Essay Review: “A Psychoanalyst in the Classroom: On the Human Condition in Education”

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Despite the overfamiliarity of education and the feeling that we have been there before and so must be able to predict and control what should happen again, learning is not like that. None of our normative measures help us encounter the human fact of dependency, the questions of love and hate, what learning feels like, why ideas make us nervous, what the contingencies of emotional life have to do with the ways in which thinking goes missing, and how one makes sense of discontentment in and desire for attaching to an education we know nothing about... Do we have time to listen to the human condition of education? (Britzman, 2015, p. 17)

DEBORAH BRITZMAN’S PSYCHOANALYTIC FRAMEWORK OF EDUCATION is a cool drink for educational researchers weary of decades of educational reform churning. If one is partial to the suggestion that education is more than that which may be assessed by testing, or that the human condition is incommensurate to standardization, then Britzman’s (2015) *A psychoanalyst in the classroom* is both deeply soothing and fortifying for those who occupy what seems often to be a lonely little watchtower in various domains of educational research.

Public discussions of education often seem to wind up at explanatory constructs for crises in public education, for example: *grit, resilience, dis/engagement, self-regulation, school choice*, and more. Britzman’s text breaks from these individualizing constructs, rendering students and teachers with dynamism and dimension—but more importantly—as enmeshed in relationship. Britzman’s human is more than an aggregate of traits and self-processes, which is a most welcome contribution to contemporary educational conversations.
This essay review is written by a Freudian sojourner: a neophyte reasonably well-versed in issues of educational policy, educational psychology, human development, and issues of educational equity such as the public-private distinction in education. That said, I should like to say that my experience with this text is akin to the discovery of a new language for something that seemed to go rather unaddressed in my studies in education; something anchored in affect, or emotion; something strummed by fiction or awakened by relationship. In moments like these I have an uncanny sense that something is happening, or that something has happened and perhaps has been forgotten. There are moments of recognition that are oftentimes welcome and comforting, and others, cause for resistance. Such experiences, rather than being dismissed as meaningless seem, to my mind, to be meaningful in the company of Britzman’s text; and this is valuable to someone interested in the field of education, if not the social sciences en masse. In other words, the human is given both breadth and depth in a psychoanalytic framework.

The major contribution of A psychoanalyst is, as the title reads, the elaboration of the nature of a multidimensional, dynamic human with/in education. Britzman (2015) asks “Do we have the time to listen to the human condition of education?” (p. 17). Can we push aside the narrow human or “self” silently articulated in the dominating language of educational crises, reform(s), standards, curriculum, and talk about what it is/means to be human? To talk about taken-for-granted terms like education, and learning? This is the work that Britzman undertakes in A psychoanalyst, addressing “the human condition in education” in a period where globally, policymakers and prominent figures of the private sector have forgone tinkering (Tyack and Cuban, 1995) for sweeping market solutions for public education (Au & Lubienski, 2016; Fabricant & Fine, 2013; Lipman, 2013).

About the Author

Deborah Britzman is a psychoanalyst and Distinguished Research Professor in York University’s Faculty of Education. Britzman’s latest book is part of a SUNY series edited by Britzman herself entitled Transforming subjects: Psychoanalysis, culture, and studies in education. This particular work follows a number of scholarly publications that include the books: Freud and education (2011), The very thought of education: Psychoanalysis and the impossible professions (2009), Novel education: Psychoanalytic studies of learning and not learning (2006), Practice makes practice: A critical study of learning to teach (2003), and After-education: Anna Freud, Melanie Klein and psychoanalytic histories of learning (2003).

Context of the Book

To appreciate why Britzman’s book is so timely, it is worth taking a brief moment to set the stage for her characters. A number of educational researchers (e.g., Verger, Lubienski, & Steiner-Khamsi, 2016) suggest that globally, a historically unique trend towards the privatization of education is occurring.

Neoliberalism. In the acknowledgements preceding the manuscript Britzman positions her essay within what some name as a neoliberal (Au & Lubienski, 2016; Harvey, 2005) or market fundamentalist (Stiglitz, 2002) shift in North American—if not global—education. Simply stated, neoliberal refers to a praxis grounded in the worldview that the free market is best able to care for the needs of the population (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism includes the creation of markets where there are none, the systematic accumulation of capital by dispossession, and a belief that “private” is always better than “public,” with public coding for state involvement in institutions like education and health care. In a neoliberal imaginary, governments do little more than protect private property rights, and let the creative destruction of the market take its course (Harvey, 2005).
Neoliberalism and education. There are problems with adopting a praxis of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has been theorized as contributing to increased precarity among low-income, minority-status students and their families (De Vogli, 2011; Lipman, 2013; Nkansah-Amankra, Agbanu, & Miller, 2013). Now well-worn discussions about school choice, teachers and their unions, top-down accountability, school “failure,” evidence-based practices and standardized testing are characteristics of a neoliberal era of federal school reforms that rely on standardization, high-stakes accountability, school closure, merit-based funding, and more (Spring, 2014). Framed in such a manner, the purpose of education, especially public schools, is to produce laborers in national economies that compete with others throughout the world. Educational crisis is the catalyst and education is reduced to that which is measurable by high-stakes standardized tests. This is a powerful narrative of education that has been persistently reproduced by a privileged few with a mind to lead.

A psychoanalyst and neoliberalism’s silent omission. Alexander Sidorkin (2013) suggests that the answer to “What is education?” may no longer be silently omitted. In the past, the notion of education in the practical field and in theory, while intuitively assumed, was coherent enough to operate. This assumed coherence must now be interrogated as “the relationships between humans, and their information, knowledge, and learning have been shifting” (Sidorkin, 2013, p. 121). I interpret Sidorkin (2013) as referring not only to digital shifts in the activity of education such as on-line and hybrid learning, but also to the philosophical and political dimensions of education, each of which concern themselves with the purpose of education (see Labaree, 1997). All this to say that answering “what is education?” means also answering, what is the human condition? Britzman (2015) writes that students have become “clients,” and professors the “deliver[ers of] goods,” in an idealized context of “accountability, evidence-based practice, quality assurance, professionalization, and standardization” (p., vii). In the neoliberal imaginary, the human condition is narrowly constructed. Left silently omitted the construction is left standing.

If Britzman and Sidorkin (2013) are correct in sensing an unfortunate change in the pedagogical relation, and therefore, our notion of the human or ontological condition, then what is lost in the change to a precarious neoliberal discourse of education? Simply put, what is lost is the idea that humans possess a dynamic, psychic life characterized by emotional complexity, contingency, and continuity with one’s history, including their relational history. Britzman writes that the significance of the pedagogical exchange has become over-familiarized, forsaking the idea that “each desire, each mistake, and all confusion that hold sway lead us to question the inexplicable occurrences of psychical life, its creative and mad procedures” (p. vii). Neoliberal discourses of education omit the primacy of relationship, affect, the perceived threat of ideas, and the complex concomitant feelings of discontentment and desire for an education we know nothing about” (p.viii). (Britzman [2015] says that humans are involved in paradox: we have discontentment and desire for/with an education we know nothing about, do not want to know anything about, and that “instructs the knowledge we thought we already had” [p. viii].) Britzman’s psychoanalytic perspective represents a strikingly different orientation to discussions of education, and the language of psychoanalysis allows her to communicate something about education that we rarely find elsewhere.

Overview

Drawing from the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud, Melanie Klein, Julia Kristeva, and others, Britzman directs our attention to the unconscious life of affect, or emotion. The unconscious life of affect is a psychical world of love and hate, anxiety and loss, libidinal urges,
creativity and madness. Freud declared that the life of affect would trump his most “brilliant results” (p. 5, Chapter 1) with the disruption of his relationship with his patient. Indeed, it is understood that every aspect of what we signify as education is embedded within this notion of relationship and its contingency upon forgotten relationships of the past. These past relationships manifest in phantasy and transference. Phantasy is a “fantastic theory of obscure, unbelievable impressions” (p. 62, Chapter 3) whose beginnings are found in childhood and adolescence. Transference is the occasion of the analysis recognizing the analyst as someone else, or perhaps, another character, for example interlocutor/baffler, friend/foe, lover/betrayer, and more; furthermore, transference represents a desire for the other’s love and hate (Chapter 2, p. 32).

Bravely and necessarily, Britzman (2015) offers herself as a character for analysis throughout the book and presents examples of her own psychoanalytic approach to the teaching of graduate students at York University in Toronto, Ontario, Canada. By favoring a literary approach to the writing of analysis, Britzman communicates both (a) the precariousness of teaching psychoanalysis—a fundamentally interpretative process which Freud himself recognized—and most importantly, (b) the riskiness (Biesta, 2014) of being involved in an “impossible profession” (Chapter 4, p. 72) riddled with uncertainty.

By “riskiness” one refers to the idea that there is no educational technology that ensures educational outcomes (Biesta, 2014). Gert Biesta (2014) suggests that there is a compunction for certainty in educational practice and policy that constricts and narrows education into something both undesirable and impossible to attain. A more desirable notion of education embraces uncertainty, and acknowledges the riskiness inherent in a notion of the individual as one with subjectivity, agency, and shrouded in contingency (Biesta, 2014).

Britzman’s psychoanalytical framing of education as human condition is similar to Biesta’s (2014) riskier conception of education. Amidst the nuanced and complex analysis of the human condition in education is another important and personal reminder of what we seem too often to forget in times of precarity: that education is concerned with acting upon subjectivities, which is an uncertain and risky social endeavor. An illustrative counterpoint to these riskier conceptualizations of education is the idea that individuals are called to become “lifelong learners” constantly adapting and displaying resilience to economic changes provoked by globalization. The purpose of education for those who call for lifelong learning, is for schools to generate what Biesta (2014) calls a “desirable change” in individuals; moreover, learning is little more than a judgment about a desirable change in an individual (Biesta, 2014). Britzman’s notion of learning, echoes Biesta’s in its description of the uncertainty, unpredictability, and anxiety that constitutes the “dilemma” of learning (Britzman, 2015, p. 4).

**Organization of the Book**

A psychoanalyst is divided into seven chapters. In chapters one and two, Britzman (2015) presents her thesis, and its ontology and epistemology. She outlines the uncertain speculative business of psychoanalysis, transference, and phantasy and tells of Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Julia Kristeva (the latter which appears most influential). Here she describes the literary approach to character studies in psychoanalysis including the “problems” of teaching psychoanalysis.

Chapter three provides a nuanced description of the problems of working with a theory that sees emotional situations as resources of inquiry. Chapter four is concerned with understanding the construct of adolescence in the psychic life of adults, its usefulness in commenting upon the
impossible professions, its “alienation between developmental theory and pedagogy” (p.25), and the place of *déjà vu, deja raconte*, and *the uncanny*.

In chapter five Britzman asserts that gender has an emotional, unconscious life influenced by valences of aggression. Here she leans on Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere to explore how “anxieties and madness” make teaching an impossible task. Chapter six addresses the problems and paradoxes of the “so-called writing block” (p. 26): two examples include (1) “one never knows if one has created the writing block or has found it” (p.26), and, (2) writing block as neurosis and couched in the latency of anxiety—meaning that one may be in the “midst of a writing block while obsessing over the writing, and this turns out to be the never-ending story” (p. 26).

In the closing chapter, Britzman (2015) describes how “to compose education as our human condition” (p. 27). The “everyday psychopathologies in education” (p. 134) are scenes of “affection for and afflictions in teaching and learning” (p. 134) that are understood through the pedagogical mistakes one makes. Mistakes are unwelcome and disorienting, but are the “royal road” (p. 27) to knowledge of the unconscious, and reiterate how the psychoanalyst and professor experience so much before “anything can be known” (p. 27). If we regard our mistakes, rather than gloss over them in a rush to act, we might allow them to be the beginnings of a “character study of [our] pedagogy” (p. 27).

**Discussion**

**The ontology of A psychoanalyst: Historicity, transference, phantasy, and agency.** Moving now towards a deeper discussion of some major ideas in *A psychoanalyst*, I would like to approach the text for a moment using the language of paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Kuhn, 2012). Guba & Lincoln (1994) write that a paradigm is a “basic set of beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates or first principles” (p. 107). Such beliefs cannot be established as truthful; therefore, must be accepted on faith. Guba & Lincoln (1994) write that inquiry paradigms define what “falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry” (p. 108) and may be summarized by responses to three fundamental questions addressing issues ontological, epistemological, and methodological. The construct of paradigm has opened up avenues for critiques of truth-claims that emerge in educational research, the most obvious example being the relatively recent clamor for random-controlled trials (RCTs) in educational research; however, what is most important to this discussion is the difference between what gets addressed in discussions of education, and what falls “outside the limits of legitimate inquiry.”

**What falls within the limits of legitimate inquiry?** When talking about the problems of education, there is a tendency to wind up back at the individual and individual traits. The problem of low graduation rates, high non-completion/dropout rates, racial/ethnic gaps in achievement/opportunity, and the school-to-prison-pipeline (e.g., Losen, 2015) are explained in varying degrees of reliance upon constructs that describe students’ individual traits, characteristics, or composite elements (e.g., *student engagement* is constructed in cognitive, behavioral, and affective elements or domains, [Crick, 2012]). We have all heard about *grit, motivation, resilience, self-regulation*, and *dis/engagement*. Such constructs focus inordinately on the individual as the unit of change to the sacrifice of context, or other conceptualizations of the human such as one inextricable from relationship to the other (see Biesta, 2014). This trend is steeped in an oftentimes racist historical trajectory that psychologizes (Fine & Cross, 2016) social problems, and separates the individual from context. Recall that the sociologist C. Wright Mills (2000) once wrote that many would have us make public problems the *private* problems of the individual.
The focus on individual traits in educational policy is buttressed by research in the domains of psychology (Fine & Cross, 2016), and educational psychology (Friesen, 2013). To answer the ontological question, to my mind, we may regard how researchers conceptualize “the self.” When the influential educational psychologist Albert Bandura introduced the language of self-processes in the early 1990s, the human was a being whose activity was largely mediated through “metacognitive” processes dubbed self-regulation, self-efficacy, and self-concept (Friesen, 2013). The ontological assumption implied is that more-or-less, the individual is autonomous, being conceptually cleaved from relationship to the other and context. Bandura was theorizing in response to the more “austere” ontologies of behavioral psychologists (e.g., Edward Thorndike) and information-processing theorists (who likened the brain to computer), marking a significant turn in the field of educational psychology (Friesen, 2013); however, the lasting effect of Bandura, the cognitivists, and the behaviorists, is a self that, though existing in a social and cultural context, is governed by a diversity of real-time self-processes in the form of cognitions (Bandura & Bussey, 2004). Less prominent in this theoretical framework are the ideas of affect/emotion, memory, unconscious, and the lasting, living psychic presence of relationship (e.g., transference, phantasy) that the language of psychoanalysis is so capable of pointing to.

The preceding overview is both brief and generalized, yet identifies what I perceive as the general tenor of educational discourse. Of course ecological frameworks of human development (e.g., Urie Bronfenbrenner’s work) and perhaps even Bandura himself might eschew dualisms like individual/context; however, as demonstrated with the recent excitement around grit, the ongoing presence of terms like resilience and self-regulation in early childhood centers, as well as student dis/engagement, it seems we are ever drawn back to constructs that seem to explain everything that is wrong with public education (Crick, 2012).

A deeper “self.” What does Britzman’s book contribute to the public discussions of the problems of education? The psychoanalytic perspective seems to stick closer to human relationship and its lasting effect via the unconscious, memory, and more. Britzman says that subjectivity is complex. That complexity is best characterized by the presence of past experiences of relationships familial and pedagogical that influence our actions: “Influence, it turns out, carries on what we cannot see coming.” (Britzman, 2015, p. 3). In pedagogical situations we are simultaneously engaged with the psychic remnants of our relational past, and acting out the human condition of seeking out an education we know absolutely nothing about. In other words, Britzman’s psychoanalytic ontology is utterly confounding to the certain, simplistic, trait-based and metacognitive language of much educational discourse.

The past and being in A psychoanalyst. One of the most important contributions of A psychoanalyst is the attention it pays to the human’s past. In a psychoanalytic framework, the past figures heavily in the present. What implications does this characteristic of being have with regards to human activity in an educational relationship? In a school setting? In chapter one Britzman (2015) writes

The human, then, is a self-theorizing creature of learning impressed by what she or he cannot know and, as beholden to her or his own research, is subject to breakdowns and the need to believe against all odds. (p. 76)

A key principle of being in this work lies in the complex articulation of what might be called human agency, or a capacity to act or exert power. Self-theorization is agentive, but a
compulsion to “believe against all odds” appears less so. Resistance (Chapter One) is agentic, but its origins in transference and phantasies are not. These tensions bear witness to a wonderfully porous boundary in Britzman’s writing between agency and (non) agency—or perhaps determinism or impotence.

One possible weakness of Britzman’s psychoanalytic epistemology is that it does not seem to say much about the future. With all of the discussion about the past, one sometimes wonders if there is a theoretical sacrifice made. For example, Anna Stetsenko (2015) suggests that the human condition is one of constant transformation, with the world also in constant transformation as a result of what people do. In Stetsenko’s (2015) ontology, humans are necessarily oriented to the future, co-creating the future, the “destination of one’s projects and pursuits” (p.108). There is a possibility that something “outside the limits” of this particular psychoanalytic approach is one’s relationship to one’s projects, which is suggestive of future as well as present and past (Stetsenko, 2015). Britzman’s human has agency, but appears deeply engaged with its past, as articulated by such psychoanalytic constructs as transference, phantasy, subconscious, and adolescence. There seems to be the possibility of futurity in phantasy, but less so when compared to Stetsenko’s (2015) ontology. Stetsenko’s (2015) human places more emphasis on the present and future, or the future-in-the-present. In the case of A psychoanalyst the general message seems to be that what is most important is the past, rather than the future; though other readers might disagree.

Adolescence. When talking about the past, the notion of adolescence figures significantly in psychoanalysis. Drawing from the writing of Helen Deutsch and Julia Kristeva Britzman (2015) writes that adolescence is not simply a developmental phase, but is characterized as a psychic structure shaped by its vulnerability and impressibility, and is influential through transference. Adolescence never ends for the adult, but continues in the unconscious. There is no explicit age range given for adolescence, but it is neither childhood nor adulthood, and it has psychic boundaries, for example, it might end with “a terrible accident, punishment, and loss” (p.70, Chapter 4) and henceforth become adulthood.

Answering the epistemological question: Affect and knowing. As mentioned previously, the emotional life figures more prominently in the psychoanalytic paradigm. Britzman (2015) posits affect before knowing: we feel first and act and understand second. Understanding is an activity of words and theory.

Knowing and language. Knowing is utterly dependent on words (Chapter 4, p. 55). When we experience anxiety “over knowing what it is we do not know” we have encountered the unreasonable, and this is the place from which theory emerges. Melanie Klein called this unreasonable theory “phantasy” (p. 54). In our dependency on others, anxiety arises and phantasy drives a desire to symbolize. Long novels are representative of such symbolizations; they are projects of understanding the frailty of the social bond. Yes, psychoanalysis is interpretative and speculative, but this is an extension of the failure of knowledge. In studios of words like the “clinics of literary theory, novels, psychoanalysis and pedagogy” (p. 52, Chapter 3) Britzman (2015) wonders how the subject handles the freedom of manipulating objects and “imagin[es] the ways we are affected by the words of others” (p. 52, Chapter 3). Britzman (2015) declares that we react emotionally, resisting and resenting theory—she acknowledges the violence and aggression of theory, its alienation and subsequent dismissal as “only theory” (p.51, Chapter 3). Here Britzman (2015) echoes previous writing on “difficult knowledge,” (Britzman, 2013) and the “thought without a thinker” that is resisted because it threatens the unconscious
with the loss of love through the displacement of our held beliefs. For student teachers, and perhaps all educators, these beliefs are our notions of schooling and education.

**Phantasy** What then is the nature of those processes of the social bond between teacher and student? Teacher and student are engaged in a relationship directed by transference and phantasy. When Britzman (2015) writes about teaching, her subject is primarily a student in higher education, or someone who has passed through the period of adolescence. Describing her experience teaching undergraduates in a teacher education course, she characterizes the teaching profession as being subject to “phantasies of becoming someone else” (p. 70). The teacher and professor each embody a super-ego (a double, divided self) that compulsively repeats. Through a lens of *déjà vu*, or *déjà recontre*, we get an uncanny sense of this psychic phenomenon. This means that within pedagogical encounters, we have the feeling that “teaching has already happened and I must make it happen again” (p. 70).

**Resistance** Resistance in relationships between student teachers and the professor arises again as a theme. In previous writing, Britzman (2013) names our preconceptions of education our “worst enemies” to rethinking what education might be (Britzman, 2013). We defend our ideas with the fervor of one who wishes not to experience the loss of love, or the loss of freedom of expression. Everyone involved in teacher education carries with them the *adolescent*, writes Britzman and we have managed to repress disturbing thoughts through projection onto our future students—or, they-who-threaten-our-pedagogy. Student teachers respond to their adolescence when they are most interested in learning how to control their future students’ behavior, and often desire to “kick the adolescent out of them” (p. 74). Anyone who has taught secondary school, undergraduate, or graduate courses will appreciate the occurrence of student resistance and resentment that Britzman refers to.

**Conclusion**

There is much missed and mistaken in a cursory review of Britzman’s (2015) book. Britzman writes with ability, complexity, and nuance—much of which is probably missed by the neophyte of psychoanalysis. On the other hand, there is something valuable here even for the psychoanalytic sojourner. In much the same way one is touched by the humanity in narrative, there is a similar effect in reading Britzman’s writing.

There is more to the human condition in education and schooling than what is most often spoken and written about. *A psychoanalyst* touches us; asks that we revisit subjectivity; revisit the possibility of the unconscious, and; pay closer attention to the influence of affect. In the aggregate, *A psychoanalyst in the classroom* amounts to a riskier (Biesta, 2014) and less certain conceptualization of education when held alongside educational narratives of accountability, evidence-based-practice, and other familiar terrains. Even the most pedagogically progressive educator might feel as though they have been left standing “empty-handed” by Britzman’s text (Biesta, 2014, p. 22), but such is the nature of education, despite what policymakers and pundits might have us believe. Can we live with a less certain, riskier notion of education? Can vast socializing institutions of education mandate such a notion of education? Likely not, but individual educators may.

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References


