55

The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing

3:2

The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing

Volume Three, Issue Two
Summer 1981

Table of Contents

Feminism and Curriculum Theory: Implications for Teacher Education

Barbara S. Mitrano
State University of New York - Brockport

Chapter One

Introduction

> Teacher education is characterized at the levels of theory and action alike by confusion, by effervescent hopes and mordant fears, by wishful thinking and destructive pessimism. (McCarty, 1973, p. 1)

McCarty summarizes as well as anyone the state of teacher education in the 1970's. On the theoretical level there is confusion over which issues are most germane to teacher education, what (if anything) constitutes the knowledge base in education, and how research in teacher education is to be conducted. On the action level there is confusion over what skills (if any) a teacher needs, how to evaluate "good" teaching, and how much clinical expeience a beginning teacher should have. Moreover, these issues only begin to deal with the many complexities with which teacher education is beset. Teacher education resembles a kaleidoscope, the colors and patterns shifting in an almost endless variety of configurations. As soon as one has seen one configuration, the pattern shifts, the pieces settle, and a new configuration presents itself. Sometimes the predominant color is humanism or behaviorism; still another shift and the predominant hue is research design or evaluation models. Anyone attempting to grasp the field of teacher education finds it elusive, a chameleon, taking on the color and pattern of whatever author is presenting the issues. Two temptations present themselves then, to those who would study teacher education. One is to give it up, to assume that it is too tedious and too impractical to sort it all out, that the demands of teaching are too urgent and daily to take time for more reflective study. The other is to design and execute studies of a more and more elaborate nature in an attempt to capture all of the "variables". John Wilson (1975) describes this temptation and why it is unsatisfactory.

> There could be a temptation here to attempt some massive work calling for adjectives like 'definitive' or 'comprehensive' - as if one could somehow settle the hash of these topics in detail ... In the present state of the subject, what we need is more initial clarity and agreement; not works of giant pseudo-scholarship. (p. 22)

Teacher education is too crucial to the total field of education to give up attempting to sort it out or to simply proceed with more of the same kinds of studies which have previously not been definitive. What is needed is some sort of honest assessment of the present and a clarification of the issues for the future. Wilson (1975) states simply.

> As with educational theory, the only honest attitude towards the preparation of teachers at present is something like, 'We're not clear what we ought to do, and we had better try to get clear.' (p. 12)

"Getting clear" implies a standing back, an extrication of oneself from the tangle which prevents a wider perception. It implies a distancing in order, paradoxically, to come closer to what the essentials are. Too great a distance, of course, removes the area of study out of sight altogether. A delicate balance, therefore, is required in an attempt "to get clear". One never has the absolute certainty that one is close enough or far enough away for the kind of clarity one desires. Yet, one can be attentive to the process of maintaining the balance and the "attending" often clarifies the balance. There is a tentativeness about the process of

writing "to get clear" about the issues of teacher education. But the process itself may reveal more clearly what the issues are. It is, as James Macdonald (1975) points out, "easier to come to know what one values through one's writing than to write from our values as rational beginning points". (p. 3)

The first stage in "getting clear" requires asking how this might be accomplished. How might one go about clarifying what is crucial in teacher education? The methodology for such an undertaking requires placing teacher education in the context of research. Research implies that the researcher is "trying to find out" something. S/he may know at the outset what it is s/he wants to find out. Such is the case when a researcher tries to find out if a certain virus is the cause of some disease. The case of teacher education, however, may (perhaps should) suggest a finding out of another sort. Since it is not clear what is being sought, attentive looking, without prior decisions as to specifically what is sought, is all the more crucial. A look at the function of research in teacher education (and education) reveals some interesting questions of its own.

One of these questions is: What effect does the research question and/or the research paradigm have on the research process and research findings? Walter Doyle (1978) in "Paradigms for Teacher Effectiveness Research" develops the point that paradigms function in a normative way, that the way the question is framed reveals a set of assumptions about the kinds of answers that are possible. As applied to the specific question of how teacher effectiveness can be measured, then the research will be of a different kind than if the validity of measurement of effectiveness is questioned or if the meaning of effectiveness itself is questioned. Doyle offers as examples three types of teacher effectiveness paradigms: 1) the process-product paradigm, 2) the mediating variables paradigm, and 3) the classroom ecology paradigm. The first operates on the assumption that specific teacher behaviors produce certain learner behaviors, in the manner of a stimulus-response circuit. Usually the focus of such studies is on the response component, the learner. The mediating variables paradigm shifts the emphasis from the response component to the stimulus component, the teacher. The classroom ecology paradigm shifts the emphasis again to the mutual relations among environmental demands and human responses (p. 32) What is crucial here is the function of the paradigm in determining the question as well as the possible answers to the question. More importantly, none of the paradigms articulates clearly whether or not the question to be researched is a crucial one or a trivial one. Nor do they offer any guidelines for differentiating crucial questions from trivial ones.

Another important question about the function of research is: What about the person doing the research? Ross Mooney (1975), in "The Researcher Himself", distinguishes between the consumer's point of view with regard to research and the producer's point of view. The consumer point of view is characterized by a separation of the researcher from the research, by a concern only in what can be quantitatively measured, controlled or manipulated. The consumer point of view requires a detached, objective, unemotional, rational researcher. It encourages the researcher to view truths as independent of the person knowing them, to see science as concerned only with what is "true and not with what is 'good' ", to select problems based on what science needs to know, not on what the researcher needs to know (p. 177-180).

Mooney advocates a producer's point of view as an alternative. The producer's point of view puts the researcher in contact with his/her experience, with his/her Self, with the world. It sees truth and good in reciprocal relationship; it sees knowledge as the sharing of meanings, carefully articulated by individuals. It requires the researcher to be committed, involved, thorough and creative (p. 199-200). The hope that the producer's point of view offers for "getting clear" is that it ceases to view issues solely in terms of dichotomies. It stresses unities rather than dualities. Seeming opposites are seen as being in creative tension rather than as either-or categories. The researcher sees him/her Self in creative dialogue with the research, with Self, with the world. If the muddle of teacher education is to be clarified at all, it would seem that the producer's point of view offers more hope that such clarification will occur than does the consumer's point of view.

If one looks even more closely at the sets of assumptions which characterize the consumer's point of view and the producer's point of view, it is clear that the consumer's point of view is a male-dominated point of view. This does not mean that it is male only because research in education is dominated by men (Parelius and Parelius, 1978, p. 222). It is male because those attributes of detachment, rationality, objectivity, etc. of the consumer point of view are those attributes commonly assigned to and advocated by men. The significance of this for educational research is that the norms of our society are male-dominated (Fantini, 1975). It is not just that males who have these qualities are doing educational research. It is that these qualities form a mind-set which develops paradigms, frames research questions, carries out research projects. It is, moreover, this mind-set which is valued, praised and financed, so that it becomes the guiding norm for what research should be about. It is obvious that some men (Mooney is one) advocate a fresh perspective, a new way of looking at research in education, which would allow previously unasked questions to surface. What Mooney terms the producer's point of view could also be termed a "feminist" point of view. A distinction needs to be made here between "feminine" and "feminist". "Feminine" refers to those qualities usually assigned to females in this society. They include passivity, docility, emotionalism, softness, etc. "Feminist", however, refers to those qualities of commitment, involvement, and perception which Mooney associates with the producer's point of view. These are qualities to which the feminist movement is dedicated and by which it hopes to transform society.

The context of this study emanates from this "feminist" view of research. It is research whose goal is "to get clear" about what teacher education is and should be. It is a kind of research which attempts to "make sense" in a fundamental way that can be termed "theorizing". If distinctions are seen as being in dialogue rather than in opposition, then the distinction between theorizing and research can also be viewed as an interchange rather than a before-then category. Richard Snow's (1973) description of this interchange reveals that in studying the role of theory in research...

> One can concentrate on the individual's research and theoretical work in the development of paradigms or on the paradigms themselves and their influence on subsequent theory and research of individuals. (p. 79)

The kind of research focused on in this study is more of the first concentration rather than the second. It views theorizing, in the sense of "getting clear," as a kind of research of its own. Madeleine Grumet (1976) reminds us that the theoros was a representative sent from his Greek city to observe sacred festivals. "Through theoria, looking on, he abandoned himself to those events, to their version of cosmic order, and strove to imitate its ordered relationships and proportions in his own self-formation" (p. 68). My own self-formation was both the motivation for and goal of this research. It grew from the biographical situation in which teaching experience, interest in teacher education, involvement in feminism, and interests in curriculum theory were seeking a way to make their interconnections articulate. It is faithful to Mooney's description of research as a personal venture, worth doing for its direct contribution to one's own self-realization (p. 176). It also seeks to be faithful to Richard J. Bernstein's (1976) description of the classical function of theory as being practical efficacy - its ability to help us distinguish appearance from reality, the false from the true, and to provide an orientation for practical activity (p. 53). As such, the process rather than the product of the research becomes the focus. Expressed another way, the process becomes the product. The dichotomies between theory and practice, quantitative and qualitative, objectivity and subjectivity are transformed into dialogues from which new syntheses may emerge. The study will attempt to provide, as a result of the research, an example of "theorizing" rather than a "theory" for teacher education.

> The point here is not just (not even chiefly) that we must be clear what we are talking about 'before we get down the facts' or 'before we launch research projects'; it is rather that, in trying to get clear what we are talking about 'the facts' themselves become clearer, and it then becomes clearer also what sort of other 'facts' we need to know. (Wilson, 1975, p. 55)

The methodology I have chosen for this study is an adaptation of William Pinar's (1976) four stage method of currere. Currere's regressive, progressive, analytic and synthetic stages have been helpful, when applied to life-history, in allowing meanings to emerge which might have remained hidden (Pinar, 1976, 1978). Since teacher education, curriculum theorizing and feminist theorizing are all elements of my life-history, currere offers a potentially fruitful method by which meanings in these areas, which may have remained hidden, will emerge. The study will be regressive in that Chapter 2 examines the state of teacher education, its research and its theorizing, up to the present. Another facet of the regressive stage is an examination of the research and theorizing in the occupation of teaching since teacher education is inextricably linked with the occupation. This stage of the study, similar to the regressive stage as applied to life-history, is concerned chiefly with the past. The progressive stage of the study, Chapter 3, looks to the future. As a means of doing this it re-examines the above literature to determine what kind of research and theorizing might offer new insight into teacher education. The analytic stage, Chapter 4, examines the insights which reconceptualist curriculum theorizing and feminist theorizing have to offer about those issues which emerge from this attempt "to get clear" about teacher education. These issues include: 1) the meaning of education, 2) the importance of experience in education, 3) the concept of Self, 4) the effect of institutional constraints on the individual, 5) sexism in schools and society, 6) the problem of individual capacity for changing institutions, 7) the power of language to shape thoughts and activities such as research. The synthetic stage, Chapter 5, shows how these insights from reconceptualist curriculum theorizing and feminist theorizing can be used as a basis from which to theorize about teacher education. It offers invitations in the form of possible ways in which curriculum theorizing and feminist theorizing may continue to dialogue and the value of this dialogue to teacher education.

The choice of currere as a methodology for research which attempts "to get clear" about teacher education was made against the background of the confusion about teacher education Wilson describes. It was made with an awareness that research of a qualitative nature, particularly in our male-dominated society, is often thought of as "fuzzy", "soft", and not sufficiently rigorous. Michael Apple (1978) examines this argument and finds it empty.

> We should not assume that the switch from the quantitative to the person oriented means less rigor. Quite the opposite is the case. Though it may require a somewhat different kind of rigor, the qualitative in no way replaces the need for conceptual sophistication. (p. 13)

In the area of feminist theorizing, there is less concern with being acceptable by current, male-dominated definitions of scholarship. Women not only have less to lose because they are already "outside" the higher levels of academia, but having examined male models of research and found them wanting (as many male researchers have also), they have proceeded to develop their own definitions. Rosemary Radforth Ruether (1975) is a good example, not only of this search for new definitions, but of the personal tone which such scholarship takes.

> I do not apologize for a certain generality. Women's studies is addressing itself to a different task from which has shaped traditional scholarship. For this reason its criteria of competence must also be different. (p. xii)

If teacher education is to achieve the kind of clarity which is now seems to lack, it must use research methodologies which are personally integrated with the life of the researcher. Currere serves such a function in my life. It provdes a way in which I can integrate my concerns about reconceptualist curriculum theorizing, feminist theorizing, and teacher education with my own life-with-meaning. It is hoped that such an integration has allowed me to work with what Mooney calls "soundness and profit" to myself and others (p. 206). There is a danger, of course, that I may, in fact, not be able "to get clear" about teacher education, or that my personal "getting clear" may not be generalizable to others. Nevertheless there are those, like William Pilder (1974), who offer encouragement.

> Throughout the journey I must resist that perverse tendency to make normative what is simply my own pilgrimage, but at the same time I know that the only hold I have on truth is this sense of what I must do. (p. 126)

Chapter Two
Regressive Stage
Teacher Education

Taking the distance required to "get clear" about teacher education requires emphasizing certain distinctions and integrating others. If the pieces of the kaleidoscope could be spread out so they were no longer confined to a narrow cylinder, various consistencies would appear in the designs, colors would be repeated, the way the pieces interconnected would become more obvious. With teacher education, the distancing reveals patterns in which teacher education, research, curriculum theory, teaching as an occupation, education as a field of study, and sexism in education intermingle in intricate ways. As a result, analyses in one of these areas are often illuminating for other areas as well. This chapter parallels the regressive stage of currere in that it examines the literature in these areas to clarify those issues and relationships which have been identified in the past, recognizing that the most recent word, even as it is written, slips from the present into the past.

As a first step in gaining this distance, Pinar's (1975) description of the curriculum field is particularly useful because it not only offers insight into the area of educational research, but demonstrates the relationship between the research perspective and its influence on the field of education, on teaching, and by implication on teacher education.

He characterizes the field as being represented by three groups of theorists: 1) traditionalists, 2) conceptual-empiricists, and 3) reconceptualists. The traditionalists are those whose concern lies with the practitioner, those in the schools who are trying to be more effective, the teacher who looks to the curriculum field for the answer to "What do I do on Monday morning?" The conceptual-empiricists are those whose focus is the social science research paradigm. They might choose Doyle's process-product paradigm or the mediating variables paradigm for their research. Their concern lies more with the methodological soundness of the research design than with its immediately applicable results. The reconceptualists' focus is upon understanding, upon challenging assumptions, upon the nature of educational experience. Much of this work makes use of existential and phenomenological tools to better understand the human experience of education.

Within this framework, the state of research in education can be seen more clearly. The traditionalist perspective gives rise to what Herbert M. Kliebard (1975) terms an "ahistorical posture" and an "ameliorative orientation". It is easy to understand how these difficulties arise. If one is concerned with helping teachers to be more effective, to do the job better, one is not likely to take the long, reflective view that an historical perspective implies. Similarly, the ameliorative orientation, the desire to improve whatever area of education is being discussed, often precludes the kind of long-range thinking that might lead to more permanent improvements. The traditionalists concern for the practitioner is also responsible for the prescriptive nature of much educational literature (Cooper, 1977; Palmer, 1975, 1975; Funkhouser, 1975; Stradley, 1968; Salzillo and Van Fleet, 1977). Most of these writings are filled with lists of what "ought" to be, what "should" be done, and how to do it. Moreover, the ameliorative orientation is not limited to the traditionalist perspective. It is applicable to the conceptual-empiricst perspective as well. One of the ways it manifests itself in this perspective is through the writings of the "humanistic" educators whose work is intended to improve the schools by humanizing them. While these writers are concerned with human

beings and human emotions, there is the repeated insistence that their conclusion must be verified empirically to be valid (Rogers, 1961, 1969; Combs, 1971; Sergiovanni and Starratt, 1971; Dussault, 1970). The ahistorical posture is influential among conceptual-empiricists also. Pinar (1978) describes the link between this view and the social science stance characteristic of conceptual-empiricists.

> This ahistorical view, not original with conceptual-empiricists, is in some degree inevitable with social science. If any knowledge worth possessing is yet to be discovered, there is little point to studying the unscientific pact. (p. 5)

While among the social sciences there are exceptions to the ahistorical view (Demos and Boocock, 1978), Pinar's description reflects what is still the mainstream social science perspective.

The reconceptualist perspective functions in two ways to mitigate the shortcomings of the traditionalist and conceptual-empiricist perspectives. One function is that of critic of the past and present. The other function is to move beyond the present into the future and to offer new tools for understanding the present and shaping the future (Pinar, 1975, Preface). There is an ameliorative orientation among reconceptualists as well, but it is of a different sort from that which characterizes the other two perspectives. It is concerned with long-term improvement which requires the distance necessary for clarity. Pinar's (1978) summary is useful here.

> The reconceptualists have not, even if some maintain they have, for the time being, abandoned school practitioners, but fundamental to their view is that an intellectual and cultural distance from our constituency is required for the present, in order to develop a comprehensive critique and theoretical program to be of any meaningful assistance now or later. (p. 3)

Pinar's categories are specifically concerned with the curriculum field. Yet its insights are applicable to the issues of research, teaching, education, and teacher education as well. These areas interact in ways which have yet to be fully specified. A "reconceptualization" therefore requires that whatever is illuminating be used regardless of which specific area the insights come from. Macdonald (1975) notes that the curriculum field engaged in theorizing cannot be clearly distinguished from other kinds of educational theory.

> Curriculum theory and theorizing may be characterized as being in a rather formative condition, for essentially there are no generally accepted and clear-cut criteria to distinguish curriculum theory and theorizing from other forms of writing in education. (p. 5)

While lack of clear-cut criteria may be frustrating, that very lack can also prevent rigidity and dogmatism and promote a kind of fluidity which is a necessary condition for creativity.

Emphasis on Empiricism

If there could be one specific color that dominates the kaleidoscope of teacher education, teaching, education, and curriculum it would be that of empiricism. This emphasis appears to stem from an interest among those working in almost every area of education to make education into a "science" and to borrow from the social and behavioral sciences the methodologies to do so. Thus educational writing has become replete with words like "variables", "inputs", "multivariate analysis", "statistical significance", and "correlation coefficient". These writings either report studies using this social science language or call for more research which can verify concepts empirically (Borg, 1975; Dunkin and Biddle, 1974; Travers, 1973; Smith, 1971; Openshaw, 1966). At the same time, there is also a great deal of criticism concerning the attempt to make education into a science and the use of social science methodologies (Eisner, 1978; Willis, 1978). These criticisms come from various subfields of education and indicate the widespread influence of social sciences on education. Kliebard (1973), addressing himself to the issue of teacher education, shows the relationship between research in teaching and empiricism.

> What has gone on in the name of scientific study of teaching has been, in large measure, raw empiricism, a blind and almost necessarily futile grouping for statistically significant relationships. (p. 20)

Kliebard's indictment is but an echo of the same type made by James Koerner in 1963.

> Educational psychology continues to turn out 6,000-7,000 studies a year, almost all of which are trying to solve problems through quantitative means. There continues to be a pretentious display of mathematical-statistical lingo throughout writings in Education and an unseasoned attempt to adapt to Education the research techniques of the behavioral sciences. (p. 30)

Part of the problem lies in the mis-application of social science methodologies to education and part lies in the social science methodologies themselves which strive to imitate the "objectivity" of the natural sciences. It appears that another decade of social science research in education has produced another decade of criticism of the same.

It is interesting to note that among those who call for more empirical studies in education and among those who are critical of the empirical stance, the consensus is that very little of any value has been produced. Some of these criticisms imply that teaching cannot be based on a scientific foundation.

> Not only does scientism in Education produce little of value in relation to the numbers of people, time, and resources devoted to it, but it also has a great many harmful effects in the education of teachers. It diverts them from some of the most important professional problems that they might otherwise deal with and encourages the pernicious belief that their teaching can be based on some kind of exact or scientific foundation. (Koerner, 1963, p. 31)

Other criticisms imply that while research has not supplied answers thus far, it is because it has not been scientific enough. Dussault (1970) raises this issue with regard to supervision of student teachers.

> In summary, it can be said that science, at the natural history stage, is the systematized description of the world as it is. But the question may be raised whether the systematized description of the world as it is, is entitled to the name of scientific knowledge. (p. 15)

Still other criticisms are concerned with the fact that if there are answers, they do not influence teacher behavior.

> Ten years ago an exhaustive review of the literature carried out by Denemark and MacDonald (1964) turned out virutally no evidence that any aspect of teacher education made the slightest difference in subsequent teaching behavior. (Borg, 1975, p. 2)

Additional critics are concerned that research has not influenced the curricula in teacher preparation (Openshaw, 1966); that research has not produced knowledge (Dunkin and Biddle, 1974); that research has not clearly identified competencies (Medley, 1974); that research has provided too many models (Dunkin and Biddle, 1974); that research has not provided enough models (Snow, 1973). In 1963, Koerner summarized the state of educational research.

> Educational research continues to be afflicted with inconsequential subjects, inadequate methods, and unused results. (p. 32)

In 1978, Howey, et al, after an extensive review of teacher preparation institutions, summarize the state of research as follows:

> There is relatively little research and development capability in most of the institutions that prepare teachers. In addition, most of the research and development capability that exists within the education community is not directed toward teacher preparation. The knowledge base in the field is not increasing rapidly. (p. xv)

Clearly, the emphasis on empiricism has produced more confusion than anything else. Yet because we live at a time when science is the measure of what is and what is not (Pinar, 1978, p. 9), the conceptual-empiricist perspective in education persists and gives rise to projects, mandates and changes which have far-reaching effects.

One of these mandates is Competency (Performance) Based Teacher Education (CBTE). The scope of such programs stretches from New Jersey to Florida, from Texas to Oregon (Andrews, 1977). The rationale behind these programs seems sound enough on the surface. Since previous teacher education programs leading to certification were based nearly exclusively on the accumulation of credits through taking courses and some student teaching, there was no way to tell if these courses had any relevance to actual classroom teaching. Therefore, it was reasoned that certification of teachers ought to be based on competence in the classroom rather than on accumulation of credits. Thus, it is that many states now require CBTE programs of those colleges which prepare teachers. The assumptions which underlie these mandates by State Education Departments are sometimes stated but less often critically examined. Starting "up close" is the assumption that a student of teaching must be able to exhibit behaviors known to promote learning (Elam, 1971; McDonald, 1978). Stepping back a bit, the identification of these behaviors becomes crucial. Another step back requires asking how these behaviors are related to pupil learning. This leads to the door of empirical research to provide these relationships. If the primary concern of teaching is behavior and if teaching is conceived of as a science, then the logical place to turn for verification of these concepts is to mainstream social science and its methodologies. Hence the previously noted criticisms of the failure of research to provide the competencies and to identify their relationship to pupil learning. These are the more obvious assumptions. Less obvious is the assumption that knowledge exists separate and apart from the people who know. It is as if knowledge were a bushel of apples which the teacher had the responsibility of preparing as attractively as possible so that the students would ingest it and digest it, one by one, according to the "subjects". This view implies that education consists solely of the process by which the person who knows (the teacher) by various behaviors (competencies) transmits this knowledge to one who does not know (the student). While the transmitting of information is surely one of the goals of education, acquisition of information alone does not constitute an education. Knowledge itself does not liberate or develop potential in a person but only provides the tools by which development may be assisted.

CBTE is not without its critics in the field of education. One aspect of the criticism focuses on the fact that isolating and identifying these concepts is extremely complex (Maxwell, 1978). Kliebard (1973) discussed this difficulty and competency issue in relation to research.

> ...the key notion seems to be that identifiable behaviors, competencies, and characteristics of teaching, once isolated, can form the basis of teacher education and teacher certification... The process of isolating those specific behaviors is more complex than appears at first. In fact, it would be difficult to name even a single specific behavior that has been shown to be consistently correlated with a reasonable definition of competent teaching. Why is this? (p. 15)

Kliebard implies that perhaps the question of competent teaching is not, finally, a social science question. He points out that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century massive research was done to determine the activities which teachers engaged in. A major check list of 1010 activities was devised. None of this affected teacher education institutions in the least. The lament that research has failed to identify the competencies is echoed by Wilhelms (1970), McCarty (1973), Openshaw (1966), Dunkin and Biddle (1974).

There is an urgency to Kliebard's question that intensifies as time passes and no answers seem forthcoming. Why is research in education in such a state of confusion? Why has it failed to provide any insight with regard to competencies? Why are there so many complaints that there is little research and what there is is not useful or not used? The answer to these questions reveal the interface between theory and

research, for any analysis of the failure of research must ultimately deal with the theory which gave form to the research.

Discussions about theory however, are not any more precise than those concerning research. There appears to be almost as many definitions of theory as there are people concerned with theory. (Snow, 1973, p. 78)

Of course, there are people concerned with theory, those who believe that this is a necessary first step in "getting clear" about anything related to education. Because of the prevalence of mainstream social science methodologies in educational research, insights into the value of theory must be related to the emphasis on empiricism. Kliebard (1973) offers his own answer to his urgent question about the failure of the research.

> Even if a persistent statistical relationship were somehow found, the absence of analytical clarification of the concepts involved and the lack of a theoretical framework for the research would preclude the development of any scientific understanding of the relationship and, for that matter, would probably rule out any useful purpose to which the research could be put. (p. 20)

So there is a further lack in educational research - the lack of adequate theory to undergird that research. Wilson (1975) accuses teacher educators of not admitting this lack and discusses the effect this has on those who would be teachers.

> Precisely because we pretend to ourselves, and to teachers, that we possess well-established 'theory', and because we spend a lot of time deluging teachers with it, we thereby succeed not in improving but in obfuscating such natural understanding and seriousness as they may have. (p. 119)

It seems then, that the research failure is traceable to a failure of theory. Yet that is not the end of the problem either. The lack of theory cry is voiced by all persuasions of educational critics from empiricists Dunkin and Biddle (1974) to reconceptualists Kliebard (1975) and Pinar (1976). According to Snow (1973), there is no general aggreement on the best ways to build improved theories or to apply them to improving research (p. 77). The root questions seems to be "What kind of theory is most likely to be helpful in education?" This in turn raises the question of the function of various kinds of theories.

Since empiricism dominates educational research, it would be useful to examine the function of this type of research and its utility for education. The basis of this examination will be Bernstein's (1976) The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. Bernstein distinguishes three main categories of theory: 1) empirical theory, 2) the phenomenological alternative, and 3) critical theory. His analysis of the first category is the main concern here. Bernstein traces the roots of empirical theory in the social sciences to their desire and attempt to mirror the natural sciences. Those who hold this view see their work as that which differs in degree but not in kind from that of natural sciences. As a result, the many seeming failures of empirical research can be traced to the threshold of theory and the failure of theory can be traced to the immaturity of the social sciences. There is no doubt among these mainstream social scientists that their work will eventually be brought to the same level of maturity as that of the natural sciences. Bernstein points out that this view is deeply ingrained especially among American social scientists who cannot understand how anyone can question social science that uses "methodologically sound" research techniques. Empiricist tradition, has at its best, insisted upon clarity and rigor. It has dispelled superstititon and myth. It has challenged mere speculation and wild conjecture. But empirical theory has not always operated at its best. Bernstein states that mainstream social scientists have come to view their discipline through the lens of positivism. Positivism recognizes only two models for legitimate knowledge: the empirical or natural sciences, and the formal disciplines of logic and mathematics. With this lens

> the history of intellectual life (is viewed) as passing through the dark ages of theological, metaphysical, and philosophical speculation, only to emerge in the triumph of the positive sciences. (p. 5)

This triumphant emergence, Bernstein notes, was (and is) seriously challenged by the social and political unrest of the 1960's.

> There were those who declared that the very foundations of the social sciences were rotten... that the most striking characteristic of the social sciences was not their ability to illuminate existing social and political reality, but their inability to provide any critical perspective on what was happening... (p. xi)

Even with these brief comments, the infatuation of education as a social science with empiricism becomes clearer and the persistence with which such research continues to be pursued becomes justified as the first stumbling steps of an infant science. As a social science, education has also been influenced by the "cultural revolution" of the 1960's (Pinar, 1974) which called into question many previously unchallenged assumptions about what constitutes authority and what knowledge is of most value. In attempting to make a place for itself among other social sciences, education has been affected by the same flaws which characterize other social sciences. One of these is what Bernstein (1976) terms the "primitive myth" that the real point of science is the collection of data and the advancing of empirical generalizations based on that data. Another flaw is the excessive preoccupation with methodology which becomes a substitute for the development of theory (p. 9-10). Education suffers from an overemphasis on the collection of data and a preoccupation with methodology. As Bernstein noted regarding the other social sciences, education has also been affected by those who voice a growing suspicion that its foundations "are rotten". Interestingly, this same conclusion is arrived at by those who believe that the fault lies with the immaturity of education as a social science (like Dussault, Dunkin and Biddle, etc.) and by those who believe that an entirely new perspective on educational research is needed (like reconceptualist curriculum theorists). The unrest of the 1960's called into question not only the mis-application of the social sciences to political and social issues but their very capacity to be useful at all. Education did not (and does not) escape this scrutiny. Education is firmly established in the mainstream social science current, carrying both its traditions and its shortcomings.

Empirical Theory as a Male-Defined Model

> Mainstream social scientists tend to think that all relevant phenomena can be divided neatly into subjective and objective, private and public. (Bernstein, 1976, p. 62)

The above statement symbolizes one of the chief characteristics of mainstream social science - duality. Duality views issues in terms of opposites, as being at one end of the continuum or at the other. Usually, not only are issues, problems and questions framed in terms of opposites, but persons are also viewed in the same manner. They are split into mind-body, the mind being higher. Reason becomes opposed to emotion, and more worthwhile. Relationships are split into public and private, the public being more significant. Nature is seens as a force to be conquered, subdued and exploited for the use of "Man". This mainstream social science perspective, typified by the duality which pervades it, is rooted in what has been termed a "patriarchal mentality" (Collins, 1974; Daly, 1968, 1973; Ruether, 1975; Millett, 1970; Dunbar, 1970; Rich, 1975). The term "patriarchy" is especially appropriate because it calls forth anthropological and sociological images of clan and tribe, rituals and lines of descent. Indeed, the patriarchal mentality developed from this observation of these phenomena. Collins (1974) describes part of the process.

> In searching out the basis for common law and current customs in the roots of civilization, the majority of nineteenth-century scholars came to the conclusion that the first and highest form of social relations was marked by the dominance of the father of the clan over the wife and mother - hence patriarchy. (p. 50)

The fact that there was evidence to the contrary was largely ignored (Collins, p. 50) and is only now beginning to come to light (Stone, 1976). Dunbar (1978) traces the development of patriarchy to the time when societies began to become more complex and men, who had formerly been hunters, returned to the community life which women had developed and began (by force) to make use of the skills he had developed in hunting, particularly competition and dominance and conquered women as he had conquered nature (p. 536-539). Ruether (1972) sees these dualities as also rooted in early tribal society but more fully developed and firmly entrenched by late classical civilization (p. 122). Regardless of its origins, patriarchy soon came to mean more than political leadership or lines of descent. It came to mean a mind-set, a world view, a perspective through which all reality was (and is) viewed.

> Patriarchal thought is characterized by being objective rather than subjective, rational rather than intuitive, linear rather than circular, logical rather than mystical, dissecting rather than unifying, abstract rather than concrete. Patriarchal behavior is cool and unemotional rather than warm and emotive, expedient rather than purposeless, aggressive rather than passive, unreflective rather than reflective. Patriarchal institutions tend to be ordered along hierarchical "chains of command" or "lines of authority" rather than being communal and anarchic; they are exclusive rather than inclusive and are goal directed rather than maintenance oriented. (Collins, 1974, p. 51)

Dominance, hierarchy, duality, and objectivity are, of course, one set of lenses through which to view reality. They are not, however, the only way that reality can be conceptualized. Yet, particularly in Western culture, the patriarchal mentality has tended to be the only way to perceive reality. Moreover, this world view has more often been associated with "innate" male qualities than with female ones. Thus reality becomes male-defined; those qualities of dominance, competition, hierarchy, objectivity, rationality, etc. associated with males and considered innately lacking in females, become the criteria against which all human endeavors must be measured. In other words, a set of qualities, ascribed to males, has come to equal reality and to develop a world view where these qualities determine what is and what isn't, what should or should not be, what can or cannot be.

All of this is not to ignore to to denegrate what has been accomplished through some of these qualities, especially in the natural sciences. Surely, objectivity, accuracy, measurement, quantification have greatly aided in the discovery of some remarkable phenomena in the natural sciences. No one would want to return to the time when surgery was unsterile, when people died from diseases against which we are now immunized, when there was no electricity for heat and light. It is understandable, when viewing these remarkable scientific discoveries, to want to extend and expand this view and these methodologies to other human endeavors, such as the social sciences. If such remarkable things could be done for humanity using these tools, then surely these tools could be used effectively elsewhere and the belief that "science" was a status to which all research should aspire became a logical conclusion.

By its emphasis on empiricism, by its attempt to be objective, rational, detached, by its eagerness to take its place among the social sciences, education has fallen into the same trap as other mainstream social sciences: quantification as the sole measure of value. The same progression which equates the patriarchal mentality with all of reality operates similarly in education. George Willis (1978) notes that

> ...many educators themselves now identify all research and evaluation in education solely with techniques of quantification. (p. 5)

It is useful here to summarize the development of this state and its relationship to teacher education. Teacher education is generally considered to be far from satisfactory. In this respect, it finds itself in much the same condition as other subfields of education. It is natural to turn to research to find the answers to this condition or to illuminate possible directions for finding solutions. Yet the state of educational research

is not any more highly regarded than the state of teacher education. The reasons offered for the state of research range from lack of theory to lack of sufficient empirical study. Yet the predominant form of educational research has been the empirical model. As a result, education can be said to be part of the mainstream social science perspective. An examination of the mainstream social science position reveals a preoccupation with qualities which typify a patriarchal mentality. These qualities have come to be regarded as equivalent to reality and faith in these qualities as "scientific" has become the touchstone of research. If education is attempting to be a social science (and I believe it is), and if mainstream social science is characterized by qualities generally ascribed to males (and I believe it is), then it can be said that education and its study have been, up to this point, male-defined endeavors.

Education as a Field of Study

It requires only a slight shift of the kaleidoscope for the pieces of research, theory, and the state of teacher education to rearrange themselves into a pattern that addresses the issue of education as a field of study. Much of the research in teacher education has been directed toward finding the proper combination of theory and practice to be used in teacher preparation programs. What has emerged from the effort is that education as a field of study lacks a knowledge base. There is a persistent, even tenacious, desire to have something concrete, definable, firm, secure, and unique to which education can point and say, "There. This is what we know about teaching and learning. This is what education as a field of study rests upon. It is our claim to a place among other fields." This seems a worthy goal. Reaching it would certainly improve the status of education among other fields of study. Yet assuming this to be a worthy goal leaves a series of questions not only unanswered, but unasked. One of these questions is "What is meant by a knowledge base in education?" Here, is in other areas, there are a variety of answers.

Some of the answers are outgrowths of the patriarchal preoccupation with making education into a science. Dussault (1970) provides some interesting insights into the area of knowledge building. For him, knowledge worthy of the name must be scientific knowledge. He describes the state of knowledge in education as being in the "natural history stage" of development; the stage at which systematic description of the world as it is, is the goal. He questions, however, whether such knowledge is entitled to be called scientific. His conclusion is that such knowledge is valid but it is only a first step. This, of course, is the mainstream social scientific, patriarchal view which sees the future as the place where "truth" will be discovered and validated by empirical data. In addition, Dussault sees this as leading to the unfortunate position in which persons interested in education must state their opinions because they lack the empirical data which would "prove" their opinions.

> It is because there is still, in the field of education, no common scholarly language about science, scientific inquiry, theory, and theory-building that one who undertakes to develop an educational theory may feel the need to state his (sic) own position with regard to these matters. (p. 9)

This view that education can become and is becoming a science is shared in many areas of education. Of particular interest here is its expression in the area of teaching. A "scientific" view of teaching focuses on skills.

> Despite all of our efforts, we apparently have no generally accepted conceptual system, psychological or otherwise, by which either to formulate or to identify the skills of teaching. (Smith, 1971, p. 3)

> It is apparent, therefore, that after all we really do not have a very large body of firm knowledge on which to construct an applied science of classroom teaching. (Cogan, 1973, p. 52)

Cogan and Smith are joined by Openshaw (1966), Koerner (1963), Dreeben (1970), Dunkin and Biddle

(1974), and Lortie (1975) in focusing on the necessity of a knowledge base in order to identify teaching skills. McCarty (1973), however, is one of the few to suggest that perhaps this search for a set or sets of skills, is not a fruitful way of viewing teaching.

> The difficulty with teaching is that the ends are mysterious. In an important sense, even the best teacher does not know what he (sic) is doing. If he did know, the remedy for poor teaching would be technical or skill instruction. (p. 236)

A corollary of the teaching skills concern emerges in the area of supervision. Because supervision is frequently tied to evaluation, the concern becomes a search for those skills which can be used as criteria for evaluation. The search in turn focuses on the process of supervision itself. It too is concerned about the lack of knowledge base.

> ...supervision has neither a fundamental substantive content nor a consciously determined and universally recognized process - both its stuff and its methods tend to be random, residual, frequently archaic, and eclectic in the worst sense. (Goldhammer, 1969, p. viii)

The question of what constitutes a knowledge base in education is, for those concerned with teaching who also view education from a mainstream social scientific, patriarchal perspective, is answered in terms of specific skills with can be incorporated into teacher education programs.

There are other motives, however, for being concerned with the knowledge base in education. One of these motives is the interest in having teaching regarded as a profession and hence teacher education programs as being professional courses of study. One of the key elements in the definition of a profession is its claim to a certain, specialized body of knowledge (Etzioni, 1969; Koerner, 1963; Friendenberg, 1973; Dreeben, 1970; Lortie, 1975; Parelius and Parelius, 1978). Etzioni (1969) claims that it is because of this lack of specialized knowledge that teaching can only be considered a semi-profession.

> The public grants him (the professional) this claim (to define his work) in recognition of his superior knowledge and its relevance to decisions about the work. The public does not grant such a mandate to semi-professionals, because it does not feel that they have any just claim to specialized esoteric knowledge. (p. 198)

Dreeben (1970) speaks of the issue in terms of occupational coherence and unity.

> The heart of the problem is that no widely agreed-upon core of general principles, courses, and training experiences exists around which to create occupational coherence and unity. (p. 127)

Inevitably, it seems, writers cannot address themselves to the issue of professionalism in teaching and teacher education without comparing them to law and medicine (Koerner, 1963; Dreeben, 1970; Lortie, 1975; Combs, 1966; Wilson, 1975). Needless to say, education does not emerge from this comparison in a favorable light. Combs (1966) specifies the differences in training between medicine and teaching.

> Other professions have long preceded us in this concept of professional training... He (the physician) is exposed to a body of knowledge, techniques, procedures, and theory and to the necessity of applying these to the solution of practical problems... I believe a similar philosophy for teacher education is long overdue. (p. 212)

Education also emerges unfavorably because while medicine and law are thought to have knowledge which is unique and often esoteric, education has no knowledge unique to itself, but rather "borrows" from other areas.

> Education as an academic discipline has poor credentials. Relying on other fields, especially

> psychology, for its principle substance, it has not yet developed a corpus of knowledge and technique of sufficient scope and power to warrant the field's being given full academic status. (Koerner, 1963, p. 19)

Wilson (1975), however, while not denying the lack of a firm knowledge base in education, points out that other fields of study may not be as clearly defined as many educationists think.

> The criteria for competence in areas marked by 'psychology', 'sociology', etc. are themselves in doubt and, even more questionable is the relationship between these areas and 'educational principles'. (p. 116)

"Principles," "practices," "skills," "theories," "experience," "processes," "language," "conceptual system," and various other concepts answer the question "What is meant by a knowledge base in education?" Obviously, there is no more agreement here than in any other area of education. Similar to the temptation which presented itself with regard to teacher education, there is the temptation with regard to education as a field of study to conclude that it too is a chameleon, changing color according to which author and which area is being addressed; that it has no substance of its own. Again, it is Wilson (1975), who provides an alternative.

> All this clearly shows the bankrupt state of the subject, but this does not mean that we have no proper subject-matter to study or examine - that 'education' is an improper subject-title: it means only that we are not clear about what it is or how to do it. (p. 18)

So there is a return to the value of studying teacher education, teaching, research, and theory in the hope of "getting clear". Wilson offers the possibility of the uniqueness of education as a beginning point.

> For clearly, since not just anything counts as 'educational' or 'educational knowledge', there may well be certain characteristic features or peculiarities of it. (p. 48)

The question is, of course, what are these characteristic features or peculiarities? Giving definitive answers to that question, considering the state of the field, is probably premature and presumptuous. To begin to share insights, however, is necessary and valuable. Wilson tentatively offers the following:

> Certainly the word (education) suggests some things which remind one of a practical techne (art, science, enterprise) like cooking or swimming, but it also suggests other dimensions which one might, as a sighting shot, describe as 'theoretical'. (p. 13)

Because of its preoccupation with the empirical model, educational research, especially regarding teacher education, has concentrated heavily on the techne portion of Wilson's scheme. The challenge in teacher education is to begin to deal with those other dimensions which Wilson terms 'theoretical' in ways which require new modes of thinking and sustained effort. There is not enough known about theory in education and its implications for teacher education to be sanguine about the theory or its implications. The tentativeness which characterizes Wilson's statement exemplifies the attitude which should permeate such study.

The Occupation of Teaching

Answering Kliebard's question regarding the inability of teacher education to correlate behavior with competence requires an examination of the occupation of teaching for which teacher education programs are preparing teachers. Entrance into the occupation of teaching usually begins with undergraduate teacher preparation programs in colleges and universities. The consensus concerning these programs reflects the same opinion concerning the rest of education: it is poor. Most of the criticism begins with the students who enter teacher preparation programs. In 1963, Koerner wrote about them. . .

> By about any academic standard that can be applied, students in teacher-training programs are among the least able on the campus. . . (p. 39)

The same complaint was voiced by Simpson and Simpson in 1969, by Dreeben in 1970, by Friedenberg, Sizer, and Ryan in 1973, by Horton and Horton in 1974, by Lortie in 1975, and tacitly acknowledged by Howey, et al in 1978. The blame for the quality of teacher education students has been laid at various doorsteps. One of these is the "open enrollment" policies which characterize most colleges of education or departments of education in universities. Usually, this means that anyone can enroll. This is true for an overwhelming number of teacher education institutions.

> Over 80 percent of the institutions in the survey indicated they used an open enrollment policy, that is, their enrollment is determined by the number of interested students who meet requirements. (Howey, et al, 1978, p. 12)

Another reason given for the poor quality in teacher education is that preparation programs are designed specifically to train teachers to teach in public schools and therefore cannot be innovative since the schools are not innovative - innovative being equated with "good" (Friedenberg, 1973; Howey, 1978). The harshest criticism, however, is that the quality of the faculty in teacher education programs is poor (Koerner, 1963; Dreeben, 1975; Ryan, 1973; Howey, 1978). Howey, et al report on one highly regarded criterion of quality: publication.

> Over two-thirds of the faculty respondents have never authored, co-authored or edited a book. Even when it comes to the publication of articles, the productivity of teacher educators is limited. More than half of the faculty have not published an article during the last three years, and less than 10 percent have published three or more. Clearly, the perception of teacher education faculty driven to publish or perish is mythical. It is valued by few, it is not perceived to be a primary criterion for success, and it occurs quite rarely. (p. 24)

Another criterion is implicit in Dreeben's (1970) comment that faculty in education are people who do not or have not taught in public schools (p. 121). This is contradicted, however, by the findings of Howey, et al (1978) who report that most faculty have, in fact, risen through the ranks of school personnel (p. xvi).

Still another indication concerning quality comes from students themselves. Lortie (1975), and Shanker (1977), report that teachers view their undergraduate preparation as being little better than useless. Certainly, part of the folklore among teachers is that education courses are "Mickey Mouse", "impractical", "ivory tower", ordeals to be endured rather than enjoyed. Yet here too, Howey, et al (1978) report somewhat different findings. They report satisfaction, but that it seems to diminish over time.

> In general, students are quite satisfied with their teacher preparation at the time that they graduate. Although in later years they will criticize the preparation that they have had, they indicate a strongly positive attitude toward their experiences and the faculty who work with them. (p. xvi)

Perhaps there is a bit of "self-fulfilling prophecy" at work in undergraduate teacher education. Certainly the morale of faculty and students in colleges of education must be affected by the dismal view that poor faculty members attract poor students who become poor teachers. People who are expected to perform poorly often do, in fact, perform poorly. Institutionally, education is often the step-child of the university, short of funds and prestige needed to attract quality faculty. It then becomes easy to shift the "blame" for poor quality to the persons in the institution without examining the ways in which the institution acts to perpetuate the situation. There is a subtle interaction of forces at work here. Most of the students in teacher preparation programs are women. Women have been socialized to scale down their academic abilities,

to "play dumb" or at least not to demonstrate and develop their intellectual abilities. They are then counseled, subtly and not so subtly, into an occupation already thought not demanding in terms of academic standards, taught by professors whose expectations of them and of the profession are also low (McCure and Matthews, 1975, p. 299). Thus, this interplay of instutionalized attitudes perpetuates, not only poor quality in terms of teacher eduation students, but sexism as well.

In addition to the self-fulfilling prophecy factor, further questions need to be asked concerning the quality of the faculty and students of colleges of education. The most significant question is whose definition of quality is being employed in describing the faculty and students? The university, as a male-dominated institution, has male-defined criteria for academic excellence. For example, is publication really the best criterion for judging the quality of faculties of colleges of education? Perhaps in a college designed to assist persons who wish to be teachers, empathy, sensitivity, and creativity might be more appropriate. Are students of colleges of education poor because they did not major in "difficult" fields such as physics or calculus? Are they considered less academically able because, if they did major in physics or calculus, they chose to enter teaching instead of industry or government? Is education as a field of study poor because it lacks the precise quantification of chemistry? Are there not, even in chemistry, areas in which precise quantification is neither possible nor desirable? Unless the university structure as a male-dominated institution is taken into account, any attempt to "upgrade" the quality of faculty and students of education will succeed only in aspiring to already questionable standards.

Closely tied to the quality issue in education in a patriarchal notion: initiation by means of an "ordeal" as a major factor in creating a "profession". In the attempt to make teaching into a profession, it is customary to compare it to law and medicine. Interestingly, educational critics see these fields as not only having a desirable knowledge base which education lacks, but as using this knowledge to create the "ordeal".

> . . . professional schools create anxiety - provoking tasks and unmanageable work situations that create individual crises and responses of collective defense. All have in common some means of arousing emotion of sufficient intensity that individuals seek a way out of a psychologically problematic, often intolerable, situation. . . When the school of education is viewed in these terms, its resources for exerting leverage appear exceedingly limited; and in those situations where teacher training does produce individual crisis, the school is poorly placed to channel the emotional energy released because the crises ususally occur within some other jurisdiction. (Dreeben, 1970, p. 144)

There is the implication that because there is not a sufficient knowledge base, education students really have very little to learn and are therefore not subject to the intense pressures which medical and law students are subject to.. Such pressues are viewed as both necessary and beneficial (Moore, 1969; Dreeben, 1970; Lortie, 1975).

> They (schools of education) do not subject students to the intense pressures and crises that contribute to the creation of solidarity among them, a solidarity that can produce unanticipated benefits in occupational learning. (Dreeben, 1970, p. 142)

No one questions whether or not the pressures faced by medical and law students in fact produce this solidarity which they feel is so necessary to commitment to the profession. No one mentions that perhaps these pressures, at least in some cases, produce anxiety, competition, jealousy, cheating and a mentality that equates punishment with learning. No one suggests that we look for other means to ensure commitment to a profession. No one questions the fact that some of the problems in the practice of law and medicine may be due, in part, to this pre-professional pressure. This uncritical acceptance of the necessity of "ordeal" in order to achieve "professional" status, is suggestive of fraternity initiation. Indeed, I suggest it is part of the "old boy network" wherein the "guys who have been there", who have "toughed it out", who have proven themselves to be "real men", can slap each other on the back in congratulations and plan how to

make it even tougher for those who will follow them.

Actually, this mentality is far older than fraternities. It is a contemporary example of the traditional "men's house institutions" where men segregated themselves to create solidarity (Millett, 1970, p. 67). Millett notes their military associations and describes the fact that young boys are often called "wives" until they have been "hardened" into manhood (p. 68).

This "ordeal mentality", of course, is an excellent example of the patriarchal mentality and sexism in process. It reinforces the stereotypical male role which requires proof of masculinity through facing some test of strength. Women, of course, not being strong enough, could not face and conquer this ordeal. Institutionally, this functions to keep women out of these professions which exalt the "ordeal" because they cannot afford to take time out to have children. Nor do they have "wives" to perform the tasks of daily life which enable people to spend the amount of time which the "ordeal" requires. In addition, the exclusion of women ensures that this mentality will not be altered.

Teacher education at the undergraduate level takes place in the context of undergraduate education in general. Undergraduate education is one of the patterns in the kaleidoscope of teacher education which benefits from distance. From this distance, one of the most vivid colors in the kaleidoscope is that of sexism. Since the overwhelming number of teachers are women (Reich, 1974, p. 340), when speaking about teacher education, it becomes essential to speak about women in undergraduate education. The institution in which women are educated, like the other institutions in our society, is a male-defined, male-dominated institution.

> The university is above all a hierarchy. At the top is a small cluster of highly paid and prestigrious persons, chiefly men, whose careers entail the services of a very large base of ill-paid or unpaid persons, chiefly women: wives, research assistants, secretaries, teaching assistants, cleaning women, waitresses in the faculty club, lower-echelon adminstrators, and women students who can be used in various ways to gratify the ego. (Rich, 1975, p. 26)

A male-defined, male-dominated institution, like the university, is structured and maintained for the convenience of the males.

> Through their curriculum, through their organization and structure, research and development programs, and behavior of their individual faculty and administrators, institutions of teacher education have contributed to the maintenance of the sex role status quo. (McCure and Matthews, 1975, p. 297)

Of course, sexism in education does not begin at the undergraduate level. It begins long before that, but just to look at the step immediately preceding higher education is revealing. Although women have generally better academic records than men, fewer qualified women then men even attend college (Roby, 1973). More scholarships are given to men (Roby, 1973; Frazier and Sadker, 1973). Women are often counseled out of going to college or counseled into areas traditionally considered suitable for women, such as teaching (Roby, 1973; Frazier and Sadker, 1973; Rich, 1975; Fitzpatrick, 1976).

The factors which operate to perpetuate sexism in the university at large, are also operative in colleges and departments of education. One of the most visible signs of sexism is lack of women professors, even in colleges and departments of education. The few women who are faculty members are of lower rank than their male colleagues. They tend to be concentrated in departments of curriculum and human development rather than in departments of administration; females earned 55% of the doctorates in elementary education awarded in 1973, but only 9% of the doctorates in administration (McCune and Matthews, 1975, p. 297).

Curriculum content is another area in which sexism is perpetuated (Rich, 1975; McCune and Matthews, 1975). The heavy emphasis on empiricism in education is only a reflection of the attitude throughout the university as to what constitutes knowledge of value. Because women's contributions are not considered to be knowledge of value, they are absent from courses ranging from the natural sciences to the humanities. In education especially, the emphasis on psychology means that Freudian bias prevails at least in the sense that views women's roles as biologically determined. An institution whose faith in science is its sole measure of truth is not likely to see an "affective" issue such as sexism as a valid subject for study.

Faculty expectation certainly plays a significant role in the success of students. Here too, sexism prevails. Many professors do not take their women students seriously (Frazier and Sadker, 1973; Women's Caucus, University of Chicago, 1970). Some have lower expectations for students who are female (Reitman, 1975). Some exploit them sexually and otherwise (Rich, 1975). Perhaps most damaging is the fact that women are never admitted to full colleagueship with male students. They are not present for the "locker room raps", the "bull sessions", the "informal talks" with the professor that are part of the rites of passage from student to professional. Although somewhat quaint in tone, Simpson and Simpson's (1969) comments on the situation still have the ring of validity.

> Nor does the undergraduate life of college women seem to socialize them into orientations favorable to professionalism. Undergraduate life seems to have the opposite effort. (p. 205)

A particularly crucial aspect of the undergraduate teacher-to-be is student teaching. The ordeal-equals-solidarity-equal-professionalization argument takes an interesting turn when applied to the student teaching experience. Few would argue with the sentiments expressed by Brosio (1975).

> It would be a conservative assumption to claim that most teacher candidates consider student teaching to be the most crucial part of their preparation. (p. 25)

Thus, all potential teachers are faced with a situation which is generally considered crucial to their careers (Salzillo and Van Fleet, 1977; Wilhelms, 1970). An examination of this situation reveals that it would not be an exaggeration to call it an ordeal.

> Sorenson & Halpert found that 75% of student teachers experience considerable psychological discomfort; 20% carried it through to the end of assignment. (Lang, 1975)

A student teacher is answerable to her college supervisor, to her cooperating teacher, possibly to the principal, and to her own ideas of teaching. Frequently, these authority figures have different expectations of the student teacher. The college supervisor may be interested in how much theory she is able to use. The cooperating teacher may be concerned with how well she keeps order in the classroom. The principal may be anxious that she relate well to parents. The psychological discomfort then is quite understandable. An insightful study by Aspy (1969) reveals some of the consequences of this discomfort. Aspy looks at the student teacher within the framework of needs as described by Maslow, and concludes that many student teachers are operating at a survival level, in the sense that their problems are very immediate and involve coping rather than growing (p. 305). Another study by Fuller, Pilgrim and Freeland (cited in Lang, 1975) identified six states of development of student teachers.

1. Concern for school rules and expectations.
2. Anxieties about subject-matter adequacy and class control.
3. Desires to determine causes of deviant behavior.
4. Desire for evaluation and feedback from others.
5. Concern for what students were learning rather than for what was taught.
6. Full concern for students and their relationships to them.

Fuller, et al concluded that few student teachers get beyond the "control" stages even to stage four: desire for feedback from others. Thus, if education as a profession desired to subject its students to an ordeal, psychologically at least, student teaching appears to do just that. Yet, according to Dreeben (1970), this experience does not qualify as a "professional" ordeal.

> Practice teaching is commonly considered an ordeal; and even more so, the first job. Both, moreover, are experienced individually; if the interpretation of the M.I.T. findings is correct (that the collective character of the ordeal is important for establishing both commitment and a sense of enhanced occupational competence), teacher preparation is conspicuously lacking in that ingredient. . . the standard training process contains no formal provision for the creation and management of such crisis. (p. 142)

It is important to note that Dreeben sees this lack of ordeal and subsequent solidarity as a fault in the student teaching experience. His emphasis is actually more on the creation of such crises than on their management.

The student teaching experience, moreover, is so structured that it not only produces anxiety, but it also perpetuates the sex-role stereotypes prevalent in undergraduate programs generally. The relationship among the student teacher and the cooperating teacher, the college supervisor and other school personnel is hierarchical rather than collegial. Thus, there are numerous studies which conclude that in order to succeed, student teachers frequently adopt the skills and attitudes of their cooperating teachers instead of developing new skills (Lang, 1975; Funkhouser, 1975). These studies are not sex differentiated, but because so many teachers are women it is fair to say that if we are talking about a typical student teacher, she is female. The hierarchical relationship in student teaching is a microcosm of a society in which women are expected to take orders, not give them; to cooperate, not initiate; to seek outside of themselves for approval and thus to feel anxiety about the quality of their work. Moreover, the student teaching experience leaves unquestioned the desirability of imitating the cooperating teacher and the entire concept of hierarchy which fosters this imitation of those who may have had to comply with the notion in order to survive in the system and to be chosen as a cooperating teacher.

Prior to student teaching, however, is the decision to enter the occupation by entering a teacher education program. One of the most frequently cited characteristics of the occupation is the ease of entry into it (Lortie, 1975; Simpson and Simpson, 1969; Dreeben, 1970). The point is made, ususally as a criticism. that the decision to enter teacher preparation programs can come early or late in the college program because these programs do not require "special" courses or sequencing which require a commitment very early in a student's program. Lortie (1975, p. 41-52) sees this factor as one of the facilitators for entry into the occupation. He also (along with others who equte the "ordeal" with "quality") sees the ease of entry factor as related to the lack of knowledge base in education which precludes the ordeal. The argument is that because medicine and law do have what is a rather esoteric body of knowledge, students need to make early deicsions about entry into the field. It becomes very difficult, once the choice is made, for the student to change program. Hence, the student is supposed to be committed to the program and then to the profession. In teacher education, however, there is thought to be no "body of knowledge" to be mastered. Therefore, the student can choose to enter the teacher education program early or late in the college career, or in some cases, after the bachelor's degree has been completed. The decision to enter teacher education, however, is sex differentiated. Women, particularly those entering elementary education, make the decision to enter the occupation earlier than men (Lortie, 1975, p. 36-39). Ease of entry then, functions to make teaching a refuge, a last minute choice for men whose career goals have had to be scaled-down because of academic failure or for those who seek administrative positions and use teaching as a means to those positions. For women, the tendency for an early decision to enter teaching is largely a result of intense social pressures and lack of other options.

> Why do women become teachers? Channeling from Mother, guidance counselors, teachers; a lack of other options, a desire to work with people; feelings of academic inadequacy; a B.A. and no typing skills. (Rich, 1974, p. 338)

Another factor affecting entry into teaching is its "high visibility". What this means is that all prospective teachers were once students. As such, they had the opportunity to see teachers "doing their job" in the presence of students. Nearly everyone then, has an idea of what it means to be a teacher. Lortie (1975) points out that this may not represent an accurate view of what teaching is all about.

> Teaching is unusual in that those who decide to enter it have an exceptional opportunity to observe members of the occupation at work; unlike most occupations today, the activities of teachers are not shielded from youngsters. Teachers-to-be underestimate the difficulties involved, but this supports the contention that those planning to teach or definite ideas about the nature of the role. (Lortie, 1975, p. 65)

What is most visible about the occupation of teaching is that it is a woman's occupation. Some of the reasons why this is so and why it need not be so are cited by Pottker and Fishel (1977).

> Teaching is basically defined as a woman's occupation in the United States because so many teachers are women. But teaching is also characterized as feminine because the traits it is identified with, expressiveness and nurturing, are associated with women in this culture. However, when sex-related characteristics of occupations in various cultures are analyzed it becomes apparent that the characterization of teaching as feminine in nature is merely a means of supporting the occupational status quo. For example, in countries where teachers are mostly men, teaching is considered a masculine occupation. (p. 281)

The importance of thinking of teaching as a women's occupation can be seen by considering the function of role models. Boys and girls making their way through the school system see that females are teachers, males are administrators. This comes to be seen as an acceptable situation. Acceptance of the situation influences career choices in subtle ways.

> . . . identification with teachers plays an important part in recruitment in that young men and women tend to identify with members of the same sex. To the extent that a subjective sense of deprivation makes male teachers less acceptable as models, there is a systematic tendency for the occupation to attract more women than men. The differential distribution by sex of material rewards of money and prestige therefore probably has effects beyond its role in the original calculus of choice. (Lortie, 1975, p. 34)

This identification with the same sex demonstrates concretely and forcefully, that teaching is a suitable occupation for females, not quite so suitable for males.

Criticisms of the occupation of teaching which are based on comparisons of teaching with the practice of law and medicine invariably come to the conclusion that teaching is a "flat", un-staged, "mobility-blocked" occupation (Blumberg, 1969; Dreeben, 1970). What this means is that while salary levels for teachers entering the occupation are relatively attractive, the salary levels for continuing teachers reflect models increases for years of service and accumulation of graduate credits but are not based on outstanding performance nor are the increases a concomitant of an increase in status. More importantly, there seem to be relatively few avenues for "moving up" within the occupation. Those who wish to advance their careers in the occupation of teaching have no status steps, no additional titles, no additional prestige. At best, they have small salary increments. To advance in education means renouncing teaching (Dreeben, 1970, p. 21). Lortie (1975) views this lack of mobility within the occupation as crucial because it is essential to the entire concept of "career".

> Compared with most other kinds of middle-class work, teaching is relatively 'career-less" There is less opportunity for the movement upward which is the essence of career. (p. 84

This structural feature of the occupation reinforces the notion that teaching is a women's occupation and in turn is reinforced by the social role assigned to women. The un-staged quality of the occupation is not viewed as a problem for men in the occupation who see teaching as a step to their goal of administration or an interim occupation on the way to another (Lortie, 1975, p. 86). In addition, the un-staged factor means that women can interrupt their careers for marriage and family and not lose a great deal in the way of advancement. Women themselves, of course, have been socialized to see this as advantageous.

> Although most women expect their careers to be interrupted, the vast majority think of teaching as a terminal status. Most men reject teaching as an ultimate goal; they see teaching as a means toward another end - as an interim engagement. (Lortie, 1975, p. 86)

Although most women teachers in Lortie's study did see teaching as a suitable life employment, this is not true for all women in the occupation. A study done by Brunetti, et al in 1972 on open-space schools revealed the following as one of its conclusions.

> Women who might be regarded as the most desirable members of the profession because of their commitment to the occupation and their desire for expanded and important roles, tend to be less satisfied with teaching jobs in the case of conventional schools. It might even be that such women eventually leave teaching as a result of such job dissatisfaction. (p. 24)

Evidently, some of these women are leaving teaching. Howey, et al (1978) reports that if their projections are accurate, fewer than six in ten students who begin a program of teacher education will obtain a teaching position and only about three in ten will be teaching after three years. In these times of declining enrollments and scarce funding, there is no shock in finding that a certified teacher cannot find a job teaching. But that there should be such a high attrition rate is surprising. Evidently, socialization into the traditional role of teacher is not acceptable to all women who enter the occupation.

Changing the occupation of teaching from an un-staged to a staged one implies several assumptions which need to be articulated. One is that upward mobility in terms of money, and status in terms of title, are essential to career satisfaction. While it is true that these are the primary features of the reward system in this society, there are male-defined features of a male-defined reward system and need to be at least questioned if not challenged. Hierarchy, status, and domination are characteristics of the partriarchal mentality. Although teaching is a women's occupation by virtue of the number of women in it and qualities thought to be desirable in teachers, it is an occupation controlled by men. Because it is a male-dominated occupation, male-defined values permeate it. If teaching were a women's occupation in terms of control of it, perhaps there would be other concerns that those of status and prestige. Creating a staged occupation of teaching would only serve to perpetuate the patriarchal mentality and would therefore be advantageous only to men. As is true for college faculty, women in teaching would end up in the lower ranks, men in the higher ranks.

In addition to the ease of entry feature, and the un-staged career-less feature of teaching, women in teaching face the same role-conflicts which women in other occupations experience (Damico and Nevill, 1978). The socialization process is a subtle one. To speak of "role conflict" only begins to penetrate the layers of guilt many women feel when they think in terms of career. Pottker and Fishel (1977) describe this in terms of multiple roles.

> There is still another factor involved in keeping women from pursuing advancements. This is the conflict some women experience between home and work. . . Part of this is due to greater job discrimination married women face, and part of this is due to women's multiple roles that

> in this society are conflictive. (Men's roles are not conflictive: no one is surprised at a man who is a husband, father, and school superintendent.) (p. 281)

The guilt that women experience in terms of conflictive roles is heightened by the tone with which these conflicts are described, as if it is too bad that women have to experience these conflicts but after all, that's what happens when people deviate from their social roles.

> The culture defines woman's responsibility to home and family as her primary one. When home and work obligations, conflict, the home has to take precedence. Women's self-images are built chiefly around their family roles, whereas men's are conditioned more by occupational roles. (Simpson and Simpson, 1969, p. 206)

While Simpson and Simpson's statement is nearly ten years old, Lortie (1975) found similar attitudes among the women in his study. In assessing involvement in teaching, Lortie found that for married women, teaching came second to marriage and family. Single women report more involvement, while men fall between single and married women. Lortie attributes this to the fact that most men in teaching are moving - either up or out (p. 92-94). Simpson and Simpson (1969) take this lesser involvement as a given and proceed to blame women for the fact that teaching is a semi-profession and not a profession. Their description reveals attitudes, assumptions, and conclusions which would be laughable if they were not still prevalent.

> Women's values and goals make many of them tractable subordinates. Their low work commitment makes some women welcome an easy job that makes few demands, and it is easier to follow instructions than to exercise judgement. They tend to want friendly relations with co-workers and are often afraid to risk these for the sake of autonomy and power. Relatively unambitious, on the average, they are not willing to fight for advancement. They tend to be more interested in giving personal service to clients than in technical mastery of skills or in professional prerogatives to define how their skills will be put to use. Their unsure position in any situation where they might have to exercise power over men contributes to their willingness to submit to bureaucratic control. Semi-professional women do not strive to establish professional independence or collegial authority patterns. (p. 232)

Women are thus caught in a double bind. If they turn to careers, the ones open to them are the ones which our society devalues. If they attempt to change the reward system by the infusion of values which have been described as "feminine" they find that these are devalued as well. If they attempt to emulate male-defined success and to seek status within the reward system they will be termed "unfeminine", even "sick"; they experience the guilt and ambivalence which thorough socialization into a role can bring. As long as our society defines women primarily according to their roles as wife and mother, they will be torn between career commitment and family commitment. A staged occupation of teaching would heighten this conflict and defeat any attempt to structure the reward system differently.

Teaching in the United States has, from its beginnings, had a kind of moral quality to it (Reich, 1974; Lortie, 1975; Parelius and Parelius, 1978). Originally, this was due to the fact that most teachers were ministers or students of ministry - exclusively male. Gradually, through shifts and growths in population, there arose a need for more and cheaper teachers. The answer, of course, was to hire women (Reich, 1974, p. 339). The moral quality persisted, however, even after the affiliation with religion was dropped.

> Although purportedly secular, the Common School Crusade did not entirely eschew the rhetoric of previous times, a rhetoric which implied an exalted definition of teaching. . . The moral controls surrounding teaching set it apart from the dominant alternatives of factory and domestic work. Whether better paid or not, teaching was demonstrably "respectable" employment. . . (Lortie, 1975, p. 12)

By retaining its moral quality, teaching was able to attract "respectable" women who also could be paid les then men. In an earlier age, this may have been somewhat liberating since a young woman would be pe mitted to leave home in order to be a teacher. The retention of this moral quality, however, has served a a control device over women's actions and choices. It is a restriction that many teachers are aware of

> The young woman who teaches encounters obstacles in her movements outside school; som said that they were not free to frequent places where singles meet (e.g. bars) since "everyon is watching". (Lortie, 1975, p. 97)

Investing teaching with a moral quality lays the groundwork for a structure which justifies lower economics rewards and which stresses psychic rewards (Lortie, 1975. p. 101). Women, after all, runs the argument, do not need to be concerned about their economic status, they have husbands to take care of them. They should be satisfied with the rewards of seeing a child learn. Indeed, as Lortie's study shows, this is where teachers place their emphasis when speaking of job satisfaction. Interestingly, however, if the typical teacher does focus on psychic rewards, she has little control over the conditions which might produce or enhance these psychic rewards. Dreeben (1970), Lortie (1975), and Eddy (1969) show clearly that with regard to assignment of students to classrooms, with regard to curriculum content, with regard to amount and kind of material, teachers have very little control. The persons who do control these factors (which might have an affect on psychic rewards) are males. Rather than actually being a legitimate compensation for low economic and status factors, psychic rewards are simply another area in the occupation in which men hold the controls. The idea of lack of control over vital areas of one's work may seem repugnant to a man on the way up, but it seems entirely "natural" if the person who lacks the control is female while the person exercising the control (in this case principals and other administrators) is male.

In fact, the structural constraints in teaching make it not so much a career for women as an extension for the role already defined by our society as belonging to women. Alexander (1975) points out that the structural pattern of teaching is a replication of the home pattern which is a replication of the pattern of the larger society. The unique feature of the teaching pattern is the special way in which it helps to perpetuate the other patterns.

> The fact is. . the system is structured in the pattern of the home, with men running the institutions and women working in them as teachers, with male students educated as if they are destined for jobs and careers, and female students as if they will exclusively be wives and mothers or variations of these roles. (p. 293)

The educational system, from kindergarten to graduate school, has had a tremendous success in socializing women into seeing that teaching is a desirable occupation for a woman. The very factors which make it desirable for a woman, however, are the same factors which are cited as "problems" in the occupation and lead to the conclusion that the occupation has these "problems" because it is dominated by women.

> It is difficult to determine if the semi-professional organizations have taken the form they have because of the high percentage of female employees, or if they recruit females because of organizational reasons; in all likelihood, these factors support each other. (Etzioni, 1969, p xv)

It is clear, however, that the "dominance" in teaching is a male dominance in terms of authority and control. It is the structure of the occupation, controlled by males which gives rise to many of the "problems" in teaching. In light of this, comments about the "feminization" of teaching and its subsequent inability to be "professionalized" place the blame on the victim instead of the structural constraints. In addition, this view leaves unquestioned those factors about "professions" which have grown from a patriarchal mentality. Until those questions are asked, any attempt to "professionalize" teaching will only result in the perpetuation of a patriarchal institution.

This analysis of the occupation of teaching is crucial to the attempt to "get clear" about teacher education. Programs which prepare teachers have in mind explicitly and implicitly, the features of the occupation. As such, these program emulate, and perpetuate, those features of the occupation discussed above. These programs are also influenced by the entire undergraduate educational program and the research issues. The kaleidoscope has only so many pieces. While the patterns may seem infinite, each piece remains within the kaleidoscope, maintaining its own color and shape and interacting in various ways with the other pieces. Teaching, teacher education, research in education, education as a field of study have their own places in the kaleidoscope. Many of the patterns they have formed in the past have been created from a patriarchal mentality. The pieces of the kaleidoscope may appear to fall into random patterns. It is clear that what in fact occurs is that the pieces are carefully chosen and patterned from a male-defined model. It is possible to arrange the pieces in different ways.

Chapter Three

Progressive Stage Teacher Education

> If there is one point which I want to get across rather than any other, it is that the study of education and teacher-training is extremely difficult. It raises problems not only in a very large number of disciplines, but also in areas which no discipline has even looked at seriously. (Wilson, 1975, p. 22)

Wilson's comment about the difficulty of the study of education and teacher education is not so much a defense of such study as an encouragement to continue despite the difficulties, an incentive to continue to try to "get clear" about teacher education knowing that it is the process which will provide the clarity for there is nothing "out there" waiting to be uncovered or discovered but whatever may come will be created in the search. Wilson's comment also serves to sharpen the focus of the kaleidoscope once more on the pattern of teacher education. It serves as a reminder that tentativeness, ambiguity and confusion are not unusual and indeed are to be expected. As was true for the regressive stage, the progressive stage will again look at teacher education. Also similar to the regressive stage, there will be many other areas besides teacher education which ultimately become part of the kaleidoscope. This chapter parallels the progressive stage of currere in that it looks to the future.

It does so in a sense that is somewhat different from the usual "predictive" nature of talk about the future. It does not offer "projections" about the future of teacher education based on current trends and demographic statistics. It does not offer "prescriptions" about what teacher education programs "should" do or what they "ought" to be like. The parallel with the progressive stage of currere is that this chapter will be nearly free-associative in its glance into the future. It will be somewhat "visionary" in the sense that it will indicate directions but not destinations. It will not be clear-cut, definite, precise or neat in its process. As such, it will not deal with those concepts or prescriptions which call for more empirical research based on the patriarchal model. It is clear that the empirical perspective is too narrow and precludes the asking of many questions which may be crucial to teacher education. Some of these questions may include what it means to teach; what it means to teach someone how to teach; what the relationship is between theory in education and teacher education; what kinds of theories might be useful in education; what ways do "feminine" traits contribute to education. This study assumes that the asking of the question is at least as crucial as the answer.

Needs of Research and Theory

The many criticisms leveled at research in education outlined in Chapter 2 lead to the conclusion that different research is needed. Abandoning the empirical, male-defined model, however, is not easy. This model has dominated our thinking for long enough that it is difficult to imagine research of any other kind. At the same time, there is an awareness that the tentativeness with which new conceptualizations of research are offered is not only due to the novelty of the idea but that "tentative" itself (along with other notions like "playful", "innovative", "aesthetic") may be intrinsically necessary to any research which attempts to differ to any meaningful extent from the empirical, patriarchal model. Because of the pervasiveness of the empirical, patriarchal model, many of the suggestions for new research patterns begin with the effects of the old model as a first step toward the creation of the new. It is sometimes easier to articulate what is not needed or wanted than it is to articulate what is. Kliebard (1975) discusses these interrelationships in terms of curriculum.

> Perhaps the most obvious conclusion that could be drawn from viewing curriculum issues in the perspective of the past fifty years or so is that our basic framework and our intellectual horizons have been severely limited. The production model and the utilitarian criterion applied to all school subjects as they have evolved over the past half century will constitute our fundamental frame of reference. The coming of modern technology, rather than freeing us from the earlier formulations, has served instead only to reinforce them or restrict them further. The task of the next fifty years in the curriculum field is one of developing alternatives to the mode of thinking that has so clearly dominated our first fifty years. (p. 49)

The development of the alternatives which Kliebard calls for is an arduous task. Ideas themselves, not to mention programs which develop from them, face enormous obstacles in becoming accepted. The male-dominated institutions in our society are reluctant to admit ideas and programs which may threaten the status quo. Masters (1970) describes how this process operates in the university.

> Without attempting to sound cute or sarcastic, I firmly believe that every new idea, every new program proposal in modern university structure, particularly in teacher education, is immediately put on trial. The trial, I suggest, is not one of program merit, quality and applicability but one of guilt or innocence in terms of how the proposal affects the current vested interests and, more important, the existing allocation of resources. (p. 45)

This preoccupation with the protection of the status quo has resulted in what Combs (1969) describes as the "surrender" of research to a group of highly proficient technicians who are experts at talking to computers but incapable of communicating with teachers (p. 221). The process, of course, has been gradual. It stems from the concept described in chapter 2 that a "knowledge base" is necessary in order for a field to be a respectable "discipline". Combs (1966) notes that it was natural for education to rely on objective, rational methodologies and to focus on the collection and communication of information (p. 220). Those methodologies had been successful with the natural sciences and were adopted by the social sciences, an area to which education whished to be admitted. Thus the "naturalness" of education's emphasis on the objective gathering of information.

There is some sense, however, not only of what is not needed, (or at least not sufficient of itself any longer), but of what is needed in the area of research. One of the needs is a wider concept of research, one that includes not only empirical methods, but many others as well. In discussing the Institute of Research on Teaching, Shulman and Lanier (1977) prefer the term "eclectic".

> The complexities of the teaching process are of such magnitude that no single form of inquiry can suffice. What is needed is a purposeful and disciplined eclecticism that brings together multiple perspectives on the phenomena of teaching. . . The anthropologist's or ethnographer's uses of "thick description", the introspective self-reports of practitioners, the process tracing strategies of cognitive psychologists, the production function analyses of economists - these and many other research strategies characterize the eclectic nature of IRT. (p. 45)

The eclectic approach, of course, requires attention to additional ways of looking at education, and teaching. In fact, there is an awareness that the preoccupation with the mainstream social scientific perspective may even have dissuaded us from looking as sensitively as we might have at the place where most of the reality of what is called education ostensibly takes place: the classroom. Eisner (1978) sees the primary need of research to focus attention on that classroom.

> What is needed is attention to the processes of classroom life and the use of forms of disclosure that can capture and convey what goes on it those settings we call classrooms and schools. (p. 621)

Capturing and conveying what goes on in classrooms has often been thought of in terms of someone coming in and observing the teacher and how s/he behaved and what effect this seemed to have on the pupils. Such an observer was thought to be "objective", "rational", and able to "see" more than the teacher who was too involved to be "objective". Clearly, this familiar description is part of the patriarchal model which combines "objectivity" with non-involvement and assumes a direct cause-effect relationship between what the teacher does and what the student learns. As an alternative to this, Combs (1966) suggests "action research" which enlists the active participation of the persons most involved in the classroom: teachers and students.

Research questions, as was shown in Chapter 2, are intimately connected with theory questions. It is also clear that there are a variety of conceptualizations of theory. I suggested that this study of teacher education was an attempt to "theorize" rather than to create a "theory" of teacher education. In doing so, I was striving to be faithful to what I see emerging in terms of theory questions regarding research in education. "Theorizing" represents a process of thinking, in this case about teacher education, in which the attention is more on the process than on the end result. It is an attempt that is best described as "understanding" rather than as "defining". It depends upon asking significant questions rather than trivial ones because they can be answered so much more easily. It depends upon conceptualizations rather than on social pressures. Wilson (1975) reminds teacher education of the challenge involved in such a perspective.

> (We should not renege) on the principle of taking what is logically or conceptually required by the notion of 'being a teacher' as a basis for teacher-preparation, rather than any notion about 'what society demands', 'what the general consensus is', 'what is politically viable', and so on. (p. 146)

Sometimes this "theorizing" is described as "asking the right questions" (Kinzer, 1974); sometimes it is termed seeing the "whole picture" (Lindsey, 1973); sometimes it is thought of a "conceptualizing (Goldhammer, 1969). However it is described, Kliebard (1973) reminds us that it is a slow and arduous process which is often unrewarding (p. 21).

However arduous and unrewarding, this theorizing is nevertheless essential (Snow, 1973; Macdonald, 1974; Wilson, 1975). The necessity of it begins with the research issue.

> Building theories and models is not only respectable but extremely useful, perhaps even indispensable, in pursuing research on teaching. (Snow, 1973, p. 77)

From research on teaching, the indispensability of theorizing extends to program development in teacher education, supervision, teaching, curriculum, and evaluation. Ultimately, theorizing is the most "practical" thing that can be done. Wilson notes:

> Similarly of course it is true that, if one finds oneself in a position of responsibility in some organization (institution, exercise) concerned with educational theory or teacher-education or whatever, one has to do something in this position. But my point is precisely that the most practically useful thing to do is to try to make sense of the exercise, rather than just 'carry on'. This involves an immense amount of sheer hard thinking and arguing - a quite different matter from creating the impression of activity and progress by committee meetings, new courses and so forth. (Wilson, 1975, p. 20)

Of course, if one is a teacher, one does, in fact, have to "carry on" on a daily basis. Wison's point is not simply to cease all activity until these questions are resolved. What is important is that we who are teachers and teacher educators must not delude ourselves into thinking that the committee meetings, the new courses and the rhetoric are the same as theorizing nor that these activities can be substitutes for theorizing either.

In either case, theorizing is still "practical" although it requires the distancing I have been discussing as well as the involvement of those closest to the situation: teachers and students.

> A teacher has to decide what to do with such-and-such children; from 10 to 11, on a rainy Tuesday, with only a blackboard, etc.; only he (sic) can decide, partly because there are so many particularities, and partly because only he is in a position to know what the children are like. What theory can, in principle, do is to equip the teachers and others with useful understanding; I do not say 'general truths' or even 'knowledge', because it is an open question how far such understanding will take the form of specific (empirical) truths rather than a much less specific awareness or clear-headedness. But if theory is to do this, it must to some extent stand back from the particular. (Wilson, 1975, p. 66)

Not only is theorizing practical in terms of teaching and teacher education, it is also practical in terms of education as a general field of study. In chapter 2 the status of education as field of study was seen to rest (or more accurately, not to rest) on a firm knowledge base. As a result, education has taken to imitating the mainstream social scientific perspective in an attempt to make itself a "science" - "science" being the sole measure of reality in a patriarchal society. Here I would like to suggest that if knowledge could be conceived of differently from the patriarchal model; if it could be conceived of as a kind of understanding which results from what I have been calling "theorizing"; if education could articulate this distinction and communicate it clearly; then education would not need to be "like" anything, but could concentrate on becoming itself. One of the first steps that education could take in the direction of becoming itself is to shift the focus of its attention from the acquisition of knowledge in the sense of specific empirical data to the acquisition of understanding. Macdonald (1974) offers one way of articulating the distinction between knowledge, as it is usually understood, and understanding.

> Understanding is a deeper concept. It demands a sort of indwelling in the other, a touching of the sources of the other. Understanding others is not a "useful" procedure in the sense that knowing is, in that it does not provide the basis for planning. (p. 113)

Acquiring the understanding which Macdonald describes has benefits in a wider context as well. Willis (1978) describes the skills which would be necessary for education to develop into a qualitative enterprise rather than the quantitative one it is currently.

> Educational evaluation in the United States will not develop into a mature and socially responsible enterprise until it widely adopts artistically developed and skillfully employed techniques of qualitative evaluation that directly confront both the significance of and the qualities of personal experience within education. (p. 9)

Although Willis speaks in terms of qualitative and quantitative in relation to curriculum evaluation particularly, what is apparent is that theorizing, in the sense of understanding, is crucial to education both in terms of "practical" application and in terms of education understanding itself and communicating that understanding.

Theorizing is also practical in a fundamental sense. Here it is useful to return to Bernstein's (1976) categorizations of theory as 1) empirical theory, 2) phenomenological theory, 3) critical theory. The focus here will be on critical theory. The dissatisfaction with empirical theory for its failure to provide insight into critical social issues called into question the entire notion of the "objectivity" of the theorist and the desirability of this kind of "objectivity" in the face of pressing social issues. Bernstein points out that theory should self-consciously address itself to the responsibility of the problems society faces. He sees critical theory as serving this function.

> Critical theory has a fundamental practical interest that guides it - a practical interest in radically "improving human existence", of fostering the type of self-consciousness and understanding of existing social and political conditions . . . such a critique becomes efficacious and leads to revolutionary praxis to the extent that it correctly analyzes and speaks to the human condition of the oppressed class. . . (p. 181)

Critical theory also offers an alternative perspective to the duality which is so characteristic of the patriarchcal mentality. In this case, the duality is between theory and action. Critical theory focuses on unity and wholeness rather than on duality.

> Critical theory aspires to bring the subjects themselves to full self-consciousness of the contradictions implicit in their material existence, to penetrate the ideological mystifications and forms of false consciousness that distort the meaning of existing social conditions. Critical theorists see the distinction between theory and action which is accepted by advocates of traditional theory as itself an ideological reflection of a society in which "theory" only serves to foster the status quo. By way of contrast, critical theory seeks a genuine unity of theory and revolutionary praxis where the theoretical understanding of the contradictions inherent in existing society, when appropriated by those who are exploited, become constitutive of their very activity to transform society. (p. 182)

Pinar (1978) addresses the issue of the unity between theory and revolutionary praxis in terms of the curriculum field and the schools. He notes that in order for theory to serve this unifying purpose, it must emanate from an "emancipatory intention". Accumulation of knowledge or the application of theory to improvement of schools without dwelling on the notion of emancipation results in technical manipulation in schools, and a state of arrest for the field (p. 18). An analogous order of theorizing could tie together education, teaching, and teacher education by focusing on the interrelationships among these various areas and the ways in which they influence one another. The patterns of the kaleidoscope radiate outward and inward again. Theorizing influences research, research influences education as a field of study, education as a field of study influences teacher education, teacher education influences teaching, teaching influences schools, schools influence society. Following the pattern in the reverse direction has equal validity and illuminates still further the intricacies involved.

It might be useful to ask what might characterize the kind of theorizing I have been discussing. What might it look like, sound like, feel like? What might it focus upon? While there are various answers to these questions, they are not "answers" in the usual sense; they are more like responses, suggestions, sharings of insight. They indicate a suspension of old ways of "seeing" things in order to experiment, to improvise, to play in the hope of creating the new. Indeed, one of the major characteristics of this kind of theorizing is a revitalization of what it means to "see". Eisner (1978) contrasts this with the mainstream social scientific emphasis on counting.

> We need, in my view, to see at least as much as we need to count. We need, I believe, to develop what I have called educational connoisseurship, an art that is concerned essentially with the appreciation of what one attends to. (p. 622)

Developing educational connoisseurship requires not only new ways of seeing but also new ways of communicating what is seen. These forms of communicating must be consonant with the quality of what it observed; must do justice to the complexities. In Eisner's view, such forms may be found in the arts - in literature, film, music. The educational critic then functions in a way analogous to that of an art critic, and "provides description, interpretation, and evaluation of the classrooms he or she has seen, and through that process raises the level of awareness that a teacher can "secure" (p. 622).

Another characteristic of this theorizing is a definition of education, both in terms of education being a field of study and in terms of education as a process, that is dynamic and organic rather than static and rigid. Pinar (1976) describes the results of pursuing education as a field of study to the point of where the entire purpose of such a pursuit is the establishment of education as a social science "discipline".

> To view any academic discipline as an impersonal quest for which human life is sacrificed (intellectually, interpersonally) is such idolatry, an inversion of life-affirmative values. (p. 3)

The inversion of life-affirmative values in much of education and its research is what has called forth these statements that something new and more insightful is needed in the way of perspectives for looking at education, research, theorizing, and teacher education. Clements (1975) offers a definition of education as a process which could be applicable to schooling from kindergarten through graduate school.

> Rather than define education as the directing of behavior toward some desirable end, we could use this definition: Education is the provision of opportunities for fruitful conversations about one's work, ideas, society, and life in general. (p. 166)

In addition to concerning itself with new definitions of education, theorizing also concerns itself with experience. This is not experience in the sense of something that "happens to" a person, nor in the sense of teachers setting up "experiences" so that pupils learn. It is experience in the sense that persons interact with other persons, with materials, and with themselves. It is experience in the sense that the person actively engages in its creation as well as participating in the results. The consensus in the literature on teacher education, teaching, education in general, and educational research calls for more attention to be paid to experience. Wilhelms (1970) wants a concept of experience in student teaching which will allow for more experimentation and fewer penalties for mistakes. La Grone (1966) calls for opportunities for teachers in classrooms to be reflective about their experience. Pinar (1976) sees that what is missing is the study of the student 's point of view from the student's point of view.

Closely related to theorizing's concerns of the meaning of education and of experience is the issue of personal meaning. Combs (1971) defines learning itself as the discovery of meaning. Meaning, however, does not lie "out there" waiting to be discovered. Meanings lie in persons. As such, they are intimately connected with the total life of the person: intellectual, emotional, physical. The attempt to separate knowledge from the person knowing is characteristic of the patriarchal, mainstream social scientific, consumer view of reality described in Chapters 1 and 2. Thus, educational critics are calling for an integration of education with the total life of the person through the personal meaning of experience. These concepts are applicable to the entire kaleidoscope from theory to research to education as a field of study to teacher education to teaching. Pinar (1976) calls for this integration in theory.

> Theory must be self-consciously rooted in experience, experience that is bodily and emotional, not experience that is reductively conceptual. (p. 9)

When the focus shifts to the issue of research, especially when compared with the empirical emphasis, the significance of numbers is reduced because the concern is not with how many but on the personal meaning of the individual.

> When we enter the sphere of selfhood, however, these quantities, numbers, and dimensions are not so important. When we deal with the concepts of selfhood, self-acceptance and self-fulfillment, we move into a dimension where the smallest quantity is in a sense, the greatest, and the smallest number, short of nothing, is all-important. Meanings may be shared, but they are realized as a personal experience by one person, and by him (sic) alone. (Jersild, 1955, p. 134)

Finally, the concept of education as a focus on experience, the reflection on the personal meaning of the experience, the connection of learning with the lived experience of the individual, integrates itself into a pattern in which the predominant color is the Self.

> The search for meaning is essentially a search for self - Meaning constitutes, in many respects, the substance of the Self. (Jersild, 1955, p. 78)

The various patterns formed by the pieces of the kaleidoscope which are teaching, teacher education, education as a field of study, research, and theory have in common the "piece" called the Self. Theorizing and research in education are said to need a new perspective, a new way of asking new questions. Some suggested directions for this search for these new ways center around the view of education as experience, as the search for meaning in this experience which is ultimately the search for Self.

Self and Education

It is interesting to note that in all of the patterns of the kaleidoscope, whenever there is any indication that there may be ways to "get clear" about teacher education, the ways pertain to the discovery of the Self. Whenever there is hope that there might be a new perspective in educational research that might ultimately lead to understanding, it begins with the Self. Whenever there is any possibility that teacher education programs might be made more meaningful, there is a call for emphasizing the Self. Whenever there is any thought given to the occupation of teaching and to what finally constitutes a "professional", it begins with the Self. It is the only piece of the kaleidoscope that appears in each pattern. It is the only issue in education about which there is any agreement whatsoever. The Self of the student, of the perspective teacher, of the teacher, is critical to the understanding of anything connected with education. The following illustrate both the diversity and the frequency with which the Self is presented as a key factor.

> The teacher's understanding and acceptance of himself (sic) is the most important requirement in any effort he mkes to help students to know themselves and to gain healthy attitudes of self acceptance. (Jersild, 1955, p. 3)

> Our primary purpose must be to help each candidate as much as we can in his (sic) personal/professional becoming. (Wilhelms, 1970, p. 13)

> Becoming is a problem in growth. It is an internal event going on inside the learner and only in a limited degree open to external manipulation. It can be encouraged, facilitated, or assisted in its development by outsiders, or it can be discouraged, inhibited, distorted, and even destroyed by outsiders. The direction and control of growth, however, always remains with the person. (Combs, 1966, p. 212)

> The most important contribution of this study is the message coming from the future teachers themselves - that their feelings of personal worth and their lack of confidence in themselves concern them far more than the acquisition of competencies and the building of skills. Learners cannot be separated from their feelings. (Karmos and Jacko, 1971, p. 55)

> They (students) need two main types of work or experience: a serious attempt to grapple intellectually with educational problems and a serious attempt to understand...their own personalities. (Wilson, 1975, p. 160)

> If teaching is an art, it is a deeply personal art. Ideally, it involves open and honest personal relationships with others. If this is the case, much more emphasis must be placed on the prospective teacher as an individual whose understanding, acceptance and development of self are

> crucial. During four years in college, when does the teacher focus on the development of self and his (sic) relatedness to others? Most of his years are spent as a passive receptacle, or as an impartial, non-involved, objective observer. (Will, 1974, p. 118)

> I am convinced that a part of the clinical supervisor's training must include self-study, in one for or another, that will deepen his (sic) understanding of factors that influence his professional behavior and that heighten his ability to exercise deliberate control and discipline over it. I am equally persuaded that beyond his initial training, the supervisor's practice should include provisions for continued, guided, self-examination on a systematic basis. (Goldhammer, 1969, p. 314)

> An honest professional worker, then, must constantly reexamine his or her own professional work and private life in order to identify and criticize the ethical, political and social implications of his or her own concepts and methodologies. This is the image we must project of professionals. (Clements, 1975, p. 165)

> If effective operation in the helping professions is a personal matter of the effective use of a self then the search for a common knowledge or a common method is doomed before it begins. Since the self of each individual is unique, the search for a common uniqueness is, by definition, a built-in invalidation. (Combs, 1969, p. 11)

> What is required is a methodology that will help the teacher to learn what he (sic) already knows by providing him with a way to extract information from his own response to his situation. (Grumet, 1978, p. 27)

> Both the 'academic' business of 'making sense' of unclear subjects (or pursuing clearer ones), and in the field of ordinary personal relationships, a person has somewhat to feel the importance of some enterprise outside himself (sic). The enterprise - love, friendship, the pursuit of truth - has to be real to him: he has to be able to invest emotionally in it, to put himself into it. In making such a move the persons shows both trust and seriousness. He has to be free and secure enough , as it were, to let himself go; a freedom and security required even to begin (let alone persist in) the hard work and hard knocks which the enterprise involves. (Wilson, 1975, p. 92)

My purpose in listing these passages is to illustrate the persistency of the issue of Self which permeates the critical literature in education. From theory and research, to education as a field of study, to student teaching, to teaching, to supervision, the significant factor for those who would work for more light in education, light by which "getting clear" might be possible, is the Self. Yet most of this emphasis on Self is lip-service. Rarely is there any systematic attempt to provide space and opportunity to develop Self. Kinzer's comment sumnarizes the situation for teacher education.

> Where, then, do we go from here? Can we continue to presume to be able to teach people how to teach? Or is there no bag of tricks big enough for that? One avenue may be to explore ways in which teacher preparation programs can provide opportunities for experiences that will enable the becoming teacher to develop skills in dealing with himself (sic) and the inevitable barrage of inputs and information received in any given lifetime. We talk a lot about this, but do we really do it? (Kinzer, 1974, p. 35)

I am tempted here by Kliebard's question concerning the failure of so much research in education to be illuminating: Why is this? Why is there so much written about the importance of the Self in education and

evidence of Self in teacher education programs? Several reasons are offered for this and it is useful to examine them. One is that Self-examination can be anxiety-producing and therefore difficult to engage in. Therefore, the idea is accepted - as long as it can be applied to someone else.

> . . . there are some who seem eagerly to accept the idea that self-understanding is important and then at once proceed to strip the idea of its potentially anxiety-producing personal implications by applying it to others rather than themselves. (Jersild, 1955, p. 51)

Another reason for the difficulty involved in Self-study, is the attempt to make it into an academic exercise, to organize, categorize, theorize it until it again becomes something separate from the lived experience of the individual.

> . . . one form of resistance is to insist on a letter-perfect definition - to keep fiddling with meanings until the concept becomes only an academic matter and ceases to have any personal significance at all. (Jersild, 1955, p. 41)

Rogers (1969) offers another explanation for the difficulty of Self-study even when it does apply to someone else. If we imagine his description as that of a schooling situation, it has an all-too-familiar ring.

> If I distrust the human being then I must cram him (sic) with information of my own choosing lest he go his own mistaken way. But if I trust the capacity of the human individual for developing his own potentiality, then I can provide him with many opportunities and permit him to choose his own way and his own direction in his learning. (p. 114)

Still another reason offered for the resistance to Self-study is education's tendency to grasp at things which are "practical", that can be translated into activities, rules, exercises, that are answers to "What do I do on Monday morning?" These are all ways of avoiding the issue, of rejecting it, of translating it into something that is removed from the Self instead of moving towards it.

> Often, when teachers look for a practical application - a method, a gimmick, a prescription, a rule of thumb - they are trying not to grasp but to avoid the meaning a theory might have for them . . . Our immediate response often is to become manipulative: to do something to someone else. (Jersild, 1955, p. 87)

If we look more closely at the patterns in the kaleidoscope, at the "piece" called the Self, at the reasons why Self-study is given so much lip-service instad of action, the features of the patriarchal mentality emerge again. Will's (1974) description of the student in teacher education as a detached, uninvolved, objective observer; the tendency to turn Self-study into an academic exercise devoid of emotion; the projection of Self-study onto someone other than oneSelf which tends toward manipulation and control; the fact that despite the amount of emphasis given the Self in the literature, institutions for teacher education do not generally create opportunities for such study; these are all features of the patriarchal mentality. I am suggesting, of course, that the reason why the development of Self has actually been so neglected is a result of the patriarchal mentality which pervades our institutions, including teacher education institutions. Interestingly, most of the writers calling for a greater emphasis on Self are male. If we consider Jersild's point about Self-study being thought of as something done to someone else, then it is understandable why Self-study has only been lip-service rather than action. Male critics of education are prescribing Self-study for teachers, the majority of whom are female. At the same time, the structure of the teacher education institution mitigates against anything so "personal" as Self-study. In addition, women are socialized not to do their own Self-study and development but to develop through others. Miller (1976) explains why this is so difficult for women.

> To concentrate on and to take seriously one's own development is hard enough for all human beings. But . . . it has been even harder for women. Women are not encouraged to develop as far as they possibly can and to experience the stimulation and the anguish, anxiety, and pain the process entails. Instead, they are encouraged to believe that if they do go through the mental

> and emotional struggle of self-development, the end result will be disastrous - they will forfeit the possibility of having any close relationships. This penalty, this threat of isolation, is intolerable for anyone to contemplate. For women, reality has made the threat; it was by no means imaginary. (p. 19)

Thus, in terms of Self-study, women are caught in a bind similar to their role-conflicts in their careers. They have been made carriers for the whole society of those qualities which are most misunderstood, problems most unsolved, emotions most intense - all of those areas which are most intimately connected with Self (Miller, 1976, p. 22-23). These qualities have then been removed from open exchange, placed outside of normal human discourse, and devalued. Finally, women in education have been asked to do Self-study under these impossible conditions!

Needs of Teacher Education

The look toward the future that is the focus of this chapter now turns toward teacher education's need for the elimination of sexism in its programs. In fact, the elimination of sexism is seen as teacher education's greatest need, from theorizing to daily activity in classrooms. There are several different reasons for this being the greatest need. The first is because of the numbers of teachers who are women.

> Because most public school teachers are women, and because their numbers are so vast, I see them as the key to changing the education of women (and men). (Howe, 1973, p. xiii)

Obviously, if these women in the public schools are to function in the key ways which Howe describes, then more attention must be given to sexism in teacher education institutions. Fantini (1975) and Howard and Garton (1975) are among those who view sexism in teacher education as having top priority. The difficulty in removing sexism is strengthened due to the manner in which sexism becomes institutionalized.

> Although the origins of sex stereotyping and discrimination may be found in attitudes and behaviors of individuals, they become incorporated into policies, practices, and structures of teacher education institutions. Once incorporated, stereotypical patterns are reinforced and maintained by institutional inertia and require active and conscious efforts for their elimination. (McCune and Matthews, 1975, p. 297)

We have already seen how these institutional constraints in teacher education and teaching function to perpetuate sexism (Chapter 2). The urgency then for making teacher education the focus of the difficult task of eliminating sexism stems from the special way in which teacher education institutions influence all of education.

> Because of the role of teacher education institutions as agencies for the socialization of staff throughout all our education systems, it is vital that teacher education institutions and faculty move to actualize their potential as leaders in educational change in this area. (McCune and Matthews, 1975, p. 229)

Teacher education, of course, is related not only to the other educational institutions in society, but to other institutions as well. Consequently, eliminating sexism cannot be confined to teacher education institutions, however great their influence on the rest of education.

> Because of the structural limitations of institutionalized education at this time in history, then, teacher liberation must become part of a societal-wide women's liberation movement and not be confined to the ranks of educators themselves. We in teacher education - men as well as women - should become strong supporters of this basic and necessary social movement at the societal level, even though we cannot realistically expect to resolve the problem primarily in

> our institutionalized positions as teacher educators. (Reitman, 1975, p. 307)

Teacher education has other needs which are closely related to the elimination of sexism. One of these needs stems from the relationship which teacher education has with the public schools. There is often a dichotomy between what the prospective teacher learns in her college class and what goes on in the "real world" of public school classrooms. Partly, this stems from a patriarchal world-view which perceives all matters in terms of opposites and partly, it stems from an unwillingness to examine these seeming dichotomies, to legitimatize them as student concerns, to question their sources. So part of what is called for in teacher education is space for such discussion.

> ...we in teacher education so seldom enable our own students to...articulate their sense of discrepancy between what is said to be desirable and what is actually acted upon in the world. (Greene, 1970, p. 68)

The importance of articulating this discrepancy between what is said and what is done becomes even more critical when teacher education is looked to, as many of the critics do look to it, for a significant role in making some changes in the entire field of education. Should teachers be trained to cope with schools as they exist or to affect needed changes? The most obvious answer is that they should be trained to do both (Clements, 1975; Katz, 1978; Kinzer, 1974; Apple, 1975; Friendenberg, 1973; McCune and Matthews, 1975; Salzillo and Van Fleet, 1977). Kinzer (1974) summarizes the difficulty by asking another question.

> The difficulty is, however, that in order to change a system, one must be able to survive in it... who can understand, survive in, and change an obsolete system; and who can, most importantly, grow and become all they are capable of being? (p. 34)

The problem of sending teachers (most women) into existing schools is that the structural constraints will not allow them to become all that they are capable of being, because existing schools perpetuate sexism (Feiger, see bibliography). If teacher education is going to be effective in influencing the rest of education, the primary discrepancy which needs to be articulated is the way in which educational institutions say they treat women and the way they act.

Needs of Society

The relationship between education, teaching, and teacher education and the rest of society is complex, intricate, and significant. In a sense, what occurs in schools is simply a microcosm of the wider society in which classism, racism, and sexism characterize relationships. The responsibility or even the ability of the school, at whatever level, to affect change is dubious at best. At the least, however, schools can create awareness of problems.

> While schools cannot solve social problems, they can illuminate them. Indeed, one of their prime functions is precisely that: to enlighten students about their present and their past. (Howe, 1975, p. 428)

The other side of the argument is that schools not only can but should act as agents of social change. In either case, part of the awareness involves the ways in which schools and the larger society interact. Change in one institution is both cause and effect of change in the other. Macdonald (1975) discusses this interaction between the school and society as follows:

> The end which I propose as the standard of critique is the quality of everyday living in the schools. This is equivalent to saying that what one needs is essentially a cultural revolution and that economic and political arrangements are key variables or means toward those ends. (p. 83)

While it may be debated that economic and political arrangements are the key variables in a cultural revolution they are certainly important ones and their relationship to the schools cannot be ignored. Zaret (1975) echoes Macdonald's concern for deep-rooted cultural change but chooses to focus on another facet of human interaction.

> If we wish to get at the root of the problem of schooling, that is, take a radical approach, it would seem to be clear that a cultural reforming is the end goal and that this cultural reform must deal directly with human activity in its qualitative aspects. (p. 94)

"Human activity in its qualitative aspects" resonates with the vibrations of the rejection of the patriarchal, mainstream social scientific, empirical world-view as the sole standard by which to judge knowledge. There is a real sense in which it can be said that the criticisms of theory, research, education, teaching and teacher education are the same criticisms which can be leveled at society and that schools are, after all, part of that society. Schools, however, act to influence and are influenced by society in special ways because they are the chief instruments of socialization of society's children. We choose, in many cases, what we wish transmitted to future generations by what goes on in schools. What we have chosen to transmit thus far (among other things) has been a rigid adherence to a patriarchal mentality.

So the question becomes - "Given the relationship between schools and society, can it be said that the needs of education are the needs of society?" Among those critics whose visions are discussed in this chapter, an answer would be in the affirmative.

> Sexism, thus, is the most critical issue of our times. It is so because the development of individual human potential, and perhaps the survival of all humans, demands drastic changes in our sex stereotypes... It also promises to be the most viable way by which the priorities in human existence may come to be realigned. (Macdonald and Macdonald, 1975, p. 11)

This realignment of the priorities of human existence from what is the current alignment calls forth a kind of wholeness which the patriarchal mentality has precluded by its emphasis on duality based on sex. Shuchat Shaw (1975) places the concept of wholeness in the context of a teacher's relationship to her subject and her students. She uses the term "congruence" to describe this wholeness.

> We have long lived with dialectical tension within all of our institutions and principles, and we have long sought to resolve separation and conflict between pairs such as thought and action, theory and practice, content and pedagogy, subject and methodology. If our lives are well-woven, well-balanced tapestries, we can leave no incongruent juxtaposition unattended; congruence means that threads of the Self weave a conceptual bond with and continuity between our theories and experiences, work and creative practices, our relation to students and the atmosphere we provide for them. (p. 446)

Also in the context of education, Macdonald (1975) describes the psychic costs which accompany this lack of congruence in male-dominated institutions.

> Social relationships tend to become anonymous and a split in individuals' identities develops. Individuals come to experience themselves in a dual manner: as a private and unique person and as a public functionary. Considerable internal psychological management then becomes necessary and the existence of discipline problems may be largely due to the constant press and struggle to maintain an appropriate dual identity (on the part of either or both teacher and student). (p. 80)

The costs of maintaining a dual identity in an educational context have also been described by Huebner (1975), Greene (1973), Pinar (1974), Hochschild (1975). Repeatedly, these writers note the fragmentation, alienation and severence from Self which occurs in schools.

To charge education and society with this alienation, fragmentation, severence from Self and with other ills many seem simply to pass through the kaleidoscope those patterns which are already familiar, perhaps so familiar as to be boring. Writings on the depersonalization of society are hardly new and startling. Yet, as is the case with the emphasis on Self in education, there is much writing and talking about it while in the "real world", the male-dominated world, things go on much as they have in the past. Miller (1976) explains why this has occurred.

> There has been a deluge of recent writings in many fields in the dominant culture bemoaning men's entrapment. These writings say that the goals held out to man create a person unable to arrive at satisfaction or even a sense of connection with what he is doing and those with whom he is doing it. Witness the stream of "alienation" and "failure of communication" literature. What this writing has not seriously considered is that these difficulties relate to the subjugation of women (p. 76)

Rich (1975) notes that a number of male writers have, in fact, acknowledged that the failure of masculine culture has sexual roots. Some even predict the re-emergence of the "feminine principle" as the salvation of the species (p. 20). Yet, somehow, this does not get translated into actual women being given the opportunity to relate their experiences, into actual women being given the opportunity to bring their "feminine qualities" into institutions in a way to transform them, into actual women being given the opportunity to exercise real power. Rich's (1975) summary shows the strange twist given the "feminine principle" by male writers.

> However, even when these writers acknowledge the problem as rooted in sexual disbalance, they seem to hope for some miraculous transformation of values brought about not by actual women working to change actual conditions and exercising actual power, but by an intangible "feminine principle" or "mother consciousness". (p. 20)

To return to the concept of wholeness - most of these writers (male and female) see this yearning toward wholeness as a human yearning for completeness. Phenix (1975) sees this as the goal of what he terms "transcendence".

> The lure of transcendence is toward wholeness . . . The case for general education for all rests finally on the nature of persons as essentially constituted by the hunger for wholeness. (p. 334)

The "nature of persons" has for a long time been defined as "masculine". To call for wholeness in men by having them internalize or relcase the "feminine principle" in themselves is to ignore that we are dealing with an unequal power situation in relationships between men and women. Up to this point, it has been males who have decided what this "feminine principle" consists of! The concept of wholeness which is a fully developed person must apply to both males and females if it is to have any validity at all. Indeed, as Collins (1974) shows, it extends to all cultures and times.

> To limit the longing for wholeness to the Judeo-Christian tradition or simply to the feminist movement would be to deny the cosmic scope and existential depth of the desire for human freedom and wholeness. The vision represents the yearning to be fully human and to be fully in touch with the ground of one's being. It is rooted in existentiality and tethered to transcendence. It is the yearning to be a self-actualized subject rather than an other-defined object. (p. 176)

Realizing this concept of wholeness is the task to be accomplished by individual human persons in their daily lives. Because women's experiences have been so long ignored it is they who will be the first to begin to infuse society with these "feminine" qualities.

> Women now face the task of putting their vast unrecognized experience with change into a new and broader level of operation. Women are the people who have the need and motivation to make major changes in their way of living. As they initiate the changes required to meet their own needs they will create the stimulus for a thoroughgoing overhaul of the entire society. (Miller, 1976, p. 56)

This also is a challenge to women who are educators because it is in that occupation of teaching where their numbers are greatest and it is in the field where the potential for change may be greatest.

> An immediate task for women who are educators is to articulate their individual paths from domination - to dominance - to liberation. The task is parallel to that of feminists who individually and collectively are articulating a new consciousness of their social domination. (Zaret, 1975, p. 45)

If the needs of society are to be met, they must be met in intimate association with those of education. They must be met by a re-evaluation of "feminine" qualities by real women who have the most experience with these qualities. What education needs is to be genuinely "feminized" by women.

Need for Languaging

Language and reality interact in mutual creativity. There are times when language seems to create reality; times when words can cause anger, inspiration and action; times when it is clear that naming something is a creative act; times when speaking the word calls it into existence. There are other times when there is no language to communicate a new experience, a new insight, a new reality; times when present language does not do justice to the lived experience of those who would communicate this to others; times when words alone are inadequate to convey the urgency of a new reality. At these times, a new language is born. The birth is not without struggle and pain. When one becomes aware of the power of language, both to restrict and to liberate, one becomes reluctant to create a language with the intention to liberate only to find that it becomes restrictive.

So it seems more appropriate to speak of "languaging" as the process by which new forms of expressing experience are attempted, rather than to speak of a new "language" as if it were already as rigid as what it is intended to replace.

The process of "languaging" has two parts: one is the analysis of current forms and their relationship to persons and institutions; the second is the creation of new forms to express a new reality and also to prvide a new lens through which the old realities may be transformed. In education then, there is a concern with both parts of "languaging". The inadequacy of mainstream social scientific language to deal with the complexities of even classroom interaction has created an attempt to understand both how this language functions and how other forms might be more adequate.

One of the first steps in "languaging" is the raising of the issue of the relationship beween language and persons and institutions. Huebner (1975) sees this as one of the fundamental tasks of the curriculum theorist.

> It seems to me that one of the tasks of the theorist is to identify the various situations in which we use language, and to find categories that describe the various functions our language serves in those situations. (p. 253)

The functions which language serves in situations varies with the situation and the language. One of these functions is the complex interaction between language and reality. There is a growing appreciation for the

ways in which language determines what we are capable of thinking (Huebner, 1975; Apple, 1975; Zaret, 1975; Eisner, 1978). Eisner (1978), referring to languages as symbol systems, describes how they function to determine thinking.

> Each symbol system - mathematics, the sciences, art, music, literature, poetry, and the like - functions as a means for both the conceptualization of ideas about aspects of reality and as a means for conveying what one knows to others. Each symbol system has unique capabilities. Each symbol system sets parameters upon what can be conceived and what can be expressed. Thus, through painting we are able to know autumn in ways that only the visual arts make possible. Through poetry we can know autumn in ways that only poems can provide. Through botany we are able to know autumn in ways that only botanists can convey. How autumn is conceived and, hence, what we know about it depends upon the symbol systems we use or choose to use. (p. 618)

The ability of language to restrict or to liberate thinking depends upon the closeness of its form to the lived experience or persons using it. Again, the part of languaging which analyzes current forms notes the disembodiment of the language from the persons who use it and the experience it is intended to convey (Zaret, 1975; Pinar, 1976; Collins, 1974; Daly, 1973).

The tendency for using language which is abstract, objective, uninvolved with the emotions or experience is, of course, typical of the patriarchal mentality. It is not surprising then, that in calling for new languaging which is bodily, organic, and rooted in experience, it is the feminist voice which is clearest and strongest.

> Whereas the language of consciousness-raising is primordial, bodily, making use of organic images and symbols, and rooted in concrete life experience, the language of men in groups tends to be non-bodily, logical, abstract, and removed from the concrete and personal by generalization. (Collins, 1974, p. 206)

Often, language which is organic cannot be verbal. Often, words themselves act to remove the person one more step from direct experience, as if the words acted as a veil through which one could see, but dimly; through which one could touch, but not directly. Such fascination with words is seductive, particularly for those connected with education where so much emphasis is placed on reading, writing, and "cognitive development". Pinar (1976) describes the alienating process which occurs under these circumstances.

> So living in a conceptual world, the life of the mind can be more pleasant than where one has been, and so one remains true to it, perhaps even reverent, and the reverence becomes an ideology, an idol: cognitive development. But it's cognitive development in a fragmentary way, because the life of the mind has come at the cost of the emotions and the body, at the cost of psychic integration, and only a particle of the mind is available for use, the rest unconsciously sustaining the repression. (p. 16)

Avoiding this fragmentation has taken the process of languaging into nonverbal areas. Again, it is feminists who see this most clearly.

> Only guttural body language, verbal and nonverbal metaphor are adequate to describe the experience. It represents a return to the elemental, to the primitive, to the time before language achieved a distancing from life. . . The person and the word are one. (Collins, 1974, p 201)

Because of the dominance of the patriarchal mentality in education and in society, new languaging will only emerge and be effective if it emanates from experience, experience involving the total person. Just as education and society cannot be liberated by the infusion of an abstract notion of the "feminine principle" apart from concrete, flesh and blood women, so too new languaging cannot emerge without the feminist

voice being spoken by these women.

In this chapter, the kaleidoscope has altered somewhat. The colors of the pieces have become pastel, their edges blurred, the intricacies of the patterns have become more delicate, as if they were no longer pieces with definite outlines but threads which wind themselves around one another until the threads disappar and only the pattern remains. There has been much pointing in this chapter, but it has been to things in the distance not yet clearly seen. There has been much questioning in this chapter, with more attention to the asking than to the answers. There has been much emphasis on "why" and "what" and not much on "how". What has emerged is that something "new" is needed even while realizing that calling for the "new" is, in fact, very "old". New theorizing was called for, new forms of research. New perspectives on education as a field of study were called for, new ways of conceiving teacher education. A few characteristics emerged concerning these visions: emphasis on experience which is bodily and organic; emphasis on the Self; emphasis on the ways in which education is related to society. Permeating these visions was the conviction that much of what is "wrong" can be attributed to a world-view which emanates from a patriarchal mentality an that much could be "right" by attending to this and by listening to an alternate world-view which is more and more clearly a "feminist" world-view. Further delineation of these visions is the focus of Chapter 4.

Chapter Four

Analytic Stage
Insights from Feminism and Curriculum Theory

And the excitement and the value may be in the search - not the answers. (Kinzer, 1974, p. 35)

In the continuation of the search for ways to "get clear" about teacher education, the kaleidoscope shifts again. This time the patterns to be examined will be feminism and curriculum theory. This chapter will examine these two areas for the insights they offer concerning issues crucial to teacher education. The perspectives offered by feminism and curriculum theory illuminate the complex patterns of theory, research, education as a field of study, teacher education and teaching. Neither of these areas offers programs, prescriptions or definitive answers. What they do have to offer are insights, ways of looking at and talking about issues that connect with teacher education in a variety of ways. These issues include: 1) the meaning of education, 2) the importance of experience in education, 3) the concept of Self, 4) the effect of institutional constraints on the individual, 5) sexism in schools and society, 6) the problem of individual capacity for changing institutions, 7) the power of language to shape thoughts and activities. This chapter is similar to the analytic stage of currere in that it utilizes those insights from feminism and curriculum theory which address most cogently those issues which were pointed to or called for in Chapter 3. It analyzes these insights as to their value in illuminating the "problems" which beset teacher education.

With this chapter, more than just the pieces of the kaleidoscope shift into a new pattern, more than the colors of the pieces will change here as they did in Chapter 3. With this chapter, the focus will be on the person and her looking into the kaleidoscope. As a result, the tone of this chapter will be more clearly personal. In this respect, I hope to be faithful to what I see as one of the major concerns of both feminism and curriculum theory: the reclamation of the Self. Thus this chapter represents a personal search as much as an analysis of the areas of feminism and curriculum theory. It represents, to paraphrase Mooney (1975), the Researcher Herself.

There seems to come a time (perhaps more than once), both in individual history and in the sharing of individual histories, when former rules, forms and perceptions no longer seem relevant, no longer seem to express the lived experience of those who follow rules, forms and perceptions. This clearly seems to be such a time for teacher education. It is also such a time for feminism, for curriculum theory, and for me. There is great excitement in living in such a time for there is the chance for creating in ways not tried before, for achieving goals long desired but previously unattained, for realizing in concrete ways situations which were previously only visions. But there is great danger in living in such a time as well. The danger is that the process of creating the new will itself finally become as enslaving as the old. This process and its accompanying turmoil is described by Isaiah Berlin.

> The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new emancipating, and at the same time, enslaving concepts. The first step to understanding of men (sic) is the bringing to consciousness of the model or models that dominate and penetrate their thought and action. Like all attempts to make men aware of the categories in which they think it is a difficult and sometimes painful activity, likely to produce deeply disquieting results. The second task is to analyze the model itself, and this commits the analyst to accepting or modifying or rejecting it, and in the last case, to providing a more adequate one in its stead. (quoted in Bernstein, 1976, p. 57)

The analysis and the turmoil does not ususally occur in the mainstream. There, things tend to continue in the conventional manner. But there is a place, at the outer edges, a time-space where people are pressing against established intellectual boundaries. It seems to me that this is the place from which feminists and curriculum theorists are working. This work is theoretical in the sense described in Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 Feminists and curriculum theorists no longer speak of "a theory" as if it were an entity in and of itself, "out there", waiting for someone to discover it. Instead, they speak of theorizing, aware that even as the words are spoken, there is the danger that they will become the straightjackets that were once liberating ideas.

It is in this area that feminism offers some useful insights into theorizing. The feminist movement engages in many activities. These are often political in nature. Yet these activities would never take place were they not undergirded by the serious reflection that is theorizing, theorizing which understands that women are capable, individual, human beings who should not be denied choices because they are female. In this sense, theorizing undergirds the movement. In another sense, the movement itself is theorizing. Because it is created out of experience, because the activities have grown out of a sense of Self that has been violated, the movement is always living, experiencing, defining itself. Rather than becoming rigidified and codified, the feminist movement is an example of the difference between theory and theorizing.

Educational Experience

In spite of the fact (or perhaps partly due to the fact) that I have spent most of my life in schools, the question "What is education?" is one that continues to intrigue me with the intricacies of its possible answers. The process of answering this question for myself led me through ten years of high school teaching to graduate school and the study of curriculum theory. Here it seemed that the reconceptualists (Benham, 1981) were attempting to give form to my experiences as Self and as teacher. It is this focus on my experience that is the starting point for searching for the answers to "What is education?"

> Whenever we speak of education, we are speaking of man's (sic) experience in the world. (Grumet, 1976, p. 33)

Obviously, this use of the term "education" means far more than schooling. In turn, "experience" means more than something that "happens to" me as if I were simply a passive object waiting to be acted upon. Experience is something that I participate in, that I create as well as that which creates me. It is my relationship to the world.

> Experience as is suggested by its etymological origin, is assertive, creative, intentional. Although we are thrown out into the world in which we move and have our being, we yet create and recreate in our experience our vision of this world. (Abbs, 1974, p. 5)

This vision of the world which I am said to create highlights the individual nature of educational experience. This is not "the individual" as an object of study from whom generalizations can be made about the nature of "mankind". The individual nature of educational experience refers to the concrete, personal, idiosyncratic manner in which each of us perceives and creates meaning.

> Experience is what one sense, one feels, one thinks, it is, in a word, one's living through of one's life. . . It is private, although you can make it public, it is individual, although you can share aspects of it with others and be influenced by others; but on the whole, it is yours. (Pinar, 1976, p.18)

To take seriously this claim to my experience, I must consider that the fact that I am female has altered not only the quality of my experience but also my claim to it. Showalter (1974) points out at least one reason for this difference between my experience and a man's experience.

> Women are estranged from their own experience and unable to perceive its shape and authenticity, in part because they do not see it mirrored and given resonance. . . Instead they are expected to identify with a masculine perspective and experience, which is presented as the human one. (p. 230)

When speaking of educational experience, we are, at this point in time, speaking of experience which is qualitatively different for males and females. The first step in terms of educational experience, for women especially, is to become conscious of our experience. In this respect, Grumet's (1976) description of education is one which is most applicable to women.

> If we must calibrate education, then we might say that we are educated to the extent that we are conscious of our experience and to the degree that we are freed by this knowledge to act through skills required to transform our world. (p. 38)

For women, becoming conscious of our experience is an invaluable first step toward the transformation of the world. One of the ways in which this happens is through consciousness-raising sessions. In these sessions, women have been able to give voice to their experience and to have this voice heard and understood. In this respect, feminists are engaged in the process which some reconceptualists see as significant for the field of curriculum theorizing: becoming conscious of experience as a way of reclaiming Self. In fact, the consciousness of experience as a way of reclaiming Self is the basic underlying goal of feminism. Gornick (1972), speaking of participation in consciousness-raising groups states:

> Then, for better or worse, I am the full occupant of my feminist skin, engaged in the true business of modern feminism, reaching hard for self-possession. (p. 172)

In the sense of making contact with one's own experience, in claiming that experience and by that claim validating it in ways which a patriarchal mentality cannot, in acquiring skills which enable one to make meaningful insertions into the world, feminists have goals similar to those of reconceptualists. The process is long and complicated and difficult - but truly educative. Pinar (1976) describes this process of reclaiming one's experience as education in its most fundamental meaning (p. 10). While both curriculum theorizing and feminism speak of reclaiming experience as the key element in education, it is important to remember that women have been even more estranged from their experience and less likely to be heard when they have voiced it than have men. Thus the curriculum theorists' emphasis on experience is even more important for women than for men. Moreover, women's experience as women will add a new dimension to the concept of educational experience.

Search for Self

As noted in Chapter 3, education in almost every area emphasizes Self. This very emphasis suggests that this is a deep need which has yet to be adequately addressed by education even by those who give lip-service to it. The "search" metaphor that is prevalent in much of these writings suggests that I am somehow "lost". This is in fact what has happened to many in pursuit of what is called education but what is in reality training, conditioning, and manipulating. Indeed, the "search" metaphor is just as applicable to teacher education as it is to the rest of education. As a field, teacher education is also trying to find its Self. The Self is the goal of the reclamation of experience. It is knowledge of my Self that I am searching for in examining my experience. This is knowledge which has been "forgotten" through the process of socialization, a major portion of which takes place in schools. Macdonald (1975) describes the process as taking palce through the loss of personal meaning.

> Our personal meanings are consistently delegitimated through the activity of schooling. . . Personal meanings when expressed or felt thus become anxiety laden and often result in

> guilt or shame reaction when not accepted for praised. As a result, individuals engage in a "forgetfulness" concerning their own meanings. Thus, they repress or submerge the unique meaning structure growing out of their own activity and take on the attitude and posture of the control agent (p. 87).

Macdonald is speaking here of teachers and their students, but for teachers, the control agent in the school is male. I would suggest that if students are subjected to the attitude and posture of the control agent, that the attitude and posture is still that which reflects the patriarchal mentality, although it may be a female which embodies it as teacher. In addition, it is females who are more encouraged by schooling to forget their own meanings because they are not really supposed to have any of their own, they are supposed to get them from males (Miller, 1976, deBeauvoir, 1974 edition; Stacey, Bereaud, Daniels, 1974).

It is important then, when searching for Self, to distinguish the differences that this might hold for males and females - and the similarities. What does it mean to search for Self, to be severed from Self, alienated from Self? There are those who refer to this severence as madness (Pinar, 1975, 1976; Laing, 1960). For women, this madness stems from several sources, one of which is a living for and through other people. It is not accidental that, in his report on schizophrenia, R.D. Laing's (1960) statement about this is about a woman.

> She had only other people's thoughts and could think only what other people had said. (p. 152)

This preoccupation with living through others is part of the socialization process women are subjected to. Miller (1976) points out that, while the process has had results detrimental to women, through it women have developed some potentially useful skills.

> Women have been so encouraged to concentrate on the emotions and reactions of others that they have been diverted from examining and expressing their own emotions. While this is very understandable, given the past situation, women have not yet fully applied this highly developed faculty to exploring and knowing themselves. (p. 39)

Miller further describes this concentration on the emotions and reactions of others as causing women to lose their inner "system" which tells them what makes them happy or satisfied (p. 91). deBeauvoir (1974 edition) states simply that woman is divided against herself much more profoundly than is the male (p. 48). She explains why this is so.

> The advantage man enjoys, which makes itself felt from his childhood, is that his vocation as a human being in no way runs counter to his destiny as a male. . . He is not divided. Whereas it is required of women that in order to realize her feminity she must make herself object and prey, which is to say that she must renounce her claims as sovereign subject. . . Precisely because the concept of feminity is artificially shaped by custom and fashion, it is imposed upon each woman from without. (p. 758-9).

This imposition from without results in what Macdonald (1975) referred to as the attitude and posture of the control agent, what Pinar (1975) referred to as madness, what deBeauvoir (1974 edition) referred to as being the Other for males. We have seen how the patriarchal mentality has been viewed as the equivalent of reality. The severence from Self which these women and men have been describing takes place in a particularly acute way in women because they are divided in ways that men are not. deBeauvoir states that men describe the world from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth (p. 161). Miller (1976) writes that the reason their viewpoint is accepted as absolute truth is that males are the dominant group and that the dominant group has the greatest influence in determining a culture's overall outlook (p. 8). Thus it is that women are examples par excellence of the severence from Self by their role as Other, by their vicarious mode of living, and by the notion of "feminine" impose upon them by males. It is no

wonder then, in a society which equates mental health with "male" (Broverman, et al, 1972), that women are treated for mental illness and institutionalized in numbers far out of proportion to their numbers in society (Chesler, 1972, pp. 42-43).

In the psychological terminology which has a great deal of influence in education, the terms "ego" and "super-ego" are frequently used in discussions concerning the concept of Self. In speaking of the dehumanizing effects of schooling, Pinar (1974) describes "man" as having been severed from his ego, that is, the Self and the ego have been severed.

> Thus, man (sic), the conscious "I" we identify as ego, is somehow severed from his self, which is hidden from his ego; it is, in part, his unconscious. That is to say, then, that man is partially unaware of himself; he is not himself; he is dehumanized. . . This severence from self appears to have the effect of forcing us to search for dignity and satisfaction outside ourselves. (p. 3)

Self then means more than just ego. Yet, there is a certain extent to which one might say that in order to be severed from one's ego, one must have had an ego to begin with. Miller (1976) sees ego development as having much to do with a person's participation in shaping the culture and in acting for herself. Women have not had this participation and acting.

> Prevailing psychoanalytic theories about women's weaker ego or super-ego may well reflect the fact that women have no ego or super-ego at all as these terms are used now. Women do not come into this picture in the way men do. They do not have the right or the requirement to be full-fledged representatives of the cutlure. Nor have they been granted the right to act and to judge their own actions in terms of the direct benefit to themselves. Both of these rights seem essential to the development of ego and super-ego. (p. 72)

What then, can I say about my Self as a woman? Am I, as Pinar suggests, ego severed from Self? Or am I, as Miller suggests, not in possession of an ego at all? What then, am I severed from? I would maintain that the madness which women experience is indeed not just the severence of ego from Self but the lack of ego which Miller describes. In a society then, in which ego is seen as a principle of organizing internal reality, not having an ego is to be severed from that which the prevailing culture holds as a reality principle. As such, it is severence of a a very deep nature. What Pinar describes then is experienced in a somewhat different and more acute form in women than in men. If the condition is as severe as he describes it for males, it is more severe for females. The search for dignity and satisfaction outside of ourselves is particularly strong for those who have no dignity and satisfaction of their own, or at least have no concrete and visible ways of exercising that dignity and seeking that satisfaction. Women have long been the Other, someone else's daughter, wife, mother, sister, mistress, slave, but never our own Selves.

There is another sense, however, another way to look at ego, which suggests that women are severed from Self in the manner of ego or conscious "I" severed from Self. Earle (1972) uses the term "divested ego" to describe the Self knowing the Self.

> The ego is a self, and in that capacity it has no internal relationship to any other thing. Therefore no analysis of the divested ego can disclose in it anything but itself. It is therefore absolute, and internally related to and dependent upon nothing else whatever. (p. 60)

Earle's use of "ego" is closer to Pinar's term "Self" ; Miller's use of "ego" is closer to Pinar's conscious "I". Earle's equation of the two is synthesized by referring to this as "divested ego". Earle further explains that this knowledge by Self of Self is that knowledge which is essential for the knower. Moreover, this knowledge cannot be obtained by seeking it outside of my Self.

> "Know thyself" does not enjoin me to find explanations of myself in the sense of finding causes which lie outside myself, in that which is not me. (Earle, 1972, p. 10)

Finding causes outside one's Self is what women have been forced into throughout history. Feminism, therefore, is seeking this reclamation of Self by divesting its Self from being the object and taking to its Self the action of becoming subject, of refusing to be Other, of refusing to be object for others and most importantly, for Self. Miller (1976) sees this finding of causes outside of one's Self as a serious deprivation in woman's attempt to create her Self.

> . . .this is a central way in which women have been seriously deprived. A woman cannot use her own life activity to build an image of herself based on an authentic reflection of what she actually is and does. (p. 53)

Women are, in a sense, attempting to develop egos by making more significant contributions to the creation of meaning in the world. In this way they are working to claim their Selves. They are also attempting to express their experience of a deeper sense of Self not adequately described by "ego". The nature of this Self has yet to be fully explored.

Psychology and the Self

What shall I find as I examine my experience and seek my Self? Will there be, after so many years of always being the Other any Self at all? Will I find that, after all, I am mad and have simply not been aware of it? Earle (1972) maintains that knowledge of the Self must be sought from within. Yet when I first look within, what do I find as a woman? I am first aware of the alienation discussed earlier, the severence from Self that is maddening. This is because I have not had the same opportunity nor the power to define my Self as males have had.

> Women come from a position in which their own nature was defined for them by others. Their selves were almost totally determined by what the dominant culture believed it needed from women and therefore induced women to try to be. As indicated at the outside of this book, such definitions by a dominant group are inevitably false. . . such definitions are grossly distorted by the dominants' own unresolved problems and dilemmas . . . To begin to define themselves almost "from scratch" and to discover what it is they want is a vast undertaking for everyone. (Miller, 1976, p. 118)

Having my Self defined by others means that when I do begin to examine my experience in searching for my Self I must understand that this experience has been largely shaped by males and that to contact my Self means understanding the ways in which males have defined me.

Miller (1976) and deBeauvoir (1974 edition) outline this male definition by illustrating that males have projected onto women all of those qualities which they most desire, fear, and hate. These projections are those areas of human life which are most misunderstood, unsolved, intense. They include bodily and sexual issues, feelings of vulnerability, weakness and helplessness. Miller sees the necessity of psychoanalysis as having developed from this situation.

> As psychoanalysis has been engaged in pointing out, these are most significant human experiences. Indeed, they involve the necessities of human experience. One might even say that we came to "need" psychoanalysis precisely because certain essential parts of men's experience have been very problematic and therefore were unacknowledge, unexplored, and denied. (p. 22)

Up to this point, however, psychoanalysis has not acknowledged this connection between probing the depths of men's experience and the projection of these depths onto women.

> Psychoanalysis, in attempting to probe the depths of the human psyche, entered the "unreal world" of "mankind's" unsolved problem, in threading its way through the many complicated

> labyrinthes, it did not recognize it for what it was - woman's world. (Miller, 1976, p. 76)

Indeed, not only has psychoanalysis not acknowledged these projections but it has fostered the retention of them by women and as a result, has placed women in a position of being enticed by two modes of alienation. deBeauvoir (1974 edition) explains how psychoanalysis has operated in this manner.

> . . .The psychoanalysts never give us more than an inauthentic picture, and for the inauthentic there can hardly be found any other criterion than normality. Their statement of the feminine destiny is absolutely to the point in this connection. In the sense in which the psychoanalysts understand the term, "to identify oneself" with the mother or with the father is to alienate oneself in a model, it is to prefer a foreign image to the spontaneous manifestation of one's own existence, it is to play at being. Woman is shown to us as enticed by two modes of alienation. Evidently to play at being a man will be for her a source of frustration; but to play at being a woman is also a delusion; to be a woman would mean to be the object, the Other - and the Other nevertheless remains subject in the midst of her resignation. (p. 57)

The deleterious effects of psychoanalysis on women have been well documented (Chesler, 1972; Tennov, 1975; Weisstein, 1971). The analyses, however, reduce themselves to the simple fact that as deBeauvoir maintained in 1952, man is defined as a human being and woman as a female. As a result, psychology, like other fields, is, as Otto Rank stated in 1941, "not only man-made. . . but masculine in its mentality" (quoted in Rich, 1975, p. 24).

There are, however, some ways in which psychology can illuminate not only these hidden areas for men but also illuminate for women the nature of the alienation from which women have been suffering. The first step would be to acknowledge the patriarchal mentality of the field; the next would be to acknowledge the projection of these qualities onto women; the next would require a perspective which sees these qualities as essential for human development.

> . . . we are now beginning to realize that the qualities whith which we have so long been associated and which previously were used against us are now worth saying and elevating. They are the very qualities that our overly masculinized, competitive, hierarchical society needs. (Collins, 1974, p. 99)

These qualities which women are said to possess "by nature" but which in fact have been thrust upon us or which we have had to develop to survive as an oppressed group, are qualities like "affiliation", "community", "empathy", "intuitiveness", "compassion", "understanding" - the list could go on and on. In addition, there are those qualities of mystery and magic associated with women's capacity to bear new life. It bears repeating that none of these qualities are valued in a male-dominated society. Making them valued is one of the main tasks of finding my Self.

> . . .male-led society may have. . . delegated to women not humanity's "lowest needs" but its "highest necessities" - that is, the intense, emotionally connected cooperation and creativity necessary for human life and growth. Further, it is women who today perceive that they must openly and consciously demand them if they are to achieve even the beginnings of personal integrity. (Miller, 1976, p. 26)

> The importance of those very qualities of communion, allotted to woman, are denied as viable attitudes toward our problems. The qualities of community; of being at one with others and the world, of unity and cooperation, are the very qualities needed for the survival of humanity. (Macdonald and Macdonald, 1975, p. 10)

> I suspect that if the "masculine" characteristics of aggressiveness, competition, differentiation, intellectuality, and unemotionality had been ridiculed and negatively reinforced in our culture, and if the opposite "feminine" qualities of receptivity, emotionality, intuitiveness, and inclusiveness had been valued and rewarded, we women would have been quite willing to claim "femininity" as our own. (Collins, 1974, p. 99)

> . . ."humanization" . . .means the amplification of certain desirable qualities (such as compassion and understanding) and the diminution or extinguishing of less desirable ones (selfishness, taking advantage of others) . . . Interestingly the qualities I have listed, those of most interest to those concerned with social and political justice, are ones we would describe as, on the whole, emotional in nature. (Pinar, 1976, p. 99)

Equally interesting, I would add, is the fact that these are "feminine" qualities, qualities which women, at this point in history, possess to a highly developed degree. In this respect, women are now "ahead" of society in having those qualities most needed by that society.

Self and Others

One of the primary qualities which women have developed is that which is often termed "affiliation". In fact, Miller (1976) sees affiliation as the central feature around which women organize their internal reality, not because they are female, but because females have had such qualities "assigned" to them by the dominant culture.

> One central feature is that women start with, build on, and develop in a context of attachment and affiliation with others. Indeed, women's sense of self becomes very much organized around being able to make and then to maintain affiliations and relationships. Eventually, for many women the threat of disruption of an affiliation is perceived not as just a loss of a relationship but as something closer to a total loss of self. (p. 83)

This sense of Self derived from affiliation has, thus far, been destructive to women because the only forms of affiliation possible have been based on the dominant-submissive, male-defined model (Miller, 1976, p. 89). This does not, however, mean the affiliation needs to be abandoned because it does not "work". Instead, it means a different perspective on what affiliation means for human beings. On the individual level, it means a recognition that affiliation is perhaps the only way in which individual development proceeds (Miller, 1976, p. 83). On the social level, it means recognition that affiliation may be the only means by which we can survive.

> It now seems clear we have arrived at a point from which we must return to a basis of faith in affiliation - and not only faith but recognition that it is a requirement for the existence of human beings. The basis for what seem the absolutely essential next steps in Western history if we are to survive is already available. (p. 88)

The question is "How can women make use of this affiliation to further develop themselves, to transform this ability to be at one with others from a mode of relating that causes the loss of Self into a mode that creates Self for the persons involved?" This question, like so many in these areas, does not have answers but only responses, probings, and occasionally, examples. The first response is that this affiliative ability can no longer be exercised in subservient ways.

> They (women) must reconstitute all the terms of the process, so that all relations within the self and between the self and others assumes a new content and a new mode of interaction. (Ruether, 1975, p. 159)

New forms of interaction are taking place within the Self and between the Self and others for many women as they begin to communicate their experience and by that communicating to validate it. Collins (1974) quotes Anais Nin.

> As I discover myself, I feel I am merely one of many, a symbol. I begin to understand the women of yesterday and today. (p. 38)

Laing (1960) decleared that the Self can be real only in relation to real people and things (p. 142). The key to this kind of reality lies in the quality of the "relation" the Self has to these real people and things. If the relation is a subservient one, then the Self does not become real at all but becomes so alienated as to be mad. If, however, the relation can be reconstituted, then the possibility occurs of relationships which can free the Self rather than enslaving it. Earle (1972) also sees the Self as becoming existent in relation to another. The tone of equality which charcterizes his description is based on love.

> My personal subjectivity exists for me only when it is acknowledged by other personal subjectivities who are acknowledged by me. . . My engrossment in another singular person in turn enables me to exist as a singular person myself. Each horizon of otherness then discloses mutually what in that world and what in me becomes existent. . . The universal name for this final, personal engrossment in which each subjectivity finds the other essential is, of course, love. (p. 74-77)

Women's currently greater skill at affiliation can, therefore, be used to improve the quality of interpersonal relationships but also to improve the quality of larger social relationships as well. This transformation cannot occur at the cost of the submersion of Self that has previously characterized women's relationships. It must occur in such a way as to enhance the development of the unique Self in relationship. Collins (1974) suggests that something of this sort is what, in fact, occurs as women reveal their uniqueness.

> Only through an affirmation and celebration of our differences can we come to an understanding of the ties that bind the total creation together. (p. 184)

Understanding the ties that bind total creation together is what finally leads to the awareness that liberation for some must mean liberation for all and that no one is liberated at the expense of another. Freire (1970) stresses the shared nature of liberation.

> We can legitimately say that in the process of oppression someone oppresses someone else; we cannot say that in the process of revolution someone liberates someone else, nor yet that someone liberates himself (sic), but rather than men in communion liberate each other. (p. 128)

Men in communion with each other cannot liberate unless they are also in communion with women. In the task of liberation, those who are oppressed take the first steps to liberate them Selves.

Self and Society

In a patriarchal society, in which duality is seen as the primary metaphor for describing situations, it is "natural" to assume that if I am concentrating on searching for and affirming my Self that I am therefore unconcerned about larger social, political, and cultural issues. There is the assumption that if I am engaged in Self work that I am ignoring the societal. Particularly with regard to education, there is the understanding that if I concentrate on the psychological perspective, I must ignore the sociological. In curriculum theorizing much of the criticism leveled at the case study approach which stresses the individual, the idiosyncratic has been in this vein. Apple (1978) summarizes,

> To the extent that we speak primarily in individual terms, we cover the possibility that the problems we face are of a collective, more structural sort. (p. 18)

It is clear that there is a sense in which what Apple is pointing out is true. Women have often been victims of a psychology which deprives them of opportunities to be in possession of their Selves and then declares them mad because they are unable to "adjust" to male-defined reality. Psychology's tendency to hold up the male as the criterion for adulthood has resulted in a "blame-the-victim" syndrome for women who cannot and will not accept the social reality that they are "second" (Feiger, see bibliography). It is also clear that psychology could focus on the value of "feminine" qualities in the society. It could focus on the fact that social and political structures which function to perpetuate sexism inevitably cause the alienation from Self which is so widely decried and so narrowly seen as remediable by changing individuals.

Not surprisingly, women on the path toward liberation do not view the personal and the political as polarities. While stating that the personal is political may smack of sloganeering, it is a slogan born of experience, born of the everyday realities which fill women's lives.

> At the psychological level, involvement in movement activities tends to transform one's self-image. Part of this self-redefinition involves the recognition that what one previously thought to be personal problems are in fact experienced by many others. Sharing private realities counters social myths and helps politicize the problems. That is, perceiving personal problems as public issues leads to the need to influence public policy. (Walum, 1977, p. 200)

Women have been able to unite the personal and the political, the individual and the societal because that has been our reality. Frazier and Sadker (1973) explain how consciousness-raising contributes to this process.

> As a heightened consciousness, liberation allows an individual to consider herself (or himself) in relation to dynamic and changing circumstances, both real and theoretical. Most important, liberation, becomes, as it proceeds, not only an individual or personal benefit, but also a tool for assisting in the liberation of others. (p. 10)

This heightened consciousness which Frazier and Sadker describe is similar to Freire's "conscientization". It is similar to the "click" of recognition which occurs to women in consciousness-raising groups. It is the perception of one's Self as oppressed and by that perception liberation is also seen as possible. Another of Freire's terms which is useful when speaking about liberation is "praxis". "Praxis" has been defined as reflection-action. One does not precede the other as in "think before you act", but rather each "informs" the other in the sense of a continual dialogue of cause and effect. Freire explains,

> Let me emphasize that my defense of the praxis implies no dichotomy by which this praxis could be divided into a prior stage of reflection and a subsequent stage of action. Action and reflection occur simultaneously. (Freire, 1970, p. 123)

The simultaneity of action and reflection makes each situation and each decision problematic. It calls into question the relationship of my Self not only to other indivdiuals , but also to the institutions in which I live and work, and the function of these institutions in the entire society. How much of my Self is shaped by these individuals and these institutions? How can greater knowledge of my Self liberate me from the constraints of these institutions and individuals? What characterizes the interactions between my Self and institutions, society? Can these interactions be characterized by the love which Earle says causes existence; by the affiliation which Miller says is necessary for the survival of society? There are no answers. There are only responses. There is only the opportunity to reflect seriously and to ask more questions. There is in the asking some similarity in the quality of the questions. Pinar offers one perspective.

> True, it feels as if there is a culture, a society, independent of us. We feel oppressed by it, liberated by it. But where is this soceity? Who is it? It is my colleagues at the university, my neighbor across the street, those appearing on the television set, the fact of universities

> and neighbors and television sets; these are society. They exist concretely, discrete from my body, but the vibration of their thought, their feeling, and their body influence me, as mine do them. Together we comprise culture; of course, this is commonplace. The error happens next. Culture remains; the individual drops out. (Life History and Educational Experience, p. 1, ch. 5)

There is a sense, of course, in which it is true that society does exist independently of us as individuals, particularly as women. Women have not bee "together" with men in comprising the dominant culture. While the male-defined notion of "woman" has always been a part of the culture, women themselves have rarely, if ever, had a significant voice in shaping the dominant culture. Thus, in a very important sense, it has been not only individual women who have "dropped out", but women as a group who have been discounted while the male-defined culture has remained.

This can be clearly seen in its institutionalized form in schools. Anyone who has spent any time at all in schools is aware of how the "rules" seem to determine what occurs rather than the needs of students. There is a kind of "organization mentality" which prevades institutions such as schools. This mentality sees the institution as necessary and inevitable. It is as if the organization did have a life of its own apart from the people who occupy the building. Moreover, it is as if this organization not only had a life of its own, but that this life was pre-existent of the persons involved and will be post-existent of them as well, and therefore, the demands of the organization take precedence over the lives of those who currently inhabit it. Pinar is not doubting that a bureaucracy has a life of its own, but cautioning that part of what perpetuates this life is the belief on the part of persons in the organization that individuals must be sacrificed to the organization because "that's the way it is". Moreover, all that is needed for a bureaucracy to function in this manner is for the few individuals who hold the power to sustain the belief by which individuals are sacrificed through what is labeled "process" (Feiger, see bibliography).

Freire (1970) describes the institutional constraints on individuals as "limit situations". He also sees that the manner in which the limit situation is perceived is in part responsible for the continuation of the situation or its alteration or elimination.

> Thus, it is not the limit - situations in and of themselves which create a climate of hopelessness, but rather how they are perceived by men (sic) at a given historical moment: whether they appear as fetters or as insurmountable barriers. As critical perception is embodied in action, a climate of hope and confidence developed which leads men to attempt to overcome the limit - situations. (p. 89)

What sort of action is appropriate at any given moment is, of course, dependent upon the persons and conditions of that moment. Freire suggests that there may be times when action is not suitable, when, in fact, the most suitable action is reflection (p. 123). Pinar (1978) indicates that there may be times when material conditions force strategic action that is in some measure unacceptable to the person involved and to others (p. 18). Sharp and Green (1975) conclude that there may be situations in which the individual is completely constrained to do things regardless of how the individual defines the situation (p. 27) This interaction of the individual with the institution has yet to be explored in such a way that neither aspect is lost sight of. Sharp and Green (1975) see such analysis as valuable and necessary.

> It is necessary to situate the individual in a social context, to be able to say something about that context in terms of its internal structure and dynamics, the opportunities it makes available and the constraints it imposes, and at the same time to grasp that essential individuality and uniqueness of man (sic) that evades any total categorization. (p. 17)

As women have been demonstrating, to lose sight of the Self is not to foster liberation but to sacrifice the

the Self to an idea; to lose sight of the institution is to grant it power over the Self which is oppression. Individual and collective work exist in creative tension, much as two hands from opposite sides of the body approach from opposite directions to grasp an object. The either-or dichotomy to which Self work and political action have been reduced is another example of a patriarchal mentality creating an abstraction from the lived reality of women's experience.

> Liberation must not be permitted to be reduced to a slogan, another meaningless abstraction. . . .For liberation to escape such a fate, it must be examined carefully as to its function in professional lives and projects, as well as grasped analytically. Without question the concept implies as well individual justice, working to extricate the individual from the psychological and intellectual inequities of childrearing and schooling, working to release the individual from characterological limitations. The two orders of liberative work - collective and individual, matter and consciousness - are correlative. They are companion efforts which ought not to be at war with each other, attempting to reduce one to the other. (Pinar, The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing.)

It is women, I believe, who are, and will continue to be, in the forefront of demonstrating that the collective and the individual are companion efforts. As women begin to redefine their Selves according to their own voices rather than according to a patriarchal voice, they will be attempting to reshape not only a definition of Self but by that process to reshape those institutions in which the Self interacts with others.

Other Facets of Self

If the pieces of the kaleidoscope were to be removed from the viewing cylinder and arranged in a three-dimensional model, each piece could be seen to have sides not previously evident when the pieces were contained in the cylinder. One of these sides or facets not previously seen is the "religious" or "spiritual" nature of the issues relating to Self and society which I have been discussing. This religious or spiritual facet surfaces both in feminism and in curriculum theorizing. Partly, this is an affirmation of a religious tradition which has held up for emulation those qualities thought to be most "human", those qualities which have also been termed "feminine", those qualities which so many believe are badly needed for the survival of society. Pinar (1976) describes how this need arises repeatedly throughout history.

> To be fully human means to conceive an idealized not historically present human being, a human being, I think we would nearly all agree, characterized by the classically admirable qualities. Love in its agape sense comes to mind as the highest or at least central quality in this gestalt, and compassion and understanding or wisdom are near in significance. Our great religions' historical founders were able to manifest, in human forms, these and related qualities. Interestingly, as these religions lose some currency among some, substitute expressions of these ideals arise. (p. 94)

Partly, this interest in the religious is also a refutation of this same religious tradition which has reinforced and sanctioned the patriarchal mentality by giving it divine authority. This refutation is an attempt to use the tools of suppression and to transform these into tools of liberation. Finally, I think, acknowledging the spiritual dimension of what it means to be human is acknowledging not only a past, but a future, not only what has shaped us but what we long to become.

At first, it seems puzzling that feminism and curriculum theorizing should have a spiritual aspect at all. Feminism seems to be vitally concerned with political issues, with gaining equal rights for women under the law, with challenging sexist attitudes and institutions. While this is certainly true and necessary, fundamentally it is the perception of reality which feminists are challenging.

> Though feminism seems to begin with a disatisfaction with social and political roles for women, a spiritual dimension seems inevitably to emerge. Feminism is a challenge, not only to traditional social and political structures, but also to the perception of reality which underlies and legitimates them. (Christ, 1976, p. 318)

Curriculum theorizing too seems concerned with political issues, with the ways in which schools oppress individuals, with the ways in which what is taught in schools defines for students what is real and valued. These concernes are ultimately spiritual concerns also.

> While we are committed to the paramount importance of a political focus in our discourse we were also aware the the foundation of this discourse was grounded in the spiritual underpinnings of the Judeo-Christian (and other) religious traditions. On the whole then our political discourse is spiritually bracketed (at least implicitly) in the desire to strive, through the political integration of action and reflection, for the primacy of the person as person and not as thing. (Macdonald and Zaret, 1975, p. 4)

Both feminism and curriculum theorizing are concerned with the alienation of the Self and the ways in which the Self may be reclaimed. I believe it is at the juncture of the individual and society, of the Self and the Self, of the Self and personal meaning, of the Self and other Selves, that the spiritual or religious dimension emerges.

These junctures are where the ultimate questions lie, where the ultimate puzzles are unsolved, where the deepest emotions are unexplained.

> To speak of theology, is to speak of the deepest roots of man's (sic) conceptual and intellectual framework. It is the framework which enables him to define himself in relation to the stimuli that constantly impact him. (Collins, 1974, p. 40)

These ultimate questions, puzzles and emotions first have to do with my Self. Jersild (1955) points out that to ask "Who am I?" is to ask a religious question.

> In the view of many people, the question of meaning a person raises when he asks,Who and what and why am I?, becomes a religious question when pursued to a final decision. ...These questions face every scientist and every scholar when he has gone to the outermost reaches of his discipline, if not before. (p. 96)

Earle (1972) also speaks of the Self in religious terms. Although he maintains that the Self becomes existent only through love, the Self's knowledge of it Self is eternal.

> The self. . . is an eternal singular; ontologically, it can find within it nothing but itself. . . As such, it has considered itself eternally and not existentially. (p. 67)

The coming into existence of the Self Earle describes in terms of the "Fall". The existent Self he terms transcendental ego.

> The life of the transcendental ego, therefore, is its plunge into chaos. Religiously and mythically, it is the "fall". Without the fall, the self would not exist at all, it would perpetually and eternally reside within itself. No one know whether he (sic) will exist the next moment, or if he does, what he will see or what he will do; the "one" who does not know this but can experience it with wonder is the singular transcendental ego that each of us is. (p. 71)

It is also on the philosophical, metaphysical level that feminism is a spiritual movement. Daly (1973) decribes it as universal human becoming.

> For my purpose is to show that the women's revolution, insofar as it is true to its own essential dynamics, is an ontological, spiritual revolution, pointing beyond the idolatries of sexist society and sparking creative action in and toward transcendence. The coming of women implies universal human becoming. It has everything to do with the search for ultimate meaning and reality which some would call God. (p. 6)

It should be noted that the term "transcendence" has surfaced time and again among feminists and curriculum theorists in an attempt to describe a certain type of experience or a certain type of human potential. Phenix (1975) describes the term as follows:

> The term transcendence refers to the experience of limitless going beyond any given state or realization of being. (p. 234)

Phenix also believes that this capacity for transcendence is present in all people - to exist is to participate in transcendence. In this conclusion, he is joined by Huebner (1975).

> Man (sic) is a transcendent being i.e., he has the capacity to transcend what he is to become something that he is not. . . Only in this way can he contribute to the continual creation of the world and recognize his own active participation in the transcendency of the world. (p. 246)

The concept of transcendence contains within it the desire, the ability to go beyond what is oppressive, to challenge what has been taken for granted, to question what has previously been accepted. Greene (1974) indicates this aspect of transcendence by a series of questions.

> Can we not, as persons committed to transcendence, engage ourselves with fellow learners to widen and diversify perspectives? Can we not stimulate within ourselves and those we come to love a fresh awareness of the questionable, of what must not be taken for granted any longer? Can we not begin beckoning insistently, challenging individuals to move beyond the domestic and oppressive, to surpass the everyday? (p. 82)

Another aspect of transcendence is that it succeeds in uniting the personal and political in a liberating and synthesizing way.

> I have already indicated that the merging of feeling and thought, of the personal and the political in the new space being created by the second wave of feminism is a widespread spiritual event. It implies conflict with sexist religion as such, but it also portends transcendence, not only of the sexism, but also of the conflict. (Daly, 1973, p. 153)

The unity of the personal and political in this way comes about through the reclamation of women's experience. Collins (1974) describes the experience of going beyond through the painful act of remembering and reliving and responding as a kind of revelation (p. 191). Russell (1974) speaks in terms of "liberation theology" to describe the process of becoming aware of one's Self and the world in order to transform it together with others (p. 76). Macdonald (1974) borrowed the term "centering" from Mary Caroline Richards to delineate a process which has a long history as a religious or spiritual experience (p. 104).

> It (centering) is primarily a willingness to "let go" and to immerse oneself in the process of living with others in a creative and spontaneous manner, having faith in ourselves, others and the culture we exist in as a medium for developing our own centering. (p. 115)

Pinar (1974) notes that the idea of improving the world through improving one's Self is hardly a new idea and has a long tradition in many religions (p. 10). Yet the persistence of the idea seems to suggest the

difficulty of achieving it. I would offer that the reason for the failure thus far has been the exclusion of the voice of women from the definition of what it means to improve one's Self. Even now, this lack hampers the articulation of the experience.

> Since the transcendent cannot be grasped or defined (and thus the experience of it transmitted) except by the human tools which are available to us, it is necessarily limited by the patterns of our speech and visual perception, by the concepts which speech makes possible and by our history. (Collins, 1974, p. 33)

Articulating this history and perception can also illuminate the issues which curriculum theorists are attempting to address. I find it encouraging that Huebner (1975) sees the communication between curriculum and theology as a fruitful means of visualizing both areas.

> The rupture between theology and curriculum was valid at one point in the history of both curriculum and theological thought. To ignore theological language today, however, is to ignore one of the more exciting and vital language communities. (p. 259)

If theology is becoming a vital and exciting language community today it is because the feminist voice has added new meanings to terms like "revelation", "transcendence", "incarnation", "being", "sacrifice", "love". The exploration of the religious or spiritual aspect of education from an explicitly feminist perspective has barely begun. The feminist voice can add a richer harmony to the diversity and richness of curriculum theorizing as it attempts to seek truly new perspectives in education.

Reclaiming the Self

> To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in its turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. (Freire, 1970, p. 76)

Freire's description of the creative aspects of languaging extends the need for new languaging discussed in chapter 3 into areas which are at once more personal and more political. In chapter 3, the relationship between language and thought was discussed; the call for a new languaging was noted, languaging which is rooted in the lived experience of the persons involved. It was noted that the disembodiment of language from experience and its use as a manipulative device has its roots in the patriarchal mentality. Language which is rooted in lived, bodily experience and often takes the form of non-verbal language was called for by feminists and curriculum theorists. Creating new language, as Freire points out, is to exist humanly.

It is not surprising then that those concerned with what it means to exist more humanly (in this case feminists and curriculum theorists) should be concerned with language. Up to this point, the naming which Freire believes is essential to exist humanly has been largely by man. Daly (1973) mentions one of the flaws in male naming.

> Women are now realizing that the universal imposing of names by men has been partial. (p. 8)

The naming by men has not only been partial in terms of reality but it has also been partial in terms of defining women. If to exist humanly is to participate in naming, then the first naming which must be done must be the naming of the Self. This cannot be done by someone other than the Self, by what Earle refers to as not-me. As women struggle to reclaim their Selves through the naming of their experience, we have realized that maning, existing humanly is more difficult for women.

> The naming which women have been engaged in is not so simple. It has taken a long time to discover our own forms of language, and the discovery has involved struggle, pain, work, and growth. (Collins, 1974, p. 193)

The struggle, pain, work, and growth which Collins speaks of is a continual process. Sometimes the process involves what Daly (1973) terms a "castrating" of language and images which perpetuate sexism (p. 9). Thus women have rejected words such as "broad", "chick", and "girl" to describe themselves and have instead insisted upon the use of "woman" to describe a female human. Other times the pain and work result in a new word altogether which more accurately reflects the experience of those to whom it refers. Such is the case with the term "Ms." which reflects that the women belongs neither to her father (as in Miss) or to her husband (as in Mrs. John) and that the status of her interpersonal relationships is not a relevant factor except to those actually involved in the relationship. At still other times, languaging involves creating alternatives to words which have been termed "generic" but are, in fact, symbols of male solidarity and female exclusion. "Sisterhood" and its immediate association with "brotherhood" is an example. Because "sisterhood" could not be acceptable if it were labeled "generic", it is a reminder that "brotherhood" is no longer acceptable because it, in fact, does not include women. "Sisterhood" also conveys the solidarity which women are beginning to experience as they claim their Selves, name their Selves. Giving new meanings to "male-words" is another way in which languaging takes place. A word such as "power" for example, which in practice has meant control over an Other, can be seen to mean to be, can be a freeing kind of power, can be the quality that "empowers" persons in their becoming.

The inappropriateness of current terminology to deal with current realities and to offer assistance in creating new realities has been noted in educational theory (Snow, 1973), curriculum theorizing (Huebner, 1975), and schooling (Huebner, 1975; Eisner, 1978). In each of these areas there is an awareness that new language is subject ot the same dangers as the old. It too can become rigid and unyielding; it too can be used to manipulate and enslave rather than to empower and liberate. The key factor in the power of language, Freire (1970) notes, is reflection. As inadequate as it may be, we do need to "put things into words," to make "codification".

> Codifications are not slogans; they are cognizable objects, challenges towards which the critical reflection of the decoders should be directed. (p. 107)

Finally, the ultimate judgement about the value of language to liberate must rest with those who are oppressed. If the language is created from experience, if it encourages what Daly (1973) calls human becoming toward psychological and social fulfillment, toward androgynous living, toward transcendence (p. 21), then it serves its function. When it no longer serves these functions, then it should be discarded and the process begun again.

Reclaiming the Self involves not only a naming of the Self and an expression of that naming in a way that is rooted in lived experience. It also involves the acknowledgement that the human persons doing the naming are physical and sexual beings (deBeauvoir, 1974 edition). Miller (1976) again views women as the persons most in need of redefining their own sexuality and those most capable of doing so. She discusses several issues which have emerged from the current women's movement, among which are physical frankness, sexual frankness, and emotional frankness (p. 25). As is the case with any attempt to reclaim the Self, the reclaiming cannot be defined or directed by someone other than my Self. My notions of sexuality have largely been shaped by the male definition of what it means to be female. The duality which pervades the patriarchal mentality has its roots in sexual dualism and the hierarchical structure which places the bodily in the inferior position (Ruether, 1975, p. 4). The effects of this duality are felt not only by women, of course, but by everyone. Reclaiming a kind of bodily awareness is crucial to reclaiming the Self. Macdonald (1974) believes this bodily awareness is crucial to the concept of centering.

> To be at home in our bodies is critical for human centering...the awareness of "who I am" and "what my biological and physical potential are" are necessary avenues for the long-range development of the centering process. (p. 112)

Because of the pervasiveness of duality and the projection of the "lower", "bodily" half of the duality onto women, we are not at home in our bodies (Burton, 1975; Schafer, 1978). Two concepts need to be altered if we are to become more at home with our bodies. One is the notion that sexuality can be defined, explored, questioned, renewed without examining this projection of the powers of sexuality onto women. The other is the notion that the body, that sex, is indeed "lower", mysterious in some generally evil way. Women and men need to explore these areas together and to find out what sexuality means in terms of reclaiming the Self. It may be that if the concept of sexuality were truly seen as valuable, that women already possess well-developed insights and skills with regard to sexuality and bodily awareness. If that can be done, women, as Miller (1976) notes, are more closely in touch with basic life experience - in touch with reality (p. 32).

When I begin the process of reclaiming my Self through the naming of my experience, I am drawn inevitably, it seems, to my past. This is because each human being is made up of his or her individual history (Russell, 1974, p. 58). In terms of my Self, I must reclaim my past as part of my experience in order to make contact with my Self. In this area of Self, women have been severed from Self even more acutely than man. deBeauvoir (1974 edition) states emphatically that women have no past, no history, no religion of their own (p. xxii). What she means, of course, is that women have no past, no history and no religion which is recognized by the dominant culture as having validity. That is why the look into the past in the reconstruction of my experience is so difficult - and necessary.

> The pattern is very simple. Until you have a history, you have no future. Perhaps it is not at all surprising to you. But for women - it is a new experience. . . (Howe, 1974, p. 428)

Repeatedly, the insistence on the claiming of a history is viewed as essential toward building a future (Russell, 1974; Collins, 1974; Greene, 1974; Pinar, 1976; Huebner, 1975). The liberating aspects of claiming one's history stem from the fact that, often, one's past contains those represssions of which one is not conscious.

> To deepen and enrich one's life may mean to get in touch with those hidden and denied areas of oneself, to open oneself to the unconscious and to manifestations of the sacred in the world around us. (Collins, 1974, p. 97).

This interaction of the past, the present, and the future has liberating possibilities not only psychologically, but socially and politically as well. Greene (1974) speaks of these possibilities in terms of the creative ability of persons to constitute meanings.

> I speak of all this because the recovery of one's own biography is necessary if one is to become aware of how one has constituted meanings in the course of one's life, how one has brought into being the traditions by which one lives and the horizons toward which one occasionally years. (p. 76)

Creating one's biography is an act of consciousness-raising in the broadest sense of the term. It is an act of awareness that impels action. It is to see my Self as a person connected from something and connected to something. By reclaiming my past, I can more clearly see the ways in which I create my future. Abbs (1974), therefore, speaks of writing autobiography in terms of time.

> Autobiography is, thus, concerned with time; not the time of the clock but the time in which we live our lives, with its three tenses of past, present, and future. Autobiography, as an act of writing, perches in the present, gazing backwards into the past while poised ready for flight into the future. (p. 7)

Reclaiming my Self means dealing with the many complexities that my Self has been and will become. It means searching my past; it means painful decisions in the present; it means creating my future. It means

viewing my life history, my biography as the meaning which I have created as I have lived my life. This is not the meaning which has been imposed on me by others, but it may imply freeing my Self from those meanings before I can constitute my own. Finally, of course, it is awareness and creation of meaning which constitutes education.

In chapter 3 the call to wholeness was described in terms of a "feminine" principle which social critics see as needing to be infused into society if it is to survive. It was pointed out that infusing a male definition of a "feminine" principle into a society in which it is still men who have the power, will not accomplish the transformation of the social values which is needed. This transformation can only occur if women have the opportunity to define their Selves, not only in terms of what they have been, but also in terms of what they can become. It can only occur when women then have the opportunity to act upon these insights into their becoming. This acting toward wholeness is what Freire (1970) calls a "vocation".

> But while both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is man's (sic) vocation. (p. 28)

When stretched into the future, the concept of wholeness is much more than the balancing out of individual traits labeled "masculine" or "feminine". It means much more than infusing the "feminine" principle into men. It means much more than teaching women to be "assertive". It means much more than working towards androgyny as the ultimate goal. It means, finally a new definition of what it means to be a human being. Schafer (1978) discusses the levels of meaning leading to this conclusion.

> A fundamental change of the terms in which a problem is defined is a structural change. With regard to sexism, however, the change of terms that is called for is not limited to changing by conscious decision along that which is to be designated masculine and feminine or active and passive; nor is it limited to consciously reallocating the prerogatives of the two sexes. Changes in both of these respects, though terribly important and possible, depend for their force on a necessary and consequential change in the idea of a whole person (p. 162)

Obviously, the idea of a whole person to which this points is only beginning to be explored. There are, however, some suggested characteristics of formulating this process. One of these characteristics is that of individual potential. Macdonald (1974), in developing the concept of centering as the aim of education, recognizes this as a completion of the person.

> Centering as the aim of education calls for the completion of the person or the creation of meaning that utilizes all the potential given to each person. (p. 105)

Utilizing the potential I am given is a difficult process. What I have been given is, in fact, a definition of my Self that has come from what is not - me. If I am to discover my Self, it is a discovery that creates the Self in the process. This is necessary not just because I am a woman, but because I am a person. Miller (1976) portrays this process as "making new visions".

> Everyone repeatedly has to break through to a new vision if she/he is to keep living. This very personal kind of creativity, this making of new visions, this continuous struggle, does not usually go on in open and well-articulated ways. But it goes on. (p. 44)

To define what these new visions are at this time is not possible. This is partly due to the fact this redefinition is just beginning. It is also due to the fact it is based on individual lived experience and can only grow gradually as these lived experiences are shared. Finally, it is due to the fact that these new visions of what it means to be human are attempting to resist the rigid, static definitions based on a patriarchal mentality.

> The wholeness which we have been discussing...is a wholeness based on a multi-dimensional vision of the world, rather than on the single vision which has dominated Western culture and

> most theological thought. Such a multidimensional vision means the ability to grasp complexity, to live with ambiguity, and to enjoy the great variety that exists in the world. (Collins, 1974, p. 183)

Because women have been so alienated from our Selves; because we have been previously male-defined; because we have developed those "feminine" qualities which are the hidden aspects of humanity; because we must define our Selves from scratch, we will be the leaders in the process of bringing this multidimensional vision to the world.

Teaching

> A new pedagogy is obviously required, one that will free persons to understand the ways in which each of them reaches out from his or her location to constitute a common continent, a common world. (Greene, 1978, p. 70)

Greene's challenge is to all of us who are and who would be teachers and teacher educators. It replaces the pieces of the kaleidoscope back into the cylinder and rearranges them into the pattern of teaching and teacher education. But now the patterns are not the same; they do not fit together in quite the same way as they did before. It is as if they have become too large for the cylinder.

What does what I have been discussing have to do with teacher education? How does knowledge of my Self relate to my role as a teacher educator? A broad view of education sees it as a process of liberating the individual from personal and structural constraints; freeing the individual to become more human and to participate in defining what that might mean. Those who participate in this process of liberating the individual cannot do so unless they themselves are also "in process". It is clear that the male-dominated, male-defined structures have inhibited rather than encouraged this liberation; that schooling has more often oppressed than liberated; that society has lost touch with what may be the most humane qualities. Thus education becomes the process by which each individual comes to define and to create his or her Self. The process involves looking inward for personal meaning and looking outward at other individuals and institutions for an understanding of how these inhibit or encourage one's progress toward human becoming. Doing one or the other is not sufficient.

> The perspective that we are advocating is one which attempts to situate teachers' world views and practices within the context of social and physical resources and constraints which they may or may not perceive, but which structure their situation and set limits to their freedom of action through the opportunities and facilities made available to them and the constraints and limitations imposed on them. However, although we want to emphasize the structural constraints of the larger system of social relationships in which the individual teacher is embedded it does not follow from this that what the teacher does in each and every instance is wholly determined by these objective relationships. (Sharp and Green, 1975, p. 30)

While looking only inward or looking only outward is not sufficient in creating new visions, it may be necessary to focus on one or the other at any given moment. Always, it is the reflective nature of the looking which is most significant. Greene (1978) comments on the difficulty of this reflectiveness for women educators.

> Educators, like most other people, have been reared in such a way as to repress their background consciousness, their awareness of their own perspectives on the intersubjective world... And if educators themselves are women, they are likely to distance themselves from that reality as effectively as from their own childhoods. (p. 250)

LaGrone (1966) places the concept of reflectiveness in the context of education of classroom teachers in the field.

> We talk about the continuing education of teachers, but it is always in a terminal tone. We have to give teachers the equipment to see and assess and grow from their own experience, not simply record that experience. In order for teachers to improve their classroom practices, they must re-conceputalize teaching. (p. 192)

Freire (1970) discusses the interrelationships among dialogue, critical thinking and education.

> Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education. (p. 81)

What all of these writers are advocating is a critical Self-awareness as the crucial component of education. They are calling attention to the fact that lack of this critical Self-awareness results in psycholgocial alienation, and social and political oppression. This critical Self-awareness reveals the nature of the patriarchal mentality as the key element both in the psychological alienation and the social and political oppression. Finally, these are educational issues and must be dealt with in existing educational institutions. Clements (1970) offers a perspective by which to judge how well educational institutions are dealing with these issues.

> ...we must assess the quality of school offerings in terms of the variety and authenticity of work going on, and in terms of the quality of conversation and interpersonal relationships to be found in educational contexts. (p. 166)

All of the areas discussed in this chapter: alienation of the Self, search for the Self, reclaiming of the Self through the naming of experience, the spiritual nature of the Self, the projection onto women of those qualities which are most complex and possibly most human, the development by women of skills and understandings related to wholeness and personhood - all of these are interrelated in the process of understanding and action that is education. These insights have largely been drawn from curriculum theorists and feminists. If it has been difficult to determine which is which, then the importance of the light they have to shed on these issues far outweighs any labels or categories. This is as it should be. Each of these groups is striving to break out of previous categories, roles, definitions of who they are and what they should be doing. Each also has its own area of especially pertinent understanding. Each also can contribute to the understanding of the other and of teacher education. How some of these understandings might function for curriculum theory, for feminism, and for teacher education is the focus of chapter 5.

Chapter Five

Synthetic Stage
Invitations

The kaleidoscope has shifted many times in this effort to "get clear" about teacher education. It has formed into patterns and colors that have sometimes been strange and unfamiliar. It has often ranged a great distance from what have been the traditional concerns in teacher education. What has emerged most clearly from these considerations of teacher education is the need to be reflective, to question the taken-for-granted, to probe deeply, to be Self-aware. In this chapter, the peices of the kaleidoscope will arrange themselves into still another pattern, one that perhaps has never really been seen before because it is a pattern, I think, more flowing, more alive than previous patterns. This chapter is analogous to the synthetic stage of currere in that it examines the ways in which feminism and curriculum theory can be useful to teacher education. It explores the mutual benefit to be derived from a dialogue between feminism and curriculum theory. It offers an extension of this dialogue to teacher education. It thus synthesizes the insights from these two areas into a new perspective from which to view teacher education. This chapter is visionary and specific at the same time. Visionary in the sense that it offers an invitation for exploration without being at all certain as to where the journey will lead. Specific in the sense that there are some examples of work that people are doing in their attempts to carry out a vision that gets created and re-created in the process of carrying it out. Pinar's (1976) description of the synthetic stage of currere notes that "synthesis" means "to place together" (p. 60). This suggests the hope that this chapter will "place together" the various elements of this study in such a way that new perspectives, new insights and new possibilities are manifested, a new wholeness concerning teacher education articulated. In many respects, this is new ground. There are no established guideposts, no smooth paths, no easy route. There is only curiosity, urgency, fear, and hope.

> I consider the fundamental theme of our epoch to be that of domination - which implies its opposite, the theme of liberation, as the objective to be achieved. (Freire, 1970, p. 78)

To speak as Freire does of liberation as the objective to be achieved is to summarize the purposes of education and revolution. Indeed, the purpose of education and revolution is liberation - personal, social, cultural, To speak of revolution may seem to suggest the unrest that characterized the 1960's rather than the emphasis on reflection and Self-awareness which I have been discussing. Yet the kinds of attitudes and behaviors which need changing are those which are deepest and therefore most difficult to change. Miller (1976) notes the process as occurring most clearly in and through women.

> Today, we can see this univeral process most clearly in women. Women are the people struggling to create for themselves a new concept of personhood; they are attempting to restructure the central tenets of their lives. This effort extends to the deepest inner reaches. (p. 44)

So to speak of liberation is to speak of revolution; to speak of revolution is, as Freire noted, eminently pedagogical (p. 54).

The domination which characterizes our age stems from the patriarchal mentality. Men, of course, have been its victims as well as women. It has dehumanized us all by its insistence on domination, control, and manipulation. As noted in chapters 3 and 4, those qualities which women have been forced to emphasize are those very qualities which are most needed by our society at this time. It will be feminists therefore, women and men who value these qualities and who are willing to work in infuse them into society, who will be in the forefront of the movement toward new concepts of personness. Of course, at this time, most feminists are women. Consequently, while men can and must be involved, it will need to be women who will articulate most clearly, by word, movement, example and action the new vision which begins with the

reclamation of the Self and by that reclamation gives birth to new concepts of personhood and society. It is clear that such a transformation constitutes nothing less than a fundamental alteration in what Collins (1974) refers to as a world view.

> Feminist ethics looks not simply to a change in political systems...but to the break-through of a radical new world view in which thought and feeling, response and behavior, in both the private and public realms, will be transformed. We are not sanguine that such a transformation will occur. (p. 166)

No one concerned with such a transformation can afford to be sanguine that it will occur. One of the reasons for the difficulty stems from the fact that the qualities which are seen as necessary for the transformation are the ones which block "success" as it is currently defined. Miller (1976) not only sees these qualities as necessary for all humans but offers hope that they can be used to make the transformation.

> Indeed, the point is that the characteristics most highly developed in women and perhaps most essential to human beings are the very characteristics that are specifically dysfunctional for success in the world as it is...They may, however, be the important ones for making the world different. (p. 124)

What Miller is suggesting I see as a challenge to feminists, to teacher educators, and to curriculum theorists to begin sharing their visions with one another. Because of the enormity of the task of changing some of the criteria by which society defines success, a united effort is needed. Feminists, teacher educators, and curriculum theorists can acknowledge the influence that they could have on schools as one of the primary institutions of socialization in society. By joining their insights and their efforts, these groups could begin to actualize their potential influence.

Feminist Contributions to Curriculum Theorizing

It has been my contention that feminist theorists and curriculum theorists, as I have been speaking of them, have similar concerns and can offer insights to one another. The first of these concerns is the reclamation of the Self. I have noted that women are examples par excellence of the severence from Self. This is not to suggest that it is only women who suffer this alienation but rather to suggest that women have experienced this loss of Self in what that are profoundly different from the ways that men generally experience it. For example, if what Miller (1976) is suggesting concerning the ego is true, that women have no egos as the term is currently used, what does that imply concerning the severence of the Self? Should women strive to develop their egos by various actions in the world? The answer would appear to be affirmative. Yet the question arises as to whether or not this ego development would simply result in women internalizing the patriarchal mentality as their reality in the same way that men view it. On the other hand, it may be that the reason that women appear not to have egos is that they have been blocked from acting in the world and have then experienced the severence from Self at every turn and have gone mad.

As a result of being thwarted from taking part in the process of the creation of the dominant culture, women have developed other qualities and other skills which the dominant culture devalues. These have been described as "affiliative", "internal", "communal", "emotional" characteristics. These are seen by curriculum theorists and feminists alike as qualities vital to the reclamation of the Self. Most of the time, these qualtiies are not well developed in men. Miller (1976) explains.

> Men can go a long distance away from fully recognizing this need (for affiliation) because women are so groomed to "fill it in" for them. But there is another side: women are also more thoroughly prepared to move toward more advanced, more affiliative ways of living - and less wedded to the dangerous ways of the present. (p. 86)

Feminism can thus offer to curriculum theorizing further insight into what it means to experience severence from Self and ways in which the Self may be reclaimed. It is not clear at present what this means or where it may lead. One of the avenues to be explored is the ways in which women have organized their internal reality around others as a result of being isolated from the world. deBeauvoir (1974 edition) sees some benefit to this process in terms of women's ability to understand others.

> From the depths of her solitude, her isolation, woman gains her sense of the personal bearing of her life. . .she tries to understand others as individuals and to identify them with herself. (p. 696)

Clearly then, being Other has some advantages as well as disadvantages. What feminists have to offer in this area is an understanding of the creative tension that occurs as they attempt to define them Selves as individuals and at the same time utilize their understanding of others.

One of the facets of understanding others is the concept of service. Miller (1976) makes the distinction between "service" and "being subservient" (p. 71). She maintains that, up to this point, service has been acted out only in subservient relationships. She suggests that service is a necessary component of human relationships and needs to be incorporated into those relationships.

> We might say that one of the major issues before us as a human community is the question of how to create a way of life that includes serving others without being subservient. How are we to incorporate this necessity into everyone's development and outlook? (p. 71)

Incorporating this necessity into everyone's development and outlook will require a conscientious effort on the part of women and men to dialogue with one another, to name the ways in which their experience of Self differs - and the ways in which their experience is similar. Daly (1973) refers to this dialogue as "adequate meeting".

> (Adequate meeting) will require in men as well as in women a desire to become androgynous, this is, to become themselves. Whenever men manage to see this promise in themselves of actually finding themselves, of finally agreeing with themselves, they will have reached the threshold of the new space. (p. 172)

There is no way to minimize the difficulty of this dialogue. It calls into question some of the most deeply entrenched attitudes and behaviors which people hold. Indeed, as some curriculum theorists and feminists have pointed out, it requires an entirely new concept of Self. Such a redefinition is bound to produce anxiety for all who engage in it. Jersild (1955) notes that the process requires courage.

> To gain knowledge of self, one must have the courage to seek it and the humility to accept what one may find. (p. 83)

Yet offering cautions is incomplete without offering the vision of the possibilities that could occur if such dialogue were to take place. Russell (1974) shares on such vision regarding the concept of service.

> Ultimately, this can lead us to be nót only pro-woman but also pro-human, and to accept a genuine reciprocal relationship...so that women are set free both to serve and to be served without loss of identity or fear of subordination. (p. 144)

Feminism thus addresses itself to the concerns expressed by some curriculum theorists for a new concept of personhood, a new concept of relationship, and a new concept of service.

There are other insights that feminism has to offer to curriculum theorizing. These have to do with a sense of community. It has been noted (in chapters 3 and 4) that this sense of community is needed in education and that this ability is currently most well developed in women. In many cases, this involves

working in small groups (for example, consciousness-raising groups) in ways that abandon a hierarchical model for a cooperative one. It is just such a group which Wilson (1975) describes as being a possible solution to the theorizing problems in education as a field of study.

> To take any of the questions seriously would involve an...organized, controlled, and intense operation. We should naturally think of something like a seminar, dealing with a limited area, with limited numbers of people who had done a good deal of background reading, were highly capable, and were anxious to spend a long time thrashing out these complicated issues. That this does not happen (not, at least, as often as it should) is partly because the problem is primarily an intellectual one, and we do not see it as such. (p. 76)

I would submit tha another reason that this does not happen is because our notion of groups and group work has been limited to one of a hierarchical model. This same emphasis on the value of an intimate working group is echoed by Wilhelms (1970) as part of his two-fold suggestion for teacher education.

> We need, I believe, just two program elements:
>
> 1. A continuing seminar, running the whole length of the professional period... For the sake of maximum openness and sensitivity, it will be best if the same students and the same faculty team can continue together over a long time.
>
> 2. An instructional laboratory, richly equipped and manned by a variety of specialists, to be used by each student when he needs it and in his own way. (p. 14)

Macdonald (1974), in discussing his notion of a transcendental development ideology of education, extends the concept of an intimate group to those who live together and notes the relationship between this and the inward journey of reflectiveness.

> It is my best guess that the next step, already begun, is an inward journey that will manifest itself by discovery through perception and imagery, of human potential only slightly realized until now, and an outer journey for new communal life stages that are pluralistic and limited to small groups (tribes?) of people. (p. 57)

Ruether (1975) discusses in some detail the kind of communal living that a feminist perspective envisions (p. 208-211). She points out the advantages to children and to adults of living in a way that integrates family life and work, personal and public, nature and technology. Such a society, she notes, might even be termed "religious".

> The center of such a new society would have to be not just the appropriate new social form, but a new social visions, a new soul that would inspire the whole. Society would have to be transfigured by the glimpse of a new type of social personality, a "new humanity" appropriate to a "new earth." One might call this even a "new religion", if one understands by this the prophetic vision to shape a new world on earth, and not an alienated sprituality. (p. 211)

None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that women are the only persons who have ever worked successfully in groups. It is meant to suggest that feminists, women nd men, are experimenting with ways in which persons can come together in cooperation and caring and equality. It is evident that such groups are seen as desirable by eduationists and feminists alike. They are desirable for the kind of thoughtful inquiry that Wilson (1975) perceives as essential to "getting clear" about teacher education. They are desirable in terms of the kind of teacher education program which Wilhelms (1970) indicates can truly assist the development of the Self. They are desirable finally for the kind of society which Macdonald (1974) and Ruether (1975) describe and which we all desire. What women can contribute to this development is a kind of understanding of others and a sense of community which has been largely untapped before. This is a long and painstaking process. There are times when the process involves separate groups of only women due to the strength of previous patterns of behavior which meant male-domination. Russell (1974) echoes Freire's

(1970) contention that the oppressed must liberate themselves.

> First, the oppressed groups must develop their own power base of mutual support, new identity, and new possibility for collective action. They must search together for their own liberation according to their own agenda, because liberation is not a commodity to be given away. (p. 68)

Another area in which feminism can offer insights into the areas which are of concern to some curriculum theorists involves the content and methodology which are being used in women's studies courses. Rich (1975) illustrates the differences by describing a "woman-centered university". First, she addresses the quantitative issue which returns the focus to the research issue with which this study began.

> It is difficult to imagine a woman-centered curriculum where quantitative method and technical reason would continue to be allowed to become means for the reduction of human lives, and where specialization would continue to be used as an escape from wholeness. (p. 32)

This wholeness toward which there is much striving, often occurs in women's studies. Rich (1975) describes more fully the classroom style which has evolved in women's courses.

> It has been almost a given of women's courses that style and content are inseparable. A style has evolved in the classroom, more dialogic, more exploratory, less given to pseudo-objectivity, than the traditional mode. (p. 33)

The fact that content and style in women's studies are inseparable is not accidental but a deliberate attempt on the part of teachers and students to view knowledge and learning from an entirely different perspective from the ways in which these are viewed in a male-dominated university (Feiger, see bibliography). It stems from the fact that women's studies is not a "subject" or a "fad", but a philosophy of knowledge. Webb (1974), in describing her experience in teaching at Goddard, illustrates the manner in which feminism cuts across traditional "disciplines".

> As a philosophy of knowledge, feminism is concerned with the forms and functions of power and how it has been wielded. Such a philosophy cuts across so-called "disciplines" to include psychology (both of the individual and in groups; the colonizer and the colonized); sociology (social forms of power and class development); economics (uses of power with varied economic bases in history); biology (is there such a thing as biological inferiority?); and of course the study of history, literature and the arts. But this study is from a wholly different context; it is the history of what was created both by the dominated and the dominator to sustain or struggle against that domination. (p. 413)

Webb also advocates a small group living/learning situation, joining Macdonald (1974), Wilhelms (1970), Ruether (1975) and others in the awareness that knowledge occurs in the knower, that it is tied to experience and to the sharing of that experience with a small group who are committed to participation in one another's growth.

> The common threads through the times when one learns seem to be (1) when one wants to, and (2) when one's whole being is called into question and one is challenged to face the operative assumptions of daily life. So if learning occurs through being together, why not have collectives while in school: living and learning/together. A woman would have to choose to spend one semester at a minimum in a collective that planned its work together. As a group they all might study some basic theoretical work, but then they could split off and do separate work depending on interest, maybe in teams, but with constant discussion of what they are doing. (Webb, 1974, p. 420)

At times the mode for joining content and style involves the use of biography and autobiography, a concern central to curriculum theorists as well. Howe (1974) discusses a course in which the content was the

biographies of eighteenth and nineteenth century women. The process began by having the women write about the most crucial experiences in their educational lives. This, in turn, gave them insight into the educational experiences of their foremothers and how they utilized these experiences (p. 424-428). She summarizes by repeating the way in which this process synthesized the usual dichotomy between past and future, between "book learning" and practicality.

> This was the most interesting result of the course; that studying history - their own history, of course - made women future - orientated and socially committed. (p. 428)

Repeatedly, the experience of women's studies has been the dissolving of dichotomies such as this; it has been the realization that my experience is the final base on which my learning rests; it has been that knowledge is in the knower's interacting with the world; it has been that there is finally, no distinction between teacher and learner but only that each are moments in the same action. Collins (1974) summarizes this experience and its impact upon the world.

> I think of the numerous courses on women, given by women, in schools of mission, in churches, in colleges, and in seminaries across the country which are demonstrating that knowledge is best which can be appropriated from within, that thc teacher is a learner and the learner a teacher, and that education involves that total person in both reflection and action toward the humanization of the world. (p. 233)

Feminism has insights into many areas which are of concern to many curriculum theorists as well as others concerned with education. These areas include the reclamation of the Self, the focus on experience in education, the power of language, the relationship of the individual to the institutions in which we work and live. These insights can best be summarized by stating that what they offer is a quality which has been missing before. They offer a voice which has not been heard before. They offer not just a "feminine principle" to be incorporated into male society, but the lives of individual, flesh and blood women, those uniqueness has been obscurred and whose solidarity comes from having been oppressed because they are female. Thus the dichotomies which often appear to force us to choose a perspective and force us to reject another because it is the opposite, are no longer seen in this light. I do not have to choose between Self work and social concerns, between developing my personal life and political issues, between a personalistic philosophy and a socialistic one. These are all moments of the intricate action which is my life. While at any given period of time, I may choose to emphasize action and at another period to emphasize reflection, even at these moments, one influences the other in creative tension.

Curriculum Theorizing: Contributions to Feminism

It is appropriate here to repeat my contention that feminists and curriculum theorists have much to say to one another. A dialogue, of course, is mutual. There are some insights which curriculum theorizing can offer to feminism as well. Ideas, theories, analyses and methodologies developed by curriculum theorists can provide valuable tools with which feminists can continue to shape their liberation. Once such methodology is that which has been adapted for use in this study: currere (Pinar, 1976, especially chapter 2). As Pinar uses it, the method involves recording, in free-associative manner, what occurs to me when I reflect upon my experience. This is the regressive step; it looks to what I recall about my past. The progressive step involves the same procedure as I imagine the future. The next step is analytical in which I examine the present by analyzing it in relation to what I have written about the past and the future. The synthetical step is what it implies: a placing together of these elements into my Self: a whole of intellectual, emotional and physical aspects. This is a simplified description of the method. Its utility for reaching my Self through my biography lies in its allowance for (indeed, insistence on) my uniqueness. The past I explore is mine; the future I envision is mine; the present is mine; the metaphors I use to describe them are mine. Most importantly, the meaning which I discern and which creates me is mine. Pinar (1978) describes the liberating

potential of such work.

> The method of currere is one way to work to liberate oneself from the web of political, cultural, and economic influences buried from conscious view perhaps, but which comprise the biographic web that is a person's biographic situation. (Pinar, 1978, p. 8)

While currere focuses on the individual, it ultiamtely leads to the kind of collective experience which women are beginning to experience and articulate. Pinar (1976) explains.

> I am asked how it is that one travels from knowledge of the individual apparently idiosyncratic self to knowledge of the general? The relation between the indivicual and the universal exists although I cannot claim to understand it satisfactorily. I do know that as I travel inward, I tend to be freed from it, and hence more sensitive and receptive to what is external. It is as if because I can see more of myself in its multi-dimensional manifestations, I am also able to see more of others. It is as if after one travels for a certain distance in the realm of the idiosyncratic one gets to the roots of that realm, and these roots become what is collective. That is, while these roots are apparently common to us all, they are manifested idiosyncratically. (p. 62)

Currere can thus be a useful tool to feminism for revealing and voicing women's experience, for articulating the unique ways in which women relate to others, for sharing the specific ways in which the personal is political.

Another useful tool (discussed in chapter 4) is Macdonald's (1974) concept of centering. As women become more and more aware of the fact that their "centers" have always been focused on other persons, centering offers a concept to imagine what it would be like to have one's own center, not in the sense of having it conferred, but in the sense of participating in its creation. Centering is a concept which can assist women in transforming their previous location of "center" as outside them Selves into the location of center as "with" others in reciprocal centering. Macdonald (1974) relates this process to knowledge, and sees the sharing as fundamental to centering.

> There is another path, much harder (than explicit knowledge) but more direct. This is the process of locating one's center in relation to the other: to "see" one's self and the other in relation to our centers of being; to touch and be touched by another in terms of something fundamental to our shared existence. (p. 113)

Centering may be analogous to the "click" of recognition which often occurs in consciousness-raising sessions when women realize them Selves as individuals and realize also their solidarity with other women. Liberating one's Self means first recognizing one's Self as oppressed and the unity that one has with others who are oppressed. Centering therefore may be used as a way of seeing that I am oppressed as well as seeing that my femaleness unites me with other women.

Huebner's work on language is another example of concerns which are shared by feminists and curriculum theorists. He points out (1975, p. 218) that curricular language is not within the realm of literature, or religion, or science. As a result, the curricularist is "stuck" with terminology which restricts his/her thinking, which determines the questions as well as the answers. He continues by developing the concept of value frameworks which may be used to value eductional activity. These frameworks he lists as 1) technical, 2) political, 3) scientific, 4) esthetic, and 5) ethical values (p. 223-226). His analyses of how these value frameworks operate in education and in society highlight the controlling as well as the liberating aspects of language. Such an analysis is useful to feminists not only in terms of heightened awareness of language in which sexism is more potent because it is more subtle, but also in terms of offering a system of categories

of language frameworks from which to choose when articulating and re-shaping their own experience. Feminists are already aware of how the technical, political and scientific frameworks are used to restrict, control and otherwise dominate and oppress them and reduce the ability of all of us to be more fully human. Finally, Huebner's (p. 228) contention that education needs to emphasize the esthetic and ethical value frameworks would give form to those abilities which are most well developed in women. His description of these value frameworks gives those women, especially those who are in schools, a suggested way of articulating and infusing their special abilities in the esthetic and ethical modes into the classroom.

Huebner is not alone in calling for greater emphasis on the esthetic and ethical value frameworks in education. It is useful here to return to Eisner's (1978) description of symbol systems. He also calls for symbol systems which would employ greater use of the kinds of understanding which the study of the humanities was generally thought to encourage.

> We also need to use symbol systems that are employed in film, that use teacher logs and student interviews, and that employ graphic visual analysis of the work students create... In short, we need to use an approach to educational evaluation that capitalizes on our human capacity to come to know reality in its multidimensional richness. (p. 622)

Knowing reality in its multidimensional richness is a vision which could benefit not only classrooms but theorizing and research as well. Snow (1973) advocates metaphor making as a means of utilizing the esthetic mode in research.

> ...it is conceivable that theory and research in teaching could benefit substantially if researchers of all persuasions engaged more extensively and intensively in metaphor making. Such activity might produce a store of interesting metaphors, some of which could lead to new ideas for concepts and variables of value. (p. 90)

Related to this concern with the power and limitations of language and the concern for the esthetic and ethical modes of valuing educational activity is a concern for ways to transcend the limitations of language and to maintain esthetic and ethical modes of valuing. The feminist and curricularist concern for greater unity between mind and body finds expression in the theater work of Grumet (1976). Her insights are particularly useful due to their educational context. She describes a class of student teachers.

> Class meetings begin with dance, yoga and voice exercises. Their practice helps the students to relax, to feel comfortable with each other and with physical movement in the class setting. Specific exercises are then devised and performed to explore the space enclosed within the horizons of a particular literary microcosm, its configurations and the kinds of movement possible within its confines. (p. 81)

This kind of physical movement in the classroom answers to the need for theory, content, and style to be one, to the need to be at home with one's body. The use of movement again provides the many women who are in classrooms a way to express the unity toward which they are striving. Grumet describes the educationally revealing nature of body movement in the classroom.

> We discovered within a particular series of movement and gesture called transformational exercises, archetypes of classroom interactions. Because words are banished from the communicated content of the exercises, there is no place for the hidden curriculum to hide. It is more difficult to disassociate gesture from its emotional, intentional content than it is to sever words from our thought and feeling: false gestures are patent when false words escape detection. (p. 82)

Feminists are seeking as many ways as possible to make our own gestures authentic, if only because so many gestures in our male-dominated culture are false. Grumet's use of movement in the classroom is an

example that such authenticity is possible.

Further insight into authenticity is offered by returning to Shuchat Shaw's (1975) concept of "congruence". As discussed earlier (chapter 3), congruence is the mesh between theory and practice, between reading about and doing, between teaching and learning. In Shuchat Shaw's case, it means that the authenticity in being a film teacher rests on the fact that she is a film maker. She describes her planning for her classes after having completed a five-month film project.

> Quite fresh from my own experience of the creative process, I attempted to approach my task from two related states of mind, those of film maker and film teacher... Intimately familiar with my own creative efforts and sensitive to my ability to learn only through doing, it seemed appropriate for both of my courses to emphasize a workshop concept rather than a lecture-discussion seminar. (p. 450)

For the most part, her insight into the desirability of the workshop concept proved correct. Yet our educational system is still so encrusted with the notion that the teacher must have the answers, that she found that some of her students felt neglected. The alternative, however, is not to give up the striving for congruence by giving up our own work, but to attempt to share it with our students.

> We must realize that our first attempts at a balance may be at the expense of several students' loss of security; this must be handled gently, and we must reassure and draw them in, give them an understanding of exactly what we are doing. We shall even find students who do not respect the intensity and authenticity with which we work; they may walk into our rooms with personal demands, regardless of our apparent involvement in something for our own. All of these students, as well as others involved in the educational system, must be made aware that we, too, are vital human beings with private and public creative needs; further, we must help them understand their own ultimate gain from our authenticity. (p. 452)

Lack of congruence is what many women experience because the skills and qualities they have developed in the home are not valued in the marketplace. Conversely, what is valued in the marketplace is thought to be a completely separate sphere of reality from the home. The concept of congruence could assist in giving a conceptual framework for the kind of wholeness which feminists desire to bring into all areas of human life.

The foregoing examples from curriculum theorists are by no means exhaustive. Nor are they offered as programs by which feminists can reach their goals. They are offered as illustrations of how particular curricularist's insights are relevant to feminist concerns. They serve to remind feminists of what Freire (1970) calls the eminently pedagogical nature of the revolution. They offer tools by which feminists can work toward their own and others' liberation. They illustrate that many of the hopes and visions voiced by feminists are shared by curriculum theorists. They offer evidence that dialogue can be mutually beneficial. What characterizes both feminists and curriculum theorists is a willingness to question what is taken-for-granted, a desire for a more human society, a searching for new forms with which to express a new reality, and a faith that individuals matter.

Contributions to Teacher Education

> Our chief goal now is obvious; to restore a feminist perspective to education. (Howe, 1974, p. 431)

Howe's comment on the chief goal of educators returns the focus of this study to teacher education. How do these insights from feminism and from curriculum theorizing apply to teacher education? Why are they particularly useful to the problems which beset teacher education? Is teacher education the best place,

(or any place at all), to deal with the issues which have the widespread purpose of creating a more human society? What Howe refers to, of course, in seeking a restoration of the feminist perspective in education is a restoration of Self, of wholeness, of experience, of critical thinking, of institutions which serve persons instead of enslaving them. These are issues which are of vital concern to educators at all levels. They are some of the issues to which contemporary curriculum theorists are devoting attention.

It may seem that to place on teacher education and by implication, on schools, the burden of such widespread attitude changes is to simply repeat the pattern in education which lays every social problem at the schoolhouse door in the expectation that schooling can solve the issue (Feiger, see bibliography). Yet it is possible to transform this faith in "schooling" to a deeper faith in "education"; it is possible to use tools which have previously been used to oppress, to liberate; it is possible to make use of the "tradition" of education as a place to ameliorate social ills, as an opportunity for action. Jersild (1955) speaks to the issue with regard to Self work.

> Some of the richest possibilities for self-examination can be found in relationships with others from month to month and from year to year. In the teaching profession we have hardly begun to explore and to tap these resources for growth in self-knowledge, although some work is being done in this area. (p. 85)

In the dailiness of contact between teachers and students lies the potential, at least, of relationships to grow, of attitudes to be influenced, of experience to be claimed, of patterns of behavior to be tried. The teaching situation even as it currently exists can be utilized for the regularity of its contact to develop trust and dialogue between students and teachers. Greene (1974) speaks to the same hope concerning the possibilities that can occur in schools. She describes the moment when a person finally begins to confront the "why" of his/her life as an awakening.

> I happen to believe that this kind of awakening can still occur in schools, at least where there are teachers who no longer lead mechanical lives. (p. 75)

Huebner (1975) offers some hope for schools in this regard as well. But he is more cautious, and serves as a reminder that education and schooling are not synonymous.

> To the extent that education can occur within a school I was and am willing to manifest my vocation as an educator throughout the school. . . As the educational limitations of the school become more obvious, I am now willing to help people be educators no matter what their institutional commitments or lack of them. (p. 28)

Huebner's statement raises for me an interesting distinction between "teacher" and "educator". A "teacher" may be the person who manipulates materials, environment and students so that the desired effects are achieved and can be measured. An "educator" on the other hand, could be conceived of as a person who enters into relationships with others, who is willing to share his/her personhood with others, who is willing to struggle with the questions rather than to provide the answers. There may be times when this person does "teach" in the sense of presenting information, providing materials, asking questions but these activities are not the primary concern. The primary concern is the development of awareness of Self, of others, of the environment and of making choices in the light of this awareness. For teacher educators to convey the notion of "educator" to their students as well as the notion of "teacher" asks of them the same kind of awareness that they ask of their students. They too must be willing to see themselves as educators in the sense that Huebner describes, to be willing to help others be educators no matter what their institutional commitments.

Huebner's statement also raises the question of institutional constraints as well as commitments. Offering hope for what could happen in schools does not mean that it will happen. Greene (1978) addressed the

issue in terms of the responsibilities of teacher educators.

> How, given the pressures of the times and the conservatism of educational institutions toda can they (teachers) educate for interrogation and critique? How can they enable teachers-t be to break with conceptions of the given, of the predefined? How can they equip them decipher, to decode, and (if they are courageous enough) to surpass and to transform? (p. 5

The ability to surpass and to transform comes from an awareness of institutional constraints; from an awar ness of Self; from an awareness of how the first influences the second. It is accompanied by a realization the specific ways in which teacher education can and cannot - change society. Teacher education canno do everything but, as Greene (1978) points out, it can do some things.

> But something can be done to empower some teachers-to-be to reflect upon their own lif situations, to speak out in their own voices about the lacks that must be repaired, the possibil ties to be acted upon in the name of what they deem decent, humane, and just. (p. 71)

Teacher education is a good place to begin to do the kind of reflexive work discussed in this study. I an not so naive as to suggest that schools and colleges can transform society. But neither are they going to fad away under the force of criticism, no matter how justified. It does no good to offer to prospective teacher only the vision of what education should be without also offering them the accompanying vision and skill to deal with education as it is. To make use of existing institutions is one way (though not the only way) to effect the kinds of changes called for in this study. Teacher education, therefore, offers the potential of awakening many women and men to their own experience and to their abilities to offer the same oppor- tunity of awakening to their students.

Teacher education is also a good place to begin to effect change because the majority of its students, at least on the undergraduate level, are women and this is likely ot be true for some time to come. The argu- ment is stong, I think, for the fact that women are in the forefront when it comes to awareness of the per- sonal and the political. It will, therefore, be women, as Howe (1973) points out, who will be the crucial agents of change in education.

> Of all the means for implementing change, I would place priority on the education of teach- ers, both female and male. Women teachers who begin to understand their own lives in the context of sex-role stereotyping and sex bias are especially likely to be the most crucial agents for change. (p. xiv)

I suggest that prospective teachers have an even greater potential for the kind of understanding which Howe suggests than do teachers currently in classrooms. Teacher educators could utilize declining enroll- ments in their programs to intensify the quality of these programs. A potential exists to develop the kind of Self work that is believed to be so significant to professional development. Smaller numbers offer the oppor- tunity to ask the kinds of "hard" questions which are required to "get clear" about teacher education. Teacher educators could provide the opportunity for students to examine the discrepancies between assumed educational goals and institutional realities. They could, as Greene (1978) suggests, enter a conversation with their students, "the kind of conversation that allows a truly human way of speaking, of being together in a world susceptible to questioning" (p. 69) In the process, teacher educators may vitalize them Selves as well as their students.

Feminism has a claim to teacher education in a special way. Teaching is considered a women's occupa- tion in some measure due to the nurturing qualities associated with it. Women have developed to a con- siderable degree the ability to facilitate the development of other persons. The qualities which teacher education so badly needs are those qualities which women have developed most fully. Yet because these qualities are devalued and because women do not control the field of teacher education, the dilemmas

persist and the qualities become diverted, sublimated, or exploited. The feminist perspective does need to be restored to teacher education. In speaking of a teacher training course, Pinar (1976) offers the realization that making a claim to an environment can be the first step toward transforming it.

> We must work through our circumstances; material, intellectual, psycho - social. We must claim the environment as our land; we lay claim to it brazenly. This is our land and we will make of it what we will. (p. viii)

Feminism's claim to the environment of teacher education can be legitimatized not so much in terms of the numbers of women involved, but more in terms of the quality of their perspective.

No aspect of the insights proffered by feminism or by curriculum theorizing is a solution to the problems in teacher education. Indeed, if there are no answers it is largely because we are only beginning to find ways in which to ask the questions. Although I have strongly urged a feminist perspective, it has not been without the realization that this is not a fixed nor perfected vision. Attempts to realize the vision have often been thwarted, diverted, co-opted, or doomed because women too, do not understand enough yet.

> It is the truths about all women that we must continue to seek. We do not thoroughly understand them yet - and therefore we do not know how to help ourselves or each other enough. No do we know how to make the kind of changes we want for ourselves. (Miller, 1976, p. x)

What then, can these two areas offer to teacher education? What can feminism and curriculum theorizing say that might promote mutual understanding and growth? There is the common concern about what constitutes research and how it is conducted. There is the interest in language and its functions. There are some methodologies for reclaiming the Self. There are a few models of courses and programs which are striving to develop a new vision. There are insights into the ways in which institutions can and do oppress the individuals they profess to serve. But there are no easy answers, no final solutions, no neat formulas to which we can point. There are only possibilities. Some of these are expressed by Greene (1970).

> There is only the hope of increased awareness on the part of persons; there is only the possibility of communicating principles which may be freely chosen by those who have learned how to learn. We can combat indifference and depersonalization by attending to persons for whom we care, by enabling them to feel free enough to imagine alternatives and choose among them thoughtfully. We can introduce them to multiple modes of ordering, to diverse ways of cherishing; but we can offer them no certainties, no "glorious destiny". Perhaps, in the end, it is as well. (p. 71)

Accepting Greene's challenge means possessing hope as part of commitment to change. It means giving up the patriarchal mentality which views the world as filled only with opposites. It means a willingness to deal with ambiguity, to be uncomfortable with assumptions, to challenge the taken-for-granted. It means further, I believe, loneliness, misunderstanding, and doubt because very few others will respond to the challenge or even see the necessity for it. It requires, most of all, faith - which after all, is a belief not in what is, but in what can be.

REFERENCES

Chapter 1

Apple, Michael. "Ideology and Form in Curriculum Evaluation". In QUALITATIVE EVALUATION. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978.

Bernstein, Richard J. THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1976.

Doyle, Walter. "Paradigms for Teacher Effectiveness Research". In REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION. Vol. 5. Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock, 1978.

Fantini, Mario. "Sexism: A Commitment to Solutions". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Winter, 1975.

Grumet, Madeleine R. "Toward a Poor Curriculum". In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Macdonald, James B. "Curriculum Theory". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

McCarty, Donald J. "Introduction". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

Mooney, Ross L. "The Researcher Himself". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Parelius, Ann Parker and Parelius, Robert J. THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978.

Pilder, William F. "In the Stillness is the Dancing". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Pinar, William F. "The Method". In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Pinar, William F. "Life History and Curriculum Theorizing: A Case Study". REVIEW JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. III, No. 1, 1976.

Pinar, William F. "Currere: A Case Study". In QUALITATIVE EVALUATION. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford. NEW WOMAN/NEW EARTH. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.

Snow, Richard E. "Theory Construction for Research on Teaching". In SECOND HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING. Edited by Robert M.W. Travers. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1973.

Wilson, John. EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PREPARATION OF TEACHERS. Great Britain: NFER Publishing Company Ltd., 1975.

Chapter 2

Alexander, Ruth. "Women and the Educational Establishment". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Winter, 1975.

Andrews, Theordore E. PERFORMANCE EDUCATION: ATLANTA OR ATLANTIS? Multi-State Consortium on Performance-Based Teacher Education, 1976.

Aspy, David. "Maslow and Teachers in Training". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. 20, No. 3, Fall, 1969.

Bernstein, Richard J. THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976.

Blumberg, Arthur. SUPERVISORS AND TEACHERS: A PRIVATE COLD WAR. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Borg, Walter R. MOVING TOWARD EFFECTIVE TEACHER EDUCATION - ONE MAN'S PERSPECTIVE. Logan, Utah: The University Press, 1975.

Brosio, Richard. "The Supervision of Teacher Candidates. A Philosophical/Historical Perspective". TEACHER EDUCATOR. Vol. II, No. 1, Autumn, 1975.

Brunetti, Frank, Cohen, Elizabeth, Meyer, John, Molnar, Sheila. "Studies of Team Teaching in the Open-Space School". INTERCHANGE. Vol. 3, Nos. 2-3, 1972.

Cogan, Morris L. CLINICAL SUPERVISION. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973.

Collins, Sheila D. A DIFFERENT HEAVEN AND EARTH. Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1974.

Cooper, James (Ed.) CLASSROOM TEACHING SKILLS: A HANDBOOK. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977.

Daly, Mary. THE CHURCH AND THE SECOND SEX. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

Daly, Mary. BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

Damico, Sandra B. and Nevill, Dorothy. "Education and Role Conflict: A Woman's Dilemma". In EDUCATIONAL HORIZONS. Vol. 56, No. 3, Spring, 1978.

Demos, John and Boocock, Sarone Spence (Eds.). TURNING POINT: HISTORICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE FAMILY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Dreeben, Robert. THE NATURE OF TEACHING. Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1970.

Dunbar, Roxanne. "Female Liberation as the Basis for Social Revolution". In SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL. Edited by Robin Morgan. New York: Vintage Books, 1970.

Dunkin, Michael and Biddle, Bruce. THE STUDY OF TEACHING. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974.

Dussault, Gilles. A THEORY OF SUPERVISION IN TEACHER EDUCATION. New York: Teachers College Press, 1970.

Eddy, Elizabeth. BECOMING A TEACHER. New York: Teachers College Press, 1969.

Eisner, Elliott. "The Impoverished Mind". EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP. Vol. 35, No. 8, May, 1978.

Elam, Stanley. PERFORMANCE-BASED TEACHER EDUCATION. Washington: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1971.

Etzioni, Amitai (ed.). THE SEMI-PROFESSIONS AND THEIR ORGANIZATION. New York: The Free Press, 1969.

Frazier, Nancy and Sadker, Myra. SEXISM IN SCHOOL AND SOCIETY. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973.

Friendenberg, Edgar Z. "Critique of Current Practice". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

Funkhouser, Charles W. "Selecting Cooperating Teachers". SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY. Vol. LXI, No. 9, May 1975.

Horton, Lowell and Horton, Phyllis. TEACHER EDUCATION: TRENDS, ISSUES, INNOVATIONS. Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1974.

Howey, Kenneth R., Yarger, Sam J., Joyce, Bruce R. IMPROVING TEACHER EDUCATION. Washington: Association of Teacher Educators, 1978.

Kliebard, Herbert M. "The Question in Teacher Education". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

Kliebard, Herbert M. "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Koerner, James D. THE MISEDUCATION OF AMERICAN TEACHERS. Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1963.

Lang, Duaine D., et al. A PARTNERSHIP FOR THE SUPERVISION OF STUDENT TEACHERS. Mt. Pleasant, Michigan: Great Lakes Publishing Co., 1975.

Lortie, Dan C. SCHOOLTEACHER: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

Macdonald, James B. "Curriculum Theory". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Maxwell, Margaret. "Teacher Education Students". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXIX, No. 2, March-April, 1978.

McCarthy, Donald J. "Introduction". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

McCune, Shirley and Matthews, Martha. "Eliminating Sexism: Teacher Education and Change". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Winter, 1975.

McDonald, Frederick J. "Evaluating Preservice Teachers' Competence". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXIX, No. 2, March-April 1978.

Medley, Donald M. "Closing the Gap Between Research in Teacher Effectiveness and the Teacher Education Curriculum". JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION. Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall, 1975.

Millett, Kate. SEXUAL POLITICS. New York: Ballentine Books, 1970.

Moore, W.E. "Occupational Socialization". In HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY AND RESEARCH. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969.

Openshaw, M. Karl. "Research in Teaching". In PARTNERSHIP IN TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by E. Brooks Smith, et al. Washington: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Eduction, 1966.

Palmer, Ronald A. "Cooperating Teacher Vital to Student Teacher Success". INSTRUCTOR. Vol. 84, No. 2, October, 1974.

Palmer, Ronald A. "ABC of Student Teaching for Cooperating Teachers". SCHOOL AND COMMUNITY. Vol. LXI, No. 5, January, 1975.

Parelius, Ann Parker and Parelius, Robert J. THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1978.

Pinar, William F. "Introduction". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Pinar, William F. "Preface". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Pinar, William F. and Grumet, Madeleine. TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Pinar, William F. "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978". EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER. Vol. 7, No. 8, September, 1978.

Pottker, Janice and Fishel, Andrew. "Women Teachers and Teacher Power". In SEX BIAS IN THE SCHOOLS: THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE. Edited by Janice Pottker and Andrew Fishel. Cranbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1977.

Reich, Adria. "Teaching is a Good Profession... For a Woman". In AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFTER. Edited by Judith Stacey, Susan Bereaud, Joan Daniels. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.

Reitman, Sanford W. "Institutional Sexism, the Contemporary Teaching Crisis, and Teacher Education". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Winter, 1975.

Rich, Adrienne. "Toward a Woman-Centered University". In WOMEN AND THE POWER TO CHANGE. Edited by Florence Howe. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.

Roby, Pamela. "Institutional Barriers to Women Students in Higher Education". In ACADEMIC WOMEN ON THE MOVE. Edited by Alice Rossi and Ann Calderwood. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973.

Rogers, Carl R. ON BECOMING A PERSON. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961.
Rogers, Carl R. FREEDOM TO LEARN. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969.
Ruether, Rosemary Radford. NEW WOMAN/NEW EARTH. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
Ruether, Rosemary Radford. LIBERATION THEOLOGY. New York: Paulist Press, 1972.
Ryan, Kevin. "The Unfinished Work of Teacher Education". JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION. Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall, 1973.
Salzillo, Frederick E., Jr. and Van Fleet, Alanson A. "Student Teaching and Teacher Education: A Sociological Model for Change". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January-February, 1977.
Sergiovanni, Thomas and Starratt, Robert. EMERGING PATTERNS OF SUPERVISION: HUMAN PERSPECTIVES. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971.
Shanker, Albert. "Professional Relationships: Reality and Action". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, September-October, 1977.
Sizer, Theodore R. "Teacher Education for the 1980's". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francsico: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.
Smith, B. Othanel. RESEARCH IN TEACHER EDUCATION. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971.
Snow, Richard E. "Theory Construction for Research on Teaching". In SECOND HANDBOOK FOR RESEARCH ON TEACHING. Edited by Robert M.W. Travers. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1973.
Stradley, William E. SUPERVISING STUDENT TEACHERS. Danville, Ill: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1968.
Stone, Merlin. WHEN GOD WAS A WOMAN. New York: The Dial Press, 1976.
Travers, Robert M.W. (Ed.) SECOND HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1973.
Wilhelms, Fred T. "Realignments for Teacher Education". In TEACHER EDUCATION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. Washington: The Association of Teacher Educators, 1970.
Willis, George. "Qualitative Evaluation as the Aesthetic, Personal, and Political Dimensions of Curriculum Criticism". In QUALITATIVE EVALUATION. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978.
Wilson, John. EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PREPARATION OF TEACHERS. Great Britian: NFER Publishing Company, Ltd., 1975.
Women's Caucus, University of Chicago. "The Halls of Academe". In SISTERHOOD IS POWERFUL. Edited by Robin Morgan. New York: Vintage Books, 1970.

Chapter 3

Apple, Michael. "Common Sense Categories and Curriculum Thought". In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING. Edited by James Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.
Apple, Michael. "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.
Apple, Michael. "Ideology and Form in Curriculum Evaluation". In QUALITATIVE EVALUATION. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978.
Bernstein, Richard J. THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976.
Clements, Millard. "Alternatives in Teacher Education". CURRICULUM THEORY NETWORK. Vol. 5, No. 1, 1975.

Collins, Sheila. A DIFFERENT HEAVEN AND EARTH. Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1974.

Combs, Arthur W. "Teacher Education - A Problem in Becoming". In PARTNERSHIP IN TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by E. Brooks Smith, et al. Washington: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1966.

Combs, Arthur W., Avila, Donald, Purkey, William. HELPING RELATIONSHIPS: BASIC CONCEPTS FOR HELPING PROFESSIONS. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971.

Daly, Mary. BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

Eisner, Elliott. "The Impoverished Mind". EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP. Vol. 35, No. 8, May 1978.

Feiger, Sheila. Class Lecture. "Sex-role Stereotyping in Contemporary American Society". University of Rochester, Spring Semester, 1978.

Friedenberg, Edgar Z. "Critique of Current Practice". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

Goldhammer, Robert. CLINICAL SUPERVISION. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969.

Greene, Maxine. "Values in Society and Teacher Education". In TEACHER EDUCATION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. Edited by Margaret Lindsey. Washington: The Association of Teacher Educators, 1970.

Greene, Maxine. TEACHER AS STRANGER. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1973.

Grumet, Madeleine R. "Supervision and Situation: A Methodology of Self-Report for Teacher Education". Paper presented to the American Educational Research Association. Toronto, Ontario, Canada. March, 1978.

Hochschild, Arlie Russell. "Inside the Clockwork of Male Careers". In WOMEN AND THE POWER TO CHANGE. Edited by Florence Howe. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1975.

Howe, Florence. "The Teacher and the Women's Movement". In SEXISM IN SCHOOL AND SOCIETY. By Nancy Frazier and Myra Sadker. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973.

Huebner, Dwayne. "The Tasks of the Curriculum Theorist". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Huebner, Dwayne. "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Huebner, Dwayne. "The Contradiction Between the Recreative and the Established". In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING. Edited by James Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.

Jersild, Arthur. WHEN TEACHERS FACE THEMSELVES. Columbia University: Teachers College Press, 1955.

Karmos, Ann H. and Jacko, Carol M. "The Role of Significant Others During the Student Teaching Experience". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVIII, No. 5, September-October, 1971.

Katz, Lillian G. "Teacher Education and Non-Sexist Early Childhood Education". In PERSPECTIVES ON NON-SEXIST EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION. Edited by Barbara Spring. New York: Teachers College Press, 1978.

Kinzer, Suzanne. "On Being a Teacher Educator: A Changing Conception?" In TEACHER EDUCATION: TRENDS, ISSUES, INNOVATIONS. Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1974.

Kliebard, Herbert M. "The Question in Teacher Education". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

Kliebard, Herbert M. "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

LaCrone, Herbert F. "Reconceptualizing Teaching". In PARTNERSHIP IN TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by E. Brooks Smith, et al. Washington: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1966.

Lindsey, Margaret. "Curricular Developments". In NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by Donald J. McCarty. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1973.

Macdonald, James B. "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Macdonald, James B. and Macdonald, Susan Colberg. "Women's Liberation and Human Liberation". Talk prepared for the John Dewey Society Meeting. New Orleans, March 1975.

Masters, Nichols. "Politics and Power Related to Educating Teachers". In TEACHER EDUCATION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. Edited by Margaret Lindsey. Washington, D.C.: The Association of Teacher Educators, 1970.

McCune, Shirley and Matthews, Martha. "Eliminating Sexism: Teacher Education and Change". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Winter, 1975.

Miller, Jean Baker. TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN. Boston: Beacon Press, 1976.

Phenix, Philip H. "Transcendence and the Curriculum". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Pinar, William F. "Introduction". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Pinar, William F. "Life History and Curriculum Theorizing: A Case Study". REVIEW JOURNAL OF PHILSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. Vol. III, No. 1, 1976.

Pinar, William F. "Self and Others". In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Reitman, Sanford W. "Institutional Sexism, the Contemporary Teaching Crisis, and Teacher Education". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVI, No. 4, Winter, 1975.

Rich, Adrienne. "Toward a Woman-Centered University". In WOMEN AND THE POWER TO CHANGE. Edited by Florence Howe. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975.

Rogers, Carl R. FREEDOM TO LEARN. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969.

Salzillo, Frederick E. Jr. and Van Fleet, Alanson A. "Student Teaching and Teacher Education: A Sociological Model for Change". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January-February, 1977.

Shuchat Shaw, Francine. "Congruence". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Shulman, Lee S. and Lanier, Judith E. "The Institute for Research and Teaching: An Overview". JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION. Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, July-August, 1977.

Snow, Richard E. "Theory Construction for Research on Teaching". In SECOND HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING. Edited by Robert M.W. Travers. Chicago: Rand-McNally and Company, 1973.

Wilhelms, Fred T. "Realignments for Teacher Education". In TEACHER EDUCATION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. Washington, D.C.: The Association of Teacher Educators, 1970.

Will, Richard. "The Education of the Teacher as a Person". In TEACHER EDUCATION: TRENDS, ISSUES, INNOVATIONS. Edited by Lowell Horton and Phyllis Horton. Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Publishers and Printers, Inc., 1974.

Willis, George. "Qualitative Evaluation as the Aesthetic, Personal, and Political Dimensions of Curriculum Criticism". In QUALITATIVE EVALUATIONS. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978.

Wilson, John. EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PREPARATION OF TEACHERS. Great Britain: NFER Publishing Company, Ltd., 1975.

Zaret, Esther. "Women/Schooling/Society". In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING. Edited by James Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.

Chapter 4

Abbs, Peter. AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN EDUCATION. London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1974.

Apple, Michael. "Ideology and Form in Curriculum Evaluation". In QUALITATIVE EVALUATION. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1978.

Benham, Barbara J. "A History of Reconceptualists". JCT, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 162-170.

Bernstein, Richard J. THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976.

Broverman, Inge; Broverman, Donald; Clarkson, Frank; Rosenkrantz, Paul; Vogel, Susan. "Sex-role Stereotypes and Clinical Judgements of Mental Health". In READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN. Edited by Judith Bardwick. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972.

Burton, William. "Schools and Sex (A Tragedy in Two Parts)". In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING. Edited by James Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington: The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.

Chesler, Phyllis. WOMEN AND MADNESS. New York: Avon Books, 1972.

Christ, Carol P. "Margaret Atwood: The Surfacing of Women's Spritual Quest and Vision". SIGNS. Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter, 1976.

Clements, Millard. "Alternatives in Teacher Education". CURRICULUM THEORY NETWORK. Vol. 5, No. 2, 1975.

Collins, Sheila. A DIFFERENT HEAVEN AND EARTH. Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1974.

Daly, Mary. BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

deBeauvoir, Simone. THE SECOND SEX. Translated and edited by H.M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.

Earle, William. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CONSCIOUSNESS. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972.

Eisner, Elliott. "The Impoverished Mind". EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP. Vol. 35, No. 8, May, 1978.

Feiger, Sheila. Class lecture. "Sex-role Stereotyping in Contemporary American Society". University of Rochester, Spring semester, 1978.

Frazier, Nancy and Sadker, Myra. SEXISM IN SCHOOL AND SOCIETY. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1973.

Freire, Paulo. PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: The Seabury Press, 1970.

Greene, Maxine. "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Greene, Maxine. LANDSCAPES OF LEARNING. New York: Teachers College Press, 1978.

Gornick, Vivian. "Consciousness". In READINGS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN. Edited by Judith Bardwick. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1972.

Grumet, Madeleine. "Existential and Phenomenological Foundations". In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Howe, Florence. "Equal Opportunity for Women: How Possible and How Quickly". In AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFTER: SEXISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. Edited by Judith Stacy, et al. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974.

Huebner, Dwayne. "The Tasks of the Curricular Theorist". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Huebner, Dwayne. "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Jersild, Arthur. WHEN TEACHERS FACE THEMSELVES. Columbia University: Teachers College Press, 1955.

Kinzer, Suzanne. "On Being a Teacher Educator: A Changing Conception?" In TEACHER EDUCATION: TRENDS, ISSUES, INNOVATIONS. Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1974.

LaGrone, Herbert F. "Reconceptualizing Teaching". In PARTNERSHIP IN TEACHER EDUCATION. Edited by E. Brooks Smith, et al. Washington: American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, 1966.

Laing, R.D. THE DIVIDED SELF. Great Britain: Tavistock Publications, 1960.

Macdonald, James B. "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Macdonald, James B. "The Quality of Everyday Life in School". In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING. Edited by James Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.

Macdonald, James B. and Macdonald, Susan Colberg. "Women's Liberation and Human Liberation". Talk prepared for the John Dewey Society Meeting. New Orleans, March 1975.

Miller, Jean Baker. TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN. Boston: Beacon Press, 1976.

Mooney, Ross L. "The Researcher Himself". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Phenix, Philip H. "Transcendence and the Curriculum". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Pinar, William F. "Life History and Curriculum Theorizing: A Case Study". REVIEW JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE. Vol. III, No. 1, 1976.

Pinar, William F. "Sanity, Madness and the School". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Pinar, William F. "Introduction". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Pinar, William F. "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing".

Pinar, William F. "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978". EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER. Vol. 7, No. 8, September, 1978.

Pinar, William F. LIFE HISTORY AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE. JCT, Vol. 3:2 and 3:1.

Pinar, William F. "Self and Others". In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Rich, Adrienne. "Toward a Woman-Centered University". In WOMEN AND THE POWER TO CHANGE. Edited by Florence Howe. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford. NEW WOMAN/NEW EARTH. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.

Russell, Letty. HUMAN LIBERATION IN A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE - A THEOLOGY. Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1974.

Schafer, Roy. LANGUAGE AND INSIGHT. London: Yale University Press, 1978.

Sharp, Rachel and Green, Anthony. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A STUDY IN PROGRESSIVE PRIMARY EDUCATION. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Showalter, Elaine. "Women and the Literary Curriculum". In AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFTER: SEXISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. Edited by Judith Stacey, et al. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.

Snow, Richard E. "Theory Construction for Research on Teaching". In SECOND HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING. Edited by Robert M.W. Travers. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1973.

Stacey, Judith; Bereaud, Susan; Daniels, Joan (Eds.) AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFTER: SEXISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974.

Tennov, Dorothy. PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE HAZARDOUS CURE. New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1975.

Walum, Laurel Richardson. THE DYNAMICS OF SEX AND GENDER. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1977.

Weisstein, Naomi. "Psychology Constructs the Female". In WOMEN IN SEXIST SOCIETY. Edited by Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran. New York: The New American Library, Inc., 1971.

Chapter 5

Collins, Sheila. A DIFFERENT HEAVEN AND EARTH. Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson Press, 1974.

Daly, Mary. BEYOND GOD THE FATHER: TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.

deBeauvoir, Simone. THE SECOND SEX. Translated and edited by H.M. Parshley. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.

Eisner, Elliott. "The Impoverished Mind". EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP. Vol. 35, No. 9, May, 1978.

Feiger, Sheila. Class lecture. "Sociology of Education". University of Rochester. Fall semester, 1977.

Freire, Paulo. PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: The Seabury Press, 1970.

Greene, Maxine. "Values in Society and Teacher Education". In TEACHER EDUCATION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. Edited by Margaret Lindsey. Washington: The Association of Teacher Educators, 1970.

Greene, Maxine. "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum". In HEIGHTED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Greene, Maxine. LANDSCAPES OF LEARNING. New York: Teachers College Press, 1978.

Grumet, Madeleine. "Toward a Poor Curriculum". In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Howe, Florence. "The Teacher and the Women's Movement". Introduction to SEXISM TO SCHOOL AND SOCIETY. By Nancy Frazier and Myra Sadker. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973.

Howe, Florence. "Equal Opportunity for Women: How Possible and How Quickly". In AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFTER: SEXISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. Edited by Judith Stacy, Susan Bereaud, Joan Daniels. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974.

Huebner, Dwayne. "The Contradiction Between the Recreative and the Established". In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING. Edited by James Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.

Huebner, Dwayne. "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.

Jersild, Arthur. WHEN TEACHERS FACE THEMSELVES. Columbia University: Teachers College Press, 1955.

Macdonald, James B. "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education". In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974.

Miller, Jean Baker. TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN. Boston: Beacon Press, 1976.

Pinar, William F. "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing".

Pinar, William F. and Grumet, Madeleine R. TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976.

Rich, Adrienne. "Toward a Woman-Centered University". In WOMEN AND THE POWER TO CHANGE. Edited by Florence Howe. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford. NEW WOMAN/NEW EARTH. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
Russell, Letty. HUMAN LIBERATION IN A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE - A THEOLOGY. Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1974.
Shuchat Shaw, Francine. "Congruence". In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975.
Snow, Richard E. "Theory Construction for Research on Teaching". In SECOND HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON TEACHING. Edited by Robert M.W. Travers. Chicago: Rand/McNally and Company, 1973.
Webb, Marilyn. "Feminist Studies: Frill or Necessity?" In AND JILL CAME TUMBLING AFTER: SEXISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION. Edited by Judith Stacy, et al, 1974.
Wilhelms, Fred T. "Realignments for Teacher Education". In TEACHER EDUCATION: FUTURE DIRECTIONS. Washington, D.C.: The Association of Teacher Education, 1970.
Wilson, John. EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND THE PREPARATION OF TEACHERS. Great Britain: NFER Publishing Company, Ltd., 1975.

******

Papers of the
SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF CURRICULUM HISTORY

edited by
Edmund C. Short
assisted by
Murry R. Nelson

introduced by
Laurel N. Tanner

and including papers by

Arthur G. Wirth, Mary Louise Seguel, Murry R. Nelson, H. Wells Singleton, R. Freeman Butts, Hollis L. Caswell, J. Paul Leonard, Paul C. Violas, R.V. Bullough, Jr., J. Stephen Hazlett, O.L. Davis, Jr., George L. Mehaffy, Kate Strickland,

Copies cost $4.50, and may be obtained from the Secretary-Treasurer of the Society for the Study of Curriculum History: Professor Murry R. Nelson, College of Education, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802.

Schools as Agencies of Social Legitimation

Jean Anyon
Rutgers University

One of the more persuasive arguments in recent theorizing about education is that schools in the U.S. and other industrial societies play a vital part in state agencies of ideological legitimation and control. An important social function of education is seen to be the transmission of dominant culture and ideologies that legitimate and thus help to preserve arrangements of political and economic power, prestige, and production (see, for example, Althusser, 1971; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977; Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Williams, 1977; Giroux, 1980; Apple, 1979; and Anyon, 1979a and 1980a). While this point about schooling has been argued at length on a theoretical level (e.g., for 'society' -- or more particularly, for 'modern industrial society') there has been little or no concrete analysis of what might actually contribute, on a day-to-day basis in school settings, to a perceived legitimacy of the U.S. social system. The present essay attempts such an analysis. It assesses cultural transmissions in contemporary classroom practices and school curriculum for contributions to received notions of political and economic legitimacy -- for contributions, in other words, to ideological hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Giroux, in press). The paper thus makes problematic, within the context of social legitimation, reproduction and control, "what it is to be educated" in U.S. schools. Potential social and ideological consequences of everyday school experience are identified, as are ideological thematic and linguistic contents in school social science.

An underlying assumption of the present paper is that schools--as one of the agencies of social legitimation (with the media, the family, etc.)-- are a source of political and economic socialization. While this assumption is hardly startling, it has a little-utilized but heuristically fecund component that will be exploited here: that is, what is significant about education as a source of socialization is the legitimating practices and assumptions that entails -- and conversely, what these school assumptions and practices reveal about the society in which the schools are embedded. Thus, among the exigencies of providing support for -- of socializing children to -- prevailing political and economic institutions and distirbutions is the requirement that "sense" be made of arrangements and practices that may, for example, be potentially unpalatable.

The assessment of schools as legitimating agencies, in turn however, allows us to identify unpalatable social practices and characteristics of the present order. That is, by identifying and analysing common classroom activities and dominant curriculum ideas, one reveals the workings of society. Rationalizations and distortions in standardized forms of knowledge, and widespread principles of classroom organization are, in the present view, neither desultory nor simply a consequence of institutional idiosyncracy, educational perquisite, or "intrinsic" characteristics of a teacher/learner paradigm. Rather, standardized curriculum knowledge and principles of classroom organization take their characteristics from exigencies of the underlying social order: schools reproduce in fact (in mimetic institutional form) and in consciousness, deep realities of political and economic structure. The study of schools as agencies of legitimation, therefore, illuminates the conjunctures of political and economic power and relationship, educational principles, practices and symbolic forms, and the construction of personal belief.

All facets of education, however, are not reduciable to relationships between schooling, legitimation and the reproduction of a social system. Indeed, education also manifests a complex assortment of social interests and privileges. These interests are to some degree mutually antagonistic. Interests in education include those of professionals in government, professors, school managers, teachers, unions, dominant business groups, ethnic and social class groupings, and politicians and parents and students. No one group is in complete control, and one cannot expect that any of these groups will always have an accurate grasp of what its

"real" interests may be. There are (as a result of these conflicts of interest) areas of autonomy, contradiction, and discrepancy between educational form and outputs and the requirements of the social system (MacDonald, 1977; Bernstein, 1977). And, as will be suggested later, this partial autonomy of education makes it possible for educators to introduce opposing cultures and competing ideologies in school settings. However, it is important that some practices are now found in most schools, and common social characteristics can be identified in everyday curriculum; and these should be understood in their relationships with underlying characteristics of the socio-economic order, and investigated for their possible contribution to the legitimation of political and economic power and authority -- and social privilege.

Just as all facets of education do not correspond to structural requirements of the social context, it is also the case that students do not always accept the legitimacy of what schools teacher.[1] Moreover, the construction of personal and social identity in the young involves a dialectic of interaction with agencies of transmission that is not captured by abstracting away from that relationship -- as will be done here. The fact that students participate, or even negotiate their own reality, however, does not deny the educational organization and content that pre-dates and exists independently of them. Indeed, it is the historically antecedent and socially-given sets of arrangements and assumptions of agencies like the family and the school that directly foster the legitimacy of (and reveal) the imperatives of society.

Assessment of characteristics of U.S. schools that reveal social patterns of power and organization and that sanction the legitimacy of these will begin with an analysis of patterns in the school experience.

Patterns in the School Experience

The physical environment, the interpersonal milieu, the rules and regulations, and the types of work activities in classrooms and schools in the U.S. manifest substantially more continuity than discontinuity (Jackson, 1968; Sarasan, 1971). This section argues that among the continuities experienced from day to day and year to year are several that predispose the legitimacy of U.S. arrangements by sanctioning unequal social power, individual culpability, the coercions of work, economic stratification and unequal opportunity, and the legitimacy of one's social class position.

Unequal Power

Hierarchical authority characterizes the social relations in almost all schools. In the vast majority of classrooms, although the degree of autonomy provided students may vary, the teacher has final authority. The school administration, in turn, has authority over the teacher. School decisions are made -- not democratically, but by a tiny minority (the administrators and teachers) -- and handed down to the majority (the student body). Studies of latent values in classrooms have demonstrated that just as students are rewarded for mastery of the formal curriculum, so are they rewarded for acquiesence to the inequities of power (Henry, 1955; 1965; Dreeben, 1968; Jackson, 1968).

This pattern of reward, of prolonged exposure and acquiesence to decisions from above, may create a prima facia legitimacy to hierarchy and unequal power when encountered in other institutions. Such legitimacy is not socially neutral. Rather, it provides practical ideological support for unequal distributions of power in society. One may be predisposed, for example, to accept hierarchy as an inherent, perhaps necessary, feature of U.S. economic institutions such as the workplace -- where a minority (the owners and managers) make decisions and set policy for the majority (the employees). One may come to assume, without verification, that hierarchical organization is necessary for "efficient" economic production. This assumption has, however, very little basis in fact. Thus the literature on shared power in industrial settings demonstrates that an equal distribution of authority and control in U.S. work places has proved more efficient,

and has led to higher worker productivity, in the vast majority of cases (see Blumberg, 1969; Vroom, 1969; Pateman, 1970; Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973; Hunnius, et al, 1973; Riskin, 1974; Dollars and Sense, 1975; Friedan, 1977). Indeed, recent economic history has suggested that explicit hierarchy (and its institutional descendant, bureaucracy) were intended primarily to achieve control -- over workers, work process and the accumulation of profit -- and only secondarily for efficiency (see Braverman, 1974; Marglin, 1974; Stone, 1974; Edwards, 1979; see also Noble, 1977). In any event, the present unequal organization of authority in classrooms and schools not only indicates unequal power in society, but may reify and legitimate this in consciousness, thus fostering the impression that unequal power is natural, logical, or merely "in the order of things" and inevitable.

School Evaluation and Individual Culpability

Whether by behavioral objectives, criterion referenced measures, or everyday teacher-made tests, representatives of the school define scholastic and behavioral criteria and set standards, and evaluate students to see if they have met these criteria. A mismatch between individual performance and institutional expectation is likely to be defined as deviance or deficiency on the part of the student (Jackson, 1968). The official explanation for those who do not achieve, for example, is usually offered (to student and parent) in terms of the student's lack of motivation, low ability, disadvantage or inattention rather than in terms of the failure of the institution to meet the student's needs by providing successful pedagogy.

This situation may teach students that they as individuals are culpable, and the institution is not. School evaluation practices teach,in other words, that it is appropriate to "blame the victim." Thus it may become appropriate later on to choose solutions to social problems that attach culpability to the poor, the unemployed, or to blacks and women for their disadvantage. The future disposition is, in effect, to minimize the contribution of unequal social and economic access to personal disadvantage. One learns in school to focus on the individual. Poverty, in this way, becomes ideologized: it appears a result of personal inadequacy (of family life or culture, failed parental guidance, or one's genes). Poverty is not seen in its social context, as simply one feature of societies in which income and occupation are not universally distributed.

Thus, school evaluation practices reflect and reinforce economic organization that centers on individuals, and social policy that attempts to alter individuals (their psyche or IQ, their family structure or social values). Collective social organization and policy that would hold accountable for individual "failure" the group, the institution or the political and economic structures of distribution (and seek to change these) are not the case in U.S. society, and are not legitimated by school evaluation practices.

The Coercions of Work

The coercions that characterize school work constitute patterns of legitimation that may begin as early as kindergarten (Apple and King, 1977). From the earliest days in school, work activities are most often those which are prescribed, in which the teacher not only defines the task for the child but also assigns and directs the activity. Work activities, and only work activities, are compulsory. Everyone starts at the same time, usually works on assigned tasks simultaneously, and is expected to finish at the same time (Apple and King, 1977). Although students work side by side, they generally work, not collectively, but alone -- in physical proximity but psychological isolation. Knowlege is private property, it is accumulated by individuals, and attempts to collaborate in its acquisition and evaluation are not often encouraged; in many cases such cooperation is referred to as cheating.

Adult experience, as well as recent scientific study, demonstrate the similarity of these coersions to those of the majority of adult work situations -- where work tasks are most often defined by others, compulsory

and privatized.[2] School work not only reproduces the sanctions and definitions of adult work but lends them an aura of rationality and inevitability they would not otherwise have. (Moreover, it is easy to see that knowledge as private property not only mimics the current form of economic ownership and legal structure but reinforces this as well.)

Social Stratification and Unequal Opportunity

One pervasive aspect of the experience of being a student is the arrangement of oneself and others into designed groups.[3] Students are officially arranged into groups on the basis of many criteria: age, grade, subject, sex, mental test score, behavior, achievement, ability (whether actual or presumed) or any combination of these and other traits. There is increasing evidence that these grouping practices not only yield stratification and unequal opportunity in school settings but that, moreover, such inequality is perceived by young children as a natural or taken-for-granted feature of social situations.

Ray Rist's (1970) study of a class of black children in St. Louis, for example, demonstrates how the normal process of placing children into classroom groups may take on caste-like characteristics. Rist followed a group of children throughout their kindergarten, first and second grades. During this time most of the students in the class remained in the reading group to which they had been assigned on the eighth day of kindergarten. Not only was there no movement out of the highest reading group during these three years, but there was no movement into this group (Rist, 1970). (Other research as well suggests that the movement of students from school groups to which they have been assigned is not common. A study of special education classes in several urban school systems found that fewer than 10% of all students assigned to special education classes ever returned to the regular program (Gallagher, 1972; see also Mackler, 1969). A case study of a high school year in Boston found almost no upward movement from non-college tracks to the college track (Rosenbaum, 1976). In 1963-64 in Washington, D.C., year in which the figures show the highest amount of intertrack movement, almost 92% of the senior high students remained in their assigned tracks. Moreover, 44% of those who did move, moved downwards (Kirp and Yudoff, 1974, p. 677; see also Ogbu, 1977).

Not only is stratification a common result of school grouping, but differential instruction and unequal opportunity to learn often accompany this stratification. Rist, for example, describes the different treatments accorded the high and low elementary school reading groups he observed:

> ...differential treatment was accorded to the two groups in the classroom, with the groups designated as 'fast learners' receiving the majority of the teaching time (better seats for seeing the board), reward-directed behavior, and attention from the teacher. Those designated as 'slow learners' were taught infrequently, (were often placed in seats from which they could not see written work on the board without turning all the way around), were subjected to more frequent control-oriented behavior, and received little if any supportive behavior from the teacher (Rist, 1970, p. 414).

(An increasing number of studies of elementary classrooms are in agreement with Rist's findings of inequality, and some suggest that it results from teachers' attempts to provide more direct teaching opportunities to those they perceive as more able to make use of that instruction (see for example Becker, 1952; Leacock, 1969; Brophy and Good, 1970; Sharp and Green, 1975; McDermott and Gospodinoff, 1978). The research thus suggests unequal opportunity in elementary school classrooms. There is less information available on the distribution of resources within U.S. high schools. There is no information, for example, on the amount of money spent by individual high schools on the various tracks. However, the Coleman report (Coleman et al, 1966) did indicate that high school teachers with the highest verbal ability scores (a school resource that was shown to have some influence on student achievement) were consistently assigned to those students classified as brightest. In addition Heynes (1974) in a reanalysis of the Coleman

data, found that upper track students had consistently greater access to guidance counsellors than did lower tracks. And Rosenbaum's case study of tracking in a socially homogenous community near Boston, Massachusetts, documents several other ways in which unequal opportunities may occur in high school. Rosenbaum discovered that while the same science courses are offered to both college and non-college tracks in the high school he studied, the non-college tracks were not offered the lab sessions. Moreover, many of the teachers in this high school reported in interviews that they "prepare more" for college-track than for non-college track classes, and that they feel that lower-business and general-track classes are "so undemanding as to require little or no preparation" (Rosenbaum, 1976). Thus, even though in this school the college and non-college tracks were offered the same courses and had the same teachers, there are indications that substantial inequalities in actual opportunities for learning occur (see also Kedde, 1971).

School groups are often assigned on the basis of statistical or other measures of ability and achievement. While it is not clear that these tests are accurate measures of such traits, (Cole and Bruner, 1971) they are likely to be presented to students as such, and thus provide a sense of legitimacy for any differentiation and unequal opportunity that occur: Thus, not only may unequal situations in school legitimate unequality as a social feature, but those in one's class or school who get less, seem to be getting less because they are not "capable" of utilizing more.

Indeed, there is fairly clear evidence that students accept their placement in school groups as equitable- as resulting from their own personal merit or failure. Studies of the effects of ability grouping on students placed in lower ability groups, for example, suggest that they do not challenge the appropriateness of their placement. Instead, they blame themselves (Mann, 1960; Borg, 1966; Lunn and Lunn, 1970). One investigator asked 102 children how they happen to be in the fifth-grade groups that they were in (labeled highest group, second high, lowest group, second low). Two-thirds of the children in the low group gave such answers as "I am in the low fifth grade, (because) I am too dumb;" or "I can't think good." (Mann, 1960). Here is an early instance of children "blaming the victim." Moreover, it does not seem likely that fifth graders would question these or other school practices. This highlights the potential of early school experience to foster in students the legitimacy of instituional practices even when those practices may disadvantage oneself.

Indeed, the children that Ray Rist observed (1970) learned quite early that there are "appropriate" ways of treating those of low status: they imitated the teacher. Rist observed that the children in the top reading group often exhibited control behavior and ridicule toward those in the low group, and children in the low group often called themselves the same name of ridicule used by others. In as much as the children in the low group were of low income and spoke non-standard English, and children in the high group were of middle income and had other middle-class characteristics, one could argue that the children in both groups were indeed learning that there are appropriate ways of treating those of low status in society. Stratification and unequal opportunity in social settings were legitimated for the students in this class long before they finished elementary school.

That similar attitudes toward grouping continue to be expressed by high school students is reported by Rosenbaum (1976). When Rosenbaum asked non-college track students why they chose the low track, he was told by 25 of 30 respondents that they chose the low track because of their own personal shortcomings (Rosenbaum, 1976, p. 167).

Thus, when working-class adults, for example those who are poor or unable to find jobs report, as they very often do, that their problems stem from their own inadequacies (Sennett and Cobb, 1972; Rubin, 1976), one can trace such ideologies to early and sustained school experience. Self-blame in the poor --

in potentially unruly social groups -- lends legitimacy and an obvious stability to prevailing social stratifications and inequalities.

Social Class Position

While schools do not officially group students by family income or social class position, virtually every study that has assessed U.S. schools and social status has found that family income and status are directly related to the placement of students in particular curriculum and "ability" groups (see, e.g., Warner; Havighurst and Loeb, 1944; Hollingshead, 1949; Sexton, 1961; Schafer, Olexa and Polk, 1970). These studies demonstrate, for example, that students of families of low social status (i.e., low-income whites and blacks) are consistently more likely than middle-income and upper-income students to be placed in non-college curriculum and low "ability" groups. This fact suggests that school grouping procedures may teach students to believe (not only that those in the lower group are there because they are less capable) but that those in society who are less capable are systematically those who are black or poor. Thus, social inequality is provided a further spurious rationale, and it seems quite "natural" that blacks and the poor would continue to occupy positions of low status in the labor market.

One's social class position may also be made socially reasonable by experiences in school that prepare one for certain job-related activities (but not others). That is, within the over-all similarities of schools and school work, there may be differences in practice that develop different cognitive and behavioral abilities in children of different social classes and circumstances. Eleanore Leacock (1969) in a study of class and race in New York City elementary schools, found that schools in different social class neighborhoods tended to reward different behaviors, and to offer different types of work activities. She found that schools in black and white poor, and in white working-class areas discouraged personal assertiveness and intellectual inquisitiveness in students, and assigned work that most often involved substantial amounts of rote activity. Students in the white middle-class schools she studied, on the other hand, were given more independent work assignments and were more often rewarded for intellectual assertiveness (see also Rosenbaum, 1976; Sharp and Green, 1975; Kedde, 1971; Ogbu, 1977 and 1978).

The data on educational experiences of students from upper-middle-class and wealthy families is sparse and contradictory (Cf Bowles and Gintis, 1976 and Prescott, 1970). However, in an ethnographical study of social class and elementary schooling that was conducted in five elementary schools by this author, it was found that the public school education of students from upper-middle-class and wealthy families did tend to be less authoritarian and more egalitarian than the education of middle-class and working-class groups, and to provide specific and frequent opportunities for these students to engage in activities demanded by professional and managerial jobs (such as taking initiative for group activities, setting priorities regarding work, negotiating and resolving problems of study, and making procedural decisions regarding the tasks that one and one's peers are going to carry out) (Anyon, 1981).

Differential work abilities and predispositions developed in children in different social classes lends a circular causality and social legitimacy to a stratified society. Low-income students 'deserve' menial jobs because that is 'all' they know how to do; and students from highly advantaged backgrounds 'deserve' to be executives, because they are 'capable' of carrying out the activities. School experience thus "explains," makes socially reasonable, the future "success' of students from affluent social settings, and the "failure" of those from the poor and working classes.

Summary

It has been argued in this section that among the continuities of school experience are several that

foster the perceived legitimacy of unequal distributions of power and authority, un-democratic and unpalatable work arrangements, economic, and other stratification and unequal opportunity, and one's future social class position. Extended school experience may reify the coersions and inequities of U.S. arrangements of power and resource and make them appear as taken-for-granted or inevitable social arrangements. Moreover, schools may teach students to attach culpability to themselves -- particularly in regard to "failure", and the inequities of educational (or other social) distributions.

The sense of institutional validity or inevitability that can develop out of lived experience, may be provided a conceptual rationale by the formal study of society. For most young people, the school social science curriculum is a major source of socially approved knowledge concerning political and economic arrangements in our own and other countries. How the knowledge made available through the social science curriculum provides a cognitive framework for the justification of U.S. social orderings and institutions is described in the next section.

The Social Content of School Studies

In the majority of classrooms social science textbooks (elementary and secondary history, civics and other social studies textbooks) are the basis for most instruction in the social science content areas (National Society for the Study of Education, 1931; Cronbach, 1955; Cox and Massialis, 1967; Donnell and Hult, 1969; Fox and Hess, 1972; Weiss, 1978; see also Shaver, Davis and Helburn, 1979). All social science textbooks are of course not identical. Some have, for example, more information on minorities and women than others, and indeed, it will be suggested later that there are subtle differences in political and economic content that may be significant. However, similar topics are 'covered' by almost all books, and there is a common vocabulary that is used to discuss events, institutions and persons considered important. These descriptions make available cognitive and linguistic categories with which to organize reality and to thus organize thinking about reality. They provide a framework within which to interpret one's social institutional experience, and the flux of events. They provide, by their examples of past and present success and failure, substantive instruction on what 'counts' as appropriate choice in current political and economic matters.

Several similarities in thematic and linguistic content of social science textbooks are discussed below. It will be argued that the textbooks provide conceptual legitimacy to U.S. social arrangements by omitting social conflict, misrepresenting the realities of economic participation, disguising or rationalizing political and economic power and privilege, de-legitimating potential economic alternatives, and constraining approvied methods of dissent and social change.

Social Conflict and Consensus

A significant finding of analyses of the political and economic content of social studies textbooks is that they quite literally ignore the social tension and conflict that are manifest in (indeed constitutive of) U.S. political and economic institutions (See Harrington and Adler, 1971; Turner, 1971; Fox and Hess, 1972; Council on Interracial Books for Children, 1977; Popkewitz, 1977; Anyon, 1978).[4] Not only do most textbooks ignore social conflict, but those that discuss it imply or state that conflict should be avoided, and that prevailing political or other social methods of reaching consensus are sufficient to resolve social problems that arise (Turner, 1971; Fox and Hess, 1972). Moreover, most textbooks ignore dissent as a social category, and suggest by example that the use of prevailing methods of reaching social consensus (e.g., social cooperation, or voting in elections) result in social progress -- whether these methods have actually resulted in material social changes or not (see, e.g., the discussion of recent black and women's history in "updated" history textbooks [Council on Interracial Books for Children, 1977].)

An analysis by the present author of labor history in 17 U.S. history textbooks provides an example of the curriculum focus on consensus, avoidance of conflict, and the purported efficacy of prevailing institutions to resolve social problems. U.S. labor history, which evinces almost continual conflict, and only minimal amelioration of the problems of the majority of workers (most of whom are unrepresented by labor unions) is transmitted in history textbooks by an explicit de-valuing of confrontation (e.g., strikes) and dissent (from mainstream political unions). Instead, the textbooks emphasize peaceful bargaining and cooperation with employers. Many textbooks offer the historically inaccurate suggestion that these methods have indeed resulted in consensus and the resolution of conflict (Anyon, 1979b).

The omission and de-legitimation of social conflict and dissent, the sanction of consensus, and the use of the highly symbolic label of progress to provide implicit praise for the use of prevailing methods of conflict resolution provides a conceptual framework for the ordering of events. This framework assumes the efficacy of U.S. arrangements of power and resource. It ignores the social consequences of persistent unequal orderings of power -- regarding, say, the distributions of power to blacks, women and workers -- and it thus tacitly legitimates these orderings. Dissent is discouraged (it has not been "successful"). Activity leading to conflict amelioration and alleged consensus has been "successful," however, and this implies to textbook readers that their own role in society is to contribute to this consensus and to support, in effect, prevailing practices, institutions and distributions.

Economic Participation

Both elementary and secondary social studies textbooks disguise the exigencies of adult participation in U.S. economic institutions by reifying notions of democracy. For example, civics and others textbooks commonly use the act of voting (participation in the decision-making process) as a measure of democracy. (Popkewitz, 1977). However, the act of voting is only used to define democracy in U.S. political institutions, and is never used as an evaluative tool with which to define or measure the extent of democracy in our economic institutions (Anyon, 1978). Thus there is no mention of the fact that not only is the average workplace not democratic for those who work there, but neither is there discussion of the fact that citizens normally do not have opportunities to vote on corporate policies or activities that affect them. The textbook reification of democratic process -- its confinement to political institutions -- obscures un-democratic attributes of U.S. economic arrangements.

In elementary social studies textooks in particular, the realities of economic functioning are obscured by the language that is chosen to characterize participation in economic affairs. In a study of elementary social studies textbooks undertaken by this author (Anyon, 1978) it was found that the textbooks utilize, but fail to qualify, the classical definition of capitalism in terms of the economic freedom it provides.[5] For example, in the textbooks analyzed, the economy is not generally referred to as a capitalist system, but as a free enterprise or free market system. In these texts economic participation is characterized by the freedom Americans have to work where they want, and to leave a job that proves unsatisfactory. The system itself is often characterized by pointing to one's freedom to own stores and factories. (Many textbooks do, indeed, provide statements to the effect that there are people who are poor and unemployed, but the problems of unemployment and poverty tend to be trivialized by definitions of capitalism that focus on alleged personal freedoms.) Freedom is an over-arching symbol and highly legitimating theme, one that focuses thought about economic events. This focus predisposes and legitimates solutions to economic problems of, say, inflation, unemployment and poverty that, although patently unsuccessful in solving these problems, have ostensibly preserved the goals of economic freedom.

Economic freedom is, of course, part of the theoretical definition of capitalist economies. However, there are daily restrictions that impinge on the economic freedoms described in the textbooks, and these

realities highlight the legitimating nature of the textbook discussions. For example, not only do very few work cites exhibit real freedom, but the inability of the economy to provide a job for every adult who seeks work is a real restriction on the mobility of the U.S. worker, on the 'freedom' to leave a job that proves unsatisfying. The freedom to own factories and stores is restricted by the fact that very few people are able to accumulate enough capital to actually buy a factory or store. Indeed, relatively few persons in the U.S. own stock in any quantity.[6] Thus, while economic freedom does not characterize the experience many people have as participants in our economy, social science textbooks do not bring this to attention, offering instead highly legitimating descriptions of economic arrangements.

Economic and Political Power

Social science textbooks subtly justify the activities of persons and groups who are powerful in both economic and political hierarchies not only in inaccurate and biased reporting of conflict and social groups active in that conflict (e.g., labor history, as noted above) but also by less obvious curriculum emphases and omissions. For example, tacit legitimation of the activities of those with power in the economy is provided when textbooks do not call attention to un-democratic decision-making procedures in the economic sphere. This omission provides covert approval of the power of a relatively small number of persons and groups, those who make economic decisions. Support is thus provided for the interests of those persons, and in cases where their interests do no coincide with those of the majority, validation is accorded their needs.

Privileges and prerogatives that accompany political power in the U.S. are also legitimated in social science textbooks, primarily by the use of politically charged language (see Harrington and Adler, 1971; Harrington, 1976). The following description of the U.S. Presidency, for example, which appears in a post-Watergate edition of the nation's most widely used high school government text, illustrates this type of language:

> The Presidency is more than executive responsibility. It is an inspiring symbol of all that is highest in America's purposes and ideas... No one could think of it except in terms of solemn consecration (McClenaghan, 1974, p.283 cited by Barger, 1976, p. 53).

Analyses of the treatment of political authority in textbooks used in elementary and junior high schools also demonstrate that political authority in texts used with these students is likely to be described by use of overly-positive laudatory language. Descriptions in elementary textbooks of persons with political power very often result in an image of them as "never malevolent, always approachable, and almost always accountable (emphasis in original) (Harrington, 1976, p. 5)." Such language ignores the obvious realities of U.S. political institutions and makes them appear to be more responsive to individuals than they have so far been. This language motivates a support of these institutions that is less than critical; and uncritical participation in social institutions facilitates the exact reproduction of institutional arrangements -- and privileges.

The De-legitimation of Alternatives

Socialism, operating on competing economic and political definitions of our own, is overtly de-legitimated by most textbooks. Socialism is usually described, not by mentioning its classic goal of freedom from economic privation, or in terms of its attempted redistribution of wealth, goods, and services, but by focusing instead on the restrictions it imposes on political freedom.

For example, the most extensive study of textbook discussions of socialism appears in a recent assessment by the Asia Society of 263 elementary and secondary social studies textbooks which contain information on Asian countries (Asia Society, 1976). Two examples of what the authors call the "blatant bias"

and "cold-war mentality" of contemporary textbooks that discuss Asian Socialist countries, are the following quotes that purport to describe modern China:

> Communes are a failure... There is good reason to believe that the average Chinese is not getting enough food to keep healthy, and in many cases even to keep alive (World Geography, Ginn 1974, p. 426; in Asia Society, 1976, p. 117).

> China is a Communist one-party system disguised as a "real democracy" (Inside World Politics, Allyn and Bacon, 1974, p. 11; in Asia Society, 1976, p. 122).

Such negative descriptions of socialism, in conjunction with the uncritical discussions of U.S. capitalism alluded to above, render U.S. arrangements the only legitimate ones, the only possible "rational" ones. Thus, should our own system begin to appear to us as irrational and unjust (despite what we have been taught) we will be predisposed to the view that there is not viable alternative. The perception of a lack of choice may produce profound resignation (or legitimation by default) rather than an active belief in the sense or equity of one's own social sytem.

Socialistic ideas and activities are also de-legitmated by most textbooks as forms of political dissent in the U.S. The U.S. political left tradition is either omitted from the textbooks or it is overtly denigrated. For example, socialist leaders (who, at an earlier period in our history were viewed as folk heroes by some groups of Americans (see, among others, Conlin, 1968) if discussed at all in school textbooks are most often described as dangerous, to be feared, and as having taken advantage of workers (Anyon, 1979b). Most textbooks disregard popular sympathies for radical ideas at various points in the U.S. past (see e.g., Conlin, 1968; Kornbluh, 1972; Weinstein, 1969). Moreover, many textbooks make historically inaccurate statements that the American public (as an implied monolithic group) has always believed (with apparent consensus) that socialism is a "horror and a nightmare" (Anyon, 1979b). Thus, those who would have redistributed economic power and resource are quite literally written out of legitimate school history.

The de-legitimation of socialism as radical activity, as a form of political dissent, not only de-limits approved methods of social action and social change, but provides as well ideological support for decisions that would restrain the activity of these groups in U.S. society.

The above discussion has identified several characteristics of social science textbooks that provide conceptual justification for U.S. political and economic structures. Evidence will now be presented that suggests that in addition to these characteristics of school materials, there are, and have been over the years, subtle and legitimating differences in the social science knowledge that is made available to schools serving children of different social classes.

Social Distribution of Legitimating Knowledge

Several analyses of the content of social science curriculum in this century in the U.S. have found that school knowledge provided students in poor, working-class and minority schools is more legitimating than information provided in schools where the children have a social advantage. One investigator, for example, analyzed the social studies curriculum in use in 1900 at the Hampton Institute (a school for blacks and Indians) (Lybargar, 1976). The curriculum at this school was used as a model for industrial education in the north (by the members of the prestigious Social Studies Committee of the National Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education). The curriculum of the Hampton Institute was praised by President Roosevelt, and was hailed by prominent educators. It was intended (in the words of an administrator at the school -- a man who later chaired the Social Studies Committee) to help students "become more intelligent in their work, more patient under oppression, and more hopeful as to the future" (Jones, 1908; in

Lybargar, 1976, p. 15). The curriculum was praised in the widely read Review of Reviews because it "[enabled the black student] to see the true drift of things in the United States, thus making him neither despondent nor defiant.... [H]e is made to see that the White [sic] people in the South are in the main his friends and well-wishers and he is taught that it is just as fine a thing to be a farmer as it is to be President of the United States" (Shaw, 1900; cited by Lybargar, 1976, p. 11). Thus, the social science knowledge provided in this early school civics and history attempted to legitimate for low status students their position of disadvantage; it attempted to help them adjust to it.[7]

Studies of social science curriculum in more contemporary schools have found that social science textbooks used in poor, minority, and working-class districts are more likely than those used in white, middle-class districts to report that political authority is benign and accountable (Harrington and Adler, 1971; see also Litt, 1963 and Leacock, 1969). In addition, these studies have found that books used in poor and minority districts are less likely than those used in white, middle-class districts to provide students with direct methods of political participation (e.g., Litt, 1963).

My own study of working-class, middle-class, upper-middle-class and wealthy schools included assessment of the knowledge made available in social studies classrooms and curriculum (Anyon, 1981). I found striking differences in both the official social studies curriculum and the "curriculum-in-use" in the various schools. Schools in working-class and middle income areas were not observed to provide students with conceptual tools or classroom opportunities to analyze or criticize U.S. society. Textbooks, work dittoes and class discussions in these schools emphasized, rather, one's personal duties: to honor the country, to uphold its laws, and to support the decisions of its leaders.

In the upper-middle-class and wealthy schools I observed, on the other hand, little 'blind patriotism' is evident. Rather, classroom discussions observed in these schools centered on analysis of the U.S. social system qua system. Critical tools were made available in part by the analysis of past civilizations, with attempts to assess the various methods by which these societies (e.g., Ancient Athens) chose leaders, and to assess the 'mistakes' that they made. Teachers in these schools provided frequent situations in which students were asked to analyze their own society, and to generate solutions to problems which, it was suggested to them, they might encounter: inflation, chemicals in foods, the dangers of nuclear power, and discrimination on the basis of sex (Anyon, 1981).

Thus, a final way that school provides justification and legitimacy to political and economic arrangements and priorities is by the social distribution of tools for critical social thought -- with analytical tools available to some, but information that is less critical and more heavily weighted toward allegiance provided those who are less likely to feel that prevailing institutions are serving them well.

Summary

The data presented in this section suggest that a highly legitimating world view is both overtly and tacitly manifest in school social science. The extent to which students internalize this world view has not been measured. (One could, of course, argue that the political stability of capitalism in this country, as compared with aggressive Eurocommunist politics in Europe, indicates a high degree of internalization and success to legitimating factors in school knowledge.) However, what is more clear is that the social perspective in the knowledge discussed here does, when internalized, impose quite specific boundaries on the types of social actions and arrangements that will be approved. Several implications of the legitimating patterns in school transmissions will be discussed in the final section.

Implications

This paper has argued that patterns of school authority, grouping, work and evaluation sanction the legitimacy of social arrangements of unequal power and opportunity, and predispose students to judgments of individual culpability and powerlessness in the face of unpalatable or unequal institutional practice. The paper has also argued that the social content of school studies disguises the conflicts and inequities of U.S. political and economic arrangements, and predisposes the view that our own institutions are without legitimate alternative.

I would like to suggest that this analysis of what schools teach has implications for realistic assessments of the social meanings of education, for empirical research on political and economic socialization in school settings, and for our understanding of social control in modern societies. In addition, the analysis suggests several types of educational activities that would be appropriate, if we are to use our schools to promote a more equal social order.

The study of schooling as a legitimating agency suggests that an accurate assessment of the social meanings of education will acknowledge symbolic forms in education, and dominant educational principles of curriculum and classroom organization, as ideal (or ideo-logical) representations of material (or socio-logical) arrangements of power and resource. Thus standardized meanings that are legitimated and transmitted by schools are material social structures grasped as ideas. These meanings reproduce on a cultural level the practical configurations of opportunity that characterize social action and social power; they express, and may confirm, social organization. Dominant paradigms of school knowledge and classroom practice transmit, then, dominant ideologies -- not just symbolic ideologies, however, but practical ideologies as well. Successful schooling produces not only dispositions of thought, but rules of personal activity -- for the conduct of behavior, for the expenditure of energy and time. Moreover, it can be presumed that this culture of meanings, values, expectations and activities constitutes a sense of reality for many people, a sense of absolute because experienced rationality, beyond which it is not easy to move.

Successful socialization, then, may be conceived of as incorporation of oneself into (this) effective dominant culture. Potentially numerous possibilities of thought and action have been delimited over time to those which support or do not challenge the underlying social order. One of the consequences of the social order in the U.S. is that among the exigencies of providing support for prevailing arrangements is the rationalization of persistent inequality. The study of schooling as a legitimating agency not only highlights this (and other) social realities, but suggests thereby a critical focus for the empirical study of political and economic socialization in school settings. That is, research that would assess the development of political and economic attitudes and capacities should examine the social and personal consequences of educational experience and knowledge that may normalize, disguise, or attempt to rationalize, unequal distributions of power and wealth -- and one's own disadvantage. One would study, from this point of view, the consequences of such transmissions in the schooling of children from groups that have differing cultures from the dominant, and no obvious social clout: black and white ethnic minorities, the poor, and the working classes. One could study, as well, the legitimation of inequality and its rationales in those who are likely to succeed to positions of social power and administration. Studies of school socialization that do not make problematic relationships between the reproduction of an unequal socio-economic order, practical and symbolic ideologies in school, and the construction of personal opportunity and identity, not only circumvent analysis of education and U.S. society, but trivialize our notions of childhood socialization.

The analysis of school as an agency of legitimation and of the transmission of dominant ideologies also has implications for how we understand methods of regulation and control in modern society. In modern societies, especially in the west, the power of absolutes, of traditional authorities such as nobilities and the

church, are diminished; and physical force as a method of coersion is not sanctioned; therefore, a basic problem of societies -- of those who govern and those who manage -- is the symbolic shaping and re-shaping of populations -- or the management of "consent" (see Bernstein, 1977; Gouldner, 1970). An increasingly important agency for the management of consent is the school. The appropriation and dissemination (that is, the "imposition") of social meaning in school settings, through daily school experience and curriculum knowledge, directs and forms the individual's unconscious "habitus" (Bourdieu, 1977). School imposes broad outlines and cultural themes within which fall behavioral and intellectual patterns, and within which will occur socially approved individual variations and permutations of these.

By providing the child with a period of extended initiation into institutional patterns of relationship and organization, by restricting the socially approved perspectives to which the child is exposed, by making available, that is, pre-existing categories and an ordered world view with which to organize reality, school shapes the individual in ways that are rarely made explicit and not always perceived. School experiences that normalize privilege, school meanings that rationalize prevailing arrangements of power and that circumscribe methods of dissent, and social science accounts that de-legitimate socio-economic alternatives, all contribute to ideological boundaries within which approved dialogue and activity will occur. School controls, then, by the imposition of ideologies that severely circumscribe what seems possible. If by other means these ideological boundaries are maintained in adults (by the transmission of news, by the entertainment media, or by conservative trade unions or religion) then more direct forms of social control are less necessary. To accurately assess the roles of schooling in U.S. society, we need to consider its contribution not only to the legitimation and reproduction of ideologies and power, but to social control.

The analysis of school as an agency of legitimation and control -- as tied to the reproduction of prevailing ideologies and opportunities -- may suggest to some people that schools are not appropriate agencies through which to attempt an equalization of poltiical and economic relationships or distributions. These people would point out that the equalization of political and economic resources lies, not in the reform of education, but in the reform of political and economic practice. They might argue that attempts to reform society by reforming the schools merely produces unintended confirmation of the legitimacy of unequal economic practice. (Thus, the effort to equalize the distribution of economic resources by increases in educational opportunity provides a tacit rationale for the very existence of an unequal economic order.) It might be concluded from this that activity intended to help eliminate undue power and privilege in U.S. society should not be directed toward educational reform, but should be located instead in more direct challenges to powerful political or economic groups.

I would take issue with this conclusion. It does not recognize the multiplicity of ways that social change may be encouraged. It ignores, for example, the dialectic between material changes in society and changes in available cultural symbols and symbolic forms. That is, while it is probably true that shifts in dominant curriculum and classroom paradigms are ultimately dependent on shifts in social power and in the types of dominant social relationships (e.g., collective, or individualistic) it is also and conversely true that the availability of perceived cultural and ideological alternatives increases the likelihood of power shifts and changes.

Indeed, pessimism regarding the contribution of educators to social change also ignores the increased potency of individuals and groups in society who have been made aware of alternatives to their own disadvantage, and of legitimate alternatives to the ideologies they have been taught. In sum, changes in political and economic practice are facilitated by the availability in socially approved settings of alternatives in behavior, thought and social organization. I would conclude, therefore, that there is important work toward meaningful social change to be done in education. Classroom and curriculum activities that introduce opposing cultures and competing ideologies in school settings will facilitate a "climate of change" in society. To attribute to school experience and curriculum knowledge real power to legitimate unpalatable categories of social life, is to ascribe potential power to educational activity to create legitimacy for

new forms of social organization

Thus, in one's pedagogy, and by contributions to the professional literature, one can attempt to make available to the young, to those who teach the young, and to those who study education, information and analyses that challenge dominant ideologies of consensus and progress and the wisdom, equity and inevitability of prevailing social and educational arrangements. One can present in one's classroom contending perspectives on what "counts" as legitimate activity, idea and social form. One can provide as well, classroom arrangements that allow for democratic distribution of power, authority, and reward, and that offer cooperative activities in work and social suasion. In these ways one contributes to the creation of a received boy of legitimate alternatives to the dominant. One contributes therefore to increased possibilities of future changes in what will count, and be approved, as legitimate political or economic practice, and social policy. One also increases one's students own perceptions of their potential social power. Indeed, it could be argued that to fail to confront the classroom and curriculum representations of an unequal social order by one's intellectual and pedagogical work, is to increase the power of schools as agencies of social legitimation, reproduction and control.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, Willis' discussion of the rejection of school culture by "the lads" in his Learning to Labour (Willis, 1977).
2. See Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1973. (Sixty-nine percent of the non-agricultural labor force in the U.S. works in non-professional, non-managerial jobs, where these work coercions are most prominent [Braverman, 1974, p. 379].)
3. Recent investigations have found that grouping on the basis of purported ability remains widespread at both the elementary and secondary levels (see Mosteller and Moynihan, 1971; Rosenbaum, 1976). National studies of ability grouping were done in 1958-59 and 1964-65 by the National Education Association, which found that of non-rural schools districts in the U.S. of over 2,500 pupils, 77.6% of elementary schools and 90.5% of secondary schools used some form of ability grouping (National Educational Association, 1968).
4. Thomas E. Fox and Robert D. Hess (1972) provide the best documentation of the omission of conflict in social studies textbooks. Fox and Hess studied 58 elementary social studies texts drawn from a sample of texts officially adopted by eight states for grades 3, 5, and 9 in the school year 1971-1972. They set up a category to include all paragraphs containing information relating to access or wealth and resources within our society (p. 36). They called this category the "Distribution of Income, Goods and Services." This rubric accounted for 367 paragraphs in their sample of 58 texts. Of these paragraphs, only 0.23% of the third grade, 0.46% of the 5th grade, and 0.91% of the 9th grade content contained any reference to conflict (p. 50). Of these few references to conflict, fully 78% expressed negative attitudes toward the existence of conflict and only 22% could be considered neutral or objective (p. 75). Thus, almost all the textbook discussion regarding the highly problematic and conflict-ridden area of the distribution of wealth (i.e., poverty and services) omitted or were negative concerning conflict involved.

In order to assess the books for political conflict, Fox and Hess set up a "Political Negotiations and Processes" category. This category included all paragraphs in the texts which contained information on the interaction between groups of people, institutions, public officials, and decisions concerning the allocation of political resources or the selection of political leaders (p. 36) The analysis of the textbooks revealed that while this category received a substantial number of paragraphs (over seven thousand in the ninth grade sample, for example) only a small percentage of the paragraphs (less than 1% -- 184 paragraphs, or 0.65% of the ninth grade paragraphs) contained any reference to political conflict (p. 49).

5. For other studies of economics in social science textbooks see Watson, et al (1973), Widenaar, et al (1973) and Davidson, et al (1975).
6. Only one out of 10 persons in the U.S. owns any stock at all. (New York Stock Exchange, 1975). Furthermore, one percent of the U.S. population owns about one-half of all corporate stock. The remaining half of corporate stock is owned almost entirely by the wealthiest fifth of the population (Smith and Franklin, 1974; see also Lampman, 1962).
7. For similar conclusions regarding U.S. curriculum in the 1940's, see Warner, Havighurst and Loeb (1944).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses." In L. Althusser, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS. Ben Brewster, Trans. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.

Anyon, Jean. "Elementary school social studies textbooks and legitimating knowledge." THEORY AND RESEARCH IN SOCIAL EDUCATION, 6, No. 3 (September 1978): 40-55.

Anyon, Jean. "Education, social 'structure' and the power of individuals." THEORY AND RESEARCH IN SOCIAL EDUCATION, 7, No. 1 (Spring 1979(a)): 49-60.

Anyon, Jean. "Ideology and United States history textbooks." HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 49, No. 3 (August 1979(b)): 361-386.

Anyon, Jean. "Social class and the hidden curriculum of work." JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980): 67-92.

Anyon, Jean. "Social class and school knowledge." CURRICULUM INQUIRY, 11, No. 1 (198):3-42.

Apple, Michael W. IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979.

Apple, Michael W. and Nancy King. "What do schools teach?" CURRICULUM INQUIRY, 6, No. 4, (1977): 341-58.

Asia Society. ASIA IN AMERICAN TEXTBOOKS: AN EVALUATION. New York: The Asia Society, Inc., 1976.

Barger, Harold. "Demythologizing the textbook president: teaching about the president after Watergate." THEORY AND RESEARCH IN SOCIAL EDUCATION, 4, No. 1 (August 1976): 51-66.

Becker, Howard. "Social class variations in the teacher-pupil relationship." JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY, 25 (1952): 451-65.

Bernstein, Basil. CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL: Volume 3--TOWARDS A THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL TRANSMISSIONS. Second edition. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

Blumberg, Paul. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY. New York: Schocken Books, 1969.

Borg, Walter R. ABILITY GROUPING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. Madison, Wisconsin: Dembar Educational Research Services, 1966.

Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY AND CULTURE. Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1977.

Bowles, Samuel. "Unequal education and the reproduction of the hierarchical division of labor." REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS, 3, No. 3, (Fall, 1971).

Bowles, Samuel and Herbert Gintis. SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: EDUCATIONAL REFORM AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF ECONOMIC LIFE. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Braverman, Harry. LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL: DEGRADATION OF WORK IN THE 20TH CENTURY. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.

Brophy, Jere E. and Thomas L. Good. "Teachers' communications of differential expectations for children's classroom performance: some behavioral data." JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY, 61 (1970): 365-74.

Cole, Michael and Jerome S. Bruner. "Cultural differences and inferences about psychological processes." AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 26, No. 10 (1971): 874-76.

Coleman, James, et al. EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966.

Conlin, Joseph. BIG BILL HAYWOOD AND THE RADICAL UNION MOVEMENT. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968.

Council on Interracial Books for Children. STEREOTYPES, DISTORTIONS AND OMISSIONS IN U.S. HISTORY BOOKS. New York: Racism and Sexism Resource Center for Educators, 1977.

Cronbach, Lee. ed. TEXT MATERIALS IN MODERN EDUCATION. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1955.

Cox, Benjamin and Byron Massialas, eds., SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE UNITED STATES. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967.

Davidson, Donald, et al. ECONOMICS IN SOCIAL STUDIES TEXTBOOKS: GRADES 1-6, Report No. 2, Iowa City: University of Iowa, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 1975.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare. WORK IN AMERICA. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1973.

DOLLARS AND SENSE, No. 8 (Summer, 1975). "When workers run the business."

Donnell, Nicole and Richard Hult. "EPIE gathers user data in classroom settings." Educational Product Report 3, 1 (October 1969.

Dreeben, Robert. ON WHAT IS LEARNED IN SCHOOL. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968.

Edwards, Richard C. CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE 20TH CENTURY. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

Elson, Ruth Miller. GUARDIANS OF TRADITION: AMERICAN SCHOOLBOOKS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1964.

Fox, Thomas E. and Robert D. Hess. "An analysis of social conflict in social studies textbooks." Final Report, project No. 11-116, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972.

Friedan, Karl. THE EFFECTS OF WORKERS' OWNERSHIP AND PARTICIPATION ON PRODUCTIVITY. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Economic Alternatives, 1977.

Gallagher, James J. "The special education contract for mildly handicapped children." JOURNAL OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, 38, No. 7 (March, 1972): 527-35.

Giroux, Henry. "Teacher education and the ideology of social control." JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980): 5-27.

Giroux, Henry. "Dialectics and the development of curriculum theory." JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING.

Gouldner, Alvin W. THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY. New York: Basic Books, 1970.

Gramsci, Antonio. SELECTIONS FROM PRISON NOTEBOOKS. Edited and translated by Quinten Hoare and Geoffrey Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971.

Harrington, Charles. "Schools and peers in the political socialization of the urban poor." EQUAL OPPORTUNITY REVIEW (August 1976): 1-5.

Harrington, Charles and Norman Adler. "Political socialization implications of grade school social studies textbooks in New York State." In REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON THE QUALITY, COST AND FINANCING OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION. Albany: The Commission, 1971.

Henry, Jules. "Docility, or giving teacher what she wants." JOURNAL OF SOCIAL ISSUES, 2, No. 2 (1955): 33-41.

Henry, Jules. CULTURE AGAINST MAN. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1965.

Heynes, Barbara. "Social selections and stratification within the schools." AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, 79 (May, 1974): 1434-51.

Hunnius, Gerry, et al. WORKERS' CONTROL. New York: Vintage, 1973.

Jackson, Philip. LIFE IN CLASSROOMS. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968.

Jencks, Christopher, et al. INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA. New York: Basic Books, 1972.

Jones, Thomas Jesse. SOCIAL STUDIES IN THE HAMPTON CURRICULUM. Hampton, Virginia: 1908.

Kedde, Nell. "Classroom knowledge." In KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL, edited by Michael F.D. Young. London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971.

Kirp, David L. and Mark G. Yudof. EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW. Berkeley, California: McCutchan, 1974.

Kornbluh, Joyce. REBEL VOICES: AN IWW ANTHOLOGY. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972.

Lampman, Robert J. THE SHARE OF TOP WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH, 1922-1956. a study of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Leacock, Eleanor B. TEACHING AND LEARNING IN CITY SCHOOLS. New York: Basic Books, 1969.

Litt, Edgar. "Civic education, community norms, and political indoctrination." AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 28 (February 1963): 69-75.

Lunn, Joan C. and Barke Lunn. STREAMING IN THE PRIMARY SCHOOL. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1970.

Lybargar, Michael. "Ideology and the early social studies." Paper presented at the National Council for the Social Studies, 1976.

Mackler, Bernard. "Grouping in the ghetto." EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY, 2 (1969): 80-95.

MacDonald, Madeline. THE CURRICULUM AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION. Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1977.

Mann, Maxine. "What does ability grouping do to the self-concept?" CHILDHOOD EDUCATION, 36 (1960): 356-60.

Marglin, Stephen. "What do bosses do?" REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS, 6, No. 2, (Summer 1974): 38-60.

McClenaghan, W.A. MAGRUDER'S AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1974.

McDermott, R.P. and Kenneth Gospodinoff. "Social contexts in ethnic borders and school failure." In NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR, edited by A. Wolfgang. New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Mosteller, Frederick and Daniel P. Moynihan, eds. ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY. (New York: Random House, 1971.)

National Education Association. ABILITY GROUPING, 12 (1968): 15-17.

National Society for the Study of Education. THE TEXTBOOK IN AMERICAN EDUCATION: 30TH YEARBOOK. Bloomington, Illinois: Public School Publishing Company, 1931.

New York Stock Exchange. CENSUS. New York: New York Stock Exchange, 1975.

Noble, David. AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM. New York: Knopf, 1977.

Ogbu, John. "Racial stratification and education: the case of Stockton, California." IRCD BULLETIN, 12, No. 3 (Summer, 1977): 1-27.

Ogbu, John. MINORITY EDUCATION AND CASTE: THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE. New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Pateman, Carole. PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

Popkewitz, Thomas. "The Latent Values of the Discipline-Centered Curriculum." THEORY AND RESEARCH IN SOCIAL EDUCATION, 5, No. 1 (April, 1977): 41-60.

Prescott, Peter. A WORLD OF OUR OWN. (New York: 1970).

Riskin, Carl. "Incentive systems and work motivations." WORKING PAPERS, 1, No. 4 (Winter 1974).

Rist, Ray C. "Student social class and teacher expectations: the self-fulfilling prophecy in ghetto education." HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 40 (August, 1970): 411-50.

Rosenbaum, James E. MAKING INEQUALITY: THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM OF HIGH SCHOOL TRACKING. New York: Wiley, 1976.

Rubin, Lillian Breslow. WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE WORKING-CLASS FAMILY. New York: Basic Books, 1976.

Sarasan, Seymour. THE CULTURE OF SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE. Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon, 1971.

Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb. THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS. New York: Random House, 1972.

Sharp, Rachel and Anthony Green. EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A STUDY IN PROGRESSIVE PRIMARY EDUCATION. Boston, Mass.: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.

Shaver, James P., O.L. Davis, Jr., and Suzanne W. Helburn. "an Interpretive report on the status of pre-college social studies education based on three NSF-funded studies." Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, 1979.

Shaw, Albert. "Learning by doing at the Hampton Institute." REVIEW OF REVIEWS (April, 1900).

Smith, James D. and Stephan Franklin. "The concentration of personal wealth, 1922-1969." AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 64, No. 2 (May 1974): 162-167.

Smith, Nila Banton. AMERICAN READING INSTRUCTION. Newark, Delaware: The International Reading Association, 1965.

Stone, Katherine. "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," REVIEW OF RADICAL POLITICAL ECONOMICS, 6, No. 2 (Summer 1974): 61-97.

Turner, Mary J. MATERIALS FOR CIVICS, GOVERNMENT AND PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY. Boulder, Colorado: The Social Science and Educational Consortium, Inc., 1971.

Tyack, David B., ed. TURNING POINTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell/Ginn, 1967.

Valence, Elizabeth. "Hiding the hidden curriculum: an investigation of the language of justification in nineteenth century educational reform." CURRICULUM THEORY NETWORK, 4, No. 1 (1973/74): 5-21.

Vroom, Victor H. "Industrial Social Psychology." In THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, edited by G. Lindsey and E. Aaronsen. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

Watson, George Jr., et al. ECONOMICS IN SOCIAL STUDIES TEXTBOOKS: GRADES 7-9. New York: Joint Council on Economic Education, 1973.

Weidenaar, Dennis, et al. ECONOMICS IN SOCIAL STUDIES TEXTBOOKS: GRADES 10-12. New York: Joint Council on Economic Education, 1973.

Weinstein, James. THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA. New York: Vintage/Random House, 1969.

Weiss, Iris. "Report of the 1977 national survey of science, mathematics and social studies education." Report to the National Science Foundation on contract no. C7619848. Center for Educational Research and Evaluation, Research Triangle Institute, March 1978. Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

Williams, Raymond. MARXISM AND LITERATURE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Willis, Paul. LEARNING TO LABOUR. Lexington, D.C. Heath, 1977.

Young, Michael F.D., ed. KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION. London: Collier-MacMillan, 1971.

On the Radical Critique of Liberal Educational Reforms: Some Theoretical Issues

Paul-Albert Emoungu
Howard University

Abstract

The issue of whether or not schools can change society is basic to the radical critique of the liberal socio-educational reforms. While both radicals and liberals espouse the goal of an equalitarian society, the radicals do not believe that liberal reforms can bring about such a society. Thus the radical critique underscores the apparent conspiratorial and hypocritical nature of these reforms. This essay argues that theoretically both the notion of social change and the nature of change itself are differently perceived by the two antagonists. The radical critique, however, is based on the assumption that there are no differences in perceptions. The essay extrapolates from the functional paradigm a notion and the nature of change that is shown to be diametrically opposed to the radical perceptions; and argues that if these differences in perceptions are taken into account the radical critique appears to be misplaced and somewhat superflous. The liberal socio-educational reforms are shown to be consistent with the structural functionalists' notion and nature of social change.

****

Since late 60s and early 70s the radical critique of schooling in America has gained tremendously in importance in terms of the literary production, the high quality and sophistication of much of this production. Also there has been a wide spectrum of scholars across many disciplines involved: radical educators, revisionist historians, radical economists and sociologists.[1] The radical critique is an attack on the implicit immanent social progress and evolutionary character of the liberal socio-educational reforms of the last century.

Basically, radical critics read in the liberal reforms a commitment to building an equalitarian society--a noble goal shared also by the critics. The radical critique is thus on the means toward this unquestioned humanitarian goal. The radical critics believe that only a radical restructuring of either the school system or the social system is the sensible means to an equalitarian society. For them, liberal progressive reforms in schools or in the society at large have failed and will continue to fail to achieve this goal; and this is so because these reforms address the symptoms and not the causes of social ills.

Liberal educational reforms are severely criticized for two reasons. One is that schooling is par excellence a passive socializing institution. Such an institution cannot be expected to take the lead in changing society. The other is that schooling as a socializing instrument is at best a "stacked deck." It is an institution used by the capitalist elites to perpetuate social inequality and thus to maintain the status quo. Consequently, such an institution cannot be expected to undo what it is used to do.[2] Theoretically, therefore, schooling, as a passive instrument, is both inefficient and efficient in the process of social change. It is inefficient because apparently a passive instrument cannot be converted into or be expected to behave as an active one in taking the lead to change society. It is efficient, of course, as a passive instrument in helping reproduce and perpetuate the status quo.

All this assumes that for both liberals and radicals the notion of social change and the consequent nature of the equalitarian society are the same. However, I shall argue paradigmatically that the liberal notion of social change is different from that of the radicals; and correspondingly the consequent nature of the new social order is not the same for both antagonists. I thus focus on the differential perceptions of the causes of social ills (social diagnoses) and the kind of social change (social prognoses) these different perceptions

suggest as remedies for social ills. More specifically, I contend that the notion of social change and the nature of the social order following change is crucial to one's verdict on whether schools have or have not failed, can or cannot change society; and that schooling as a strategy for social change is either relevant or irrelevant to one's notion of social change - i.e. what constitutes change, and in what way or ways does change manifests itself or we perceive it.

The thrust of my argument is that much of the radical critique, it merits nothwithstanding, appears spurious or misplaced. This is so because radical critique is guilty of what I call the fallacy of "goal imputation." This fallacy consists in imputing to given social programs, institutions or groups, goals that are characteristically alien to them and then underscore their failure to achieve these alien goals. I try to show through an examination of the liberal way of thinking--the liberal functional paradigm-- that in spite of the avowedly equalitarian overtones of the liberal rhetoric and reforms, equalitarianism as a goal has no place or justification in the liberal scheme of things. Thus a criticism which insists on the legitimacy of such a goal and deplores the failure to achieve it simply is misplaced.

The criticism of the radical critique to date has been varied both within and outside of the radical ranks. Some more ideological critics simply dismiss it as reactionary radicalism of the new left. But more scholarly critiques have focused on methodological and interpretative problems of data; or on paradigmatic issues by offering variant forms of the conflict paradigm as substitutes.[3]

Recently some revisionist historians of education have provided ample documentation to argue persuasively that inadequate selection of historical sources and interpretations led some radical critics to base their work on the "liberal view of liberalism." The net effect of this brand of liberalism is to view "liberalism in general and progressive reforms in particular in the twentieth century as having been not an expression of capitalism but as having been defeated by capitalism. In this way the role of liberalism as an ideological vehicle for maintaining the economic system is effectively mystified..."[4] In this vein, the radical critique commits the goal imputation fallacy advanced above. Equalitarianism is imputed to the liberal rhetoric and educational reforms; and the failure of these reforms is explained away in terms of the inherently inhumane capitalist system through the workings of its market place. The thrust of these revisionist historians is to show that equalitarianism was not a legitimate goal of the liberal progressive socioeducational reforms. If so, then accusing liberal reforms or the capitalist system of failure to achieve an equalitarian society is fallacious.

In this essay, I attempt a similar argument and demonstration from the vantage point of structural-functionalism taken to be the dominant paradigm of liberal social diagnoses and social prognoses. Inherent in functionalism are the concepts of consensus, control, stability and equilibrium which inform this essay.

Structural-functionalists have an essentially axiological conception of a social order as opposed to the Marxian materialistic conception. The stress is on the value consensus which forms the basis of a social order rather than on the mode and social organization of production. The analytic building block of a society is the role defined in terms of a cluster of values embodied in patterned role performances and related social expectations. In turn, roles cluster into social institutions which form a social system. A social system is held together by means of consensus over social values. This consensus is a condition sine qua non for the survival and continuity of a system. It gives a system order and stability. The propensity of a social system is toward self-maintenance, to remain in a state of equilibrium. This propensity implies that a system must continually guard against external as well as internal forces that tend to disturb its equilibrium. It is through mechanisms of contol that a social system guards itself against these forces.[5] Therefore, the primary theoretical interest of functionalists in a social order is to account for the ability of a social system to maintain and reproduce itself in the face of adverse and disturbing forces, as Guy Rocher puts it,""for/functionalists/, order appears less as a fact than as a problem. ... What is most surprising is not that there are

conflicts and struggles, but that in spite of the sources of breakdown, some order persists."[6] In this caricature of structural-functionalism I emphasize the axiological conception because it is essential to appreciate the functionality of the socialization/resocialization function of schools in social change.

Mechanisms of control--essentially those of enforcing uniformity and stability in values and beliefs--together with those of defense and adjustment in the personality systems, work to 1) induce individuals or groups to conform to and fit into a given social system of expectations, and 2) to counteract tendencies to deviance or strains in a social system in order to restore or maintain that system's equilibrium. These controls are largely carried out by processes and socialization at home and/or at school.[7] If a social system's mechanisms of control do not work, the system either changes (in the sense of a revolutionary change replacing it with a different one) or dies. This implies that both radical change and/or death of a system are undesirable states to be avoided--at all cost--for the sake of the stability and longevity of a social order.

It is not my intention here to take up the much written about issue of the inability of this sociological paradigm to explain dynamics of social change.[8] The functionalist theory of social change comprises three postulates of differentiation, reintegration and adaptation.[9] Through differentiation a simple and fused structure expands and builds up new subunits which come to serve new and more functional needs. Differentiation takes place when there occurs sufficient strain and disturbance in a system. This disturbance is caused by the immanent propensity of a system to adapt to its environment (within as well as without) or in need of stability by seeking new levels of equilibrium. Forces of disturbance, of course, cause a system to to be malintegrated; and stability cannot be reached unless a system, in its adaptive capacities is able to reintegrate malintegrated functional parts, thus reaching a new equilibrium. Adaptation, then, is the cause and consequence of differentiation and reintegration. The process of social change implicit in this theory is here termed restorative or therapeutic and thus it is essentially a system-maintenance and not system-alteration process.

Moreover, this type of social change does not seem to be systemic at once but it is rather mostly localized or targeted to those parts of the system that are judged dysfunctional. This means that reforms are directed not at the whole system at once but are targeted to those parts of the social structure, institutions, or social groups--Blacks or the poor--whose social conditions are thought to be precarious to the stability of the social system. A social system as it is now is a given datum for the functionalist, irrespective of how it came to be--i.e., whether through the expediency of a ruling elite (like the capitalist elites) or through the divinely grace and unfolding toward the Absolute. The sociological interests of the functionalists then concern the behavior of a given sytem and how the system maintains itself. For the conflict theorists (radical critics), however, the sociological "ante" of a system--how it comes into being--is problematic and not to be taken for granted. Thus, whereas for the functionalists the matrix of social change is intra-systemic--to be found in the maintenance functions of a system; for the conflict theorists it is inter-systemic--to be found basically in the rise and fall of social systems, or at the different stages of the dialectic process. Thus the functionalist system-maintenance notion of change is opposed to the radical system-alteration or system-substitution notion in which a given system is replaced by another structurally different. If the radical notion of change is the condition sine qua non for an equalitarian society, then the liberal reforms, conceived in terms of the system-maintenance notion of change, will not succeed and the radical condemnation of them can be justified. But is this the case?

If an equalitarian society is the result of the radical notion of change, is the same type of society also possible with the liberal notion of change? A way to answer this question is to inquire into whether or not the perception of an equalitarian society is the same for the liberals and the radicals. What are the theoretical or empirical dimensions or specifications of an equalitarian society? Does this type of society imply an absence of a ruling elite or some form of a structure of domination. Is it free of any form of social stratification? How are social rewards distributed (if at all possible) and what type of social structure does this

distribution entail? Is it a society free from control ideologies? What is the role of schooling in this society? Does it contribute toward social conformity and integration or toward social anarchy? How are the perennial problems of stability, order and control (if any) resolved? If the liberals and the radicals have some clear cut answers to these questions, then it would be simple to say whether their perceptions are the same or not. In either case we can then inquire into whether or not their perception(s) is (are) function of their differential notions of change. Such analysis is not possible in the absence of a clear cut image of an equalitarian society from both sides.

Meanwhile, one can also inquire into whether the equalitarian goal imputed to liberal reforms by the radicals is indeed a legitimate goal of the liberal functionalist temperament. As indicated above, recent evidence derived from archival sources strongly suggest that equalitarianism cannot be atttibuted to liberal socioeducational reforms.[10] However, it is also true that these reforms are saturated with equalitarian rhetoric. Is it then a case of conspiracy or covert deception as some have suggested?[11] Whatever the exact empirical dimensions of an equalitarian society, most people would concur that theoretically, at least, it means the opposite of inequality. There are indications from the literature on functionalism that inequality is functional to a social system, and thus raising doubts as to whether an equalitarian goal is logical or sensical in the liberal scheme of thoughts.

The Davis-Moore classic theory of stratification sets forth the inevitability, universality and functionality of inequality in a social system.[12] Briefly, this theory rests on these premises: 1. In any society, occupational positions depend on particular kinds of skilled performance; 2. these positions are filled either by individuals with innate ability or who have the necessary training for the performance of given skills; 3. some of these positions are more functional to a given society than others; 4. this innate ability, and the needed motivation to receive adequate training are not equally distributed in the population; and 5. inequalities of social rewards in wealth and prestige constitute an incentive system necessary to ensure that the supply of individuals with the necessary ability and/or training satisfies social demand of most functional skilled performance.[13] Thus social inequality is not only inevitable and universal, it is socially functional in enabling a social system to make a more efficient use of its human resources in the maximization of its interests and social welfare. Such maximization is indeed the bed rock of functionalist liberal perception of immanent social progress; and the apparent equalitarian rhetoric of this progress must be viewed ideologically.

Given the centrality of consensus, integration, equilibrium and stability in functionalism, ideologies indeed constitute a chief control mechanism; and this is because the exercise of power for control through physical or economic coercion, is not as effective as naked power cloaked in belief that legitimize the exercises of this power and make control and those who control and the whole social existence appear inevitable and natural.[14] The functionality of an equalitarian ideology in a society based on inequality is revealed in Karl Mannheim's treatment of ideologies and types of "ideological mentality." He wrote:[15]

> Ideologies are the situationally transcendent ideas which never succeed de facto in the realization of their projected contents. Though they often become the good-intentioned motives for the subjective conduct of the individual, when they are actually embodied in practice their meanings are most frequently distorted. The idea of Christian brotherly love, for instance, in a society founded on serfdom remains an unrealizable and, in this sense, ideological idea, even when the intended meaning is, in good faith, a motive in the conduct of the individual. To live consistently, in the light of Christian brotherly love, in a society which is not organized on the same principle is impossible....
>
> The fact that this ideologically determined conduct always falls short of its intended meaning may present itself in several forms--and corresponding to these forms there is a whole series of possible types of ideological mentality. As the first type in this series we may regard the case in which the conceiving and thinking subject is prevented from becoming aware of the

equilibrium. Social equlibrium care-taking is the key to the notion of social change inherent in structural-functionalism. Systemic structural alteration sought by most neo-Marxist critics of liberal social reforms appears to be anathema. Thus a critique of the functionalists' perception of the role of schools in social change, based on the notion of structural transformation of a social order, appears unwarranted.

Given this notion of restorative or therapeutic social change of the structural-functionalism, it appears that the socialization/resocialization function of schools is quite a logical strategy for social change.[18] In fact the effectiveness of this strategy, i.e., the use of schooling processes for social control and integration, has been unanimously acknowledged by all the critics of the liberal functionalist reformers. As Joseph Featherstone puts it, the take-off point of the radical critique is the conviction that "schools, once again, are rational and efficient culture factories smoothly tooling children up for the changing needs of capitalist industry."[19] Most critics, especially the most influential neo-Marxists are troubled by the effectiveness of this strategy. Dominant groups, these critics maintain, have effectively used schools to control and integrate lesser groups in a social system in a way that is advantageous to the capitalist elite social position.[20] Paradoxically, therefore, the radical critique is by and large a vindication of the functionalist position,

The functionalist liberal reformers' usage of schools in restorative social change can be illustrated in regard to their perceptions and solutions of two perennial American social problems, namely the race problem (referred to as the "Negro problem") and the poverty problem.

At the outset, both of these problems are viewed in essentially axiological vein. They are basically moral problems caused by the failure of some to live up according to the dominant American values, the American Creed. For Blacks, it is argued, their alleged deficient socialization at home does not allow most of them to internalize adequately these values and perform accepted social roles according to social expectations. Most of them are thus deviants. This is compounded by the fact that unethical practices in dominant institutions discriminate against them. Solutions to the race problem, therefore, call for more adjustment, integration and control as John Morton observed: "The liberal...solution to the Negro question entails the expansion of opportunities for mobility within the society and socialization of the deviant (the Negro and the anti-Negro) to expanding opportunities. Hence the importance of education and job training."[21] Because for the liberal "...solution to the racial question follows from the American-dilemma thesis: the belief in the ethical nature and basic legitimacy of American institutions."[22] Furthermore, "Given the assumption that the American Creed is formally embodied in the political structure, the liberal also looks to legislation as an important and perhaps sole means of reinforcing the Creed by legitimizing changes in the American opportunity structure.[23] These strategies for changes are localized and targeted to particular individuals, groups or agencies. They are piecemeal rather than systemic approaches.[24]

As for the poverty problem, all the five major policy categories on the War on Poverty--Cash Transfer and In-Kind Transfers (housing and food programs), Direct Services (legal and medical), human capital (manpower programs and educational programs mostly compensatory education), and Community Participation and Development programs (model cities programs)--were all exclusively designed and aimed at those who were perceived as poor.[25] Again,reform strategies were all variant of "mechanisms of control" which called for mostly behavioral approaches which rely on intensive resocialization techniques and not on structural approaches.[26] These techniques require the relearning of particular set of values that enable the prospective occupant of a social role to meet the socially patterned behavior that characterize a given social role, in short to combat incompetence.[27]

Incompetence, the main attribute of the poor, is characterized by lack of productive skills due to a low level of lack of education. It follows, therefore, that to deal with poverty was mainly a question of making

poor people competent by teaching them productive skills and raising their level of educational attainment.[28] Consequently, all the educational antipoverty programs of the 1960s aimed at 1) improving basic cognitive skills (especially in mathematics and reading) from the preschool age through elementary and secondary education; 2) increasing the educational attainment level at the college level, and 3) imparting specific job skills to those who were outside of school, e.g., school dropouts and adult populations. This educational emphasis is consistent with the functionalist evolutionary and meritocratic view of the function of schooling as necessitated by technological changes and increasingly complex occupational differentiation.[29]

A major criticism of the functionalist educational emphasis has been that statistical evidence has not supported the posited close fit between education, ability, and occupational achivement - the human capitalist view. In other words there is no, or in some instances very weak linear correlation between indicators of educational achievement in school and those of achievement in the after-school life.[30] However, the evidence seldom given, if at all, is the kind that show that there is or there is no functional relationship between these indicators.[31] Moreover, the assumption of randomness is central to statistical inferences. The pertinent question then is, in what kind of social structure would one more likely to find that both the opportunity structure and consequent achieved status of individuals or groups are randomly distributed? In spite of dismal correlations, the functionalists are interested in the function of these variables in the context of the capitalist social equilibrium. Whatever their nature, all the critics, as indicated earlier, agree that liberal educational and social reforms have been effective, thus successful, in ensuring the control, integration and the continuity of the capitalist social order. But if so, why the criticism? Is the radical critique of the traditional school a superfluous one? In a sense, yes it is, and in another it is not.

If my argument that the notion of schooling for social change is both theoretically and empirically consistent with the structural-functionalism framework, then much of the radical critique is superfluous, and partially so on the critics' own admission that socioeducational reforms have worked in maintaining the system in the face of adverse conditions.

The radical critique, on the other hand, is not superfluous. It is not because it addresses vital moral isues by exposing the malicious nature of the institutionalized conflict and its consequent structured inequality.[32] This critique is thus an invitation to a different social melodrama, to a new social order, although no one has yet come forth with convincing theoretical and empirical evidence of the possible existence of such a social order.

Have liberal reformers succeeded in their use of schools for social change? Or, can schooling bring about desired social change? To answer these questions one must, as I have argued in this essay, ascertain first what one means by social change--whether it means radical systemic alteration of a social order, or whether it means restorative or therapeutic change (increasing a system's potential for adjustment, adaptation and integration for higher levels of equilibrium). If one means the former, then the answer to both questions is no. But if one means the latter then the answer appears on emphatic yes, in fact the critics themselves concur. The radical critique is not without merits. Whatever its merits, they are not to be found in its effective prosecution of liberal socioeducational reforms since Horace Mann. In fact, the critics appear to have no case at all since their own arguments have demonstrated that these reforms have succeeded. They have no case simply because their own view of schooling for social change is parallel to, if not identical with, that of their opponents--i.e., a new social order in which reformed public education is still functional. Put it differently, with the exception of the deschoolers, radical critics are really disguised functionalists.[33]

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

1. John Holt, HOW CHILDREN FAIL (New York: Dell, 1967); Herbert Kohl, 36 CHILDREN (New York: New American Library, 1967); and his THE OPEN CLASSROOM (New York: New York Review of Books, 1969); Jonathan Kozol, FREE SCHOOLS (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972;); Christopher Jencks, et al., INEQUALITY (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (New York: Basic Books, 1976); Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin, THE LIMITS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1976); Martin Carnoy, (ed.), SCHOOLING IN A CORPORATE SOCIETY (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1975); Michael B. Katz, CLASS BUREAUCRACY AND SCHOOLS: THE ILLUSION OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICA (New York: Praeger, 1971); Colin Greer, THE GREAT SCHOOL LEGEND: A REVISIONIST INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Joel H. Spring, EDUCATION AND THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE STATE (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Clarence Karier, (ed.), SHAPING THE AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL STATE (New York: Free Press, 1976); Clarence Karier, et al., (eds.), ROOTS OF CRISIS (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973).
2. Jencks, et al., INEQUALITY.
3. Cf., Randal Collins, "Functional and Conflict Theories of Educational Stratification," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 36 (December 1971), pp. 1002-1019; Christopher Hurn, THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF SCHOOLING. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1978); Jacob B. Michaelsen, "Revision, Bureaucracy, and School Reform: A Critique of Katz," SCHOOL REVIEW, Vol. 85 (February 1977), 229-246; Clarence Karier, "The Odd Couple: Radical Economics and Liberal History," EDUCATIONAL STUDIES, Vol. 7 (Summer 1976), pp. 185-193; Marvin Lazerson, "Revisionism and American Educational History," HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, Vol. 43 (May 1973), 269-283; Paul Violas, THE TRAINING OF THE URBAN WORKING CLASS (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1978).
4. Karier, "Odd Couple", pp. 186-187.
5. Admittedly this is a caricature of Structural-Functionalism. The reader should remember that the importance of a caricature is to magnify distinctive and unique characteristics.
6. As quoted in Seymour Martin Lipset, "Social Structure and Social Change," in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, edited by Peter M. Blau (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 178.
7. Cf., Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of Its Functions in American Society," HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, Vol. 29 (Fall 1959), pp. 297-318; Alex Inkeles, "Social Structure and the Socialization of Competence," HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, Vol. 36 (Summer 1966), pp. 265-283.
8. cf., Ralf Dahrendorf, "Toward a Theory of Social Conflict," JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 2 (June 1958), pp. 170-183; "Out of Utopia: Toward a Reorientation of Sociological Analysis," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 64 (September 1958), pp. 115-127; CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 157-318; Pierre L. Van Den Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 28 (October 1963), pp. 695-705.
9. Talcott Parsons, "Some Considerations on the Theory of Social Change," RURAL SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 26 (1961), pp. 219-239; Van Den Berghe, "Dialectical and Functionalism." A classic example of the functionalist theory of social change is to be found in Neil J. Smelser, "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," in INDUSTRIALIZATION AND SOCIETY, edited by B. Hoselitz (Mouton: Unesco, 1966), pp. 11-29; also see "Part II Spheres of Change" in SOCIAL CHANGE, edited by Amitai Etzioni and Eva Etzioni (New York: Basic Books, 1964), pp. 75-98.
10. Violas, TRAINING.
11. Richard Pratte, "Conspiracy, Schools and Schooling," (mimeographed paper).
12. Kingsley Davis and Wilber E. Moore, "Some Principles of Stratification," in CLASS, STATUS, AND POWER, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset (New York: The Free Press, 1966), Second

Edition, pp. 47-53; also see Lewis A Coser, THE FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (New York: The Free Press, 1956), also his CONTINUITIES IN THE STUDY OF SOCIAL CONFLICT (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

13. Collins, "Functional and Conflict Theories," pp. 1004-1005.

14. Caroline Hodges Persell, EDUCATION AND INEQUALITY (New York: The Free Press, 1977), pp. 21-33.

15. Karl Mannheim, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1965), pp. 175-176.

16. Walter Buckley, SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SYSTEMS THEORY (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 25.

17. Herbert Gans, "Culture and Class in the Study of Poverty: An Approach to Anti-Poverty Research," in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY, edited by Daniel P. Moynihan (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1969), p. 216.

18. An interesting conceptual problem, but not of immediate concern here, may be raised in regard to the fact that the notion of immanent change, in the nature of structural interdependence of social institutions and their environment. This notion of change ignores the human "actor", yet strategies for change are aimed not at social institutions but at human actors in them. Cf., George C. Homans, "Bringing Men Back In," AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 29 (December 1964), pp. 809-820.

19. Joseph Featherstone's review of Bowles and Gintis, SCHOOLING, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 29, 1976), p. 26.

20. See note No. 3 and James E. Rosenbaum, MAKING INEQUALITY: THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM OF HIGH SCHOOL TRACKING (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), especially Caroline Hodges Persell, EDUCATION AND INEQUALITY (New York: The Free Press, 1977), more interestingly the chapter 3 on "Structures of Dominance and Societal Ideologies," pp. 21-33.

21. John Morton, "Order and Conflict Theries of Social Problems as Competing Ideologies," THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 71, (May 1966), p. 711.

22. IBID., p. 710.

23. IBID., p. 711.

24. On the issue of piecemeal vs. systemic approaches, see Morris Janowitz, INSTITUTION BUILDING IN URBAN EDUCATION (Russell Sage Foundation, 1969).

25. Robert D. Plotnick and Felicity Skidmore, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY. A REVIEW OF THE 1964-1974 DECADE (New York: Academic Press, 1975), and Robert H. Haveman (ed.), A DECADE OF FEDERAL ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS. ACHIEVEMENT, FAILURES, AND LESSONS. (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

26. Haveman indicates that in discussions of antipoverty strategies at high levels of government in Washington, D.C. any recognition of structural weakness was rejected; see his introductory chapter.

27. J. McVicker Hunt, THE CHALLENGE OF INCOMPETENCE AND POVERTY (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1969).

28. David M. Gordon (ed.)., PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL ECONOMY. AN URBAN PERSPECTIVE. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1972), pp. 163-172.

29. Martin Trow, "The Second Transformation of American Secondary Education," in Bendix and Lipset (eds.), CLASS, STATUS, AND POWER, pp. 437-449. See a critique by Robert Dreeben in his "American Schooling: Patterns and Progresses of Stability and Change," in STABILITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, edited by Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), pp. 82-119.

30. Jencks, et al., INEQUALITY; Bowles and Gintis, SCHOOLING; William G. Spady, "Educational Mobility and Access: Growth and Paradoxes," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. 73 (1967-68), pp. 273-286; Ivar Berg, EDUCATION AND JOBS: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBERY (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970).

31. Lester C. Thurow, "Proving the Absence of Positive Associations," HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, Vol. 43 (February 1973), pp. 106-112.
32. Critics do forget that for most functionalists social conflict and inequality are functional in the present social order, see Note No. 12.
33. Pierre Van der Berghe has shown considerable similarity between functionalist and conflict theories, and thus argued to move toward their synthesis. Recently, Seymour Lipset, drawing extensively from the writings of leading Marxist sociologists in the West and in the East, has shown a considerable overlap between the two theories in their usage of structural-functionalist analyses. See Van der Berghe, "Dialectic and Functionalism," and Lipset, "Social Structure and Social Change." I would suggest that instead of looking at the two "theories" as contradictory or alternatives, they should be taken as two stages toward a comprehensive social theory.

******

******

A Curriculum Theory for Education Based on Transcendental Learning Theory: Centering

Donald L. Hamann
University of Northern Colorado

Curriculums are an illusion, a mirage. Too often curriculums are designed to provide for one system of learning, one approach to the acquisition of certain specified objectives, or one framework of thought that is to provide for all individuals. Thus, much alike the architect that designs one "Gothic" column to embellish and support all frameworks to a building, whether it be a Classic, Baroque, or contemporary design building, so too do curriculum designers provide for only one column of thought and learning that is to "fit" the individual needs of each and every person in education. In either case, the architect and the curriculum designer sees an illusion, a mirage. This illusion being that one column or one approach to learning can fit and enhance each and every building, each and every individual. Much like the dying man in the desert seeing a mirage of water on the hot sands, the designers of such curriculums see a mirage, an illusion that these "prefab" columns of learning fit all individuals, that no other column is necessary, that one particular system or approach will blend beautifully, gracefully, and functionally into an individual's own structure. How fitting is a Gothic column in a contemporary building? How fitting is a "prefab" curriculum in a learning environment? Neither is either fitting, beautiful, graceful, or functional. Yet the designers of such curriculums see the illusion, the mirage that such approaches to learning can and do fit the structures of all individuals. But as the man on the hot sands of the desert without water will eventually die with his mirage, so too will such curriculums die taking with them the individuals they were to provide for.

Curriculum designers and educators can't continue to live with the illusion that one particular approach can benefit every individual. One approach can only accommodate a few individuals. Curriculum designs and theories must be developed and used that can benefit all individuals. Every individual is unique, has their own form and strengths, and needs to be able to develop these qualities within the framework of an educational curriculum design that can provide for this flexibility. We can't expect and we don't accept Gothic columns to be placed in contemporary structures, why then should we allow "prefab" and prescribed curriculums to become the bulwark of our educational structures? Curriculums must be designed for the individual just as different columns are designed for different buildings. We need theories that can allow for uniquenesses of individuals, for self-growth and development, and for the tapping of individual resources and strengths (both external and internal).

A curriculum theory for education based on transcendental learning theory can provide for the individual development and growth in education. A process, discussed by Richards[1] known as centering, which allows for the development of individual needs and strengths, can be used to facilitate this procedure.

Centering

Centering can be described as establishing a balance point with the self. If we are balanced we are "in tune" with ourselves and our inner most senses. Balance is then the point in the center of the self whereby each person can go to any point from the center with the least effort and most efficiency.

> When one is "balanced" it is as though one is standing at the center of a circle--all the points on a circle are the same distance from the center--therefore--when one is centered, to go to any one point on the circle requires no more energy or effort than to go to another. One simply chooses and goes to the point.[2]

The process of centering or establishing a balance point allows each person to take in all which is in them, that which the physical form envelops but does not contain.

> When on center, the self feels different; one feels warm, on rayonne, in touch, the power of life a substance like an air in which one lives and has one's being with all other things, drinking it in the giving it off, at the same time quiet and at rest within it.[3]

Centering is a process which allows each person to find their center, the point from which we can move to and from without losing the inner balance. When on center, a person feels that every part is a whole and the whole is every part.

> When you center clay on the potter's wheel, you take a lump of clay, and by moving it upwards into a cone and outwards into a plane, you create a condition of balance between the outside and the inside, so that when you touch the clay at a single point, the whole mass is affected. Centering has nothing to do with a center as a place. It has to do with bringing the totality of the clay into an unwobbling pivot, the equilibrium distributed throughout in an even grain. The substance of the clay has to be brought to a condition of stillness at the same time that it is spinning, it has to be worked so that there is no difference in quality between the surface and the interior, a balance between the inner consistency and influences from without.[4]

Macdonald[5] has described a process for achieving this balance.

Macdonald lists seven procedures to facilitate the centering process in an educational setting. These procedures are: pattern making, playing, meditative thinking, imagining, the aesthetic principle, the body of our biology, and the education of perception. Pattern making as a procedure involves the creating of order in search of meaning, locating oneself in time and space, and creative and personal ordering of data. Playing refers to the encounter with ideas, things, and people which frees a person to order and create without constant attention and direction from others. Playing allows each person to self-regulate potentials while participating with others. Meditative thinking is a procedure which allows us to receive messages from the world in and around us. Imagining involves the formation and creation of images and information through perception. The aesthetic principle is the directing of intuition, sensations, and feelings into the center of the individual's activities. The body and our biology deals with the framework from which we as humans function. It is the form that encloses those thoughts, feelings, emotions, etc. Finally, Macdonald speaks of the education of perception. This is obtained through an altered state of consciousness. If we are in a state of total and complete perception, we would then be able to find our true center.

Centering allows each person to benefit not only from the world of sight and sound but also from a spiritual world. That world being described as the world of intuition, dreams, etc. In order to benefit from the process of centering, a philosophy that can provide for a model in which each individual can benefit from the world of sight and sound, from a "spiritual" world, and become centered must also be found. Through the writings of Carlos Castaneda[6] a philosophy that allows for centering through the process of becoming an impeccable warrior and an approach for allowing individuals to gain from a "spiritual" and a "non-spiritual" world is presented.

Unlike Macdonald's approach to transcendental learning theory, (centering), which lists seven procedures (any one of which may be used to facilitate the centering process in an educational setting) the approach that will be set forth using Castaneda's philosophy will have only one procedure for doing the same. Within this procedure are areas which must be developed in order to become centered. These areas are: power, allies, discipline, dreaming, aura, will, and seeing. In addition to these areas, Castaneda discusses two worlds in which we should and must function in order to achieve, what I am calling, centering.

These two worlds are the "tonal" and "nagual." The process of centering is equivalent to the goal of becoming an impeccable warrior as discussed by Castaneda. Thus, when a person becomes an impeccable warrior they are centered and must be able to function in the words of the tonal and the nagual. Individuals in our educational systems must also become impeccable warriors functioning in the worlds of the tonal and nagual.

The Worlds of the Tonal and Nagual

The tonal is that world in which our body, our flesh, emotions, and senses (hearing, feeling, smelling, etc.) function within. The tonal world can be described as that which we can understand through reason, function within our bodies, perceive through our senses, express through emotions and verbal communication, and cope with through indulgences. This is the world where: fear and joy function instead of will; hope and religion reign rather than power alone and through allies; inner dialogue speaks and reasoning explains rather than letting dreaming inform; the senses and rational mind rules over true seeing; and aura is that which is around a human shell.

The world of the "nagual" allows our spirit, dreams, intuition, and other "un-organ" senses to function. In this world travel through walls, to great distances in seconds, and to other dimensions of the universe is possible. It is the world in which our "normal" senses are not used in order that our other senses may function. In this world our energy or spirit functions and receives messages and information from itself and from other forms.

In the design for an educational curriculum based on transcendental learning theory, each student would evaluate, encourage, and use data from the unconscious realm, the world of the "nagual". The use of this knowledge would aid each student in dealing with and functioning in the conscious realm, the "tonal" world.

> The implications of a scientifically acknowledged objective nonspatial realm shared by human beings and by nature are tremendous. . . It means there is a way for people to develop an intuition of the objective psyche and to observe its forms just as we discover and observe the visible forms of physical differences. It gives new meaning to the old advise: know thyself and study nature.[7]

It will be shown later what types or kinds of data or information are obtained from the world of the "nagual" and how this information can be used in the world of the "tonal."

The Impeccable Warrior

The world of the "tonal" is accessible to each person as we now exist, but to benefit from the world of the "nagual" we must become centered. As mentioned previously, Castaneda refers to the like process as living the life of an impeccable warrior. Being centered and living as an impeccable warrior are similar in that each requires discipline and the strength to act upon information given us from the world of the "nagual" or the point at the center of each person. Being an impeccable warrior and being centered is a process which allows us to tap the world of the "nagual" while we function in the world of the "tonal."

The process of centering or being an impeccable warrior involves the ability to discover those things which we are or are not. For example, we are humans and not rabbits, we have feet not paws. When we discover those things that we are, we will find both positive and negative qualities. These negative qualities are weaknesses. The next thing we must do is eliminate weaknesses in our being. An impeccable warrior lives his life in such a way that he eliminates those weaknesses in him.

> "How can one stalk one's weaknesses, Gorda?" "The same way you stalk prey. You figure out your routines until you know all the doing of your weaknesses and then you come upon them and pick them up like rabbits inside a cage."[8]

An impeccable warrior is one who knows what choices are to be made to benefit both himself and others. His inner spirit informs him of his choices.

> Every man has good and bad within him. He must make his choice. It is the choice that counts. You must hear the good in you and obey it.[9]

As impeccable warriors we must hear, trust, and act upon the messages of one's inner voice.

> Listening to oneself is, for many people, an unaccustomed occupation. Trusting what one hears when one listens to oneself and acting on it requires considerable autonomy.[10]

Acting upon one's inner voice means living by and following its messages. "Life would be richer and better if each man independently followed his own law and will."[11]

In order to hear, trust, and live by the inner voice in each of us we must be able to accept and understand what is being said to us. This was also stated by Carl Jung. "I have learned to accept the contents of the unconscious and to understand them. I know how I must behave toward the inner images."[12] By understanding and accepting the inner voice, one expands what is or has been there.

> We can receive only what we already have! We can become only what we already are! We can learn only what we already know! It is a matter of realizing potentialities. It is not a matter of "adding to" but of "developing," of "evolving." We contain within ourselves a world of capacities, of possibilities, which the outer world summons forth, speaks to, releases.[13]

If we live as impeccable warriors we are allowing ourselves to experience the "nagual" in each of us, to evolve into what we are. Our goal then is to be centered through the disciplined life of an impeccable warrior.

> I saw that here the goal had been revealed. One could not go beyond the center. The center is the goal, and everything is directed toward that center. Through this I understood that the self is the principle and archetype or orientation and meaning... For me, this insight signified an approach to the center and therefore to the goal.[14]

The curriculum design in an educational environment must be flexible and allow for each student's centering process. It must provide for student discovery and use of inner knowledge. "The education of men by men means the selection of the effective world by a person and in him."[15] It must provide for guidance from teachers who are also involved in the centering process.

> The province of the instructor should be simple, awakening, invigorating, directing, rather than the forcing of the child's faculties upon prescribed and exclusive courses of thought. He should look to the child to see what is to be done, rather than to his book or his system. The child is the book. The operations of his mind are the true system. Let him study these carefully and his success is sure. Let him follow out the impulses, the thought, the volitions, of the child's mind and heart, in their own principles and rational order of expression, and training will be what god designed it to be--an aid to prepare the child to aid himself.[16]

By allowing each student to develop and live as an impeccable warrior, we are establishing an environment in which students can choose according to their inner laws, that will help them select those things that are meaningful in their lives, and will allow them to discover that which is in them.

> It is not a question of putting things together, it is a question of starting at the center where they are together and proceeding toward their articulation, like an organism with all its functions. The hope is that we may enter into those parts of ourselves that are yet to be awakened.[17]

If each student is to benefit from those worlds within and around them, if they are to develop and use the knowledge within and around them, and if students are to help others in their lives and endeavors, then educational environments must be established that will allow for and encourage this growth. "Education must shift from instruction, from imposing of stencils, to discovery--to probing and exploration and to the recognition of the language of forms."[18] Education must allow for the recognition of forms not only from the "tonal" world but also from the "nagual" world. In order for this to occur, each student must become an impeccable warrior.



As is shown in the diagram above, an impeccable warrior is enclosed or surrounded by aura, which radiates and glows according to the brightness of his or her power, allies, dreaming, will, seeing, and discipline. Aura is our being, our presence, from which all others identify us: aura is the inner-self as perceived and felt by others.

Aura

The aura for each person is different. The more centered a person is the more brilliant the aura is. The person who is not disciplined, who indulges, who is not an impeccable warrior has a dull, pale aura. Dull, pale auras can also be a result of having holes in one's self. Castaneda said that these holes could be caused

by having had children. Thus the child has taken part of one's body with them and has caused a hole. I believe that he is referring to the idea that many parents depend on their children to do those things which they feel they are not able to do, to rely on them for support of all kinds, and not to develop their own abilities because of this dependence. The holes in the aura can be patched but are never as brilliant as the rest of the aura, according to Castaneda. I believe that Castaneda is saying that we all have weaknesses of one type or another. Even though we strive and do overcome these weaknesses, we are never quite sure that they will not return. Thus, we guard these areas to the point that we do not rely heavily on the information received from them.

In education we can also see those students who have holes. These are the students who are anxious when they are given freedoms and choices. When asked to write a paper of their choice, they cannot decide what they should write on, they want to be told what to do, and they want to know what they should know. Thus, as some parents depend on their children for those things which they feel they cannot do, students depend on their instructors for those things they feel they cannot do. These are holes in students and in education. It is not a matter of whether a student can "handle" freedoms or make choices, for all students can and will make choices if no other alternative is presented, it is a matter of encouraging and allowing students to make choices.

Too often "learning" means being told what, how, and when to "perform tasks" by an instructor. This "educational process" begins in the elementary grades and continues through the student's secondary and sometimes higher educational training. Instructors and educational systems do not encourage, nor want in many cases, student choice or freedom. The attitude is taken that students do not know what is "best" for them. The freedom to choose, the freedom to create, the freedom to discover their own reality and their own qualities, is often severely repressed or non-existent. This type of approach teaches the student to doubt their own qualities and to depend on others for their decisions which pertain to their lives. It is no small wonder that students, when given the freedom to choose, do not know what to do; they have been conditioned into this state of confusion and reliance on others; they have been conditioned into developing holes. It is important that educational systems and curriculums guard against this practice. Students should, at an early age and through their educational training, be allowed and encouraged to make choices. They should be trained in the practice of becoming impeccable warriors.

An impeccable warrior, whether or not they have had holes, has a brilliant, luminous, radiating aura. This aura is not a shell that can't be penetrated, but rather a hue which surrounds the person. Aura does not necessarily take on any shape or form but like fireworks (rockets) on the fourth of July bursts outward, constantly, from the person. It clings to that person like fog in a valley clings to the earth. Aura is not a shell which keeps in or out things. It is rather a ray of color that catches one's eye, it is like the warmth of a fireplace that invites one to sit near it, that draws one to share in and with it. Thus, each person perceives another person's aura. This occurs through a sensation much like the sensation that is perceived when in a room with others. It is a sensation that is usually explained as a feeling of comfort or discomfort, "receiving good or bad vibrations from another person or groups of people." People perceive group or individual auras. As individuals or an individual becomes or is centered, the aura(s) of that group or individual becomes more inviting, warmer, and brilliant to the eye. There is something that wants to be shared, that can be shared. The aura of a person conveys the Quality of that person.

According to Pirsig[19] quality is not easily defined, yet all people know what it is and to what degree it exists in an object (or in a person). In education, students perceive the type and level of quality present in their colleagues, instructors, and in the system itself. This aura, this quality is important and must exist at all levels of education. A pale, dull aura attacts pale, dull auras, just as poor quality attracts and begets poor quality. It is important that all people develop as impeccable warriors so that their auras, their qualities

invite and do not discourage others, so that education attracts and does not discourage. Educational systems must provide for an environment in which students will desire to reach out,grasp, and savor the aura, the quality of that environment; to share in the aura of others and of self. Not only will brilliant, luminous, radiating auras (qualities) attact others, it will also invite them to share in that which is being perceived and developed. It is important that educators, educational systems, and curriculums provide for such things as freedom and choice so that students may develop their qualities, their auras, and in turn provide for brilliant group aura. As impeccable warriors the quality of aura is developed; as "impeccable educational systems" the quality of education is developed.

Discipline

Discipline is the ability to develop those "things" which we feel are right for us. Discipline is different from will, which shall be discussed next. Perhaps discipline could be said to be the catalyst that carries out or performs the tasks that our will wants. Discipline is a focus or a drive that enables people to prepare to receive knowledge from the tonal and nagual worlds. Discipline is not a study it is an art form that maintains those values and goals set by our will. Discipline is the ability to follow our inner will and desires, to have the courage to carry out tasks, to keep us on the "path" to becoming an impeccable warrior. Discipline is courage. "A chief characteristic of this courage is that it requires a centeredness within our own being, without which we would feel ourselves to be a vacuum."[20]

Discipline, as described above, is different than is normally thought of as discipline in education. Discipline in education is a course of study, an approach, or a focus in an area. Discipline in the transcendental learning sense (following Castaneda's philosophy) is the ability to follow a course of study, an approach, or a focus in an area. More than just an ability to follow any course of study, etc., it is the courage to follow one's life study or focus. It is the courage to undertake and follow that which is right for one's self, one's inner law, one's inner will, one's inner needs. It is a courage that enables a student to pursue those programs, courses, or needs which outside forces may deem unncessary, unpractical, or unreasonable.

Students who follow their inner drives, often find themselves confronted with decisions, such as having to make a choice between a science course or an art course. Outside forces may encourage or even "try to railroad" the student into believing that the science course is better for them than the art course, even though the student knows that his needs and wants are toward the art course. The student who has the discipline, the courage to follow his inner will, will select that which satisfies and follows that inner path. This is one type of discipline or courage. Another type of discipline is the ability to follow a course of action which may seem to others to be unpractical, etc. For example, a student may pursue a course in which they try to work out a system whereby all nations in the world could work together in harmony, where no nation would have arms, where all nations helped each other to develop to the fullest the potentials of that country. This would probably be described as unpractical and the student would be urged into a narrower focus or encouraged to forget the whole idea. A person with the inner-discipline and courage to undertake this challenge may well come up with a solution to the achievement of this goal. That student's discipline/courage would have enabled them to follow their inner path.

In an environment of transcendental learning, each student should be allowed to form his own inner-discipline. A centered student knows what his needs are and how to fulfill them. Each student should develop the discipline/courage to fulfill those needs as they see the need to do so. In this way each student progresses on the road to becoming centered.

Will

The will according to Castaneda consists of many luminous fibers which are sent out from the abdominal region to grasp that which is needed to create order, meaning, and locate oneself in time. Through his will a person creates his own laws and values. His needs are based on these individual laws and values, his life is guided by them. "A self-willed man obeys a different law, the one law I hold absolutely sacred--the law in himself, his own will."[21] Will becomes an extension of the body, like extremely long arms which can grasp, like rays of sun that are far-reaching and are brilliant. Will is that which allows each person to surround and absorb things in the environment which will aid them in their lives. Will is the inner-rule for self.

Each person must be allowed to create and live by the law of their will. The student should be encouraged to make decisions which follow their inner-laws and inner-rules. Too many times educational systems have built-in, fixed, and unwritten laws. In such systems, students do not have any input or say as to what the laws are or should be, they are only expected to follow and obey. Students should not be forced to follow and obey external laws, but should be encouraged to follow their inner-laws and rules. If education is to aid in creating "good" citizens, in helping people develop positive inner-strengths, and foster positive qualities in people then educational systems must allow for individuals to follow their inner-laws. Students must be exposed to themselves and their laws; they must find those things which are positive and develop them; they must find those weaknesses and eliminate them. If this is to occur, then we must allow for the student to practice inner-will and law and discover that which is positive and negative. If every student is allowed to follow their will, this would infer that the following of their will would not prevent others from following their will. Students would learn that in order to be able to listen to themselves they must let others listen to themselves, they must permit others to be as they are allowing them to do the same.

A student who would like to have a group class discussion would have to consider that others may not want to have group class discussions. Thus, the student would consider that another person's will may not follow the path of his will. In order for that student to follow his will and not infringe on the will of others, they would have to create a situation in which members who wanted group discussion could have it and those who did not would have their option. It is important that students be able to follow their will and it is equally important that through this process they discover that they must allow others to follow their will, if they are to be given the freedom to do the same.

Power

Power is a type of energy. Power as an energy enables us to "fight the good fight." It is a force, not a negative force that is used against others, but rather one that protects us and helps us through difficult times. It is the energy that springs forth when we feel we cannot go on. It is in part what people call will-power, but it is also the energy that runs our brain, a type of electricity that charges the brain and the body. It is a type of strength that keeps us safe while we venture in unknown realms.

Power is developed through discipline. Discipline, as mentioned previously, is a focus that aids us in developing as an impeccable warrior. If a person has led a disciplined life (one that is void of envy, greed, lust, etc.) then power begins to grow. Power and discipline are closely tied in the centering process. From discipline stems power.

Students develop power through their discipline, through their courage. Power enables students to venture into new areas and to maintain the strength, both mental and physical, to pursue and gain knowledge from and in that area. For example, a student doing research into an area would find that power would aid them in the following ways. First, power would aid the student in collecting an ample amount of data in the

area of research. Both a physical and mental power is needed to find relevant information. Second, a student would need power in order to organize, arrange, and report the findings. Power in this phase would be more than just a type of energy that would enable the actual physical and mental stamina needed to complete the task, although it would also provide for this, power in this case would also provide the energy to spark creativity, to allow the conveyance of the qualities of that person to flow through and in the work, and to insure that the creativity and quality of and in a person is brought forth. Power is a type of stamina/ energy that provides for individual quality control. Without power students may not be able to complete the task at hand, to follow the path of their inner-will, or to maintain the quality of and in their aura. Thus power aids in the fulfillment of will and quality of will, and assists the student in following his inner-laws.

Allies

Allies add to one's power. Unlike a friend in the human form, an ally, according to Castaneda, is a type of spirit from the world of the nagual. If a person is an impeccable warrior he will be able to see form to this ally. Usually the form taken by an ally changes and is not like that of a human but more like something out of a science fiction movie. An ally does not come to a person of its free will. The only way a person can receive the aid of an ally is to struggle with it and win, therefore the more power a person has acquired the more likely one is to win the battle with an ally. To loose a battle with an ally, according to Castaneda, is to be killed. A person then has a choice to make. An ally will present themself to a person. If that person feels that they have enough power to win the ally then the struggle begins, if not the struggle may be avoided. In time the ally will return and the battle will have to be fought.

One way of further explaining what an ally is in our tonal world is by viewing struggles in life. Every person at one time or another has to deal with a terrible force. This force, the ally, may show itself in many forms (sickness, famine, death, etc.). If we win the battle over these elements we gain from the experience and thus we have an ally, an aid to our power to deal with those things in life which we must. Thus out of a personal catastrophe we gain an ally.

If we are not yet developed as an impeccable warrior we can't see our ally (allies) but we can sense it. For example, people relate experiences such as not taking a certain plane flight, for no reason, and later they find out that the plane has crashed. A person avoids a certain street while driving at a specific time of day and later finds out that a terrible collision has occurred on that street at the very time they would have been on it. This then could be the ally aiding us in our life.

In education, the student has a need for allies. In addition to aiding the student in day-to-day living, allies also come forth in assisting in educational tasks. Authors have said that they have had divine inspiration come to them and write their works as though they did not have control over the pen, musicians have said that they were playing an instrument but an unknown force was directing their actions. These are what I believe to be the forces and workings of the ally. Allies can assist students in providing "extra" creative power or strength, they can guide students in directions of their inner-will when the path becomes rough. Not all students may have an ally, but having an ally is an asset not only in day-to-day living but also in day-to-day learning.

Dreaming

Dreaming is a procedure which allows us to receive messages from the world in and around us. Often referred to as intuition or insight, these messages can aid us in our decision making.

> In many tribes the youth seeking insight goes apart from his fellows and lives for a time in the wilderness, fasting and praying.

> If he is the proper sort, he will return with a message from the god he set out to seek, but even if he fails in that particular he will have had a vision or seen a marvel--and these are always worth listening to and thinking about.
> ....They refer to experiences felt, to "inner voices." Clearly, such experiences aren't primarily visual. Insight is more appropriate than "vision," hearer or feeler is more accurate than "seer."[22]

In order to create a state of dreaming, much like meditative thinking, we must turn off our inner dialogue. The inner dialogue is a voice which speaks to us from our tonal world, much like the inner voice which speaks to us during a restless night. "This inner division is indeed a war within man. Or dialogue."[23] To stop the inner dialogue we must, like a blackboard, erase all thoughts. By doing this, we can then begin the procedure of dreaming.

Dreaming involves the formation and creation of images and information through perception. This procedure allows us to receive information through our perceptual power as in imagining. "Free perception leads the senses freely to follow the movement of form as it occurs, unobstructed by habit, anxiety, or unconcern..."[24]

Carl Jung found that dream images gave insight into a person. "As a result of my experiment I learned how helpful it can be, from the therapeutic point of view, to find the particular images which lie behind emotions."[25] People receive messages and images through their dreams. These messages and images may reveal events that have or will happen. Dreams may indicate a course of action that should be taken. Dream messages and images should be acknowledged and acted upon.

> It is very difficult to practice what we agree to in theory. And it is very difficult to be modest in our scorn of the gap between what we dream and what we do, and to persevere patiently in our efforts to bridge it. This battle is daily and specific and basic.[26]

Dreaming, with eyes closed or open, can provide individuals with messages and images which can help guide their direction in life. Whether the dream is a desire or an actual message or image, the centered person should evaluate its merit in light of their life. Each person should be concerned and directed towards filling the gap between dreaming and "reality." Imagining or dreaming can become an important guide in a person's becoming an impeccable warrior.

Dreaming can provide "food for thought and action." Each student must listen to and act on their dreams, for in these dreams the material for creativity exists. "But if you do not express your own original ideas, if you do not listen to your own being, you will have betrayed yourself."[27] How then does dreaming invite creativity? Let's assume that a high school student has been playing trumpet ever since the sixth grade. He wants to major in music in a university. Through his inner thoughts he has dreamed of becoming a cellist. He has never had any instruction on the instrument but still wants to use it as his principle instrument in a university program. The student may have been told that such an endeavor would be impractical, that the mechanics of learning to perform on such an instrument would prevent him from doing the same, that the idea is unrealistic. "What people today do out of fear of irrational elements in themselves as well as in other people is to put tools and mechanics between themselves and the unconscious world."[28] If the student would follow the advice of others and not follow his dream he may well be preventing an outlet for creative activity. Through his dreams, the student is being told that a potential for creativity exists in the act of performance on the cello. Thus, the student should be encouraged to follow that dream, to pursue a path which may lead to creativity in that path.

Creativity is needed in all facets of education and learning. "Creativity demands commitment. To

change one's life even in small ways requires energy, participation, and enthusiasm."[29] We must encourage students to act upon their dreams, to provide an environment where this can occur, and to provide a flexibility in curriculums that will not inhibit or deter spontaneous, creative, thoughts/dreams/messages. What would happen to a creative thought or dream in an unflexible setting? If a student was supposed to be completing a reading assignment and suddenly got a dream, an inspiration for a poem and begin to write that poem instead of completing the reading assignment, the outcome may well be a reprimand. Creativity as well as dreaming cannot be programmed or scheduled. Educational structures must understand this and provide for atmospheres in which creative acts can be acted upon and encouraged when they occur. If dreaming and creativity is negated at any time, then the experience of learning and of centering are negated for all students as well as instructors.

Dreaming allows for messages from the outside world of the nagual and from our allies to come to us. These messages often form the basis for creative thoughts and actions. Whether the dream provides for a long term course of action, such as learning to play an instrument, or a short term course of action, such as writing a short peom, it does provide for "food for thought and action." If creativity is to be encouraged, then dreaming must be encouraged. A transcendental learning curriculum can provide for this encounter.

Seeing

Seeing is the final step and area is becoming an impeccable warrior. When true seeing has been achieved, the ability to perceive the total aura of another person, to see their will, to perceive allies, and to witness both worlds of tonal and nagual is possible. "Only the spirit is present, a kind of awareness which shows no trace of egohood and for that reason ranges without limit through all distances and depths, with 'eyes that hear and with ears that see.' "[30] Seeing allows the person to step out of the world of the body, so to speak, and view him or herself as they are. Each person will be able to perceive their weaknesses and growth, to see their allies and their enemies, and to see the world of knowledge in and around them. Seeing also helps one to see the aura, power, will, etc., the quality, creativity, etc. of another person. Seeing can help us help others by assisting and understanding their point in the becoming of an impeccable warrior. Thus, seeing helps us in our world of the tonal and nagual and helps us view others in their perception of the same.

Seeing is the point reached when a person is centered. A centered student, an impeccable warrior, would display the qualities of self-direction, self-discipline, brilliant aura, and balance in life. This is the goal of an educational curriculum based on transcendental learning theory. Each student should be able to choose their course in education, maintain the discipline to carry it out, and develop as a "total person" through this balance.

A curriculum in education based on transcendental learning theory should provide for teacher and student centering potentials. Both teacher and student must be able to give of themselves in order to establish their true center. "One's hands must be empty if they are to receive. Empty if they are to give. Empty even of emptiness."[31] Centering in education may not be easy for either the teacher or student, but it is the way an individual can discover the total knowledge in them, bring it to use, and share it with others. Since centering involves a total working on both student and teacher, I shall discuss the role of the teacher in this environment.

The Role of the Teacher

A teacher in a transcendental learning theory curriculum would sanction student freedom. Freedom permits students to make decisions for themselves, find their strengths, and to remove weaknesses. The teacher's role would be to encourage this centering process and be sensitive to each child's individual centering process.

> A teacher is at a disadvantage who is not deeply sensitive to the nature of his pupil. Some may, for example, be concerned for a child's freedom, yet be unable to share his anxieties, or enjoy his noise, his candor, his affection and innocence. They may admire the poetry written by adults for children, but be quite ignorant of how the poetic impulse mainifests in children themselves. This is perhaps why it is said that a good teacher is taught by his students. For he is not to teach them merely what he knows but to help to bring to maturity what is already in them. It takes, of course, a very good ear, to hear what is present in a child, or adult.[32]

If the teacher is sensitive to the student's needs, promotes the use of inner strengths, and encourages the maturity of inner knowledge, he or she must be able to stimulate the centering process. The teacher must bring his or her center into focus and present it. This will act as a ctalyst for the student's own centering process. The teacher must relate experiences to each student. "It is the teacher's responsibility to prepare the individual for experiences of relatedness."[33] The instructor should give of him or herself in such a way that he or she can encourage students to "act upon their own," through their inner world.

In education, the teacher should present all information that would lead to a student's choice of course offerings. Once the student selects the area of interest, it is the responsibility of the teacher to encourage the student to use the knowledge in them. This may be done, for example in English, by stimulating the student to compose short stories, science fiction, poetry, or by working with others in group writing projects. A student in math could be encouraged to explore and research unexplored areas, relate skills in mathematics to music or art, to develop new ways or systems in presenting math to other students. The teacher should be sensitive to each child's growth, analyze those needs, and allow the student to fulfill those needs by presenting the possibilities for doing so. The instructor is not a dictator who gives directives, the teacher is a person who fulfills the needs of individuals by allowing them to experience the knowledge in them.

Teaching environments and teachers must allow for and encourage each student to bring that which is in and around them to focus, to the center. Rigid programs must become flexible; set schedules must become timeless; expected procedures must become spontaneous events; classification of students must be eliminated. Each student is a unique, resourceful, and creative being. Instead of forcing these individuals into a group of nondescript matter, educational systems and instructors should allow for a blending of each individual's aura into a brilliant, "cosmic" array of shared knowledge. This is the type of atmosphere and environment that a classroom in a transcendental learning system would create.

Summary

Transcendental learning theory involves the processes of centering, of being balanced, and of experiencing the worlds of the tonal and nagual. In order to benefit from these processes, we must live as impeccable warriors, find the balance point at the center, and discover and use the knowledge that is within and around us. "A curriculum of transcendence provides a context for engendering, gestating, expecting, and celebrating the moments of singular awareness and of inner illumination when each person comes into the consciousness of his inimitable personal being."[34] As a person becomes centered he or she will discover and use that in and around them. Thus, the person moves through life, in both worlds, with the knowledge of both worlds. As was shown in the design (see page 119), a person is in a circumambient form. In this form, the person is able to touch others by actually "blending" in with the other person's form or by "floating" parallel with the same, much like two discs being close but not touching. Thus, the person shares their knowledge by either taking on a duo-aura or by having an "electric-charge-like" interchange between their two discs. The centered person is not a "lone wolf" but a person who can aid not only himself but others as well.

In a curriculum this process, described previously, can be extremely helpful in letting each student find and create that which is in them. Living as impeccable warriors, the student can create and live by their inner-laws. In this way each person builds on their strengths and removes their weaknesses. Then they can help others do the same.

> We are trying to move into a new relation to The Power Who flows in us. People act as if nuclear power is all OUT THERE somewhere, stored in big bombs. They don't realize that we are all WALKING STOCKPILES. Every nucleus in our bodies is full of THAT STUFF. NO WONDER WE CAN DO SO MUCH DAMAGE AND SO MUCH GOOD TO EACH OTHER.[35]

A transcendental approach in an educational program provides for each individual's needs. Since the program is geared to the individual, each student in a sense, is exceptional. As long as individual needs are satisfied, which is the aim of this program, there is a built-in consideration for "exceptional" students. A program of this scope is not geared toward a "middle" group. There are no groups, only individuals, with individual needs, that fit together forming a society, an educational system, a curriculum. "The model for the new curriculum is in our imaginations; we are meant to create the possibilities we envision."[36] It is the teachers' and students' responsibility to discover and fulfill needs of their own and be sensitive to the needs of others, to the needs of the "new curriculum." In this "new curriculum" teachers and students will respect the right of self and others; they will help others in their endeavors. Each individual will become a motivational catalyst for self and for others, they will become impeccable warriors of the earth and of education.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mary C. Richards, CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE PERSON. (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1964).
2. Drew Thomason, MUSIC FOR THE CLASSICAL GUITAR. (Austin, Texas: By the Author, 301 W. 17th Street, 1979), p. 4.
3. Mary C. Richards, THE CROSSING POINT: SELECTED TALKS AND WRITINGS. (Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1974), p. 56.
4. IBID., p. 61.
5. James B. Macdonald, "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education," HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY, ed. by William F. Pinar (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 109-12.
6. Carlos Castaneda has written five books in this area. They are: TALES OF POWER, THE SECOND RING OF POWER, THE TEACHINGS OF DON JUAN: A YAQUI WAY OF KNOWLEDGE, JOURNEY TO IXTLAN: THE LESSONS OF DON JUAN, and A SEPARATE REALITY: FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH DON JUAN. See bibliography for publication information.
7. Richards, THE CROSSING POINT: SELECTED TALKS AND WRITINGS. p. 61.
8. Carlos Castaneda, THE SECOND RING OF POWER. (New York: A Touchstone Book/Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 49.
9. Pablo Casals, JOYS AND SORROWS. (New York: A Touchstone Book/Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 49.
10. Frances F. Fuller, Oliver H. Brown, and Robert F. Peck, CREATING CLIMATES FOR GROWTH. (Austin, Texas: The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, The University of Texas, 1971), p. 23.
11. Herman Hesse, IF THE WAR GOES ON, trans. Ralph Manheim. (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 72.

12. Carl G. Jung, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, Ed. Aniela Jaffe. (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 188.
13. Richards, CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE PERSON, p. 37.
14. Jung, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS, pp. 198-99.
15. Martin Buber, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN, trans. Maurice Friedman. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 101.
16. George Hochfield, SELECTED WRITINGS OF THE AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS. (New York: A Signet Classics, 1966), p. 92.
17. Richards, THE CROSSING POINT: SELECTED TALKS AND WRITINGS, p. 20.
18. Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE. (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 100.
19. Robert M. Pirsig, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE. (New York: Bantam Books, 1974).
20. Rollo May, THE COURAGE TO CREATE. (New York: Bantam Books,1975), p. 3.
21. Hesse, IF THE WAR GOES ON, p. 72.
22. Edmund Carpenter and Ken Heyman, THEY BECAME WHAT THEY BEHELD. (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfry/Ballantine Books, 1970), p. (not numbered).
23. Richards, CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE PERSON, p. 137.
24. IBID., p. 105.
25. Jung, MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS, p. 177.
26. Richards, CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE PERSON, p. 138.
27. May, THE COURAGE TO CREATE, p. 3.
28. IBID., p. 76.
29. David Campbell, TAKE THE ROAD TO CREATIVITY AND GET OFF YOUR DEAD END. (Niles, Illinois: Argus Communications, 1977), p. 7.
30. Eugen Herrigel, ZEN IN THE ART OF ARCHERY. (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), pp. 49-50.
31. Richards, CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE PERSON, p. 112.
32. IBID., p. 104.
33. IBID., p. 40.
34. Philip Phenix, "Transcendence and the Curriculum," CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RE-CONCEPTUALISTS, ed. by William F. Pinar. (Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1975), p. 333.
35. Richards, THE CROSSING POINT: SELECTED TALKS AND WRITINGS, pp. 21-22.
36. IBID., p. 48.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barrett, William. IRRATIONAL MAN: A STUDY IN EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958; Doubleday Anchor Books, 1962.

Campbell, David. TAKE THE ROAD TO CREATIVITY AND GET OFF YOUR DEAD END. Niles, Illinois: Argus Communications, 1977.

Carpenter, Edmund and Heyman, Ken. THEY BECAME WHAT THEY BEHELD. New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfry/Ballantine Books, 1970.

Casals, Pablo. JOYS AND SORROWS. New York: Touchstone Books/Simon and Schuster, 1970.

Castaneda, Carlos. A SEPARATE REALITY: FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH DON JUAN. New York: Touchstone Books/Simon and Schuster, 1971.

Castaneda, Carlos. JOURNEY TO IXTLAN: THE LESSONS OF DON JUAN. New York: Pocket Books, 1976.

Casteneda, Carlos. TALES OF POWER. New York: Pocket Books, 1976.

Casteneda, Carlos. THE SECOND RING OF POWER. New York: Touchstone Books/Simon and Schuster, 1977.

Casteneda, Carlos. THE TEACHINGS OF DON JUAN: A YAQUI WAY OF KNOWLEDGE. New York: Pocket Books, 1976.

Fuller, Frances F., Brown, Oliver H., and Peck, Robert F. CREATING CLIMATES FOR GROWTH. Austin, Texas: The Hogg Foundations for Mental Health, The University of Texas, 1971.

Herrigel, Eugen. ZEN IN THE ART OF ARCHERY. New York; Vintage Books, 1971.

Hesse, Hermann. IF THE WAR GOES ON. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New York: Bantam Books, 1971.

Hochfield, George. SELECTED WRITINGS OF THE AMERICAN TRANSCENDENTALISTS. New York: A Signet Classics, 1966.

Jung, Carl G. MEMORIES, DREAMS, REFLECTIONS. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston, Edited by Aniela Jaffe. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.

Macdonald, James B. "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education," HEIGHTED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.

May, Rollo. THE COURAGE TO CREATE. New York: Bantam Books, 1975.

McLuhan, Marshall. UNDERSTANDING MEDIA. New York: Mentor Books, 1964.

McLuhan, Marshall and Fiore, Quentin. THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE. New York: Bantam Books, 1967.

Phenix, Philip. "Transcendence and the Curriculum," CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley, California: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

Pirsig, Robert M. ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE. New York: Bantam Books, 1974.

Richards, Mary C. CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE PERSON. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1964.

Richards, Mary C. THE CROSSING POINT: SELECTED TALKS AND WRITINGS. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1974.

Thomason, Drew. MUSIC FOR THE CLASSICAL GUITAR. Austin, Texas: By the Author, 301 W. 17th Street, 1979.

Theory-Practice and the Hermeneutic Circle

James B. Macdonald
University of North Carolina at Greensboro

What does a fish know about the water in which he swims all his life?
Albert Einstein

Einstein spent his whole life preoccupied with the interrelationships that give our world its structure and that link "us" with the "world about us." He sought to understand.

Now Einstein may have wished to have controlled these structures and relationships, and/or he may have wished that knowledge of these structures and relationships would provide an emancipatory experience for humanity. What is clear, however, is that his basic intention, and one he shared with many others, was a desire to search or truth and to come to a better understanding of reality.

I have introduced this theme because we, in curriculum, have experienced a heavy input of control and/or emancipation oriented ideas in the past thirty years. The search for understanding, the hermeneutic quest appears to have been relegated to a third neutral, non-action category of cultural consensus. This, I suggest is a grave error on our part, for I believe the search for understanding is the basis in which scientific-technical and critical theory efforts are grounded.

Understanding, among other things is not a totally rational process. It is not a goal which may be reached by a mathematic-logical process of reasoning. Understanding is not an outcome of problem solving, or a product which emerges rationally from preexistent structures.

It is most likely an overemphasis upon rationalism, dependent upon dualisms such as mind and body, subject and object, thinking and doing that has created the present situation in our intellectual lives and most assuredly therefore in curriculum theory.

"The essence of what we call rational thought is leaving out things - gut sensations, feelings, impulses to act," says Phillip Slater (1977). It leaves out the thinker, his or her unique horizon or place in the universe, with its associated urges, feelings and impulses. The main purpose of rational thought is to explain things so that we may predict and control them. Explain means to ex - plain or "flatten out."

The emotions that govern the need to be rational or "objective" (analyse, distinguish, and categorize) are anxiety, fear and tensions. A thought, Slater remarks, is just a deed running scared, and "rational" or "objective" thought is the most frightened form of thinking. Rationality, Slater continues, is painting by the numbers. No matter how much information rationalists accumulate, or how many concepts they identify, they won't learn about those aspects of reality that frightened them into being cautious in the first place.

It is this rationalism that prevades curriculum theory in the clothes of science, or critical theory, or technique. This was brought home forcefully to me, for example, by William Doll's (1979) recent statement on "A Structural View of Curriculum." What occurred to me then was the recognition that Doll's proposal to transcend the behaviorist-humanist squabble was another totally rational proposal. Doll's use of Piaget's structuralism is highly rationalistic, both in content and process. What could be more so than having the capstone of intellectual development rest in formal logic. Among other things, this discovery warrants the kind of sexist review that Carol Gilligan (1977) gave Lawrence Kohlberg when she suggested that compassion was the highest female virtue, not justice as Kohlberg posits. Margaret Donaldson (1978) has laid some

partial groundwork for that sort of analysis of Piaget.

The point here is to emphasize that almost all of our curriculum theory efforts are attempts to explain, (flatten out) which are usually intended to lead to prediction and control. Thus, implicit in this form of rational theory is the dualism of theory and practice and the assumption that the "proof of the pudding" is in practice. The paradox of rationalist theory is in effect that it leads to an anti-intellectual priority in doing. Rationalism, in other words, becomes the handmaiden of "good works."

The ancient Greeks distinguished between theory and practice as two ways of living: the contemplative and the political. I think that this understanding holds for what I wish to present. The rationalist in curriculum thoery is living a political way of life; explaining in order to affect the living context of education in a direct controlling way - a political action. I personally suggest that it is time to reaffirm that legitimacy of contemplative curriculum theory. In Heidegger's terms let us accept mediative thinking on an equal footing with calculative thinking.

Both the control and the emancipation curriculum theories have an optimistic bouyancy that suggests we can create and/or control ourselves, our relationships and the world. Archibald Wheeler, (1979) a theoretical physicist, reminds us that the physical world is not amenable to this when he says "what is hard is to give up thinking of nature as a machine that goes on independent of the observer. What we conceive of as reality is a few iron posts of observation with paper-maché construction between them that is but the elaborate work of our imagination."

Lyall Watson, (1979) a biologist, puts the matter this way:

> "In other words what we regard as ordinary physical matter is simply an idea that occupies a world frame common to all minds. The universe is literally a collective thought, and we have a very powerful say in the reality manifest in our particular sector."

In our sanest moments we are all critical realists. We know that there exists a reality "out there", and we know that as human beings that reality is known to us by the limits and creativeness of the human imagination. What we "know" is as much or more who we humans are: as it is what is there!

The age of the naive realist, the positivist with delusions of one to one correspondence is no longer at the forefront of our physical science. Our knowledge and understanding has moved us beyond this, through the residue of this exists strongly in the common sense of our culture of positivism. Thus, we live with naive realism in our lives and especially in our scientific-technical world, but also in the form of such emancipatory doctrines as scientific Marxism. As William Barrett suggests so persuasively; both capitalism and communism as they exist today are offsprings of the scientific-technical era.

D.H. Wilkinson (1979), another physicist, suggests that there are three kinds of limits to the knowledge of our natural world. Essentially they are limitations placed upon our perceptual and conceptual ability by the nature of technology, reality, and the biology of the human species. Wilkinson's major point is that scientists are limited in their knowledge and that at the point where knowledge no longer suffices, the scientist, like all other humans, creates explanation and meaning from an aesthetic feeling base.

As Wilkinson says, "It is a truism with a capital T, that in man's description of the natural world, truth can never be accorded more than a 't' from the lower case. This is because you can with certainty prove a hypothesis to be wrong, but you can never prove a hypothesis to be uniquely wise. He goes on later to ask "How do we choose between alternative scientific hypotheses when we have used up all our scientific criteria?"

The remaining criterion of what is right rests in our feeling. It is precisely what we do when we are faced with a 'regular' choice between two paintings, or poems, or any two courses of action. We sift and exhaust the evidence and then choose because we feel.

What this says is that human behavior and activity, thought modified by experiences, issues from a basic capacity which is the same for whatever endeavor, art or science, that humans engage in, in their personal and cultural experience.

The fundamental human quest is the search for meaning and the basic human capacity for this search is experienced in the hermeneutic process, the process of interpretation of the text (whether artifact, natural world or human action). This is the search (or research) for greater understanding that motivates and satisfies us.

The real, both Slater (1977) and MacMurray (1957) remind us, means important. What is real is what is important to us. Abstract thought is grounded in value, since a thought (or system of thought) can only be of value to someone - a matter of feeling, motive and desire. "We can't separate thinking from wanting, we can only think desirously."

Curriculum theorizing is potentially the creation of reality. Our rationalistic theory leads to what Slater has termed the "tinkertoy" style of reality, a sequential compartmentalized and categorized set of pieces which we put together through a language of nouns.

Curriculum theory as a search for understanding, a meditative thinking, is an attempt to deal with unity rather than bits and parts additively. It is a theory which is experienced as a participatory phenomena, where the person engages in dialogue with the theory, bringing each person's biography and values to the interpretation. The intention is not to explain (flatten out) for control purposes, but to reinterpret in order to provide greater grounding for understanding.

Setting for Theory-Practice

What has been said up to now is a platform or frame within which I shall place my concern for theory and practice. Essentially, I shall propose that the problematics of theory-practice must be viewed in a larger framework. In a process which Paul Ricouer and Hans Gadamer call the hermeneutic circle. Thus theory and practice are not only integrated though action and reflection, but are a part of a larger interpretive endeavor which includes intention and direction toward the recovery of meaning and the development of understanding.

Practice, Barrett (1979) reminds us, is an abstract concept. The idea of practice as separate from the world of everyday life is a specific development in human thought. Thus, the separation of theory from practice is only possible when each is abstracted from the concreteness of reality.

Theory as systematic and formal reflection is an abstraction from the ordinary thinking present in all human activity. Practice is abstracted from the constant action which accompanies ordinary reflection. Both theory and practice are embedded in social and cultural forms. All the human sciences start off by referring back to a lived experience, at least an implicit one, and they provide a certain understanding of this. Social science data provide us with a basis for our imaginations in terms of our experience of the life world.

Ricouer (1978), for example, discusses hermeneutics in terms of whether the hermeneutic quest is focused upon the restroation of meaning, or the reduction of illusion. He talks at some length about the

theorizing of Freud, Marx, and Neitsche in terms of their commitment to facilitating greater understanding through the reduction of illusion. Thus they enter the theory-practice problematic with the intention of reducing illusion, distortion, and mystification. For these theorists, engaging in a theory - praxis relationship reveals the illusions that exist and provides us with a basis of new knowledge and understanding of reality.

Paul Ricouer, however, raises questions about this form of hermeneutics and opts for the restoration of meaning as the more desirable intention of hermeneutics. He feels that what is at stake is what he calls the mytho-poetic core of imagination. He says that a demystifying hermeneutics sets up a "rude discipline of necessity." Following Spinoza, he characterizes rude necessity as: "first one finds oneself a slave, understands ones slavery, and rediscovers oneself within defined necessity." Ricouer feels this intention lacks "the grace of imagination, the upsurge of the possible."

Hans Gadamer (1976) discusses a similar concern as expressed by Ricouer in terms of the distinction between "not understanding" and "misunderstanding." Attributing the shift from not understanding to mis understanding to Schleirmacher, one suspects that Freud, Marx and Neitsche (for example) are oriented toward clearing of misunderstandings. Gadamer too, as Ricouer, feels that this is a mistake. It is not so much that we misunderstand but that we do not understand. For him the intention of hermeneutics is to reinterpret the situation, and the boundaries or horizons of the interpreter are a critical part of this process of understanding. In essence what Gadamer and Ricouer are calling for is an ontological interpretation in hermeneutics rather than a epistomolgical or methodological stance.

Following from this it appears that the problem of theory-practice must be seen in light of the interpretation of meaning, as an attempt to reinterpret a context with the hope of reducing illusion, yes; but more fundamentally to come to understand what is not now understood.

It would appear that both the scientific-technical and critical theorists look specifically toward practice as the foundation variable. "By your good works shall ye be known." Theory, in this sense becomes strictly an instrumental schema at the service of human activity. This attitude toward knowledge was articulated by Francis Bacon in Novum Organum.

"Of all signs there is none more certain or noble than that taken from fruits. For fruits and works are as it were sponsors and suretics for the truth of philosophies...." This attitude is anti-theoretical and persists today in the idea that science or knowledge ought to be 'practical,' that is applicable to technological progams ... and all men "ought to organize themselves as a sacred duty to improve and transform the conditions of life..':

This attitude turns out to be a limited concept of theory. Later science was to affirm the power of theory, and for our purposes it is proposed that both theory and practice are contributory to revealing greater understanding, to being a part of the hermeneutic circle.

Both enter in as a necessary moment in the hermeneutic circle, the quest for understanding and meaning; and as such the dialectic of theory-practice must itself be viewed in terms of what it reveals that creates new meaning for us through our interpretation. The test of "good" theory in practice is thus, not centrally that it works (i.e., that we can control practice), but that in the engagement of theory and practice we are emancipated from previous misunderstandings and are then freed to reinterpret situations and reach greater understandings.

Both science and critical theory are engaged in the theory-practice problem. In science, for example, you may treat theory as a set of hypotheses which are tested in the practice of empirical studies. Thus the

concrete world of practice either responds as predicted or it doesn't. If it does respond as predicted this response is added to the larger corpus of related responses in the form of new knowledge. In science this process supposedly goes on in a neutral value framework.

Critical theory recognizes the role of human interest in knowledge formation and creation. Science, critical theory claims, has an interest in control and critical theory has an interest in emancipation. Thus, critical theory calls its interest in practice, a problem of theory and praxis. What this means is theory which is self-reflective and with an interest in practices which release persons from domination; or speaking positively - in emancipation.

Critical theory then proceeds on the basis of a methodological paradigm much as psychoanalysis, as Habermas describes it, or as a method of action such as Paulo Friere (1970) illustrates. In either case there are common elements such as: a general analytical theory (e.g., variations of Marxism) which are presented as a potential way of viewing the practical reality of a person or group of persons. This framework is related and integrated in relation to the way the person or group of persons sees their own reality; and then tested in their real life circumstances in terms of their emancipation (e.g. release from neurosis or improvement of realistic consciousness or practical freedom from the past domination by others.)

Provided what has been said is a reasonable and valid portrayal of science and critical theory, two significant understandings emerge.

First, both science and critical theory are methodologies (epistomological approaches) which utilize a theory-practice (or praxis) relationship to create knowledge.

Further, each methodology utilizes the theory-practice relationship to increase their understanding of what is, as well as utilizing their knowledge to create technical functions or emancipatory praxis.

This leads to a recognition that both science and critical theory are participants in a hermeneutic process. Both methodologies lead to increased understanding of reality thorugh the interpretation and reinterpretation of the reality with which they are concerned through the dynamics of the theory-practice/praxis relationships.

Whatever rests in this category which is truly separate from control or emancipation must rest in the area of poetics. I would thus propose that there is a third methodology; that of the mytho-poetic imagination, particularly related to the use of insight, visualization and imagination, which is essentially separate from science and praxis. Its practical method is surely similar to Polanyi's (1972) indwelling, and most probably what Steiner (1979) credits Heidegger's life work to be - that is, a process of "radical astonishment." The myth of poetic deals with "why there is being rather than nothing," at the awe, wonder, and anxiety of this puzzle.

I think perhaps this concern is most beautifully caught in Soren Kierkegaard's novel REFLECTIONS.

> "One sticks one finger into the soil to tell by the smell what land one is on: I stick my finger into existence - it smells of nothing. Where am I? Who am I? How did I come to be here? What is this thing called world? How did I come into the world? Why was I not consulted?... and if I am compelled to take part in it, where is the Director? I would like to see him!"

To me this clearly expresses the poetic practical interest in meaning. It is perhaps best called the methodology of "so what"? Its search is for meaning and a sense of unity and well being.

The methods of poetics also engage in the theory-practice relationship, only in a more personalized and uniquely biographical manner. Here, broadly speaking, insights, images, and imaginative (or speculative) symbolizations are created as possible meaning structures. These meaning structures are however created as much or more by the concrete and practical experience of the participant in relation to the symbols, as they are in the coherence of the symbolic structure itself. The process of self reflection in this case is the reflection upon the self, not reflection on the theory in a critical theory mode.

Science (in contrast to scientists) cannot deal with ultimate meaning, and critical theory in its concern for praxis leaves open the questions of infinity and eternity. For this and a host of more mundane aesthetic aspects of reality we need poetic participation in meaning.

But what of hermeneutics, per se? It is my opinion that the hermeneutic circle of understanding lies within each of the epistomologies and also transcends each method in the form of an ontological platform.

Each method, thus, uses a theory-practice interaction to create greater understanding and practical activity. To the extent that we come to know and understand more through the theory-practice relationship we are participating in a hermeneutic process.

The three methods, (science, critical theory and poetics) are contributory methodologies to a larger hermeneutic circle of continual search for greater understanding, and for a more satisfying interpretation of what is.

The importance of this distinction lies in a different action between the ontological and epistomological understanding of hermeneutics and is illustrated by what I believe to be a misunderstanding by Habermas (1971) about the basis of hermeneutics. This opinion is shared by Gadamer and there exists today a series of dialogues between the men (see, e.g., Hoy, 1978). I shall not review this literature here, but simply comment that Habermas' position issues from concern mainly for the social science and follows the works of Dilthey in both spirit and content. Gadamer's position of the larger view of hermeneutics comes out of broader religio-social concern.

Also, Habermas does not deal adequately with the aesthetic (a failing of many critical theorists[1]), and concludes that the humanities hermeneutic methodology has become "objective" in its patterning after the scientific method. The hermeneutic, by his view remains merely method, and it is my contention, following Gadamer and Ricouer that the hermeneutic circle is ontological in nature; and that at the level of method the appropriate category to accompany science and praxis is art, or the mytho-poetic.

Science, Critical Theory and Poetics provide us with boundaries, or "landscapes" as Maxine Greene (1978) expresses it. But Colin Wilson (1975) reminds us that although we need to frame to see the world, sooner or later this frame is seen as an absurdity. The frame is really a life, for everything in it implies the existence of new vistas beyond. Yet we cannot grasp the world without a frame. This is the nature of mind.

And What About Curriculum Theory and Practice?

Curriculum theory, it is suggested here is a form of hermeneutic theory. Thus curriculum theory is an ever renewing attempt to interpret curricular reality and to develop greater understanding. Curricular practice results from hermeneutic process which both lies within the three methods (Epistomologies) and transcends them.

Curriculum theory, as a movement in the hermeneutic circle does not draw its reason for existence from practice. Schwab (1970) made this point clearly when he dramatically separated theory from practice through his discussion of the radical difference between theory and practice that may be witnessed in the methods of each, the source of their problems, their distinctly different subject matters; and outcomes of a different kind. Schwab did not, however, place the theory-practice relationship in a larger hermeneutic process.

Theory, however, as Van Manen says, has meaning of its' own. Theory is an act of imagining and it is through theory that we may hope to reach what theory points to. Not in the theory, for theory focused upon as a thing in itself becomes opaque, merely a "thing" in itself, which ends any vision it might possess. And, we don't reach our reality because of theory, for it is not a link in a logical chain, nor a conclusion in itself, or part of a syllagism. It is through theory that we see, think, know.

The act of theorizing is an act of faith, a religious act. It is the expression of belief, and as William James (1917) clearly expounds in THE WILL TO BELIEVE, belief necessitates an act of the moral will based on faith. Curriculum theorizing is a prayerful act. It is an expression of the humanistic vision in life.

As such it should not be whipsawed into "accountability" by a set of "mind forged manicles", whether Aristotelian syllogism, Roman formulary, factualized hypotheses in scientific terms, or critical visions of someone's utopia. Curriculum theory is what speaks to us through it and what we do is informed by theory; but neither the specific words of theory or the specific pedagogical acts of educators are the reality of education. What defines each is the spirit and vision that shines through the surface manifestations.

These methods provide us with technical and utilitarian control through technique, with emancipatory praxis through critical reflection, and with aesthetic, moral and metaphysical meaning through poetics.

What has been missing, and what has caused antagonism in curriculum theory, is a failure to realize that all three methodologies participate in the larger hermeneutic circle.

The necessity to reject the method of science and its positivism is essentially a political activity on the part of curriculum theorists by which the legitimacy of critical theory and poetics can be established in the field. The conflict between poetics and critical theory, perhaps best represented by the dialogue between the writings of William Pinar (1975) and Michael Apple (1978), turns out to be sibling rivalry rather than a fundamental schism.

The three methods, in other words, provide instrumental practice (technique), emancipatory political praxis; and personal awareness, insight, and vision for self reflection. Each is a valid basis for increasing our understanding, for helping us to interpet the reality of curricular circumstances.

The work of Dwayne Huebner (1966), especially that dealing with languaging in the classroom, prepares us for this view. When we examine the technical, scientific,, political, moral, and aesthetic language structures and potentials for talking about curriculum; we are clearly leading toward the three methods of knowledge that are called the Scientific-Technical, and Emancipatory (political), and the mytho-poetic (moral, aesthetic, metaphysical). As Huebner pointed out, all ways of talking are legitimate in some way, or for some purpose, or at some time. What wasn't explicated in his work was the ground of talking, which it is proposed here (in terms of methods) is the frame of horizon of the hermeneutic circle of understanding.

Returning to the presumption that curriculum theory is a form of hermeneutic theory with three contributing methodologies, it becomes explicable why non-scientific curriculum theory is a mystery to most

educators. It is a mystery because it deals with the mystery.

Curriculum theory is not essentially instrumental. If we must counter with opposites, curriculum theory is basically expressive. We possess instructional methods which fall within the activity of curricular theorizing, but these instrumental methods provide a theory-practice dialectic which leads to the expression and interpretation of meaning; and the development of greater understanding.

The focus of curriculum is not simply a context where a curriculum is in operation. The focus of curriculum is a microcosm of the universe. Blake's grain of sand; to which we bring ourselves, our consciousness, and our cultural reality. We are in effect expressing this in a total context.

As curriculum theorists we should be reminded of what Barrett (1979) quotes Alfred North Whitehead as saying to Bertrand Russell. "There are two kinds of people in the world, the muddle-headed and the simple-minded. You Bertee, are simple-minded, and I am muddle-headed."

The mathematical logic of Bertrand Russell no longer holds out the solution to reality. It was simple-minded as are most of the instrumental methods of curriculum. We are, as curriculum theorists, more aptly doomed to the expression of our muddle-headedness, since this appears to be the only long range hope for the creation of meaning in our lives or our profession.

Van Manen (1980) carries this thought in another direction in his writing on pedagogical theorizing. Language is the vehicle of expression, but the words let the life world shine through them. It is as an alternative to the silence that speech points toward. Pedagogical practice is the constant recovery of the pedagogical relationship through redemption, recall, regaining or recapturing the meaning of pedagogical activity.

About theory, Van Manen (1980) says:

> "Theorizing for the sake of theorizing, like art for art's sake, is not a superfluous self serving exercise.... Theorizing contributes to one's resourcefulness... not in a simple means-ends as applied technical pragmatic sense, nor in an attitudinal or subjectivist psychological sense. Theorizing contributes to one's resourcefulness by directing the orienting questions toward the source itself; the source which gives life or spirit to (inspires) our pedagogic life. To theorize is to struggle to achieve one's limits, to find one's origins, one's grounding in that which makes our pedagogic life possible."

The hermeneutical process is universal and basic for all inter-human experience, both of history and the present movement, precisely because of the fact that meaning can be experienced, even where it is not actually intended.

FOOTNOTES

1. A notable exception is the recent work of Marcuse (1978) who challenges the classical Marxist ideological conception of Art, and discusses the truth that art expresses as necessity, an experience which is an essential component of revolution even though it does not fall in the domain of radical praxis.

REFERENCES

Apple, Michael. (e.g.) "Ideology, Reproduction and Educational Reform". COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW, XXII, October, 1978.

Barrett, William. "The Illusion of Technique". New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday, 1979.

Doll, William. "A Structural View of Curriculum". THEORY INTO PRACTICE, Fall, 1979.

Donaldson, Margaret. CHILDREN'S MINDS. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1978.

Friere, Paulo. PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED. Herder & Herder, 1970.

Gadamer, Hans-George. PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS. University of California Press, 1976.

Gilligan, Carol. "In a Different Voice: Woman's Conception of the Self and Morality". HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, Vol. 47, No. 4, November 1977.

Greene, Maxine. LANDSCAPES FOR LEARNING. Teachers College Press, 1978.

Habermas, Jurgen. KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTEREST. Beacon Press, 1971.

Hoy, David Couzins. THE CRITICAL CIRCLE. University of California Press, 1978.

Huebner, Dwayne. "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings" in LANGUAGE AND MEANING. J. Macdonald and Robert Leeper, (Eds.), A.S.C.D., The Association. Washington, D.C., 1966.

James, William. THE WILL TO BELIEVE, SELECTED PAPERS ON PHILOSOPHY. J.M. Deny and Sons, 1917.

Kierkegaard, Soren. REFLECTIONS. Quoted by Colin Wilson, see below (1975).

MacMurray, John. THE SELF AS AGENT. Faber and Faber, Limited, London, 1957.

Marcuse, Herbert. THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION. Beacon Press, 1978.

Pinar, William F. (see e.g.) "Currere: Toward Reconceptualization" in CURRICULUM THEORIZING. William F. Pinar (Ed.), McCutchan Publishing Co., 1975.

Polanyi, Michael. THE TACIT DIMENSION. Anchor Paperback, 1972.

Ricouer, Paul. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOUER. Charles Reagon and David Stewart (Eds.). Beacon Press, 1978.

Schwab, Joseph. THE PRACTICAL: A LANGUAGE FOR CURRICULUM. National Education Association, 1970.

Slater, Phillip. THE WAYWARD GATE. Beacon Press, 1977.

Steiner, George. MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Viking Press, 1979.

Van Manen, Max. "Pedagogical Theorizing". Paper presented at the Annual A.E.R.A. Conference - Boston, Mass., April 1980. Author, University of Alberta, School of Education. (quote pp. 12-13).

Wheeler, Archibald. "Proving the Universe." NEWSWEEK, March 12, 1979.

Wilkinson, D.H. "The Universe as Artifact" in SCIENTIFIC MODELS OF MAN. Henry Harris (Ed.). Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979.

Wilson, Colin in THE INTELLIGENT UNIVERSE by David Foster. New York: G.P. Putnam & Sons. 1975, p. 24.

Caring

Nel Noddings
Stanford University

What does it mean to care? Our dictionaries tell us that "care" is a state of mental suffering or of engrossment; to care is to be in a burdened mental state, one of anxiety, fear, or solicitude about something or someone. Alternatively, one cares for something or someone if one has a regard for or inclination toward that something or someone. If I have an inclination toward mathematics, I may willingly spend some time with it, and if I have regard for you, what you think, feel, and desire will matter to me. And, again, to care may mean to be charged with the protection, welfare, or maintenance of something or someone.

These definitions represent different uses of "care" but, in the deepest human sense, we shall see that elements of each of them are involved in caring. In one sense, I may equate "cares" with "burdens"; I have cares in certain matters (professional, personal, or public) if I have burdens and worries, if I fret over current and projected states of affairs. In another sense, I care for someone if I feel a stir of desire or inclination toward him. In a related sense, I care for someone if I have regard for his views and interests. In the third sense, I have the care of an elderly relative if I am charged with the responsibility for his physical welfare. But, clearly, in the deep human sense which will occupy us, I cannot claim to care for my relative if my caretaking is perfunctory or grudging. In this paper, I shall for the most part restrict discussion to caring for human beings.

I shall claim that there are three aspects of caring relationships. The first two contain elements that are necessary, that is, constitutive of caring; the last reveals elements which are characteristic. There is engrossment, a first-person condition in which the consciousness of the one-caring is focused on the cared-for. This engrossment induces a displacement of motivational focus from the one-caring to the cared-for. There is an attitude of the one-caring which is received by and reflected in the cared for (a second-person aspect). This attitude conveys the regard for the one-caring to the cared-for; its reception in the cared-for completes the caring. We shall see that one may properly claim to care for another if the first-person conditions are met, but that the relation itself cannot be called "caring" unless the caring is completed in the cared-for. Finally, there is usually some observable action (a third-person aspect) in behalf of the cared-for. It will be clear, however, that an action criterion cannot be used as an infallible external test for caring; that is, we cannot say with certainty that X cares for Y on the basis of characteristic acts that we, as outsiders to the (X,Y) relation, may observe.

I. The One-Caring

In the ordinary course of events, we expect some action from one who claims to care, but action is not all we expect. How are we to determine whether Mr. Smith cares for his elderly mother who is confined to a nursing home? It is not enough, surely, that Mr. Smith should say, "I care." (But the possibility of his saying this will lead us onto another path of analysis shortly. We shall have to examine caring from the inside.) We, as observers, must look for some action, some manifestation in Smith's behavior, that will allow us to agree that he cares. To care, we feel, requires some action in behalf of the cared-for. Thus, if Smith never visits his mother, nor writes to her, nor telephones her, we would be likely to say that, although he is charged formally with her care-- he pays for her confinement--he does not really care. We point out that he seems to be lacking in regard, that he is not troubled enough to see for himself how his mother fares. There is no desire for her company, no inclination toward her. But notice that a criterion of action would not be easy to formulate from this case. Smith, after all, does perform some action in behalf of his mother; he pays for her physical maintenance. But we are looking for a qualitatively different sort of action.

Is direct, externally observable, action necessary to caring? Can caring be present in the absence of action in behalf of the cared-for? Consider the problem of lovers who cannot marry because they are already committed to satisfactory and honorable marriages. The lover learns that his beloved is ill. All his instincts cry out for his presence at her bedside. Yet, if he fears for the trouble he may bring her, for the recriminations that may spring from his appearance, he may stay away from her. Surely, we would not say in such a case that the lover does not care. He is in a mental state of engrossment, even suffering; he feels the deepest regard; and, charged by his love with the duty to protect, he denies his own need in order to spare her one form of pain. Thus, in caring, he chooses not to act directly and tenderly in response to the beloved's immediate physical pain. We see, then, that there is an act of commitment on the part of the one-caring, but there need not be an action observable in the external world.

Engrossment is the fundamental aspect of caring from the inside. When I look at and think about how I am when I care, I realize that there is invariably this displacement of interest from my own reality to the reality of the other. Kierkegaard has said that we apprehend another's reality as possibility.[1] To touch me, to arouse in me something which will disturb my own ethical reality, I must see the other's reality as a possibility for my own. This is not to say that I cannot try to see the other's reality differently. Indeed, I can. I can look at it objectively by collecting factual data; I can look at it historically. If it is heroic, I can come to admire it. But this sort of looking does not touch my own ethical reality; it may even distract me from it. As Kierkegaard put it:

> Ethically speaking there is nothing so conducive to sound sleep as admiration of another's ethical reality. And again ethically speaking, if there is anything that can stir and rouse a man, it is a possibility ideally requiring itself of a human being.[2]

But I am suggesting that it is not only the logical possibilities for becoming better than we are that we see when we struggle toward the reality of the other. We also have aroused in us the immediate feeling, "I must do something." When we see the other's reality as a possibility for us, we must act to eliminate the intolerable, to reduce the pain, to fill the need, to actualize the dream. When I am in this sort of relationship with another, that the other's reality becomes a real possibility for me, I care. Whether the caring is sustained, whether it lasts long enough to be conveyed to the other, whether it becomes visible in the world, depends upon my sustaining the relationship or, at least, acting out of concern for my own ethicality as though it were sustained.

In this latter case, one in which something has slipped away from me or eluded me from the start (in a particular case) but in which the strive to regain or to attain it, I experience a genuine caring for self. This caring for self, for the ethical self, can only emerge from a caring for others. Now, of course, a sense of my physical self, a knowledge of what gives me pain and pleasure, precedes my caring for others. Otherwise their realities as possibilities for my own reality would mean nothing to me. But this sense is anticipatory to caring; it is not caring itself. When we say of someone, "He cares only for himself," we mean that, in our deepest sense, he does not care at all. He has only a sense of that physical self--of what gives him pain or pleasure. Whatever he sees in others is pre-selected in relation to his own needs and desires. He does not see the reality of the other as a possibility for himself but only as an instance of what he has already determined as self or not-self. Thus, he is ethically both zero and finished. His only "becoming" is a physical becoming.

Now I need not be a person who cares only for myself in order to behave occasionally as though I care only for myself. Sometimes I behave this way because I have not thought through things carefully enough and because the mode of times pushes the thoughtless in its own direction. Suppose that I am a teacher who loves mathematics. I encounter a student who is doing poorly, and I decide to talk with him. He tells me that he hates mathematics. Aha, I think. Here is the problem. I must help this poor boy to love mathematics, and then he will do better at it. What am I doing when I proceed in this way? I am not trying to

grasp the reality of the other as a possibility for myself. I have not even asked: "How would it feel to hate mathematics?" Instead, I project my own reality onto my student and say, "You will be just fine if you only learn to love mathematics." And I have "data" to support me. There is evidence that intrinsic motivation is associated with higher achievement. (Did anyone ever doubt this?) So my student becomes an object of study and manipulation for me.

But if I care, I do not make the cared-for into an object of study; at least, I do not allow this change to become permanent. The "feeling with" of caring precedes rational determination of what might be done in behalf of the cared-for, and I must continually turn back to this feeling, to the receptive mode which allows me to apprehend the other. As I convert what I have received from the other into a problem, something to be solved, I move away from the other. I clean up his reality, strip it of complex and bothersome qualities, in order to think it. The other's reality becomes data, stuff to be analyzed, studied, interpreted. All this is to be expected and is entirely appropriate provided that I see the essential turning points and move back to the concrete, the personal, and the receptive. If I care, I must consider the cared-for's nature, his way of life, needs, and desires. I enter into a relation with him and tie my objective thinking to a relational stake which stands at the heart of caring. By this tie, I allow myself to be continually pulled back into direct communication. If I fail to do this, I may climb into clouds of abstraction, moving rapidly away from the cared-for into a domain of objective and impersonal problems upon which I impose whatever structure satisfies it. If I do not turn away from my abstractions, I lose the cared-for. Indeed, I lose myself as one-caring, for I now care about a problem instead of a person.

Caring involves, for the one-caring, a "feeling with" the other. This "feeling with" is not synonymous with "empathy" as it is usually defined. It does not involve projection into the other, nor does it imply a full understanding of the other. Rather it involves receiving the other. When I care, I receive this variable and never fully understand other into myself. I become a duality.

Suppose for example, that I am having lunch with a random group of colleagues. Among them is one for whom I have never had much regard and for whom I have little professional respect. I do not care for him. Somewhere in the light banter of lunch talk, he begins to talk about an experience in the war-time navy and the feelings he had under a particular treatment. He talks about how these feelings impelled him to become a teacher. His expressions are unusually lucid, defenseless. I am touched--not by sentiment--but by something else. It is as though his eyes and mine have combined to look at the scene he describes. I know that I would have behaved differently in the situation, but this knowledge is in itself a matter of indifference. I feel what he says he felt. I have been invaded by this other. Quite simply, I shall never again be completely without regard for him. My professional opinion has not changed, but I now care.

Apprehending the other's reality, feeling what he feels as nearly as possible, is the essential part of caring from the view of the one-caring. For if I take on the other's reality as possibility and begin to feel its reality, I feel also, that I must act accordingly;that is, I am impelled to act as though in my own behalf, but in behalf of the other. But, of course, this feeling that I must act may or may not be sustained. I must make a commitment to act or to refrain from acting. The commitment to act in behalf of the cared-for, the continued interest in his reality, and a continual renewal of commitment are the essential elements of caring from the view of the one-caring. The renewal of commitment spans the temporal space of caring. It may endure for a brief interval as I aid a stranger in minor distress, or it may endure for a life-time with family and friends. So long as it endures, I care.

II. The Cared-For

Caring is, at the outset, a relation between the one-caring and an apprehended reality that represents the cared-for. But to be completed in the world it depends upon the receptivity of the cared-for. You may care

for me, for example, without my knowing it; further, I may not believe that you care for me simply because you say that you do. Assuming that I am unresisting and even receptive, what will convince me? Generally, I look more for an attitude than a specific kind of action. I look for something which tells me that you have regard for me, that you are not behaving perfunctorily or merely out of obligation.

Gabriel Marcel characterizes this attitude in terms of "disposability (disponabilité), the readiness to bestow and spend oneself and make oneself available, and its contrary, indisposability."[3] One who is disposable recognizes that she has a self to invest, to give. She does not identify herself with her objects and possessions. She is present to the cared-for. One who is indisposable, however, comes across even to one physically present as absent, as elsewhere. Marcel says:

> When I am with someone who is indisposable, I am conscious of being with someone for whom I do not exist; I am thrown back on myself.[4]

The one-caring, in caring, is present in her acts of caring. Even in physical absence, acts at a distance bear the signs of presence: engrossment in the other, regard, desire for the other's well-being. Caring is largely reactive and responsive. Perhaps it is even better characterized as receptive. The one-caring is sufficiently engrossed in the other to listen to him and to take pleasure or pain in what he recounts. Whatever she does for the cared-for is embedded in a relationship that reveals itself as engrossment of the one-caring and in an attitude that warms and comforts the cared-for.

The caring attitude, this quality of disposability, pervades the situational time-space. So far as it is in my control, if we are conversing and if I care, I remain present to you throughout the conversation. Of course, if I care and you do not, then I may put my presence at a distance, thus freeing you to embrace the absence you have chosen. This is the way of dignity in such situations. To be treated as though one does not exist is a threatening experience, and one has to gather up one's self, one's presence, and place it in a safer, more welcome environment. And, of course, it is the way of generosity.

The one cared-for sees the concern, delight, or interest in the eyes of the one-caring and feels her warmth in both verbal and body language. To the cared-for no act in his behalf is quite as important or influential as the attitude of the one-caring; an act done grudgingly may be accepted graciously on the surface but resented deeply inwardly, whereas a small act performed generously may be accepted nonchalantly but appreciated inwardly. When the attitude of the one-caring bespeaks caring, the cared-for glows, grows stronger, and feels not so much that he has been given something as that something has been added to him. And this "something" may be hard to specify. Indeed, for the one-caring and the cared-for in a relationship of genuine caring, there is no felt need on either part to specify what sort of transformation has taken place.

The intangible something that is added to the cared-for (and often, simultaneously, to the one-caring) will be an important consideration for us when we discuss caring in social institutions and, especially, in schools. It may be that much of what is most valuable in the teaching-learning relationship cannot be specified and certainly not pre-specified. The attitude characteristic of caring comes through in acquaintance. When the student associates with the teacher, feeling free to initiate conversation and to suggest areas of interest, he or she is better able to detect the characteristic attitude even in formal, goal-oriented situations such as lectures. Then a brief contact of eyes may say, "I am still the one interested in you. All of this is of variable importance and significance, but you still matter more." It is no use saying that the teacher who "really cares" wants her students to learn the basic skills which are necessary to a comfortable life; I am not denying that, but the notion is impoverished on both ends. On the one extreme, it is not enough to want one's students to master basic skills. I would not want to choose, but if I had to choose whether my child would be a reader or a loving human being, I would choose the latter with alacrity.

On the other extreme, it is by itself too much, for it suggests that I as a caring teacher should be willing to do almost anything to bring my students to mastery of the basic skills. And I am not. Among the intangibles that I would have my students carry away is the feeling that the subject we have struggled with is both fascinating and boring, significant and silly, fraught with meaning and nonsense, challenging and tedious, and that whatever attitude we take toward it, it will not diminish our regard for each other. The student is infinitely more important than the subject.

The cared-for responds to the presence of the one-caring. He feels the difference between being received and being held off or ignored. Whatever the one-caring actually does is enhanced or diminished, made meaningful or meaningless, in the attitude conveyed to the cared-for. This attitude is not something thought by either the one-caring or the cared-for although, of course, either one may think about it. It is a total conveyance of self to other, a continual transformation of individual to duality to new individual to new duality. Neither the engrossment of the one-caring nor the attitude perceived by the cared-for is rational; that is, neither is reasoned. While much of what goes on in caring is rational and carefully thought out, the basic relationship is not, and neither is the awareness of relatedness. The essentially non-rational nature of caring is recognized by, for example, Urie Bronfenbrenner when he claims:

> In order to develop a child needs the enduring, irrational involvement of one or more adults in care and joint activity with the child.[5]

In answer to what he means by "irrational," he explains:

> Somebody has got to be crazy about that kid![6]

Now, of course, philosophers are certain to point out that being "crazy" about a child is not necessarily "irrational." There is equivocation here. But Bronfenbrenner's way of talking nonetheless underscores the essential point I have been trying to make. The caring relationship is, at bottom, nonrational. However rational the decision making processes which enter it, however, rational, the investigation of means-ends relationships, the commitment that elicits the rational activity precedes it and gives it personal meaning. The one-caring stands ready to engage in play, to embrace, to take wild and desperate chances in behalf of the cared-for. All this the cared-for sees and, in the absence of pathology, he grows and glows with it.

So far, I have proceeded phenomenologically. I have been exploring situations that all of us are familiar with, and I have subjected these situations to analysis. But it is important to realize that there are both logical and empirical factors that contribute to the analysis. In the logical domain, I have claimed that reception by the cared-for of an attitude of caring on the part of the one-caring is partially constitutive of caring. This attitude and its reception are not just characteristic of caring. Does this mean that I cannot be said to care for X if X does not recognize my caring? In the fullest sense, in evaluating the relation, I think we have to accept this result. Caring involves, essentially, two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for. It is complete when it is fulfilled in both. We are tempted to say that the caring attitude is characteristic of caring, that when one cares, she characteristically exhibits an attitude. But, then, it could be missed by the cared-for. If Imeet the first-person requirements of caring for X, I am tempted to insist that I do care--that there is something wrong with X that he does not appreciate my caring. We want to allow my claim without committing ourselves to call the relation caring. For consider: If X is looking at this relationship, X would have to report, however reluctantly, that something is missing. X does not feel that I care. Therefore, sadly, I must admit that, while I care X does not perceive that I do and, hence, the relationship cannot be characterized as one of caring. This result does not necessarily signify negligence on my part. There are limits in caring. X may be paranoid or otherwise pathological. There may be no way for my caring to reach him. But, the caring has been only partially actualized.

Logically, we have the following:
(W,X) is a caring relationship if and only if
i) W cares for X (as described in the one-caring), and
ii) X recognizes that W cares for X.

When we say "X recognizes that W cares for X," we mean that X receives the caring honestly. He receives it; he does not hide from it or deny it. Hence, its reception becomes part of what the one-caring feels when he receives the cared-for. We do not need to add a third condition and a fourth, as in, "W is aware that X recognizes," "X is aware that W is aware that..." and so on. Caring requires the typical engrossment and motivational displacement in W and, also, the recognition of caring by X.

Now, of course, the relationship can be mutually (or doubly) caring if we can interchange W and X and retain true expressions. This seems the correct logical analysis of caring, and of course, it has the merit that it accounts for the ambivalance that may arise in such a situation. By that, I mean it allows me to say, "I care for X," even if I must admit that (I,X) is not a fully caring relationship.

There is, also, empirical confirmation of much that we have explored phenomenologically. Space prevents extended discussion, but we may note that the empirical literature contains many references to the effects of attitude (both positive and negative) on the one-to-be-cared for. Sanger,[7] Montague,[8] and Wengraf,[9] for example, present evidence that even a fetus is affected by the feelings of acceptance or rejection in its mother. Speaking of maternal hostility, Zilboorg says that it

> .....has its rather mysterious ways of conveying itself to the child and of provoking a considerable number of undesirable and at times directly pathological reactions.[10]

Further, studies have shown that significant differences in child personality and behavior cannot always be traced to specific differences in child-rearing practices but are often correlated with parental attitudes toward their children.[11]

Hence, a claim that attitude is crucial to an analysis of caring, that feeling is somehow conveyed faithfully and directly, is supported both logically and empirically.

III. Caring Acts

We have seen that externally observable action is not necessary to caring, but we can agree readily that it is characteristic of caring.

Our motivation, in caring, is directed toward the welfare, protection, and enhancement of the cared-for. When we care, we should, ideally, be able to present reasons for our action/in-action which would persuade a reasonable, disinterested observer that we have acted in behalf of the cared-for. This does not mean that all such observers have to agree that they would have behaved exactly as we did in the caring situation. They may, indeed, see preferred alternatives. They may experience the very conflicts that caused us anxiety and, as a result, suggest a different course of action. But our reasons should be so well connected to the objective elements of the problem that our course of action clearly stands a chance of succeeding in behalf of the cared-for.

The problems a third-person (observer) has in judging a chain of action for caring seem somehow extraneous or unimportant to the actual caring. There are, after all, two persons in a unique position to judge: the one-caring and the cared-for. Over time, the cared-for should recognize and acknowledge the caring; from the start, the one-caring should be aware of a displacement in attention from the self to the cared-for. But

the problems of the observer become important when we consider how care may be entrusted. When we consider the possibility of institutional or societal caring, these problems become critical.

Clearly, the motive of one claiming to care may properly yield either partial support for a claim to care, or it may reveal a desire merely to be thought of as caring. But motives are not always revealed. There is, also, an attitude characteristic of caring; the one-caring is engrossed in the other, not in herself. There is a move away from egoism. But how is this revealed in action?

It seems likely that the actions of one-caring will be varied rather than rule-bound. Variation is to be expected if the one claiming to care really cares, for her engrossment is in the variable and never fully understood other, on the particular individual in a particular set of circumstances. Rule-bound responses in the name of caring lead us to suspect that the claimant wants to be credited with caring. A person who "cares" for animals and whisks every stray promptly to the county shelter may be suspect. To care, after all, is to have an inclination toward, to protect. Most animals, once at the county shelter, suffer death. Does one who cares choose swift and merciful death for the object of her care over precarious and perhaps painful life? Well, we might say, it depends. If we live in a quiet area, relatively free of traffic, we might feed strays for a while, watching for signs of illness and inquiring in various ways after the owners. We might adopt some of them. If, however, we live on a street where traffic presents a continual threat to life and if we cannot ourselves provide shelter, we might properly turn often to the institutional shelter. But, by and large, we do not say with any conviction that a person cares if that person acts routinely according to a fixed rule.

Caring involves stepping out of one's own personal frame of reference into the other's. When we care, we consider the other's point of view, his objective needs, and what he expects of us. Our attention, our mental engrossment, is on the cared-for, not on ourselves. Our reasons for acting, then, have to do both with the other's wants and desires and with the objective elements of his problematic situation. If the stray cat is healthy and relatively safe, we provide food, water, and encouraging affection. Why condemn it to death when it might enjoy a vagabond freedom? If our minds are on ourselves, however, our reasons for acting point back at us and not outward to the cared-for. When we want to be thought of as caring, we act routinely in a way that may easily secure that credit for us.

A teacher describes a series of incidents that occurred in a team teaching situation. The students had entered into contracts for the grades they would like to receive in mathematics. One bright boy achieved his "B" relatively early in the marking period, and decided to use the rest of his time on non-mathematical studies. The teacher telling the story accepted his decision, but the other teachers on the team did not. They felt that they could not properly allow a student to "waste" his obvious talent and that they were obligated to insist that he strive for the "A" of which he was clearly capable. They insisted that they cared and that they were helping the student. The teacher who accepted the boy's decision was not so sure. Were they helping or hindering?[12] For this teacher, the boy's motives and attitude toward mathematics and other studies were respectable possibilities. She "felt with" him and respected his decision. This is not to say that she refrained from trying to influence him, but she did refrain from attempting to control him "for his own sake."

This is, I think, an important point about caring in the teaching relationship. When we care, we are touched by the other and expect to touch him. We enter into a relation with the student, but that relation need not be one of interference and control. Martin Buber describes it as a master-apprentice relation:

> ....the master remains the model for the teacher. For if the educator of our day has to act consciously he must nevertheless do it "as though he did not." That raising of the finger,

> that questioning glance, are his genuine doing. Through him the selection of the effective world reaches the pupil. He fails the recipient when he presents this selection to him with a gesture of interference...Interference divides the soul in his care into an obedient part and a rebellious part. But a hidden influence proceeding from his integrity has an integrating force.[13]

To care, then, is not to act by rule but by affection and regard. We act not to achieve for ourselves a commendation but to protect and enhance the welfare of the cared-for. Because we are inclined toward the cared-for, we want to act in a way that will please him. But we wish to please him for his sake and not for ours. Even this reason--to act so that the happiness and pleasure of the cared-for will be enhanced--may not be a sure sign of caring. We are sometimes thrown into conflict over what the cared-for wants and what we think would be best for him. As caring parents, for example, we cannot always act in ways which bring immediate reactions of pleasure from our children. But our decisions are accompanied by conversation which is open to influence.

The one-caring desires the well-being of the cared-for and acts to promote that well-being. She is inclined toward the other. An observer, however, cannot "see" the crucial motive and may mis-read the attitudinal signs. The observer, then, must judge caring, in part, by the following: first, the action under consideration either brings about a favorable outcome for the cared-for or seems reasonably likely to have done so; second, the one-caring displays a characteristic variation in her actions--she acts in non rule-bound fashion in behalf of the cared-for; third, decisions are often made through deliberation with the cared-for and through mutual influence rather than interference.

IV. Can Institutions Care?

We want to ask, how, whether a society or large community can care. In light of our analysis, the initial response to this question must be "no". A society cannot be "present" to the cared-for; only an individual can be disposable in this important sense. Strictly speaking, only an individual has a motive. But in a modified sense, it would seem that a society can care. It can allocate funds to enhance the well-being of groups to be cared for; it can structure its laws and institutions in ways which make it clear that, at least, the existence of the group to be cared for is recognized. It can provide systematically for caretaking.

The motive for caring arises in individuals. As groups of individuals discuss the perceived needs of another individual or group, the imperative changes from, "I must do something!" to "Something must be done." This change is accompanied by a shift from the nonrational to the rational. What should be done? How shall it be done? Who should do it? Why should the persons named do it? The danger, as we have already seen, is that caring which is essentially a nonrational response to the needs and wants of the cared-for is transformed into an analytically prescribed system of caretaking. The result is a pervasive complaint against our caretaking institutions and agencies: "Nobody cares!"

Is there an alternative to this rational transformation of caring? I would like to suggest that institutions, agencies, and large groups should not undertake what is clearly impossible for them to accomplish; that is, they should not try through any sort of rational transformation to care directly. Rather, the individuals planning for these large groups should consider how they might best provide supportive environments for caring. This means that planners will have to ask how they can provide opportunities for those entrusted with caretaking to care. The engrossment constitutive of caring and its reception in the cared-for require that relations be developed. Persons in a caring relationship need time to talk to each other, to share, to influence each other.

Space prevents the extended discussion which must eventually be engaged on this, but some recommendations compatible with our analysis can be made.

Provisions for extended interactions must be made. Working groups might be kept small. Their association over time might be extended. In schools, for example, "schools within schools" or some such device might be tried. Advisors might stay with students, by mutual consent, for the students' entire school attendance. Similarly, teachers might stay with their classes for two or three years instead of the traditional one year. Several desirable outcomes might emerge from such arrangements. First, and most important, caring has a better chance of developing in longer, closer relationships. Second, teachers might predictably develop a greater sense of responsibility for the growth of students with whom they will have extended contact. Third, teachers might gain greater proficiency in the subjects they teach by following the subjects longitudinally instead of teaching the same thing year after year. It is sometimes protested, in reaction to this recommendation, that there are teachers we would not wish to entrust our children to for such extended periods. This is a poor argument. We should not entrust our children to such persons for one year or even for part of a year. A fourth, final, advantage to this arrangement, then, is that we might finally--and quite naturally--begin to force out of the profession those who are least caring and least competent.

Next, rules must be converted, wherever possible, to principles and guidelines. Those entrusted with caretaking must also be entrusted with making judgments. Variability in treatments must be expected and encouraged with appropriate justification. Caring reduces the necessity for justice. Where we can, we respond to the felt needs and longings of the cared-for. We establish expectations, and our regard makes it likely that the expectations will be met. But decisions are not necessarily easily made in caring relationships; they are not made by formula. When we care, we personally are addressed, and we must respond. We can turn to others for help, but we cannot turn to others, or to "society," to relieve us of responsibility. Always we turn away from rules and abstractions to the real, concrete, present cared-for, and organizations which entrust us with caretaking must encourage us to do this.

As Bronfenbrenner suggests, organizations might themselves be rewarded for encouraging caring in their personnel. Organizations might, then, make it acceptable for parents to stay home with sick children; to make and receive phone calls from family members; to bring infants to work under suitable conditions (a baby is no more a distraction in an office than in a kitchen); to participate in community activities requiring one-to-one interactions.

The intrinsic rewards of caring must also be acknowledged, and persons must be freed of the constraints which now prevent their harvesting these rewards. In schools, this means a shift away from rule-bound accountability, and from product-oriented evaluation, away from insistence on uniform competencies. It means a move toward personal responsibility, toward helping rather than rating, toward increased opportunities for dialogue, toward long-term and, perhaps, joy filled personal relationships.

V. Closing Comments

Caring is a large, complex topic. In this paper, I have outlined an analysis of personal caring and caring relationships, and I have tried to suggest some ways in which large organizations might foster caring among their personnel. Many intriguing aspects of caring remain to be explored: how caring develops in the young, the ontological status of caring, how caring for nonhuman living things contributes to the quality of human life, what it means to care for things, ideas, and principles, what "caring schools" might look like. Then, too I have not discussed in detail the conflicts of caring, the role of contiguity in caring, or the formal and informal chains that bind us lightly in a state of "preparation to care."

There is work enough, I suspect, to occupy many of us for some time to come.

FOOTNOTES

1. Soren Kierkegaard, CONCLUDING UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT, trans. by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton University Press, 1941).
2. IBID., p. 322.
3. See H.J. Blackham, SIX EXISTENTIALIST THINKERS (New York: Harper & Row Publishers), pp. 66-85.
4. IBID., p. 80.
5. Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Who Needs Parent Education?" TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, May 1978, pp. 773-774.
6. IBID., p. 774.
7. Margaret Sanger (Ed.), THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL NEO-MALTHUSIAN AND BIRTH CONTROL CONFERENCE, Vol. 4: RELIGIOUS AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF BIRTH CONTROL (New York: American Birth Control League, 1926).
8. M.F.A. Montagu, PRENATAL INFLUENCES (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1962).
9. F. Wengraf, PSYCHOSOMATIC APPROACH TO GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS (Springfield, Ill.: Thomas, 1953).
10. G. Zilboorg, "The Clinical Issues of Postpartum Psychopathological Reactions," AMERICAN JOURNAL OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, 73, p. 308.
11. See, for example, R.R. Sears, et al, PATTERNS OF CHILD REARING (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957) and E.S. Schaefer and R.O. Bell, "Patterns of Attitudes Toward Child Rearing and the Family," JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 54, 1957, 391-395.
12. For a discussion of "hindering" in the helping professions, see David Brandon, ZEN IN THE ART OF HELPING (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc. 1978), ch. 3.
13. Martin Buber, "Education," in BETWEEN MAN AND MAN (New York: The Macmillan Company), 1968, p. 90.

Caring: Gender Considerations

William F. Pinar
The University of Rochester

A Response to Nel Noddings' "Caring"

I find this paper interesting, thematically and methodologically. "Caring" is not a common theme of scholarly papers, certainly not in curriculum studies, probably not in philosophy of education. Because as Noddings suggests, caring is "nonrational"[1], I think it tends not to readily lend itself to an analysis of its properties. Because it is an attitude (disposability is the inelegant translation of Marcel's word) and not a specifiable set of behaviors, it does not readily lend itself to empirical research, as conducted by mainstream social scientists. Even so, Noddings manages to mend this incongruence of method and theme. How she manages this mend, and why the study of caring is methodologically complicated, can be partially explained by situating these issues in a body of work just now entering curriculum discourse: gender analysis. In a word, gender analysis refers to the reconstruction of the process of gender formation, and can be regarded as loosely allied with psychoanalytic strands of feminist thought. It almost goes without saying I have time to sketch this connection only lightly. Doing so might, however, bring into sharper relief the phenomenon of caring, and Noddings' deft analysis of it. To begin, let us return to her paper.

Early on we learn that "we shall have to examine caring from the inside."[2] This she achieves, and without abandoing linguistic analysis, without resorting to autobiography or poetry, two more likely methods of portraying "the inside." Her depiction of lovers, for instance, who care for one another while remaining married to others,[3] does not slow the progression of her argument. But it does contextualize that argument in emotion and experience, sacrificing neither the experince to the argument, not the argument to the experience. This methodological ssuccess is evident again in her portrait of "objectification". Describing the mathematics teachers and his poor student, Noddings notes the delusion of the former who thinks "I must help this poor boy to love mathematics, and then he will do better at it."[4] She observes:

> What am I doing when I proceed this way? I am not trying to grasp the reality of the other as a possibility for myself. I have not even asked: How would it feel to hate mathematics? Instead, I have projected my own reality onto my student and say, You will be just find if you only learn to love mathematics. So my student becomes an object of study and manipulation for me.[5]

She returns us to the world of everyday experience. It penetrates her prose, not permitting the reader to escape into a discrete world of ideas, the inter-relationships of which become the consuming interest. Instead, it is my life, and the lives of others I am pointed to. In a quiet, disarmingly simple way she clarifies the psychologically complex and perennial confusion of need and caring. "(Caring) does not involve projection into the other, nor does it imply full understanding of the other. Rather it involves receiving the other."[6] This last idea is central to her conception. "Caring is largely reactive and responsive. Perhaps it is even better characterized as receptive."[7]

"Receiving the other" is, classically and specifically heterosexually, the woman's posture. It suggests a certain passitivity, a certain openness to the Other. Classically and specifically heterosexually, the male is the asserting, even aggressive one. Gender analysts argue that these classical, and to an extent stereotypic, postures are not anatomical givens. Rather, they are the psycho-sexual consequences of contemporary child-rearing practices in advanced industrial societies. That is another story, too long and too complex for

present purposes. For present purposes I want to suggest that "caring" is classically a woman's preoccupation, especially when it is described as receptivity. (That is why it is rare in the literature. There are few women among us). Further, I want to speculate that linguistic analysis may have its psychogenesis in the classic male resolution of the oedipal crisis. That Noddings has made use of the latter to clarify the former is a methodological achievement, although perhaps not a feminist one. Finally, it is necessary to suggest that in the effort to establish institutional support for caring (as Noddings calls for)[8], gender considerations are probably curcial. It may be, as some feminists have concluded, that men -- by virtue of their gender formation -- have "stunted relational potential"[9], to use Nancy Chodorow's phrase. In a word, we men may have reduced capacities to care. With that unpleasant thought, let us back up a bit, sketch this problematic process of gender formation, linking it to the idea of subjectivity and objectivity. For this we turn to Madeleine R. Grumet who, in her seminal essay "Contradiction, Conception, and Curriculum"[10] argues that the capacity to experience, understand, and articulate subjectivity tends to remain intact in the woman, while becoming repressed in the man. Grumet relies on Chodorow's reconstruction of the oedpial crisis for her arugment that men lose this capacity as they lose their pre-oedipal identification with the mother. This identification they must repress in order to construct a male identity, an identification with the father. Thus at its inception the male's identification of himself as a man is characterized by a cognitive construction. He is like his father, the absent one, the one who inhabits a world outside the child's, a world the child can only imagine. He becomes unlike his mother, the present one, from whom he has hitherto been undifferentiated, whose world he shared as she shared his. The complicated result is that the male makes virtue out of necessity: he rationalizes the denial of undifferentiated experience of and with the mother, and he celebrates the conceptualization of himself after an embodied idea, his father. He becomes an object to himself as he is a son to his father. The female child, because she is permitted to remain identified with the mothers, adds desire for the father. She remains immersed in the intersubjective and undifferentiated experience of mother and child. The male tends to disparage that which he has lost -- subjectivity becomes "soft", to "messy" -- and admire what he has gained: the facility to construct and infer, symbolically systematized in science, law, and logic. As an adult he posits cause and ownership of the child his woman only "carries." Grumet describes the father's compensation for his abstract and inferred paternity and -- more generally -- identity. Grumet writes:

> As a parent the father contradicts the inferential and uncertain character of his paternity by transforming the abstraction that has been felt as deficiency into a virtue, into virtue itself. Co-opting the word, and transforming it into the law the fathers dominate communal activity. Typing procreation and kinship to the exchange of capital the fathers master the pernicious alchemy of turning people into gold, substituting the objectification of persons for the abstraction paternity imples and technology and capitalism amplify. The project to be the cause, to see the relation of self and other as concrete is expressed in monologic epistemologies of cause and effect, either/or construction of truth, and of social sceince that denigrates the ambiguity and dialectical nature of human action to homor the predictability and control of physical and mechanistic phenomena.[11]

It is the objectification of persons Noddings underscores as not caring.[12] It is the situating of persons in Idea -- whether that idea be excellence in mathematics or for capitalists the accumulation of capital -- which idolizes the object,[13] and forgets or mrerely manipulates the Subject. These politico-economic tendencies parallel the epistemological ones in the tendency to objectify and naturalize contingent and variable human experience into invariant laws and objective truth. What sometimes seems like an obsession with logic and language in twentieth-century philosophy (the parallel perhaps of positivism in social science) likewise suggests the virtue of cognitivism, the idolatry of symbol, and the neglect of nonrational experience can be linked to the male's repression of his female identity, and with it, the repression of feeling and undifferentiated experience. What is striking about Noddings' paper is she sacrifices neither feeling or logic. She returns us to that nameless domain which is primal emotion and conceptually unmediated experience, but

we do not lose our analytic mode of conveyance. Consider the following passage in which she subtly describes the experience of the "one cared-for".

> When the attitude of the one-caring bespeaks caring, the cared-for glows, grows stronger, and feels not so much that he has been given something as that something has been added to him. And this "something" may be hard to specify. Indeed, for the one-caring and the cared-for in a relationship of genuine caring, there is no felt need on either part to specify what sort of transformation has taken place.[14]

Noddings observes that the unspecified nature of this "something added" parallels that which cannot be specified, and yet which is central, in a "teaching-learning relationship." We are told that through eye contact the teacher communicates to his student he cares for him. "I am still the one interested in you. All of this is of variable importance and significance, but you still matter more."[15] Simply and powerfully Noddings notes that "the student is infinitely more important than the subject."[16] I submit that this is not the language of the Father, whose final commitments are to achievement and career; it is the language of the Mother, for whom, even in failure, her baby remains her baby, irreducibly important.

That caring is at heart something "added on," something "unspecified," may be -- given present child-rearing patterns and oedipal resolutions -- the woman's experience. It is the daughter who adds on desire and love for her father, although complete in her relationship with her mother. That caring is something unspecified in Noddings' paper may illustrate the woman's comfort with subjective experience. Our (meaning we men) possible discomfort may derive from our particular oedipal experience. It is the male's repression of his subjectivity, the repression of his identification with the mother, which demarcates his estrangement from the primordial, the undifferentiated, the formless, from pure emotion. It is the male who consequently insists upon the specification of experience, the analysis of concepts, the objectifications of persons. His caring often take mediated form: providing for his family for instance, rather than being lovingly present for and disposable to them.

Noddings' paper is important as it refers to that which is unspecified while not abandoning or repudiating what is. She makes use of her words to recreate and clarify the experience of caring, not to reductionistically call attention only to words themselves. Honoring the experience of her Mother with the words of her Father, she unites in androgynous prose that which in the present historical moment is usually dissociated. For this I appreciate her, and I look forward to more from her.

FOOTNOTES

1. Nel Noddings, "Caring," unpublished manuscript, p. 14.
2. p. 3.
3. p. 4.
4. p. 7, emphasis removed.
5. p 7, emphasis in original.
6. p. 8, emphasis in original.
7. p. 11.
8. pp. 23ff.
9. Nancy Chodorow, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
10. Madeleine R. Grumet, "Contradiction, Conception and Curriculum," paper presented to THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING, 1979 Conference, Airlie, Virginia.
11. Grumet, pp. 17-18.
12. Noddings, p. 8.
13. p. 10.
14. p. 12.
15. p. 12.
16. p. 13.

Up From Agapé
Response to "Caring" by Nel Noddings

Mary Anne Raywid
Dix Hills, New York

Nel's decision to examine the concept of caring -- with its ramifications for schooling and other institutionalized activities -- is much to be applauded. For the lack of caring in these institutions, and the absence of the conditions which would permit and encourage it, are not just accidental. I find that my students, and many of my colleagues, too, tend to contrast the carers with the non-carers as though these were innate and immutable traits, likenable to good and evil, kind and callous. The trouble with this kind of thinking is not only that it is dysfunctional for making things better: it is dysfunctional even for understanding what they are.

I believe that the absence of caring from the current institutional scene is neither individual failure nor casual accident: it is the inevitable consequence, the played out logic, of what what we have explictly sought as the articulating spirit of these institutions. We have systematically substituted the virtues of non-caring relationships for those of caring. Such ideals as justice, equality, impartiality, due process, and decision by law not individuals surface first in government. But they have made the long march through our public institutions, coming increasingly to order the activities and priorities of all of them. Nel is right in saying that "Caring reduces the necessity for justice." (p. 147) It introduces an entirely different set of concerns to be heeded, and principles for guiding institutions, and quite different attitudes for relating to one another within them. Coming to understand what caring entails -- and how we have quite systematically excluded it from our public interactions -- may prove important steps to restoring it within schools -- which I deem a much-needed move. Thus, I want to begin by applauding Nel's effort.

Before examining the parts of her concept in detail, it is important to identify her general strategy. Note first that Nel chose to explore caring -- in preference, e.g., to loving or esteeming, or cherishing or liking or being fond of. She is interested, I take it, in all of these -- in what sustains any positive relationship between two human beings. And she is also interested in what this answer might or should mean for the way we operate institutions, particularly schools. Her search, then, is for a concept with sufficient scope to encompass all human relationships marked by positive affect. Her next move is to extract the essential elements common to all such relationships.

I'm afraid the strategy yields difficulty. The more I pursue the provocative questions her paper raises for me, the more I doubt that there is much that can informatively be said about "caring" -- because the concept represents such a high level of generalization or abstraction, so remote from any context. The "caring" of a lover, a parent, a friend, a co-worker, a teacher, a child, and an air traffic controller seem so vastly different in nature, as well as in intensity, that an analysis of what is common to all must encounter considerable risks of error on the one hand, versus vague and inapplicable generality on the other. The most likely way out of such a predicament is to settle on a model or paradigmatic form of caring to deal with, which is what I think Nel has done. But this is a move which must prove reductionist in proportion to the variability of the types or forms of "caring" rolled into the original concept. I think there remains s sizable job to be done in demonstrating that what is true of the "caring" she talks about is, indeed, true of all forms of human caring. Short of such demonstration, her analysis seems repeatedly to take on the flavor of a programmatic definition -- by means of which one is admonished that one is not a real carer unless one feels or acts or responds in the ways specified.

What is the particular form of caring that Nel has taken for her model? What she selects as logical requirements and empirical attributes of caring seem to mark her paradigm as being in love -- and perhaps only one phase of being in love, at that. Recall that the constitutive elements of caring are "engrossment" and "an attitude...which is received by and reflected in the cared for" (p. 140) who is thus aware of and receptive to be cared for. (p. 143) On her part, the career has made, and continually renews, her "commitment to act in behalf of the cared-for" and to maintain a "continued interest in his reality." (p. 141) On the other side of the relationship, the cared-for must feel that the one-caring is continually "present" to him and, in rough translation, 'at his disposal.' (p. 142) "The cared-for responds to the presence of the one-caring" (p. 143) and "the cared-for glows, grows stronger, and feels not so much that he has been given something as that something has been added to him." (p. 142) "The one cared-for sees the concern, delight, or interest in the eyes of the one-caring and feels her warmth in both verbal and body language." (p. 142) What the one-caring offers is "a total conveyance of self to other, a continual transformation of individual to duality to new individual to new duality." (p. 143)

Now this simply is not logically or empirically descriptive of any caring relationship except the first phase of being in love. Even in such a rare relationship as this one, after the initial phase the figure-ground focus is allowed to shift at least occasionally, so that the beloved is not the only and continuously dominant figure in the consciousness of the one-caring. (Otherwise there could be only one caring relationship at a time in our lives,and it would, of course, preclude getting any work done! - two consequences of Nel's account of caring that would have particularly serious ramifications for the teacher.) But notice that when such a figure-ground shift takes place, the one-caring is no longer constantly marked by "engrossment" in the cared for, and is not "present" nor disposable to him at all times. When working, neither my husband nor I tend to be psychically available to the other in the sense that Nel's logical requisites would seem to require of us. What I would want to insist, of course, is that the caring is nevertheless still there. But if so, then caring is not as Nel has described it, and its constitutive elements are other than those she has identified.

There is a haunting scene from Thornton Wilder's "Our Town" -- a play that became a classic largely, I suspect, for its portrayal of caring -- which for me offers a powerful counter instance to Nel's account. It is the scene in which Emily returns to earth for the one day she has chosen to re-live, her twelfth birthday -- and as her Mother stands at the stove cooking breakfast, Emily-returned silently cries, "Oh, Mama, just look at me one minute as though you really saw me... [It is] just for a moment now we're all together. Mama, just for a moment we're happy. Let's look at one another." (Act Three, New York: Franklin Watts, 1938, p. 99) I don't think Wilder's point is, as Nel's analysis would have it, that Emily's Mother doesn't care for her: It is that this is simply the nature of people and the stuff of life. At least after adolescence, we can care very much about an individual, yet be occupied with others, or with things or ideas -- which would have to disqualify us as caring, according to Nel's requisites.

The reason for some of these apparent difficulties in Nel's account seem clear. She wants to find one form of positive human disposition toward another that can subsume all forms. This necessitates that she choose the most intense mode -- a move which subsequently obligates her to perceive all our positive dispositions toward others as approximations of this most intense form, differing from it only as a matter of degree. And this, it seems to me, is simply unfaithful to human experience. The quality of affect marking the initial phase of being in love is probably for most of us quite atypical of the range of caring relationships which involve us most of the time -- rather than paradigmatic of these multiple kinds of caring. And treating it as though it is the ideal or model form seems likely to mislead us into all sorts of false expectations about the way we can and should feel about people, that we simply don't. It is at least partly what leads Nel to conclude that "institutions...should not undertake what is clearly impossible for them to accomplish; that is, they should not try...to care directly." (p. 146)

Although I found Nel's concept of caring fascinating, I want to call attention to only one additional feature of it, or I'll have no time left to explore its institutional ramifications. Nel is obviously right in suggesting that caring is at root affective and nonrational in nature. But I am bothered, nevertheless, by what seems to be her tendency to split it off so completely from the rational. It seems to me that the attempt to "feel with" and to help the cared-for may frequently call for cognitive activity. Granted, if the caring-one focuses too exclusively on just how to help, at some point she has come to "care about a problem instead of a person." (p. 141) But short of such an obsessional switch, rationality seems to me incumbent on the one-caring, not somehow inimical to or disruptive of the caring. I tend to feel more comfortable about a surgeon I believe cares about or for me as an individual. Similarly a lawyer or a teacher. But in none of these cases would I want to see the carer's rationality circumscribed. There are some things we want and need from others -- including teachers -- to which rationality, and objectivity, are essential. The remoteness from and correcting of my frame of reference may be exactly what I most need from a lawyer or a teacher.

For me, then, there is an obligation to effectiveness in genuine caring. The caring one who rushes to save his beloved from a bee, but knocks her over a cliff in the process, has not exhibited the kind of caring we can admire. If he simply knocks her flat instead, he's just a klutz instead of a tragic figure, but that's no model of caring either. And effective caring, it seems to me, calls for a rationality which Nel's concept seems to minimize at best. I prefer Mayeroff's conception in this regard. He says quite bluntly "To care for someone, I must know many things..." (Milton Mayeroff, ON CARING, New York: Perennial Library, 1971, p. 13)

The importance of the effectiveness requirement becomes even clearer when we begin to explore the possibilities of institutionalized caring. Here, the harm that teachers or social workers or surgeons can do is written so large and bold that effective caring seems as incumbent upon them as mere caring. As Bettelheim has told us, "Love Is Not Enough." And as the film "The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie" demonstrated for us, some caring -- particularly of the adult for the young -- can have tragically destructive effects. (I am thinking of the girl -- a favorite of Miss Brodie's -- who acted on her mentor's romanticized view of the Spanish civil war and was killed.)

Nel doesn't make it explicit why, but she feels that teachers should be caring people. She even wants to force non-caring teachers out of the profession. (p. 147) Yet in the way she defines caring, and caring relationships, she makes it very difficult for teachers to be carers -- and, to the extent that they care, she may make it difficult for them to be teachers. How can an individual share the caring relationship Nel has described, with an entire class, or even with several members of a class? Nel's caring relationships are highly selective, in the first place. We would also have to note that only sometime in adolescence would most youngsters become able to enter into a caring relationship as Nel has described it. Prior to this time, they typically lack the awareness of others, and the logical capacities Nel implicates in the receiving and reflecting of caring. On her idea of caring, then, the teacher's caring must remain "only partially actualized" (p. 143) and incapable of being "completed in the world" (p. 141) --since caring involves two parties and is complete only when fulfilled in both. (p. 142)

While this onesidedness seems accurate enough, mightn't it be more helpful to construe the teacher's caring in terms which acknowledge and accept the asymmetry of adult-child relations, instead of casting them as unsatisfactory imitations of adult relations? I have found Buber's discussion of non-mutuality of teacher-student relationships extremely insightful in this regard. He distinguishes the educational relation from the relationship of friends precisely by virtue of its one-sidedness. Furthermore, for Buber, if the educational relation loses one-sidedness it loses its essence. (BETWEEN MAN AND MAN)

But I am bothered even more by the priority Nel assigns "feeling with" in a caring relationship. The one-caring must maintain a focus on sharing the reality of the cared-for and preceiving the world in his

terms. I am ambivalent about the wisdom of that for the teacher. For many teachers, it would be a very desirable corrective to try to do so. We seem so often in education to be indifferent to the phenomenology of our students -- and when interested at all, it is typically with the way their heads will be at some future time, not now. On the other hand, however, the teacher's "feeling with" the student needs also to be contained, alternated perhaps with another perspective. The teacher's obligation is to mediate between the child's present perceived reality and other realities. She has the task of introducing these new realities -- a charge that cannot be fulfilled without stepping outside the child's reality.

In sum, then, I would have to say that the institutional application of Nel's caring concept to schools suggests that it does not respond well to the realities of children and of the teaching task. But I am very much interested in caring teachers, and in trying to frame a conception of caring that could shed light on the elements of teacher caring. How might that be done? I think first that we must begin with another mode of caring altogether -- rather than with what appears to be the most intense kind of caring. Two possibilities arise. One is that we look to a kind of 'impersonalized' or public sort of caring--the sort epitomized in its most extreme form, perhaps, by the sort of selfless gallantry John Jacob Astor is supposed to have displayed as the Titantic went down. At more mundane levels, this is simply the kind of depersonalized caring exhibited in good manners -- the concern that the door you let go of may strike and injure a stranger. I'd love to see this kind of caring restored in the world, but I don't think its chances are very good. It would appear that genuinely impersonal caring is highly improbable, at least under the conditions of mass society and extensive anonymity.

The other possibility is that we attempt somehow to restore a personalized caring within public institutions. I am very much committed to this and have been focusing for the last several years on a form of education specializing in it: alternative schools. The single most prevalent feature of alternative education is its emphasis on interpersonal relationships within the school. Alternatives make loud and specific reply to the question of 'why should teachers care?' by suggesting that no other kind of institution can be healthy for -- or even minimally injurious to -- children. Moreover, claim alternative educators, human relationships are themselves among the most educative features of a school. Accordingly, within an alternative school, a fair amount of time is likely to be given to an activity many call "community building." The explicit purpose is to promote a very personal kind of caring among all the members of the group. My observations of alternative schools suggest that many succeed at this to a remarkable degree. Note that the caring in such cases is not just teacher to student, but student to student as well. I've come to believe that that is important. Another way of putting it is that the secondary associations we have been content with in other institutions -- and have even cultivated in the school -- simply will not do there, and must be converted to primary associations.

Acting on such a conviction calls for extensive changes in schools. For openers, you cannot confront a teacher with 150 students each day, divided into groups claiming 45-minute time slots, and say you're serious about caring relationships between that teacher and his or her students. Nor can you haphazardly schedule a student into eight different peer groupings a day -- with what could conceivably be a total of 240 different classmates -- and say you are serious about developing caring relationships among students.

But the rearrangements this suggests are just the beginning, if we want to cultivate caring relationships in the school. And perhaps the first thing we must do is to understand the extent to which secondary associations have come to constitute our taken-for-granted reality with respect to what schooling must be -- an understanding that must precede any very promising attempt at change: The school's culture makes secondary associations the norm -- and friendships are assumed to be irrelevant at best, and more usually, prospectively disruptive of classroom procedures.

Were we to take seriously the idea that a caring relationship ought to obtain between teacher and student, we would have to allow students and teachers to choose one another--because we know it is as impossible for a teacher to genuinely care for all her students as it is for a student to feel that way about all his teachers. We should probably begin thinking much more seriously about such questions as 'What draws one human being to another?' and 'What makes us like one and want to keep our distance from another?' We know very little about such matters, but several years ago, David Epperson worked up a fascinating theory in response: He speculated that we are drawn to people who see the world generally, and themselves within it, as we do; and seeing ourselves and the world similarly is very largely a matter of sharing fundamental discontents. Epperson listed eight such pervasive discontents which, he believed, gave rise to eight different sorts of relationships or alliances binding those who share them to one another. (David Epperson, "Assessing Alternative Teaching - Learning Alliances," in THEORIES FOR LEARNING, edited by Lindley J. Stiles. New York: Dodd, Mead, (1974, pp. 97-117). Perhaps some such theory as this one might figure prominently in our grouping projections for schools. It surely makes as good sense as an organizing principle as some of the others we have tried as the basis for dividing youngsters into groups.

To take caring seriously -- as something institutional policy ought to promote instead of discouraging -- would also make for considerable change in the institutions with which most of us here are most immediately familiar. As decline has replaced growth in higher education, and as openly adversarial relations have come to mark many of our interactions, the impersonality and detachment of secondary associations have frequently given way to active animus. Collective bargaining has exposed the adversarial character of faculty-administration relationships. But what many of us have failed to acknowledge is that the departmentalized system which brings us into interaction with fellow faculty from other departments only in committees, is also an adversarial context, particularly in a contracting (and contractual) universe. Under such circumstances, if we are to make campuses viable places for faculties to live, we will need to think about how to stimulate positive interactions among them in order to let caring develop. Structures offer much more promise for doing so than the occasions we have depended upon (the Xmas party and annual picnic). So we will need to restructure our colleges and universities as well as our schools, once we begin to take caring seriously--as something to be encouraged among faculties as well as among students, and between the two.

I think Nel is right in singling out caring for attention. It has been the missing element in many of our attempts to change and improve schools -- and ironically so, since I suspect it lies close to the crux of determining what will work there. A number of our best-intentioned plans for bettering education have led instead to what has well been called the 'thingification' of human beings. It was hauntingly appropriate that one of the slogans of the student revolution of ten years ago was the notice "I am a human being. Do not bend, fold, spindle, or mutilate." Nel's interest in caring seems centrally concerned with acknowledging and nurturing what is at the heart of that humanness. It thus makes so much better sense to follow her lead than to turn toward such bromides as ombudsmen and student advocates, and court decisions to render uncaring institutions minimally viable. Caring, and caring relationships, may be a long way from a sufficient condition for good education. But we need reminding that they are probably a necessary condition. More power to Nel for so suggesting.

Change: Social, Cultural and Educational *

Philip Wexler
University of Rochester

1. Introduction

I believe that there are new directions in education--in educational practices and organization, and in the character of the relation between education and the social context. These new directions in education are not entirely sanguine, although of course, like any changed situation, they contain possibilities for the future.

The question that I want to raise here is whether we have--and whether we can--take account of these changes, in our theory and research, and whether our scientific grasping of events will be one that enables us to effect the course of educational and social events. To do this requires first at least some brief comment on where we have been, and where, I think, we are now, in the task of developing a critical social analysis of education that is politically relevant and effective.

2. Paradigms

The work that many of us have done over the past decade in the sociology of education, and in curriculum studies, was directed precisely toward developing such a paradigmatic critical analysis. Development of this paradigm has gone through a number of "stages" and modifications: the early "ideology-critique"--a becoming aware of the assumptions of existing research attempts to show how the assumptions developed historically; what their connections were to the cultural milieu of academic work; amd how they prevented us from understanding socio-educational processes. Earlier concepts, like "hidden curriculum," were used and turned toward critical rather than apologetic analyses. We borrowed, and developed, a new language for educational discourse, using concepts like cultural capital, cultural reproduction, and hegemony, and tried to apply these concepts to the analysis of education. The work of our colleague Michael Apple (1979) in the application and diffusion of these concepts (a task, as Gramsci wrote, far more important than some philosophical "discovery") has been of particular intellectual and political value.

At least at the beginning, our work of paradigm development did not follow the ordinary Kuhnian model of a scientific change initiated by a politically disinterested observation of persistent anomalies. The critical redevelopment of sociology of education and curriculum began as a result of historic, concrete experiences of oppression, and an effort to articulate an analysis that would help change our immediate, and wider, social context. The capacity to experience dissatisfaction, and to want something different, that was then articulated as an alternative paradigm, was an effect of the social movements of the late sixties and early seventies, and the structural and cultural changes which were their bases.

What we accomplished (and this work is far from completed) was: to displace the individualistic, meritocratic analysis of the relation between education and social inequality, with an historical and structural one; to displace the objectivist psycholgoized version of academic achievement and curriculum, with a socio-political analysis of school knowledge; to challenge the managerial version of classroom and school organization with a socially interactive and culturally-based critical view. Current theory and research within the alternative paradigm expands and refines these positions. These insights are reinforced by the addition of analyses of the labor process, the state, and culture.

There is, however, a problem: whether the establishment of the critical paradigm and its academic

acceptance occurred at the cost of neglecting the original impetus--to develop theory and research in, against, and for the purpose of changing socio-historical conjuncture. The development of scientific paradigms, like basic culture change generally, goes through, in Anthony Wallace's (1978) description, a sequence of: innovation, paradigmatic core development, exploitation, functional consequences, and rationalization. My concern is that, unintentionally, the critical paradigm has been subsumed in this typical sequence of cultural changes. We have not asserted strongly enough a political (as opposed to a scientistic or cultural change) view of the very character of paradigm development itself. In a political model, new theoretical understanding is not a response to issues within scientific communities. It is a response to problems of social reality. For example, the critical paradigm in the sociology of education was a response to an early period in the social and cultural instability of liberalism. The liberal mystique of happy sociability, individual success and pure science was a lie for many. Social conditions made it possible to demonstrate that lie, and to do intellectual work directed toward producing an alternative social reality. Sheldon Wolin (1980: 182) summarizes this political view: "Many of the great theories of the past arose in response to a crisis in the world, not in the community of theorists." We have built an alternative theoretical paradigm in education upon a past crisis. The danger is that in developing and rationalizing our response to that crisis, we may have ignored important new elements of the current social situation. I hope that we have not mistakenly derided liberalism as a practical stance, only to be unwittingly caught in elaborating - albeit in Marxist language - liberalism's negative, decadent moment. Our critical paradigm may remain the negative moment of liberalism's problematic - its negation, rather than its alternative.

Wolin (1980:186) further suggests that "...most of the major theories have been produced during times of crisis, rarely during periods of normalcy." From a political, rather than a scientistic view of paradigm development, the question is whether the existing alternative paradigm enables us to respond to the current crisis and to the changes which have occurred in recent years. Or does it remain overly attached to the articulation of a political moment that has been significantly altered? The political development of a paradigm requires constant revision in light of the changing social situation, and the limitations and possibilities which it offers for change.

3. The Crisis

I am not going to describe the current social crisis. Many of you daily experience its effects: in declining standards of living, in reduced job prospects and increased job insecurity, in the greater difficulty of financing education, and in the impoverishment of the quality of personal lives. Nor, will I offer an analysis of the crisis. Somewhat different, but overlapping analyses are provided in the works of Habermas (1975), O'Connor (1973), and Castells (1980), for example, and in a variety of periodicals.

What I do want to indicate, however, is first that this crisis is not a sudden, spontaneous eruption. It is the result of historical trends in the social organization of production, of the relation of this society to the rest of the world, of technological change, of disjunctions between different aspects of the production process, and of the relation between cultural, social and personal formations. I think, that there is no simple exclusive formula such as the changing organic composition of capital, the contradiction between forces and relations of production, the bankruptcy of the state, or the transformation of the cultural bases of identity which encompasses the dynamic of the social crisis.

Second, the crisis is not an integrated, static representation of long-run historical forces. The capitalist class is not of one piece. Its composition and needs change historically. Within the crisis efforts are made to deal with it among a variety of groups. The efforts of ruling classes are aimed toward accomplishing their hegemony not only by the imposition of their culture as "fact". Classes rule through the work of accomplishing social reorganization. In a social crisis, these efforts at reorganization are intensified and become

more apparent. The reproduction view is most accurate as a representation of class rule for periods of relative social stability.

If we begin instead with the assumption that the accomplishment of class hegemony requires not simple economic and cultural domination, but requires constant social reorganization and restructuring, then, we may be drawn to look at different aspects of the social process of education.

I shall offer a few examples of some implications of current social changes for education, and for thinking about education. In each case, I suggest that the reproduction model is incomplete, and that grappling with current social and educational problems points us toward the development of an alternative theory and practice -- one rooted not in a critical response to the first crack in liberal hegemony, but in its present defeat, and as a response to the attendant social realignment signified by the rise of the political right.

4. First Example: Educational Reproduction or Educational Reorganization

When class rule of the social context is seen as fairly stable, then it makes good sense to analyze how, beneath the ideology of meritocratic achievement, unequally distributed and produced cultural capital - not recognized as such, but viewed instead as individual differences - plays a role in the reproductive maintenance of a class society.

The development and application of this analysis is what I mean by saying that the hidden curriculum concept turns critical. This leads to analysis of the social relations of the school - as a semi-autonomous, contradictory, but largely reproductive mediation between the family and the individual on the one hand, and on the other, the societal stucture of inequality in which system needs, such as accumulation and legitimation are met. But, if the maintenance of ruling classes, is accomplished not by the transmission of deep false consciousness -- cultural reproduction -- but instead by redefining the very meaning of schooling and restructuring the institutional relation between schools and other aspects of the social formation, then the theoretical and political problems are different. This position emphasizes not only the social relations within the school, but the changing social relation of the school, to the social formation.

In a recent paper (1981a) Emily Moskowitz, Tony Whitson and I argued that there is now occurring an institutional reorganization of the educational function. While, at one historical moment schools served the needs of the capitalist class by the inculcation of dispositions - cultural reproduction - as well as skills training, the broader cultural reproduction aspects of the educational function are now being re-allocated to the family and accomplished by the mass media. The content of educational knowledge is being redefined exclusively as skills training, work is being substituted for schooling, and transferred out of the public sector to private and corporate education. We traced these changes to the altered constitution and organization of labor-power, and suggested that the contradiction between the need for generally educated and socially competent labor-power and socially-submissive technocrats was being contained by the segregation and partialization of educational functions - by a set of changes, which taken together, point to a corporate rather than populist de-schooling. We argued for the economic basis of a general education, its present suppression, and the current political value of the ideal of public schooling that has been traditionally associated with liberalism.

By focusing on how schools produce and distribute unequal cultural capital, and so contribute to social reproduction, the importance of the current process of educational reorganization has been slighted. The paradigm formed to combat liberalism by showing the class cultural character and effects of the social relations of schooling as hidden curriculum ("getting inside the black box") neglects analysis of a restructuring of education which supports the capitalist hegemony at a new and deeper level--in this instance by contracting the public sector and occluding the general social character of the knowledge required by newer forces

of capitalist production.

The issue that this conjuncture forces upon us--when we are not battling liberals to whom our relation has shifted with the advent of what Stuart Hall (1981:113-137) has not so humorously called "The Great Moving Right Show"-- is less a matter of the internal transmission of educational cultural capital than of the institutional reorganization of the educational function. Hall describes the changed situation as the "recomposition of the educational state apparatuses and the redirection of resources and programs...".

In this conjuncture, the forms of class rule have changed. They now involve the destruction of whole ranges of activities and organizations. The political practice appropriate to this conjuncture includes, at first, a defense of the public sector. By continuing to emphasize internal-institutional cultural inequality and reproduction--which is, of course, a method of class rule--we are ignoring the kind of analyses that can grasp the present moment. The kind of institutional analysis that I am referring to: returns to the idea of the educational function; recognizes that this function has internal and potentially contradictory constituents; and studies its institutionally changing organizational expressions as aspects of the changing forms of class conflict.

If we have been working against liberalism, but analytically within its problematic, and adding Marxism to structuralism, I suggest that we work for and through liberalism, that we combine Marxism not with structuralism, but functionalism, and that our problematic be defined by class conflict and struggle.

5. Second Example: Sociology of Knowledge or Social Knowledge

There is a second aspect of the reproduction paradigm that has to be reconsidered in the light of what present social changes reveal: the social analysis of school knowledge. My interest in education has been strongly influenced by the sociology of knowledge tradition. The insight of this tradition is that knowledge which is presented as universal, timeless and socially disinterested is really socially and historically specific, interested, and serves the ruling class by legitimating its knowledge--its cultural capital--as neutral. The value of such analyses, of competing educational paradigms and of knowledge in use in schools, is to debunk and relativize knowledge, by showing its linkages to the social formation, and so open the road for subordinate classes to reclaim their own authentic knowledge.

The problem with this approach, in the present conjuncture, is that it decomposes knowledge by mapping out is social correlates. But, this necessary work of analytical relativization slights the social process of the transformation of knowledge-as-a-whole--just as the study of cultural reproduction, by analyzing the social relations of the school, blocks seeing the restructuring of the educational function. The transformation which is occurring is in part a response to the qualitatively new importance of knowledge as a force of production. In part, it is a response to a societal generalization, decentering and diffusion of symbolic domination. And, in part, it is a response to a changed political discourse. The specific character of the transformation of knowledge is that the claim of knowledge superiority on the basis of scientific objectivity or transhistorical truth--a claim of social detachment, a claim that we rightly opposed in the past, this claim itself (as an aspect of legitimation) is now being displaced. Instead of a unified true objective transcendent knowledge, the legitimation of knowledge now rests on a bifurcation of legitimate knowledge into technocratic utility on the one hand, and moralistic superiority on the other. Liberalism has broken down also at the site of its knowledge-claims. The political value of relativizing "objective" knowledge has diminished. The sociology of knowledge is "beating a dead horse." It is increasingly less necessary to appeal to such claims as neutral truth for purposes of legitimation. Utility and morality are the discursive coin of the new-old realm. Do we still need to combat the liberal sociology of education? A grants funding official

recently suggested dropping the very term "sociology" and substituting "operations management." If you think this merely anecdotal, study the systematic extraction of "the social" from all federal funding agencies (WALL STREET JOURNAL, p. 54, March 27, 1981).

One implication of these developments is that instead of attacking the autonomy of knowledge, that autonomy needs to be defended. Practically, this means fostering the diminishing capacity to appropriate knowledge when it is not tied to a technocratic or moralistic interest. Educationally, it means the fostering of literacy, the capacity to comprehend, the encouragement of, to transpose Barthes' phrase, "the pleasure of the text." In research, it means the study of the process by which the capacity to appropriate knowledge is developed, to learn how to reverse what Horkheimer called a process of the "amalgamation of thought with advertising." It implies the study of what constitutes reading and criticism.

An additional consequence for the sociology of education and curriculum studies is that (along with an externalist social mapping of school knowledge) it becomes politically meaningful to study the internal production of knowledge as text, and to describe, as Terry Eagleton (1979) suggests, the text's internal "generative mechanisms." The "seeing through" of textual opaqueness requires a study of the relation between the identity of the reader -- the subject -- and the symbolic structural production of knowledge -- the text. (Wexler, 1981b).

In paradigmatic terms, this would lead us away from an underlying model of the naturalistic social causation of knowledge, and away from mechanics as the paradigmatic metaphor. We can begin to replace social mechanicism with models of literary criticism, linguistic structuralism, and the phenomenology of reading (to say nothing of defending the right to read), as ways of thinking about knowledge. These are political and theoretical reasons to take knowledge seriously. I think that the currently changing character of the use of knowledge requires that we affirm its autonomous moment in our educational practices and theoretical investigations.

6. Third Exmaple: Contested Cultural Reproduction or Cultural Mobilization

Both of these brief examples may be understood as responses to a current, but undoubtedly not the last, social crisis of capitalism, and its political "Great Moving Right Show." They are in some sense defensive postures. Indeed, I am suggesting that rather than criticize liberalism from within its assumptions, we get behind it, but from outside of its theoretical presuppositions. I do think, however, that these types of analyses offer a road that goes beyond liberalism, toward a critical analysis of a rightward moving post-industrial society--an analysis from the interested position of social transformation. Nevertheless, I want to indicate a more directly "offensive" position, not as an articulated theory nor as a detailed strategy, but simply as one heuristic to help us think and act our way through the lived and theorized dynamic of cultural reproduction.

Contested cultural reproduction rightfully expresses the importance of class struggle within education, and the cultural domain generally. It indicates the possibilities and limitations for the assertion of the patterns of meaning and expression that define social class as a mode of life. But, this type of struggle occurs within the parameters of the existing dominant cultural formation. When, however, that cultural formation empties itself out, when it bifurcates into technicism and moralism, a meaning space is left open--at least for some--where the cultural struggle takes on a new and different aspect. This structurally produced cultural space is subjectively experienced as a need for meaning. The result is that it becomes possible to conduct the struggle for change not merely by asserting an oppositional authentic space within the culture. The struggle occurs at the site of the process of constructing new meanings.

During some historical periods, the prevailing culture becomes experienced as inadequate even for ordinary social adaptation and identity formation. Cultural reproduction no longer works, especially for the most oppressed groups. What has occurred in the past, and what is now occurring again is that the accomplishment of social and personal integration in cultural processes--"the cultural function"-- is sought outside of existing institutional routines, in social movements which reformulate the cultural meaning system as a whole. The clearest instances of this are messianic movements. Anthony Wallace (1961) in his analyses of processes of cultural change has described a common sequential pattern of such cultural revitalization movements, that includes: individually experienced stress; a period of cultural distortion ("deviance"); the formulation (ordinarily, but not necessarily, of individual visions and inspirations) of a "new, utopian image of socio-cultural organization," as a goal; the communication of this alternative; the organizational establishment of a small group of converts; the reworking and wider adaptation of the new cultural image; the actual mass transformation of the failing culture; and the ultimate establishment and routinization of a new image as the basis for social and individual reintegration.

I am not saying that this is how some major social transformation will occur in the United States. But, I am saying that reproduction, including a contested, contradictory reproduction, is only one (historically specific) type of collective cultural process. During some periods, the cultural function can only be accomplished by massive cultural revitalization, renewal and reconstruction.

I have tried to apply (1981c) the model of cultural revitalization to schooling, by suggesting that already existing social possibilities (e.g., self-realization, play, and community), aspects of contained contradictions, can be advanced by a pedagogy of realization. The socially-produced, experienced need of students for more satisfying lives can become a basis for reorganizing the intra-institutional cultural processes within schools. These processes include: need articulation; a language of social understanding; commitment to ideals; fostering emotional and cognitive capacities such as empathy, hope and social knowledge; communicative potential; cultural imagination for alternatives; social practicality for organizational forms. I have called this a model of "cultural mobilization."

A somewhat less disrupted, eschatological view of a similar process is described by Herbert Gintis by the concept of "accord," which he defines as (Gintis, 1980: 220): "a mutually accepted joint redefinition (emphasis added) and consequent reconstitution of political reality by antagonistic classes or class fragments." "An accord," Gintis continues (1980: 221-222), "is a reorganization (emphasis added) of society on two levels: institutions and tools of political discourse... An accord is likely to set into motion a new logic of social action and class struggle..." An accord that is salient for Gintis is liberalism, particularly the historically progressive extension of person rights. I fear that the redefinition and reorganization of the cultural totality, which is the crucial phase of cultural mobilization, may have to take place within a less friendly camp than that of liberalism. Rather, it may need to be from within the discourse of what Hall describes (1981: 122) as the "resonant traditional themes - nation, family, duty, authority, standards, self-reliance" that cultural reformulation and mobilization will begin. To ignore the mass "resonance" in favor of a continuing attack on decimated liberalism, only increases the possibility that the cultural reconstitution of religious fundamentalism will turn even more profanely political, and will displace the "Great Moving Right Show" with fascism.

The implication for research is that we may now cease congratulating ourselves upon having replaced a passive concept of school socialization with an active, interactionist, "constructivist" one. Perhaps we may now begin to think of how an interactive pedagogy can be consciously directed toward accomplishing the sequence of pedagogical events necessary to reach social goals. Without articulated goals, cultural mobilization in society and in school will occur for the realization of ideals other than our own. Preoccupation with cultural reproduction may distract us from this pedagogic work, our own instance of cultural mobilization.

7. Conclusion

I have argued that the current alternative paradigm in the social theory of education began as a political-theoretical act. It was formed in, against, and with a desire to go beyond, a particular historical conjuncture. It has, and continues to have, significant value for social explanation, and for the project of social transformation. But, paradigmatic formulations, even critical ones, are subject to incorporation within ordinary cultural sequences of academic paradigm development. Therefore, I think it important to continue to reassert a political model of scientific development: a critical paradigm is an interpretive, emancipatory-intended response to a specific sociohistorical situation.

Such a view of paradigm development is particulary relevant now. The historical situation has changed, favoring the rightist rather than the liberal tendency in U.S. society. To understand this situation, analytically and concretely, so that we may not become its victims, requires both political and theoretical reassessment.

This reassessment includes analysis of tendencies toward the contraction of the liberal public sphere. In education, this is expressed as "de-schooling." The intellectual appropriation of this tendency both requires and stimulates an analysis that emphasizes the institutional reorganization of education. The theoretical vantage point is to describe the processes by which the social educational function is historically reorganized, rather than continued and reproduced.

Political reassessment encourages a re-appreciation of the social importance of knowledge. Not debunking ideological mystifications of knowledge and thought, not critique of transcendental truth claims--but the defense of autonomous knowledge, the fostering of the capacity for reading, for thinking, and for critical understanding, are the scientific and educational practices which the current situation presses upon us. When knowledge-as-a-whole is transformed, analysis of its social decomposition detracts from the task of understanding and appropriating knowledge as a moment in social transformation. Taking knowledge seriously, as a text, and as a social practice, replaces it social relativization.

As yet, the rightward social restructuring only contains existing social contradictions, without finally eliminating them as potential bases for social change. But social conditions, as experienced dissatisfaction, have to be actively appropriated. This appropriation is facilitated by recognizing historic moments when cultural reproduction fails, and when even societal maintenance requires cultural revitalization. The task is to develop this moment, to explore the possibilities of cultural mobilization, and to understand the extra-routine institutional processes of meaning construction. To ignore such processes risks their practical surrender.

In the social conflicts through which the future will be determined, we cannot ignore the importance of traditional values, of liberalism and of the educational preconditions for social change. I hope that we shall also still want to always reevalute our paradigmatic theoretical advances politically.

References

Apple, Michael W. 1979. IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Castells, Manuel. 1980. THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eagleton, Terry. 1979. "Ideology, Fiction, Narrative." SOCIAL TEXT, 2 (Summer): 62-80.

Gintis, Herbert. March-June 1980. "Communication and Politics: Marxism and the 'Problem' of Liberal Democracy," pp. 189-232, in SOCIALIST REVIEW, No. 50-51.

Habermas, Jurgen. 1975. LEGITIMATION CRISIS. Boston: Beacon.

Hall, Stuart. January-February 1981. "Moving Right," pp. 113-137 in SOCIALIST REVIEW, No. 55.

O'Connor, James. 1973. THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE. New York: St. Martins.

Wallace, Anthony F.C. 1961. CULTURE AND PERSONALITY. New York: Random House.

Wallace, Anthony F.C. 1978. "Paradigmatic Processes in Culture Change," Appendix, pp. 477-85 in ROCKDALE: THE GROWTH OF AN AMERICAN VILLAGE IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. New York: Knopf.

Wexler, Philip, Tony Whitson and Emily J. Moskowitz. 1981a. "De-Schooling by Default: The Changing Social Functions of Public Education." INTERCHANGE, September (in press).

Wexler, Philip. 1981b (in press). "Structure, Text and Subject: A Critical Sociology of School Knowledge" in Michael Apple (editor) CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION. London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wexler, Philip. 1981c (in press). "Body and Soul: Sources of Social Change and Strategies of Education," BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION and to be reprinted in THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING.

Wolin, Sheldon. 1980. "Paradigms and Political Theories," pp. 160-191, in Gary Gutting (editor). PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS: APPRAISALS AND APPLICATIONS OF THOMAS KUHN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE. Notre Dame and London: Notre Dame.

This paper was delivered as a talk to the conference on "New Directions in Education," held at SUNY, Buffalo, New York on April 8, 1981.

Navajo Tapestry
A Curriculum for Ethno-Ecological Perspectives

Florence R. Krall
University of Utah

With contributions by: Fred Edwards, Richard Hageman, Joseph Knighton, Susan Parry, Jacquie Spafford, Stella Thayer, Gordon Welsh, Terry Tempest Williams

And appreciation to: Sara Largo, Norma Begay, Helena Rosa, Delbert John, Betsy Yazzie, Sam Alonzo, Roger Tsotsie, Galina Dick, Beverly Crum, Bob Chiago, Regis Clauschee, and the many other Navajo who shared their insights with us.

> On a visit to Leningrad some years ago I consulted a map to find out where I was, but I could not make it out. From where I stood, I could see several enormous churches, yet there was no trace of them on my map. When finally an interpreter came to help me, he said: "We don't show churches on our maps." Contradicting him, I pointed to one that was very clearly marked. "That is a museum," he said, "not what we call a 'living church.' It is only the 'living churches' we don't show."
>
> It then occurred to me that this was not the first time I had been given a map which failed to show many things I could see right in front of my eyes. All through school and university I had been given maps of life and knowledge on which there was hardly a trace of many of the things that I most cared about and that seemed to me to be of the greatest possible importance to the conduct of my life. I remembered that for many years my perplexity had been complete; and no interpreter had come along to help me. It remained completed until I ceased to suspect the sanity of my perceptions and began, instead, to suspect the soundness of the maps.
>
> E. F. Schumacher[1]

Introduction

In this paper, I present an educational criticism of a curriculum, and "lived experience," shared by seven graduate students and myself as we explored the interrelationships between the Navajo and their reservation environment. The four-week field seminar described is a prototype of curriculum as I conceive and practice it in courses I offer under the rubric of "Field Studies in Environmental Education."

The form of inquiry presented here, primarily through self-disclosure, is obviously limited by my "teacher-centricity." No outside observer sorted through the complex web of phenomena comprising the field seminar or made comparisons with other curricular contexts. At the very moment I attempt to recapture the educational scene for the reader, and myself, I am filled with self-doubt. Swept along by the experiences of the seminar that still dominate my thoughts, I wonder if I can present a clear view open to the scrutiny and appraisal of others? Is there anything of worth for others in my unique subjective experiences? Will the disclosure carry meaning for those outside the experience?

With these questions uppermost in my mind, I offer the disclosure to students who have shared my curricular explorations; to colleagues who have been wondering what has been going on; to outside critics who may feel inclined to offer their appraisals. This paper continues my struggle to describe and interpret the underlying meaning that flows from an "ecological" curriculum in which students explore the relationships between themselves, other living things and the environment.

The body of the paper is presented in journal form. To my original journal entries, I have added regressions to provide comparisons and historical perspectives and to show the evolution of the curriculum to this point; references to clarify content; and excerpts from student journals to provide other perspectives for comparison by the reader. The works of Pinar, McCutcheon, Della-Piana, Eisner and Spradley and McCurdy have provided the methodological basis for this form of evaluative criticism.[2]

Chronology

Tuesday, June 26, 1979 — U. of U., SLC, UT

With the excitement of the "first day of school," I sense possibilities within The Group. There is no newness or novelty between us in this initial meeting; I know each student from previous classes, student teaching, graduate work. The obvious disadvantage is that we cannot begin with a clean slate but must carry the pleasures and pains of previous encounters with us. The warmth generated by the meeting indicates that we are willing to begin where we left off; we can continue the dialogue.

Some of the students are strangers to each other so I ask each to share a brief history and expectations. Their explicit reasons for entering the classes are mostly academic; their "hidden" expectations will emerge or be discovered while "running the course." As they speak, I fill in the blanks:

Stella is a gymnastic instructor from a college in New Jersey and is pursuing a doctorate in leisure studies with environmental education as an allied field. She is petite, blond, energetic, bright, and talkative. Rich, her friend who gave up a lucrative career in computer science for teaching in the elementary schools, is in a similar masters program. Rich has an easy, friendly manner and an interesting sense of humor. They were both enrolled in my class last summer when they experienced wilderness back-packing for the first time. They are serious about their programs of study but their first commitment is clearly to exploring their personal relationship and the possibility of future plans here in the West.

Gordon is a high school earth science teacher. He begins with an honest and open disclaimer for in-depth study by admitting his purpose in taking the seminar is "for a lane change." He has an active interest and broad background in the sciences and a forthright demeanor. He shares his beliefs and knowledge freely although somewhat dogmatically. He is especially knowledgeable in botany and geology.

I have worked closely with the other four students during the past academic year; in fact, the summer field seminar was planned with them and with their program needs in mind. Jacquie is a young single mother with the responsibility for three daughters. She is a primary teacher in a Title I school where the achievement of the students, some of them Navajo, is extremely low. Her hope is to enhance student academic growth and self-esteem with an emphasis on cultural awareness. Like many women who were bound to motherhood early in life, she is just beginning to explore her inner reality and is often torn between her duty to her daughters, her career, and her personal needs.

Terry is an informed and talented teacher and naturalist. She has taught science to elementary children in a private school and environmental education in a prestigious science camp in the Teton National Park. She is a dedicated student of the biological sciences and literature, and is presently planning a curriculum that combines science and traditional mythology for Navajo children. She knows who she is and where she's going; she is endowed with a subtle humor, a gentle assertiveness, a creative mind and unquenchable curiosity.

Fred is a teacher in an alternative school. He has talent for designing curricula that lead students to examine the social and personal implications of environmental issues in their community. His reasoning is unique, radical, and idealistic; his opinions, well-founded in intensive study. He is dedicated to the study of Native Americans and to the political, legal, economic, historic, and social underpinnings of their struggle for self-determination.

Susan has a broad experiential background in ethnic and ecological realms. Among other things, she has lived in France, collected butterflies in Costa Rica, and taught in a marine aquarium in New York City. She has a sharp, penetrating mind and the capacity to listen selectively. When the conversation is pointless, her black eyes flash off and she wanders off to more fertile grounds. When the speaker hits the right cord, she focuses in, asking the kinds of questions that bring inconsistencies to the surface. Although her main interest is the economic relationship between a people and the land, she is open to all learning in the realm of the environment.

Following introductions, we gather around a huge map of the Four Corners Region. I have pasted together AAA maps of Utah, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico and traced our course with highlighter. The borders encompassing the 25,000 square miles of Navajo Reservation are outlined in black. As the students follow the route, covering some 2,000 miles, I explain the itinerary.

The tracings, circles and checks on the map represent many hours of planning and weighing alternatives. During spring quarter Fred, Jacquie, Susan, Terry and I shared a seminar where we explored our ideas with Navajos and other ethnic experts on campus. Although each guest brought a different and often contradictory view, each enriched our understanding of the complexity of organizing a summer field seminar in the Navajo Nation. After calls and letters to the reservation that left me doubtful of the adequacy of my communication and aware and apprehensive of the intricacy of the undertaking, I finalized the itinerary in early June.

In the planning, I attempted to satisfy the expressed goals of the graduate students and to schedule blocks of time in areas where we could participate in school settings and/or natural history explorations. We would utilize National Parks and Monuments, where free camping is available to education groups, for studying the natural and anthropological history of the Navajo Nation and for R,R,& R (Reading, Research, and Reflection).

After reviewing the itinerary, I clarify my expectations for learning and my role in the seminar. Although the students are familiar with the general goals of my classes, there are specific expectations for this class that I wish to clarify.

The "common threads" that run through my curriculum closely follow those identified by Klohr in the work of reconceptualists.[3] Students are asked to inquire collaboratively into the social, political, and/or economic aspects of some contemporary environmental problem. The format is such that students experience the social press of the problem and are confronted personally with such questions as: What can I do to help alleviate this problem and to prevent its being handed on to future generations? Will I act? If so, how will my actions affect my lifestyle and ultimately the quality of my life? As a teacher, what can I do to educate students to this problem?

The curricular experiences in these classes must provide for cognitive growth in understanding the environmental issues as well as in the ethical, aesthetic, emotional, logical, and interpersonal realms comprising personal growth in students. The curriculum is also liberating[4] in that it requires that students analyze, select, reflect, and make decisions. The format of the course requires that students spend some time living

in a natural setting away from bathrooms, stereos, and other amenities of modern society.

The above "threads" naturally select students into the program. The population is atypical. Whereas motivation is no problem among these students, frustration is common. They must learn to cope with general goals rather than clear-cut and specific assignments. Likewise they must learn to live with some students with insatiable appetites for learning.

I review some specific expectations for our inquiry this summer. Hopefully our study of Navajo life and education will help us to:

*enrich our knowledge of Navajo educational practices;
*experience direct contact with Navajo children and adults;
*gain a greater appreciation of historical and contemporary Navajo life;
*study the present and past natural history of the region;
*share the Navajo child's view of the natural world;
*evaluate the effectiveness of our communication with Navajo children;
*assess the effectiveness of integrated natural history activities with Navajo children;
*experience multiple perspectives and grow in empathy and understanding.[5]

I warn the students that because of the necessity of clearing and keeping appointments in the Navajo schools, the seminar will be more structured than is typical of my classes. However, I have provided gaps in the schedule, several days at a time, when they will be free to plan activities and pursue interests.

Within the general theme, "The Relationships of the Navajo to Their Environment," students will pursue independent research topics. They will gather data through observations, interviews, and reading and keep extensive journal notes. The purposes of THE GROUP will be to protect the rights and enhance the opportunities for each person to maximize his/her learnings. Although in the past, the classes have been fairly democratic, I warn that this year I will intervene in decisions for the sake of learning or efficiency or to preserve the intent of the seminar.

We disband for the day. I end in a traditional teacher mode by asking students to review their assigned readings[6] and bring in articles or books for the resource file that will travel with us.

Friday, June 29 SLC,UT

The past three days have been spent in preparation for our Navajo journey and have been a wonderful blend of collaboration and challenge. Early on, I attempt to clarify a methodology for research adapted from Spradly and McCurdy's descriptions of ethnographic semantics[7]: The major purpose in such a study is for the participant to become more aware of her/his ego or ethnocentrism, of her/his cultural biases and prejudices. The itnent will be not so much to learn about the Navajo People, the Dine, as they are called, as to learn from them; that is, to take the perspective of the Navajo, and to discover their views of reality. Instead of asking, "What do I see these people doing?" we must ask, "What do these people see themselves doing?"[8] Rather than studying the entire "Navajo experience," each person will select a particular educational aspect upon which to focus independent studies. Data may be gathered in any form but should be recorded in descriptive (illuminative) journal notes. At the end of the experience we shall each share our perspectives in brief papers.

Terry and Fred, who have read extensively, bring in impressive annotated bibliographies, articles, and books. Their willingness to share their knowledge is appreciated by all. Fred explains his unique system of journal keeping or note-taking "as if learning mattered." All contribute to the resource file.

Stella has us draw numbers for cooking groups then trades with Terry so that she can be in Rich's. Her bending the rules amuses me. Terry, Susan, Fred, and I are in one group. Stella, Rich, Jacquie, and Gordon, in the other. Each person will provide her/his own breakfasts and lunches; each cooking group will plan, prepare, and serve eight dinners for THE GROUP. We'll eat at restaurants occasionally. It all works out logistically!

Rich suggests that we walk over to the motor pool to inspect the vehicles available for the trip. I have reserved two station wagons, but after examining the vehicles, THE GROUP decides that at most one station wagon and sedan will suffice. Susan suggests that if we all pack light we can fit into one station wagon. The debate on one or two vehicles continues on our way back to the seminar room. I summarize the "pros" and "cons" for taking two vehicles. Although the ethical and conservative views favor one vehicle, I know that safety, comfort, and convenience will win out. I suggest that we all pack very light and know that on Monday we will take two vehicles and that THE GROUP will eventually divide onto two groups, the cooking groups. I accept the fact and am determined not to waste energy trying to prevent the inevitable.

Today at the end of the meeting I felt ready. I no longer want to talk about it. I just want to get there, to become immersed, to see if it (the curriculum) works. The warp is laid. The pattern will emerge from whorls of student imagination, chance, and circumstance. I will be the batten to tighten or provide room for the weaving. Hopefully this Navajo tapestry will be beautiful.

Monday, July 2

Arches National Park

Bathed in the soft light of evening, I am high on a rock overlooking the Klondike area with sun and wind at my back. White-throated swifts chatter as they glide over frosted red sandstone.

We arrived in late afternoon in a heavy rain. The rocks took on a sheen, as if glazed. The rain has left the smell of damp sand, lavendar clouds, pools of water, and a warm, "soft" wind (by Navajo definition, a female wind), a startling clear and refreshing scene.

We got off to a good start this morning when we loaded gear into two University vehicles and headed south. It's good to be with people who can care for themselves--and me! Preparing to leave took much time and energy. I'm looking foward to sleeping tonight in my Mexican hammock which Rich helped me pitch between two junipers. Terry is sitting beneath a juniper writing in her journal:

> I have heard this is the land where the tall shadows dwell, stretching themselves across the painted sandstone. They are alive at this moment. Their mighty heads tower over me with their bold shoulders carrying the weight of twilight. I hardly know they are here; when they arrived, I am not sure. How they move about in such stillness...only the Sun could ever betray their secret. Yet they live and breathe with the desert pulse. Gradually, I am caught in their embrace. I and everything around me is changed.
>
> The wind is racing through this canyon, and I am being sand-blasted. Perhaps I shall be an arch tomorrow. Eons may pass in hours, my pale skin might turn crimson, while energetic air spirits whirl and twirl about me...creating a special cavity in me that I might look through and see. Through the wind's voice - I hear others. (From the journal of Terry T. Williams)

The others are hiking to Delicate Arch to view the sunset. I declined to hike with them, perhaps because I wish to reminisce, to return to a similar time three years ago: It was evening and raining as 60 of us hiked to Delicate Arch for our final session of the workshop that Edward Abbey[9] the guest author, has facetiously entitled "On the Rocks." When we arrived at Delicate Arch, the sky cleared and multiple rainbows

appeared. Our final words were accentuated with Lori's song and Ed's flute. At that moment, I felt both prostitute and lover, locked in a spiritual embrace with these people I had enticed here with credit and Abbey. We hiked the two miles down the trail in silence and darkness. I knew this was the grand finale to workshops I had been offering from mountain top to river gorge. Henceforth I would strive to bring this level of consciousness into my regular classes, my daily life.

At my feet are tiny patches of cryptogams, microcommunities of lichen and mosses, nature's way of tacking down the desert sands, I take from my notes a poem slipped under my door by one of the students who shared that workshop three years ago. I must share this with Terry later:

Cryptogam

"soil lichens castellate
a patch of soil. . ."
Ann Zwinger

One foul footprint
of bulldozing vibram
could crush this
fragile fortress of soil, this
scab of life on sand
that wind would bleed away.
Thirty years to build
this half inch high
symbiote civilization,
enough composted crust
to nest and hatch
some cheat grass seeds
and cheat the breeze
of this mound of sand
surrounding its sprouting
juniper.
Joseph K[10]

Wednesday, July 4, 1979 Hovenweep National Monument, Utah

Bruce, Terry, Susan, and I are sitting in an Anasazi ruin. The others are in a similar one next door. We met Bruce in Bluff and invited him to join us for a few days. He is a photographer, active environmentalist, and a teacher's aide at Mexican Hart, Utah where 99% of the student body is Navajo. We have worked together on wilderness issues. Last night he led us here over a maze of dusty roads.

Bruce says this ruin is a library; I prefer to call it the cultural center. It is a typical example of Anasazi architecture here in Hovenweep, this "deserted valley," as the Utes called it. The dwellings are small and conform perfectly with their bedrock foundations, often in the form of pedestals or tipping planes. Instead of altering the underlying structure, the Anasazi built upon what already existed (a good model for educational development). Our modern architects, especially those specializing in school construction and/or landscape destruction should be required to come here to study conformation and harmony. I suppose the original dwellers chose this place for its life-giving springs, so well concealed below in the tiny box canyons. The construction and location make such good sense.

We took shelter here from the glaring sun to observe Cooper's hawks nesting in the lone cottonwood below. Four downy white offspring keep their parents hunting. The adults take turns: they perch in a juniper snag on the rim and then dive screeching at prey. When they hit we hear a deadly thud. Often they miss. But they don't give up. They return to their perch and vigil for small birds, lizards, and rodents.

We hiked the rim trail today, "naturalizing" as we went along, exchanging knowledge, ideas, and questions. THE GROUP shows a good mixture of interest and expertise. Gordon provides names of minerals and plants with life histories as background. He has apparently read extensively and shows a phenomenal capacity to remember details. Last year, Stella undertook an in-depth study of insects, admittedly in an attempt to overcome a deep fear of insects. Having succeeded, she this year is an Annie Dillard[11] with an almost compulsive curiosity about the "crawling creatures." Rich shares her interest. We benefit as they call our attention to the little things. Susan and Jackquie are filled with learning and curiosity. I take a picture of them as they stand like two sandstone sentinels, binoculars up, debating the field marks of a bird. Terry, with her trained eye, is selective in her observations. She focuses on the spring in the canyon bottom, where birds and insects come to drink, insects emerge to flying forms; the cottonwood cradling the Cooper's hawk nest; the bird call.

Fred is quiet in this his first experience with "nature interpretation." He is starting a file that he says will require months to complete as he researches each new plant and animal he is introduced to. He thanks me for the experience and says that it is just what he hoped it would be. I can understand his delight in this new world. A similar experience came to me in the early sixties when I was a biology teacher in a small town in Wyoming: One summer, when I decided to enrich my biology teaching (and gain recertification credit) by attending an Audubon camp in the Wind River Mountains, I encountered "environmentalists" for the first time. I listened carefully to their conversations about "protest," citizen participations in government," and "degradation of the environment." Whereas the homefolk were concerned with extermination of coyotes and sagebrush to provide more habitat for domesticated flocks, these people talked about all organisms as a necessary part of a "web of life." But what impressed me most was that militant young and elderly bird watchers alike shared a passionate love of nature. I stood in awe as they knelt to a tiny nodding flower or stood in ecstasy as an eagle soared overhead. During free hours, I hiked the trails alone, mimicking their behavior. I began seeing the beauty that exists in nature that had somehow escaped me since my childhood on a sheep ranch where survival and hard times had transformed nature into an enemy to be conquered.

When I returned to teaching that fall, I placed the BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE CURRICULUM STUDY texts, that had previously provided the structure for my biology classes, on the reference shelf. I created an outdoor laboratory and a "living" indoor laboratory where students actively investigated the cold, overgrazed, sagebrush desert that was their home. The stained-glass slides gathered dust in the closets as we spent weeks studying the web of life in pond water, collected from a tiny mudhole over the hill.[12]

During the next few years I involved teachers in the district and resource persons in the community in the development of this outdoor laboratory. In 1969, when I left secondary teaching to pursue a doctorate at the University of Utah, I carried one skill tucked under my belt: the ability to utilize environmental resources to involve students in "relevant" studies. I also harbored the intent to bring students into some "close encounter" with nature, a seminal experience, one that would trigger active commitment to environmental causes.

On campus, I can never replicate this rich learning millieu, this beautiful classroom, this "poor curriculum."[13] My desert favorites are here: the tiny rock wren with descending, flute-like song, so melodious and utterly beautiful that I want all to hear it; the collard lizard, spectacularly patterned in yellow and green and yet completely camouflaged in the spider shadows of desert shrub; sacred datura, mystical "green

thing," locking in secrets at night with tentacled petals; and the ubiquitous yucca, prototype for co-evolution with man and insect.

In my free moments I have been reading about the use of the yucca plant by the Zuni in a monograph on ethnobiology Terry brought along.[14] Today at an interpretive stop provided by the park, where the crumbling ruins across the way were restored on a display complete with Anasazi busy in their daily activities, I could visualize the ties these people had to this fibrous desert plant: After gathering, paring, and heaping the yucca fruits, the women would chew the fruit (discarding the seeds) and deposit the pulp in a bowl which was placed on the roof overnight to ferment. The saliva converted the starch to sugar. The pulp was then cooked, dried, and formed into dehydrated cakes that could be later mixed with water to form a sweet conserve, syrup, or drink.

They didn't stop there. Juniper bark and yucca leaves were formed into sandals. Yucca fibers and leaves were used for baskets, mats, bags, fish nets, skirts, head cushions (for carrying water), belts, cradles, brushes for painting pottery, fireplace hoods, fire drills, and poison arrows dipped in a concoction of scorpions, red ants, centipedes, and jimpson weed. They chewed the leaves for an emetic in the sweathouse, and dead yucca roots were burned to fire pottery. Saponin, found in the roots and used to this day, provided a hair coloring and shampoo. I can think of no similar analogy in modern cultures for such complete utilization of a single plant. The yucca plant is also a metaphor for symbiosis. At night, the female Pronuba moth gathers pollen from its milky white flower. She flies to another blossom depositing the ball of pollen on the pistil providing a vehicle for cross-fertilization and assuring the production of seeds. She then lays a few eggs in the fleshy ovary of the plant and goes on to repeat the act. When the larvae hatch, they feed on the seeds, but some seeds are always left to assure survival of the yucca.

Later I pick a yucca fruit and cut across it to show students. Just as I predicted, a fat larva and plump, ripe seeds are found in conjunction in the three-chambered fruit. As I lay the fruit on the ground, I feel guilty and know that the demonstration (of symbiosis in nature or my knowledge?) was not worth the sacrifice.

We spent yesterday at the San Juan County Curriculum Materials Center in Blanding, Utah where we perused materials designed mostly by Anglo teachers especially for the Navajo. The majority of students in this strong Mormon school district are Navajo. In an effort to help educate their youth, the DNA brought suit against the District for moving too slowly to provide equal educational opportunities for Navajo students. Some were being bussed almost 200 miles a day. The dropout rate has been understandably high. New schools, that will be nearly 100% Navajo because of their locations, have been and are being built by the district. Presently Morman Navajos serve on the School Board and informed persons feel that soon the Navajo will move into politics in the region, a hot spot for environmental controversy with a conservative white minority that is pro-development and anti-environment.

The day was filled with multiple perspectives. The secretary talked to Susan, Terry, and me as we ate lunch on the lawn. Her father, a Mormon Indian scout was "called" by the church to quell fighting between the Navajo and whites in the region, at that time totally cut off from the rest of Mormon territory by the gorge of the Colorado River. She reiterated the philosophy of that day, "It's better to feed them than to fight them" and attested to the continued collaboration and friendship between her family and the Indians. She exemplifies a caring and sincere person.

The others went downtown for lunch. When they returned they were excited about two people they met, Jim Dandy, a Navajo, and Al Clark, a teacher:

> (The Navajo) started becoming people in Blanding when we met Jim Dandy, a Navajo who was involved in youth sports programs there...We were as fascinated by him as Terry must

have been by her first bird.

He was introduced to us by Al Clark, a teacher at Montezuma Creek School, a former L.D.S. missionary among the Navajo, and husband to a Navajo girl. (Al) felt that the main difference between them and us is technology. He described these people as being a stone age culture entering the twentieth century. I wouldn't go quite that far but I think that it took everyone by surprise and I saw people in the group resisting the idea as if to preserve the mystique of these people. He also mentioned the fact that the Navajos were very adaptable in their religious practices. As he put it, if one god doesn't work they'll try another, and frequently Christian Navajos will also practice the old ceremonies. (from the journal of Gordon Welsh)

Later a teacher expressed an informed view of the Navajo. She felt that the pressing need in the District was for trained Navajo aides who could speak the language. Finally, the director of the center informed us that the Indians do not want to change. They consider outsiders Communists who cause trouble. They welcome development. There is a familiar ring to his words. It echoes the testimony I have heard at many public environmental meetings. I find it hard to restrain my anger. I get up and walk into the next room and let the students continue the discussion.

THE GROUP debates whether or not we should view a "Coyote Tales Cartoon." Traditional Navajos tell "Coyote Tales," the adventures and misadventures of the trickster coyote, the Navajo Brer Rabbit, only in winter when the frost is on the ground. The majority agree to view the clever, animated cartoon. Terry absents herself. Fred voices strong objection and spends the time interviewing the secretary. He is able to act on his beliefs. He will undoubtedly be our moral conscience on this journey. Later together we watch a moving documentary, "The Navajo Way."[15]

As we follow Bruce's jeep over the dusty winding roads to Hovenweep, the students discuss the Anglo bias written into curriculum materials, a patronizing attitude. Susan explains to Fred why she watched the "Coyote Tales." She does not feel that a non-Navajo is compelled to live by Navajo norms. She would never show such a film if Navajo children were present. An exercise in dialectic, this journey provides many contradictions. I wonder how many can be synthesized into a holistic view.

Culture cannot be looked at as a static concept - or separate. Our culture has irreversibly affected theirs - we cannot change that... Contradictions pop up...I got the feeling that at the Curriculum Center they are trying but still treating the Indian as some sort of inferior race. They are not inferior - even behind - just different. So many beautiful ways of looking at things, their myths are all beautiful too - and not any harder to take stock in than ours. It is not the actual incident but the lesson of life to be learned which must be believed. (from the journal of Stella Thayer)

Thursday, July 5

Shiprock, N.M.

Jacquie, Gordon, Stella, Rich and Fred are hiking around the base of Shiprock, like "The Little Prince"[16] looking for yet another spectacular sunset. We have been blessed with many in this wonderful desert land. Terry, the bird woman, perched motionless high above me, silhouetted by crimson clouds, seems to be a part of the Winged Rock, one of the places of Navajo emergence from others worlds. Terry is joined by Susan. They are looking for raptors: owls, eagles, hawks. There is always the hope of seeing a peregrine.

The more I become open to the Southwest, the more mystical I find myself becoming. It is true, one cannot separate the Navajo from the Land or from their religious mythology. They are intrinsically interrelated. Shiprock is a monument, a shrine to ancient days and future inspiration. (from the journal of Terry Tempest Williams)

I choose an igneous seat. The vista unfolds before me to the east: desert shrub streaked yellow by the setting sun, lavendar mesas in the distance, navy blue stratus clouds topped with pink cumulus puffs. At my back is the Winged Rock, awesome! mystical! Lingering rays penetrate its deep crevices revealing fissures and flow lines, features confirming the liquid origin of this massive, 1,400 foot volcanic neck. Except for the plumes on the horizon trailing from the Farmington Power Plant, "beauty is all around me."

After a hectic day, the peace and serenity of this scene is most welcomed. The heat and hundreds of festering and itching "No-see-Um" bites acquired at Hovenweep have added to our discomfort. Because of Independence Day, a BIA (Bureau of Indian Affairs) school, where we were to have spent two days, dismissed school for the entire week. So we are seeking other possibilities in the Shiprock area.

On our way here we visited an old and classic trading post at Ishmay. It didn't take students long to get into baskets, jewelry and rug room, but they missed what appeared to me to be the most interesting aspect, the elderly couple who run the post. Later at a birding stop, I chide them for having ignored the perspective of the elderly traders. My remarks, given freely after the fact, are a low blow. Tears glisten in Terry's eyes. Fred becomes silent.

Farther down the road, at the Four Corners Monument, which is surrounded by stands of jewelry, sand paintings, pottery, and people, the mistake is not repeated. The conversations I hear between students and vendors as I wander from stand to stand are directed and probing. I buy fried bread with honey and lemonade, wait, and listen to Fred's conversation with two women vendors.

Fred: What do you think is important for your son to learn?

Sarah: My boy, he wants to be a welder because they make a lot of money but there was another man in our area and he was a welder and it made him go blind. The light burns in your eyes and you can't see. If he does it he will have to leave because he can only make 3 or 4 dollars on the reservation and there isn't much work. He can make 6 or 8 dollars outside. I try to tell him to think about things; What would happen if he went blind? But like it is his life and I can say things that he should think about you can't make other people do what you want them to do. They have to decide.

He goes to the store and buys a loaf of bread before the other loaf is finished and he throws it away. I always tell him that we should use everything wisely. You should use what you have and not waste anything in this world. I always say that a smart person can do a lot with just a little but you have to use your imagination. It might not seem like there is much food but I can always pull from here and from over there and put a good meal together. I made this blouse from a piece of material. I never use a pattern.

Fred: Do you make all this jewelry?

Sarah: Yes, and people will come by and say I'll give you $3 for this ring or I'll give you a dollar for this necklace. They pick it up and they pound on it or they take out their knife and scrape the stone and say is this turquoise or plastic. They have no respect.

Fred: Do you go to the medicine man?

Sarah: There is a lady, she had cancer and they said she would die but for 25 days they sang and performed healing ceremonies and she was cured. I go to a Commanche medicine man. My mother went to him and sometimes I go to a Navajo medicine man sometimes. They cure different things. This is going to be my daughter. She's going to marry my son and she better start calling me mother. Her name is Norma.

Norma: What is important to learn? There was this boy and he and his family were very poor and he was very quiet because he felt like he wasn't as good as everyone. The kids at school would tease him. Even the Indian kids and everyone, all the teachers thought he was retarded and everybody thought he was stupid. He was sent to this other school. Alternative school.

And this boy that everyone thought was stupid became the president of the class. It's because they really care about people. I went there for a while and I really liked it but we don't know if the school will be there next year.

. . .

I asked a question
and
I was offered stories
and
found not only answers
but
in the manner of response
answers
that
I didn't even know
the questions
to - yet.
Listen.

(from the journal of Fred Edwards)

We drive on to the town of Shiprock and survey possibilities. It is the center for agribusiness in this region and we identify a bank, community college, Youth Recreation Center, and a laundromat for further reference. We stop by the recreation center first. It is housed in an old BIA boarding school with wooden porches and a dusty courtyard. Terry, who is very anxious to teach, seeks out Betsy, the director, who says it would be fine if we wish to "teach" the next morning. I make tentative arrangements with her pending confirrmation by THE GROUP.

We talk it over in the hot sun at "high noon!" Except for Terry's affirmation, there is negative or no response. What appears to be a splendid opportunity to me, is extremely threatening to THE GROUP. Jacquie, "We don't know what we're doing," Stella, "We might harm them," Gordon, "I'm not prepared and haven't any teaching materials." To the latter, I reply abruptly, "You have what you have each day you walk into a classroom--Yourself! What more do you need?" Stella eases the tension by suggesting we go for ice.

During the few blocks to the ice stop my mind follows endless routes I have traversed many times before. The same old dilemma shows its ugly face. Do I make the decision that I feel is best for the students or allow them to choose and perhaps "cop out," choose the easiest route?

When we arrive at the stop, I announce that we'll stay here tonight and meet with the children and youth at the center in the morning. The looks are a mixture of hostility, amusement, and indifference. I understand their resentment, but there isn't time to resolve it. I just have a feeling we should stay. How can I explain that to anyone's satisfaction? This is not the Navajo way. I am being an authoritarian parent. The Navajo way of discipline is done quietly, out of love. No loud scolding and severe reprimands. When discipline is necessary the reason is to change behavior and not because that behavior is right or wrong but because it is to the individual's advantage or disadvantage. It becomes a matter of pride and ambition and benefit to him to act in certain ways. Parental dominance breeds resentment. Because there is extraordinary patience and acceptance, more guidance than discipline is the Navajo way. (from the journal of Jacquie Spafford)

We eat lunch and head for the Navajo Community college. There we meet Jim Tutt, vice president of the College who for the next hours shares his aspirations about the growth of this trailer campus. During the coming years, the college will grow to a 15 million dollar complex of permanent buildings, he says. As we move about the campus he speaks of his lobbying efforts in Washington, the Navajo awareness component of the curriculum to strengthen Navajo tradition, and the attitudes of the Navajo toward development.

He shares an ethnographic study conducted to determine Navajo perceptions about the impact of environmental changes due to energy development. The preface contains a moving introduction:

> The following quotation is the conclusion of a speech given by an Officer of Burnhams Chapter. We feel that the remarks underscore both the doubts and insight of many Navajos toward the accelerating socioeconomic changes brought about by energy development. The points he makes stand for the social costs as the Navajos themselves see them. It is also a plea for careful consideration and for a commitment, on the part of the many governmental agencies concerned, to include the Navajos of all walks of life in the decisions which will affect them first and most severely.
>
> (When the White Man Will Come to Understand Our Ways)
>
> "We see! Indeed, that is the reason
> they hesitate."
> They will come to realize.
>
> "Indeed, that is the reason for
> their not making a hasty move."
> They will come to realize.
>
> "Indeed, they have been born at
> this very place."
> They will come to realize.
>
> "Indeed, even their late grandmother
> and grandfather have been
> born at this very place."
> They will come to realize.
>
> "Indeed, they do not roam about as
> we do, and they do not move from
> place to place."
> They will come to realize.
>
> "Indeed, their sheep are like their
> mother, father, grandmother, and
> grandfather."
> They will come to realize.
>
> "Indeed, that is how they think
> about their sheep."
> They will come to realize.

"Indeed, even those endless lonely
ridges they will have become at-
tached to."

"Indeed, even though it seems bar-
ren and lifeless they have become
attached to the land."
They will come to realize.

"Indeed, they really like to live
in this particular place. Now we
understand."
They will come to realize.[17]

Although we had no previous appointment with Jim, he stays with us all afternoon. In addition, he opens the library to us, gives us his desk copy of the report, and offers us the campus for camping. As we sit in the silversmith's shop, a hogan, I watch the students wilt in the heat. He sees this too and jokingly adds that they now have experienced a sweat bath. I can see he has a greater psychological tolerance for such discomforts. He is a beautiful person, filled with energy from many dreams.

We drove over bumpy dirt roads through Chuska Valley to the foot of Shiprock tonight. Some want to go back to NCC to camp. Terry, Susan and I shall sleep here to watch for owls. I am weary--my head throbs. The weight of my unilateral decision weighs heavy. If this initial contact between THE GROUP and Navajos goes poorly, it may cloud the remaining journey.

Early on in the course of the trip differences arose between individuals and small segments of the group. These were inevitable considering the seriousness with which we approached the study and the fact that because we worked as a unit, each of us was often bound to feel the consequences of an act of another, especially if we disagreed.

On the evening, we drove the dirt road to the Shiprock, the spirits of those in the first car were high, eager to see the mythical mountain and anticipating the next day, our first formal contact with Navajo children. The other half of the group was edgy...concerned about the rough road and lack of precise plans for the next day. The first sight of the rock was impressive enough to calm all our fears. It stands alone on a huge plain of desert scrub, grasses, and dry flowers. We all stayed till dusk, exploring, making plans for the next day in small groups. Climbed down at dark to find that the others wanted to go back to town to sleep at the Community College campus, in spite of our general agreement to remain together for safety. Three of us decided to stay. A spectacular night, purple, windy sky, a few drops of rain, three women, the mountain. (from the Journal of Susan Parry)

Friday, July 6, 1979

Shiprock, N.M.

I woke up this morning to the Mourning Dove's call, raindrops, and a waxing moon. The night was strange with alternate deathly calm and strong blasts of wind that interrupted my sleep.

We drove to the recreation center early. There were no children about, but about 40 youth from the Navajo Youth Conservation Corps were milling around. When I asked the director where the little ones were she said, "They don't come on Friday." My heart dropped! But as we talked to the NYCC volunteers, they

seemed agreeable to working with us. We helped them clean up the center, their task for the day, and then they joined us. The youth, who work with the younger children, felt they might benefit from some natural science experiences. Yesterday I made tentative team assignments. I move about tensely trying to push team involvement. Susan and Terry have been busy since we arrived and are surrounded by a large group. Terry passes around earth objects (feathers, stones, shells, etc.) from her leather pouch. With oil pastels the youth depict their ties to land and then volunteer explanations. I listen in as Helena, a beautiful woman of 18, talks openly about her life: She has attended BIA schools all her life but feels no bitterness--she accepts the way it is. She lives in a hogan high on the mesa top. She runs down to the river each morning to bathe. It is cold but makes her feel alive. She follows the traditional beliefs taught to her by her grandfather. She believes she is one with the animals: the bear that walks through each year that her grandfather has ridden. The rattlesnake that comes to a tree where her grandfather hangs a rattle. She feels one with the animals, a tie she "hasn't the vocabulary to express." She points to the paperback she carries, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT. "This is the same as Indian psychology. I talk with my grandfather about this." She has just enlisted in the air force and is not presently thinking of college. Helena, beautiful maiden with strong sense of identity, harmony, and respect for elders, open to the present, reveals the Indian way. Quiet and shy, but with a sense of humor and enjoyment of the present, she answers our questions in parables. She carries a strong sense of union with all living things, the four-leggeds, winged ones, and green things alike. She is timeless.

The wild beasts; birds are my friends, messengers, protectors
Their sacred names and their ancient songs
are the keys to their world--
a world of no time
a world of harmony
If everyone would look to their beast and fowl brother
one could learn the mysteries of mother earth.
They were created by the Great One
to aid us five fingers;
Aid us in our need for food
or be our teachers in the lessons mother earth has for us.
And our mother, the earth
the beautiful woman whom we live on
the trails of life that she adorns - are the trails we travel.
In my path or life I shall
always look to nature
because I am a child of nature in spirit.

--Helena Rosa
Shiprock

Helena - born of winter snow, baptized daily by the San Juan waters. This young woman breathes contemporary tradition. She speaks of Mother Earth and the power of animals, of bears her grandfather has ridden, of snakes he has lured with rattles - and she believes Ritual language is a part of her communion with the land. As she shares her sentiments the tears fall freely on Fyodor Dostoevsky. (from the Final Paper of Terry Tempest Williams)

One young woman with whom I spoke at the recreation center at Shiprock embodied for me the dilemma the Navajo Nation faces - maybe if her life is any indication, the problem is not as insurmountable as we Anglos interpret it to be. Helena is a beautiful 18 year old, even more so spiritually than physically. She knew and was able to express her deep knowledge of and

concern for traditional Navajo myth and ways. Her descriptions of her life were of a purely traditional existence without any of the modern "conveniences" that have been adopted in less rural parts of the reservation. Helena was about to join the airforce...a move which while giving her a new kind of freedom, would be a drastic change from the routine that she knows. Maybe the Navajos' ability to tolerate hardship, and their spiritual depth make them more capable than we imagine of dealing with the changes that will occur as a result of their own need to survive within another very dominant culture, in a way that will preserve their own world. (from the Final Paper of Susan Parry)

Jacquie, Gordon, and Fred are "talking" to a large group--It appears to be mostly interrogation. I ask Gordon to join me in doing some earth science. We have brought rocks from Shiprock and use them in an inquiry format. When I ask how many have been there, they inform me that Navajos never go to the Winged Rock, a place of mythological emergence. The air there is thin. I flash back to my sleepless night. We should not have brought the rocks here. Our ignorance shows but we forge ahead. Fred is talking to a counselor:

Fred: What is really important to learn in school?
Delbert: Everything has a spirit. There is a spiritual part of everything. Like that other one was trying to show us about rocks and he was giving them all those names. Well, we have names too. They tell about the difference in shape and texture but we know that they are all rocks and that they are part of Mother Earth. We don't separate them. When we keep taking rocks from Mother Earth we are digging her insides out. Taking her heart. Like there are 3 things. Fire, water, and earth. And like, they are everywhere. The fire that you use for food, is the same fire that travels through those lines there, or start that truck there. It's the same and it is the same as the fire in your heart. When it dies, so do you. The water gives life and it is like the blood that runs inside of you. You might say ocean, lake, river but it is water. The earth is our mother and people should be careful. People don't see the spiritual but they should. Like I talk with the elders and they are really worried because we have a prophecy about a war between two powers and one is good and this is the United States but we are afraid that it will not win over evil and another fire will come from the sky and destroy things. The last time the people were suffering and they tried to offer the Great One different things and finally tobacco was offered and accepted but under the condition that there would be death. The old men are trying to figure out what will have to be done this time. Sometimes they pray that white people will come and learn things from us and take them back and teach others the way things should be. This one man can take a rock and see inside of you if your fire is working. They are powerful the things they use for healing, the plants. The Great One was really smart because he put the power in these things and not inside of men themselves. If he gave them directly to men they would use them in a bad way against each other so they were put in other things. It takes a long time to learn about the power. You spend your whole life learning about these things.

Once I went to the Peyote. They can take you places in your mind and I said I wanted him to take me somewhere and I was really surprised because he took me inside my body; inside myself and I could see many things.

Fred: What are the most important things to learn in life?
A Hopi NYCC Student: Where I live we had groups that would get together and just talk and rap with each other and we would share and learn from some of the elders in the group. My father is a spokesman for the place I'm from and he went to a meeting that the United

Nations held. There were all of these scientists and really big, important people. Medicine men and many elders went and they had a meeting and talked about their prophecies and what they believe and everyone was really amazed because everything fit together so well even though everyone was so different it all came together.

And like...white people come to us and they are really lost and they want something from us and I really don't know what to do or what to tell them. They don't know who they are and they don't fit in and they are really lost. That's why I'm really glad. I'm really thankful that I grew up in a traditional family where we had ceremonies...because I know where I came from and who I am and I feel sorry for them because it's like they are all dizzy and mixed up. I have ceremonies so wherever I go I can always be strong and not lose my head. (from the Journal of Fred Edwards)

Rich and Stella organize the entire group into "games" in the gym that provide the opportunities to join hands, touch, laugh with the Navajo youth. Then volley ball in the court. The Navajo play hard and rough, but nonverbally. Our comments stand out in bold relief; we are the only ones talking. They never compliment one another on a good shot or chide a person for an error. They exhibit a totally different orientation to game playing. They are in good physical condition, enjoy the games. The women join in and are as vigorous as the men.

The games over, I sit on the porch and watch the interaction as individuals mingle with the youth and get into conversations. The tension flows from me. I no longer worry about how we are going to be received by the Navajo. I am sorry that I didn't handle the situation with THE GROUP better. Why must I be so direct, confronting, and intimidating? There must be a better way. The experience was obviously rich and positive for them. But do the means justify the ends?

Sunday, July 8

Pinasco Blanco Ruins,
Chaco Canyon National Park
New Mexico

A scarlet mallow anchored atop a mound of discarded sherds from another culture sways in the breeze that refreshes this hilltop. Crumbling doorways frame azure sky. The Anasazi who lived here were opportunists, using rain water whenever it occurred to mix the mortar and adobe plaster needed for these structures or to irrigate the corn and squash grown along the Chaco River and Chaco Wash.

I obtained back country permits and Gordon, Fred, Susan, Terry and I hiked here early this morning. Gordon is especially interested in the rock glyphs that are thought to depict the 1054 super nova. So far we haven't found them and we are now resting in the shade of crumbling walls writing in our journals.

The Chaco River, wandering through mud and sand, below me presents a beautiful metaphor for my professional journeys. The stream in its journey to base level traverses diverse terrains. The course taken, often a mystery to the casual observer, is in reality a subtle synthesis of inner and outer forces: of conforming to what exists, of avoiding what resists, of changing what yields. At times the stream flows gently through fertile low fields, feeling its way carefully, cutting a bank here, leaving a trace there. The casual observer sees a sluggish, aimless wanderer, dominated by its environment. At other times contained by sidewalls and pulled by gravity, the stream cascades, cutting into its confining borders, carrying huge burdens with it. "Aha!" says the casual observer, "Here is a stream filled with energy actively changing its environment." Such has been the course of my professional life for the past two decades. The meanderings and cascades, aimless or energetic to the casual observer have carried me past many "landscapes" where I could view "learning"[18] from a new perspective.

The experience at Shiprock put me in a contemplative mood and took me back to my first experiences at the University of Utah. I let Susan drive and let my mind wander back: As I went about my T.A. duties that first year (the supervision of student teachers in the public schools) I was struck by two contrasting scenes: incredibly sterile classrooms where geraniums were dying all over the place and rich parking lots behind the school where all sorts of exciting little things were sprouting up in the cracks in the asphalt. During my second year, as instructor of secondary methods, reality slapped me in the face. How indeed do you bring "relevance" to Secondary Methods? At first I suggested that students go into schools to seek out "problems to be solved." For several miserable weeks we sat around as I explained to them how one teaches. My words followed me down the hall to my office where they echoed as I sat like an emply bag after each session.

One Thursday morning, I arranged a field trip to an innovative high school. The principal, Mary Caffey, a tall, straight woman with spartkling eyes and sharp wit guided us past a cafeteria filled with students that she said would not go to class. They were allowed to "hang out" in the cafeteria since no one knew what to do with them.

The image of the alientated youth followed me through a sleepless week-end. On Monday morning at 8 a.m., I was in Mary Caffey's office mumbling something about a program for the cafeteria crowd. Expecting to hear her say "Come back with something in writing," I heard instead an open invitation, similar to the one extended by Betsy at Shiprock. Anything I could do, she said, would be better than what was being done.

Mary called in counselors and began recruiting kids. I went back to the University to try to convince my students that the encounter would be exciting. These haphazard plans laid the ground work for STEP, an alternative program.

During Winter Quarter that year, a tall, handsome man with a keen intellect, soft eyes, and an aura of energy walked into my class. His manner and words told me that he was going to give the Education Department one last chance before "bagging it" and pursuing his real interest, Oriental History?! I carted him off to East High School where he became the first legitimate alternative teacher in the valley. With Robert V. Bullough's help, the STEP program grew into an exemplary alternative program and a teacher-center for training alternative teachers.

It was then I decided that a descriptive study of STEP was dissertation enough, but without knowledge or skill in the forms of educational criticism, I found the descriptive study an impossible task. With forebearance and support of my chairman, I somehow completed the dissertation in the spring of '72. The dissertation reflected my inability to convey the true essence of STEP; the chapters alternated between flowing narrative and a Tyler curriculum bag that I tried to stuff STEP into. In the final chapter, however, I was able to identify the elements that I considered essential in a humanistic educational environment that provide the foundation for my relationship with students to this day.

The next years were filled to overflowing. My office was filled with long-haired, bearded and braless protestors from the 60's; they were "fed-up" with the system, "psyched" about alternative teaching, and convinced of their abilities to bring a new life to disenchanted youth. My days were filled with visitations to the alternative programs where I observed inspired instruction often combined with scanty content. My nights were filled with team meetings with alternative teachers and student teachers discussing endlessly the inflexibility of the system, the rights and responsibilities of individuals, the limits of tolerance, the place of authority, and methods of building meaningful curriculum.

Sandwiched between alternative education commitments was what the tenure committee calls "service." Because of the mandates of NEPA on resource development, the environmental movement had gained credibility in the West. I found myself serving on two Department of Interior Advisory Boards. At public hearings, I invariably defended the rights of coyotes, cougars, and canyons who could not speak for themselves. I organized a committee to seek protection of the breeding habitat of the Great White Pelican on an island in the Great Salt Lake. I was leading and teaching ecology workshops for the Audubon Society and believing that understanding of ecosystem concepts and a deep love of nature were transferable to socio-political participation.

Often at public hearings I would look at the "audience," predominantly representatives of resource development, and wonder why more teachers and students were not participating. What could provide better instruction in citizen participation in the governmental process? Where were the alternative teachers?

Environmental themes were an integral part of the alternative programs; some units were excellent, focusing on wastes, water quality, etc., but for the most part I was disappointed by the paucity of alternatives for learning, the lack of basic ecological understanding. I was tired of environmental sentimentality and puzzled by the relationship between experience, awareness, appreciation, and action. It was then I began legitimizing "environmental education" in the form of a proficiency for graduate students seeking masters degrees in education and began offering workshops in Environmental Education hoping that if I could fuse experience, awareness, appreciation, and content, action would be a natural consequence.

On my office wall I tacked a picture of the earth viewed from somewhere in outer space where I felt I was floating. Each time I looked at it, I asked the question: How do I bring this holistic view of the earth into the reality of teachers and students?

In the meantime, Bob Bullough, in a doctoral program at Ohio State, was sending me papers from conferences written by people who were "reconceptualizing" curriculum. The words of Macdonald, Greene, Klohr, Pinar, Mooney, and Huebner were like messages from home.

After my "last" workshop, "On the Rocks," I floated the Colorado River. After ten days on the River, I emerged to photograph sunset and sunrise from the South Rim of Grand Canyon. At the Visitors' Center mid-morning, sipping a cup of coffee and watching Mr. and Mrs. America, I was aware that something was missing. I couldn't hear the river. I headed my old VW east and when I passed First Mesa on the Hopi Reservation, the sound of the river returned.

Filled with fear and fascination, I let my fantasies carry me for the next days on through the Navajo Nation, from ruin to trading post. The pattern for the tapestry woven this summer took shape then in my mind's eye.

I have since spent time on St. Paul with the Aleuts and in the Indian villages of Guatemala and Mexico. And now I'm back full circle rehashing the places I've been and wondering what, if anything, it has to do with Pinasco Blanco and the people sharing this rubble heap with me today. Perhaps there doesn't have to be a reason. I can just sit here and enjoy this small decaying ruin where the spirit of the place seems more unaltered and intense than in the large restored ruins.

Sitting in ruins built by men 800 years ago, trying to imagine their sweat, long dead. They were just like me, love, hate, anxiety, joy, lust, jealousy, sadness. Did they fear death? Did they get bored? They had to have feared death or they wouldn't have tried so hard to stay alive. And they surely got bored by tedious tasks.

Who were you Chacoans? Why did you give up? Where did you go? What did you do in Kivas? Mysteries to us were everyday life to you, no big deal.

I see the canyon you saw and walk the same ground. Your simple, tedious, boring drudgery becomes enigmatic mystery to the ones who came after you gave up...You died 800 years ago and they can't even find your bones. Oh, there are fragments of the clay pot your mother's mother bought with beads from the trader up north (beads she got for peyote gathered in the sacred places). The pot you kept beans in. And a wall that you helped build with your sweat and bitching...Walls now crumbling into dust in the wind. The same wind that you heard, under the same sun, on the same ground.

Where are your bones Chacoan? And what would they tell us if they could speak? What you did in the Kivas? What you did to please your gods for fun and profit and because you didn't know any better? And finally, did not your gods betray you in the end anyway?

Where are your bones Chacoan? What did you really think you were doing besides just surviving the only way you knew how, the way you learned from your father, who learned it from his father? What mysteries could you show us? Or would you only talk of joy and sorrow, euphoria and pain, death and boredom? You were like me, a Human Being, getting through life the best way I can. But you're dead and your bones are lost and you don't care anymore anyway.

Now, 800 years later I sit against the stones you layed and sweated on, and suddenly you are alive again, talking from deep in the past, in jumbled words and messages. You don't know me and we will never meet but somehow I know you, because you were just like me. (from the Final Paper of Gordon Welsh)

For a brief moment, the boundaries of time and space which we live dissolve...it is exciting to build these eroded walls back up with one's imagination. What whispers and echoes will our 1979 civilization leave to future peoples? One thing for sure, the wind will be our mouth peace/piece. The land will house our souls. (from the Final Paper of Terry Tempest Williams)

We traveled to Chaco Canyon Friday after leaving Shiprock. It is a rest stop on our way to the Pine Hills School in Ramah. Yesterday THE GROUP, tired from heat and travel, slept in--some very late. When they finally assembled, I talked to them about their studies: I expressed my positive feeling about the Shiprock experience, their performance as well as the richness and potential for learning that existed there. I reiterated the limitations we anticipated and have now confirmed: lack of time for complete immersion in the culture (one would need to live here for years); the linguistic barrier (none of us speaks or understands Navajo); the logistical difficulty of traveling, and being in two vehicles; the variation in perspectives we find between regions and between Navajos; our personal biases and interests that filter and cloud what we see. I point .out that the latter, although a limitation, is also necessary if they are to focus on one aspect. As

patterns begin to emerge they will become more discriminating and selective, and more narrow. I ask them to share their topics with each other. Summarized, they are as follows:

Stella: Sex roles of Navajo women,
Rick: Navajo attitudes toward competition,
Gordon: Similarities in Navajo and Anglo cultures,
Jacquie: The role of the child in the Navajo family,
Susan: Navajo perceptions about land,
Fred: Navajo perceptions about what is important to learn in school,
Terry: A curriculum unifying science and mythology.

In the afternoon, we join a guided tour through Pueblo Bonito, an extensive, restored ruin that may have been a trading and religious center for the dwellers. The ranger/guide, an informed anthropologist who conducted ethnographic studies in Guatemala, expresses the National Park philosophy for preserving such sites: Looking into the past enables us to look more critically at the present and perhaps identify in advance the causes and remedies for cultural disintegration. He takes us into the central plaza, askes us to imagine we are in the past, and then asks us how we feel, what we see? His pedagogy is effective. The pillars rise, the court fills with people bartering for goods displayed around the perimeter. They have come long distances over roads paved with stone to share goods and ideas in this religious and economic center. The white walled adobe reflects the colors of their garments woven of earth colors.

I ask the ranger if he might come to our camp tonight to speak to THE GROUP about his studies. In the evening, he joins us and explains that ethnography may encompass man's relationship to his habitat (economics), man's relationship to man (politics), or man's relationship to ideas (education). He says that the investigator observes in a holistic way, setting up categories or systems as they emerge. The observer has a moral obligation not to intrude into the culture being studied. How strongly we have felt this! Each day we ask ourselves whether we really have a right to be here. His words are well received and compliment what I said at noon. I feel the pattern emerging.

Thoughts on a Rainbow in Chaco Canyon

Yeibichai dancers
streaming down from clouds
to bless the five fingers...
bringing to earth
established brilliance;
colors to the desert.
They appear - intensify - fade.
The Holy Ones are here
in Chaco Canyon.

(from the Final Paper of Terry Tempest Williams)

Tuesday, July 10

Ramah Navajo School District
Pine Hill, N.M.

The drive here from Chaco Canyon was disjointed and filled with stops that are beginning to annoy the people in the other car. I don't blame them and can understand their frustration. I am always stopping for a bird, small animal or some extraordinary phenomenon like the dead coyote hanging from the ranch gate.

The dead coyote, a warning to environmentalists, is an explicit statement to all that there are no coyote lovers living beyond that gate.

Coyote
Hangs
from ranch fence.
Tongue exposed - decaying.

Dried blood
lay on sand beneath.
And within my heart -
I find a void,
that only tears
can
fill.
(from the Journal of Fred Edwards)

The tapestry here at Ramah is woven with deeper hues than sun-bleached Chaco Canyon. The verdant juniper forests are substantial and interspersed with radiant magenta and flaming orange blossoms of cholla and Indian Paintbrush. El Moro National Monument, where we are camping, is serene and beautiful. To the east is the sky city of the Acomas; to the west, the Zuni Reservation.

The red brick buildings with turquoise metal roofs blend well with the red clay and deep green vegetation of this area. The circular buildings with sensitive and unifying design and color symbolize the bond that unites the seven clans in this region. The Ramah Navajo Reservation is apart and isolated from the main reservation as well as mainstream America. The feeling of separateness and independence is prized and nurtured. Many of the people have been Christianized, primarily by the Nazarenes, Pentecostals, and Mormons.

The Ramah School Board is incorporated and began its struggle for self determination in 1970 with "a couple of condemned BIA buildings and a hogan or two." Now the complex represents a community enterprise. Good health and social services, the development of an agrarian economy, and Navajo as well as English literacy are goals. Sam Alonzo, the middle school principal coordinating our visit, put it this way: "We want our people to possess the 'combat' skills to get along in either the Anglo or Navajo culture."

The demonstration school, that must negotiate directly with a House subcommittee for funds, has managed its affairs well. Almost every person in the community is involved one way or another in community education. There are graphics arts center, radio station, barns, green houses, health center, native arts and crafts. Vocational education is directed at a self-sufficient and agrarian economy. The "Brangus" cows are "farmed out," a cow to each family which must return the first-born calf. In this way the community herd is maintained and families benefitted. The families are invited to pick the vegetables that ripen in the huge greenhouses.

Very few of the families have running water. They are free to utilize the showers in the gym, that also serves as a center for community recreation.

The program is bilingual with the almost 100% Navajo in kindergarten to 30% in the high school. The transition is subtle. They strive for an appropriate ratio of non-Indian and Navajo teachers.

Yesterday Sam Alonzo, Christian Navajo and self-educated principal of the middle school coordinating our visit, arranged a tour of facilities, a meeting with the Anglo superintendent, children and classrooms for observation and experimentation, lunch and showers! As we followed him from place to place he shared his life openly: He attended BIA schools where they were punished if they spoke Navajo and then a mission school in Albuquerque. Upon graduation, a friend talked him into enlisting in the Army. His friend was rejected; he was sent to Viet Nam. He walked through the battlefields as if in a dream. He could not (would not allow himself to) feel the pain of war, the death and misery around him. After the experience, he could relate to the pain of defeat known by his ancestors. When he returned, he educated himself as a teacher and is presently working toward his administrator's credentials. He is not a registered voter and sees no inconsistency in fighting for his country but not voting. His wife serves on the school board. He says the Navajo children are naturally quiet and do not need to verbalize or rationalize their feelings. When I ask him how then do they sublimate their anxieties, he says they turn their aggressions inward and become passively hostile. They exhibit this side more to Anglos than Navajos, he says.

This morning after breakfast has been served at school, the teams met with students of all ages, from preschoolers to high school. I wandered around listening to the sessions, observing THE GROUP teach. There are more questions from the teachers than answers from the students. But now THE GROUP can tolerate silence without discomfort, assured that behind the shy, downcast eyes are racing visual images.

After the "passing of the pouch" and pictures, Terry and Fred ask third and fourth graders to name desert things. Fred writes the words on the board in long columns. The children go on and on. I am amazed at the richness of their awareness. It strikes me now as I transpose this list that it probably would have been more appealing to the students had Fred recorded their objects in a spiral or circular form:

hogan
lizard
rattlesnake
horned toad
sand
bones
yucca
treasures
worms
bees
stink bugs
horses
fossils
deer
bear
broken pottery
bats
arrowheads
chuck wagons
old clothes
weeds
graveyards
clouds
stars
mud
sun
cactus
roadrunners
flowers
rain
lakes
ants
flies
insects
land turtles
wind mills
porcupines
skin walkers
coyotes
owls
plants
skulls
tracks
Navajo tea
mesas
sky
mice
dead rats
trees
eagles
rocks
vultures
birds
moths
tarantulas
ruins
snakes
fox
bottles
butterflies
old guns
fry bread
trails
bullets
sun
moon

Later Terry and Jacquie meet with four preadolescents; the response is totally different.

> I feel totally drained. I have just experienced one of the most difficult, intense, precious encounters of my life...working with these four junior high school students; Melinda, Jerry, Quinn and Carolyn. We sincerely communicated through silence. When working with the Navajo child one must be sensitive to their whispers. They have the ability to read souls, truly.

> I felt at such a loss at times...the silences were our bond, smiles and eye signals spoke. I risked all that I was...and I really thought I had failed. They turned in their work. It was beautiful. I thanked them. Melinda wrote on her scratch paper. "Thank you too." Carolyn withheld her writings, but I intuitively felt she wanted to give them away...Words don't count here, feelings do. I respected her wishes however. Then she threw her paper away and looked at me. I felt as though she was testing me, "How much do you really care?" At this point, I trusted my feelings and used humor as my recourse saying, "If you don't mind, I'm a collector of garbage!" She smiled. I smiled. We all laughed. The air rushed in. We had touched. As I left, they whispered, "Come Back..." My tears flowed freely. (from the Final Paper of Terry Tempest Williams)

In the courtyard Rick and Stella are playing a marvelous "sheep" game with the children:

> Had a great time teaching 2nd & 3rd graders. After we got two boys out of the tree and got started, everything was all right. Kids were shy but real cute and well behaved. (from the Journal of Richard Hageman)

Jacquie and Susan supervise the primary girls. It's their day to shower! Gordon is in his element in the earth sciences with high school students--having them draw a map of where they live.

Friday, July 13

Wheatfields Lake, Ariz.

I lie in a morning bath of warm sun. The only sounds come from nuthatch and woodpecker seeking food in the giant ponderosa pine. The mountainous backdrop hints of volcanic origin. Near here the incest medicine plants are found[19]. Volcanic rocks and cones, columnar cliffs dominate the horizon. Lying here in my hammock, my sleeping bag for a pillow, I can repeat Crazy Horse's Words from the depth of my heart."Today is a good day to die for all of the things of my life are here." At this moment, I can't think of another thing I want, a place I would rather be, or anything I would rather be doing.

Rich, Stella and I shared thoughts and a campfire until late last night. This mountain area and its chill nights are a welcomed respite from the desert heat. The others went to a dance at the community college. They will all sleep in this morning. I welcome and relish this quiet time to relive the past days and bring my journal up to date.

After leaving the Pine Hills School on Tuesday, we drove through Gallup, N.M., the jewelry capitol; Window Rock, the Navajo capitol; and Chinle, a typical border town to a campground at Canyon de Chelly National Monument. Early the next morning, we headed for the Rough Rock Demonstration School, a contract school, where we had appointments. We are referred to Roger Tsotsie, elementary principal, who coordinates our visit and takes us on tour of the building. He talks to us in the library:

> The Navajo is always aware of the environment. You get up in the morning, step out of the hogan. There are open spaces all around you. No fences. A few trees. Wide open spaces. Livestock. The livestock represent responsibility. When you are a child, you always ask, "Where are the livestock."
>
> The Navajo children have high visual discrimination. They are already motivated to the environment. What they aren't motivated to is an isolated, self-contained, classroom surrounded by books closing them in. (He walks to the board and draws one circle within another.)
>
> The children and parents and sometimes grandmother and grandfather live and work together in a hogan. They live within a closed circle. Circles that go in their own direction, go into the American mainstream, float out into space. "One Circle" is our school theme. We want to fit floating circles back into one circle. We want to maintain the land and culture as one circle.

When I teach, I make comparisons. I motivate through comparisons. I start with individuals and name things around them, feelings, e.g., happy--unhappy. But I always end up with the individual again. You always have to accept the students' background and life.

I herded sheep until I was 13, then was sent to a BIA school in Riverside, CA. We were not allowed to speak Navajo. If we did, we had to eat soap or stay up all night and scrub the "johns" with a tooth brush. I was not motivated to study. Then one day we went on a vocational field trip. I saw a boy feeding a press. He was so skilled! I kept watching him. I decided to take up printing.

When I came home and got off the bus in Chinle, my parents were there to meet me in the wagon. I felt clean and distant from them. My parents felt dirty. The sheepskins on the floor, the dirt floor, the wagon, the dirt roads all felt dirty. I wanted to walk on the sidewalks. I was floating in space.

Then I went to college in the Ozarks and through a "friend" came to know the common folk in the backwoods. They would take their children to the Baptist church meetings. The kids were crying and running around. I saw the commonality, common interests, a way to share.

We are losing our culture. It has to be taught and carried on by the elders. But they don't teach the ways anymore. They have a feeling that if you can't lead the life in a pure way, a dirty way with sheepskins on the floor and no electricity, the culture cannot be maintained. The culture is dying.

Legendary stories are told at night--stories about the brave men that survived the enemies, the government and other Indians. Children are taught many things by the elders through stories in the winter, the coyote night stories. Children are disciplined to always be careful, to always be looking for tracks, to be aware of other animals. To whisper around snakes. Not to whisper at night because it wakes the ghosts and enemies. To step over tracks. To never listen for owls for you should never be out for any reason when owls are calling. You should be in a hogan listening to night stories.

When a grandfather tells a story he jumps around and the story is more interesting. When you read it's not the same. The story goes from start to finish and is boring.

I know Roger is a busy man but will devote as much time to us as we take. I recognize the characteristic timelessness. I get up, move about, and then tell him how much we appreciate his time and thoughts. He shows us the classrooms where we will participate tomorrow. We leave.

His talk has moved each of us. At one point when he was describing the cruelty in the BIA schools, the attempts by the government to erase the Navajo culture, I ask: How can you accept us after such experiences? He answers sincerely, simply, that those days are past. He carries no hostility or bitterness. It is obvious that indeed he does not. It is also obvious that he, like his brothers and sisters and unlike non-Indians, can end a story on a hopeless note. They do not have to have happy endings to rationalize their feelings. Unquestioning, they seem to accept the feelings, fate, and outside forces that shape their destinies. They allow others to draw their own conclusions.

Roger spoke with us for several hours. This man is different from any administrators I've ever met. He is totally honest. His words come slowly; they are not polished. He doesn't answer questions in the analytic ways that administrators often do. He does not gauge the effect of his words at all, it seems. He justifies the school by telling the story of his life in BIA schools. There is no bitterness. Everything he says comes out clean, uncensored, frank, and pure. How can he say these things to us, of all people? (from the Journal of Susan Parry)

While I make arrangements for showers and camping, the others go with Galina, the art teacher, to the area of colored sands. I am disappointed when I return to find them gone. I am more disappointed when they return and I see their beautiful sand bottles and hear them repeat Galina's words. I wanted to share her perspectives. Susan acknowledges my disappointment and offers to take me there tomorrow. She always seems sensitive to the needs of others. As we set up camp, I find old pint whiskey and wine bottles. I gather and wash them in preparation. But they are a poor substitute for Galina.

> When the adventure started, I was pessimistic that I could gather enough information in the time available, mostly because I was led to believe that the Navajos were a closed and much over-studied society. I still believe the Navajos have had more than their share of anthropologists, but as for being closed and unwilling to talk, nothing is farther from correct. Where else in the world could you sit with a woman for 20 minutes and find out how old her great-grandmother was when she was married; how her husband would have to leave on business leaving her to run the family alone; how her mother was killed in a car accident on the way back home from Salt Lake City where the family had to go to make enough money so they could buy what they couldn't make; how her brother almost died because he was breastfeeding at the time her mother was killed; and how at six years old, she had to learn to be the mother that she had hardly known. It is important to understand that Galina accepts her life for what it is. There was never a complaint, no bitterness, just acceptance. (from the Final Paper of Richard Hageman)

> In Rough Rock, a beautifully warm and friendly woman named Galina told us about her family. By this time I had learned that Navajo society is matrilinear, tracing descent and property lines through the female. When she mentioned how her grandmother left her family to live with her husband's family, I asked whether this was contrary to Navajo custom. She agreed it was but added that circumstances change how the culture is adhered to. In this instance her grandmother's family was poor, her grandfather's family had more land and sheep and could provide a better life. In addition they needed the help with the sheep her grandmother could provide. The tradition does not seem totally inflexible as to disregard sound judgement. When Galina told us her background, she had no trace of sadness or despondency. She merely accepted the events she described, events which left me with tears in my eyes and a knot in my throat, events I doubt I could survive as she had, without a trace of bitterness. (from the Final Paper of Stella Thayes)

> Galina was a young mother of five, and an elementary school teacher at Rough Rock School. During the brief afternoon spent with her she emphasized two things. First was her commitment to doing things in traditional ways. After school she gathers plants to make foods, medicines and drinks in the ways she was taught by her grandmother. She and her husband read the old stories to their children. She talked about her fear that when her mother dies too much of this knowledge will disappear with her. She spoke too about her clan. There is no way that I can recount the system of relations that she described. The number of people involved was apparently tremendous, and relationships were classified not on the basis of how kinship followed sequentially, but by the relative ages of the people involved. Members of the clan were in close, and frequent contact with each other and depended on one another for favors and help. Galina is proud of the improvements in the school, and might welcome economic changes that would provide others in Rough Rock with the opportunities for providing for themselves in the ways she has been able to do. But she would probably resist massive

environmental changes near Rough Rock that would disrupt the way of life she considers so important. (from the Final Paper of Susan Parry)

Next morning I decide to forgo observing the others in order to participate directly with the children. I sit on the steps, watch the children in the playground. Modern music, exhilarating and rhythmic, is broadcast from a stereo speaker. The young children are kicking balls and wrestling with each other. There is much shoving, pulling, pushing, rough-and-tumble body contact. But I see no anger, hear no shouting, sense no aggression.

Lenny, a preschooler, comes to the steps and sits beside me. He is joined by several others. Carmelita swings from the rail on my right. As she comes close, our eyes lock. Lenny is looking at his skinned knee, fighting tears, being brave. I ask if it hurts. He nods. I open my pack and find the first aid kit, take out a band-aid. His face floods with relief. My mother has some too, he says. After receiving his consent, I apply the band-aid. I search in my pack for my binoculars, take them out, and scan the hillside. What about me? asks Lenny. I place the strap around his neck. To my amusement, he mimics me, scans the hillside. Suddenly I am part of a pre-school organism. Plump, brown hands tug, pull, tap. Steady brown eyes stare into mine. The whisper is repeated over and over in my ear What about me? My joyous flight with this throbbing flock is terminated when the teachers correct the bottleneck that the children, the binoculars, and I have created. I retrieve my binoculars and follow Lenny and Carmelita into their classroom.

Terry and I lead the children in an ABC song. To the children's amusement, the teacher must help us with the words. We discover that they can identify the letters but cannot say them in sequence. Then we follow them to Galina's art room where she gives instructions in Navajo. The child next to Jacquie translates Galina's instructions into English.

I leave the young ones and walk into a fifth grade class, all boys. They are writing compositions. I pick up a bilingual reader, part of the curricular materials developed here. The wording in passages interests me: "When Dezbah and Chee herd sheep, they like to play with their goat. Today they were lazy. For that reason (because of that), they didn't get to play with their goat." And later: "Dezbah and Chee were glad that Nellie came back to give them a happy feeling." As I puzzle over these expressions of causality, several boys gather around. I speak to them and they scatter like chickens. I walk over to one who is struggling with the assignment. When I ask him if I might help, he picks up his things and moves elsewhere. I have much to learn, need Terry's pouch.

Classes end. I get in on the end of a discussion with Galina. She is telling several others about customs. She explains that when visitors come to the house, you should never sit down and visit with them. That would make them uncomfortable. You should just go about your work and ignore them as much as possible. That makes them feel more welcomed. She also explains how Navajos use relationship terms (sister, brother, grandmother, grandfather, uncle, aunt) within clans. Although they have real names, these are sacred and not used.

The teachers leave the building for the day, and we head out. Some go to the trading post. Susan, Fred, and I go to the colored sands. Traveling through the Navajo reservation has been a walk through a multitude of rainbows. Now at my feet in little hummocks are the familiar colors that have been reflected over and over in the landscape, distant mesas meeting the sky in muted tones, vegetable-dyed tapestries. The sands grade from deep sepia and burnt umbre to shades of ochers, tans, and golds, from rich mauve and madders to the softest pinks. I walk from one patch to another without planning or studying the result. I cherish the final product, a reminder of all I have sensed in this land.

We drive in to Chinle to the laundromat. I offer to "watch the clothes" as the others shop and eat. What I really want to do is to observe the women. Lately, I have been doing a lot of woman watching. The trend started in the "mercados" of Guatamala. The stamina of the women there amazed me. I couldn't keep my eyes off them. Carrying babies, on their backs and in their wombs, they acted out roles I could relate to. Sitting here, I know that the downcast eyes, the seemingly hostile glances are in reality a shyness. The women do not want to be confronted directly, either with speech or looks. Their little ones stare at me unabashed; they are open about the curiosity their mothers cannot show.

I am the only Anglo in this laundromat. It is one of the largest I have ever seen. Many of the families do not have running water so they come here. I glance sideways at the woman sitting next to me. She is in traditional dress borrowed from the Spanish: tiered lavender satin skirt, navy velveteen blouse, and dark kerchief. Her face is bronzed, ageless. Our eyes meet briefly. We both look away. Then they meet again. I smile. For a brief moment, her face radiates warmth, friendliness, beauty. Thankful for the brief union, I do not press on. I look away, at a young woman in jeans with long, beautiful hair. She constantly attends the infant, immaculate and content, tied in the cradle board. Like their Middle American counterparts, these women do not let their babies cry. In the two weeks down here, I have yet to hear one whimper.

The young woman is pale and thin. She really looks ill. Under her thin blouse, I recognize the contours of a curved spine. I feel the strain of the new baby, her fatigue. My heart moves out to her.

The young husband next to her is vigorous and robust. I try, but cannot exchange places with him. That is a problem with me lately, the same flaw that prevents me from understanding Gordon and Rich. I reject the role they expect Stella and Jacquie to play and get impatient with Stella and Jacquie for doing so.

I am thankful that Fred is riding in our car sharing his view and wanting to develop his feminine side as well. His openness and honesty help me see the masculine view, the view I have been rejecting, blocking out of late. I know it's no good to do this, to restrict my growth. When I mend, I'll try again. But not for a while.

The washing and shopping done, we head for Tsaile and the Navajo Community College. We go to the bookstore and visit the beautiful windowed cultural center. Its circling walls enclose a hogan for meetings and on the second floor an incredible collection of 8 foot reproductions of sand paintings. We buy snacks in the comfortable union with windows framing pine-covered hills. Then we drive to Wheatfield Lakes for a swim. As we complete our swim, a Navajo Ranger comes by to tell us that swimming is against the rules. Secretly I am glad he came by after and not before our swim.

Sunday evening, July 15, 1979

Navajo Community College
Tsaile, Arizona

We returned here Friday. The taste of books wet the students' appetites and they descended on the library and its Native American Collection like a cloud of locusts. I watch the group load their arms with books and head for the tables where they begin devouring words and transcribing them into notebooks. I sit yoga-fashion among the stacks, looking at the volumes, not knowing where to begin.

Then Gladys Reichard steps out of the musty volumes and places her book in my hands. I take it to a table and begin reading. I am impatient when anyone interrupts. My answers to questions are abrubt and rude. When Jacquie tells me Scott Momaday's "House Made of Dawn" is being shown upstairs, I leave reluctantly. The film is moving; I recognize details that would have meant nothing before this trip. It ends and I

immediately return to the book. When Rich asks if we can discuss something I say I'd rather not and return to the book. He is justifiably angered by my rudeness and isolation.

It is time for the library to close. I go to the librarian, show her my Univesity Faculty Card and ask if I might check out books for students and myself until Sunday evening when we'll return them. I expect her to say no. Instead, she checks them out to me without question.

From that point on, Spider Woman[19] becomes my weekend companion. She shares the last rays of dusk and the first of dawn. She sleeps beside me in my hammock and rides in my pack. Between the pages of this Story of Navajo Weavers and Chanters, I place a book mark poem given to me by Joseph K:

The book
Opens its hand
The message is something
You dreamed through
A nightlong rain.
Its lightning strikes your eye
like memory uncurling
mind's grey pages.
The printed voice is
a flock of birds stirring
the leaves of your ears,
filling your head
with bright music
or the call of water
trickling through dark scenes.
If you listen carefully
to each page
you will sense
the packrat scurrying
between the words,
storing his conspiracy
behind your tongue.

The dialogue between Spider Woman and myself continues intermittently all weekend. The itinerary at this point provides an open space before we turn northward and begin the trek home.

I review the time frame with THE GROUP. Our only scheduled stop is at Rock Point Community School on Monday, where an exemplary bilingual program has been developed. However, I am doubtful as to whether we will be able to participate there. When I called the principal to confirm our visit, he said that the summer program is a watered-down monolingual program designed to bring the students up to grade-level in English. I had the feeling he would rather we not intrude.

I remind the students of the paper that will be due Thursday, the day before we arrive back at the University and suggest that we plan on arriving at Capital Reef National Monument mid-afternoon that day, share our papers in late afternoon, and then go out to dinner that evening. That will leave a five-hour drive to Salt Lake City on Friday, plenty of time to drop people off and turn in vehicles at the University.

As I speak of the end of the journey, I sense a change in mood, a drop in energy. This is the "bend in

the road," the time when the joy of sensing and experiencing the present moment must be subordinated to reflection; a time when past perceptions, the reading and research, the journal notes, the view of the future must somehow be synthesized into a "here and now" statement.

They respond to my teacher role in typical student fashion: How is it possible to write a 3-5 page paper after all we have experienced? The time was too short to do any kind of valid study! You need years to do ethnography! It is impossible to separate our perceptions from the Navajo's. How can you reflect on an experience when you are immersed in it? The response is all too familiar. I acknowledge the validity of their questions and admit I am having the same problems with my assignment. Nonetheless, I feel that it is important to synthesize the experience, draw out the categories, identify the salient features, ask the really important questions. While still away from our ordinary lives, it is important to capture the magic. I ask them to try to stand outside themselves as they look at their personal experiences. I agree that nothing much can be said in a few handwritten pages; nevertheless, we should strive for brevity. We will read the papers to each other on that last afternoon, ALL EIGHT OF US! My expectations are clear. They give up and move on to a discussion of alternatives for the next days.

I remove myself from the decision-making and for the next few days ride like a corpse in a wheeled coffin or walk like a spectre with a book under my arm. We drive the rim of Canyon de Chelly, getting out at each overlook. We hike down into the Canyon at White House Ruins in the heat of midday. Several loads of tourists drive up escorted by Navajo guides that, like their Anglo counterparts, are giving the tourists what they paid for. But, because of their fear of death, the guides do not enter the ruins. I wonder if this too is for the tourists. Gordon finds a black widow and Stella becomes involved in photographing it. She gets so close, I expect it to crawl out of its web and onto her camera. I photograph for diversion. The canyon is deep, provides panoramic views of present-day Navajos living in a traditional manner. The last strong-hold of the Navajos against the government's planned genocide, this is the place the Navjos fought Kit Carson before they were finally defeated, captured, and forced on the "long walk" to Fort Defiance. I wonder how they survived that long walk and the eight years, almost a decade, of incarceration and cultural disruption and the long walk back to self determination. I think of Sam, Galina, Roger.

THE GROUP has decided to attend a rodeo and pow wow at Luckachukai and camp in that region over night, but they can get no concrete information beyond what the posters say. No one seems to know exactly when or where the pow wow will occur.

We stop at a trading post. The white trader unlike others we have met, is surly and rude. When asked if he's ever attended a pow wow, he replies that he never has nor does he want to. The Indians just beat drums and scream.

THE GROUP stops at Luckachukai for gas, water, more shopping, and information. A cloud of dust rises from the rodeo grounds where the afternoon events are in progress. We are told that the pow wow will take place there this evening.

We try to find our way to a campsite over a bumpy, dusty road that eventually leads to a dead end. The cooking group finally decides to prepare the evening meal under a cottonwood that has shed a blanket of cotton on a badly eroded field of cheat crass and tumbleweed. Pickup trucks filled with families drive up and down the road. They wave as their wheels raise a cloud from the ruts of dust. It settles over us. Hardly an idyllic setting for dinner! If I were in the cooking group tonight, I'd give up and tell everyone to get fry bread at the rodeo. But Jacquie and Stella forge bravely ahead, despite the lack of help from their partners. Jacquie is playing a Pollyanna role. Yes, this is a wonderful place. Yes, the mountains are beautiful. But it's hard to see them through the dust, Jacquie.

I recall a funny story about medical students, horse manure, and calling things by their proper name. I giggle to myself, the clever subconscious bringing comic relief to this situation that would otherwise be unbearable. Jacquie is truly good-natured as is Stella. I have yet to see Stella angry although Rich is often perturbed - especially with me. Perhaps he vents frustration for both. Maybe it would be best to be a Pollyanna around the office, lead to more harmony. I should smile and be happy like a good woman. No one wants to see another's suffering. Unlike the Indians, we do not share grief, cry on each other's shoulders.

I am completely out of sorts. The midday hike, the drive, the constant stopping and waiting, have depleted me. My head throbs. I wash down a couple of aspirin with yellowish, luke-warm water we procured at a gas station. God knows where it came from! I wonder how I can possibly survive the evening. I hate rodeos! But I try to tell myself that some members of THE GROUP have never witnessed one. I decide that I can always retreat to one of the cars; that is, if I don't collapse before.

We eat, load up, follow the pickups, pay our fee, and park the car in a field next to the rodeo grounds. We learn that the rodeo and pow wow will begin at the same time. That's the first good news of the day! At least I won't have to attend both. Maybe I can make it through one.

As we get out of the cars, I urge Susan to ask two men, dressed in elaborate Indian "costumes" if taking pictures is allowed. She returns, red faced and flustered. They say I can take their picture if I give them a kiss in return. We take our cameras and walk around the grounds to the circle of stands where we buy cold drinks, then head for the "shade," a ramada-like structure with willow boughs on top, where the pow wow will take place. As we pass the two men once more, I hear one remark to the other, Where did these refugees come from? I giggle as I look at our assortment of shorts, halter tops, T-shirts, baggy jeans. I have on dark glasses, a kerchief, and my straw hat from Ibiza. We present quite a contrast to the traditional Navajo dress or the contemporary neat-fitting levis and shirts. Other than another couple that I saw enter the rodeo, we are the only Anglos and we stand out like sore thumbs.

I follow Fred and Susan toward the shade. Two young men, obviously brothers, drive up. They get out of the car and quickly begin preparations. They take out fir leggings, brush them until they are soft and shiny. They wear bright red jogging shorts and shirts. Their hair is black, straight, and short. They look like football players.

Fred and Susan are talking to an important looking gentleman in black pants and white shirt. I listen in and learn that he is from Shiprock and will be the announcer/master of ceremonies. He explains the pow wow: It is really a meeting of the Indian tribes. They come from great distances, from Oklahoma, the Northern Plains, Montana and Wyoming, as well as from the Southwest. Each region has a typical style of dance--e.g. the Northern tribes have a faster step. The dances will be a combination of competitions, usually preceded by a practice dance, and intertribal dances open to all. The competitions will be divided by age and sex, junior boys, junior girls, senior girls, etc. If during a competition, any part of a costume should drop off, a feather or bell, the dancer must disqualify him/herself. There will be three groups of "Singers." I ask if it's appropriate for us to sit around the ring and to take pictures. He says yes and moves on as he is called to begin announcing.

We find places around the perimeter. For a time, I sit on the logs circumscribing the dance area, snapping shots of the men, women, and children preparing meticulously for the dance. I wish the dance would begin before the light is gone. I look at the people sitting around the circle. They are beautifully simple and contrast sharply with the spectacle in the center. They sit quietly, watching intently as preparations proceed. I would like some pictures of them, but can't bring myself to that. I had the same trouble in the markets in Guatemala. You should ask permission before you take pictures. But how does one secure

permission from a market place or a pow wow? The answer is simple to Fred: You don't take pictures of people. I have only a few shots left. I decide I'll save them for when the dance begins and then forget picture taking. Besides it will be too dark.

Suddenly I feel self-conscious. I pick up my things and seat myself cross-legged in the dust next to Fred and Susan. My knees and back ache. I decide to lean back on a car parked behind me, but when I try, I am stepped on by a steady stream of people going back and forth. Terry has totally separated herself from us and sits among Navajo women and children. Stella, Rich, Jacquie, and Gordon are together a little ways off.

I have been keeping my eyes on "the brothers" across the way. The preparation is lengthy and detailed. They appear ready with painted faces, long braided wigs and magnificent feather head dresses and tall feathers.

The Singers are taking their places around huge drums. Two groups are placed opposite each other on the perimeter; one group is in the center. The eight to ten members, each with a tom tom, seat themselves around the drums. Several young men are rigging up lights around the shade and microphones to the Singers. I feel raindrops on my arms; look up puzzled to see a perfectly clear sky.

The shade entrance across the way frames red sandstone piled high with pink trimmed rain clouds rapidly losing their momentum as the sun sets. The long rays and lengthening shadows enhance the scene, magnifying the colors of cliffs and costumes, rainbows of feathers, red painted faces, silver bells, flaming satin, supple buckskin, and multicolored beads.

As the light fades, the shade radiates anticipation. It is electric. The announcer welcomes the tribes, compliments the people of Luckachukai for working hard to make the pow wow possible, the first here in three years. He repeats everything in Navajo. I wonder if he would speak in English if our white faces were not in the ring. He emphasizes the importance of the tribes coming together, welcomes the contestants from long distances.

Then the Sun Singers begin. The drums. I feel the vibrations within me striking a primal chord, an elemental rhythm I have never felt before. The drums are joined by a single high falsetto, a primordial scream. And then the others join the chant "hey a a hey." For the next four hours I lose contact with body, time, and place and float with Black Elk on clouds filled with visions. The unbearable fatigue felt earlier, the discomfort of sitting cross-legged in the dust are lost to a cycle of chanting colors.

Like waves on shore or wind in trees, the movement and sound ebb and flow. Dancers disperse and drums cease momentarily--then pick up the song that is always there, has always been there from the beginning.

The dancers present a metaphor for social order. They flow together in the same stream. The shawl of fox skin thrown over the arm; the tomahawk dangling from the wrist all sway to the same rhythm. The silver bells accentuate the drumbeat. But each pair of feet dances a different dance, interprets the song in a unique and individual style. The "brothers" are filled with energy and vigor. The beautiful Navajo woman is as precise as a pendulum. The sprightly Hopi dance on air cushions. A little one, who can't be over four, mimics his father with a blur of tiny legs. I wait expectantly for my favorite to circle in front of me. His costume is simple: a crown of porcupine quills and feathers, beaded arm bands, an apron of beads and bone, a loin cloth, a pipe dangling from his wrist. He reminds me of a cougar I once saw in the wild. The

movement ripples through his body from toe to head, passing through every muscle and joint. He stalks the perimeter looking left then right.

I look at the couple that has befriended Fred and Susan. The man talks to Fred. Fred nods his head. He understands even though the words make no sense. The woman is bronze and wrinkled. There is a reddish cast about her eyes. Unlike the others around the circle, she is not clean. I wonder how old she is. It really makes no difference. She has undoubtedly struggled through many lifetimes. The man and woman talk to each other a great deal. She is louder and more impulsive than the other women. When she sings spontaneously with the chant, her husband is ashamed, reprimands her. Why is she so different from all the others we have seen? Has she been drinking? The woman and her husband leave for a moment and ask Fred and Susan to tend their little boy. The woman insists that they move close and, talking in Navajo with gestures, warns them not to move until she returns. When she returns, she is delighted that everything went well. She shakes hands with Fred and Susan, and anyone else near, laughs, and keeps repeating "please," apparently the only English word she knows.

I marvel at the open and straight-forward manner the woman and her husband use in communicating the power of this simple relationship. Today I wrote a quote down from Reichard...A man and his wife are like two streams running together for the common good. You may haul water and wood for a woman, but if there is no love in your heart for her she knows it and does not appreciate it anyway. It is the little attentions with love that make for happiness.[21]

The pow wow draws to a close. Suddenly I am spent. I suggest we leave before the hundreds of pickups start vying for the opening in the barbed wire fence. The others join me reluctantly. They want to stay till the very end. We drive back to Wheatfields. I lay my ground cloth and sleeping bag next to Terry, Susan, and Fred. They talk to each other as they prepare for sleep, but I can't hear what they are saying. The drums muffle the sound.

Wednesday, July 18

Natural Bridges National Monument
Utah

We have passed the last days locked in reflection winding our way slowly northward through the Navajo Nation. This morning as we crossed the San Juan River, the northern boundary of the Reservation, we stopped the car, and Terry and Susan ran down to its waters for a final ablution. I followed, waded in its muddy waters and felt the connection to this meandering female river.

> I went down to the San Juan River and bathed myself in her waters. The cool drops were absorbed by my parched skin. I felt refreshed and rejuvenated...but most importantly, it was my way of respecting the Navajo Way. We crossed over from the Navajo land into Utah...perhaps in this manner, I partcipated in my own purification ceremony. (from the Journal of Terry Tempest Williams)

THE GROUP has been subdued and introspective since the pow wow. The chants are still there, provide background for our thoughts. After about five false starts, I finally completed my paper today. I agree with the students; it is impossible to say much in a few handwritten pages. It was a difficult task and I am relieved to get done with it. Terry and Susan still labor over theirs, but the others have finished and are relaxing. It's interesting to see the spirit and humor of each person return as he/she completes the assignment.

Sunday, after the pow wow, was a quiet day. I wake early, look around at the now familiar campground, stretch, examine my forearms. Damn this Arizona sun! More age spots! I test with saliva. Some

wash off! The rain? Tobacco juice!!! I hurriedly dress, wash off, then string my hammock. Susan and Terry go to Luckachukai to a Mormon church service and drop Stella and Rich off at NCC where they read and work on their papers. Gordon, Jacquie, Fred and I spend the day at Wheatfields. Except for a time when Gordon calls me to view a swarm of bees, I spend the day locked in my hammock web.

In late afternoon, we regroup and drive to NCC to spend a little more time in the library and return books before the library closes at 9 p.m. At 8:30 I read the final word, close the book, and say good-bye to Spider Woman. THE GROUP has dispersed and I spend time in frustration checking to see if all books have been returned. As I scurry from Student Union to Library, the most spectacular sunset yet flames in the west, its magenta rays reflected in the windows of the circular Cultural Center. Jacquie and Terry are calling home. I dash to the gym to shower away the remaining dust and tobacco from the pow wow, join the others, and head for Wheatfields once again.

I spread my sleeping bag on the ground and crawl in as I listen to the discussion around the campfire nearby. With the end of the journey in sight, they are apparently getting a few things off their chests. I hear Terry ask Stella why she took the bit of pottery. Stella replies that she doesn't know for sure, is thinking about it, why she felt she wanted and needed it. Stella refers to the time last summer when one of the students found a perfect arrowhead. We tried to resolve the dilemma of whether or not to take it through discussion but in the end, the student took the arrowhead. Perhaps the fragment will not bring Stella the pleasure she expects and in the end she will return it to the National Park - as the student did who took the beautiful snake from the "On the Rocks" workshop back to his home in Maryland. After displaying it in his classroom for several months, he sent it by airmail back to the superintendent of Arches National Park and confessed his "crime" to me.

On Taking Pottery

> I cannot rationalize myself into thinking that those pieces of pottery belong to anyone but those whose handprints are upon the walls of these ruins. For I have placed my fingers upon theirs and felt the presence that defies rational thought, that stops the world, and exposes time for what it really is. (from the journal of Fred Edwards)

The "pros" and "cons" are discussed freely. Then Fred and Gordon get into a science/spirit debate. I keep telling myself I should be out there moderating, but the drums return and I doze off.

> We in the west are convinced that we have a corner on reality - a pipeline to God - and that other realities are simply superstitions or distortions brought about by inferior or less developed systems of thought. This gives us a "right to free them from ignorance and make them like us." The dazzling success of our technology, as well as our understanding of the physical world, has blinded Europeans and Americans alike to the complexities of their own lives and given them a false sense of superiority over those who have not evolved their mechanical extentions to the same degree. Science is our new religion, and in many instances, like old religions, it has served man well up to a point. But it has been put on a pedestal, and its pronouncements and rituals are commonly taken as dogma. by Edward T. Hall (from the Journal of Fred Edwards)

> The language and the culture of the Navajo can be preserved because it can be written, recorded, photographed, put in a museum, or mechanically reproduced. The feeling of a different time cannot be saved. I see the modern Navajo just beginning to enter the twentieth century of about the same level of technology as my grandmother knew, and this I see as the main problem

for them, even greater than language at this time. Technology is a problem for the Navajo not because it is not understandable, nor because it is not available, but rather because it is not affordable. Poverty and its accompanying low self-esteem seem to me to be the Navajo's most difficult obstacle. (from the Final Paper of Gordon Welsh)

On Monday morning my doubts about our visitation to Rock Point Community School are affirmed; we are informed that we can't participate there. We head for Navajo National Monument where we will spend the night before turning northward toward home. As we cross Chinle Wash, Fred rummages through his papers, finds what he's looking for, and reads aloud to us a poem by Simon J. Ortiz:[22]

Having Left Round Rock
Simon J. Ortiz

when you come off that higher ground
the red dirt furrowed old faced earth
so desolate and late and sad you can't tell
    where it is just there
south of those gods standing solid forever
since millions of years no one ever considers anymore
    nor did they ever - when they emerged
out of the earth coming red orange a lasting stone color,
 south of those gods,
having left round rock
    where the heat
(coming down a long asphalt highway)
dances rhythms in your senses
you go almost crazy knowing the dancing
knowing those moments when it is possible to see your sanity
punished and going,

the car pounds away
gasping
    your mind reshuttling between the beats
of the impossible heat
"god, it must be 100 at least,"
hold on the wheel vibrates you must look at the gods
in the rearview mirror
but you see only stone beaten by wind and sun,

so you're there settled into the valley
the highway stretches easily
crosses Chinle wash read a sign many farms 14 miles
jan say, "how do people live out here?"
there is a hogan off the road half a mile
i tell him that the people have an extensive religion
the only way to live is work and pray
    that is what should be understood,

i look at the rearview mirror
and the gods are standing solid
and to the side towards monument valley more gods
these people here in the dancing heat
    they see gods coming out of the earth
    like the First People.

We drive down the road, stop at Baby Rocks Trading Post. The two cars are having trouble staying together. We decide we'll drive on to see the Black Mesa Strip Mine and meet the others at Navajo National Monument later.

From the top of the mesa, we see the strip mine spread before us, its vastness marked by huge cranes and clouds of dust. The land forms in the area when viewed from the air resemble the contours of a woman. Her head is Navajo Mountain, one of the Navajo's sacred mountains. Black Mesa Strip Mine eats away at her bowels. Fred reads another poem by Ortiz:

The Long House Valley Poem
Simon J. Ortiz

(the valley is in northern Arizona near where it is proposed
that one of the largest power centers on the continent will be built)

sheep & navajo woman
the long brown & red land
looming unto the horizon
    breathe so deeply

tsegi
a canyon
hello & goodbye
but always hello
& smile

the old rocks millions of years old

a mohawk camper trailer
behind a big white cadillac
tourists
the crusaders

cop car flashing frenetic orange
slowwwww down
can't remember my license plate number

& then a painted sign:
the Peabody Coal Co.
Black Mesa Mine

power line over the mountain
toward Phoenix toward Denver

another sign: Open Range
the bulldozer smoke & the dust
from the wounded mountain

A PLAGUE ON ALL YOUR DAMN HORSEPOWER
AND KENNECOTT COPPER BLIGHTS

the old rocks millions of years old

& horses quietly grazing quietly
a skinny black one throws his head

at the sky at the wind

the gods
& hogans & the people
roadside flowers
cornfields and the sage
the valley peace[23]

Later at Navajo National Monument, I reread some of the papers in our resource file with new insight. I am beginning to comprehend the Navajo redundancy in the use of the words "beauty" or "beautiful." The words encompass all of the virtues which we desire, all of the "good" things that can come to us, e.g. good health, goodness, good luck, good will, happiness, comfort, success, etc.

When I began this journey, I considered 20 days a substantial time to experience the Navajo Way. But it appears now as nothing more than a grain of sand in the 23,000 square miles of land filled with dichotomies that one must learn to live with: dependence--independence, present--past, traditional--contemporary, subsistence--development, individual--tribal, material--spiritual, despair--determination, mythology--science, conquest--harmony. Meaning is not obvious here in the bold patterns that first capture your attention but lies in subtle tones and reflections that blend one into the other like the gentle vegetable tones in Wide Ruins tapestries or subtle earth hues viewed from the top of a mesa at sunset.

I review the stages of interpersonal development[24] and wonder whether forced perspective-taking nurtures growth. Are we all stalemated at an egocentric level? What is the difference between self-awareness and self-indulgence? Have we grown in self-reflectivity and developed the capacity to stand outside ourselves and view circumstances with deeper understanding of their complexity? How long does it take? A lifetime or several?

I find a quote for Fred and Gordon that rekindles their discussion.

> Myth and science are polar opposites, not because one is wrong and the other right, but because myth portrays reality as it is experienced while science postulates a reality that is thought to exist but can never be experienced.[25]

This morning we hiked down into Betatakin Ruins through an ecosystem inverted by water availability. On the trail: varied thrush, blue-grey gnatcatcher, turkey vulture, red penstamen, silver-leaf buffalo berry, hawks' nests and giant aspen. At the ruins: cubic kivas, foot and hand holds, ladders, poles, manos, matates, mountain sheep petroglyghs, and a sparkling sacred spring to drink from. In the visitors' center, Floyd laughter, the medicine man whose poetic testimony at the Glen Canyon Hearings remains a testimony to Indian self-determination. Terry talks to him.

> But the man who touched me through his silence and power was Floyd laughter. His look was not of the world I know. His vision was his medicine and as he walked into the visitors' center at Navajo National Monument, one became aware of a very special wind soul. (from the Final Paper of Terry Tempest Williams)

For the past days, Jacquie has been filled with tension. She rushes to the phone booth at each stop. I sense the ambivalence, the motherly concern as well the resentment, the demands created by friends and children who need her. Reflected in her blue eyes is the same pain I saw in the brown eyes of that woman in Mexico: The child in her shawl was nursing as she walked along with others following or tugging at her skirts. She held out her hand to me saying, The children's father is dead. My mind replies, Good, perhaps now your misery will be diminished. Shocked by my thoughts I stand inert unable to reach for the pesos in my pocket. Impatiently she walks away with the little ones mimicking her cursing and lethal glance.

I want to say to Jacquie that she has had a brief moment but she must realize she can never be free. There will always be another tugging at her breasts and skirts, kicking to make more room. But that won't do - not now. Instead I walk to her, put my arms around her and say, Jacquie, I know what you're feeling. The sympathy (or is it empathy?) breaks her composure and she walks away from me into the junipers to cry.

Friday, July

Fourth Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah

Tonight I am back in my big old house on "The Avenues" in Salt Lake City. The city heat, unlike the desert heat, stifles my imagination. But I try to summarize the seminar that ended late this afternoon when Susan and I, after delivering people and gear to their homes, turned in the University vehicles and caught the bus home.

We arrived at Capitol Reef National Monument in late afternoon yesterday, found an empty campsite and sat around a picnic table to read our papers to each other. I suggested that there be no discussion following each paper and that they allow me to deliver my paper last. Susan voiced protest to my latter request with a strong "Flo!" but no further objection was voiced. (My paper was brief. I had tried to make it a summary, a collage of our experiences. My hope was that it would provide an appropriate finale.) An inquisitive Ranger and a crying baby nearby provide temporary interruptions, but we sit for two and one half hours listening to what each has learned.

Fred begins. He summarizes three pervading beliefs he has identified as he has asked the question, "What is important to learn in school?" First, he says, the Navajo want their sons and daughters to have a good paying skill or profession. Many of these people have such a desire because they attended BIA schools and were made to feel that they would be nothing unless they abandoned traditional ways. Some of them have experienced futility in their own lives and want something different and better for their children. Secondly, the Navajo, faced by encroachments of Anglo culture and by self-induced influences, see a need to retain their own culture, traditions...The people are seeking the retention of identity as a nation...Thirdly, they want the spiritual aspects of their culture taught...To these people the Earth is indeed Mother and

there is a spirituality in the rocks, water, and all things..."The fire they use to warm the hogan and cook on is the same that runs through electrical lines, or starts the car." The water is sacred and Mother Earth is sacred...Harmony is the emphasis and interrelatedness the concept.

A brief pause and then Rich carries on. Openly touched by the moment, he pauses intermittently to retain composure and steady his voice. Contrary to what I was taught in school, these people, the Navajos, are not savage renegades. They are gentle, accepting, hard working masters of whatever they pursue...Environmental Education is not a nine credit course to the Navajo. If they stay in tune with nature and the forces of nature are good to them, they pass the course. They use what they need from nature and protect and cherish what remains. They are just another aspect of nature...These five fingers. He goes on to summarize the Navajo's feelings about competition and says that acceptance is the foundation of their feelings for others. A Navajo respects his opponent in competition whether he is winning or losing...To win a game by taking unfair advantage is not to win at all...Very often a Navajo competes for the glorification of his clan or tribe and individuals do not like to shine because it makes the opponent look bad. He ends saying that if the Navajo are to compete with Anglos, they will probably have to change their orientation toward competition. However, he hopes that in the process they don't lose the unique aspects of their culture but instead pass their beliefs of fairness, rightness, acceptance, and cooperation on to us.

Stella set out to study the role of women in Navajo society. Her conclusion: The Navajo women are liberated and have no need for a Women's Movement. There are duties taken on specifically by women and others by men...some, governed by tradition, but...immediate needs...or simple expediency more often dictate what a woman will do. She points out the matrilinear nature of their culture as well as the matriarchal influence in the extended family. Unlike our youth-oriented society, Navajo men, women, and children alike deeply respect and love their grandmothers. Grandmothers run the show. The Navajo are proud to become old. Indians accept and adhere to the doctrine that the female was created simultaneously with the male..." To an Indian it would be the height of irrationality to ascert that woman was made from the rib bone of man. The natural processes, unceasing in their functioning, negate the allegation that one sex could have been created without the other." The Navajo woman does what she has to do - her every act is permeated by the rhythm of life...She can see and feel herself woven into the pattern of life the way she weaves her intentions into the pattern of her rug...Navajo Women are masters of survival and part of the universe. That is true liberation.

The tears "run down her cheeks freely," her eyes and voice tremble, as Terry shares the experiences she has assimilated into her previous knowledge of the Navajo. The science/mythology theme pervades her "Emergence": My immersion into the Navajo Way has led me to Sipapu...my place of emergence. Through First Man and First Woman, I have found a metaphor to live by.

Thought is the power source of all creation. First Man and First Woman, accompanied by other Holy People, went into a sweathouse and thought their world into existence. First Man and First Woman knew the danger of separating knowledge from the sacred. As they would place themselves in the midst of the Great Mysteries they found themselves in touch with natural forces. Basic education among the Navajos does not separate the search for knowledge from sacred learning. They know the value of knowledge through awareness, acquaintance or familiarity. Awareness is a means of seeking life. The Navajo Way insists on learning, on education as an essential foundation for personal awareness and growth.

In the first world, I journeyed upward to the land. Colors absorbed me as I placed my eyes on drenched arches and juniper berry skies. The earth became a living rainbow. Mesas bathed my soul in bands of

pastels. I gathered bits of Rough Rock sand in desperation to hold the day - but, only the Navajo Weaver, inspired by Spider Woman can unleash these colors to fly upon her loom.

Through the blushing earth, I saw light and all living things. I heard coyote crying up the moon and found Gray Fox stealing strength from Father Sun. Lizards pumped their daily energy from below, while "no-see-ums" feasted on my flesh.

The sounds of birds awakened me; the canyon wren, the owl, the raven and the thrush. I found freedom in swallows and swifts, as they played on canyon currents. A cottonwood tree cradled the babes of Cooper's Hawk, while she chose to soar with the spirits of Hovenweep.

To the second world I journeyed on the back of a pre-dawn owl - to a cultural emergence; an awareness of others present.

...Moved to Eroded Boulder in Hovenweep Canyon. There I listened to the voices of Anasazi spoken by the birds who live there.

White washed walls - Hand prints - Streaked fingers, looking like a sunburst...a spirit of Anasazi dwells here; I can see a young woman weaving mats out of yucca - perhaps a babe at her breast...silence...the air is thin...cool air rushes out.

In the third world I emerge seeing a sunkissed woman tending her flock of sheep. She is dressed in lavender and turquoise, akin to the earth and sky. She moves ever so slowly across the vermillion sand and sage. Occasionally she looks upward with her scarf blowing in the breeze - but her steady pace brings her look forward as she sends her sheep westward. The spirit of changing woman encircles her deeply etched face erasing years of living only to bring forth traditional youthfulness.

Into the fourth world I emerged. I am different now. My eyes are a deeper shade of green-blue; my skin, a bit more brown, yet I am non-Indian.

I have been touched by their great acceptance and their ability to move forward in the face of many shadows...I have felt their love when bitterness and mistrust could surely be theirs. I have felt their confidence in who they are.

I was moved by their knowledge of self with no need to be other than they are. Also with no desire. Again, I find a sense of place within them. The desert is theirs.

But, as I look back over my emergence through the Navajo Way, it is their ability to read the land through mythological eyes which sings out to me. All life is One...Let us dance in the light of our differences. Let us sing together where harmony can be found. The Earth is our mother and we are her children. What could be more binding? Relationships bloom when placed in Nature's soil...

Gordon pursues his line of reasoning "On the Similarities of Navajos and Anglos" by asserting that Human beings have certain innate characteristics which make "all men brothers"...To be sure there are extreme differences between the Anglo and Navajo cultures in art, music, language, architecture, religion, kinship, competition, etiquette, perceptions of space, time and nature. But, he says, these differences stem from isolation and cultural evolution, not from innate difference. His thesis is that the differences are cultural; but all humans share similar human qualities. In summation, he says, I believe that the worst attitude an Anglo can have toward the Navajo or any other ethnic minority is the condescending belief that these people are something different, an alien phenomenon, an object to be studied. We definitely should recognize the differences and as educators teach to these differences, but we must recognize that these people

are Human Beings like us with feelings and desires like ours. Also, we should remember that they have the right to preserve their culture if they wish, or let it disappear. We have no right to interfere either way.

The Navajos have survived because they were able to adapt to new conditions. Their culture was a mongrel even before the Ango-Saxon invasion. They will do what they need to survive or they will perish. And if they choose to be absorbed into mainstream American civilization, then we have the moral obligation to make room for our "red brothers."

Jacquie's voice reflects the intensity of her inner feelings as she reveals not so much what she has learned about the role of the child in the family but what the study has taught her about herself. After six months of worry and self-doubt, indecision and working everything through with my kids I was on my way at last. I could feel tension draining away, only to return suddenly as situations presented themselves and demanded decisions. In the late afternoon of the first day the panicked feelings of "I don't want to be here, and especially for three weeks." The need to fit into this group and even more personal, the need to fit into myself. I realized one goal was to get above the mechanical things on this trip and gain harmony within myself. The main body of the paper is a letter to Galina. We're not so different, you and I. We dream, we hope, we push, sometimes losing perspective, sometimes changing course, sometimes giving up - momentarily. As we push, we are being pushed. Our children, at home and school, are our catalysts. They provide our goals, needs, desires and drives, frustrations and rewards, pain and comfort. They almost become our whole life. Almost, yet we seek harmony within ourselves. Harmony to the Navajo is closeness to family, land and sheep. To me harmony is also closeness to myself.

Similarly to Stella, she points out the attachment of the youth to the elders and the importance of the extended family. Your Navajo way is not smothering, but accepting and supportive. You allow each person to make his/her own decisions yet you take care of each other... She ends: Thank you Galina for being so open and sharing so deeply with me. My life is much richer because of you. May you always "walk in beauty." May I incorporate the best of the Navajo Way into my life as they are trying to take the best of the non-Indian world.

May I gain harmony with my family, my land and myself.

May I show love through respect, patience and acceptance and allow others to be individuals.

Susan, who has been looking at the relationship between the Navajo and the land as an economic resource, points out the dilemmas facing the Navajo: Not only how and when and where to develop the resources but how to grow and simultaneously maintain the culture and character of the Nation. Ways of making a living reflect the limited economic potential of the land...and the values of the culture. Herding and dry farming have been practiced for hundreds of years and continue to dominate...In contrast to the homogeneity of ways of life, the spiritual fabric is rich and complex...and based on an intimate understanding...of the natural world they inhabit. I have come away from the experience with the impression that the power of the Navajo people lies in their ability to adapt to change and still not lose touch with the parts of their lives that they consider crucial. The strength of the clan system, the mythology, the real closeness to and dependence on the land, Navajo language, ritual ceremonies; all of these are very much alive in the Nation today. She concludes that the strong spiritual aspect of Navajo life, may be the power that sustains the Navajo through the economic changes that lie ahead.

The students, although interested in different aspects of ethnoecology, the relationships of the Navajo to their environment, have drawn similar conclusions, essentially that their experience of Navjo tradition and culture has been a positive force, enriching their non-Indian perspectives. I present my paper, "Desert Tapestry, A glimpse of the Navajo Way" as a final affirmation of that statement.

The tapestry reflects the perspectives of my friends. I am thankful they were there to share the venture. They introduced new colors, patterns I would have missed had I been weaving alone.

The Patterns, soft and subtle, repeat and reflect my limited view of the Navajo Way.

The Navajo way is...

...Colors mirrored over and over, in the sands at my feet and in distant mesas that meet the sky in muted tones.

...Helena, laughing maiden, bathing in the cold stream. Bear and Rattler share your footsteps as you walk back to the hogan, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT tucked under your arm.

...Dustbaths warmed in the sun for fluffing feathers.

...Giving in return for what one takes or to one who asks---and never stopping.

...Corn, mummified in ruins. Strange plant needing human touch for planting, giving food and ceremonial pollen in return.

...Sam Alonzo, Christian Navajo, unregistered citizen, wandering dreamlike through battlefields and back to Ramah to self-education and self-determination.

...Circles: hogans, kivas, pow wows, clans, sun, moon, earth, faces, "free-floating," lost in despair.

...Roger Tsosie - closing circles.

...Sounds of ravens calling, flies buzzing, chants echoing in dreams; of the radio announcer's Navajo interspersed with "50% discount" and "Midas Muffler;" of coyotes and campers whooping in celebration; of white-throated swifts chattering over red rims and canyon wrens calling from crumpled ruins with flute-like descending chords.

...Bronze skin, weathered, wrinkled, ageless, framed with turquoise, framing penetrating eyes scanning the horizon for eons seeking lost sheep.

...A Pow Wow - continuous, circular, timeless rhythm, endless chant. Rhythmic original dancers blending in one pulsing movement.

...Lizards doing push-ups under junipers and sandstone overhangs.

...Plants (Green things): pinyon, juniper, and ponderosa; snake weed; pinkish-blue and scarlet pen-stamen; sagebrush and rabbit brush; orange-red paintbrush and flaming cholla blooms; vivid greens, soft luminous grays and slate-blue juniper berries; and a single scarlet mallow swaying in the breeze atop the rubble at Pinasco Blanco.

...Lenny, brave and tearless, sitting on the steps with skinned knee watching the others play.

...Preschoolers with firm, aggressive hands tugging at my sleeve, eyes and soft-whispers asking "What about me?"

...Black Widows in White Ruins.

...A melody - harmonious, improvised with no beginning or end, a timeless theme.

...NCC with magenta sunsets, giant sant pointings, and a womb-like library to comfort restless minds.

...Polar opposites: dependence--independence; integration--isolation; present/past--future; subsistence--development; despair--determination; mythology--science; material--spiritual; individual--tribal;

...Respect for age, wisdom, custom, ritual, tradition.

...Trading Posts with cold pop, enamel wear, wash tubs, Pendleton blankets, and rug rooms.

...Sky-Reaching Buttes, Changing Woman, Houses made of Dawn and Darkness, Monster Slayer, Night-Walkers, Houses made of Blue sky and Yellow Evening Light, Black-horned rattlers, Floyd laughter, dew-drops, pollen and a Trail of Beauty.

Friday, August 16

SLC, UT

A month has passed since the field seminar ended. When any of THE GROUP drops by or calls, it's like family returning. We spent one evening together at Jacquie's viewing slides, slides that to an outside

observer could have been taken on different journeys that in a graphic and beautiful way accentuate our differing views. City images, unlike desert tones, wound or puzzle the spirit: A news item in the paper casually mentions that a radioactive containment pond has broken, possibly contaminating waters on the Navajo Reservation: (Who will tell the maidens who run down the river to bathe?)...The Indian man ahead of me in the grocery line, has been drinking and is giving the checker a bad time...My eyes meet the puffy blackened eyes of an Indian woman waiting outside the door; her hand covers her mouth...In my backyard, I walk into my garden, pick a tomato warmed by the afternoon sun, suck its sweet juices and listen to the sounds of this mixed neighborhood. Laughter emanates from the rooftop pool of the condominium down the street. Gay, strange music filters from the apartments across the street where several Lebanese families live. (My elderly neighbor calls them Arabs.) A Navajo family lives in the lower apartment...I am busy in the kitchen when seven-year old Mindy comes in for a snack. You know what those Kookie Navajos did to my friend Eileen? (Long pause as I gain composure) No, what did the Navajos do? Well, we were playing and this gull flew over and a feather dropped out of it and Eileen picked it up but the Navajo lady came running over and said, "Oh, Eileen, you have my feather!" and took it! Do you know what I learned this summer, Mindy? What? That the most precious thing to a Navajo is a feather that falls from a flying bird. From now on I'm going to save all of the feathers I find but if Navajos are around, I'll give the feathers to them. Finished with the snack, she walks away. At the door she stops and asks, Flo, does a bird know when it loses a feather? ...A week later Mindy brings me a fragment of board splashed with a bright design of red, green, black, yellow, and white. That Navajo girl asked me if I wanted this. I said no but I thought my grandmother would like it. I thank her and admire the painting. Will you buy me some poster paints? I buy poster paints for Mindy and she immediately completes and presents me with a "board" painting. She has chosen a small piece of 2" X 4" and has painted each side a different color, has followed the edges precisely...Mindy comes running to tell me that brother Jason has his head caught in the railing at the apartment. I run across the street to witness a rescue by the Navajo woman. She has poured baby oil on his head so that he slips easily out. We share the humor of the situation, I thank her, dry his tears, and walk back home with the children. I look down the street past the buildings at the pinks in the western sky. Why is it I never know when the sun is setting? Mindy slips her hand in mine. You're right, Flo, she says, Navajos are nice.

FOOTNOTES

1. E.F. Schumacher, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED (New York: Harper Calophan Books, 1977), p. 1.
2. My primary sources for the methodology include:

Gabriel M. Della-Piana, "Literacy and Film Criticism: Sensitization through the Illumination of Form and Style," (Portland, Oregon: Research on Evaluation Program of the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory, June, 1979).

Elliot, W. Eisner, "The Perspective Eye," (Washington, D.C.: Address at Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C., 1975).

Gail McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism: Methods and Applications," (Rochester, N.Y.: The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 1:2, Summer, 1979).

William F. Pinar and Madeline R. Grumet, TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976), pp. vii-x; 51-65.

James P. Spradley and David W. McCurdy. THE CULTURAL EXPERIENCE: ETHNOGRAPHY IN COMPLEX SOCIETY (Chicago: Science Research Associates, Inc., 1972).

Pinar's method of currere is a strategy of disclosure of existential experience that allows the writer (and reader) to view more clearly an external structure, i.e., an educational experience. Della-Piana's perspective, related to Eisner's, favors description that illuminates the quality and character of that experience. McCutcheon, however, warns against pure "impressionistic criticism" and asserts that educational criticism, a process of inquiry between the critic and an educational phenomenon, must include interpretation and appraisal as well as illuminative description. She suggests that the use of comparisons will aid the critic in achieving objectivity.

Spradley and McCurdy address the problem of objectivity in ethnographic studies:

> Between the events of social behavior (what people are actually saying and doing) and the investigator's descriptive account there is an important variable, the investigator himself. Complete objectivity may be a characteristic of some omniscient observer, but not of a human being. In any research, selective observation and selective interpretation always work to transform the "actual events" into the "facts" that are used in a descriptive account...The only choice of the investigator is whether he will be conscious of his own selective processes or whether they will go on without his awareness. pp. 13-14.

The method of inquiry (primarily through disclosure and description) presented in this paper was inspired primarily by the works of Pinar and Spradley and McCurdy. My efforts toward interpretation and appraisal (if, indeed rendering can be considered appraisal as McCutcheon suggests) are offered with full realization of the personal and subjective orientation of my view. My aim, as Macdonald suggests, is to make that view, rooted in my personal biography, passion, values, and justifications as clear as possible to the reader and to myself. (James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum, Consciousness, and Social Change," a paper presented at the Kent State Curriculum Theory Conference, 19).

3. Paul R. Klohr, "Curriculum Theory: The State of the Field" (Cincinnati, Ohio: A paper presented at the Xavier University Curriculum Theory Conference, October, 1974), p. 11. The common threads found in the work of reconceptualists are summarized by Klohr as follows:

1. A holistic, organic view is taken of man and his relation to nature.
2. The individual becomes the chief agent in the construction of knowledge; that is, he is a culture creator as well as a culture bearer.
3. The curriculum theorist draws heavily on his own experiential base as method.
4. Curriculum theorizing recognizes as major resources the preconscious realms of experience.
5. The foundational roots of their theorizing lie in existential philosophy, phenomenology and radical psychoanalysis, also drawing on humanistic reconceptualizations of such cognate fields as sociology, anthropology, and political science.
6. Personal liberty and the attainment of higher levels of consciousness become central values in the curriculum process.
7. Diversity and pluralism are celebrated in both social ends and in the proposals projected to move toward those ends.
8. A reconceptualization of supporting political-social operations is basic.
9. New language forms are generated to translate fresh meanings--metaphors, for example.

4. Paulo Freire, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED (New York: Herder and Herder, 1976).

5. I was particularly interested in promoting students: abilities to take perspectives, a necessary precursor for growth in other personal and interpersonal dimensions and had considered testing the students in this realm. But I rejected the notion since my experiences in the past with interpretation of tests has left

me with a drawer full of data, a head full of questions, and the feeling that test scores do little to substantiate, negate, or illuminate the outcomes of open experiences.

6. The assigned texts were:
Clyde Kluckhohn and Dorthea Leighton, THE NAVAJO (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974).

7. Ibid., pp. v-77.

8. Ibid., p.9. (Rich facetiously suggests that perhaps the basic question in interviews should be "What do you think you're doing?" As the journey progresses, this becomes the standard joke.)

9. Edward Abbey, guru of western environmentalists, is the author of DESERT SOLITAIRE (New York: Ballantine Books, 1971), essays on his season as a ranger in Arches National Park.

10. Joseph Knighton, to be published in SANDSTONE, a chapbook of poems, 1979.

11. Annie Dillard. PILGRIM AT TINKER CREEK (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1974).

12. Florence R. Krall, "Mudhole Ecology" in THE AMERICAN BIOLOGY TEACHER' September, 1970.

13. Pinar and Grumet, TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM'

14. Bell and Casletter, "The Utilization of Yucca and Beargrass by the Aborigines in the American Southwest" from ETHNOBIOLOGICAL STUDIES OF THE SOUTHWEST (University of New Mexico, 1941).

15. "The Navajo Way," National Broadcasting Company Films, 1144 Wilmetti Avenue, Wilmetti, Ill.

16. Saint-Exupery, Antoine, THE LITTLE PRINCE (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1943).

17. G. Mark Schoepfle, et al, "A Study of Navajo Perceptions of the Impact of Environmental Changes Relating to Energy Resource Development" (Shiprock, N.M.: Navajo Community College, May 23, 1979).

18. Maxine Greene, LANDSCAPES OF LEARNING (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978).

19. Gladys A. Reichard, SPIDER WOMAN, A STORY OF NAVAJO WEAVERS AND CHANTERS (New Mexico: The Rio Grande Press, Inc., 1971).

20. Joseph Knighton, unpublished poem.

21. Gladys Reichard, SPIDER WOMAN, p. 135.

22. Simon J. Ortiz, "Amerindian Poems" published in PEMBROKE MAGAZINE (Pembroke, N.C.: Pembroke State University, 1971)

23. Ibid.

24. Robert L. Selman and Dan Jaquette, "The Development of Interpersonal Awareness" (working draft), a manual constructed by the Harvard--Judge Baker Social Reasoning Project, January 1, 1977.

25. Robin and Tonia Ridington, TEACHINGS FROM THE AMERICAN EARTH (New York: Liveright, 1975).

Curriculum Inquiry From a Religious Perspective: Two Views

Robert E. Richards and Edmund C. Short
The Pennsylvania State University

We want to address two issues in this paper. The first concerns the difference between inquiry from a religious perspective and inquiry from an a-religious perspective. We also give attention to a second issue that concerns what specific implications this distinction may have for curriculum inquiry.

Each of the two authors of this paper will proceed to state his own views on these issues independently. You will note some agreement between the two of us because both of us come at these issues from the same perspective--the religious perspective. Nevertheless, you will discover some variation in how we view and handle each of them. We present these two views, not so much to debate or reconcile whatever difference we may exhibit on these questions, but rather to stimulate dialogue on the issues involved within the religious perspective on curriculum inquiry and on issues that exist between the religious and the a-religious perspectives. We think it important to initiate scholarly dialogue on these matters because of the serious implications for educational practice any stance taken on these issues (including avoidance) is bound to have.

Robert E. Richards

I have mixed feelings about trying to present to you my views on curriculum inquiry from a religious perspective. Not only do I feel some reservations about sharing publicly some of my most personal convictions, but for some reason I feel like I am trying to mix water and oil to be talking about religious inquiry in front of an ostensibly academic assemblage. My reservations are not unique as I am sure you are wondering how I can academically discuss a subject which may seem more fitting for a theological seminary or testimony meeting. I take some strength in the fact that others such as J.B. Macdonald in this field, and Allen Bergin in clinical psychology have spoken up boldly in the defense of being explicit about one's values and orientation while discussing the process and results of inquiry.

Macdonald has noted that too often we fail to realize that "every bit of curriculum talk and directed work is shot full of this basic value (some basic) assumption about goodness. The problem is we cover it up or sugarcoat it, or are really unaware of our debts. In any of these cases, we fuzz over and disconnect the value base from the topic of our rhetoric and action. We would be well-advised to pronounce these values and work directly through them." (Molnar and Zahorik, 1977, pp. 20-21)

I am going to describe a framework for inquiry which I consider to be more complete than those currently being used for studying man and his world. What I will describe are not algorithms or procedures, but principles and assumptions. As I make these assertions I suspect that you will be wondering how I could ever prove or substantiate these viewpoints. That is a very good question and my answer is basically this.

If indeed reality includes the spiritual dimension, which I assert and believe it does, then inquiry allowing for the fuller and truer view of reality will yield better results. By results I mean that the theories derived from inquiry will be closer to reality as evidenced by improved explanation of phenomenon and prediction of future states of affairs.

This prompts another question. How will I know if my theories, explanations, and predictions are better than those derived through other methods of inquiry? My answer is two-pronged. The evidence should show up in both rigorous empirical tests of the framework-generated hypothesis, and also in the more

important, more meaningful, but less quantifiable, elusive, qualitative tests related to happiness, peace, and growth.

Parenthetically, I believe that the scientific paradigms social scientists are now using, borrowed from the physical sciences and dependent upon quantifiable observable measurements, are woefully inadequate in describing human beings and groups, partly because they leave out so much that is so important. The need to find better paradigms, then is one of my conclusions, and my recommendation is that those who are religiously-minded seriously consider coming out in the open regarding the viability of an integrated paradigm to inquiry as advocated by Dr. Allen Bergin of the Institute for Studies in Values and Human Behavior at Brigham Young University. (Bergin, 1979, p. 5)

In believing that quantifiable empirical results will be found I realize that I am going out on a limb because the validity of empirical studies depends so much on the consistency between hypothesized variables and the instuments used to measure the variables. Until we can find better instruments for measuring, evaluating, and assessing human beings, the error variance--the noise in the instruments and techniques--may continue to drown out the really important differences.

Now that I have stated generally my thesis, let me describe very explicitly what I mean by religious inquiry. The phenomenon of investigation of religious inquiry is truth. Primarily, of course, it is religious truth--theological truths. Some of these truths include those relating to the nature of God, his attributes, powers and purposes, the nature, origin, and destiny of man, the purposes of mortal life, the manner in which men can fulfill their destiny, how they sould worship God, how they should treat themselves and their fellow men, and how they should treat animals, plants, and the earth itself. The domain of inquiry obviously overlaps widely with the concerns of the curriculum theorist. I see earthlife as a kind of macro-curriculum which has been variously called a time of growth, a time of testing, a time of preparation, a time to walk by faith. These truths, as well as others, clearly in the religious domain, have tremendous implications for the field of curriculum--even public school-oriented, work-a-day curriculum.

Although religious inquiry is primarily concerned with the deep issues and questions which theologians and philosophers have spend centuries debating and upon which prophets have made declarations, there are other, secondary, concerns for religious inquiry. The study of order, natural or artificial, the study of law, natural or spiritual, the study of creation, discovery, and management, for example, are logically related to the undeniably religious questions.

What are the methods of inquiry used by the religious inquirer? And who qualifies as a religious inquirer? I believe religious inquiry is fundamentally different than normal rational scholastic inquiry. It is not dependent on reason or sensory data--instead it is dependent on revelation. Fundamental truths about the spiritual realm are learned through revelation or they are not learned or really known at all.

Revelation? Yes, revelation. I realize that modern philosophers have typically claimed that such personally gained truths, not being publicly verifiable (physically observable), do not constitute knowledge. The justification of truth the religious inquirer uses is not public verifiability, but an assurance borne of the Holy Spirit that something is, in fact, true. "And truth is knowledge of things as they were, as they are, and as they are to come." (Doctrine & Covenants 93:24)

A religious inquirer may prepare himself, may learn of the scriptures, may learn humility and obedience, may develop faith and learn through fasting and parayer to recognize the promptings of the Holy Spirit. Though these preparations may facilitate religious knowledge, they do not, singly or together, as a matter of course result in such. Religious knowledge is gained through revelation from God. Revelation, then, is the criterion for religious inquiry.

My definition of religious inquiry may seem restrictive, I realize--and it may appear very one-sided--God selecting and speaking to whom He will as in the days of the Old and New Testament. But without this criterion it is impossible to distinguish between religious inquiry and almost any other type of inquiry. Another advantage of this criterion is that it resolves the issue of conflicting religious doctrines. I will not discuss that issue here as this is not a religious forum.

This criterion for religious inquiry has been set forth by numerous prophets of God (I speak as a Christian--a Mormon). Paul wrote to the Corinthians:

> "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so, the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God.
>
> "Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God.
>
> "Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual." (ICorinthians 2:1013)

Much more recently a man I revere as a prophet, Brigham Young wrote:

> "I say that the living oracles of God, or the spirit of revelation, must be in each and every individual, to know the plan of salvation and keep in the path that leads them to the presence of God." (Widstoe, 1971, p. 38)

What perhaps seemed like an exclusive definition of religious inquiry at first, I assert, is actually an all-inclusive one. Everyone can and should become a religious inquirer. Everyone can receive revelation from God, the source of all truth.

Scholars have typically kept church and state apart even in their inquiries. Compartmentalizing knowledge in this way, I believe, is totally artificial and even hampering. What is found to be true through religious inquiry will have profound implications in every aspect of a person's life. One cannot keep religious truths apart from other truths. Truth is coherent--one whole--though some truths are far more critical in importance than others. Issues found in seemingly secular areas may be frought with religious implications and require religious inquiry. An extremely successful chemist, Dr. Bryant Rossiter, has discussed the breaking down of such compartments in his mind and the consequent convergence of science and religion. He feels that there is no conflict between truth in religion and truth in science. The challenge is finding the truth in both these areas. (Rossiter, 1977)

I am not advocating the abandonment of traditional scientific and scholastic methods, i.e., reason and experimentation, but I am asserting that they are incomplete and that religious inquiry provides a further check, a point of reference. The religious inquirer is not against scholarship or experimentation. He attempts to use all three appropriately. He advocates rigorous scholarship and experimentation. But in addition to the traditional methods of inquiry he is able to consciously examine the implications of spiritual truths. He has at his disposal in the scriptures and through personal revelation, a wealth of knowledge about man and how he should live. Simply by using more valid concepts and questions he can shortcut years of less effective investigation by incorporating into his theories and designs the truths already learned.

In studying the history of science, Dr. Allen Bergin, a prominent clinical psychologist, has claimed that all great discoveries have come through personal inspiration. He advocates incorporating religious inquiry into our quests for truth. Let me quote Dr. Bergin directly.

> "To take the step from terrestrial to celestial scholarship requires an integration of the spiritual and the empirical, with the spiritual providing the basic frame of reference and much of the impetus for our rational and empirical efforts. In keeping with Church teaching, I believe

that the extraordinary insights of scientists, scholars and artists, come by revelation in the context of disciplined and educated searching. This means that the process that pertains to sacred knowledge also applies to secular knowledge, for the origins of both lie ultimately in the same divine source of truth. It seems important, then to make this influence a systematic part of our work instead of the happenstance factor it often is now." (Bergin, 1979, p. 2)

Bergin has clarified many of the aspects of this type of integrated inquiry which involves the validation either in the ecclesiastical or the secular system of insights gained through personal revelation. Bergin uses the following diagram to illustrate the possible processes involved in this celestial scholarship.



"On the left is indicated the process of spiritual validation; that is, testing a revealed or personal insight by seeking further revelation or a witness about it.

"This method includes checking one's insights against the scriptures, or the words of the living prophets, or by gaining the additional testimonies of other scholars who are capable of making their own spiritual test of the question."

Bergin recognizes that truth can be found through revelation, experimentation and reason-- and that there is a harmonious relationship between the three. He feels that most scholars have lopped off or neglected revelation.

Lest anyone feel that I am speaking of zeal without knowledge, let me assure you that I understand fully that this type of integrated inquiry is more demanding rather than less demanding than traditional methods. Personal reform, "superior dedication, devotion, and discipline are prerequisites to this process. It demands more effort, not less, than what is expected of other scholars. Similarly, family duty, fidelity and love are required." (Bergin, 1979, p.25)

In the final part of this paper I well suggest some of the implications I see for curriculum inquiry and development of religiously acquired knowledge.

First of all, the framework and knowledge from religious inquiry provides a foundation for knowledge about human purposes, growth and potential, learning and values. In short, it provides the ingredients for a good framework capable of synthesizing all the fragments of the knowledge found through other inquiry methods.

Secondly, religious inquiry, when added to other forms of inquiry creates the possibility of a very broad curriculum. It would be even broader than any of the root metaphors discussed by Van Manen.

Van Manen (1977), in analyzing Habermas' thinking, paints an interesting picture concerning levels of practice and reflection, each level having its root metaphor and criteria of values. He discusses three levels.

"(1) The empirical-analytic level tends to be very practical in seeking to find scientifically the best ways to accomplish certain means. Associated with this level is the input-process-output model of factory production and the criteria for reflection is efficiency and effectiveness which tends to maintain the status quo and foster socialization and hamper deeper reflection. (2) The humanistic-phenomenological level is less immediately practical but deals with orientations or world views people have. This level uses a communication metaphor and stresses the importance of personal meaning. (3) The third level is critical thinking which focuses on social wisdom, liberation, community concensus, and worthwhileness of knowledge." (Van Manen, 1977)

From a religious perspective it is possible to add a fourth level to broaden the scope even farther and look at not only the personal liberation, but the theotropic (God-becoming) instincts in mankind. The root metaphor is the family, a Father and his children. The criteria for reflection are eternal growth of each individual based on eternal truths--becoming as God is.

Thirdly, within this broader framework it is possible to look at the key questions of curriculum (its definition) and discover many startling things. Instead of being a luxury of modern times, the field of curriculum becomes central to human existence. From a religious perspective life itself is curriculum with a very clear purpose and the Gospel is this broader ranging theory. The general aim of the curriculum is to enable man to become like his Heavenly Father (the Father being perfect in all attributes including, for example, knowledge, truth, and justice, and having a glorified body of flesh and bones distinct from the Son's). God himself has stated his objectives for us: "For this is my work and my glory to bring to pass immortality and eternal life of man." (Pearl of Great Price, Moses 1:39)

Looking further, one sees that instead of dealing primarily with textbooks or learning aids (these are secondary or tertiary), the prime material tool of the curriculum is one's own physical body (assuming the spirit had premortal existence in the presence of the Father) and the family and home experience second, where love for oneself and others, honesty, work, and other values are taught. The purpose of our body (our first teacher) has been artistically stated by Jose Ortega y Gasset:

> The so-called spirit is an all too ethereal agent, permanently in danger of being lost in the labyrinth of its own infinite possibilities. Thinking is too easy. The mind rarely meets with resistance in its flights. Hence, the vital importance for the intellectual of touching concrete objects and of learning discipline in his intercourse with them. Bodies are mentors of the spirit.... Without the check of visible and palpable things, the spirit in its highflown arrogance would be sheer madness. The body is the tutor and policeman of the spirit. (Mitcham and Mackey, 1972:313)

Since the goal is to become as a being who is infinitely complex and cannot be described with the conceptual systems now at our disposal, the life outcomes, as Broudy would call them, cannot all be described in behavioral or even humanistic terms. However, there are behaviors and personal attributes which can be defined as enabling. Certainly formal schooling and skill development are useful and have instrumental meaning within this framework.

Finally, the religious perspective defines the nature and organization of knowledge and truth as well as the way of acquiring knowledge. To know God is to know truth for in God is all truth. "I am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto the Father but by me." (John 14:6) "Truth is knowledge of things as they are, and as they were, and as they are to come." (Doctrine & Covenants 93:24)

This religious perspective calls for a realist view of truth where men are accountable for their actions in relationship to the truth that they know. "All truth is independent in that sphere in which God has placed it, to act for itself, as all intelligence also; otherwise there is no existence." (D&C 93:30)

Philip Phenix echoes a similar view of truth in a discussion of disciplinary knowledge.

> The structure of things is revealed, not invented and it is the business of inquiry to open that structure to general understanding through the formation of appropriate concepts and theories. Truth is rich and varied, but it is not arbitrary. The nature of things is given, not chosen, and if man is to gain insight he must employ the right concepts and methods. Only by obedience to the truth thus discovered can he learn or teach. (Phenex, 1971)

From a religious point of view, revealed knowledge is of greater importance because of its eternal consequences than scientific knowledge. For example, if the reality of things is as Mormons see it, then knowledge and obedience to the "saving principles" is immensely more important to individuals and societies than knowing the number of feet in a mile or the distance between earth and sun. That world knowledge is in second place does not mean that world knowledge should not be acquired, but only that the priority should be kept straight.

> Secular knowledge, important as it may be, can never save a soul nor open the celestial kingdom nor create a world nor make a man a god, but it can be most helpful to that man who, placing first things first, has found the way to eternal life and who can now bring into play all knowledge to be his tool and servant...Can you see that the spiritual knowledge may be complemented with the secular in this life and on for eternities, but that the secular without the foundation of the spiritual is like the foam upon the milk, the fleeting shadow?" (Kimball, 1977)

From a religious perspective life itself is not only a curriculum of knowledge to be gained, but also a final exam, a personal trial of choices. Hence, being honest on a test in school may be more critical in the curriculum of life than answering the questions correctly, though that also has value. Building upon the base of revelation (to prophets and to individuals) one can know the truth because the confirmation comes from outside the narrow physical system our senses perceive. Rational and empirical means can be used to further elaborate and clarify and make "sense" out of revealed truth. The three complement each other but revelation constitutes the base. Knowledge is not sought after simply for its technical value, but for the expansive views, the empathy and the understanding it affords, and ultimately the glory. "The glory of God is intelligence, or, in other words, light and truth." (Doctrine & Covenants 93:36)

The type of knowledge to be sought after is most broadly stated. It is difficult to find a more inclusive curriculum.

> Teach ye diligently and my grace shall attend you, that you may be instructed more perfectly in theory, in principle, in doctrine, in the law of the gospel, in all things that pertain unto the kingdom of God, that are expedient for you to understand.
>
> Of things both in heaven and in the earth, and under the earth; things which have been, things which are, things which must shortly come to pass; things which are at home, things which are abroad; the wars and the perplexities of nations, and the judgments which are on the land; and a knowledge also of countries and of kingdoms. (D&C 88:78-79)

The means of acquiring that knowledge is diverse: among others, righteous living (Doctrine & Covenants 121), experience (Doctrine & Covenants 122:45-46), studying things out personally (Doctrine & Covenants

9:5), diligence, fasting and prayer (Doctrine & Covenants 88:63-64), revelation, obeying God's commandments, teaching one another, through faith, personal experiment, and reading out of the best books (Doctrine & Covenants 88:118).

Curriculum design and implementation is not just a pasttime, but in an eternal perspective where things count, it is a matter of commandment. "But I have commanded you to bring up your children in light and truth." (Doctrine & Covenants 88:77) The most important skill or way of being we are to learn is spirituality. Truth is not to be toyed with or used for perverse ends. C.S. Lewis has said:

> For the wise men of old the cardinal problem had been how to conform the soul to reality, and the solution had been knowledge, self-discipline, and virtue. For magic and the applied sciences alike, the problem is how to subdue reality to the wishes of men..." (Mitcham and Mackey, 1972)

This paper has briefly introduced one justification for one religious perspective. There is much more to be said about truth, subject matter, and curriculum from this particular religious perspective alone, but constraints of time and space require some summing up. Theory aside, curriculum as people experience it is practical. It is the real life contact of people with others and their environment, usually considered in the context of schooling. A religious perspective is warranted (as well as others) because without breaking out of our pervading positivistic ideology we are in danger, according to Habermas, of becoming "an exclusively technical civilization devoid of any connection between theory and praxis." (Van Manen, 1977) If, as Habermas has also pointed out, "the relation of theory and praxis always referred to the good and the righteous--as well as the truth--and to the life, both private and collective of individuals as well as citizens" (Van Manen, 1977), then the religious perspective has a great deal to offer curriculum inquiry.

A religious perspective need not be inhibiting, intolerant, nor authoritarian, but instead may be expansive (eternally so), based on ultimate tolerance (Christlike love), and extremely personal (tutorial, with the Holy Ghost as teacher). Churchman (Van Gigch, 1974), a systems approach expert, has asserted that the systems people have learned the hard way not to promise pre-packaged solutions when one uses their technique, but rather to promise the excitement of asking the right questions.

> Those of us who worked for years in...applied General Systems Theory or the Systems Approach have certainly been quietly advertising our wares in terms of results rather than processes. We proclaimed that we produced "solutions" to the pressing problems of society like so many packages of goodies. Now, some of us realize that the business we were really in was not producing results--solutions to inventory problems, waiting line problems, or allocation problems-but rather raising richer questions for people to consider, which is the essence of the creation process we all enjoy. You see, creativity spouts and thrives on the soil of good questions. (Van Gigch, 1974, p. v)

Likewise, I assert that inquiry (curriculum or otherwise) from a religious perspective, a unified framework which integrates theory and practice and provides fundamental structure, allows for the richest, broadest possible inquiry and curriculum.

Edmund C. Short
Religious and A-religious Inquiry

My view of inquiry is based upon the assumption that human ability to know is inevitably quite limited. At best our knowledge is built up slowly and meticulously over the centuries within various relatively circumscribed conceptual compartments that are logically and semantically distinct from one another and, for

all practical purposes, require us to make a conceptual shift when we move from one realm to another in our thinking. There is no unity of knowledge possible, in the sense of interlocking and consistant sets of ideas across all disciplines and/or other conjunctive or interdisciplinary realms of knowledge. This unity of knowledge may be the hope of many theorists, but so far it has not been discerned how this goal might be achieved. I do not believe it can be achieved.

Our present methods of inquiry have been based upon the very fruitful habit of focusing attention upon limited ranges of phenomena with intellectual processes molded uniquely to address particular questions within these categories or domains. We focus on "light" or "human behavior," for example, by means of separate and distinctive inquiry modes; we do not try to encompass them both in the same inquiry nor do we try to address them both by the same generalized method. This approach is dictated by the way the human mind works, the way all human minds in common function, I presume. That is, the human capacity of reason, with its requirements to be logical, consistent, unified, etc., dictate that when we can no longer contain our systems of knowledge under these criteria, we set about to conceive of how to explore some realm of the unknown in a different way and to construct other systems of ideas that possess the qualities that reason demands. We have understood the necessity of this human limitation since the appearance of Godel's 1931 proof of the limits to consistency in systems of propositions. (Nagel and Newman, 1958) By adhering to this habit of tailoring our modes of inquiry to the various classes of phenomena we wish to examine, we have produced extraordinary advances within many domains of research and have spawned many new disciplines and modes of inquiry appropriate to them. Each of these has survived the tests of reason (logic, consistency, unity) and has yielded a publicly verifiable realm of knowledge within its domain, even if we cannot see how we can systematically relate one domain to another. When it comes to the use of this knowledge in the real world of human living, we do not have any trouble drawing upon what is pertinent and making our decisions in more intelligent fashion with such knowledge than without it. We only wish at times we had more valid knowledge from more realms upon which to draw. Thus the impetus for continued inquiry is kept going.

It should be said, however, that some domains of inquiry encompass wider ranges of phenomena than others. Among the very broadest of these are the synoptic disciplines of history, philosphy, and religion. Since it is germane to the topic of this paper, I wish to examine in particular one of these domains--that of religious knowledge, and the nature of religious inquiry. Indeed, I want to distinguish it, if possible, from what has been called a-religious inquiry.

Given the above epistemological assumptions, I contend that there is no distinction possible between religious and a-religious inquiry. There can be religious and non-religious inquiry--non-religious in the sense of other-than-religious, such as sociological or chemical research, but there cannot be a logical distinction between religious and a-religious--a-religious being taken in the sense of having an unreligious, anti-religious, or neutral-on-religion perspective. The basis for this contention is that the religious perspective is a value position, just as the un-religious, anti-religious, or neutral-on religion perspectives are. None of these including the religious perspective, should have a controlling role in the adequate conduct of inquiry of any kind. This applies to such domains as sociology and chemistry and to the domain of religion as well.

The standards governing the creation and validation of knowledge in any realm exist independently of researcher preference, values, bias, and religious perspective. They may be applied equally objectively by the religious, un-religious, or neutral scholar. Another way of saying this is that no matter who does the research the results of inquiry will be established by mutual verification among competent scholars in the particular field who certify that the canons of reason and the logic of the appropriate mode of inquiry have in fact been employed and that the findings are not a result of researcher bias.

Now, I recognize that a good many scholars will not see eye-to-eye with me on this matter. They will claim that the influence of values held by scholars does in fact almost always color both the process and the outcomes of inquiry. I didn't say they wouldn't or don't. All I said was that they can't enter into the research process in such a way as to yield idiosyncratic results that are unverifiable by others, examining the same phenomenon and employing the same mode of inquiry. It is clearly possible for scholars to challenge a particular scholar's conceptualization of the problem or his casting of the results of the particular inquiry in certain terms, but only on the grounds that the challenge to make intelligible some piece of a domain by some appropriate method of inquiry has not been adequately achieved, not on the grounds that the research was done inappropriately if in fact it has been checked publicly and found to live up to appropriate research standards. It is clearly possible for scholars deliberately or inadvertently to allow their personal perspectives to enter into the execution of their work in such a way that objective, public criteria would be violated. But even when the scholarly prohibition against this sort of thing is scrupulously adhered to and reputable scholars have been able to pronounce the work correct and verifiable, it still remains possible to reject a particular formulation of knowledge in favor of alternative work that seems to make more intelligible the particular domain of the unknown in ways that are both methodologically acceptable, that lead to further clarification and understanding, and that lead to continued fruitful and cumulative lines of research.

Thus, I must conclude that a presumed difference between religious and a-religious inquiry, done in accord with appropriate canons of inquiry, cannot be a real difference if we are talking about researchers holding different religious perspectives as individual articles of faith, belief, or value preference. Inquiry is inquiry. Their individual perspectives are washed out as an influence on the conduct of valid inquiry. On the other hand, the very growth and expansion of inquiry is any given field, with its development of new or more adequate theories, revised concepts and conceptual frameworks, fresh metaphors, and reconstituted structures of knowledge, depends in very large part on the assertion and verification of ideas that undoubtedly arise out of the intuitive and creative depths of the most perceptive scholars in each field who try to bring the fruits of their particular perspectives and ideas to the tasks of elucidating phenomena under question and of making them more intelligible for the rest of us. This is as it should be, as it must be. Acceptance of the conceptual frameworks they offer, and the particular language and root metaphors imbedded in them, is, as always a matter of judgment. If the work stands up methodologically, and no contrary evidence comes along to invalidate the results set forth in these studies, these conceptualizations cannot be rejected on any rational basis; they will be embraced or rejected on the basis of whether people--scholars at first, then the general public--find them both compatible with their experience and values, and fruitful in thinking through matters where the available established knowledge is relevant. When the current knowledge is no longer adequate or satisfactory for dealing with some particular matter, then the scholars are compelled to push forward the cutting edge of their fields of inquiry and to rethink the old ways of comprehending reality. In this manner, new knowledge is generated which may overtake and replace previously accepted knowledge.

Here, then, is the appropriate and inevitable role for religious, metaphysical, or value perspectives held by researchers: that role is in breaking with traditionally accepted knowledge and in creating new formulations that serve the current needs to know. I would not reject the possibility that the ultimate source of these fruitful openings in scholarship may be derived from "revelation," as defined by particular religious communities; that question, it would seem to me, might be settled by some careful empirical inquiries concerning a wide sampling of such breakthroughs by scholars from across the many fields of inquiry.

A word now about the specific mode of inquiry which yields religious knowledge, as I have reserved that label for a particular domain of inquiry. What is subject to investigation in this domain is not the subjective, personal, religious experiences people have; this may become the focus of study within some aspect of the discipline of Synnoetics (Phenix, 1964) which addresses facets of personal knowledge. And it may be

be the knowledge of individual religious experience, when taken in the aggregate, may be used as evidence in support of claims made in the realm of religious knowledge. But the primary foci of religious inquiry are the ultimate attitudes of orientation, the ultimate object(s) of devotion, held by human beings in general. The fact that answers about these sorts of questions have formed the basis for various sets of religious practices and institutions does not detract from the search for truth in general about these questions. It is striking how various religions and their systems of beliefs deal with pretty much the same issues no matter what particular formulations they may have accepted as true knowledge about these questions, or no matter the historical circumstances giving rise to each of the particular religions. This is not to say that all religions have equally acceptable knowledge claims at their core, in terms of what religious inquirers have established as valid knowledge using appropriate means of intellectual inquiry. In fact, it is frequently the case in the realm of religious practice, perhaps more so than in other realms of human activity, that we tend to rely less on validated knowledge than upon traditional or unexamined views. I am always surprised that this is the case, but no doubt this has to do with conceptions of the ultimate object(s) of devotion held by people. Some of these conceptions seem to rule out using the human mind to inquire into truth. Nevertheless, most religions at least claim to regard thinking through religious issues as being desirable, whether the answers obtained in this fashion are given a high place or not in their institutional and personal value structures.

In summary, questions related to the most comprehensive, the most profound, the most unified meanings held by persons are the appropriate objects of religious inquiry. And the mode of inquiry in this realm is largely synoptic; that is, it draws together knowledge from all areas of inquiry--the sciences, the arts, the humanities, ethics, history, philosophy, and synnoetics--in its attempt to address these questions. The product of this type of inquiry is religious knowledge-- about God, or some other object of ultimate devotion, and about our relationship to that object of devotion and to all of reality, even to human knowledge, scientific or otherwise. Religious knowledge is public knowledge, just as is all knowledge derived by scholarly guilds. It is confirmable by reference to canons of religious inquiry, and when checked against these criteria over and over, yields support for the same knowledge claims each time. There is no necessity in this domain of scholarship, or in any other (it is in the others that we tend to worry more about so-called religious or a-religious perspectives), to question "unacceptable" claims made by some scholars who approach their inquiries from one perspective or another. If they have played by the rules of the knowledge game, their results must be accepted as valid. They may have chosen to focus on a certain scope of reality, defined in a particular way, which does not satisfy another scholar who wishes to illuminate a broader (or narrower) set of phenomena and to couch his handling of it in different terms, but both should be allowed to follow either path so long as their claims can be publicly verified. The test of which knowledge shall endure longer (St. Paul said human knowledge is imperfect and soon passes away) is left to the judgment of users of this knowledge. Whether they find one configuration of knowledge or another better matches the focus of attention they may require at a given point is a function of need and of conceptual fit rather than of truth. Put another way, what knowledge is acceptable depends on what persons or groups are using it and what context it is being used in. They are just different. If it is substantiated, publicly verified knowledge, it at least can be trusted as not being irresponsibly arrived at, and users can utilize it within appropriate use-contexts.

Curriculum Inquiry and Religious Inquiry

Curriculum inquiry is a domain of inquiry dealing with a part of that field of human activity known as education. This domain addresses questions rooted in the facets of educational practice where thought and action must be taken regarding what to teach; how this is to be justified; to whom, under what circumstances, and in what manner it shall be taught; and finally, how to relate components with each other over time (Kliebard, 1977). These are practical problems requiring judgment and action (Reid, 1978). Knowledge that would be most helpful in dealing with these value-decisions cannot be solely technological in

nature (Short, 1973, p. 272), although such knowledge necessarily plays a part in arriving at appropriate curricular judgments and actions.

Practical theory, it is now conceded, is the kind of knowledge most needed to provide guidance to practitioners dealing with practical curriculum decisions. Practical theory is both empirically grounded and prescriptively oriented. It is empirically grounded in that it is based, in part, on knowledge derived by disciplinary modes of inquiry in the humanities and sciences that have addressed specific pointed questions related to curriculum practices, such as studies of child development or manpower needs of society. It also draws upon knowledge from conjunctive inquiries that describe holistically certain sub-domains of curriculum reality itself within which decisions have to be made, such as curriculum policy, design, or evaluation. Technical knowledge is, likewise, a part of what practical theory draws upon. Here, technological forms of inquiry have produced knowledge of what does or does not result from taking certain sorts of action under certain conditions.

In addition to this empirical base, practical theory requires that normative assertions be made that specify what is desired (assuming that in education there are many possible alternatives) with regard to the type of person being developed through the curriculum, beliefs about the type of education preferred and the conditions under which it should take place, and many other value questions impinging upon practical curriculum decisions. Choices on these matters must be made, and a practical theory will provide a prescriptive orientation by which such choices can be made. (Hayes, 1977).

Practical theories in curriculum, when they come into existence (they are not yet at hand in usefully explicated form), will need to be multiple in number. What is required is not a single theory as is the goal in scientific inquiry--one that can be shown to be in accord with all the facts and one that can lead to further fruitful inquiry. Rather, what are needed in curriculum practice are formulations of alternative versions of prescriptive theories, each of which offers a consistent configuration of compelling injunctions based on accurate empirical understandings and on specified value assertions about desired curricular processes and effects. One or another of these theories would be available to be followed if decision-makers found themselves in agreement with their basic goals and philosophy and chose (for good reason, let us hope) to adopt a particular practical theory for use in their own settings. Or, it may be necessary that these kinds of practical curriculum theories be developed in each situation by the people involved there. However created and by whomever they are created, the necessary curriculum knowledge that must go into them needs to be produced, and we are at a stage now where very few curriculum scholars have envisioned, let alone begun to carry on, inquiry of the kind that will feed into such practical curriculum theories. Or perhaps, it would be more accurate to say that the shift from intending to produce general scientific curriculum thoeries to producing prescriptive theories in a form useful for curriculum practitioners has barely begun among curriculcum inquirers (Short, 1978; Reid, 1979) even though many of the pieces that might contribute to this new goal may have been generated already.

Now, what has the matter of religious perspective got to do with the kind of inquiry that I have outlined as appropriate for the study of curriculum? Consistent with what I stated earlier about inquiry generally, I would say that curriculum inquiry in its many forms cannot be divided into curriculum inquiry with a religious perspective and curriculum inquiry with an a-religious perspective. The standards and logic of the various modes of inquiry employed to study curriculum matters are the same ones adhered to in any study employing such modes of inquiry. The knowledge yielded meets the criterion of replicability just as in any search for public knowledge; that is, other scholars besides those originating a particular inquiry check the process and results of the inquiry, and when they find no flaw in them, they assert its objectivity and declare it free from researcher bias. Curriculum inquiry is curriculum inquiry, regardless of the perspective held by the curriculum scholar.

Again, we should admit that either a religious or an a-religious perspective within any inquirer studying curriculum matters no doubt manifests itself in the particular topic or problem chosen for investigation, in the precise phenomenon of interest isolated for specific attention, and in the kind of language and concepts utilized in categorizing and expressing the substance and conclusions of these studies. The presence of many different perspectives and value positions within curriculum inquiry can be recognized with little difficulty from an examination of recent scholarly literature in curriculum. It is rare to find a line of work in which different inquirers focus upon precisely the same phenomenon of interest, and the variety of language and concepts that appears is sufficient evidence that no single paradigm or ideology is dominating curriculum inquiry at the moment (though the same perhaps could not be said a few years back).

Curriculum inquiry is beginning to challenge some of its traditional assumptions--e.g., that only certain kinds of curriculum research problems are important and that only certain modes of inquiry will be productive. This I take as evidence that the religious perspective is functioning as it should within this field of inquiry. Such scholars as Huebner, Macdonald, Apple, Kliebard, Pinar, Reid, Short, and others have publicly declared that the source of their challenge to define new questions, to employ new methods of inquiry, to adopt new language, is their religious perspective on curriculum inquiry. This perspective, along with the existence of value positions of many other kinds, leaves the field of curriculum research in a relatively healthy condition with respect to withstanding any threat of restrictive uniformity.

The major fault in curriculum inquiry, it seems to me, is not that curriculum inquirers are endowed with so many sources of creativity, but in their being so often undisciplined in defining their broad research goals (practical theory), in choosing forms of inquiring appropriate to their task (moral, axiological, critical, synthetic design, and the like, as well as empirical), and in mastering and faithfully carrying out the arts of inquiry associated with these various forms of inquiry such that their work can be systematically traced, checked, and validated according to relevant standards and the logic of inquiry appropriate in each instance.

In these latter matters, curriculum inquiry, as a whole, has not yet arrived at levels of performance that merit much admiration among the scholarly community. Even the branch of curriculum inquiry that has borne the torch for reform in this field most courageously over the last few years--the group of scholars roughly identifying themselves with the series of Curriculum Theory Conferences of which this Airlie House conference is the eighth in succession (I hesitate to apply to this group the label they generally carry, reconceptualists, because they do not embrace all those who are engaged in this reconceptualizing kind of inquiry and because the group engages in so many forms of scholarship that the single term cannot adequately cover them all)--this group has faltered in trying to cope successfully with the three major scholarly demands of disciplined inquiry that I asserted above. While admittedly making some admirable moves in new directions, this group has tended to revel in these new insights and methodologies without sufficient intellectual discipline. Some colleagues have probably misunderstood their efforts or have dismissed their work
as inappropriate or misguided because of this failure (not confined to this group, to be sure) to define and interpret its work clearly and within the bounds of scholarly mores. (Tanner and Tanner, 1979). I do not think that this condition is beyond remedy, but it will take a bit of careful differentiating, categorizing, conceptualizing, and communicating in order that the breakthroughs inherent in this work are not lost. (See Greene, 1978, and Van Manen, 1979).

I should make one point specifically about the relationship of curriculum inquiry and religious inquiry. In so far as religious knowledge, generated through the formal discipline of religious inquiry, is of significance to the lives of students and of human beings generally, studies of curricular concerns should not neglect to look at the impact of schooling on the interior experience of the individual student, including his religious experience. It will not be possible to make wise judgments about content, teaching, and learning without understanding the meanings the experience of schooling is having on individuals and how that may

be related to other experiences--religious, psychological, moral, etc. Inquiry in this realm, I submit, is not religious inquiry, however, (which yields general religious knowledge) but rather synnoetic inquiry yielding an understanding of personal knowledge (Phenix, 1964, Ch. 16). Work of Pinar (1975) and others (Mitrano, 1979) that has touched on these matters, I think, must be seen as synnoetic inquiry and should be refined and extended. Furthermore, I think this same sort of interior meaning that exists within curriculum inquirers themselves must be studied and better understood if we are to enlighten one another effectively about adequate research purposes and procedures and if we are to improve the quality and utility of the curriculum knowledge being generated. This line of inquiry, too, should be rigorously pursued. We must, in the final analysis, be straight about whatever facets of curriculum inquiry we engage in and the modes of inquiry we employ and be able to communicate this clearly within the larger context of the scholarly tradition in curriculum.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Robert E. Richards

Bergin, Allen E., "A Religious Framework for Personality and Psychotherapy." Paper presented at the Brigham Young University Symposium on Values, 1977.

Bergin, Allen E., "Bringing the Restoration to the Academic World: Clinical Psychology as a Test Case." Unpublished paper, Brigham Young University Values Institute, February 1979.

THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS. Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company, 1973.

Kimball, Spencer W., "Life's Directions." Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company.

Lewis, C.S., "The Abolition of Man." In C. Mitcham and R. Mackey (Eds.), PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

Mahoney, Michael J. SCIENTIST AS SUBJECT: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976.

Macdonald, James B., "Values Bases and Issues for Curriculum." In Alex Molnar and John Zahorik (Eds.), CURRICULUM THEORY, Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1977.

Ortega y Gasset, Jose., "Thoughts on Technology." In C Mitcham and R. Mackey (Eds.), PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

THE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE. Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company, 1973.

Phenix, Philip H., "The Use of the Disciplines." In M. Levit (Ed.), CURRICULUM. Urbana Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971.

Schwab, Joseph J. THE PRACTICAL: A LANGUAGE FOR CURRICULUM. Washington, D.C: National Education Association, 1970.

Van Gigch, John P. APPLIED GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974.

Van Manen, Max, "Linking Ways of Knowing with Ways of Being Practical." CURRICULUM INQUIRY, 1977, 6, 205-228.

Widstoe, John A. DISCOURSES OF BRIGHAM YOUNG. Salt Lake City, Utah: Deseret Book Company, 1971, p. 38.

Edmund C. Short

Religious and A-Religious Inquiry

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967.

Blackstone, William T. THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

King, Arthur R., Jr., and John A. Brownell. THE CURRICULUM AND THE DISCIPLINES OF KNOWLEDGE. Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger, 1976.

Kuhn, Thomas S. THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDEIS IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

Nagel, Ernest and James R. Newman. GODEL'S PROOF. New York: New York University Press, 1958.

Phenix, Philip H. REALMS OF MEANING. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.

Polanyi, Michael. THE TACIT DIMENSION. Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1966.

Polanyi, Michael and Harry Prosch. MEANING. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975.

Robinson, James Harvey. THE HUMANIZING OF KNOWLEDGE. Second Revised Edition. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1926.

Smith, Huston. THE RELIGIONS OF MAN. New York: Harper & Row, Perennial Library Edition, 1965.

Curriculum Inquiry and Religious Inquiry

Greene, Maxine, "A Response to 'Curriculum Knowledge and Cacaphony' by John D. McNeil and 'Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978' by William F. Pinar." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Toronto, March 27, 1978.

Hayes, Helen E., "Curriculum Development as a Moral Enterprise," CURRICULUM INQUIRY, 6 (No. 3, 1977), 229-235.

Kliebard, Herbert M., "Problems of Definition in Curriculum." Paper given at Annual Meeting of American Educational Research Association, 1977, 9 pp. (ERIC: ED 148 017)

Mitrano, Barbara S., "Feminist Theology and Curriculum Theory," JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM STUDIES, ll (July-September, 1979), 211-220.

Pinar, William F., "Currere: Toward Reconceptualization," Chapter 23 in William Pinar (ed.), CURRICULUM THEORIZING. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

Reid, William A., "Practical Reasoning and Curriculum Theory: In Search of a New Paradigm," CURRICULUM INQUIRY, 9 (Fall, 1979), 187-207.

Reid, William A. THINKING ABOUT CURRICULUM: THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF CURRICULUM PROBLEMS. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.

Short, Edmund C., "Knowledge Production and Utilization in Curriculum: A Special Case of General Phenomenon," REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, 43 (Summer, 1973), 237-301.

Short, Edmund C., "Review of CURRICULUM THOERY, edited by Alex Molnar and John A. Zahorik," TEXAS TECH JOURNAL OF EDUCATION, 5 (No. 3, 1978), 229-231.

Tanner, Daniel, and Laurel N. Tanner, "Emancipation from Research: The Reconceptualist Prescription," EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER, 8 (June, 1979), 8-12.

Van Manen, Max, "Reconceptualist Curriculum Thought: A Review of Recent Literature," CURRICULUM INQUIRY, 8 (Winter, 1978), 365-375.

Education and How Ulysses Defeated the Cyclops

Nicolae Sacalis
Ministry of Education, Romania

Foreword

Nicolae Sacalis, Romanian national, received his Doctor of Philosophy degree as a Fulbright Scholar at The Ohio State University's College of Education, 1974-78. Since that time he has served his government in its Ministry of Education in Bucharest where he resides.

I have been a friend and admirer of Nicolae's since his arrival in Columbus and had the privilege of visiting him in his country in August, 1979. Being with this patriotic man in the context of his country led me to petition the Board of Editors of JCT to invite an essay from him. What follows here is the outcome.

Romania is a neglected cousin of the West. This is the easternmost nation which gazes West and has done so consistently since the Empire of Rome. Its people labor to sustain ideals which we regretfully take for granted and transmit fitfully to our young. The aspirations of classic times are consciously nurtured in their intellectual lives. They watch us on the Atlantic's shores and share in our quest though we are ignorant of the camaraderie they feel.

This essay is a case in point. From east of the Acropolis we gain the reflections of a scholar in our tradition. Dr. Sacalis brings to JCT continental theorizing on an issue of continuing concern to our readers. He writes with passion -- urgency -- and the tone is integral to his message. Perhaps we allow an illusion of security to breed complacency in us. I have altered his idiom minimally. His syntax and metaphor conveyed his meaning clearly to me and with flavor. May the character of his prose remind us, though geography or politics may separate us, colleagues sharing our values are sharing our work.

Paul Shaker, Ph.D.
Mount Union College
Alliance, Ohio
August, 1980

Introduction

It was a small essay, and a British scholar, C.P. Snow, drew attention to an aspect of our modern culture in a way which since then has become a kind of "classical diagnosis."

"I believe," wrote C.P. Snow in his well-known booklet Two Cultures, "the intellectual life of the whole of Western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups..... at one pole we have the literary intellectuals, who incidentally while no one was looking took to referring to themselves as 'intellectuals' as though there were no other..... at the other scientists, and as the most representative the physical scientists." (1).

The misunderstanding between "intellectuals" and "scientists," which C.P. Snow did not like, was, however, only a trace of a more insidious and subtle problem which in this century, especially in Europe, has caused many philosophical debates and much unrest. In a more professional formula this is the insurmountable problem of the relationship between facts and values, science and humanism, man and technology. Its metaphysical overtones are pervasive, but as the century draws to an end, and the troubles and the

successes on our planet keep mounting, a quest for clarification and alternatives seems generally welcome.

Let us then pick up some of the fruits of this paraphernalia, and see, from the beginning, what happened to human knowledge.

To Know Becomes "To Foresee" and "To Manage"

To know means many things to many people. It means feeling, remembering, understanding, reasoning, inquiring, foreseeing and many other things. It might even mean loving and dreaming. In some old languages, including English, to know a woman meant to have sexual contact with her. Different cultures in different times, and in various parts of the world have emphasized one aspect or the other. What Descartes meant by "to know", for example, was quite different from what Buddha or Lao-Tze had in mind when they talked about "knowing."

However, in spite of all these different meanings, at the beginning in Europe, and then in the rest of the world, "to know" has become more and more associated with the idea of foreseeing and managing. Thus, "to know" has meant increasingly to know how things work and to know, therefore, how to manage them. The kinds of knowledge which were granted by facts and by the course of experience were called scientific, or science. Since this knowledge gave man a real grasp and an upper hand on the world around him, F. Bacon did not hesitate to say that science is power. Indeed things happen most of the time as experimental science had predicted, and when Oppenheimer lost the bet and the atomic bomb did go off, the power of science became awesome. Strange or not, this happened when man was in one of the darkest moments of his entire history.

Yet, a question arose: what was going to happen to the other human knowledge - the knowledge which did not deal so much with what is but with what ought to be: not with facts, but with values.

In other words, if experience and laboratory tests were destined to become a kind of modern Delphic oracle, what was going to happen to that knowledge bred not by logical reasoning and experiments, but by hopes and fears, feelings and beliefs, and especially by "knowing thy self." As Sartre or Camus would say: what happens to the meaning of the sentence "John is dead," given by John's relatives.

To put it in a broader perspective, the issue was whether Galileo, Newton, Mendeleev and Einstein uttered the whole truth about our existence. Or, did something remain to be told about the human story by such "chaps" as Aristotle, Shakespeare, Eminescu, Bach or Tu-Fu. The issue was too important not to cause controversy. So, for good or bad, human knowledge became a house with more rooms, and sometimes many divided tenants.

Positivism and Humanism

If the measure of knowing were only the facts and the experiment, then even the idea of human knowledge would change. The knowledge that could predict the course of events would be "scientific" and the "true" knowledge, and those that could not predict were "non-scientific," or simple opinions (doxa), as Plato would say.

Thus, a line between so-called positive, or experimental sciences and social or human sciences began to be drawn. As a matter of fact, positivism, in all its forms, would relegate value judgements as simple emotional declarations. Under Occam's blade, as well as under the verification principle of Carnap, knowledge about man, and in general classical philosophy, would be beheaded.

Moreover, since the positive, or experimental sciences were successful in extending human control and human power to tinker with nature's puzzles, experimental methods were more and more adopted in the social sciences. In this way there occurred a restriction of the normative approach. Or, as Habermas put it, "social philosophy had been forced to cancel its normative implications by itself." (2)

Human behavior began to be looked upon as a natural, measurable behavior and the teleological aspects of human life were more or less left aside for artists or "for some miserable intellectuals who balk at technical progress." (3)

But strange or not, when positive science was close to encompassing the whole universe, Heisenberg found his uncertainty relations, Russell turned to philosophy, and Pierce quit pragmatism in favor of a more subtle understanding of the role of science and said that " A theory which should be capable of being absolutely demonstrated in its entirety by future events, would be no scientific theory but a mere piece of fortune-telling. On the other hand, a theory which goes beyond what may be verified to any degree of approximation by future discoveries is, in so far, metaphysical gabble." (4)

It looked as if positivism would fail to accomplish its very dream: to know the thing in itself, beyond good and bad, and to comprehend ultimate truth. But why this virginal candor? Among other things, because positive science was reaching now its age of maturity and discovered for the first time, something more important than all the other truths -- it discovered the sense of human hybris. It discovered that the tremendous forces, set on fly by science and technology, could turn against man if not checked by an equal spiritual and moral strength.

Moreover the world of human values banned or neglected by positivism emerged -- many times in a twisted way -- in technology, religion and ideology. And the lethal arsenals that haunt our existence are only the visible trace of this spiritual crisis. Beneath lies a greater danger -- the danger of an increased number of modern Calibans, and "The emergence of such a man, outwardly knowledgeable, inwardly blind: preoccupied with techniques and not with teleologies: responsive to the dictates of scientific progress, but not to the imperative of human culture, should serve to unsettle us all." (5)

How then can the saga of positive science be retold to get closer to human hopes and human dreams for a better life?

Episteme and Phronesis

It is known that Aristotle and Greek classical philosophy, in general, made a distinction between "episteme" and "Phronesis," as between two different types of knowledge.

Episteme, according to Aristotle would refer to those types of knowledge that are apodictic and of rigorous science. In this form it may be found in logic, mathematics, and in what we would call today positive science.

Phronesis, on the other hand, represents a kind of practical philosophy, or a prudent understanding. and search for Justice and Excellence within the contingent situation of life. As a modern scholar would say -- unlike "episteme", which is value-free -- "phronesis" is a "mixture" of facts and values. In other words "phronesic knowledge" compares always what happens in life and what ought to be. Thus, the "phronesic knowledge" is half real and half ideal, half fact and half value, half reality and half dream.

In a way "the phronesic knowledge" is more archaic than "the epistemic knowledge", and it stems from

that "massive central core of human thinking which has no history" (6) and where the inner fluid of human desires, aspirations and dreams meet, or amalgamate, with the fixed pattern of the outer world. As a matter of fact it is here where the great human drama occurs, where the great myths and follies arise, and where dragons and angels contest for our souls. It is one thing to know, and something else to know to appreciate and to value. We lost paradise not because we had known the things around us, but because we learned what value they might have for us.

Thus, the problem lies not with knowledge about facts, but with knowledge about the values the facts might have for us. In other words in combining the world of facts with the world of human desires, dreams and ideals.

To know, therefore, what is good and what is bad for our life proves to be far more complex than getting, for example, to the moon. And, yet, this might prove to be our great challenge: to restore human values in our universe which expands rapidly and remains indifferent to risks which may swallow us all.

Education and Innovative Learning

This quest for a value knowledge, or "phronesic knowledge," has something to do with education because education is the principle human activity in which facts and values, the scientific-man and the manifest-man, come together. The distinction between right an wrong is not the result of a "techne", but of a much more complex process in which the "mind" and the "heart", the conscious and the unconscious inter play.

Thus, to achieve a genuine value clarification, or value experience, implies, as Professor Smith says, "An entirely new approach" and "Such a new approach if it is really new, will mean reestablishing imagination, insight, intuition, and human values where they belong, at the heart of reason." (7)

This kind of new approach for education, which will strive to bring together facts and values, might prove to be our great hope, because, as it is said in the recent report of the Club of Rome, No Limits to Learning, "The challenge now confronting human learning is to shift from a mode of unconscious adaptation to one of conscious anticipation; or, as suggested in the introduction, from conventional, maintenance/ stock learning to innovative learning." (8)

Innovative learning means to teach and to learn not only what is, but also what ought to be. In a way, the problem of modern man lies in the fact that he cannot rid himself of the old spell from the beginning of the industrial era that he can play God who can do everything. The Olympian gods, however, merely personified the motives and the vices of the ordinary man. Therefore, now when man is faced with his own destruction, he has to pick up the sour fruits of humility, love, patience, and other fundamental and life-supporting human values. In other words, he has to learn not only to know how to manage and control, but also to know how to value and how to distinguish between right and wrong, life and death.

Ulysess, though less strong, defeated the cyclops, the one-eyed creature, and the old myth, perhaps, should be reinterpreted.

Let us then stare at life with both our pristine eyes, and try to come back to Ithaca, as Eyvind Johnson (9) would say.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) C.P. Snow. THE TWO CULTURES AND A SECOND LOOK. Cambridge University Press, 1969, p. 3-4.
(2) Jurgen Habermas. THEORY AND PRACTICE. Boston: Beacon Press, 1974, p. 44.
(3) Jacques Ellul. THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY. New York: Vintage Books, 1964, p. 436.
(4) Charles Sanders Pierce. THE ESSENTIALS OF PRAGMATISM IN PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PIERCE, edited by Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1955, p. 268.
(5) Peter Abbs. MASS CULTURE AND MIMESIS TRACT, No. 22(nd) 10.
(6) P.F. Strawson. INDIVIDUALS, AN ESSAY IN DESCRIPTIVE METAPHIESIES. London: Methuen Co., 1959, p. 10.
(7) TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD. Colunbia University, Volume 80, Number 3, February 1979, p. 401.
(8) James W. Botkin, Mahdi El Mandjra, Mircea Malita. NO LIMITS TO LEARNING. New York: Pergamon Press, 1979, p. 17.
(9) Swedish writer, Nobel Prize Winner.

AIRLIE: THE ONTOLOGICAL BRIDGE

Edward W. Milner

Hawks hang high in the evening sky and wait
Flocks of birds like driven unjudged masses
Moving in the darkness. White weeds and late
Thistles, briars, constrain unmowed grasses.
In spent nature our history is relived.
Autumnal breeze both harsh and clear will sound
Tragic, hopeless, or even redemptive,
Astonished at false stages in the foreground.
The stems of leaves are strings for unsung branches,
Filaments of heart-shaped tress lighting
Circular flyway for avalanches
Of winter geese, around, and cheek biting.
Flat willow contemplating lake at night
Is all the beauty that is seen in flight.

Two shuffle boards are airstrips for the geese
Flying straight into the evening light,
Clucking and signaling to give release
To those migratory impulses of flight.
No planets so wander in turns because
At best they are completely rational,
Attending to the field of force and laws,
And unattending to all matters distal.
Calling us to wonder on the order
In every other mind is body clothed and hot,
Where instincts are planted on the border
Reaching inward-dwelling issues that are not.
Prescriptions of nature--not our duty--
Unimagined negligence of beauty.

Fields away the maple complements bound
Yellows; near green lawns surround bare yearning.
Hickory leaves that carpet ponds, float round,
Settle into fish-maze. Detoured learning
Is problem; language of colors whose stain
Discloses types of meanings that were lost.
Brown flowers and the mauve of season reign
In sky. Dark pines and stone walls are embossed
By ivy. Reproduction is dumb loon
Whose diving at horizons for a spell
Was way to spend a rich fall afternoon
Waging wars with ideas that rose and fell.
The dialectic gatekeepers must shout
The flood warnings when beauty's bridge is out.

PRETEXT: Essay review of CURRICULUM BOOKS: THE FIRST EIGHTY YEARS, William Henry Schubert. Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1980. 389 p.

Paul R. Klohr
Ohio State University

Despite his demur that his work might have direct value primarily only as "an attempt to whet curricular appetites and inspire further study," (p.8) Schubert has given the curriculum field a very useful tool for teaching and scholarly work. It has been sorely needed. Reflecting further on its purpose, the author asserts he wants "to further historical consciousness for curriculum inquiry" in a field often viewed as a-historical. (p.8) In his words, the book is not "a history book in a technical sense; rather it is a chronology of books with commentaries." (p. xii)

Each of the first eight chapters contains a yearly bibliography of curriculum books, beginning with 1900, published in the decade under review. These bibliographies, a charting of 1,138 books in all, are placed in what the author calls a "context-setting." In these sections he cites a number of social, cultural, intellectual, artistic and scientific developments that characterized the decade. And secondly, he identifies and discusses briefly the curricular movements and trends related to the books and writers included in the bibliography. How many times in teaching a curriculum class or helping graduate students find their way around in the field have I wished for such a resource!

Over the entire eighty years Schubert lays a framework he calls "schools of curriculum thought." These schools he labels: intellectual traditionalists, social behaviorists and experientialists. I shall say more about this framework, later, but first, I want to describe further the organization of the book itself and something of the background efforts out of which it evolved.

In his introduction, Schubert does an exemplary job of relating how the book grew -- from his days at the University of Illinois with a card file of 600 entries through his presentation of progress papers at 1976 and 1977 AERA conferences and the revised Chronology of Curriculum Development Literature presented to the AERA Special Interest Group concerned with the creation and utilization of curriculum knowledge. From these efforts emerged the criteria he used to delimit the scope of the massive undertaking which, broadly conceived, had almost no boundaries. The decision was made to limit entries to curriculum books published in English and to exclude journal articles except in rare instances when curriculum is the only focus. Excluded also are books concerned only with specialized subject areas.

We have in this introduction a good mini-case study of a curricularist "at work." Throughout the book, Schubert calls attention to tasks yet to be undertaken in areas deliberately excluded from his work in order to achieve reasonable boundaries and a clearer focus. In setting these boundaries, he sidestepped the common trap of those mainstream curricularists who wrote synoptic books and edited many of the collections of readings -- namely, and encyclopedic scope that tended to cover all topics from all possible curricular sources. The result in such cases is a compendium of all things for all people. This tendency has been so widespread that it colors the common perception of the nature of curriculum literature. Schubert asserts that synoptic texts and books of readings dominated the field from the 1940's through the 1960's. (p. 331)

Schubert's brief "contextual reminders," in which he selects events to place curriculum books of each decade in a social-cultural context are well chosen. Not only do they give something of the ambience of each decade, but also, they serve to identify a number of potential leads a scholar might want to explore in searching out certain relationships such events might have for curriculum literature of the period. Much

research of this kind remains to be done to generate a solid historical base for the curriculum field. Beginings of this kind are being made by a number of young scholars entering the field. The works of two such individuals come to mind -- Robert V. Bullough, Jr. at the University of Utah and Craig Kridel at Ohio State.[1]

In a final chapter, Schubert reflects on curriculum literature and its authors. He points out that his scheme for categorizing the books is not rigid, and he acknowledges the limitations of overly simplistic categories. In this chapter, he also shares with the reader some speculations generated not only from the analysis of the books but also from his extensive work in which he collaborated with Posner to trace the geneology of curriculum scholars. Central in his thinking is the need for curriculum scholars to "advance the emergent tendency to perceive curriculum broadly as a function of culture not merely schooling." (p.344) In several places, he states his conviction that the exclusive focus on schooling is too narrow.

In summary, the book is, in my judgment, an excellent addition to the professional literature of the curriculum field. But having made this overall assessment, I also feel an obligation to express a concern. I report this in the spirit of Schubert's invitation to his readers to enter a continuing dialogue.

My concern stems from his conception and use of the three "schools of curriculum thought." Like him, I recognize that there can be no rigid set of categories into which every individual and their writing can be neatly placed. And, I do not want to engage in the debate over whether or not there is such a phenomenon as a Kuhnian paradigm shift, and if so, does it apply to theory development in the curriculum field.

But regardless of what it is to be called or how it is to be explained, something has happened that makes me uneasy with the wide range of individuals Schubert places in the experientialist school without making sharper distinctions among them. There seems to me to be a number of individuals loosly linked together who are working in significantly different ways from those historical antecedents he views as experientialists. As it stands, the category blurs what appears to have been a critical shift in curriculum theorizing that surfaced in the 1970's.

Macdonald called attention to this in his 1971 review of the field for AERA.[2] Pinar's work extended Macdonald's idea for differentiating modes of inquiry and resulted in his calling certain curricularists "reconceptualists."[3] He has not been fully satisfied with that term but has made a sound case for the distinction he insists should be made.

Again, my interest here is not to settle the question of a more appropriate designation, but rather, to assert that my experience in trying to understand and make some kind of meaningful order out of the field convinces me that some distinction must be made. The issue is larger than just a matter of the nature of categories and the most effective way to classify publications. Schubert would agree with this. His scholarly effort to trace the conceptual roots of prominent curriculum scholars is clear evidence.

Touching one aspect of this issue might give some idea of the larger problem. I have in mind the argument advanced by Troutner[4] when he expresses the hope that educational theorists can go beyond both Dewey and Heidegger. He asserts that today's theoreticians are asking questions for which neither philosopher has an answer, (p.126) and then he demonstrates the danger of forcing, for example, Dewey's concept of experience to carry such an overload of meaning that it breaks down altogether and the concept, experience, becomes suspect. (p. 146)

Troutner's argument helps me to see why I have trouble placing Greene, Pinar, and Apple -- to name but three -- with individuals like Boyd Bode, Harold Rugg, L. Thomas Hopkins, even though one might select

ideas from Dewey's works or others that seem to link them together. Insights from psychoanalysis, political theory and gender analysis -- to name only several sources significant in the work of some of the reconceptualists -- clearly differ markedly from the common sources undergirding the thinking of most of those Schubert calls experientialists. The problem for curriculum theorists is even more complex than a confrontation between experimentalism and existentialism, but that is part of it. I view this issue as the most pressing matter curricularists face in the 1980's as their field continues to mature. This is something of the task that I believe Schubert sees as he looks ahead and emphasizes the need for "freedom from the chains of domination by one epistemological base." (p. 341) It is the position I understand Jean A. King to be proposing in her plea for methodological pluralism.[5]

The book seems quite free of errors in dates and the misspellings of names so common in many current publications. I did find one nit to pick. On page 103, Margaret Willis, who studied the guinea pigs class of Ohio State's University School after twenty years, is referred to as "he." Margaret, an ardent advocate of women's rights long before the cause became popular, would want this corrected in the revision. And all who read the book will probably find several additions they would like to include, perhaps publications on the fringe of Schubert's criteria. One of my own would be Alexander Frazier's pieces in the collection of papers and addressed from the 1970 ASCD conference in which he calls for the "generation of new understandings" in curriculum.[6]

Finally, I join with Schubert when he writes in an epilogue: "The real epilogue for this book must be a cooperative venture of all who care about curriculum problems." (p. 351) I am optimistic that individuals now working in the field will engage in new cooperative ventures and that this book will be of help in such undertakings.

FOOTNOTES

1. Robert V. Bullough, Jr., DEMOCRACY IN EDUCATION -- BOYD H. BODE. (Bayside, New York: General Hall, Inc., Publishers, 1981) and Craig A. Kridel, "Toward a Theoretical Base for General Education Curricular Design" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1980.
2. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH. 64:5 (January) 1971. pp. 196-200.
3. William Pinar. Curriculum Theorizing: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975).
4. Leroy F. Troutner, "The Confrontation Between Experimentalism and Existentialism: From Dewey Through Heidegger and Beyond," HARVARD EDUCATION REVIEW, 39 (Winter) 1969, pp. 124-154.
5. A MAN FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD (Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1970).
6. Jean A. King. "Methodological Pluralism and Curriculum Inquiry," CURRICULUM INQUIRY. 11:2 (Summer, 1981) pp. 167-174.

PRETEXT: Essay review of SCHOOL-BASED CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT IN BRITAIN; A COLLECTION OF CASE STUDIES, Edited by John Eggleston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston.

Michael Eraut
University of Sussex

This book comes as a welcome reminder of alternative practice at a time when North American literature is focussing on the concept of curriculum implementation and even the British are talking of curriculum guidelines. Curriculum change does not have to be top-down. Local initiatives do not have to be at district level. Individual schools can achieve a great deal on their own. Significantly, none of the changes reported in the volume are dependent on external funding, though many benefitted from small grants during the course of their development. None of them are static. Each school continues to develop and modify its practice, and the reports cover periods of 3-10 years.

Taken together, these six case studies convey much of the flavour of school-based curriculum development in England during the last decade. As all are written by the main proponents of the changes, the rhetoric sometimes obscures the reality. But, for those who are less familiar with the British scene, even the rhetoric may at times seem refreshingly different:

> "The writers recognised the need for such material but quailed at the prospect of writing for children other than those they taught."

While the careful reader is well advised to read between the lines, the credibility gap rarely exceeds that commonly found in research proposals.

The last two case studies are probably the most typical of British practice. They describe innovations in a single curriculum area or aspect: Lower Secondary Humanities (English, History, Geography, Religious Education) in one school and Language across the curriculum in the other. The accounts are modest and easy to follow, their authors less rhetorical and more attentive to the problems than in the earlier chapters, where convincing other teachers often takes priority over clarity of description. These less pretentious accounts also present more evidence of the impact on pupils.

The two middle chapters describe curriculum development and staff development on a school-wide basis at schools with established national reputations for their emphasis on resource-based learning. Unlike the schools in Chapters 5 and 6, these two were effectively refounded when they became comprehensive.

Chapter 3 contains some interesting insights into school micropolitics, some blunt comments on the overweaning influence of the examination system and the frank admission that, contrary to the original rationale, the resource centre was being largely used to improve and back-up expository teaching. However, it is severely hampered by being stuffed with extracts from internal school documents that are difficult to interpret. These extracts occupy 22 out of 40 pages; and they should surely have been either pruned or more fully integrated with the text at the editorial stage.

Chapter 4 focusses on the school's staff development programme which emphasizes production of learning resources and learning about the local community. As with the previous chapter it is difficult to estimate the impact of these school-based innovations on the average teacher and impossible to assess how the pupils are likely to have been affected. The ideas are interesting but we want to know more about how they work out in practice than these single-perspective case studies are able to provide.

The first two case studies describe inter-school networks for the development and exchange of learning materials in science and might have been more appropriately placed at the end. Both attempt to meet the need for vast quantities of learning materials to support systems based on individualised learning and recognize that no school has the resources to go it alone. Chapter 1 describes the evolution of a national network for materials exchange between individual schools and multi-school groups supported by their Local Education Authorities; while chapter 2 describes how two such groups were set up and supported by curriculum advises in one LEA, Staffordshire. Even where the LEA provided considerable support, usually in the form of travel and reprographics but occasionally with some additional provision of release time, the materials were voluntary. These cooperative but still essentially school-based developments indicate the kind of arrangement that can be productive wherever it is decided that teachers can and should be the main agents of curriculum change.

My main criticism of the book is that it gives a distorted picture of the relationship between developments at local and national level. In his introduction Professor Eggleston talks of the resurgence of school-based curriculum development in the mid 1970's and implies that this was some kind of successor phase to a decade of national projects. Yet there is no evidence of such a phenomenon, only that certain educators began to take it more seriously when they realised that national projects did not work miracles. There was a great deal of school-based curriculum development in the 1960's with well-publicised activities in the North West and around Goldsmith College, London. My impression is that financial retrenchment and falling enrollments were causing some diminution in school based-activities in the mid 1970's, especially at primary level. Moreover, most of the British national curriculum projects drew heavily on prior school-based initiatives, even those on Science and Mathematics; and many used school-based curriculum development as their main form of dissemination. Only one of these six case studies does not describe significant use of ideas or materials from a national project. Thus it would be a pity if one myth--that of achieving curriculum change by national initiative alone--should be replaced by another--that national projects have no useful role to play. The interdependence of developments at local and national levels has been a characteristic but ill-documented feature of the British scene for two decades. Hence I predict a decline in curriculum change as national initiatives fade out, just as I regard national projects as developers of resources and ideas for refashioning at local level rather than purveyors of learning systems to be implemented by increasingly sophisticated attention to dissemination and training.