Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform:
Toward a Critical Theory of Education

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Within the last two decades there has developed an impressive array of ideas and activities aimed at redefining and reexamining the meaning of radical educational reform.\(^1\) Out of this has come a renewed interest in the development and application of Marxism, critical theory, phenomenology, critical sociology, and the sociology of knowledge to the area of radical educational change. Yet in spite of this, the American left often appears baffled over the question of what constitutes radical educational theory and practice. Beneath the plethora of pedagogical approaches, that range from deschooling to alternative schools, one searches in vain for a comprehensive critical theory of education which bridges the gap between educational theory on the one hand and social and political theory on the other. One also searches in vain for a systematic theoretical approach to a radical analysis of the day-by-day sociopolitical texture of classroom structure and interaction, i.e., how specific forms of knowledge and meaning penetrate, develop, and are transmitted within the context of the classroom experience.

While this paper cannot examine the many radical educational movements of the last two decades, it is useful to analyze the major tendencies that have dominated them. From this an attempt will be made to formulate a critique of these tendencies and to move tentatively toward a critical theory of radical pedagogy. In addition, this paper suggests some general approaches which might be useful in implementing radical educational reform.

Amidst the theoretical shambles characteristic of the educational left, two major positions stand out: these can be loosely represented, on the one hand, by the content-focused radicals and, on the other, by the strategy-based radicals. These representations are, of course, ideal-typical and should not be seen as exhibiting rigid boundaries. It is clear that many educators fall between these ideal-types; but this should not obscure the fact that few radical educators have provided a theoretical perspective that equally acknowledges and integrates both positions. The content-focused radicals define radical pedagogy by their insistence on the use of a Marxist-based perspective to provide a demystifying analysis for students of the dominant ideology reproduced in varied forms in the prevailing system of schooling.\(^2\) On the other side, there are the strategy-based radical education. This group defines radical pedagogy as the development of "healthy," non-alienating classroom social relationships.\(^3\) In this case, specific classroom social encounters are designed to help students break through the engineered boredom and oppression characteristic of late capitalist relations of production and its everyday life. Although both groups have made significant gains in furthering radical educational reform, each ends up with a limited pedagogical model, one which fails to integrate theory and process, content and methodology. Moreover, beyond their differences, both groups share perspectives which not only reveal theoretical gaps, each also provides theoretical building blocks for a more integrated form of radical pedagogy. As such, both positions warrant further examination.

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The theoretical cornerstone of the content-focused radical position lies in its stress on the relationship between the economic and political structures of capitalism and the ideological superstructures, of which schools occupy a paramount position. According to this group, schools deepen social and economic domination by functioning as agents of legitimation. As agents of legitimation, schools help to mediate the contradictions between the ruling-class and the oppressed by fostering a collective consciousness reared on “myths” and steeped in the “virtues” of passivity, docility, and unquestioning obedience. While this view in general suffers from an overdetermined and oversocialized perception of the way schools function, it does raise fundamental questions about how institutionally selected and sanctioned knowledge is used to confer cultural legitimacy on dominant belief and value systems. Michael F. D. Young writes clearly about the focus of this position: “...to tackle the dialectical relationship between access to power and the opportunity to legitimise certain dominant categories and processes by which the availability of such categories to some groups enables them to assert power and control over others.”

Translated into classroom pedagogical practice, this view of knowledge undermines the positivist teaching practices which presently characterise contemporary American education, particularly in elementary and second education. The idea of categorically imposed meanings lays bare the ideological underpinnings of the positivist elevation of value-free classroom methodology to the status of an unquestioned truth. Moreover, content-focused radicals have also helped students to move beyond the anti-theoretical, fragmented, skills oriented modes of pedagogy so deeply entrenched in American schools. Consequently, a small but significant number of radical teachers have helped their students to recognize the ideological basis of the division of knowledge characteristic of most school curricula and to view knowledge as more than a “neutral picturing of fact.” Through their efforts, these radicals have helped to expose the prevailing belief that traditional pedagogy represents a better mode of learning; instead, they have exposed its functional underside: a sustained, institutionalized attack on the radical dimensions of critical thinking.

The strategy-based position springs from a long tradition of thought including such diverse notables as Rousseau, Wilhelm Reich, A.S. Neil, Carl Rogers, and Erich Fromm. Steeped in what can be generally termed a radical humanism, this group acknowledges the oppressive power and control exercised by schools, but they differ from the content-focused radicals in their assessment of the nature of such control. For the strategy-based radicals the essence of schooling lies in its reproduction of traditional, hierarchical social relationships. In general these relationships replicate top-to-down models of authority and sanction social conformity rather than student initiative and imagination. The strategy-based radicals believe that the process of schooling inculcates in students a form of domination that is deeply felt, lived, and experienced as part of one’s own history and self-formation. The nature of this domination is not to be found by pointing to social, political, and cultural ideas that are merely imposed on students. According to the strategy-based position, conventional ideology may be significant as a mode of mystification, but the essence of social control in the schools is to be found in the reproduction of reified social relationships, in the confinement and restriction of individual and social experiences. The theoretical cornerstone of this group’s position is that industrial society is lodged not only in men’s minds but in their personalities and character structures as well. Implicit in this view is a perception
of domination and control which involves unconscious as well as conscious dimensions of the personality. The strategy-based position thus shows, even if loosely, that domination is a multi-varied phenomenon, much more complex than the content-focused radicals have claimed. Moreover, by indicating that the shaping of the personality and character structures of students is not limited simply to the manipulation of knowledge, these radicals also have called into question the political and normative underpinnings of traditional classroom pedagogical styles. It is in the latter area that the strategy-based radicals have made their most significant contributions.

Reacting against orthodox pedagogical methods, strategy-based radicals have focused their energies on developing classroom social relations which would free students from ideological manipulation and internalized control. The radical core of this perspective lies in its presupposition that as students experience a qualitative change in their classroom encounters, they will be in a better position to redeem their own subjectivity, their psychic autonomy. Ronald and Beatrice Gross capture this sentiment in their claim that “in social relations radical means libertarian: an affirmation of the autonomy of the individual against the demands of the system.”

In so far as the strategy-based radicals have illuminated the complexities of domination, introduced more humanistic teaching methodologies, and revealed the need for a child-centered psychology which supports a more complex mode of knowing and personal growth, they have partly supported their program for a radical pedagogy. Taken as a whole, however, strategy based approaches to radical pedagogy appear to have ended up as a palliative for reformers whose interests are more closely aligned with Rousseau than Marx. While this group attempts to restructure and reshape the social relations of students along lines conducive to democratic socialist values, they, in fact, end up by divorcing the social relations of the classroom from the kind of theoretically informed action that could link classroom social relations to a viable political perspective. By down-playing the role of content and the need for an overt political framework by which students can examine and come to an understanding of the ideological assumptions embedded in specific forms of classroom social relations, the strategy-based group, in effect, depoliticizes the function of methodology and ends up reproducing in their pedagogy a limited subjectivist notion of freedom. As a result, the political significance of the social relations of the classroom are not explored relationally by establishing their meaning within the context of corresponding socio-political forces in the larger society. Under such circumstances, “personal warmth, trust, and community” become solipsistic categories that deny the intersubjective realms of morality and history. Self-indulgence becomes synonymous with liberation, and the privatized morality of the classroom becomes an affective antidote for the moral complexities and political problems that characterize the society at large. In brief, the systematic, boring socialization of the traditional classroom gives way to a “radical” socialization which -while parading under the banner of self-actualization, warmth, and personal autonomy-may appear more palatable, but, in the final analysis, may be no less “oppressive”.

The strategy-based radicals are caught in a curious but fatal paradox. On the one hand, they acknowledge the power of the dominant social order to manipulate students into docile, obedient members of the society. But, on the other hand, they do little to help them to move beyond a cheery spontaneity, the substance of which is anchored in the manipulative behavior it is alleged to overcome. What is lost sight of in this perspective
is a distinction between spontaneity and freedom. Radical praxis, as Herbert Marcuse argues, is based on more than simply the expression of unfettered spontaneity “spontaneity can advance the movement of liberation only as mediated spontaneity, that is, resulting from the transformation of consciousness.” Furthermore, social relationships that encourage letting-go and feeling good without mediating these actions through a critical conceptual framework end up reproducing a subjectivity riddled through and through with a “happy” but no less mystifying false consciousness. Under such conditions, the social forces that perpetuate reified social relations are driven from sight by a program of “feel more and think less.” Instead of promoting radical praxis, strategy-based radicals in many cases, unwittingly end up humanizing the very social and political forces they initially attempt to eliminate. As Russell Jacoby argues...

...the insistence on finding humanity everywhere by underestimating the objective and social foundations of inhumanity perpetuates the latter-it humanizes inhumanity.16

Many content-focused radicals have rightly criticized the strategy-based approach for assuming that pedagogical techniques in themselves “represent a critique of capitalist domination and ideology.” But rather than acknowledge the liberatory possibilities that classroom social relations have in fostering a critical political consciousness, the content-based radicals dismiss the importance of social relations and posit as an alternative a reductionist, undialectical pedagogical model. Consequently, for this group the social relations of education are insignificant compared to the ‘content’ of a given course.

Assume a ‘traditional’ teacher-scholar who gives (more or less) formal lectures with provision for discussion. The teacher stands in the front. The students sit lined up in rows. This teacher requires tests and written essays and even grades them with the criteria for what he considers coherent, rigorous, intellectual work set forth as clearly as possible well in advance. If one were to pose the question as to whether or not the creation of critical consciousness could emerge within this traditional ‘form’ the answer must, of course, be ‘yes’...The determination of the critical thrust of a course must be posed and answered with reference to content, not form.18

Content in this case, however, is abstracted from the classroom social encounter. As a result, the distinction between oppressive and radical classroom relationships is blurred and a pedagogical model is developed which fails to recognize the covert “messages” inherent in the pedagogical styles used to transmit information. Thus the content-focused radicals bypass an important ideological dimension of the learning experience, a learning experience they claim to redeem!

Yet it is precisely because of this mechanical relationship between content and process that American radical educational theory is at an impasse. Ignoring the ‘political content’ embodied in classroom arrangements leaves radicals open to an unexamined contradiction between the radical nature of their theoretical analysis and their use of top-to-bottom models of socialization. What is at stake here is whether radical pedagogy represents more than sim-
ply providing the ‘correct’ analysis for students. It is also a matter of developing a compatible radical educational style. What the content-focused radicals have ignored is that learning demands not only the critical comprehension of a given social reality but also a hermeneutic examination of the social context in which learning takes place. Paulo Freire states the position well. “In thinking about practice, we learn to think correctly.” Divorcing content from process not only suggests a rather crude pedagogical simplification, it also helps to reproduce a social division of labor that prevents radical praxis.

At first glance, it appears that both the content-focused and strategy-based radicals exist on different pedagogical planets. Both groups appear wedded to uncompromising theoretical views that prevent them from moving beyond the bifurcation of content and process. Locked into their respective positions, their theoretical differences appear to be matched only by the strengths of their theoretical shortcomings. On further examination, both groups share commonalities that reveal not only the incompleteness of their respective pedagogical approaches, but also suggest limits that can serve as starting points for a genuinely radical critical theory of pedagogy.

One of the most serious limitations shared by both groups centers around their implicit denial of the student as subject. Both groups underestimate subjectivity in their respective pedagogical approaches. The strategy-based radicals succumb to a vision of human liberation in which ‘healthy’ vibes and feeling good slide into a subtle form of manipulation. Beneath the smiles and warmth lies a rather reductionist behaviorism that substitutes the crude external calculus of limited pain and maximum pleasure for social responsibility and critical thinking. As such, self-realization ends up as a sophisticated form of self-indulgence. Pleasure-oriented classroom encounters are reduced to the role of a medicinal bath in which the notion of the student as subject in the learning process is denied rather than affirmed. Joy and ‘happiness’ become engineered antidotes for the repression and false consciousness which the strategy-based radicals unknowingly perpetuate.

The content-focused radicals deny the subject less through the manipulation of feelings than through their refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of classroom social relations, the very relations which provide the foundation for students to engage in critical thought as a form of meaningful social discourse. This failure on the part of the content-focused radicals rests with their indiscriminate use of pedagogical methods which, as Freire argues “cease to be identified with the power men have to think, to imagine, to risk themselves in creation, and rather comes to mean carrying out orders from above precisely and punctually.”

In addition to the denial of subjectivity, both groups share a limited theory of knowledge. The content-focused radicals view knowledge in the narrow epistemological sense as being theoretical, abstract, and verbal. The importance of the social process that gives shape to the epistemological dimensions of ‘knowing’ are not stressed. The strategy-based group, on the other hand, ignores the critical epistemological dimensions of knowledge and stresses social relationships that give meaning to the act of knowing. Both groups end up with pedagogical approaches which not only separate knowledge from the act of knowing, but also distances educators from learners as well. Both groups fail to emphasize the complementary of the emancipatory content and the liberating classroom structure and end up unaware of the ideological interest served by their different pedagogical approaches. Paul Ricoeur writes well of the need to attend to both emancipatory subject matter and commun-
cation in the search for radical praxis.

It seems to me that only the conjunction between the critique of ideologies, animated by our interests in emancipation, and the reinterpretation of the heritages of the past, animated by our interest in communication, may yet give a concrete content to this effort. A simple critique of distortions is just the reverse side and the other half of an effort to regenerate communicative action in its full capacity.²¹

In the most radical sense, knowledge should be viewed as a shared process, a mediation between teachers and students, a creative political exchange that forges commonalities and the kind of critical reflection that allows all to be seen as both teachers and learners. Under such circumstances, knowledge is not treated simply as problematic, it becomes the vehicle for teachers and students to discuss its problematic grounding and meaning. Knowledge in this instance becomes situated in ideological and political choices; in other words, knowledge becomes de-reified in terms of both its content and the social context in which it is mediated.

Content-focused radicals have not moved beyond their static notion of knowledge as a set of radical ideas to be transmitted to students. Yet if the notion of the student as subject is not to be denied what is needed is a definition of knowledge which recognizes it not only as a body of conceptual thought, but also as a process which demands radical educational relationships. If radicals of both groups are going to take seriously the Marxian view of the relationship between form and content, they will have to develop a conception of knowledge in which radical theoretical and conceptual thought is paralleled by similarly radical social relationships. In the final analysis, both groups can only move beyond their one-sided notion of knowledge if they begin to look more critically at the relationship between radical “knowledge” and “the roles that the act of knowing demands of its subjects-creator, recreator, reinventor.”²²

Another perspective shared by both radical groups is the correspondence theory. With minor variations, radicals define this theory as something of a one-to-one correspondence among the cultures of the workplace, the family, and the school, with the workplace exercising a determinate and formative role on the latter two socializing agencies. According to this view, the family and the schools play a major role in inculcating in the populace those values and dispositions conducive to the continual reproduction of the dominant relations of production. Leaning heavily on the correspondence principle in their own analysis of schooling, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis highlight its workings.

*The educational system helps integrate youth into the economic system, we believe, through a structural correspondence between its social relations and those of production. The structure of social relations in education not only inures the student to the discipline of the workplace, but develops the types of personal demeanor, modes of self-presentation, self-image, and social class identifications which are the crucial ingredients of job adequacy.*²³

Embedded in the correspondence principle is the particularly important insight that the school cannot be analyzed as an institution removed from the socio-economic institutions in which it is situated, particularly the “institutions and processes of work.”²⁴ While the
correspondence principle is of critical importance in understanding the nature and role of legitimating institutions such as schools, many radicals stretch the principle to the point of caricature and end up with an oversocialized model of schooling. The result is a mechanistic analysis that encloses itself in the dead-end of one-dimensionality; thus little room is left for radicals to explore the contradictions inherent in the schooling process or to analyze the tensions, rejection of values, and the deep disjunctions experienced by many students. Schools may legitimize the social relations of production and existing forms of consciousness but they do so in a complex and often contradictory fashion and setting.\textsuperscript{25} As Paul Willis has pointed out, schools do not simply “process” students by imposing an ideology on them. “Social agents are not passive bearers of ideology, but active appropriators who reproduce existing structures only through struggle, contestation, and partial penetration of these structures.”\textsuperscript{26} Karabel and Halsey raise questions about the correspondence principle that echo a number of similar criticisms by both radical and liberal critics.

\begin{quote}
There is a tidiness about the family-school-work triumvirate that in the neo-Marxist view serves to transmit inequality from generation to generation, the process seems to work so smoothly and is based upon such an imposing system of domination that one must wonder how it is that educational change ever takes place.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

Many of the attacks against the radical use of the correspondence theory have been well focused.\textsuperscript{28} For instance, with few exceptions radicals of both schools have consistently failed to provide a rich account of the conflicts and contradictions that characterize American educational history. Instead, one is treated to flattened out and contradiction-free historical accounts,\textsuperscript{29} accounts which not only suffer from a great simplemindedness, but also fall back upon a mystifying vulgar Marxism which reduces culture to a mere reflex of the material base. One example will suffice.

\begin{quote}
The school serves to transmit the social and economic structure from generation (to generation) through pupil selection, defining culture and rules, and teaching certain cognitive skills. Children become a form of natural resource to be molded by the schools and fed into the industrial machine. The school becomes an instrument of social, economic, and political control. It is an institution which consciously plans to turn people into something. In this situation, the educational system tends to become functionally reduced to its role in generating labor for the economy, and the development of the individual becomes more or less FULLY TAILORED (italics mine) to the needs of ‘economic rationality.’ Instead of discovering and developing the natural aptitudes of children, the schools ‘discover’ the aptitudes which are essential to the needs of the capitalist system.\textsuperscript{30}
\end{quote}

Lost from this type of trivializing perspective are the contradictions and tensions among and within each of the individual school-family-work agencies. For instance, as Michael Apple points out, the school curriculum attempts to convince working-class students that the world of labor is filled with jobs offering opportunities for mobility, material and personal gratification, and opportunities for a better future. But working class students know better. “They have already experienced the world of work from their parents, their acquaintances, and in their own part time jobs. This experience clearly contradicts the messages of the
school which are viewed cynically.” The principle of contradiction is an essential one since it provides a focus for political action. Furthermore, it raises fundamental questions about the quasi-autonomy of schools, the family, and other primary institutions of mass culture. These questions are instrumental in assessing accurately the relationship between social reproduction and cultural reproduction.

The concepts of social and cultural reproduction need to be clarified at this point, particularly since the definitions provided by some of the radical educational theorists to be analyzed are at odds with those associated with the structural-functional view characteristic of mainstream social science. In the functionalist usage, cultural reproduction refers to the “transmission,” via the schools and other agencies of socialization, of cultural norms and values which are seen as the necessary and unproblematic functional requirements of the larger society. In this view, social reproduction, the ongoing maintenance and reproduction of existing socio-economic and political arrangements, is the regenerative process characteristic of a social order marked by consensus and social harmony. The principle of contradiction, particularly as it applies to the intra and extra classroom levels, has little relevance in this approach.

Social and cultural reproduction are viewed in distinctly different terms in some of the more recent work by radical educational theorists. In this perspective, both concepts are defined in highly political and ideological terms and are linked to the relationships between power and control. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu views social reproduction as the reproduction of power relations between classes. Rejecting apolitical and atheoretical notions of social reproduction, he views the latter as the reproduction of the hierarchical distribution of class and power relations all of which buttress the existing capitalist mode of production and its concomitant social division of labor power. Similarly, cultural reproduction, from this perspective represents the transmission of the culture of the dominant class. In more specific terms, the cultural hegemony, or dominant form of cultural capital, consists of those attitudes, dispositions, tastes, linguistic competencies, and systems of meaning that the ruling-class deems as being legitimate. This specific form of cultural capital is institutionalized in schools and is passed off as natural, unchanging, and even eternal. As a mechanism of social control, dominant cultural capital posits itself in both the form and process of the educational experience. Thus it structures not only the selection and distribution of knowledge, it also structures, legitimates, and saturates the day-by-day experience of the classroom encounter. In essence, cultural reproduction as used here is a vehicle of social reproduction. But unlike functionalist theories of reproduction, the more recent radical perspective recognizes that there are serious disjunctions and tensions inherent in the relationship between social and cultural reproduction. As Willis points out, capitalist cultural hegemony is characterized by an element of uncertainty, and “always carries with it the possibility of producing alternative outcomes.”

What is significant is that these contradictions and tensions have recently been highlighted by a number of educational theorists, and it is their work which suggest a rationale for studying both the form and process of the classroom encounter and its dialectical interconnections with larger social and economic forces.

A new direction for radical educational praxis is implicit in the work of a growing number of educational theorists who have helped to strip the correspondence principle of its reactionary trappings while preserving its radical core. Both theoretically and empirically they have attempted to show how the organization, distribution, and evaluation of selected aspects of
the culture function as reproductive mechanisms within schools. Moreover, by examining knowledge stratification and its relationship to social stratification, they have begun to illuminate the often subtle political connections between economic power and ideological control. By exploring the differences among and between classes in the role of cultural reproduction, Bourdieu and Bernstein, in particular, have made an impressive case indicting schools as agencies which legitimize the principles of social control inherent in the institutions of late capitalist societies. More specifically, by looking at the latent specialized meanings inherent in the school's three message systems: curriculum, pedagogy, and evaluation, they bring into focus class-based contradictions centering around both the nature of classroom social relationships as well as the organization and transmission of linguistic and cultural competencies. By focusing on the selection, organization, and distribution of knowledge as well as the various pedagogical styles used in the transmission process, they have provided a conceptual schema that enlarges our understanding of the hidden curriculum and the mechanisms of domination as they operate at the everyday level of schooling. This represents a significant theoretical leap beyond traditional functionalist and radical analyses of the hidden curriculum. Unfortunately, neither Bernstein nor Bourdieu have developed a Marxist conceptual framework suitable for a viable form of radical educational praxis. In specific terms, neither theorist has developed an adequate theory of ideology and concept of hegemony to explain adequately the dialectical relationship between the ideological principles that structure the classroom encounter and the power relationships that characterize the larger society. Nevertheless, both theorists should be read as an important force and contribution to the study of the connection between knowledge, schooling, and the reproduction of the social relations of production.

While many radicals have used the term hidden curriculum to categorize the unstated but effective distribution of norm, values, and attitudes to students in classrooms, few have provided more than a one-sided analysis of this important phenomenon. And yet the notion of the hidden curriculum represents one of the most important conceptual tools by which radicals can explore the dialectical relationships and tensions that accompany the process of reproduction at the level of day-to-day classroom interactions. The paramount issue to be explored below is that radical educational reform will continue to be stalled until radicals begin to reexamine and redefine the meaning of the hidden curriculum. Because it is only on the basis of such an analysis that a new conception of radical educational theory and action can be developed.

II

To make sense of the hidden curriculum means that schools have to be analyzed as agents of legitimization, organized to produce and reproduce the dominant categories, values, and social relationships necessary for the maintenance of the larger society. This should not suggest that schools simply mirror the interests and wishes of a conspiratorial ruling-class. Nor should it be denied that schools have immense power to manipulate the consciousness and actions of students and function to pass on selected aspects of the dominant culture. The process of legitimization is clearly much more complex than most radical educators have suggested.

The process of legitimization should be viewed in terms of what may be called the special
ambiguity of schools. This special ambiguity stems, on the one hand, from the representation of schooling as "...a vital human need common to all societies and all people in some form, and as basic as subsistence or shelter." On the other hand, schools are a fundamental part of the power structure, ideologically and structurally committed to the socio-economic forces that nourish them. It is in this nexus of vital needs and power that the special ambiguity of schooling takes on its meaning. Also embedded in this nexus is the key to the socio-political structure of schooling, the hidden curriculum.

The notion of the hidden curriculum is not new. Both liberal and radical educators have helped to identify some of its structural properties as well as many of the norms and values which it reproduces. While these analyses and critiques have illuminated the tacit socializing function of the schools, they have failed to integrate the complex and dynamic interconnections between the hidden ideological underpinnings of classroom knowledge and the hidden messages and values underlying classroom social relationships. Consequently, liberals and radicals have provided an incisive but limited definition of the hidden curriculum and schooling. In general, they have limited their definitions to those "non-academic" norms and attitudes that are systematically and effectively taught to students but are not openly stated in a school's or teacher's statement of objectives. Central to this perspective is the assumption that what students learn from the formal curriculum is much less important than what they learn from the structure of classroom relationships. Bowles and Gintis state this position as clearly as anyone else: "The heart of the (educational) process is to be found not in the content of the educational encounter or the process of information transfer but in the form: the social relations of the educational encounter." While many liberals and radicals agree that schools do more than teach cognitive tasks, they part company over the political nature and ideological function of the hidden curriculum.

Liberals such as Talcott Parsons and Robert Dreeben view the function of the hidden curriculum as a necessary one. For them, the hidden curriculum offers students the opportunity to learn vital social norms and skills more fully than they could within the family structure. Dreeben, for instance, points positively to the learning by students of such norms as independence, universalism, achievement, and specificity. Missing from his analysis is any clear-cut examination of the relationship between the normative underpinnings of the hidden curriculum and a capitalist ethos fueled by the necessity to legitimate and reproduce its class-based interests. In general terms, the liberal analysis abstracts the normative basis of the hidden curriculum from its ideological context and appears mute over the question of why certain sets of values are considered legitimate while others are not. Wrapped in the guise of "objectivity," the liberal position appears to suffer from what Nietzsche once termed "the dogma of the immaculate perception."

While there is a certain amount of agreement among liberals over the meaning and importance of the hidden curriculum, radicals are divided over the definitional nature of the concept. On the one hand, there are the strategy-based radicals who limit the concept of the hidden curriculum to the social relations of the classroom; on the other hand, there are the content-focused radicals who deny the radical implications of classroom social encounters and therefore ignore this dimension of the hidden curriculum. More importantly, this group does not adequately understand how the hidden curriculum operates in the formal curriculum, though they would not deny that the hidden curriculum plays a strong role in reproducing ideologies in the formal curriculum. Until recently, the only radical analysis of the
hidden curriculum has been made by the strategy-based group.

For the strategy-based radicals, schooling entails a hidden curriculum representing an oppressive cultural hegemony, the purpose of which is to reproduce the streamlined personalities necessary for the alienated realms of work and leisure. But cultural hegemony as it is used here does not refer to the various forms of false consciousness that are drummed into students' heads via the formal curriculum. Instead, cultural hegemony refers to material practices embedded in the roles and routines through which students give expression and meaning to their classroom experiences. In other words, hegemony here is produced not simply through the diffusion of ideas but in the everyday routines and rituals of the classroom social encounter and its corresponding reward and punishment system. In this view, schools function through the hidden curriculum to manipulate the student's "psychic space," those aspects of character structure which contain the possibilities for emancipatory behavior and action. The whittling away of this "private space" is matched only by the school's efforts to create student personalities which offer little resistance to the alienated worlds of work and consumerism. Bowles and Gintis speak to this issue by pointing to specific personality characteristics fostered in schools which allegedly prepare students for 'acceptable' job performance in hierarchically and bureaucratically organized workplaces. The corporate sanctioned personality traits include: punctuality, proper level of subordination, intellectual over affective modes of response, respect for external rewards, and orderly work habits. While schools tend to label these as desirable personal qualities, radicals view them as modes of social conformity strongly correlated to a student's chances for academic and future economic success.

The strategy-based radicals do not believe that schools provide all students with the same socializing experiences. In fact, the nature of a student's socializing experience is determined largely by their socio-economic background. In other words, the socializing experience of the hidden curriculum itself is class-based. The substance of hegemonic ideology remains the same, but the form varies depending upon the types of students and the specific socio-historical conditions of a given period. Thus we can say that in conditioning youth for the realities of the workplace "...the schools serve to prepare workers to fill the work hierarchy by differentiating both the amounts of and types of schooling experience they receive." For example, schools which serve minorities of class and color are characterized by rigid rules and order. Students in these schools are often expected to conform to clearly arranged patterns of hierarchical authority. Conformity, powerlessness, and impersonalization are the governing characteristics of the student's school experience. Classroom social relations for these students are typified by what Basil Bernstein has called a visible pedagogy. This type of pedagogy refers to teacher-student relationships marked by a high degree of certainty, control, and student powerlessness. The nature of this type of pedagogy is exhibited by an explicit set of criteria for student evaluation, an explicit sequencing of time and rules, and an explicit hierarchy of authority. The socialization process, however, appears quite different for most middle and upper-class students. These students not only receive higher levels of cognitive input, they also operate within a classroom experience where flexibility and interpersonal relations (soft socialization), replace overt rule conformity. Under these conditions, external control is replaced by internalized behavior.

The radical critique of the hidden curriculum has persuasively discredited the techno-
cratic notion of a neutral and value-free system of schooling. Yet while such a critique has helped to clarify the connection between knowledge and human interest, it has failed to provide a more encompassing and detailed analysis of the intricate links between ideology and the workings of the formal curriculum. Radicals, in general, in the United States have been too little interested in the actual structure, complexity and interrelationship between classroom knowledge and classroom social relations to provide a convincing account of how they manifest themselves in ideological terms. Moreover, the existing analyses of the hidden curriculum have been dominated by a one-sided concern with the forms of schooling while more in-depth analyses of the nature and function of curriculum knowledge have been ignored. In brief, radical educators have failed to develop what Michael Apple calls the sociology of school knowledge.54

The first step in developing a radical sociology of school knowledge, one which extends the notion of the hidden curriculum to the formal curriculum, must begin with the recognition that classroom knowledge is shaped by hidden structures of meaning steeped in a complex interplay of ideology and power. Put another way, each of the three message systems of the school: curriculum pedagogy, and evaluation prefigures a selection, organization, and distribution of meanings based on ideological considerations. The focus in this case is one step removed from a simple acknowledgement of the ideological nature of the form and content of knowledge. The question to be analyzed is not so much what is considered legitimate knowledge as much as how is it that some knowledge is labeled legitimate and some is not. What is the source of legitimation? Or put another way, what is the relationship between school knowledge and the distribution of power and privileges in the larger society?

In pedagogical terms this means that radical educators will have to help students recognize what might be called the “hidden curriculum” of classroom knowledge. This can be done by clearly showing them how the taken-for-granted meanings which govern classroom knowledge in many instances represent a constellation of imposed meanings selected from specific social and economic ideologies and interests.55 Learning can only become politically significant for the student and teacher when they are able to understand how meaning emerges, how constitutive ideologies structure their learning processes. The first step towards such an understanding has been suggested by some advocates of radical pluralism who stress giving students the opportunity to examine knowledge from a variety of theoretical perspectives. For instance, Maxine Greene writes:

Significant learning can only take place when the individual consciously looks from a variety of vantage points upon his own lived world, and when he achieves what Alfred Schutz calls a ‘reciprocity of perspectives’ upon his own reality. When he recognises that he himself has blended those perspectives and permitted his perceptions to confirm one another, he knows that he himself has constituted meanings and brought whatever order there is into his own world.56

Of course, it must be quickly realized that one must move beyond radical pluralism by refusing to give equal weight to all theoretical perspectives. To tolerate each one equally is simply another way of banalizing the truth through the prism of a substanceless methodology. Radical pluralism is a necessary but incomplete step towards acknowledging the social
construction of reality. If the relationship between ideology and school knowledge is to be fully comprehended, the relations between dominant and subordinate ideologies must be clarified. A more critical exploration would investigate the links between power and the various categories of knowledge by analyzing the specific socio-economic contexts and interests which allow certain types of knowledge to become legitimized. Utilizing this approach, students are given the opportunity to focus on the preeminent question of why reality takes on a particular meaning, or for that matter is ignored, in both the schools and the society in general.

The importance of the hidden curriculum of knowledge can be further illuminated by analyzing both the style and content of bourgeois hegemony. While radicals have spent some time in criticizing the content of the dominant ideology, they have often failed to spend a reasonable amount of intellectual effort analyzing bourgeois styles of thought. And yet, as Sherry Gorelick argues, "These styles of thought are far more subtle than facts, but they-powerfully shape the selection and omission of facts, the interpretation of facts, and the shaping of facts into a theoretical structure: a picture of the world."57

Bourgeois styles of thought are linked to a number of powerful and misleading assumptions which radicals have left relatively unexamined. Two of the more important assumptions center around questions relating to what might be called the form and content of Anglo-American philosophy. The first assumption raises questions about the nature of traditional Anglo-American methodology. This methodology, particularly in the social sciences, is characterized by a fragmented, anti-theoretical, and undialectical approach to the construction and analysis of socio-political reality. Therefore, within this perspective knowledge is not only artificially compartmentalized and divided, it also lacks any type of socio-historical grounding. Thus, questions are raised and problems generated which usually appear to be unconnected, or at best, only connected marginally to the fundamental structure of society. Drawing upon an amalgam of philosophical strains such as logical positivism, pragmatism, "tough-minded" empiricism, and some shades of liberalism, Anglo-American philosophy has given rise to a slew of methodological approaches in the social sciences all of which share one flaw: they are "wedded" to the individual fact or item "at the expense of the network of relationships in which that item may be embedded...and encourage submission to what is by preventing its followers from making connections, and in particular from drawing the otherwise unavoidable conclusions on the political level."58 Knowledge, in this case, becomes reified because the methodological stance which it 'celebrates' undermines the variable and historically changing nature of knowledge by presenting it as a natural and necessary fact, unrelated to the social conditions that give it meaning.

A second assumption centers around the failure of radical educators to analyze sufficiently what might be called the hidden meanings embedded in the cultural styles of bourgeois thought. This is not to suggest that radical educators have overlooked classroom messages which transmit specific ideological content. What they have overlooked are the selective messages inherent in differing sets of linguistic and cultural competencies. What many radical educators have failed to do is to link the concept of knowledge to what Pierre Bourdieu has termed cultural capital. As previously mentioned, cultural capital suggest more than the content-based issues and "facts" which are used to reproduce the existing relations of domination. Cultural capital refers to the socially determined tastes, certain
kinds of prior knowledge, language forms, abilities, and modes of knowing that are unevenly distributed throughout society.59

Bourdieu’s important contribution rests with his insight that schools have institutionalized forms of cultural capital which help to reproduce the social relations outside it. And that any understanding of how class and economic interests penetrate the form and substance of classroom pedagogy will be incomplete unless one comprehends the dynamic and function of cultural capital in the schools. For instance, though Nell Keddie does not highlight adequately the need for teachers to understand the socio-political interests that govern the distribution of knowledge, she has shown how classroom knowledge and meaning are not the result of negotiation between students and teachers in cases where they are alleged to be; instead the knowledge used represented the imposition of “acceptable” symbolic meanings and norms mediated, albeit unknowingly, through the classroom teacher.60 By accepting the legitimacy of institutionalized definitions of cultural capital, radical educators run the risk of unknowingly structuring classroom experiences with students according to how well the latter imitate middle-class linguistic and cultural styles. The point here is that even though teachers may argue against tracking and other pedagogical mechanisms of social control, they continue to relate to students differently as a result of the specific cultural capital which characterizes students from working class and minority cultural backgrounds. Hence, students who do not relate to the style, taste, language, and competencies of the middle-class are viewed and treated in a discriminatory fashion. Whether they are viewed as “deprived” or “distressed” or in need of “therapy,” students emerge from this type of pedagogy learning more about the various forms of social control than they do about the possibilities and mechanics of human liberation.61

For radical pedagogy to become meaningful, radical educators will have to begin by recognizing and understanding the cultural capital of the students they will be working with. It is crucial that students learn to understand and move comfortably within their own culturally determined subjectivity. Students must learn to recreate and politically analyze the world in terms of their own cultural capital and not in terms based on the teacher’s cultural capital. The categories that students use to give meaning to the world must be taken seriously, and then checked for their truth and validity. Any other approach points to an objectification of the student’s subjectivity. One of Paulo Freire’s students has put it well. “The democratization of culture has to start from what we are and what we do as a people, not from what some people think and want for us.”62 What the notion of cultural capital suggests is that any progressive pedagogy is steeped in a dual dialectic. On the one hand, knowledge is historically grounded and contextualized; while on the other, knowledge has to be linked to the existential situation of the learner. One without the other suggest a pedagogy that is incomplete. The interpenetration of the historical and existential dimensions of knowledge and knowing results in a pedagogy that helps both students and teachers to think at “...deeper and deeper levels, about how human beings live in their world. It means taking the daily routine itself as an object of analysis, trying to penetrate its meaning.”63 The critical message here is that once students learn to view their daily experiences as problematic, using their own cultural capital, they can then move beyond the personal sphere and attempt the leap to more abstract theoretical conceptualizations and cultural codifications.

In short, my main purpose thus far has been to show that radical educational theory faces
a number of difficult tasks in the search for redefinition and renewal. Trapped by assumptions which have largely shaped either a content-focused or strategy-based approach to radical pedagogy, radical educational theory has been unable to confront either holistically or dialectically the normative and political realities of the educational process. Existing radical pedagogy has been plagued by a limiting correspondence theory, a truncated notion of the hidden curriculum, and an objectification of the student as learner, and, finally, a myopic vision of what constitutes radical classroom practice.

In general terms, the construction of a radical educational theory will have to begin by developing a broader and more organized view of schooling and its place within the entire social, political, economic, and ideological superstructure. Schooling must be studied, on the one hand, as part of a critical theory of society which is logically prior to and inclusive of a radical theory of education. On the other hand, schooling must be seen not only as part of a "global" dimension of oppression, but must also be studied in its own right. What this means is that schooling must be viewed in non-mechanistic terms as a superstructural agency that has both relative and dependent features which characterize its relationship to the dominant mode of production. Moreover, it follows that proponents of a genuinely radical educational theory will have to spend more time in understanding how the many variables at work in the classroom encounter, reproduce and contradict the prevailing ideologies and social relationships in the larger society. As such, the entirety of the educational process will have to be analyzed for its normative and ideological meanings. Curriculum, teaching methods, forms of evaluation, textbooks, school organization, and the organization of teachers will have to be seen as components of the educational process, shaped by the latter's dialectical role as a representation of a vital human need and as a class-based instrument of the established power structure. Such an analysis demands that we begin the difficult task of laying the groundwork for a substantive critical theory of education. Section III represents a modest step in that direction.

III

This section of the paper deals with a critical theory of education. But it is intended to do no more than raise some questions and suggestions for the construction of such a theory. Moreover, more time and analysis will be spent on developing concrete, radical classroom practices than on analyzing the overall relationships of the system of schooling to the larger socio-economic order. But while educational practices need to be critically analyzed one cannot even begin a cursory examination without illuminating those theories which inform and sustain such practice.

With few exceptions, radical educational theory appears to suffer from either an explicit or implicit dose of unwarranted pessimism. For instance, on one side, there are those radicals who in the Ivan Illich tradition argue that changing schools will do little to alter the oppressive nature of the society in which they are embedded. On the other side, there are radicals who believe that working in schools serve a viable radical purpose, but when one examines their theoretical baggage there is little to reveal how such work can be justified. Thus one position favors abandoning radical activity in the schools altogether, while the other provides little reason, in spite of their supportive political rhetoric, for not doing so. Neither view, in the final analysis, constitutes a viable theoretical stance for a radical reform movement in the schools. More specifically, neither approach has analyzed sufficiently the tensions and contradictions that exist in schools or the ways in which teachers and students
can effectively challenge the hegemonic function of schooling and organize to change the fundamental structure of the larger society.

Any radical educational theory must start with the recognition that radical educational reform in and by itself will do little to change the fundamental structure of society. This does not suggest that radical pedagogical reform is a liability or waste of time. It simply means that such reform has to recognize its limits while capitalizing upon its strengths in the struggle for radical social and political reconstruction. When viewed from this perspective radical educational reform represents an important force for radical change. The most that can be expected of such reform is that it will contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of teachers and students who could then work to change society. The truth of radical pedagogy lies in its power to negate the power of those who define what is legitimate and real. The parameters of a radical educational theory designed to provide educators with such a "truth" must be shaped by an analysis that not only challenges the predominant notions of sanctioned educational culture but also the political and social hierarchies to which they are linked. Such a theory must highlight the contradictions that exist in the formal and hidden curricula of schooling; it must also provide the foundation for developing strategies designed to help teachers overcome those contradictions. Some of the components in such a theory might take the following form.

As has been pointed, one important component of radical educational theory centers around the necessity of situating the politics of schooling within the politics of the wider community. But this means looking at schools not only with reference to their existing connections with other agencies in the fields of production and cultural reproduction, it also means tracing historically the ever-changing pattern of connections. For it is only through a historical examination of the dialectical linkages between the educational system and other systems of economic and cultural production that we will be able to understand both the development of different modes of domination and the complex relationship between schooling and ruling-class interests. The reality of educational systems at both the broad policy level as well as the level of daily classroom interaction is more dynamic and complex than exaggerated versions of the correspondence principle suggest. By historically grounding the fight for control of schooling among competing political and socio-economic forces and their accompanying educational theories, radical educational theory provides the framework for a viable strategy for radical educational reform. The strength of this framework lies in its usefulness in illuminating not only the contradictions that exist in the system of schooling but also the political interests which it legitimates and the ideologies which it perpetuates.

Educational practice embodies specific values, purposes, and meanings. But all too often the various dimensions of the schooling process are viewed by teachers and students as apolitical and ahistorical in nature; and, in the final analysis, schooling itself is perceived as an instrumental process governed by technical problems and answerable to "common-sense" solutions. This perspective flattens reality and effectively removes the dynamics of schooling from the realm of ethical and political debate. Educators, in this case, tend to view themselves as impartial facilitators who operate in a value-free and ideologically uncontaminated classroom setting. A viable radical educational theory will have to provide the theoretical framework by which teachers and students can come to understand that the "common-sense" world of pedagogy is an ideological smoke screen that dissolves theory into practice. Or to put it another way, it divorces methodology from ideology by advocating the
use of pedagogical "practice without, or with a minimum theoretical content." The normative interests behind educational practice must be illuminated and questioned through the use of a critical theoretical perspective, one that employs the terminology of social criticism to question the source, meaning, and rationality behind all forms of pedagogical practice. Radical educators must provide a central place in their pedagogy for helping other teachers and students transcend the limitations of social and pedagogical theories which ignore both the historical development as well as the relationship between the legitimation of certain forms of knowledge and the distribution of power. It is on this basis that radical educators can begin to unveil the hidden structures and over-looked contradictions that underlie so much of the prevailing thinking about schooling.

Another component of radical educational theory would center around a dialectical concept of knowledge, one which is linked to a progressive pedagogy of critical thinking. Knowledge would be seen as a historical and social construct "created by past and present generations, inlaid with strata of meaning which we learn to reanimate and interpret in original ways, finding new sense in the old, and old sense in the new." Moreover, as a social construct, knowledge would also be defined through the social mediations and social roles which provide the context for its production and distribution. The latter point is important in defining a radical dialectical conception of knowledge because it moves beyond the rather conservative phenomenological recognition that knowledge is simply a social construct. Knowledge must also be viewed as the basis for social action. The limitations of the phenomenological perspective have been aptly summarized by Richard Lichtman:

But the view is inadequate as it stands. It is overly subjective...and lacks an awareness of historical concreteness, is naive in its account of mutual typification and ultimately abandons the sense of human beings in struggle with an alien reality which they both master and to which they are subordinate. It is a view which tends to dissolve the concept of ideology or false consciousness and leaves us often against its will, without defense against the present inhuman reality.

A dialectical notion of knowledge represents a transition from a contemplative analysis of constructed meanings to the transformation of socio-economic structures which narrowly define and legitimize such meanings. The means for such a transition rests, in part, with the development of a pedagogy of critical thinking, a pedagogy which helps students link knowledge to power and human interests. A radical pedagogy of critical thinking would help students reflect on the hermeneutic meaning beneath falsified appearances; it would also help them to recognize and act upon those social processes and forces which prevent them from creating their own meanings.

The first task in constructing a radical pedagogy of critical thinking would focus on giving students the conceptual tools by which they could free themselves from what might be termed the tyranny of imposed meanings. The ideological bedrock of the latter rests with its pseudo-objectivism and anti-theoretical definition of facts. Wrapped in the language of "common-sense," facts become the epistemological fodder of false-consciousness. Within this empiricist model, the apriori values and beliefs which determine the facts are situated
in a curious silence. Thus reality becomes no more than that which is codified in the language and logic of facts—established and enforced by those who benefit from such facts! As such an important task of radical pedagogy would be to help students analyze "facts" as more than descriptive, self-contained data. The absolutizing of facts, of course, represents more than an epistemological failing; it also represents the normative core of a theoretical framework the essence of which is the abdication of reflection and the capitulation of reason before the status-quo. Given this premise, it is crucial that students understand that knowledge is not an objective, inert phenomenon which gives rise to theory. In other words, theory does not emerge after the collection of facts. Theories about intelligence, ability, motivation, learning, and interest "...do not demonstrate how they arise from the 'facts' that they are supposed to explain, but take for granted what they are supposed to explain." Therefore, it must be demonstrated that theory constitutes both the selection as well as the meaning of facts. In the final analysis, theory would be viewed as crucial to almost every stage of thinking. Not only because it helps us to order and select data, but because it also provides the conceptual tools by which to question the "data" itself. Students must be taught to recognize that theory and facts, the subjective and objective dimensions of learning, are an inseparable part of what we define as knowledge. Then the first step will be made to help them assess both their own theoretical framework as well as to move beyond the "factuality of the observed world" to that stage of thought where they can "...make inferences, to offer arguments, to develop explanations of social events which may counter those that are considered authoritative.""

The critical use of theory for the student is thus steeped in a need to recognize the difference not only between appearance and reality, but between the world as it is and the world as be or she thinks it should be. Thus, theory becomes more than a structural device for selecting and defining facts; it also becomes the medium for social action, the medium for understanding and changing reality by acknowledging its emancipatory possibilities and working to make those possibilities a reality. Consequently, theory within this context becomes an axiomatic construct the purposefulness of which is shaped by the nature of its emancipatory vision, a vision that is always transcendent, but never complete.

Underlying a dialectical notion of knowledge is the recognition that viewing one issue or problem at a time leads to a form of tunnel vision. What is important here is that students learn to view the world in its complexity and then to use a frame of reference or world view which can provide some explanatory power in shaping their own lives in a liberating fashion. It is at this point that a radical theory of knowledge and a pedagogy of critical thinking moves beyond the limiting content-focused and strategy-based pedagogical frameworks discussed earlier. For in addition to the emphasis on theory, the normative basis of knowledge, and the historical and dialectical dimensions of knowing, radical educational theory must concern itself with classroom social relations, particularly with what has been defined as the hidden curriculum underlying classroom social encounters.

A critical task of radical educational theory is to identify and move beyond those classroom structures and processes which maintain an oppressive hidden curriculum. As we have seen, the hidden curriculum of schooling operates at two levels of classroom experience. On one level, specific ideological assumptions and norms are embodied in the cultural capital and modes of reasoning institutionalized by schools and used by teachers in
the formal curriculum. On another level, students also learn roles, feelings, norms, attitudes, and social expectations from the social context, interpersonal relations, and organizational structures of the classroom. By pressing for a classroom environment in which the influence of the hidden curriculum can be understood and thus minimized, radical educators can help students develop the capacity and determination to struggle collectively to control their own lives and to "regulate their social interactions with a sense of equality, reciprocity, and communality." Here lies the key to helping students bridge the gap between theory and practice at the level of their classroom experiences. This would take the form of developing classroom social relationships in which students would be able to analyze the context of their schooling experience and thus be able to intervene in it in order to alter and overcome its reactionary features - the degree to which such change could take place would of course depend on more than the subjective insight of the students, a great deal would depend on the very real material and power restraints embedded in the school and larger community. The essential lesson here is that any viable radical educational theory has got to point to the development of classroom interactions in which the pedagogical practices used are no less radical than the messages transmitted through the specified content of the course. In brief, the content of classroom instruction must be paralleled by a pedagogical style which is consistent with a radical political vision. Some of the guidelines for such an approach can only be discussed briefly.

In general terms, radical classroom relationships must be developed with the aim of overcoming those alienating divisions of labor which help to reproduce the relations of domination and powerlessness in the classroom. Both students and teachers must learn to operate out of a context of shared respect and trust. Put another way, power in the classroom must be both democratized and humanized. It is only on the basis of this theoretical premise that a foundation can be built for developing more specific classroom practices.

Power operates in the classroom in both visible and not so visible ways. On the visible level, hierarchical relations of power manifests themselves in top-to-bottom methods of communication, rigid time schedules, rigid prescriptions about classroom behavior, and inflexible modes of evaluation. All of these practices make one thing clear: the student is viewed as a spectator rather than a choice-making participant. As such, democratized relationships are replaced by authoritarian encounters in which communiques are substituted for communication, lectures are consistently substituted for discussions, obedience is substituted for creativity, and formulas are substituted for critical thinking.

On a less visible level, power operates in the classroom through the form of social encounters in which knowledge is divorced from the student's own level of experience and knowing. Regardless of how provoking and insightful such knowledge might be, it is curiously disconnected from the student's own day-to-day reality. It is a form of knowledge that is objectified, removed from the concrete issues which touch students' lives; moreover, it usually is also removed from the language and systems of meanings used by students to understand the negotiate their own life experiences. The message here for students is more implicit but no less powerful: they are being told that their cultural center of gravity, their mode of generating meaning in the world, does not matter. Instead, they are told that what they bring to the class is less important than what they are given.

The democratization and humanization of power in the classroom should not suggest
that radical educators retreat from positions of authority. What is suggested is that we should abandon authority roles that deny the subjectivity and power students have to create and generate their own meanings and visions. Power and knowledge are intimately related in the classroom. And students must be given the opportunity to understand the political truth of the relationship. Radical educators will have to use their authority in a progressive way to build classroom social relationships which will provide the basis for helping students to understand and analyze the meaning of authority and knowledge in socio-political terms. For instance, students must learn the distinction between authority which dictates meaning and authority which fosters a critical search for meaning. This points to the understanding that knowledge must become an instrument of both the teacher and learner. Knowledge must be seen as problematic, as a mediating force between teachers and students, subject to dialogue and analysis. Under such circumstances, radical educators must recognize the limits of both their own as well as their students' knowledge and then use these limits as a foundation for continued exploration and growth.

The correlation between power and subordinacy in the classroom finds its most blatant expression in the grading process. Grades are used, in many cases, as "soft-cops" to promote social conformity and to enforce institutional sanctions. Grades become, in this case, the ultimate discipline instrument by which teachers impose their desired values, behavior patterns, and beliefs upon students. Sometimes this is done consciously, sometimes it is not; the pattern has become so institutionalized that it seems to have transcended the need for analysis and criticism. One answer to this problem is dialogical grading. Dialogical grading represents an extension of Paulo Freire's emphasis on the role of dialogue among students and teachers over the criteria, function, and consequences of the grading system. At the outset, such dialogue will have to address itself to eliminating the most arbitrary aspects of the evaluation process. Criteria for evaluation must not only be negotiated (depending to a great degree on the grade level one is working with), they must also be clear with little or no room for arbitrary judgments, i.e., grading attitude! The most important issue here is that students learn how to play a meaningful role in the grading process, one that gives them the opportunity to understand the ideological assumptions behind the choices that determine the process of grading itself.

Developing a consciousness that is nurtured in a shared struggle to democratize classroom social relationships is imperative for students if they are to overcome the passivity that accompanies the hierarchical division characteristic of most classrooms. We must make it clear to ourselves and others that such a consciousness is not going to appear spontaneously in students by simply eliminating oppressive classroom constraints and controls. The democratizing of classroom social relationships is often approached by radicals through libertarian conceptions of freedom which underplay the importance of critical conceptual mediations and overplay the personal rather than collective struggle against authority. The former ignores the notion of false consciousness and results in unfettered spontaneity while the latter fosters excessively privatized notions of freedom. Both do little to help students critically re-examine the assumptions they bring to the classroom about authority or to develop and capitalize upon new assumptions that would allow them to engage in a shared struggle to minimize the use of arbitrary authority and power in the classroom.

Any radical pedagogy must also strive to make concrete links between schools and society.
by taking students outside of the classroom. The reality of the classroom represents an ensemble of social relationships and norms whose meaning and social value can best be seen only if students are given the chance to look at these roles from outside the school itself. Radical educators must link up with progressive workers from other sectors of the economy so that students and workers can discuss mutually the socio-political realities that underlie their respective places in the larger society. Through this type of contact with other sectors of the labor force, students may be able to understand that communication and dialogue are not merely pedagogical devices for classroom use, but also represent valid political tools to be used in the struggle for a better society. Classroom insights, if they are to become meaningful, must develop in a context in which they can be explored as social truths. And this can happen only if classroom relations, grounded in the here and now of mutual respect and critical analysis among teachers and students, are extended to broader socio-political contexts which include a wider cross-section of humanity. There is another important message in this approach. Students must be able to see through the false and mystifying notion that work is inherently alienating and boring, and that working with one’s hands is accorded limited status because it is considered to be practical labor. Implicit in this message is a rationale for a division of labor, one that separates craft and discipline from imagination and extolls a false view of creativity by disconnecting it from two of its most essential components: the disciplined skill and craftsmanship that constitute the practical realm. The practical and the creative are part of the same world, and any pedagogical position which does not recognize this “dignifies the division.” In addition, this perspective promotes a false elitism in students and obscures the distinction between alienating and non-alienating labor. The latter being represented, in part, by the union of craft and imagination, the practical and the aesthetic.

In conclusion, the moment of truth for a radical theory of schooling rests, on the one hand, with its ability to help students move critically within their own subjectivity and to break with the “common-sense” assumptions that tie them to the dominant structures of power and control. On the other hand, the viability of such a theory also depends on its success in fostering the subjective preconditions necessary for a movement of liberation aimed at restructuring and reshaping the basic structure of society. As we have seen, existing perspectives on radical educational theory lack the proper analytical depth or direction for developing a radical sociology of knowledge, one that illuminates and extends existing notions of the hidden curriculum and provides a theoretical perspective on the interrelationship between schooling and ideology, knowledge and social control. A radical educational theory which links content and process, curriculum and pedagogical styles, with their corresponding forces in the larger society provides the theoretical basis for social action mediated by critical analysis. Within this context, radical educators can broaden their base of political struggle and build alliances around an organizing principle which is clearly democratic socialist in nature. It is from the vantage point of such alliances that radical educators can define the meaning of education in terms which indict not only the existing system of education, but also the fundamental structures of a society that reproduces the worst features of itself through the experience of schooling.

The search for building new possibilities for human relations within both the schools and society will not be an easy one. Many of the suggestions outlined in this paper represent a direction rather than a detailed blueprint for action. But in the final analysis, we can be sure
of one thing. Such a search will have to be steeped in a self-conscious attempt by radical educators to unite content and process at all levels of thought and action. The message here should be clear for all of us. The radical core of any pedagogy will be found not in its insistence on a doctrinal truth as much as in its ability to provide the theoretical and structural conditions necessary to help students search for and act upon the truth.
FOOTNOTES


10. Spring, OP. CIT., p. 33-34.
13. It has been pointed out that many radical educators foster subjective and individualist notions of freedom and autonomy which are at odds with the development of collectivist values that encompass social consciousness, social responsibility, and group solidarity. Elizabeth Cagen, "Individualism, Collectivism, and Radical Educational Reform," HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 48, No. 2, (May 1978), pp. 227-228; Jonathan Kozol, FREE SCHOOLS (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972).
16. Ibid., p. 68.
17. Elshtain, OP. CIT., p. 102.
22. Paulo Freire, PEDAGOGY IN PROCESS, p. 12.
Correspondence Theory,” EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 28, No. 3, (Summer 1978), pp. 194-213.
29. This is not meant to suggest that the historical struggle over the role and control of schools has been portrayed by revisionist historians as free from conflict and contradictions. Just the opposite is true. What is suggested here is that radical educators have failed to match these accounts with historical accounts of the struggle and contradictions that have characterized the day-to-day process of schooling itself. In both the past and the present students of various classes have refused to accept the “process” and “imposition” of schooling. Unfortunately, the vulgarity that characterizes overly-determined versions of the correspondence theory seem to get their weight from historians who distort the very richness and complexity of revisionist history. See Diane Ravitch THE REVISIONISTS REVISED: A CRITIQUE OF THE RADICAL ATTACK ON THE SCHOOLS (New York: Basic Books, 1978). See also the reply by Michael Katz, “An Apology for American Educational History,” HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 49, No. 2, 1978, pp. 256-266.
33. Karabel and Halsey, OP. CIT., p. 3.
35. Bourdieu and Passeron, OP. CIT., p. 11.
36. Willis, OP. CIT., p. 172.
39. Bernstein, OP. CIT.; Bourdieu, OP. CIT.; Young, OP. CIT.
42. Bourdieu and Passeron, OP. CIT.
43. An excellent analysis can be found in Raymond Williams, “Base and Super-Structure in Marxist Cultural Theory,” NEW LEFT REVIEW, 82, (November/December 1973), pp. 3-
44. Hoare, OP. CIT., p. 35.
47. Bowles and Gintis, OP. CIT., p. 255.
52. Bowles and Gintis, OP. CIT., p. 132.
58. Bourdieu and Passeron, OP. CIT., passim.
59. Keddie, OP. CIT.
60. Elshtain, OP. CIT.
63. Touraine, OP. CIT., pp. 1-175; Bourdieu. OP. CIT.
64. Touraine, OP. CIT., pp. 1-175; Bourdieu. OP. CIT.
65. The distinction between legitimation and ideology does not represent or suggest in any way the rejection of ideology as a form of legitimation. It simply acknowledges ideology as one form of legitimation, a point often overlooked by many radical educators. For instance, Pierre Bourdieu points to the hidden structures of domination which have ideological conse-
quences but do not “overtly speak” in an ideological language: “The most successful ideological effects are those which have no need of words, and ask no more than complicitous silence.” Bourdieu, IBID., p. 188.


70. Sarup, OP. CIT., p. 143.

71. Aronowitz, OP. CIT., p. 771.


73. Freire, PEDAGOGY IN PROCESS, passim; see also Andrew McLaughlin, “From Student Centered to Dialogic Teaching” RADICAL PHILOSOPHERS’ NEWS JOURNAL, No. VI, (April 1976), pp. 31-39.


75. Bowles and Gintis, OP. CIT., p. 40.

76. Freire, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED, passim.

77. Cagen, OP. CIT., p. 28.

78. Rossanda, Cini, and Berlinguer, OP. CIT., p. 657.


80. Wartofsky, OP. CIT., p. 179.