

On Analyzing Hegemony

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Introduction

Two or three years ago I was asked to write a personal statement for a volume that was reprinting a number of my papers. In that piece, I tried to document the kinds of political and personal commitments that I felt provided an irreducible minimum set of tenets which guided my work as an educator.¹ In summary, I argued strongly that education was not a neutral enterprise, that by the very nature of the institution, the educator was involved, whether he or she was conscious of it or not, in a political act. I maintained that in the last analysis educators could not fully separate their educational activity from the unequally responsive institutional arrangements and the forms of consciousness that dominate advanced industrial economies like our own.

Since writing that statement, the issues have become even more compelling to me. At the same time, I have hopefully made some progress in gaining a greater depth of understanding into this relationship between educational and economic structure, into the linkages between knowledge and power. In essence, the problem has become more and more a *structural* issue for me. I have increasingly sought to ground it in a set of critical questions that are generated out of a tradition of neo-Marxist argumentation, a tradition which seems to me to offer the most cogent framework for organizing one's thinking and action about education.

In broad outline, the approach I find most fruitful seeks to "*explicate the manifest and latent or coded reflections of modes of material production, ideological values, class relations, and structures of social power - racial and sexual as well as politico/economic - on the state of consciousness of people in a precise historical or socio-economic situation.*"² That's quite a lot for one sentence, I know. But the un-

derlying problematic is rather complicated. It seeks to portray the concrete ways in which prevalent (and I would add, alienating) structural arrangements -- the basic ways institutions, people, and modes of production, distribution, and consumption are organized and controlled -- dominate cultural life. This includes such day to day practices as schools and the teaching and curricula found within them.³

I find this of exceptional import when thinking about the relationship between the overt and covert knowledge taught in schools, the principles of selection and organization of that knowledge, and the criteria and modes of evaluation used to "measure success" in teaching. As Bernstein and Young, among others, have provocatively maintained, the structuring of knowledge and symbol in our educational institutions is intimately related to the principles of social and cultural control in a society.⁴ This is something on which I shall have more to say in a moment. Let me just state now that one of our basic problems as educators and as political beings, then, is to begin to grapple with ways of understanding how the kinds of cultural resources and symbols schools select and organize are dialectically related to the kinds of normative and conceptual consciousness "required" by a stratified society.

Others, especially Bowles and Gintis⁵, have focused on schools in a way which stress the economic role of educational institutions. Mobility, selection, the reproduction of the division of labor, and other outcomes, hence, become the prime foci for their analysis. Conscious economic manipulation by those in power is often seen as a determining element. While this is certainly important, to say the least, it gives only one side of the picture. The economic position provides a less adequate appraisal of the way these outcomes are *created* by the school. It cannot illuminate fully what the mechanisms of domination are and how they work in the day to day activity of school life. Furthermore, we must complement an economic analysis with an approach that leans more heavily on a cultural and ideological orientation if we are to completely understand the complex ways social, economic, and political tensions and contradictions are "mediated" in the concrete practices of educators as they go about their business in schools. The focus, then, should also be on the ideological and cultural mediations which exist between the material conditions of an unequal society and the formation of the consciousness of the individuals in that society. Thus, most of my work here and elsewhere

has sought to illuminate the relationship between economic and cultural domination, at what we take as given, that seems to "naturally" produce some of the outcomes partly described by those who have focused on the political economy of education.

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I think we are beginning to see more clearly a number of things that were much more cloudy before. As we learn to understand the way education acts in the economic sector of a society to reproduce important aspects of inequality⁶, so too are we learning to unpack a second major sphere in which schooling operates. For not only is there economic property, there also seems to be symbolic property -- cultural capital -- which schools preserve and distribute. Thus, we can now begin to get a more thorough understanding of how institutions of cultural preservation and distribution like schools create and recreate forms of consciousness that enable social control to be maintained without the necessity of dominant groups having to resort to overt mechanisms of domination.⁷

This is not an easy issue to deal with, of course. What I shall try to do here is to portray, in rather broad strokes, the kinds of questions embodied in this approach. However, given the limited space available in a relatively brief essay I shall enumerate what I consider to be some essential resources. These should help provide the reader with the conceptual, economic and political tools to answer the questions of "Where do I as an educator and political actor stand?", "What position should I embrace?", and "What program should guide my work?" In my discussion about some of the necessary preconditions for a politically and educationally potent program of analysis, I shall often draw upon the work of the social and cultural critic Raymond Williams. While he is not too well known among educators (and this is a distinct pity) his continuing work on the relationship between the control of the form and content of culture and the growth of the economic institutions and practices which surround us all can serve as a model, both personally and conceptually, for the kind of progressive arguments and commitments this approach entails.

There are three aspects of the program that need to be articulated here: 1) the school as an institution, 2) the knowledge forms, and 3) the educator him or herself. Each of these must be *situated* with-

in the larger nexus of relations of which it is a constitutive part. The key word here, obviously, is situated. Like the economic analysts such as Bowles and Gintis, by this I mean that, as far as is possible, we need to place the knowledge that we teach, the social relations that dominate classrooms, the school as a mechanism of cultural and economic preservation and distribution, and finally, ourselves as people who work in these institutions, back into the context in which they all reside. All of these things are subject to an interpretation of their respective places in a complex, stratified, and unequal society. But we must be careful of misusing this tradition of interpretation. All too often, we forget the subtlety required to begin to unpack these relations. We situate the institution, the curriculum, and ourselves in an overly deterministic way. We say there is a one to one correspondence between economics and consciousness, economic base "automatically" determining superstructure. This is too easy to say, unfortunately, and is much too mechanistic. For it forgets that there is, in fact, a dialectical relationship between culture and economics. It also presupposes an idea of conscious manipulation of schooling by a very small number of people with power. While this was and is sometimes the case⁹, the problem is much more complex than that. Thus, in order to go further, we must first clarify what is meant by the notion that structural relations "determine" these three aspects of schools. As I shall argue, the key to understanding this is the concept of *hegemony*.

It is important to note that there are two traditions of using concepts such as "determine". On the one hand, the notion of thought and culture being determined by social and economic structure has been used to imply what was mentioned a minute ago, a one to one correspondence between social consciousness and, say, mode of production. Our social concepts, here, are totally prefigured or predicated upon a pre-existing set of economic conditions that control cultural activity, including everything in schools. On the other hand, there is a somewhat more flexible position which speaks of determination as a complex nexus of relationships which, in their final moment, are economically rooted, that exert pressures and set limits on cultural practice, including schools.¹⁰ Thus the cultural sphere is not a "mere reflection" of economic practices. Instead, the influence, the "reflection" or determination, is highly mediated by forms of human action. It is mediated by the specific activities, contradictions, and relationships among real men and women like ourselves -- as they go about their day to day lives in the institutions which organize their lives. The control of schools, knowledge

and every day life can be, and is, more subtle for it takes in even seemingly inconsequential moments. The control is vested in the constitutive principles, codes, and commonsense practices underlying our lives, as well as by overt economic division and manipulation.

Raymond Williams' discussion of hegemony, a concept most fully developed in the work of Antonio Gramsci, provides an excellent summary of these points. *It is Gramsci's great contribution to have emphasized hegemony, and also to have understood it at a depth which is, I think, rare. For hegemony supposes the existence of something which is truly total, which is not merely secondary or superstructural, like the weak sense of ideology, but which is lived at such a depth, which saturates the society to such an extent, and which, as Gramsci put it, even constitutes the limit of commonsense for most people under its sway, that it corresponds to the reality of social experience much more clearly than any notions derived from the formula of base and superstructure. For if ideology were merely some abstract imposed notion, if our social and political and cultural ideas and assumptions and habits were merely the result of specific manipulation, of a kind of overt training which might be simply ended or withdrawn, then the society would be very much easier to move and to change than in practice it has been or is. This notion of hegemony as deeply saturating the consciousness of a society seems to be fundamental . . . [It] emphasizes the facts of domination.* 11

The crucial idea embedded in this passage is how hegemony acts to "saturate" our very consciousness, so that the educational, economic, and social world we see and interact with, and the commonsense interpretations we put on it, becomes the world "tout court", the only world. Hence, hegemony refers not to congeries of meanings that reside at an abstract level somewhere at the "roof of our brain." Rather, it refers to an organized assemblage of meanings and practices, the central, effective and dominant system of meanings, values, and actions which are *lived*. It needs to be understood on a different level than "mere opinion" or "manipulation." Williams makes this clear in his arguments concerning the relationship between hegemony and the control of cultural resources. At the same time, he points out how educational institutions may act in this process of saturation. I would like to quote one of his longer passages, one which I think begins to capture the complexity and one

which goes beyond the idea that consciousness is only a mere reflection of economic structure, wholly determined by one class which consciously imposes it on another. At the same time the passage catches the crux of how the assemblage of meanings and practices still leads to, and comes from, unequal economic and cultural control.

[Hegemony] is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary understanding of man and his world. It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced [as a] reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of a society to move in most areas of their lives. But this is not, except in the operation of a moment of abstract analysis, a static system. On the contrary we can only understand an effective and dominant culture if we understand the real social process on which it depends: I mean the process of incorporation. The modes of incorporation are of great significance, and incidently in our kind of society have considerable economic significance. The educational institutions are usually the main agencies of transmission of an effective dominant culture, and this is now a major economic as well as cultural activity; indeed it is both in the same moment. Moreover, at a philosophical level, at the true level of theory and at the level of the history of various practices, there is a process which I call the selective tradition: that which, within the terms of an effective dominant culture, is always passed off as "the tradition," the significant past. But always the selectivity is the point; the way in which from a whole possible area of past and present, certain meanings and practices are chosen for emphasis, certain other meanings and practices are neglected and excluded. Even more crucially, some of these meanings are reinterpreted, diluted, or put into forms which support or at least do not contradict other elements within the effective dominant culture.

The process of education; the processes of a much wider social training within institutions like the family; the practical definitions and organization of work; the selective tradition at an intellectual and theoretical level: all these forces are involved in a continual making and re-making of an effective dominant culture, and on them, as experienced, ^{as} buildt into our

*living, reality depends. If we what we learn were merely an imposed ideology, or if it were only the isolable meanings and practices of the ruling class, or of a section of the ruling class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely the top of our minds, it would be - and one would be glad - a very much easier thing to overthrow.*¹²

Notice what Williams is saying here about educational institutions. It is similar to the point I argued earlier about the possible relationship between the school as an institution and the recreation of inequality. Schools, in the words of the British sociologists of the curriculum, do not only "process people"; they "process knowledge" as well.¹³ They act as agents of cultural hegemony, in Williams' words as agents of selective tradition and of cultural "incorporation." But as institutions they not only are one of the main agencies of distributing an effective dominant culture; among other institutions, they help create people (with appropriate meanings and values) who see no other serious possibility to the economic and cultural assemblage now extant. I want to argue, hence, that his makes the concepts of ideology, hegemony, and selective tradition critical elements in the political and analytic underpinnings of an investigation of the relationship between curriculum and cultural and economic reproduction.

For example, as I have argued elsewhere, the issues surrounding the knowledge that is actually taught in school, surrounding what is considered to be socially *legitimate* knowledge, are of no small moment in becoming aware of the school's problematic so that their latent ideological content can be recovered. Questions such as the following need to be taken quite seriously. Whose knowledge is it? Who selected it? Why is it organized and taught in this way? To this particular group? The mere act of asking these questions is not sufficient, however. One is guided, as well, by attempting to link these investigations to competing conceptions of social and economic power and ideologies. In this way, one can begin to get a more concrete appraisal of the linkages between economic and political power and the knowledge *made available* (and *not made available*) to students.¹⁴

The movement, say, in social studies toward "process oriented" curriculum is a case in point. We teach social "inquiry" as a set of "skills", as a series of methods that will enable students to "to learn how to inquire themselves." While this is certainly better than the more rote models of teaching which prevailed in previous decades, at the same time it can actually depoliticize the study of social life. We ask our students to see

knowledge as a social construction, in the more disciplinary programs to see how sociologists, historians, anthropologists and others construct their theories and concepts. Yet, in so doing we do not enable them to inquire as to *why* a particular form of social collectivity exists, *how* it is maintained and *who* benefits from it. As the British sociologist of education Geoff Whitty so nicely puts it, "The overemphasis on the notion that reality is socially constructed seems to have led to the neglect of the consideration of how and why reality comes to be constructed in particular ways and how and why particular constructions of reality seem to have the power to resist subversion."¹⁵

There exists in curriculum development, and in teaching, something of a failure of nerve. We are willing to prepare students to assume "some responsibility for their own learning." Whether these goals are ever actually reached given what Sarason has called the behavioral regularities of the institution is interesting here, but not at issue. Just as important is the fact that what one is "critically reflecting" about is often vacuous, ahistorical, onesided, and ideologically laden. As has been demonstrated in prior analyses, for instance, the constitutive framework of most school curricula centers around consensus. There are few serious attempts at dealing with conflict (class conflict, scientific conflict, or other). Instead, one "inquires" into a consensus ideology that bears little resemblance to the complex nexus and contradictions surrounding the control and organization of social life.¹⁶ Thus, the selective tradition dictates that we do not teach, or will selectively reinterpret (and hence will soon forget), serious labor or woman's history. Yet we do teach elite and military history. Whatever economics is taught is dominated by a perspective that grows out of the National Association of Manufacturers or its equivalent. And honest information about countries that have organized themselves about alternative social principles is hard to find. These are only but a few examples, of course.

Neutrality and Justice

The very fact that we tend to reduce our understanding of the social and economic forces underlying our unequal society to a set of skills, to "how to's", mirrors a much larger issue. It speaks to the technicization of life in advanced industrial economies. In Habermas' terms, purposive-

rational, or instrumental, forms of reasoning and action replace symbolic action systems. Political and economic, and even educational, debate among real people in their day to day lives is replaced by considerations of efficiency, of technical skills. "Accountability" through behavioral analysis, systems management, and so on become hegemonic representations. And at the same time considerations of the *justice* of social life are progressively depoliticized and made into supposedly neutral puzzles that can be solved by the accumulation of neutral empirical facts¹⁷, which when fed back into neutral institutions like schools can be guided by the neutral instrumentation of educators.

The claim to neutrality is important in this representation, not merely in social life in general, but in education in particular. We assume that our activity is neutral, that by not taking a political stance we are being objective. This is significantly falsified, however, in two ways. First, there is an increasing accumulation of evidence that the institution of schooling is not a neutral enterprise in terms of its economic outcomes. As Basil Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu, and others have sought to show, and as the quotes from Williams have pointed to in this essay, schools may in fact serve the interests of many individuals, and this should not be denied, at the same time, though, empirically they also seem to act as powerful agents in the economic and cultural reproduction of class relations in a stratified society like our own.¹⁸ This is a rather involved issue, yet the literature on the role schools play in economic and cultural stratification is becoming increasingly impressive. This is one of the sections of this essay, hence, where I would like to take the opportunity to suggest a number of pieces that might best be examined to uncover what schools may actually do.

Despite its many weaknesses and its somewhat too heavy reliance on a correspondence theory, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA* (New York, Basic Books, 1975) is one place to begin the analysis of economic reproduction. The school's role in cultural reproduction, in hegemony, is explored in Basil Bernstein, *CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL*, Volume 3: *TOWARDS A THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL TRANSMISSIONS* (second edition; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), in Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE* (London: Sage

Publications, 1977), in Michael F. D. Young, ed., KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), in Michael F.D. Young and Geoff Whitty, eds. SOCIETY, STATE, AND SCHOOLING, (Guildford, England: The Falmer Press, 1977), Roger Dale, et.al., eds., SCHOOLING AND CAPITALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL READER (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), and Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, eds., POWER AND IDEOLOGY IN EDUCATION (New York: Oxford, 1977). These volumes would be a good place to start one's investigation of schooling and economic and cultural control.

Let me note, actually reiterate, the second reason a claim to neutrality carries less weight than it might. The claim ignores the fact that the knowledge that now gets into schools is already a choice from a much larger universe of possible social knowledge and principles. It is a form of cultural capital that comes from somewhere, that often reflects the perspectives and beliefs of powerful segments of our social collectivity. In its very production and dissemination as a public and economic commodity -- as books, films, materials, and so forth -- it is repeatedly filtered through ideological and economic commitments. Social and economic values, hence, are already embedded in the design of the institutions we work in, in the "formal corpus of school knowledge" we preserve in our curricula, in our modes of teaching, and in our principles, standards, and forms of evaluation. Since these values now work *through* us, often unconsciously, the issue is not how to stand above the choice. Rather, it is in what values I must ultimately choose.

But this brings to the fore another part of the problem as well -- those deep-seated values that already reside not at the top but at the very "bottom" of our heads that I mentioned before. The very categories we use to approach our responsibility to others, the commonsense rules we employ to evaluate the social practices that dominate our society, are often at issue. Perhaps the most critical of these categories is our commitment to the abstract individual. For it is the case that our sense of community is withered at its roots. We divorce the individual from larger social movements which might give meaning to "individual" wants, needs, and visions of justice.¹⁹ This is strongly supported by the notion that curriculum research is a "neutral scientific activity" which does not tie us to others

in important structural ways.

Our inability to think in other than individualistic terms is nicely expressed once again by Raymond Williams in his argument that the dominance of the bourgeois individual distorts our understanding of our real social relations with and dependence on others.

*I remember a miner saying to me, of someone we were discussing: "He's the sort who gets up in the morning and presses a switch and expects a light to come on." We are all, to some extent, in this position, in that our modes of thinking habitually suppress large areas of our real relationships, including our real dependence on others. We think of my money, my light, in these naive terms, because parts of our very idea of society are withered at root. We can hardly have any conception, in our present system, of the financing of social purposes from the social product, a method which would continually show us, in real terms, what our society is and does. In a society whose products depend almost entirely on intricate and continuous cooperation and social organization, we expect to consume as if we were isolated individuals, making our own way. We are then forced into the stupid comparison of individual consumption and social taxation - one desirable and to be extended, the other regrettably necessary and to be limited. From this kind of thinking, the physical unbalance follows inevitably. Unless we achieve some realistic sense of community, our true standard of living will continue to be distorted. . . . Questions not only of balance in the distribution of efforts and resources, but also of the effects of certain kinds of work both on users and producers, might then be adequately negotiated It is precisely the lack of an adequate sense of society that is crippling us.*²⁰

Williams' points are many here, yet among them are the following. Our concern for the abstract individual in our social, economic, and educational life is exactly that -- it is merely an abstraction. It does not situate the life of the individual (and ourselves as educators), as an economic and social being, back into the unequal structural relations that produced the comfort the individual enjoys. It can act as an ideological presupposition that keeps us from establishing any genuine sense of affiliation with

those who produce our comforts, thus making it even more difficult to overcome the atrophication of collective commitment. Thus, the overemphasis on the individual in our educational, emotional, and social lives is ideally suited to both maintain a rather manipulative ethic of consumption and further the withering of political and economic sensitivity. The latent effects of both absolutizing the individual and defining our roles as neutral technicians in the service of amelioration, therefore, makes it nearly impossible for educators and others to develop a potent analysis of widespread social and economic injustice. It makes their curricular and teaching practices relatively impotent in exploring the nature of the social order of which they are part.

An exceptionally important element in this kind of argument is the idea of *relation*. What I am asking for is what might best be called "relational analyses." It involves seeing social activity -- with education as a particular form of that activity -- as tied to the larger arrangement of institutions which apportion resources so that particular groups and classes have historically been helped while others have been less adequately treated. In essence, social action, cultural and educational events and artifacts (what Bourdieu would call cultural capital) are "defined" not by their obvious qualities that we can immediately see. Instead of this rather positivistic approach, things are given meaning relationally, by their complex ties and connections to how a society is organized and controlled. The relations themselves are the defining characteristics.²¹ Thus, to understand, say, the notions of science and the individual, as we employ them in education especially, we need to see them as primarily ideological economic categories that are essential to both the production of agents to fill existing economic roles and the reproduction of dispositions and meanings in these agents that will "cause" them to accept these alienating roles without too much questioning.²² They become aspects of hegemony.

Here again a number of volumes are exceptionally helpful in illuminating the nature of relational analysis. Bertell Ollman's excellent explication of the conceptual apparatus of seeing things relationally in *ALIENATION* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971), is perhaps the best. Other works that are useful here as concrete examples of the actual practice of such inquiries are Raymond Williams, *THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), Eugene Genovese, *ROLL*,

JORDAN, ROLL (New York: Random House, 1974), Harry Braverman, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), Lucien Goldmann, CULTURAL CREATION (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1976), and Paul Willis, LEARNING TO LABOUR (Westmead, England: Saxon House, 1977). The Braverman book is of special interest since it documents the growth of such things as systems management, task analysis, and so forth, items which have become such a large part of the rhetorical arsenal of "efficiency minded" educators.

So far I have looked rather broadly at what I perceive to be much of the reality behind schools as institutions, the knowledge forms we selectively preserve, reinterpret, and distribute, some of the categories we use to think about these things, and the role of the educator as a "neutral" participant in the large scale results of schooling. There are still a few final comments to be said about that last aspect of the program, the approach, I am setting forth here though -- the educator him or herself as political being. This is a very personal question, one that is by far the hardest. I am quite aware of the difficulty, in fact often the torture, that one must face in responding to or even adequately asking the question of "Where do I stand?" This kind of question already presupposes the relationship between cultural capital and economic and social control. It requires an analysis of what social and economic groups and classes seem to be helped by the way the institutions in our society are organized and controlled and which groups are not.

The fact that this question *is* so hard to deal with, the helpless feeling we get when we ask it (what can I as one educator do now?) points to the utter importance of Gramsci's and Williams' arguments about the nature of hegemony. To hold our day to day activities as educators up to political and economic scrutiny, to see the school as part of a system of mechanisms for cultural and economic reproduction, is not merely to challenge the prevailing practices of education. If it were "merely" this, then we could perhaps change these practices through teacher training, better curriculum, and so on. These practices may need changes, of course, and there is still a place for such ameliorative reform. But the kinds of critical scrutiny I have argued for challenges a whole assemblage of values and actions "outside" of the institution of schooling. And this is exactly the point, for if taken seriously, it must lead to a set of commitments that may be wholly different than those many of us common-

sensically accept. It requires the progressive articulation of and commitment to a social order that has at its very foundation not the accumulation of goods, profits, and credentials, but the maximization of economic, social, and educational equality.

All of this centers around a theory of social justice. My own inclination is to argue for something to the left of a Rawlsian stance. For a society to be just it must, as a matter of both principle and action, contribute most to the advantage of the least advantaged.²³ That is, its structural relations must be such as to equalize not merely access to but actual control of cultural, social, and especially economic institutions.²⁴ Now this would require more than mere tinkering with the social engine, for it implies a restructuring of institutions and a fundamental reshaping of the social contract that has supposedly bound us together. This theory of social justice which lies behind such a program needs to be generated out of more than personal ideology. It has its basis in a number of empirical claims as well. For example, the gap between rich and poor in advanced industrial nations is increasing. The distribution and control of health, nutritional, and educational goods and services is basically unequal in these same industrialized nations.²⁵ Economic and cultural power is being increasingly centralized in massive corporate bodies that are less than responsive to social needs other than profit. After some initial gains, the relative progress of women and many minority groups are either stagnant or slowly atrophying. Because of these and other reasons, I am more and more convinced that these conditions are "naturally" generated out of a particular social order. Our educational dilemmas, the unequal achievement, the unequal returns, the selective tradition and incorporation, are also "naturally" generated out of this social arrangement. It may be the case that these institutions are organized and controlled in such a way as to require rather large scale changes in their relationships if progress is to be made in eliminating any of these conditions.

I realize that this is rather controversial, to say the least. Nor do I expect that everyone will accept all that I have written here. However, I did not first come to the position that our educational issues are *at root* ethical, economic, and political and then search for documentation for it.

Rather, and this is important, I have been convinced by evidence available to all of us if we are willing to search and question, if we can learn to analyze hegemony. In fact this is part of the approach I would like to explicate here. One thing should be clear, this program requires a good deal of plain old hard "intellectual" work, as well. It involves more than a modicum of reading, study, and honest debate in areas many of us have only a limited background in. We are unused to looking at educational activity politically and economically, not to say critically, given the very difficult (and time-consuming and emotionally draining) nature of being a decent educator. This task is made even more difficult because of what might be called the politics of knowledge distribution. That is, the kinds of tools and frameworks I have noted here are not readily distributed by the prevailing institutions of cultural preservation and distribution like schools and mass media. These critical traditions are themselves victims of selective tradition. If my arguments here and elsewhere about the nature of whose knowledge gets into schools are correct, this may be unfortunate but it is to be expected. However, if we do not take it upon ourselves to master these traditions, to relearn them, we ignore the fact that the kinds of institutional and cultural arrangements which control us were buildt by us. They can be rebuildt as well.

Conclusion

I have argued in this essay that any serious appraisal of the role of education and curriculum in a complex society must have as a major part of its analysis at least three elements. It needs to situate the knowledge, the school, and the educator him or herself within the real social conditions which "determine" these elements. I have also argued that this act of situating needs to be guided by a vision of social and economic justice if it is to be meaningful. Hence, I have also maintained that the position of educator is neutral neither in the forms of cultural capital distributed and employed by schools nor in the economic and cultural outcomes of the schooling enterprise itself. These issues are best analyzed through the concepts of hegemony, ideology, selective tradition, and relational analysis.

Obviously, a brief article can do more than state these elements. No matter how passionately stated, though, documentation is still often

required. Because of this, throughout this essay, both in the body of my analysis and in the footnotes, I have noted a number of resources that should prove helpful in underpinning such a critical program. But we must be cautious here. Documentation does not only come from books. It comes from praxis as well, from reflexively inserting oneself in the political, economic, and cultural struggles to change the unequal and hegemonic conditions out of which this program was generated.²⁶ Thus the question is not merely "How do I understand?", but "How do I, collectively, act?" Only in such thoughtful commitment is there hope.

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Note: This essay appears in revised form in my forthcoming volume, *IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979). A briefer version has appeared in *THE HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE TEACHER* XIII (Winter 1978).

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13. See, for example, Michael F. D. Young, ed. *KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971.)
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15. Geoff Whitty, "Sociology and the Problem of Radical Educational Change," *EDUCABILITY, SCHOOLS AND IDEOLOGY*, Michael Flude and John Ahier, eds. (London: Halstead Press, 1974), p. 125.
16. Michael W. Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," *INTERCHANGE II* (number 4, 1971), 27-40.
17. Trent Schroyer's account of this process is helpful here. See his *THE CRITIQUE OF DOMINATION* (New York: George Braziller, 1973). I have discussed this tendency at greater length in Michael W. Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education," *REGAINING EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, Ralph A. Smith, ed. (New York: John Wiley, 1975), pp. 104-121
18. See, e.g., Michael W. Apple, "Ideology, Reproduction, and Educational Reform," *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW XXII* (October 1978).

19. Part of what follows here appears in expanded form in Michael W. Apple, "Humanism and the Politics of Educational Argumentation," *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: VISIONS AND REALITIES*, Richard Weller, ed. (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1977). See also, Michael W. Apple, "Ideology and Form in Curriculum Evaluation," *QUALITATIVE EVALUATION*, George Willis, ed. (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978).
20. Raymond Williams, *THE LONG REVOLUTION* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), pp. 298-300.
21. Apple, "Power and School Knowledge," op. cit.
22. Ian Hextall and Madan Sarup, "School Knowledge, Evaluation and Alienation," *SOCIETY, STATE AND SCHOOLING*, Michael Young and Geoff Whitty, eds. (Guildford, England: The Falmer Press, 1977), pp. 151-171.
23. John Rawls, *A THEORY OF JUSTICE* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.)
24. For an interesting discussion of the debate in education over the social principle of equality of opportunity, see Walter Feinberg, *REASON AND RHETORIC: THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF TWENTIETH CENTURY LIBERAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY* (New York: John Wiley, 1975).
25. Vicente Navarro, *MEDICINE UNDER CAPITALISM* (New York: Neale Watson Academic Publications, 1976).
26. On this point, see the analysis of Gramsci's treatment of the "organic intellectual" in Carl Boggs, *GRAMSCI'S MARXISM* (London: Pluto Press, 1976).