of the most notable concepts is Žižek’s framing of academic/philosophical “buggery” (a term used to imply anal sexual intercourse or same-sex relations). According to Sinnerbrink (2006), “Žižek is remarkably candid about the philosophical eros driving his strange, Hegelio-Lacanian encounter with Deleuze” (p. 62). This “homoerotic fantasy,” as Sinnerbrink expressed, becomes more illuminated and intimate, as Žižek (2004) proposed the idea of “[Hegel] taking Deleuze from behind,” in a fantastical ideal of begging the question: “How would the offspring of this immaculate conception look?” (p. 48). It is difficult to imagine whether Hegel would be a gentle lover enflamed with the passion of Broke Back Mountain (Cosigan, Hausman, McMurty, & Phlad, & Lee 2005), or if one would bear witness to a savage raping reminiscent of Deliverance (Boorman, 1972). However, I imagine a more ambiguous scene, like that of Full Metal Jacket (Harlan & Kubrick, 1987), when Sergeant Hartman says, “I bet you're the kind of guy that would fuck a person in the ass and not even have the goddamn common courtesy to give him a reach-around.” Regardless of the image inflicted into our imaginations by Žižek’s sodomistic mise-en-scene, does it not propose a challenging question in relation to the philosophical and stylistic “blendings” taken up by young curriculum theorists—the embryonic resultants—who must make sense of tensions and tumultuousness in the field? Can one be philosophically promiscuous and a pervert buggerying in the curriculum field? The pervert’s guide to curriculum theory implicates strange bedfellows (i.e., Žižek), who seduce us into buggerying, which results in (monstrous) blendings that have the possibility of producing some-Thing Other, that is, the pervert curriculum theorist.
Introduction

In this paper, I move about a theoretical canvas in exacting my need for sublimation, to pour my libidinal energy into my work. Guiding such philosophical strokes is the spectral influence of Slavoj Žižek. It is under the influence and over the (acceptable) limit that I engage in curriculum theory here; that is, a theoretical plane that is “beyond shape,” that is anamorphically un-bound, that lies in the fissure(s) of a neither/nor realm. That is, we must go beyond ourselves to evoke an entry into the “unknown-unknown” (that which we don’t know that we don’t know). Žižek is but one flight (or leakage), one excursion, and perhaps one trip to a philosophical Disneyland.¹ But I would remind the reader that multiplicities (especially those under consideration in curriculum theory), as Reynolds and Webber (2004) point out, are never “dualisms or either/or” (p. 2). For, as much as one may be enamored with Žižek or inclined to reject his verbose language and wry humor, one cannot, especially if one takes Plato (1991) into account here (that is, a philosopher being a “lover of wisdom”), negate that all things have some value and all things are always-already value laden to one degree or another. Keeping this in mind, one should take Deleuzian ideas with Žižek—side by side, not from behind or otherwise—in order to come-into a space wholly one’s own. In curriculum theory, the space of complication, contemplation, and confrontation is always our own (we make it by participation or creation); however, it is the “space between” or beyond that is at the core of our goal in curriculum theory and epistemology; that we may make the “unknown-unknown” in epistemological inquiry the “known-unknown.” Malewski (2010) reminds us that “proliferating curriculum—that is, multiplying the perspectives and practices of teaching and learning—necessitates risk taking and seeing the unknown as a way of knowing” (p. 24).

It is perhaps odd to begin with Gilles Deleuze’s (and Felix Guattari’s) notion of lines of flight (lignes de fuite) (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) in curriculum theory when primarily exploring and expounding on the work of Slavoj Žižek. The Slovenian philosopher and cultural theorist has often heavily critiqued Deleuze (i.e., Žižek, 2004). However, Deleuze and Žižek share some common distinctions that demonstrate their philosophical and stylistic ebb and flow (i.e., their “leakages”). Both Deleuze and Žižek scrambled the neat order that one expects of philosophy, with great diligence and intention akin to the conceptual artists of the 20th century who scrambled art (e.g., Dadaists, Warhol, Duchamp, etc.). Groys (2012) asserted that “A traditional philosopher is like a traditional artist: an artisan producing texts” (p. xiii). Groys juxtaposed traditional philosophy with “antiphilosophy,” a term often cited with Lacan and Badiou (see Bosteels, 2008), in which the “antiphilosopher is like a contemporary art curator: he contextualizes objects and texts instead of producing them” (p. xiii). Projects replace the production of texts (i.e., texts that produce truth(s); texts that are self-evident) in the traditional sense. In connection, Žižek believed that philosophy is “an exploration of what is presupposed even in daily activity” (Žižek & Daly, 2004, p. 26).

Furthermore, Deleuze (2004) wrote, “Neither Guattari nor myself are very attached to the pursuit or even coherence of what we write . . . We are among those authors who think of what they write as a whole that must be coherent; if we change, fine, so there’s no point in talking about the past” (p. 278). For Deleuze and Guattari, there was not a rigid contingency and dependency from one project to another, but coherency, a nomadic wondering and wandering. (In the truest sense of the cliché, there is a method to their madness.) Those that have “neat” programs of philosophical study (e.g., the logical positivists of philosophy) and writing are rewarded in the hegemonic domain of the academy and “circles” proper. Thus, Deleuze said,
what is produced in the traditional sense of philosophy are “manufactured specialists in thought” (Deleuze & Parnet, 2002, p. 13). If one breaks this neat and orderly paradigm with new language (neologisms and euphemisms) and conceptions, one risks being “denounced as a nuisance” (p. 14) rather than a nuance. Reconceptualist curriculum theorists, such as myself, seeking nuance and novel approaches in the fissures of disciplines—those “in between” spaces—are vulnerable to being “at-risk” scholars relegated to the intellectual red light district (Garcia & Holland, 2009); we are the perverts of our fields who pose a threat with such deviancy towards the traditional order. Giroux (1988) explained:

If one ceases to speak within the discourse of the discipline, one will no longer be considered part of it. This does not usually mean that heretics will be prohibited from teaching or even from publishing; rather, they are simply marginalized. The situation is similarly severe for the new Ph.D. for whom the price of admission into the academy is the same conformity with dominant academic discourses. (p. 146)

How do we reach something new if the traditional paradigms are the bread-and-butter reward systems? Young scholars defending their dissertation work are often asked, “What unique contribution does this work offer?” How unique or novel can one be without risking excommunication from academia and one’s field?

“Your do not confine people with a highway,” said Deleuze (2006), “but by making highways, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the only aim of highways, but people can travel infinitely and freely without being confined while being perfectly controlled. That is our future” (p. 322). Let us think, too, about a complementary question to the negation of, or rebellion against, academic tradition, as I posed above. Should we consider the highways that Deleuze mentioned as a misarticulated or illusory freedom? That is, are we always-already complicit in participating in (or supplementing) one regulating regime for another? Therefore, what if radical departures from normative claims and regulating regimes within a field become themselves normative and regulative? Does not the “Other of the Other” result in the Other in a type of Derridean (and Sartre) sense, whereby a negation or rejection is merely an acceptance and creation-compliance of the thing it negates? To put it simply: What if the other of the other is the other that brings us full circle to the same thing, albeit dressed differently? For example, Heath and Potter (2004) pointed out the paradox and irony of counter-cultural studies: I want to be different like everyone else. This point is exemplified in the South Park episode “You got F’d in the A” (Parker, 2004), in which Stan is challenged to a dance-off by a group of dance crew kids. In an effort to recruit a dance crew, Stan approached the “Goth kids,” who responded to him accordingly:

Red Goth: “I’m not doing it. Being in a dance group is totally conformist.”
Henrietta Biggle: “Yeah, I’m not conforming to some dance off regulations.”
Kindergoth: “I’m not doing it either. I’m the biggest non-conformist of all.”
Tall Goth: “I’m such a non-conformist that I’m not gonna conform with the rest of you. Ok, I’ll do it!”

Red Goth, Henrietta Biggle, and Kindergoth represented the first negation—a rejection of popular, mainstream culture. However, Tall Goth exhibited a negation of the primary negation,
which obligates him to accept the original proposition. Thus, the other of the other—the rejection of rejection—results in the other. But one should ask: Is there not another choice that negates a triangulation of othering? This is the quest for the “authentic” that a theorist and philosopher seek. This fourth possibility is the leakage (fuite)—the unknown-unknown—that is a destination unknown (inconnu), but a destination towards which we nevertheless move. Nietzsche, an anti-philosopher par excellence (see Badiou, 2001), wrote:

No one can construct for you the bridge upon which precisely you must cross the stream of life, no one but you yourself alone. There are, to be sure, countless paths and bridges and demi-gods which would bear you this stream; but only at the cost of yourself: you would put yourself in pawn and lose yourself. There exists in the world a single path which no one can go except you: whither does it lead? Do not ask, go along it. (Nietzsche, 1983, p. 129)

It is no wonder that Deleuze emulates Nietzsche (see Deleuze, 1983); the theoretical apparatus that influenced his style was an ontological séance that called upon the dancing specter of Nietzsche. Deleuze did not wish to be Nietzsche; rather, by volition or consequence, he was Nietzschean. In a quest to be authentic myself, I do not wish to be Žižek; rather, I wish to tap the Žižekian vein vampirically and emerge as an/Other resisting domestication.

The Slovenian Spectral Pervert

His writings spew forth ideas like a swirl of Lacanized lava vomited up from an orifice deeply recessed in his Gothic-laced unconscious . . . The paroxysms that spike his ideas and his cross-dressing of different codes recalls surrealism. Reading him is like being invited to drink formalist logic from Marcel Duchamp’s urinal . . . His volcanic theoretical constructs conveyed in the thick-boned prose of a debt collector create an exciting contrast that has captured the imagination of many progressive intellectuals. Whether one believes that Žižek’s oeuvre represents a seismic shift in Marxist Analysis or avant-garde cultural criticism disguised as revolutionary struggle, it is impossible not to admire the scope and depth of his theoretical understanding, especially his acute familiarity with and probing analysis of issues that range across so many disciplinary traditions. (McLaren, 2001, p. 618)

To the extent that Žižek is a pervert, he is an old-fashioned one. He is a theorist whose primary raison d’être is to turn conventional understandings upside down by the unremitting application of theory. (Taylor, 2010, p.8)

A specter is haunting me—the specter of Žižek.

I was asked at one time, “Who can you not work or write without?” I have come to answer this with the added implication of “Who can I not teach without?” What specter floats above me as I write? Who bears over my shoulder whispering in my ear with a lispy accent peppering each thought with an abrupt “My god!”? How I have paced like a good neurotic, to-
and-fro, avoiding the mirrors in my mind. Those especially placed parallel, to create an infinite regression of reflections upon reflections, creating a rift between the Real and the other real; this is the complicated “I” of Being that situates my abyss of madness. Nietzsche (1989) cautioned, “When you look long into the abyss, the abyss also looks into you” (p. 89).

That I should be Kafka-esquely stained, if that is benign enough to say, with the sentient pervert, who suggested that the back cover of one of his books should read, “In his free time, Žižek likes to surf the Internet for child pornography and to teach his small son how to pull the legs off spiders” (Žižek, 2008a, p. 12). This may seem crude and shocking, but Žižek has been “frequently scatological in nature” (Taylor, 2010, p. 2) with his profane, perverse, and obscene style; it becomes his tableau to excavate—often critiqued as ad hominen arguments (Sharpe & Boucher, 2010, p. 223)—the theoretical and cultural latrines of society. But why should we give attention to gutter culture, disgust, and obscenity as a line of flight for curriculum theory and inquiry? Miller (1998) reminded us:

[We should] encourage the study of obscene things . . . The obscene is what a society considers to be profane . . . [and] the profane is at times the profound . . .

The profound shocks us from our common perceptions and sensibilities. (p. 113)

Is not the artistic method—the aesthetic provocation—of the director John Waters, “The Prince of Puke,” an attempt to rupture the symbolic coordinates by which normativity and acceptability are established? Is it merely for shock value or is there something about watching Divine (the famous drag queen who appears in Waters’ films) in Pink Flamingos (Waters, 1972) crouching down behind a dog shitting and scooping up its feces and then eating it? Is this art and aesthetics at its purest or is it merely Waters’ desire to normalize his perverted desires on film? What if Divine’s eating shit was not just an act (publicity stunt) or fetish (coprophagia), as one would encounter watching “Two Girls One Cup,” but the movement towards the not-yet? When Waters was interviewed about the scene, he said that it was something that had never been done and it is something that will never be done again in Hollywood history, at least to the candid, gonzo degree that Waters’ captured in Pink Flamingos (see Fields & Lebowitz, 2011, p. 31). Like a conceptualist artist, such as Duchamp with his art piece, “Fountain” (the mounted urinal that he signed “R.Mutt”), Waters took the obscene and created a rupture in the symbolic order that regulates normativity and acceptability.

However, in embarking on a line of flight that pushes the bounds of obscenity, one must not return to the same tricks. Is not South Park a perfect example of the evolution of symbolic regulation? When the cartoon show first started, it was highly offensive and aroused parental discontent, but now it is a staple of youth culture and social commentary. In My Teaching (2008), Lacan said, “Eating shit is all very well, but you can’t always eat the same shit. So, I try to get hold of some new shit” (pp. 69–70). Is Žižek the new shit that we might get a hold of in curriculum theory that pushes new boundaries through his wry jokes about dusty balls (Žižek, 2009), anal sex (Aitkenhead, 2012), and other examples (like “fist-fucking”), as the expansion of a concept (see Žižek, 2004, 2006b), as well as his philosophical buggerying?

The work of psychoanalysis—from Freud, to the Frankfurt School, to Lacan—has been instrumental in curriculum theory and cultural studies (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman, 2008). There is a realm of curriculum theory that desires psychoanalysis because it provides the immutable space for transference. Britzman (2009) reminded us that, in psychoanalysis, “we may be subject to our own revolting questions, themselves a precursor to therapeutic action” (p.
Is not writing, especially in reconceptualist curriculum theory, a sort of psychoanalytic session where the author writes with the implication that the reader must thus become an analyst? If so, then readers of curriculum theory in this vein are obligated to read “between” the lines; that is, one is elevated and obligated to continue under the assumption that, as Lacan famously stated, “The unconscious is structured like a language.” The abyss of the unconscious takes shape symptomatically through language—especially jokes—in which the perverse, obscene, and inappropriate become a cartographical expedition of the mind.

In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, Freud (1989) said, “Only jokes that have a purpose run the risk of meeting with people who do not want to listen to them” (p. 107). The pervert is a joker who masks his inappropriate demands and desires through the use of jokes. Appel (1999) suggested, “A moment of laughter may open up an analysis to the unaccountable, the novel, and to the material marginalized in the guiding theory . . . Without laughter there would be no progress in knowledge or self-knowledge” (p. 48). There is something about humor that opens up an avenue toward the disavowed in everyday life. Did not the comedian Daniel Tosh exemplify a certain honesty when he said, “It’s funny because it’s racist!” when he showed a video of a black woman on YouTube at a watermelon eating contest? Though I would not necessarily support a thesis that Tosh was attempting to raise a level of consciousness with his viewing public, I would suggest that he was not bullshitting or hiding anything; he was saying only what people were afraid to say, but were thinking. And, to exemplify this point towards the profane and prophetic, did not George Carlin rupture the disavowing fetish by commenting on “Bullshit”?

There’s just enough bullshit in this country to hold things together. Bullshit is the glue that binds us as a nation. Where would we be without our safe, familiar American bullshit? [For example] Land of the free, home of the brave, the American dream, all men are equal, justice is blind, the press is free, business is honest, the good guys win, your vote counts, the police are on your side, God is watching you, your standard of living will always improve, and everything is gonna be just fine. (Carlin, 2008)

One may laugh, but is there not an exploited kernel of truth that the audience must confront? This is the pedagogical provocation that Žižek employs by using jokes in his writing and lectures.

Mead (2003) rhetorically posed that even though “he may appear to be a serious leftist intellectual . . . is it not the case that he is in fact a comedian?” (p. 38). In the introduction to Rabelais and His World, Bakhtin (1984) said, “[Laughter] frees human consciousness, thought, and imagination for new potentialities” (p. 49). Žižek’s use of jokes and wry, popular culture bridges the gap of the unknown and uncomfortable with the tangible, everyday colloquialisms that we take for granted (for a collection of jokes, see Mortensen, 2014). Kirsch (2008), however, asserted that Žižek “expects you to be in on the joke. But there is a difference between Žižek and the other jokesters. It is that he is not really joking” (section II, para. 2).

Žižek is not just a scatologist who examines the excremental remains and stains that putridly fill society’s cavities; he is also the laxative, the intellectual enema that moves the constipated bowels of crisis and un/consciousness. One may remember in Batman (Melniker & Burton, 1989) when the Joker (Jack Nicholson) proclaimed, “This town needs an enema!” Žižek is the fibrous philosopher whose provocations are what educational discourse (theory and
otherwise) need in order to instigate a peristaltic rush of the ideologically-clogged educational intestines. This is not a simple task. Yoram Kaniuk described the paradox of such intellectuals:

When a society is sick (which is most of the time), the intellectual is the one who either gets the enema or, more often, gives it. The spirit is boundless, and dogmatism is born out of intellectuals to be attacked by other intellectuals, in order for them to catch the wayward spirit (which we all do), and while doing so we miss the most important point—what is good to you, what is pure, simple, and just, is the opposite to the other. (2000, p. 199)

Žižek is a public intellectual, anti-philosopher, and pervert who represents a radical departure from the academic tradition(s), as was Deleuze, whose neologisms and analogies provided new entrances, access, and palatability for a wide range of audiences. Bowman (2012) noted, “He seems to delight in breaking academic taboos. Surely this is at least part of the reason why he is so widely read” (p. 57). Some, like Marchart (2007), may see Žižek’s work as a Howard Sternian “shock and awe” provocation. Critchley (2007) believed that “Žižek’s work is littered, cluttered even, with the most spectacular reversals, inversions, and surprises and concatenation of objects that one would usually consider as opposed” (p. xiv). Žižek writes with “academic attention deficit disorder,” where thoughts flow like the rise and fall of the Nile river. Marchart (2007) cautioned that “one necessarily has to make a distinction of carving out a Žižek rather than discussing ‘the Žižek’” (p. 100). Accordingly, Žižek is neither monolithic in the sense of staticity nor a fractured mind pursuing projects schizophrenically. On the contrary, Žižek, like Deleuze, aims for something broader, bigger, and in the distance. Butler (2005) explained, “What is radically posed by Žižek’s work—both as a theme within it and by the very existence of the work itself—is the relationship of thought to the Other, to the subject that knows” (p. 15). Jagodzinski (2010) suggested that:

[Žižek’s] work is systematically rhizomatic to use an oxymoron, leaving his own singular trail as he gropes for the unknown and the unsaid. By taking on the role of the analyst he seems to be performing what Deleuze called ‘becoming imperceptible,’ a process of transformative encounters that charts his own becomings. (p. 17)

His incessant writing becomes in such case a “writing cure” (see La Berge, 2007). In the psychoanalytic domain, Nietzsche seems appropriate to evoke. Implicating both Deleuze and Žižek, Nietzsche once wrote, “One does not only wish to be understood when one writes; one wishes just as surely not to be understood” (Nietzsche, 2001, p. 32). Writing is but one continuous psychoanalytic session, where the writer is the neurotic, talking incessantly to the analyst (the reader) who must exhume the corpus of unknown knowledge that emerges.

**Parlaying Perversion and Desire**

I want that the ear be flicked, the mind be caressed, and thoughts be embraced in an eclectic orgy of uncertainty that arouses suspicion and attraction. To read these thoughts is an indecent proposal for the reader that sensually coerces them into a
playful fondling of the mind. How can we not write with some artistic flair in the way that codifies our underlying assumptions and deeply held beliefs? Scholarship is a dark and ominous poetry that fills the symbolic cavern of prose meshed into a sweet-tooth of academic debauchery. Holding ourselves to standards is a performative ritual that finds us cloaked amongst the scantily available philosophical prostitutes of an unbeknownst red light district. (Garcia, 2014)

The philosophical pervert—a reconceptualist curriculum theorist—evokes desire from demand. In Fifty Shades of Grey (James, 2011), a book predicated on BDSM and fantasy (though I won’t spoil whose fantasy), Anastasia answered Christian’s request to be pleased. She said, “Please him! He wants me to please him! . . . And I realize, in that moment, that yes, that’s exactly what I want to do. I want him to be damned delighted with me. It’s a revelation” (James, 2011, p. 100). Christian responded, “I want you to please me . . . I have rules, and I want you to comply with them. They are for your benefit and my pleasure” (James, 2011, p. 100). Anastasia is 22, a recent college graduate, and a woman who has never had sex or masturbated. Anastasia entering the “red room of pain”—in which Christian embodies the spectral, libertine lifestyle of Marquis De Sade with whips, chains, and other devices—is not of conscious volition, at least from what we would expect from Anastasia. However, her evolution and entrance into the world of BDSM and Kink is not so much uncovered in the classical Freudian motif, for example, with latent infantile connections with her father beating her like Sabina Spielrein. Rather, Christian demands from Anastasia something that can only be answered by teaching her to desire. It is the pervert (i.e., Christian) here who demands, but who must—if such a demand is to be answered wantingly—teach the subject (i.e., Anastasia) to desire. Christian’s red room of pain is akin to the intellectual red light district (Garcia & Holland, 2009); it is a not a place one goes unless one desires.

It is desire (désir) that a psychoanalyst must create in the patient (analysand) so that he or she will continue returning for sessions. Is not the teacher charged with a similar task where students must desire to return—not just to the edificial space of school but also the educational space of epistemological relish and return? Why should anti-philosophy, and what we could pose as reconceptualist curriculum’s turn towards anti-curriculum (the rejection of traditional modes), be focused on the notion of the pervert? Venturing down this rabbit’s hole of psychoanalytic theory, one finds the concepts of desire, fantasy, lack, and the unconscious twisted about among psychoanalysts, philosophers, and cultural theorists. Although it is too much of an undertaking to explain all these concepts here in depth, I will briefly cover some important concepts for our discussion here.

I conceptualize the pervert as always-already (déjà) pre-coital; his drive is toward coitus though not necessarily with a partner but towards elation (an elation that may also be painful or shameful afterwards; this is a type of jouissance). Freud (2007) believed that “In every healthy person a supplement that might be called perverse is present in the normal sexual goal” (p. 136). If we frame the “normal sexual goal” as part of the traditional hegemonies and regulating machines, then the pervert is one who “acts out” against them. Our social connotation of the pervert, for example, is the Peeping Tom in a young girl’s window (voyeur), one who watches porno and gets off in the virtual world, or one who must engage in certain acts in order to achieve sexual climax (such as being spanked, being in a certain place or position, etc.). What is
popularly thought of as perversion is better allocated to the category of fetishism: the necessity of an “object directed” compulsion needed to achieve sexual satisfaction.

Within the Freudian and Lacanian veins, one begins with parental relations and infantile sexual development (e.g., Oedipus complex, Jung’s Electra complex, castration, alienation, etc.); that is, the symptoms, anxieties, and psychical stability rest on a deep rootedness in the libidinal economy of the sexual development of the child. Deleuze and Guattari (2003) critiqued the oedipal implication of “mommy-daddy-me” (p. 23) supplied by Freud, where everything must return to the sexual relation with the parents: “from the moment we are measured in terms of Oedipus – the cards are stacked against us, and the only real relationship, that of production, has been done away with” (p. 24). “Production of the unconscious,” rather than a reduction of it, is the project of Deleuze and Guattari (see Deleuze, 2004, pp. 274–280). Deleuze and Guattari share similar terminology with Žižek; however, Žižek remains faithful to Lacan’s explications and definitions.

“Desire is not,” Žižek explained, “something given in advance, but something that has to be constructed . . . Through fantasy, we learn how to desire” (Žižek, 1991, p. 6). The question is, as Žižek stated in the film, The Pervert’s Guide to Cinema: how do we know what we desire? (Fiennes, Rosenbaum, Misch, & Wieser, & Fiennes, 2009). Deleuze and Guattari do not negate the concept of desire; they even use the term “desiring-machines;” however, their critique of psychoanalysis and the Freudian/Lacanian conception of desire-structuring fantasies was that the “process of production” is negated in “defining desire as lack” (Deleuze & Guatarri, 2003, p. 26). In An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, Evans (1996) explains that objet petit a is “any object which sets desire in motion” and to which can be attributed “the cause of the analysand’s desire” (p. 125). Lacan frames objet petit a as a signifier without a signified; it is ambiguous. For example, when McDonald’s uses its slogan “I’m loving it”, the “it” has no substance or signification. One then assumes or interprets “it” as infinitely as one wants: chicken nuggets, Big Mac, sweet tea, etc.

Our fantasies are structured by desire, which, Žižek (via Lacan) told us, is not natural but given to us. The Lacanian objet petit a is, for me, the central element in psychoanalysis. Curriculum theory has the possibility to be the ultimate pervert discourse. As Žižek posed in the Perverts Guide to Cinema, “Cinema is the ultimate pervert art. It doesn’t give you what you desire, it tells you how to desire” (Fiennes, Rosenbaum, Misch, & Wieser, & Fiennes, 2009). As a pervert curriculum theorist, I do not give anyone what he or she desires. Rather, like Christian teaching Anastasia, I hope to tell (or teach) one how to desire (a desire that arouses a craving toward the intellectual red light district); this is the seduction of writing and philosophy.
Can One Be a (Pervert) Curriculum Theorist Today?

As soon as one perceives a monster in a monster, one begins to domesticate it, one begins, because of the “as such” – it is a monster as monster – to compare it to norms, to analyze it, consequently to master whatever could be terrifying in this figure of the monster. (Derrida, 1995, p. 386)

To be inside and outside a position at the same time – to occupy a territory while loitering skeptically on the boundary – is often where the most intensely creative ideas stem from. (Eagleton, 2003, p. 40)

I am at once consumed by monstrosity as an affliction and at once liberated by it. I resist, as Derrida said, domestication—that which, I feel, obliges me to choose hegemonic loyalty within a regulating machine and discourse. But what place and future does a monster have in a curriculum where monsters become exceptional entertainment that panders to others, welcomed oddities to legitimate a particular hegemony, while still promoting regulating machines? The question is not simply, “What is a curriculum theorist in the post-reconceptual era of curriculum” (see Malewski, 2010)? Rather, one must take up seriously and honestly the question, “Can one (still) be a curriculum theorist today?” That, to be a curriculum theorist born from the swollen womb of reconceptualism, imbued with the distinct flux of thought, is to be something of a different animal, if not a beautiful monster, born out of the necessity to define and distinguish the theoretical “turn”—as it is often referred to with paradigm shifts and deviating from traditions.

The function of this work would appear to be understanding, and this understanding is of the sort aimed at and sometimes achieved in the humanities. The humanities fields that have been influential thus far are history, philosophy, and literary criticism. Hence the dominant modes of inquiry for this group have been historical, philosophical, and literary. (Pinar, 1975, as cited in Pinar et al., 2008, p. 213)

A large part of reconceptualist curriculum theory is, as Pinar asserted, predicated on certain philosophical veins, especially those arterial connections with Dewey, Hegel, Foucault, Habermas, Derrida, and Sartre, to name only a few. Theorists have rejected positivist, objective-oriented, and social efficiency philosophies (see Bobbit, 1918; Kliebard, 2004; Tyler, 1969) that guided much of 20th-century curriculum thought; or, at least, have attempted to work against such ideals (see Hlebowitsh, 1999). A foundational precursor of reconceptualism—rejection of scientism in place of an artistic, aesthetic, philosophical, prosaic, and narrative-based curriculum theory and inquiry—was outlined by Pinar and Grumet (1976) and Pinar (1975, 1978), in which currere became the guiding principal for reconceptualist curriculum. This “turn,” however, has faced its share of critiques (e.g., Wraga, 1999). But it has also opened up new, liberatory spaces in which the subjectivities and experiences of individuals are unchained from traditional regulating machines and hegemonies in the field.

In the literary and philosophical spirit of Hunter S. Thompson, the field of curriculum theory became a “gonzo” discipline through currere: “gonzo journalism features a bold, exaggerated, irreverent, hyperbolic and extremely subjective style of writing, which positions the author at the centre of the narrative” (Franklin, Hamer, Hanna, Kinsey, & Richardson, 2005, p.
Slaughter said, “A gonzo journalist is always himself a part of reality . . . [Being gonzo] vaporizes the positivistic separation of subject and object and mixes the observer and the observed into one inseparable web” (Saarinen, 1981 cited in Lassila-Merisalo, 2011, p. 198). The reconceptualist “turn”—an explicit move away from “master narratives” (Lyotard, 1984) that previously engaged the perennialist ideals of “curriculum development”—implicates a more ideological-ontological obligation for the study of curriculum. The “I” (ich) becomes the foregrounding anchor of inquiry whereby universality is ruptured in place of the subjective, singular, and contextual. Thus, the gonzo curriculum theorist is a pervert par excellence in which s/he cannot negate his/her position as an always-already obligated participant-observer. To this end, the pervert curriculum theorist is an anti-philosopher (Badiou, 2011; Groys, 2012) to the degree that he or she does not simply reject traditional paradigms, but moves toward a curriculum at large, in abundance (see Jardine, Friesen, & Clifford, 2006), and provokes a desire to move about in the unknown distance. In short, the pervert embodies, fluidly, a running of the course that is currere.

**Post-Coital Conclusions**

Life is a process of becoming, a combination of states we have to go through. Where people fail is that they wish to elect a state and remain in it. This is a kind of death. (Nin, as cited in Hinz, 1973, p. 40)

When Deleuze (2004) lamented “The sadness of generations without ‘teachers’” (p. 77), he was referring to Jean-Paul Sartre, in whom he admired the ability to have new thoughts and arouse them in new ways. Could the poverty of our times be that we have many who study philosophers and curriculum theorists who call themselves philosophers (see Rorty, 2009) and curriculum theorists (see Gabbard & Garcia, in press)? Hunter Shields, a young philosopher, once questioned, “If I listen to the radio, does that make me a musician? If I read the works of great poets, does that make me a poet?” (2012, n.p.). To be a philosopher, one must say something original and towards the world of everyday life (as Nietzsche did), even if that something is about ready-made objects/texts (Groys, 2012). To be a philosopher is to provoke the spirit (Geist), as Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Derrida, and Žižek have done. Žižek joked, “What is the lightest object in the world? The penis, because it is the only one that can be raised by a mere thought!” (Žižek, 2000, pp. 382–383).

With the twists and (paradigm) turns in curriculum, is it possible to be a pervert curriculum theorist today? Do we not need perverts in philosophy and curriculum that provoke us to explore lines of flight—leakages of in/continental philosophy—to consume or bear witness to coprophagia (real or metaphorical in Lacan’s sense), and to push us towards the intellectual red light districts in the various fields where the strange bedfellows buggerying about produce undomesticated monsters? Slavoj Žižek is a pervert, a buggerying philosopher, but he is my teacher. His spectral presence, which haunts me from behind, allows me to feel the range of aphoristic playfulness embodied by Nietzsche, and the rhizomatic and nomadic thought emulated by Deleuze. I do not wish to be Žižek; rather, I wish only to be Žižekian. It is uncertain whether Žižekian ideas will be accepted in curriculum theory, but Žižek espouses an exemplary possibility as a red light district muse that beckons us toward the red room of theoretical pain and pleasure. Nothing is certain, I am certain of that. However, as Cooley (2009) believed, “The
future of Žižek’s work in educational philosophy and educational studies is yet to be determined, but one hopes it is large” (p. 391). One must wait and see how the production of perverts—beautiful undomesticated monsters, such as myself—will find their place in the future of curriculum theory.

Notes

1 On “leakage,” see Brian Massumi’s “Notes on the Translation and Acknowledgments,” in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus: “Fuite covers not only the act of fleeing or eluding but also flowing, leaking, and disappearing into the distance. . . . It has no relation to flying” (p. xvi).

2 I owe thanks here to Rob Helfenbein for his mentorship early in my studies and forcing me to think on the theoretical and pedagogical planes. As a philosopher and individual always in the process of becoming and coming-into, I attribute a great deal to Stephanie Koziej with sincere humbleness in showing me the possibilities of taking a vulnerable risk by embracing the space in-between, unleashing free flowing fluidity, and seeing a BwO out there beyond the aether; that is, to go to the “hidden place.”

3 “Two Girls One Cup” was a trailer for a scat porno film that became infamous on the Internet for the disgusting portrayal of two girls who appear to eat shit out of cup like a chocolate sundae. See Blue (2007) and “Two girls one cup” (2007).

4 Žižek (2008b) explained the disavowing fetish as: “I know that I know, but I don’t want to know so I choose not to know what I know). It seems that we are sorely becoming the lemmings of ideological fantasy (a better world is possible tomorrow, just not today” (p. 15).

5 Spielrein was a patient of Carl Jung who entered psychoanalytic treatment after displaying symptoms of hysteria and anxiety. She could only achieve sexual elation through paddling or spankings. This pleasurable punishment was connected to the spankings her father gave her as a child (see Covington & Wharton, 2015).

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