The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing

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Editor's Note

This last of the large issues opens with a significant new study of the "reconceptualist" movement in curriculum studies. Karen Mazza has done careful, thoughtful research, and I commend her. Even so, one wishes that the imprint of her mentor had been lighter. Mentors' imprints are visible also in the article which follows Karen's, one in which John Olson introduces work influenced by well-known Canadian and English curriculum theorists, Michael Connelly and William Reid respectively. It is work Americans are advised to attend to. Third in this section is William and Ann Schubert's dialogue on teaching curriculum theory. It is a dialogue we need more of. Finally is William Reid's conversation with Janek Wankowski, a conversation some of us will find irritating at times. I know I did. It is a provocative piece that invites elaboration.

Secton two opens with our friends at Utah discovering how easily and completely taken in most of us can be by the latest "innovation." The topic, their analysis and emotion are all correct. So is Michael Littleford in her precise and wise exposition which follows. Next is H. Svi Shapiro's telling analysis of correspondence theory, and concluding this section is Philip Wexler's brilliant and often beautiful enunciation of body and soul and the present moment.

The papers Nancy Bazin and Janet Miller read to the 1981 Airlie meeting are next. Janet's paper is lyrical and healing, all the more remarkable characteristics given the oppression Nancy documents in her section on women's studies. Selma Greenberg assures us that Dewey would approve of women's consciousness-raising groups in her piece, and I think she is right. Concluding this section is Bob Bullough's portrait of Martha Cox and Richard Horne, teachers who faced conditions that might -- only for a moment of course -- make us feel relief at ours.

Dennis Carlson usefully presents aspects of Heidegger's work in the opening essay of the final section. Then Edward Milner poetically recreates his school world for us. When Edward writes, invariably I feel like thanking him. Thank you Edward.

And thank you Conrad Pritscher, for bringing to our attention the portentous views of Dr. Barton Lowdegger. How timely.

Michael Littleford's fine review of Soldiers of Light and Love concludes the issue.

I hope you won't be shocked at the new format of JCT. I hope I won't be either. The next issue will much smaller and thinner; you will receive four rather than two of them per subscription. It should be easier to read. The one complaint that has reached us is that the journal intimidates one by its size. Be intimidated no more.

W. P.

Reconceptual Inquiry as an Alternative Mode of Curriculum Theory and Practice: A Critical Study

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Chapter I
Introduction

Purpose of the Study

Educational historians generally agree on dating the period of the formation of the curriculum field as a profession from roughly 1918 through the 1920s. This initial date coincides with the publication of Franklin Bobitt's book, The Curriculum, and Clarence Kingsley's Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education. During the ensuing years brief periodic attempts were made to renew, redefine, or challenge the mode of thought that has characterized the field from its beginning. However, none of these attempts generated continued directions. The failure of these efforts to produce a revitalization of curriculum theory resulted in a declaration that the field was moribund.[1]

A new attempt at renewing the curriculum field has emerged within the past ten years. While still too tentative to be called a paradigm,[2] the current critical movement is taking form through a growing body of literature, annual curriculum theory conferences, and the creation of the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing. Some of the most visible writers in this vein are William Pinar, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Michael Apple, and Maxine Greene. Although these writers often pursue different themes they are united through their asssertion that curriculum theory has been dominated by a technological mode of thought that is inadequate for dealing with the social, moral and political complexity of educational concerns. Macdonald described the function of their work as the reconceptualization of curriculum theory and Pinar popularized the name "reconceptualist" in order to highlight their efforts toward developing an alternative form of curriculum rationality to this technological mode of thought. While use of the term "reconceptualist" is disputed, the absence of a generally agreed upon substitute necessitates, for convenience, use of that designation throughout this study.

The reconceptualization is a significant movement to investigate because of the scope of its concerns and the questions it raises. Reconceptualization is both an attempt to renew curriculum theory and a critique of schooling. As a critical movement it situates curriculum theory and schooling in the nexus of historical, economic, cultural, and political factors influencing their development. Thus reconceptual educational criticism is also historical, economic, cultural, and political criticism. The literature of the movement is grounded in the diverse theoretical traditions of existentialism, phenomenology, psycho-analysis, and neo-Marxism. This range of reconceptual analysis raises questions about the relationships between curricular decisions, school life, ideology, and patterns of alienation, inequality, and injustice that pervade the larger society. At this level of analysis reconceptualization becomes a challenge to educators to rise above the microscopic procedural focus on how to design and implement curriculum, and consider the macroscopic view that exposes the personal, cultural, moral, and political consequences of the curricular decisions we make. By pursuing this level of analysis curricularists interested in reconceptualization intend to expose the ways in which societal patterns are often unconsciously reproduced in schools and through this illumination promote conscious emancipatory activity.[3]

The significance of the reconceptual movement must be judged by answering the following question: Does it have the potential to meet its challenge to the field by offering insight into the development of a new curricular language and rationality? This study will investigate that question.

The primary purpose of this study is to examine the reconceptual literature in order to: (1) understand the reconceptual critique of traditional curriculum theory; (2) understand how the theoretical traditions that reconceptual theorists draw upon can contribute to the development of new ways of talking and thinking about curriculum; and (3) assess the degree to which reconceptual inquiry has been successful in developing an alternative curriculum theory and practice. A note of clarification must be made in regard to the second stated purpose. This study seeks to identify the concepts that reconceptual theorists have borrowed from the previously mentioned theoretical traditions, to ascertain how they have used those concepts to refocus their view of curriculum. The study does not seek to investigate the depth of reconceptual theorists' understanding or research in each of these traditions. While such an investigation would be valuable for assessing the sophistication of reconceptual inquiry, that task will have to wait for future studies conducted by researchers steeped in these continental traditions. Therefore the major concerns in this study are to understand what reconceptual inquiry is, understand how its theoretical orientations change its views of curriculum, and evaluate its success in meeting its challenge to the field.

To answer these three questions this study must be both interpretive and critical. At present, reconceptual literature is a diffuse body of discourse written by many theorists pursuing varied directions. There are a few signposts that demarcate the boundaries and direction of reconceptual inquiry or maps that chart its territory and reveal the relationships between its diverse parts. In other words, reconceptual inquiry does not exist as a cohesive, unified curriculum theory. The significance of this condition for this study is that a great deal of spade work must be done first, to identify the nature of reconceptual inquiry; its concerns, themes, and theoretical frameworks; the questions it has raised; and the alternatives it has generated. To develop this comprehensive picture of what reconceptual inquiry is, the works of various reconceptual theorists must be examined in a way that establishes the connections between their research. In a sense, the picture of reconceptual inquiry is at present an incomplete jigsaw puzzle. The interpretive task is to identify the common features of the parts and link those parts that can be connected. It is only after this more fully developed picture is assembled that one can begin the work of critique.

Since the reconceptual discussion is young it cannot be evaluated to determine its successes or failures as though it were a completed project. Rather, the reconceptualization is in the incipient state of "becoming." What this study does is seek to critique the extent to which reconceptual theorists have met their challenge to the field at this point in the development of their research and offer projections about the potential of their research for future development of the curriculum field.

Types of Curriculum Theorizing

One way to define reconceptualization is to compare the function of reconceptual curriculum theorizing to the function of other types of curriculum theorizing. This is a difficult task due to the fact that there are no clear boundaries to demarcate types of curriculum theorizing from each other or to differentiate curriculum theory from educational theory in general. As James B. Macdonald has noted:

> Curriculum theory and theorizing may be characterized as being in a rather formative condition, for essentially there are no generally accepted and clear-cut criteria to distinguish curriculum theory and theorizing from other forms of writing in education.[4]

In Macdonald's much quoted article, "Curriculum Theory," he offers a categorization of three types of curriculum theory based on the function each serves. In other writings William Pinar embellishes upon Macdonald's classification and refers to it as a "map of the field."[5] Although the division of theorists into three main categories (traditionalists, conceptual-empiricists, and reconceptualists) is problematic, it serves to contrast the function of reconceptual work from that of other curricularists. Janet Miller's historical analysis of recent curriculum theory provides further comment on the significance of Macdonald's map.

Macdonald's analysis of the state of the field provides a foundational base for the emerging foci of those theorists who are committed to a reconceiving of the nature of curriculum theory itself. Macdonald's analysis brings a coherent ordering to the role of theorizing and serves as a forerunner to the revisioning of the field.[6]

In Macdonald's schema traditionalists are the first and largest theoretical camp to be defined. Their purpose is to guide practitioners in the tasks of curriculum design, implementaiton and evaluation. Pinar classifies Tyler, Taba, Saylor and Alexander, and the Smith-Stanley-Shores combinations as examples of traditionalists. He estimates that 60 to 80 percent of university and college professors of curriculum are traditionalists.

The second group of theorizers, conceptual-empiricists, tend to use the theory and practice of social science research to investigate curricular phenomena empirically. Macdonald explains the function of their work:

> The purpose of this theory is primarily conceptual in nature, and research would be utilized for empirical validation of curriculum variables and relationships, rather than as a test of the efficiency and effectiveness of a curriculum prescription.[7]

Pinar's examples of the estimated 15 to 20 percent of curricularists in this group are Duncan and Frymier, Decker Walker, Ian Westbury, Mauritz Johnson, George Beauchamp, and William T. Lowe. However, Pinar has more recently noted that Decker Walker appears to be moving away from the strict behavioral science approach to curriculum.[8]

Reconceptualists comprise roughly 3 to 5 percent of the field. Macdonald describes their purpose:

> A third group of individuals look upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual task which they maintain should be neither used as a basis for prescription or as an empirically testable set of principles ad relationships. The purpose of these persons is to develop and criticize conceptual schema in the hope that new ways of talking about curriculum which may in the future be far more fruitful than present orientations will be forth-coming. At the present time, they would maintain that a much more playful, freefloating process is called for by the state of the art.[9]

Pinar draws a distinction between conceptual-empiricist and reconceptual research in regard to the issue of objectivity. Unlike the former type of research which models itself after the behavioral sciences, reconceptual inquiry states its value commitments and political perspective explicitly. In illustrating this distinction, Pinar uses Michael Apple's research as an example. Apple's work is written from a value-laden perspective which is contrary to the supposed value-neutrality of behavioral social science research. Secondly, Apple's writings emanate from a perspective that has an emancipatory intent. As Pinar further elucidates upon the distinction:

> In contrast to the canon of traditional social science which sees data collection, hypothesis substantiation and disconformation in the disinterested service of building a body of knowledge, a reconceptualist tends to see research as an inherently political as well as intellectual act.[10]

This explantion of Macdonald's and Pinar's discussion of the functions of curriculum theorizing serves to situate the reconceptualists literature in the context of other types of theorizing in the field. Contrasts between the traditional, conceptual-empiricist, and reconceptual perspectives are offered as a partial and

initial glimpse of what the reconceptualization is and is not. The distinctions between these three approaches appear in regard to function and methodolgy. While traditional and conceptual-empiricist research function to guide practitioners or empirically examine curricular phenomena, reconceptual theory functions to critique present modes of curricular thought and create alternative curricular rationalities. Second, traditional and conceptual-empiricist approaches share a commitment to objectivity in research methodology whereas the reconceptual perspective recognizes that all methodology is explicitly or implicitly value-laden and political. In the next section further clarification of reconceptualization will be presented through more specific definition of its characteristics.

Defining Reconceptualization

In explaining a new perspective one is tempted to supply a neat, concise definition. However, this customary definitional approach is inappropriate for the present task because reconceptualization is not a finite set of unified propositions to prescribe curricular action. Rather, reconceptualization is a process or form of inquiry that is grounded in a set of critical assumptions for the purpose of creating new ways of thinking and talking about curriculum and schooling. As a process, reconceptualization is a fluid, evolutionary movement in contrast to a static, finished statement of what curriculum should be. Therefore William Pinar prefers to call the movement reconceptualization rather than reconceptualism, highlighting its transformational nature and intent. Pinar explains his preference for the term reconceptualization in the following passage:

> The term "reconceptualization" ——not reconceptualism——accurately describes what is occurring in the curriculum field in the nineteen seventies. The field is being transformed from an essentially non-theoretical, pseudo-pragmatic (i.e., narrowly technical) area into a theoretically potent, conceptually autonomous field which inquires systematically into the multidimensional reality that is education and schooling and most importantly, in ways that aspire to transform both. Instead of being handmaiden to the extant technocratic order, we aspire to transform that order as we work to transform ourselves and our work, from the static, the oppressive, the deformed, to the fluid, freeing process that is historical and individual movement.[11]

While no precise, capsulized definition of reconceptualization can be stated, some broad generalizations and assumptions that characterize the movement thus far can be offered. These generalizations are provided as an initial preview of the nature of reconceptual inquiry. However, through the interpretive research that will be developed in Chapters II, III, and IV, this researcher will present a much more comprehensive and detailed view of reconceptual inquiry.

First, writers who share a common commitment to reconceptualize the field are united in their opposition to the limitations of the technocratic rationality that dominates curriculum theory. Therefore reconceptualization is a critical movement. These authors argue that their radical critique differs from earlier reform efforts by its emphasis on the comprehensive transformation of educational structures rather than sporadic improvements to educational institutions. William Pinar describes this distinction between radical critique and liberal reform efforts:

> It (Reconceptualization) begins in fundamental critique of the field as it is. The order of critique distinguishes it from most reform efforts, efforts which accept the deep structure of educational and social life, and focus upon "improving it." The reconceptualization aspires to critique which insists upon the transformation of extant structures.[12]

In this study a detailed analysis of the reconceptual critique will be presented in Chapters II and III.

A second characteristic of reconceptualization is its foundation in the European theoretical traditions of existentialism, phenomenology, psycho-analysis, and neo-Marxism. The use of these theoretical traditions influences the nature of reconceptual concerns. In varying degrees and combinations these traditions support in curriculum theory and research explorations of the inner world, consciousness, transcendence, and ideology: moreover, these traditions distinguish reconceptualization from the focus on the observable, measureable, predictable, and controllable variables characteristic of the supposedly value-neutral empiricism and behavioral science that underlie traditional and conceptual-empiricist theory. This change in focus that the reconceptualist seeks to bring about in curriculum inquiry exists within a similar transformational effort in the social sciences where the domination of positivist thought is now under dispute.[13]

One consequence of the use of existentialism, phenomenology, psycho-analysis, and neo-Marxism as foundations for reconceptualization is the diversity and the broad scope of concerns that they contribute to the movement. At the Xavier University Curriculum Theory Conference in 1974, Paul Klohr presented a framework for summarizing recurrent themes in reconceptual literature. His list shows a wide range of concerns and reflects both the philosophic and political nature of the European theoretical traditions mentioned above. Klohr's framework is presented below:

1. A holistic, organic view is taken of man and his relation to nature.
2. The individual becomes the chief agent in the construction of knowledge; that is, he is a culture creator as well as culture bearer.
3. The curriculum theorist draws heavily on his own experiential base as method.
4. Curriculum theorizing recognizes as major resources the preconscious realms of experience.
5. The foundation roots of their theorizing lie in existential philosophy, phenomenology and radical psychoanalysis, also drawing on humanistic reconceptualizations of such cognate fields as sociology, anthropology, and political science.
6. Personal liberty and the attainment of higher levels of consciousness become central values in the curriculum process.
7. Diversity and pluralism are celebrated in both social ends and in the proposals projected to move toward these ends.
8. A reconceptualization of supporting political-social operations is basic.
9. New language forms are generated to translate fresh meanings—–metaphors, for example.[14]

Klohr's list is provided here simply to illustrate the diversity and scope of reconceptual concerns. With the further development of reconceptual inqury six years after this list was originally provided, a much more detailed analysis of reconceptual themes is both possible and necessary. As previously mentioned, this researcher will provide that interpretation in Chapters II, III, and IV.

A second consequence of using European theoretical traditions is that their diversity has resulted in internal debate. Conflict has surfaced between some writers using the existential-phenomenological perspective focusing on the self and between some authors using the neo-Marxist perspective focusing on the political realities of schooling. Those writing from a political perspective fear that the emphasis on the self and the individual's understanding of one's lived experience obscures the role of political critique in exposing the oppressive features of society impinging on the individual and also ignores the importance of political critique leading to collective action. James B. Macdonald, commenting on this debate, has stated that "neither approach need be exaggerated to the point of exclusion."[15] William Pinar has defended his existential-phenomenological approach by showing that it shares with political critique a complementary emancipatory intent.

> There is unwarranted criticism that the autobiographical work Madeleine R. Grumet and I have developed is reducible to an upper-middle-class absorption with self. It is not mere journal keeping. It is conscious work to examine the ways in which the individual accepts the contemporary situation and remains enslaved to it. Oppression does not exist in the abstract; it exists in the lives of individuals. While work with one's peers, with groups generally can be essential in extricating oneself from complicity with contemporary social-political oppression, emancipatory movement finally occurs individually. If it does not, if it is only acquisition of others' attitudes, hence a conceptual rearrangement, then no fundamental structural change has occurred, only change in content. The very structure of individual mind and psyche must be transformed if there is to be authentic historical movement. Thus the status of the psychoanalytic process in Habermas' scheme. There must be this individual transformation if there is to be social regeneration.[16]

These comments by Macdonald and Pinar indicate that while the different theoretical perspectives cause internal debate, some curricularists interested in reconceptualization consider the two viewpoints to be compatible and interrelated.[17] Reconceptual scholars view debate positively and see it as a source of strength in providing a greater range of ideas and possibilities fo the creation of an alternative curriculum rationality.

Summarizing the discussion thus far, the following points have been made to clarify the meaning of reconceptualization. First, reconceptualization is a process or a form of inquiry that seeks to discover new ways of perceiving curriculum. Reconceptualization can be characterized by its function as a radical critique of the curriculum field and by its use of the European theoretical traditions of existentialism, phenomenology,psycho-analysis, and neo-Marxism to develop new way of talking and thinking about curriculum. The use of these continental perspectives: distinguishes the concerns of reconceptualization from those of traditional and conceptual-empiricist curriculum theory; generates a wide range of philosophical and political themes within the movement; causes internal debate; and creates a variety of possibilities for reconceptualizing the field.

William Pinar has grappled with answering the question, "What is the reconceptualization?" in an article of the same title appearing in the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing. For the future delineation of reconceptualization he perceives the necessity for at least two tasks. First, reconceptualization as a field will be developed by sketching the relationship of reconceptualist work to the work of other curricularists. Thus reconceptualization will partly be understood as it is seen in context with other theoretical work. Second, Pinar indicates the importance of going beyond the critique of traditionally and empirically oriented work to conduct basic research that develops a clearly reconceptualist perspective on educational issues.

> I am suggesting that a field cannot seriously develop if we are unwilling for part of our time, to take our eyes off empirically-oriented colleagues, and work earnestly and intensively among ourselves, building a systematic understanding of issues which make problematic the American educational enterprise. Work of an equivalent order to "basic research" must be conducted before we achieve understanding which allows us to potently and meaningfully assist others.[18]

A tension between contradictory needs exists within Pinar's discussion of defining reconceptualization. He acknoweldges the need to define reconceptualization but cautions that an emergent field cannot be defined by singular effort. Rather, definition must develop historically with the field through collective dialogue.

> Implicit in such work (defining reconceptualization) is the charge to construct a collective

direction for the work. However vague our sense of direction is now, we must begin with this vagueness and begin to define it, else face the diffusion and stasis of discourse typically heard at the annual meetings of ASCD and AERA. Direction isn't something one can expect to know in advance; it is created in the course of delineation. We are already in theoretic and historical context: we have a tradition. What is appropriate now is increasing acknowledgement of the relation of individual work to the tradition and to the contemporary scene. Thus to answer the question this paper asks, (What is the reconceptualization?), we can begin to continually sketch the relation of our individual efforts to the tradition and to each other. Not by one theoretician but by us all, the question will, over the years be answered.[19]

The thrust of this discussion has been to reveal reconceptualization as a process that seeks to transform the curriculum field by exploring new ways of thinking and talking about curriculum. Reconceptualization can be seen, in part, as an evolutionary process that will develop through continual research and dialogue. The next step in understanding reconceptualization is to investigate how it came into being. In the following section of this chapter a history of the development of the reconceptual movement ot this point in time will be presented.

The Developement of Reconceptualization

Information tracing the history of the development of the reconceptual discussion in the curriclum field is available form three types of sources. The first type is the reconceptual writers who have written self-consciously about the movement. William Pinar and Janet Miller have made contributions in this area. The second type of source consists of those individuals who have conducted research or reviews about the reconceptualization. Very scant information of this type exists. The most substantial work of this type is a dissertation written by Margaret Huber entitled, "The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: An Historical Study." The third type of information comes form the actual record of work done by reconceptual theorists in the form of published articles, books, the new journal, and the proceedings of their curriculum conferences. The present account of the development of reconceptualization is composed by the interweaving of information from these three types of sources.

Margaret Huber's study is the most detailed account of the development of the reconceptual movement. Noting the dispute over their name she refers to them as critical curriculum theorists. Her study begins with an examination of the changes in the curriculum field from the 1950s through the 1960s leading to the renewal of curriculum in the 1970s. In the second chapter she chronicles the process by which critical curriculum theorists developed into a social movement. Huber then reviews the major themes in the works of five critical theorists: Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, William Pinar, and Michael Apple. In chapter 4 she searches for the American intellectual roots of critical curriculum theory and finds forerunners of their themes in the Puritan antimonian heritage and the transcendentalist heritage. While Huber finds these theoretical connections, they are connections that she has established, and are not intended to suggest that critical theorists are aware of these connections, agree that they exist, or in any way draw upon the theoretical base of these earlier American theoretical traditions. She has noted that in fact, critical curriculum theorists ground their work in the European intellectual traditions of existentialism, phenomenology, psycho-analysis, and neo-Marxism. Huber follows this section with a chapter in which she interprets their work through the metaphor of a secular revival, by noting three ways in which the critical curriculum movement uses a revival style. The highly problematic style similarities she perceives are preaching, conversion, and reform from within. Huber concludes the study by highlighting the plight of critical theorists as intellectuals working within an intellectual community from which they differ.

Huber bases her study upon the critical curriculum literature, interviews with selected theorists conducted by B.J. Benham, and personal correspondence and conversations with selected theorists. While Huber's dissertation is not relevant to the questions being investigated in this study, her description of the process by which critical curriculum theorists have generated a movement does provide valuable information for the discussion of the development of reconceptualization.

She has found that, in the interest of protecting the diversity of their individual perspectives not all critical theorists agree that they can be included in a movement. But Huber does see the emergence of leadership, the formation of a network of participants, the occurrence of annual conferences, and the formation of a journal as "visible expressions of a developing social movement."[20] In discerning these expressions of a movement she found that the existence of leadership is not demonstrated formally through the development of a professional organization, but informally from the respect that certain individuals have earned from their colleagues "due to academic achievements—ideas, publications, personal interaction with conference participants and colleagues, and insight in their critiques of society and the schools."[21] From correspondence with participants of the movement, Huber found that James B. Macdonald, William Pinar, Dwayne Huebner, Michael Apple, Paul Klohr, and Maxine Greene are the "leaders" that have gained the respect of their colleagues.

Huber categorizes the growth of the movement into three stages of development: intellectual awakening among individual scholars, developing group conscousness, and collective action. Her framework will be used to trace the growth of the movement.

The first developmental stage, intellectual awakening, came for various theorists at different points in their lives when they began to shed old conceptions of curricular and educational theory to seek new insights. Huber describes the process:

> At some point in their life histories the individuals studies here began to free themselves from the prevailing ideology and stepped back to examine it critically. This intellectual act of awakening and liberation has been a continuing one for many of the critical theorists. The theorists possess an openness to constant reawakening and recurring liberation from the ideas that have formed the past. Throughout their writings there are references to moments of heightened consciousness leading to a critical view of the world and a personal conversion to a new point of view.[22]

From this stage of heightened consciousness Huber has traced the diffusion of reconceptual or critical curriculum theorist ideas. The process has taken place as professors spread their ideas to their students who in turn have become university professors. She lists Paul Klohr, Ross Mooney, Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, and Dwayne Huebner as "the original teachers who were early 'critical theorists.' "[23] This process has continued through three academic generations of critical theorists in the curriculum field. By analyzing correspondence with participants in the movement, conference publications, prepublication lists of conference proceedings and conference programs, Huber has compiled a list of sixty-five persons "who have written, published or in some way participated in curriculum theorizing within the context of the critical group."[24] This list can be expanded since new individuals are continually participating in reconceptual conferences or publications, but the value of doing so is questionable since the presentation of a paper at a conference does not necessarily indicate a committed interest in reconceptualization. Huber found that Columbia Teachers College, Ohio State University, and the University of Rochester are three major locations of interest in reconceptual curriculum theory and that almost one-half of her list of sixty-five participants have studied or taught at Columbia Teachers College and Ohio State University.

Reconceptual theorists have also transmitted their ideas through the publication of articles and books. The five major books that have been published will be discussed separately in the next section of this chapter. At this point it is useful to continue with Huber's framework on the growth of the movement but also to include information from additional sources.

Group consciousness represents the second developmental stage of this movement. Group awareness developed largely from the efforts of James Macdonald and William Pinar. Macdonald contributed to the

development of group consciousness through his article "Curriculum Theory," in which he suggested a classification of types of curriculum theory according to their function, thereby helping to foster further research and exchange through the provision of a framework around which shared concerns could emerge. William Pinar popularized the term reconceptualist and through the book he edited, Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, he called attention to the work of those interested in fresh approaches to curriculum theory. Pinar has also sought to make reconceptualization a self-conscious movement by tracing its historical roots. To that end, Pinar has noted earlier curriculum theory conferences in which voices were heard that indicated a need for the development of new patterns of thinking about curriculum. B. Othanel Smith presented such a challenge at the 1947 Chicago Curriculum Theory Conference. Elizabeth Maccia also called for new and divergent approaches to thinking about curriculum in the 1965 Curriculum Theory Conference in Chicago sponsored by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. Pinar has also written about the goals and future tasks of the movement. Through these efforts he has made reconceptualist work more visible to those within the group as well as those outside it.

Other writers have contributed to the identification of the reconceptual theorists as a group by discussing their work in their own research on the curriculum field. B. J. Benham compiled a bibliography of reconceptualist works supplemented by interviews with eight reconceptual authors.[25] Decker Walker included this group in his 1976 article reviewing curriculum literature.[26] Janet Miller has written a recent history of curriculum theory tracing the development of reconceptualist literature and conferences. Max van Manen has written a review of reconceptualist literature summarizing four of the major books written from a reconceptualist perspective.[27] Henry Giroux has discerned similarities in the perspectives of reconceptual writers and some European theorists and has described their combined influence as "the new sociology of curriculum."[28]

The third developmental stage of the reconceptual movement is collective activity. Formal sharing of ideas among curricularists interested in revisioning the field has taken place through a series of annual curriculum theory conferences that began in 1973. The proceedings from some of these conferences have been published and other conference proceedings will be published at a future date.

In identifying tasks for the future development of reconceptualization, Pinar has called for continued research into the meaning of reconceptualization, and the discussion of reconceptualist research and its relation to other work in the field. For those purposes continued research and dialogue concerning new directions for curriculum theory are being encouraged by the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, formed in 1978. William Pinar serves as editor with a Board of Advising Editors bearing the names of many theorists who have been associated with the reconceptual movement. Janet L. Miller, the managing editor, summarizes the purposes of the journal:

> 1) The journal will provide an open forum for curriculum theorists to explore the various cultural, political, and psychological dimensions of the field, and 2) the journal also will acknowledge the variety of perspectives which characterize these various dimensions by printing criticism of such work.[29]

The journal will sponsor annual conferences, occasional smaller meetings, and a small book series in curriculum theory. In these ways the journal sponsors hope to "increase the frequency and intensity of dialogue in the field,"[30] and "enhance that sense of excitement which allows us to move beyond our multiplicities in order to share in those larger dimensions, those 'feelings rekindled' which unite us."[31]

This account of the development of intellectual awakening, group consciousness, and collective action is a summary of the road along which the movement has come. In the next section some of the salient themes that have been discussed through that developmental period will be presented by summarizing the five books published about renewing curriculum theory by authors associated with the movement.

Reconceptual Literature

In addition to transmission through university study, reconceptual ideas have also been disseminated through the publication of scholarly articles and books. This section will briefly highlight the major themes of those books. The first of the five books, Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory, edited by Pinar, consists of the seven papers presented at the University of Rochester curriculum theory conference in 1973 and "represents the first public indicaton of a move to reconceive the purposes and nature of curriculum theory."[32] The varied presentations reflect existential, phenomenological, and political perspectives all of which critique the nature of schooling and question the ability of school's to be liberating institutions. The papers were concerned with the day-to-day world of schooling as lived experience. In order to change the nature of that experience, these authors point to the need for a change in consciousness as the first step leading to transcendence and liberation from oppressive institutions.

Pinar edited a second book, Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, which goes farther in setting forth a paradigm for situating reconceptualist work in relation to other types of theorizing and suggests by its organization three stages in the process of revisioning the field. The first stage is the accumulation of a body of knowledge and a tradition in the field. Traditional curriculum literature represents that accumulation. The second stage is historical, political, and methodological criticism of the existing tradition. In the third stage, the postcritical, theorists attempt to create new ways of thinking and talking about curriculum.

The third book, Schools in Search of Meaning, is the result of deliberation by the 1975 ASCD yearbook committee. Edited by James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret, the book makes a strong political statement about the ways in which patterns of alienation, inequality, and injustice that exist in the larger society are reproduced in schools. Assuming the role of radical educators, these authors see their purpose as the development of emancipatory education. The book concludes with an outline for action.

The fourth book, Toward a Poor Curriculum, is written by William Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. The book uses the existentialist, phenomenological, and psycho-analystic dimensions to develop the method of self-examination which Pinar calls currere. The intent of this method is to help educators rethink the meaning of educational experience by remembering their past histories in schools and projecting their hopes for the future. Following this reexamination of schooling experience educators can choose which aspects of their past to relinquish, and which to keep in order to reorganize their relation to and action upon schools.

Michael Apple's book, Ideology and Curriculum, is the most recently published book by one of the curriculum critics. Apple uses neo-Marxist analysis to investigate the ideological role of schools in reproducing the social, cultural, and economic patterns of society. Through the neo-Marxist concept of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci, he illuminates how these latter societal patterns are transmitted through the ways that educators organize and select knowledge, the social relationships of the classroom, the administrative procedures of the school, and the categories and labels that are used in perceiving student performance and behavior. The book concludes with a discussion of possible actions educators can take in order to counter the oppressive forms of cultural and economic domination reproduced in schools.

Related Literature

American reconceptual curriculum theorists are not alone in their critique of the limited technical model of curriculum and their illumination of the ideological role of the school. As American theorists have been influenced by the change in the social sciences and the recent renewal of interest in a neo-Marxist analysis of schools, so too have European educational theorists. This influence is seen particularly in educational literature from England associated with the "new" sociology of education.[33] American and continental theorists often draw upon the same theoretical traditions and sources. They share similar themes and concerns. Reconceptual authors often cite these European works.

Reviews of Reconceptual Literature

Few reviews of reconceptual literature have been written. Those that have include simple summaries, one intemperate attack, and one perceptive, well-informed analysis.

Norman J. Bauer wrote a favorable review of Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution and Curriculum Theory appearing in the Peabody Journal of Education in which he summarized the major themes of the book and recommended it to those sensing the "oppressiveness" of the modes of thinking that have dominated the curriculum field and to those who wish to "sharpen their awareness" of this condition.[34] John L. Harrison wrote a conservatively favorable review of Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists that was published in Educational Studies. He noted that the book included the works of a good number of respected curriculum theorists and that it gives "the impression of being on the threshold of new insights and language."[35]

The most thorough analysis of reconceptual literature was written by Max van Manen and published in Curriculum Inquiry. In this review he analyzes the first four reconceptual books, revealing an accurate understanding of their themes and a balanced interpretation of their limitations. He states that these authors have developed powerful arguments exposing the problem inherent in the technological ideology characteristic of mainstream curriculum theory. According to van Manen's assessment, the strength of the movement thus far is its critique. The weakness of the movement is the lack of literature that is practical. As he states, "There is not enough in this work as of yet that actually shows us how you do something like phenomenological analysis or how you work for curriculum change in a critical theory sense."[36] Max van Manen concludes his review by suggesting ways that current uses of ethnographic and ethno-methodological inquiry into classroom and school settings might be used as sources in the development of a reconceptual method of analysis.

The scathing attack of the reconceptual movement was written by Daniel and Laurel Tanner.[37] The fact that they cited few reconceptual sources and misrepresented reconceptual discussions reveals their lack of knowledge about the movement and their gross misunderstanding of it. Sifting through their deprecatory comments, three major criticisms are discernable. First, reconceptual curricularists are criticized for lacking a body of knowledge that could be called a curriculum theory according the the Tanners' definition of theory. Second, they assert that the reconceptualist critique is based on rhetoric and is unsubstantiated by documentation and rigorous analysis. Third, they object to the classification of curriculum theorists into three camps——traditionalists, conceptual-empiricists, and reconceptualists——referring to them as fictional categories.

William Pinar has written a sophisticated and judicious response to the Tanners' article by dealing minimally with the inaccuracy of their interpretation and placing the disagreement within the larger consideration of disciplinary conversation among students of a field.[38] Pinar asserts that there are two types of critical response. The first type assists the scholar in improving his work. The second type of critical response is ill-tempered and seeks to silence or stop the work of the scholar under review. Pinar states that the Tanners' criticism belongs to the second type and invites them to write an earnest critique offering information that can be used not only for Pinar's individual development but for the advancement of the field as well.

Pinar's reply concerning disciplinary conversation is included here to reemphasize the earlier discussion of reconceptualization as a process of reconceiving the field that will develop through future dialogue and research. It is a process in movement, not a completed project. Critics may justifiably claim that the reconceptual movement has not offered to date an implementable curriculum theory to guide practice. However, to offer this statement is to misunderstand the intent of the movement, the developmental stage of the movement, and the length of time and amount of future research and dialogue that will be needed to answer

the questions reconceptual theorists have raised. The movement's extensive critique of mainstream curriculum thought points to the over-emphasis on practice in the curriculum field and the importance of reconceiving the rationality upon which that practice has been based. Therefore the new reconceptual movement must engage in the exploration of new forms of inquiry and thought prior to any recommendations for practice. This type of theoretical spade work must continue before guidelines for practice can be offered. In other words, the ramifications of using various European intellectual traditions in generating new forms of curriculum practice has not yet been given full attention by the movement. The purpose of this study is to engage in theoretical inquiry that contributes to that task and in some measure to the advancement of the field.

Critical Viewpoint

As Pinar recommends in his reply to critics, this study is written in the interest of promoting disciplinary conversation. At the outset, it should be acknowledged that this researcher shares reconceptual concerns and value commitments, agreeing both with the reconceptual critique of mainstream curriculum theory, and with their challenge to develop an alternative curriculum rationality.

The question then becomes: how does one critique a perspective that one shares? In this study, to be critical is not to negate the basic assumption that the curriculum field needs to be reconceptualized——it is to evaluate the progress reconceptual theorists have made toward meeting their challenge to the field. In other words, the movement will be critiqued against the backdrop of the purposes and commitments expressed by theorists associated with the movement——rather than measuring their work against the scale of an extraneous analytic framework. Therefore, it is important that the questions asked of the reconceptual movement be questions designed to explore and evaluate reconceptual attempts at developing alternative ways of thinking about curriculum. The problem with critics that dismiss reconceptual inquiry for its lack of practical guidance is that they are asking the wrong questions. They fail to grasp the fact that it is the very assumptions upon which they base their view of reconceptual inquiry that are under dispute.

It follows, therefore, that this researcher should explicate what some appropriate questions are to test the success of reconceptual inquiry in developing alternative curriculum rationalities. Those questions and the rationale for selecting them are: (1) How does the movement stimulate imagination?[39] To promote consideration of alternatives a movement must be able to heighten one's awareness and appreciation of existing alternatives and envision new possibilities. (2) To what extent have reconceptual theorists developed alternative assumptions to guide their respective works? If a movement is to challenge the supremacy of an existing paradigm it must expose the assumptions it repudiates and replace them with a different set of assumptions that reorient the nature of one's inquiry.[40] (3) What alternative modes of theorizing are developed? To create alternative rationalities for curriculum one needs to develop new ways of seeing, investigating, and confirming curricular phenomena.[41] (4) What different categories have reconceptual theorists used to refocus their perception of curriculum? Theorists give form and direction to modes of thought by the central categories that they use to organize that thought. Changing one's rationality involves developing different categories that express one's new focus and central concerns.[42] (5) What alternative styles of expression have been developed? Language is the expression of thought; new ways of perceiving also require new language to communicate different meanings.[43] (6) What steps have been taken to conceive and develop the relationship of an emancipatory curriculum theory to radical praxis? If reconceptual inquiry is intended to do more than heighten consciousness, the ways by which it seeks to effect change in the curriculum field and schooling should be explored.[44]

Answering these questions is an important and valuable first step in critiquing reconceptual theory because the questions provide the outline of a legitimate critique, as distinguished from an ill-conceived commentary that misperceives the purposes of reconceptual theorizing. They represent six areas that this researcher has identifies as essential criteria for judging the success of reconceptual inquiry in meetings its

challenge to the field. The questions also serve as a framework for pulling together the separate works of reconceptual theorists, establishing connections between them, and assessing their cumulative progress toward reconceptualizing the field. But disciplinary conversation would not be promoted solely by the analysis of reconceptual successes. The dialectic tension needed to encourage debate will be provided by discussion of omissions, contradictions, and problems in reconceptual work to date. In other words, these questions can be used to evaluate both reconceptual achievements in these six areas as well as problems and omissions that presently prevent existing research from fully meeting the six criteria. The points at which these questions will be used will be explained in the following overview of the study. By examining the works of reconceptual theorists it is hoped that this study will underscore the power of their critique, illuminate the promise of their vision, assess their unrealized potential--and thereby augment continuing efforts to redefine the nature, orientation, and scope of curriculum inquiry.

Overview of the Study

The comprehensive nature of this study can be seen in that its approach is historical, interpretive, and critical. Chapter I has provided the historic view of the reconceptual movement by tracing its development and situating reconceptual discourse in relation to other types of curriculum theory. The interpretive focus is found in Chapters II and III, which elucidate the reconceptual critique of mainstream theory, and Chapter IV, which elucidates the reconceptual alternatives that have been developed as a response to that critique. The six questions enumerated in the preceding section will be used implicitly in these chapters to guide the selection of aspects of reconceptual inquiry to consider, and explicitly at the conclusion of these chapters to discuss the value of these works in contributing to the six areas reconceptual inquiry must address to meet its challenge to the field. Since these chapters are written for the purpose of constructing a picture of what reconceptual inquiry is, establishing relationships between the works of various theorists, and discussing common themes and modes of analysis, the commentary concluding these chapters will emphasize the strengths and achievements of reconceptual inquiry. After this interpretive work is completed, Chapter V will present a critical analysis of the reconceptual alternatives, assessing the degree to which reconceptual inquiry has addressed the six areas identified in this study as essentail to successfully meet its challenge to the curriculum field.

The interpretive framework that will be used in this study identifies four major areas that have become modes of reconceptual inquiry: the historic, the aesthetic/philosophic, the psycho-analytic, and the social/political. These themes have been recognized by Pinar and labeled by van Manen.[45] All four of these areas provide critiques of mainstream curriculum theory. In addition, the latter three areas have become post-critical forms of theorizing that provide alternative ways of thinking about curriculum. Therefore, the interpretive portion of the study will progress from the historical critique, discussed in Chapter II, to the extended critique interpreting the aesthetic/philosophic, psycho-analytic, and social/political critiques discussed in Chapter III, to discussion in Chapter IV of alternatives generated by those three critiques. The critical analysis in Chapter V will conclude the study.

Each chapter builds upon the previous one. The historical critique provides the foundation for understanding the larger reconceptual critique of the field by critiquing technocratic rationality and identifying the influences that promoted the adoption of technological models as the dominant curriculum pattern. This becomes a springboard for the extended critique in Chapter III because it identifies how reconceptual theorists view mainstream curriculum theory. The extended critique in Chapter III builds upon that foundation by exploring in greater detail the aesthetic/philosophic, psycho-analytic, and social/political consequences of mainstream curriculum theory, as they interpret it. The criticisms that these perspectives raise in Chapter III become the issues that the alternatives discussed in Chapter IV must address. Chapter V evaluates the alternatives discussed in Chapter IV, using the six critical questions enumerated in Chapter I as the critical framework. But before reaching the point where we can discuss the potential of a reconceptualized curriculum field, we must reach into the past to understand more critically the way that we have come. That historical inquiry is the subject of the next chapter, to which attention is now turned.

FOOTNOTES

1. Joseph J. Schwab, "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum," *School Review* (November 1969), pp. 1-23.
2. Henry A. Giroux, "Toward a New Sociology of Curriculum," *Educational Leadership*, 37 (1979), 248-253.
3. This notion of emancipation refers to what Douglas Kellner has defined as an "enlightenment which contains insight and awakening, leading to a transformation of thought and behavior." (See Douglas Kellner, "TV, Ideology, and Emancipatory Popular Culture," *Socialist Review*, 9, No. 45 (1979), 30.
4. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.)
5. William Pinar, Preface, in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, pp. ix-xii and William Pinar, "Notes on the Curciculum Field," *Educational Researcher*, 7, No. 8 (1978).
6. Janet L. Miller, "Curriculum Theory: A Recent History," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1: 1 (1979), 32.
7. Macondald, "Curriculum Theory," p. 6.
8. William Pinar, "The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies," *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 10, No. 3 (1978), 210.
9. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," p. 6.
10. Pinar, "The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies," p. 8.
11. William Pinar, "What Is the Reconceptualization?" *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1, No. 1 (1978), 100.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
13. Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978; and Theodore W. Adorno et al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).
14. Miller, "Curriculum Theory: A Recent History," pp. 35-36.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
16. Pinar, "The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies," pp. 12-13.
17. An example of the ways in which these approaches can be fused is developed in Henry A. Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform: Toward a Critical Theory of Education," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2:1 (1979).
18. Pinar, "What is the Reconceptualization?" p. 95.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Margaret Huber, "The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: An Historical Study," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* 3:1 (1981).
21. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
25. B. J. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: The Reconceptualist Movement," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 3:1, 1981.
26. Decker Walker, "Toward Comprehension of Curricular Realities," in *Review of Research in Education*, vol. 4, ed. Lee S. Schulman (Itasca: F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1976).
27, Max van Manen, "Reconceptualist Curriculum Thought: A Review of Recent Literature," *Curriculum Inquiry*, 8, No. 4 (1978), 365-374.
28. Giroux, "Toward a New Sociology of Curriculum."
29. Miller, "Curriculum Theory: A Recent History," p. 41.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
33. Representative sources include: Michael F. D. Young, ed., *Knowledge and Control* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971); Basil Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control, Volume 3: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions* (Second edition; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977); Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, *Education and Social Control* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975); and Madeleine Macdonald, *The Curriculum and Cultural Reproduction* (Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1977).

34. Norman J. Bauer, Rev. of *Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution and Curriculum Theory*, ed. William Pinar, *Peabody Journal of Education*, October 1975, pp. 59-60.

35. John L. Harrison, Rev. of *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, ed. William Pinar, *Educational Studies*, 8 (1977), 79-81.

36. van Manen, "Reconceptualist Curriculum Thought: A Review of Recent Literature," p. 372.

37. Daniel Tanner and Laurel Tanner, "Emancipation from Research: The Reconceptualist Prescription," *Educational Researcher*, October 1979, 6 and 24.

39. The pertinence of this question in assessing alternative educational theories is discussed in Michael W. Apple, "Ivan Illich and Deschooling Society: The Politics of Slogan Systems," in *Social Forces and Schooling*, ed. Nobuo Shimahara and Adam Scrupski (New York: David McKay, 1975).

40. An example of this type of argument can be found in Henry A. Giroux, "Toward a New Sociology of Curriculum."

41. See for example Dwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*.

42. This form of analysis is used in Henry A. Giroux, "Teacher Education and the Ideology of Social Control," *Journal of Education*, 162, No. 1 (1980), 5-27.

43. Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings." Also Giroux, "Toward a New Sociology of Curriculum," p. 251.

44. This point is raised in Apple, "Ivan Illich and Deschooling Society: The Politics of Slogan Systems." A contrasting viewpoint concerning the limitations of theory in leading to strategic action is discussed in Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field, 1978," p. 11.

45. van Manen, "Reconceptualist Curriculum Thought," p. 367.

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See the inside back cover for details.

CHAPTER II
The Historical Critique

Introduction

Historical critique of the curriculum field's dominant traditions is a significant aspect of reconceptual inquiry. It is important to examine the reconceptual theorists' historical critique to understand their interpretation of mainstream curriculum theory, the factors that influenced its development, and the explicit and implicit assumptions in which it is grounded. Through this analysis of the field's past, reconceptual historians portray their view of the nature, orientation, and latent consequences of the dominant traditions that emerged in early curriculum thought and that continue to influence contemporary curriculum theory. Chapter II consists of an explanation of the reconceptual approach to curriculum history, an interpretation of their historical critique, a discussion of the value of their commentary, and an explanation of the relationships between the historical analysis and other themes of the reconceptual critique to follow in Chapter III.

Nature of the Historical Critique

The principal works about the critical history of the curriculum field have been written by Herbert Kleibard, Michael Apple, and Barry Franklin. This interpretation of the historical critique will be developed by establishing links between their works to construct a more complete view of the history of the field. Until recently, there was little interest in historical research of the field. a factor that promptedKliebard to assert that the profession was ahistorical, and therefore lacked both facts about the field's development, and dialogue concerning new and recurrent issues in historical perspective.[1] Franklin has noted increased interest in curriculum history during the years following Kliebard's statement.[2] As evidence of this observation, he cites the publication of Mary Louise Sequel's The Curriculum Field: Its Formative Years, the appearance of a significant number of journal articles and papers for professional meetings, the 1975 symposium on curriculum history sponsored by the American Education Research Association, the dedication of the 1976 Yearbook for the Association of Supervision and Curriculum Development to curriculum history, and the inclusion of chapters on the topic within two texts on curriculum planning (Tanner and Tanner's Curriculum Development, and Curriculum: Principles and Foundations by Zais).

Commenting on these works, Franklin distinguishes between two types of curriculum history: Descriptive and critical.[3] The critical approach surpasses the neutral recording of events by interpreting and evaluating the context in which curriculum theorists acted, the reasons why certain ideas took hold, and the values embedded within those actions and ideas. Most of the historical works listed above fall into the descriptive category. Surveying the state of curriculum history, Franklin asserts that:

> ... (W)e now possess an adequate, albeit limited descriptive history of the organizational theories that have played a role in the development of the field; but we lack a history that addresses itself in an interpretive and critical fashion to the psychological and more importantly the social ends that these organizational theories were designed to serve.[4]

The importance of historical critique is a recurrent theme in the works of Kliebard, Apple, and Franklin, each of whom write self-consciously about the rationale and focus of their research. All three of these theorists use historical inquiry to reexamine taken-for-granted patterns of thought and action through and analysis of the social context in which those patterns were developed. As Kliebard states:

> We have inherited from our past certain ways of thinking, criteria of excellence, dualisms and dichotomies, and dialectical patterns that seem so normal and natural that we rarely stop to examine them. If we are to grow and prosper as a field of study critical reexamination of this inheritance is crucial. We must, in other words, create a dialogue not only among ourselves, but with our professional forebears.[5]

More specifically, these theorists are particularly concerned that curriculum workers are continuing their uncritical acceptance of current technological models of curriculum without being aware of the historical roots, nature, or implications of those models. This concern is reflected in the following passage by Franklin:

> The development of the kind of history we are talking about is critical for the contemporary curriculum field. The last several years have seen curriculum workers in increasing numbers turn in their work to a host of systems management procedures, primarily behavioral objectives and competency based education. A popularized kind of systems thinking has in fact become a major force in the contemporary curriculum field. In adopting these procedures curriculum workers have shown little awareness of the fact that they are rooted in a behavioristic psychology. And they have shown even less awareness, or interest for that matter, in the social orientation embedded in that psychology.[6]

Mentioned in the preceding quotation, the "social orientation" of curriculum thought and practice is a key concept in understanding the perspective underlying this type of historical critique.[7] It is a perspective that views curriculum in its interconnections with other economic, political, and cultural institutions; that sees curriculum as a moral and political process creating far-reaching personal and social consequences; that interprets curriculum as a selection of culture; and that reveals the meaning of curriculum by exposing both the overt and latent ideological commitments upon which it is based. In other words, curriculum is understood both ideologically and "relationally." In his research of the relationships between ideology and curriculum Michael Apple explains the process of relational thinking:

> First, any subject matter under investigation must be seen in relation to its historical roots—how it evolved, from what conditions it arose, etc.—and its latent contradictions and tendencies in the future.... Second, anything being examined is defined not only be its obvious characteristics, but by its less overt ties or other factors. It is these ties or relationships that make the subject what it is and give it its primary meanings.[8]

Seen in this way, the concept of social orientation is especially important because it is the critical cutting edge that differentiates descriptive history from critical history. It is through this concept that reconceptual theorists reveal their unique interpretation of mainstream curriculum theory. It should be noted that their historical critique of the curriculum field exists within the context of a similar perspective on the history of education, developed by the revisionist historians.[9]

Prefaced by this explanation of the nature and perspective of the historical critique, the next section interprets the historical analysis by Kliebard, Apple, and Franklin. The interpretaion has two purposes. On the one hand, it presents their major conclusions along with some of the supporting historical evidence so that the reader will be able to appreciate the texture of their argument and the strength of their conclusions. On the other hand, the interpretation also focuses on the theorists' research itself, establishing the relationships between the works of Kliebard, Apple, and Franklin, and explaining the rationale for what they chose to investigate.

Interpretation of the Historical Critique

Social context of the formation of the field. The curriculum field did not begin as a monolithic movement with one accepted process for curriculum-making. There were various appraches to the topic. To understand why some approaches became more popular than others one must understand the social context of the times.

The newly emerging curriculum profession took shape within the progressive reform movement that exerted its influence both outside and within schools during the early 1900s.[10] These years marked a transition period in American society, with progressive reformers demonstrating concern for the many changes that were occurring: changes such as the shift from a rural agrarian society to an urban industrialized one, and the influx of immigrants largely from Eastern and Southern Europe.[11] These changes created new demands upon a society that was not prepared for the scope of urban problems or the immigration of a more culturally diverse population. Many progressive reformers viewed these changes with alarm, fearing that their ideal, rural, middle class society was in danger of extinction.[12] Consequently, they invested the school with a mission to shape the new society, thereby establishing it as a major agency of social control. As Michael Apple and Barry Franklin point out:

> Not just in 1950, but even more between 1870-1920, the school was pronounced as the fundamental institution that would solve the problems of the city, the impoverishment and moral decay of the masses, and, increasingly, would adjust individuals to their respective places in an industrial economy.[13]

Partly in response to these pressures, progressive educators within schools reacted against the dull, irrelevant curriculum, advocated a utilitarian education that would prepare students for life activities, and embraced the methods of science in their drive for efficiency in school planning.

With this brief background of the social context in which the field developed, the next section turns to a consideration of the approach to curriculum theory and practice that became the dominant curriculum tradition.

Technocratic rationality as the dominant curriculum tradition. In sketching this social caricature of the early 1900s it should be noted that both progressivism and curriculum thought of the times encompassed disparate viewpoints. Franklin reports that Harold Rugg contended that by 1926 the curriculum field had established three distinct traditions: fixed subjects, scientific curriculum-making, and dynamic growth or child's needs-interests.[14] A fundamental point of the reconceptual historical critiques is that one of those traditions, scientific curriculum-making, initiated a technological model for the curriculum field that has become the dominant tradition throughout its roughly sixty year history, despite the existence of other approaches to curriculum. Kliebard describes the persistence of the technical orientation:

> The production model and the utilitarian criterion applied to all school subjects as they have evolved over the past half century still constititute our fundamental frame of reference. The coming of modern technology, rather than freeing us from the earlier formulations, has served instead only to reinforce them or restrict them further. The task of the next fifty years in the curriculum field is essentially one of developing alternatives to the mode of thinking and the limited framework that have so clearly dominated our first fifty years.[15]

Various reconceptual authors have synonymously referred to this technical orientation as a production model, a technological model, or as technological or technocratic rationality. It is perhaps the term "rationality" which suggests the importance of the technological influence on the curriculum field. Described as a rationality, the technological influence can be seen as a way of thought—a level of consciousness—that both frames and pervades one's entire approach to research, theorizing, and practice within the field. As Henry Giroux has stated:

> Any form of rationality suggests specific limits and boundaries on the areas one sees fit for investigation, the questions one deems important for study, and the modes of investigation to be used. All forms of rationality, in one sense provide both the definition and legitimation

> for the categories and assumptions that give expression and create opportunities for investigating the world.[16]

Inasmuch as technocratic rationality has been a dominant influence on the field, the explication of its nature and general assumptions is essential for creating a debate within the field that questions first, the truth and value of those assumptions, and second, the implications of the curricular patterns that have been grounded in those assumptions.[17]

The nature of technological rationality is described by James B. Macdonald based on his interpretation of Herbart Marcus's extensive discussion of that topic:[18]

> Essentially is is a process of objectifying all phenomena, abstracting from reality some bit of matter, event, or behavior and manipulating reality as if this objective part of it were all there were. At a more sophisticated level it conceives of the world as a potentially finite set of causal relations. It is essentially the creation of "closed" systems which work in terms of certain predefined goals.[19]

An extensive analysis of technological rationality is not developed in reconceptual literature. There are numerous references to technological models and the consequences of using them in curriculum. However, except for Macdonald's brief discussion and Apple's critique of technocratic rationality, to be represented later in this chapter, there is little in reconceptual literature that elaborates on the philosophical underpinnings of the technocratic perspective. Such a discussion can be found in numerous works critiquing positivism in the social sciences.[20] The contribution that reconceptual theorists have made is that they have drawn upon that discussion to provide insight into the problems that are created by the use of technological models in curriculum. Their work, however, is not a full treatment of the problem. For example, absent from their discussion is an elaborated explication of the assumptions of technocratic rationality. While some curriculum theorists have attempted an initial statement of those assumptions,[21] their lists match only some of the concepts suggested in Macdonald's brief definition of technocratic rationality. The different interpretations suggest that reconceptual theorists need to present a more thorough discussion of technocratic rationality if they are to adequately detect its presence in curriculum thought.

While it is not possible to present a more thorough interpretation of technocratic rationality here, this researcher will highlight its major characteristics, using Macdonald's definition as a starting point. Key words or phrases in this passage that describe three major features of the technocratic perspective are: objective, bits of matter, and predefined goals. These concepts can be expanded into the following statements that represent assumptions of technological rationality:

1. The objectification of phenomena

   Reality exists independently of the interpretation and construction of the knower.

   Corollary assumption: The social scientist should describe reality objectively, i.e., as a disinterested, neutral observer.

2. The fragmentaion of reality

   Reality can be divided into discrete elements; the sum of the discrete elements equals the whole.

3. The predetermination of goals

   The social scientist should act to achieve certainty of outcomes.

At the very core of their critique, reconceptual theorists repudiate these technocratic assumptions because they represent a view of science that is inappropriate for designing educational environments that are responsive to the needs, interests, and meanings of the persons that inhabit them. Rather, they assert that these assumptions embody a conservative orientation that is reproduced through the curriculum, endowing it with the capacity to operate as an instrument of social control. This critique of technocratic rationality is the subject of the next section.

The social orientation of technocratic rationality. Herbert Kliebard, Michael Apple, and Barry Franklin have contributed in different ways to the illumination of the social orientation of technocratic rationality. Both Kliebard and Apple have examined the underlying assumptions of the technical models borrowed from industry and behavioral science, and have concluded that these models resulted in a conservative orientation that emphasized stability and certainty, and cast the student in a passive role to be manipulated according to uniform and predetermined behavioral outcomes. Hence, curriculum became an instrument for social control because it was "a potential instrument for external imposition and manipulation."[22] Their conclusions are derived from an analysis of assumptions that are implicit in technological models. Kliebard and Apple differ in their approach to exposing the implications of those assumptions. On the one hand, Apple supports his critique of technocratic rationality with historical evidence, but enlarges that discussion with a philosophical analysis of the view of science adopted by mainstream curriculum theorists. On the other hand, Kliebard's approach is primarily historical, revealing the implications of these assumptions in the context of discussing the specific curriculum practices that manifested them. Franklin agrees with their conclusions and through still a third approach he confirms their findings. Whereas Kliebard and Apple inferred the social control orientation of these models., Franklin substantiates their claims by looking directly at the stated social attitudes of selected theorists to ascertain how their attitudes were reflected in the curricular practices they developed. In other words, he demonstrates that the use of technological models embodying a social control orientation was no accident; in fact, some early curriculum theorists expressed the intention that schools should operate for the purpose of social control.

In view of the distinct tasks that each of these theorists have used to explicate the social implications of technological rationality in curriculum thought, the discussion that follows will summarize each theorist's critique separately. First is Apple's philosophical critique inferring the implicit social consequences of the technocratic assumptions. Since Kliebard's critique of technocratic rationality is interwoven with his account of the development of technological models in the curriclum field, his critique will be reserved for the next section, which discusses how technological rationality became infused into curriculum thought. Franklin's analysis of the stated social attitudes of early curriculum theorists will follow in a third section establishing the explicit evidence of a social control orientation among those theorists.

Apple's critique of technocratic rationality. Michael Apple argues the case that in the interests of becoming more like a science, mainstream curricularists have historically based their work on models drawn from the behavioral sciences, fields which in turn borrowed their constructs from the physical sciences.[23] He contends that the acceptance of these models by the curriculum field has resulted in a limited theoretical framework that, in actuality, misperceives the nature of science, and in its name substitutes "an outmoded positivist stance," one that collapses the distinction between science and technique.[24] As an example of this distinction he points to the use of systems strategies in curriculum design that he feels are based more upon "an after-the-fact examination of scientific products" than upon an accurate interpretation of scientific activity.[25] In the former view, science is based on what he terms, after Abraham Kaplan, a "reconstructed logic" developed by what observers say the logic of scientific investigation appears to be. In the latter view, science is based upon what Kaplan calls "logic-in-use," i.e., "what scientists actually do; and that is not necessarily the linear progression of stating goals absolutely clearly, of hypothesis testing and verification or falsification through statistical or other analysis, and so forth."[26] Maintaining that it is the reconstructed view of science that has been infused into the curriculum field, Apple asserts that main-

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objectivity is Apple's third criticism of technological thought. He contends that in contrast to the technical perspective, curriculum design, as the creation of educational environments, is both a political and moral process that decides what is valued educational activity. By ignoring these complex issues, technological rationality contributes to the legitimation of existing educational institutions because it fails to confront educators with the fact that the decisions they make have far-reaching social, political, and ethical consequences for the human beings they serve. Apple explains:

> Our common-sense thought in education, however, tends to move in a direction quite the opposite from moral and political considerations. Instead spheres of decision-making are perceived as technical problems that only necessitate instumental strategies and information produced by technical experts, hence effectively removing the decisions from the realm of political and ethical debate. In other words, even though rationales such as systems procedures cloak themselves in the language of "being realistic," there is a strong tendency intheir use to flatten reality, to define the complex valuative issues out of existence by using a form of thought that is amenable only to technical competence.[30]

The fundamental contribution of Apple's critique of technocratic rationality, as well as the critiques by Kliebard and Franklin to follow, is the exposure of the latent social control function embedded within its assumptions. Apple's commentary effectively reveals the consequences of the technocratic concepts of predetermination and objectivity, although he gives little attention to the consequences of fragmentation.

At this point the discussion will turn to the analysis of how technocratic rationality becomes embedded in the curriculum field. Focusing primarily on Kliebard's historical interpretation, supported by Franklin's historical research, the next section will demonstrate how the concepts of objectification, predetermination, and fragmentation were manifested in specific curriculum practices. Moreover, their critique explains how those practices specifically operated to place curriculum in the position of becoming a primary instrument for social control.

The development of technocratic rationality in the curriculum field. Herbert Kliebard established the foundation for the historical critique of the curriculum field by explaining the influence of ideas then current in business and industrial models of bureaucratic organization such as the popular scientific management perspective then in vogue. Franklin explains how the simultaneous emergence of the measurement movement started by Edward L. Thorndike's behavioral psychology complemented the efficiency drive of scientific management. Together, these two influences resulted in the scientific curriculum-making movement that, as stated earlier, became the dominant tradition of early curriculum thought. The succeeding paragraphs describe how these two forces became infused into curriculum theory and practice.

The influence of business and industry

Raymond Callahan's Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces that Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools, a book cited in reconceptual literature, is a useful source to supplement Kliebard's and Franklin's historical critique. Callahan explains that business and industry rose to a position of prestige and influence after 1900 due to the material achievements of industrial capitalism in the late 1800s.[31] Reformers of the day associated modern business methods and efficiency with progress. He concludes that "it was, therefore, quite natural for Americans, when they thought of reforming the schools, to apply business methods to achieve their ends."[32] Increasingly, schools were subject to criticism according to the business-industrial criteria of economy and efficiency, and were urged to adopt business and industrial practices. Callahan lists several sources of this pressure: "muckraker" journals, presentations made before educational meetings by businessmen, and direct pressure from school boards which were increasingly dominated by businessmen.[33] Kliebard describes the strength of the business-industrial influence:

> The picture that emerges from the apparently frenetic educational activity during the first few decades of this century seems to be one of growing acceptance of a powerful and restrictive bureaucratic model for education which looked toward the management techniqes of industry as its ideal of excellence and source of inspiration. The dominant metaphor for educational theory in the early twentieth century was drawn not from the educational philosophy of John Dewey or even from romantic notions of childhood, but from corporate management.[34]

The bureaucratic model Kliebard refers to was known as scientific management. Advocated by Frederick W. Taylor, this system differed from classical conceptions of bureaucracy by emphasizing efficiency rather than relationships of power and authority within organizations.[35] Taylor initiated scientific management in the late nineteenth century and published his book, Principles of Scientific Management, in 1911, with the system reaching wide popularity between 1911 and the 1920s—precisely the time of the formation of the curriculum field. Taylor devised the system to increase productivity from workers, a purpose of popular appeal since he claimed the system could both increase productivity and lower prices through efficient management and the reduction of waste. Through scientific study managers were to discover the best procedures to use in completing a job, teach those procedures to workers, and encourage them to produce more by increasing their wages. Kliebard describes how the system worked:

> Through time and motion studies, the worker's movements were broken down into minute operations and then standards of efficiency were developed for each of the operations. The rules of scientific management and psychological principles were then applied to the worker to bring him up to the appropriate level of efficiency.... The essence of scientific management was the fragmentation and analysis of work and its reordering into the most efficient arrangement possible.[36]

Kliebard identified standardization, particularization, and predictability as significant characteristics of scientific management. The important comparison to be made here is that these three features of scientific management are equivalent to the three characteristics of technocratic rationality discussed earlier. Therefore, the adoption of the principles of scientific management by early curriculum theorists was one of the primary channels through which the technocratic perspective became sedimented into the curriculum field. Kliebard's research illuminates how these features were extended to curriculum theory by leading curriculum figures such as Franklin Bobbitt, W. W. Charters, and David Snedden. Bobbitt's work is of special import since, by 1922, he had emerged as the "foremost practitioner in the field of curriculum."[37]

Bobbitt's use of scientific management spanned his work in both school administration and curriculum. The characteristics of standardization, particularization, and predictability were reflected in a variety of his recommendations. For example, in school administration he advocated the division of labor and job specialization—both practices based upon the principle of particularization. One position created as a result of this proposal was that of the specialized supervisor of instruction who was analogous to the foreman in industry. Supervisors maintained standardization of the educational product by developing quantitative standards to measure the quality of instruction.[38]

In regard to curriculum, Bobbitt conceived the process as analogous to industrial management, with the school as the factory, the child as the raw materials, the ideal adult as the finished product, and the teacher as the operative.[39] Clearly embedded within this metaphor is the representation of the child as an object to be molded into a predetermined direction. As Kliebard comments:

> This extrapolation of the principles of scientific management to the area of curriculum made the child the object on which the bureaucratic machinery of the school operates. He became

> the raw material from which the school-factory must fashion a product drawn to the specifications of social convention. What was at first simply a direct application of general management principles to the management of schools became the central metaphor on which modern curriculum theory rests.[40]

Particularization, predetermination, and standardization were all reflected in a central aspect of Bobbitt's curriculum-making: the specification of objectives. Uncertainty in educational purposes was no longer tolerated in the new age of science.[41] To eliminate uncertainty, minute educational objectives were pre-determined for all areas of study, thus transforming curriculum content into a standardized product.

Objectives were derived from a second component in Bobbitt's curriculum: the process of activity analysis. The origins of this method stemmed from a corresponding principle in scientific management calling for the identification of descrete units or work. The curriculum worker carried out this process by analyzing life activities to determine the "abilities, attitudes, habits, appreciations, and forms of knowledge"[42] that students needed to prepare them for those life activities. The concept of curriculum as preparation for life was known as social efficiency. According to this principle, judgments were made about a student's probable social destination, resulting in a decision about the type of curriculum the student would be exposed to. Consequently, curriculum was differentiated, and students were tracked into the course of study that met their needs. Behind this seemingly well-intentioned practice lay a basic pessimism on the part of early curriculum leaders, in the ability of the "masses" to learn anything beyond practical studies.[43] Hence, the concept of predetermination, which on the surface appeared to be an innocent step in achieving efficiency, had serious social and political implications for the distribution of knowledge and consequently opportunity among different classes of people.[44] Kliebard concludes, "In the school setting, such a process becomes a vast bureaucratic machinery for labeling, stamping, and tracking students into different curriculum patterns."[45]

The extreme particularization that the practice of activity analysis led to, along with the way it meshed with the concepts of social efficiency and curriculum differentiation, is revealed in the following passage describing David Snedden's use of the process:

> In 1921, Snedden had written that, 'By 1925, it can confidently be hoped, the minds which direct education will have detached from the entanglements of our contemporary situation a thousand definite educational objectives, the realization of which will have demonstrable worth to our society.' Snedden devoted the next few years to the realization of that prediction, and also differentiating the curriculum so that the right objectives were applied to the right 'case groups.'[46]

Charter's work for Stephens College in the early 1920s, in which he developed a curriculum for women, is an example of how activity analysis was used to specify objectives for a particular "case group." He analyzed the role of women through their descriptions of what they did for a week. These replies were analyzed into about 7300 categories which became the base for the curriculum for Stephens College. Commenting on Charter's work, Kliebard wryly points out, "What constitutes being a woman of course, was determined through activity analysis."[47]

Summarizing the Kliebard's critique of these curriculum practices, one finds that he shares Apple's perception that technological models exhibit a deterministic outlook:

> The mechanistic conception of man, the technology-systems analysis approach to human affairs, the production metaphor for curriculum design all share a common perspective. They represent a deterministic outlook on human behavior. The behavior of human beings is con-

trolled in an effort to make people do the particular things that someone wants them to do.[48]

Kliebard also touches upon some of the aesthetic and psycho-analytic themes of the reconceptual critique to be discussed in Chapter III.[49] For instance, he raises aesthetic considerations about the nature of educational experience when he discusses the effect of separating means from ends——a by-product of predetermining outcomes. He cautions that the technocratic perspective values experience solely for its instrumental worth, ignoring other values that emphasize the intrinsic quality and wholeness of the experience itself. Second, he introduces a glimpse of the psychoanalytic theme developed more extensively by other reconceptual theorists, in his reference to the alienating, dehumanizing qualities that education assumes when students are manipulated, and experiences are engineered. Through his meticulous analysis of specific curriculum practices Kliebard reveals how all of these negative features exist tacitly within technological models of curriculum. Furthermore, he provides the data to understand why technological models became the dominant tradition of the curriculum field by explaining how the social pressures of the times, the zeal of reform, and the ascendancy of business-industrial prestige, catapulted business-industrial language and practices into a position of overriding influence on schools and curriculum-making. The following section will summarize the influence of behavioral psychology on the field and demonstrate how it complemented the business-industrial ethic, and contributed to the infusion of technological rationality in curriculum thought.

The influence of behavioral psychology

Barry Franklin has studied the influence of Edward L. Thorndike's work in psychology on the curriculum field. Franklin asserts that Thorndike's influence on curriculum is evidenced by the following achievements: the publication of methods texts applying psychology to issues in teaching and curriculum; the publication of his own elementary textbook series in arithmetic; the construction of ability tests in reading, spelling, handwriting, and drawing; and most notably, his polition at Columbia University as one of the nation's first educational psychologist.[50] According to Franklin, "the elements of Thorndike's psychology that have had the most impact on the curriculum field are his laws of learning, primarily the law of effect, and his theory of identical elements."[51] Franklin also devotes attention to explaining the significance of Thorndike's emphasis on measurement for the field.

Thorndike's law of effect was the main principle in his "connectionist" psychology, forerunner of contemporary behavioral psychology. This principle described learning as a process of connections or bonds between external environmental stimuli and overt responses by the organism. This was one of the earliest formulations of the stimulus-response theory that came to be known as operant conditioning.[52]

The theory of identical elements was Thorndike's reaction against the notion of transfer in the mental discipline movement. According to proponents of the latter movement, studying certain subjects such as Latin or algebra improved one's general mental functioning. In other words, they believed that knowledge from one area could be transferred to another area. In contrast to this view, Thorndike argued (in his theory of identical elements) that mental functions were specific, and could only be improved by instruction in the particular skills that composed a given mental function.

The application of Thorndike's principles of psychology to the curriculum field reinforced the curriculum-making practices derived from scientific management. For example, the law of effect was similar to the factory model of learning since both principles required manipulating student behavior through exposure to external stimuli.[53] Secondly, the theory of identical elements justified the principle of minute particularization of objectives through an equally minute process of activity analysis.[54]

As Kliebard and Apple discussed the political implications of the manipulative orientation in business industrial models, so too Franklin reveals the political consequences of Thorndike's behavioral psychology. He finds that these consequences are apparent in Thorndike's expressed intention to manipulate stimuli to produce desirable social and political attitudes.[55] In this way, Thorndike's psychology also had the potential to be an instrument of social control.

Thorndike's leadership in using statistical measures for school administration and instruction also complemented scientific management in education since quantitative measures were needed to make judgments about efficient operations. In addition to this function, quantitative measures became a third means of infusing technocratic rationality into educational discourse, because they were especially effective in making the claim that educational theory was based on objective research and was therefore value-free. The resultant effect was to use the veneer of science to legitimize educational policy by representing statistical findings as objective fact, thereby successfully squelching ethical and political debate concerning that policy.[56] Thorndike's actual use of statistics in the technical assessment of cultural issues is a perfect example of this legitimizing effect. For instance, while he did not directly say that racial minorities and immigrants were inferior, he produced statistics that implied that they were, and then defended himself against any potential charges of cultural bias by asserting that he was merely reporting what the statistics revealed.[57] Franklin puts it this way, "Unlike many of the social scientists of his day, Thorndike did not just assert the inferiority of heterogeneous elements within the population, he attempted to prove it empirically."[58]

A second example of Thorndike's use of statistics is useful to reveal the import of his findings on social policy. Believing that intelligent people were also morally superior, he investigated the relationships between the two attributes and pronounced that there was a +.56 correlation between intelligence and morality. Consequently, he recommended that financial incentives be provided for intelligent people to marry and have children; people with low intellect would be offered eugenic sterilization.[59] Here again, the status of scientific research was used to mask cultural bias and elevate it to the level of institutional policy.

The curricular significance of Thorndike's statistical research was that achievement tests and IQ tests were being used with the claim of scientific objectivity to make judgments about an individual's intelligence, character, and ultimately that individual's future. The test findings were then used to support the practice of tracking and curriculum differentiation.[60] As Franklin reveals, Thorndike was well aware of the social control orientation of these procedures.

> For Thorndike educational measurement was a mechanism of social control. His work during World War I in the development of the famed Alpha and Beta intelligence tests as well as other tests used to select men for various aspects of military training led him to conclude that the mental measurement movement had provided for "...the greatest increase in scientific control over the management of men ever made in any year in any century."[61]

The foregoing summary of Kliebard's and Franklin's historical critique explains how an overriding concern for efficiency and scientific objectivity led to curriculum practices that on the surface appeared to be neutral reforms for the purpose of making schools more progressive, but in actuality made the curriculum an instrument of social control, and the school a legitimizing agent for a society marred by the reality of social, economic, and political injustice. Complementing their historical inquiry, Apple's critique of the assumptions of the pervading technocratic rationality underlying both the business and behavioral science influences illuminates how the conservative orientation of social control is embedded within that mode of thought. What this means is that reform-minded educators were borrowing business and scientific models that had the potential to make schools more oppressive than progressive . As these critics have pointed out, the crucial task of historical criticism is to illuminate these oppressive features so that educators do not continue to borrow technological models without being aware of their tacit socio-political meanings. The

historical critique by Kliebard, Apple and Franklin has been admirably successful in exposing what heretofore have largely remained hidden implications of taken-for-granted technological curriculum procedures. But the excavation of the social control orientation of the dominant technological rationality in curriculum thoughtis not the end of the historical critique. Barry Franklin has sought to pursue the social control theme further by investigating whether or not this orientation was always hidden. His research reveals that, in addition to Thorndike, several influential early curriculum theorists openly championed the ideology of social control as the proper role of the school and the curriculum. It is to this final aspect of the historical critique that the next secion will turn.

Franklin on the curriculum field and the problem of social control. Franklin defines social control as "...those sociological and psychological processes through which individuals are forcibly or voluntarily convinced to conform or adjust to the attitudes, values, and behaviors of their social group."[62] Franklin discovered that social control was an important topic of investigation in sociological research from roughly 1900 to 1930. As an example of the attention the concept was receiving, he notes that the American Sociological Society devoted its 1918 annual meeting to the social control theme. He attributes the widespread interest in the topic to the societal changes resulting from increased urbanization and immigration.

Franklin distinguishes between two formulations of the idea of social control: the overt and the covert. He traces the development of the overt theory from its early formulation by the American sociologist Edward A. Ross and its further development by his colleague and student Charles A. Ellwood, to its later integration into the curriculum field by Ross L. Finney, David Snedden, and Charles C. Peters. These latter three figures were sociologists in the developing sociology of education field who wrote extensively on curriculum matters, thus justifying Franklin's assertion that they should also be considered formative theorists of the early curriculum field along with the more recognized figures of Bobbitt, Charters, and Rugg. What Franklin refers to as the covert theory of social control was developed by John Dewey, Charles Horton Cooley, and George Herbert Mead and was reflected in the child's needs-interests school of thought. Franklin contrasts the two theories in this way:

> These two formulations can be distinguished on three grounds. The overt theory of social control was concerned with direct, artificial modes of control that operated at the external, institutional level. The covert theory of social control, on the other hand, was concerned with indirect, natural modes of control that operated at the internal, psychological level of the personality. Second, the overt theory of social control focused on conscious and planned modes of direction, while the covert theory looked to unconscious and spontaneous modes of control. Third, the mechanism of the overt theory of social control was coercion, and its intent was centered on securing behavioral conformity. The covert theory emphasized voluntary or self control in order to secure an adjustment in beliefs and attitudes as well as behavior.[63]

As more attention has been devoted to the historical critique of the scientific curriculum-making movement, Franklin chose to investigate Finney's integration of the concept of social control into the fixed subject curriculum trend. The important relationship to establish here is the connection between Finney's stated social attitudes, his view of the purpose of school, and the curriculum practices he recommended.

Finney, like Thorndike and other intellectuals of the time, feared immigrants and the cultural heterogeneity that they associated with dangerous ideas (such as Bolshevism), low intelligence, and immorality. Finney equated low intelligence with the laboring class and believed in the middle class as the strength of American society. Therefore he believed the school should teach the laboring class to be like the middle class. Finney defined the key purpose of education as the "...production of conformity, like-mindedness, solidarity, loyalty, consensus––all of which have been, and still are, essential to the preservation of the group and its civilization."

Franklin further explains how Finney integrated the ideology of social control with his curriculum theory.[65] First, he felt that through drill the curriculum should train students to "revere and obey" the rules of existing social institutions. Conformity would be best achieved, in his view, if all students had knowledge of the social heritage, i.e., the knowledge in the humanities, sciences and technology amassed by society over time. Consequently he advocated what he called "the new humanities" (biology, geography, psychology, anthropology, economics, sociology, political science, philosophy, history, and social psychology) to instill students with the desirable attitudes toward society's institutions. The significance of his plan is that he placed curriculum content in the role of socializing students to obediently accept existing societal arrangements.

A second relationship between Finney's belief in social control as the role of the school and his curriculum theory exists in his learning theory and resultant pedagogy. He believed in a learning process he called passive mentation, whereby the mind learned from imitation, resulting in the development of habits that would continue to operate routinely. Compatible with Thorndike's behavioral psychology, this view of learning led to a teaching method based on fragmenting knowledge into habitual responses that would be taught through slogans and catchwords to facilitate imitation. His lack of confidence in the ability of the "masses" to participate in creative, critical thought is reflected below:

> What the duller half of the population needs, therefore, is to have their reflexes conditioned into behavior that is socially suitable. And the wholesale memorizing of catch-words—provided they are sound ones—is the only practical means of establishing bonds in the duller intellects between the findings of social scientists and the corresponding social behavior of the masses. Instead of trying to teach dullards to think for themselves, the intellectual leaders must think for them, and drill the results, memorizedinto their synapses.[66]

Franklin's research on the infusion of the social control orientation into the curriculum field reveals a direct relationship between the social attitudes and prejudices of men like Finney and the curriculum content and pedagogical techniques they selected. His research confronts the contemporary curriclum field with a crucial dilemma:

> The problem is whether or not curriculum theories rooted in a context in which social control is the highest ideal, can be removed from that context and used for different and more benign ends.[67]

Through posing this dilemma he challenges the field to reconceptualize its taken-for-granted patterns of thought and action. He expresses his own answer to that dilemma in the following observation of Gouldner's work in reformulating sociological methods of inquiry:

> Gouldner's implication is that theories developed within one social context cannot simply be removed from that context. They carry with them the social orientation in which they were developed. As such, it may be impossible without a total break with our past traditions of organization for the curriculum field to sever its linkages to a commitment to social control as defined by Finney and Peters.[68]

Franklin's illumination of the social context of early curriculum thought and its ramifications for contemporary curriculum theory bolsters the compelling tenor of the reconceptual challenge to the field.

Value of the Historical Critique

As noted earlier, the three curriculum critics discussed in this chapter have written self-consciously about the significance of their historical inquiry. In describing theirapproach, they have discussed two major features of their work: the analysis of taken-for-granted assumptions, and the interpretation of curriculular phenomena relationally. The question I am considering here is: In what ways do these aspects of the historical critique contribute to the reconceptual goal of developing alternative curriculum rationalities according to the critical criteria established in Chapter I?

The process of analyzing taken-for-granted assumptions is an important initial step toward stimulating imagination of alternative possibilities. It is a process based on the phenomenological practice of bracketing basic patterns to create new perceptions. Michael Apple describes the task as follows:

> ...(W)e need to act like the phenomenologist who seeks to cast aside his previous perceptions of familiar objects and attempts to constitute them anew, to recreate and renew the basic aspects of an object without the limiting conceptual dominance of a previously accepted commonsense or scientific orientation.[69]

The historical critique of technological models in curriculum thought has bracketed the assumptions upon which technical models are based and exposed the negativity of their consequences, thereby creating the opportunity to reconsider the nature of science and the way it is used in education.

Furthermore, the historical critique has gone beyond bracketing and negating technological rationality. It has developed a new way of seeing curricular phenomena through the concept of relational thinking. Seeing curriculum relationally has meant, in contrast to the technocratic perspective, viewing an object in its complexity and interconnections to other factors. Moreover, this new way of seeing means that the roles of science and technology in education, rather than being rejected, are reconstituted and placed within a contextual framework that illuminates their relationship to ethics and politics. In other words, Michael Apple's critique is not intended to dismiss science; it is intended to offer an alternative view of the relationship of science to education. He explains:

> While there is certainly a need for technical expertise in the field––after all, curricularists are called upon to assist in the designing and creating of concrete environments based on our differing educational visions––all too often a technical and efficiency perspective supplies the problems, and other considerations such as those analyzed in this volume are afterthoughts, if they are indeed considered at all. A more appropriate relationship would require that educational 'science' and technical competence be secured firmly within a framework that continually seeks to be self-critical and places both one person's responsibility to treat another person ethically and justly and the search for a set of economic and cultural institutions that make such collective responsibility possible at the center of its deliberations.[70]

Kliebard and Franklin have also used historical inquiry to offer alternative assumptions to guide curriculum theory. Both of them have suggested investigating the works of specific figures who developed alternative theoretical concepts. Kliebard has suggested that Dewey's view of experience would alter the instrumental view of experience that follows from the predetermination of objectives.[71] He mentions the work of Edward Krug in fostering the concept of intellectual play as an alternative to the utilitarian view of knowledge.[72] Franklin studied George Herbert Mead's theory of social control and suggests his concept of the reflexive self as a substitute for the manipulative form of social control that has dominated the curriculum field.[73]

In conclusion, the historical critique conducted by these three theorists has created the preconditions for reconceptualizing curriculum theory by provoking reexamination of predominant patterns, and stimulation of alternative possibilities and assumptions to guide curricular endeavor. However, historical research is only one way to critique curriculum theory. Reconceptual theorists have also extended their critique through use of social/political, aesthetic/philosophic, and psycho-analytic frameworks. These perspectives offer additional ways to stimulate reconceptual imagination and offer alternative assumptions. In Chapter III, the study turns to examination of the extended critique and the possibilities these three frameworks offer.

FOOTNOTES

1. Herbert Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective," in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 40-41.

2. Barry Franklin, "Curriculum History: Its Nature and Boundaries," *Curriculum Inquiry*, 7, No. 1 (1977), p. 67.

3. See Barry Franklin, "Curriculum Thought and Social Meaning: Edward L. Thorndike and the Curriculum Field," *Educational Theory*, 26, No. 3 (1976), p. 298, and Barry Franklin, "Technological Models and the Curriculum Field," *The Educational Forum*, March 1976, p. 303.

4. Franklin, "Curriculum Thought," p. 298.

5. Herbert Kliebard, "The Curriculum Field in Retrospect," in *Technology and the Curriculum*, ed. Paul W. F. Witt (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), p. 83.

6. Franklin, "Curriculum Thought," p. 299.

7. Franklin, "Technological Models," p. 305.

8. Michael Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (London: Routledge adn Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 132.

9. Michael B. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform: Educational Innovation in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968); Michael B. Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Colin Greer, *The Great School Legend* (New York: Basic Books, 1972); Clarence Karier, *Shaping the American Educational State: 1900 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1975); Clarence Karier, Paul Violas, and Joel Spring, *Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973); Joel Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972); Joel Spring, *A Primer of Libertarian Education* (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975); Walter Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of Twentieth Century Liberal Educational Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975); Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., eds., *Work, Technology, and Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America: Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life* (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

10. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues," p. 42.

11. Barry Franklin, "American Curriculum Theory and the Problem of Social Control, 1918-1938," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Chicago, April 1974), p. 10.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

13. Apple with Barry Franklin, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 67.

14. Franklin, "American Curriculum Theory," p. 18.

15. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues," p. 49.

16. Henry Giroux, "Teacher Education and the Ideology of Social Control," *Journal of Education*, 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980).

17. Henry Giroux, "The New Sociology of Curriculum," *Educational Leadership*, 37, No. 3 (December 1979), p. 249.

18. Herbert Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

19. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Development in Relation to Social and Intellectual Systems," in *The Curriculum: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Robert M. McClure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1971), p. 103.

20. For an excellent bibliography and treatment of this discussion see Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978).

21. For other treatments of technological rationality and the positivist model of social science in curriculum see Giroux, "Teacher Education," and Thomas Popkewitz, "Myths of Social Science in Curriculum," *The Educational Forum*, March 1976.
22. Barry Franklin, "George Herbert Mead, Curriculum Theorist: The Curriculum Field and the Problem of Social Control," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C., March 31-April 3, 1975, p. 3.
23. Michael Apple, "Scientific Interests and the Nature of Educational Institutions," in *Curriculum Theorizing*, p. 132.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
25. Michael Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education and Alternatives," in *Perspectives on Management Systems Approaches in Education*, ed. Albert H. Yee (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Educational Technology Publications, 1973), p. 6.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
28. Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management," p. 9.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
31. Raymond Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces That Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 1.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
34. Herbert Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in *Curriculum Theorizing*, pp. 51-52.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 55. For an elaborated discussion of scientific management see Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capitol* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
36. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
37. Kliebard, "The Curriculum Field," p. 71.
38. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy," p. 57.
39. Mary Louise Seguel, *The Curriculum Field: Its Formative Years* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 80.
40. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy," p. 56.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Kliebard, "The Curriculum Field," p. 82.
44. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 7.
45. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues," p. 47.
46. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy," p. 61.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 60.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
49. The issues addressed in this paragraph are discussed in Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory."
50. Franklin, "American Curriculum Theory," p. 15.
51. Franklin, "Curriculum Thought," p. 299.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
54. *Ibid.*
55. Franklin, "Curriculum Thought," p. 300.
56. Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management," p. 16.
57. Franklin, "Curriculum Thought," p. 307.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
60. Kliebard, "The Curriculum Field," p. 82.
61. Franklin, "Curriculum Thought," p. 307.
62. Franklin, "American Curriculum Theory," pp. 1-3.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
69. Apple, "Scientific Interests," p. 127.
70. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 162.
71. Herbert Kliebard, "Reappraisal: The Tyler Rationale," in *Curriculum Theorizing*, p. 79.
72. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues," p. 49.
73. Franklin, "George Herbert Mead."

CHAPTER III
The Extended Critique

Introduction

Like the historical critique, the aesthetic/philosophic, psychoanalytic, and socio-political critiques share a common opposition to the narrow technocratic rationality dominant in curriculum discourse. Moving beyond the historical documentation of how the technical perspective became infused into curriculum thought, the aesthetic/philosophic and psycho-analytic critiques deal primarily with the consequences of the technical focus on life in schools and the quality of educational experience. The social/political critique deals with the political economy of schooling revealing the relationship between schools and the larger society. While these forms of critique have distinctive features, they are also interrelated. Some of these interconnections will be addressed in Chapters IV and V.

A fine distinction needs to be made regarding the purpose of critique within each of these perspectives. One can think of each perspective as having two stages which Pinar referred to as critical and postcritical. In the first sense they are critical because they protest the dominance of mainstream curriculum theory, expose its limitations, and generate new questions and areas of inquiry. In the second sense each critical perspective becomes a form of theorizing itself, investigating the new areas of inquiry and developing new insights. The use of the two stages in this study differs from Pinar's original rationale for classifying the perspectives, in that he confined the social/political discussion to the critical stage and the other two perspectives to the postcritical, whereas this study treats each perspective as both critical and postcritical. Thus what started as aesthetic critique of objectives and learning becomes an ongoing form of aesthetic rationality; psychoanalytic critique becomes currere, a method for understanding the person in relation to their work or study through autobiography; and the social/political critique evolves into a critical theory of education. Each perspective contains a continuum from criticism of what is—to ongoing criticism as theorizing of what could be.

Chapters III and IV represent the opposite ends of this continuum. Therefore, in Chapter III the early critical literature that initiated these three perspectives will be interpreted. The focus of this chapter will stay within the province of reconceptual literature that reacts to mainstream curriculum theory. The intent, beyond discerning the major critical themes of these three perspectives, is to assess what new questions and areas of inquiry they have generated. In Chapter IV the focus will swing to the other end of the continuum, exploring each of the three perspectives as alternative forms of theorizing and practice.

It is important to note that in both Chapters III and IV these three themes will not be given equal weight. The reason for this imbalance is due to this researcher's contention that the social/political theme is more fully developed within reconceptual literature than the other themes. One reason for the difference in the degree of their development is that there is much more extensive research being conducted in Europe, particularly England, into the social/political perspective. Moreover, some of the social/political work has also benefitted from the research of the revisionist historians. Consequently American social/political theorists have the benefit of being able to draw upon a larger research bank. In contrast, the work in aesthetic criticism and the autobiographic research of the psycho-analytic focus originated without the benefit of established or parallel research efforts relating aesthetic or psycho-analytic theories to curriculum.

These differences are reflected in the texture of each of the sections in Chapters III and IV. For example, the aesthetic/philosophic theme is least developed within the five reconceptual books and the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing (although the latter publication does tend to give more space to the historic, aesthetic, and psycho-analytic perspectives than the social/political). Therefore this researcher will supplement the aesthetic theme with some works on the topic that appear ouside these publications, but will confine the study to a more superficial treatment of the topic, one that highlights, its main themes. The

psycho-analytic discussion will be somewhat more developed, with the social/political perspective receiving the greatest degree of attention. This pattern of emphasis coincides with this researcher's assessment of the comparative degree of development of each perspective.

The Aesthetic/Philosophic Critique

The thrust of the aesthetic/philosophic critique is the concern for the intrinsic nature and quality of educational experience, apart from its utilitarian function for the achievement of goals. The original outline of this critique was forged by Dwayne Huebner in his opposition to the centrality of the categories of objectives and learning in curriuclum theory. In addition to Huebner's work, these themes have also been developed by Maxine Greene and to some extent by James B. Macdonald. While Greene is primarily a philosopher of education, two of her essays have been included in collections of reconceptual literature and her current research continues to offer insight into alternative modes of curriculum inquiry with particular emphasis on the aesthetic. Germane to this chapter is her discussion of the search for personal meaning in curriculum. Macdonald's concern for the "person in the curriculum" also contributes to the aesthetic/philosophic critique. While this chapter focuses on the critique they have developed, thereby freezing their work for one still picture of an earlier period in their research, it should be remembered that it is but one frame in their continually developing scholarship.

As a starting point, Huebner offers two critical assumptions about the curriculum field:

1. Current conceptions of curriculum are inadequate, in that they tie the educative process only to the world of man's technique and exclude ties to the world of his spirit.

2. This inadequacy stems from an overdependency upon a conception of value as goals or objectives, and a consequent overdependency upon learning as the major characteristic of man's temporality.[1]

Huebner refers to the categories of objectives and learning as myths embedded in curricular language.[2] He sees value in continuing to use these categories but not to the extent that they "prevent the development of other forms of curriculuar thought."[3]

Huebner's critique of objectives is grounded in his concern for man's temporality, a concept revealing the existential foundations of his work. The problem with defining specific objectives is that it is viewed as a technical process that is focused on future goals, often forgetting the past. In other words, decisions about the future involve knowledge of where a society has been and how it arrived at that point. Huebner expresses the relationship of temporality to objectives this way:

> Basically, the determination of objectives is the search for the bridge between the past and the future; it is argument over the degree of continuity necessary for change, or the amount of change that is necessary for continuity; it is concern for the balance between succession and duration. All of these categories are concerned with society's existence "in time" and refer to man's concern for the historical continuity which gives his social forms and institutions some kind of stability, yet vitality, as they emerge from yesterday into tomorrow. Unfortunately, the educator's too easy acceptance of the function of or the necessity for purposes or objectives has replaced the need for a basic awareness of his historicity.[4]

A second criticism Huebner raises in reference to the definition of clear goals is that the concern for order, clarity, and simplification ignores the fact that the task of choosing purposes is a political process. He states:

> It is too easy to forget that debate about educational objectives is part of the continuous struggle of rival political ideologies, which has its consequences in who controls the educational environment. The problem of living historically, or at least of living as an historically aware person, is not resolved by pronouncements of goals or purposes, but by engaging in political action.[5]

Together, his two criticisms of objectives discussed in the preceding paragraphs point not to the negation of objectives as a concern for curriculum, but rather to the limitations of the concept for expressing other educational realitites——specifically, temporality and politics. A third limitation he briefly touches upon is that the focus on the future often obscured the present. The present comes into play when the educator works with the student. His concern is that if the educator maintains a past or future orientation, he/she may lose contact with the student and the educational process.[6]

Huebner also exposes the problems resulting from interpreting learning only in psychological terms. Grounded in behavioral psychology, the concept of learning focuses on change in behavior. Huebner asserts that while this focus explains how some forms of patterning or conditioning occur, it does not explain man as creator, as transcendent being.[7] In his opinion, this view is misdirected, for it fails to see that the individual lives in the world, not apart from it. Drawing upon the existential discussion developed by Heidegger, he explains:

> The unit of study, as Heidegger, among others, points out, is a "being-in-the-world." Any system of thought dealing with human change as something that happens within the individual is likely to lead the educator astray. However, if a curricular language can be developed so that the educator looks at the individual and the situation together, not separately, then his powers of curricular design and educational responsiblity might be increased.[8]

In another vein, Huebner discusses a second consequence of perceiving education as something one does to the individual, in his contention that education so viewed becomes abstract and alienating. Activities are developed "to motivate, to build readiness, to direct attention, to give head starts."[9] The point is that these activities are determined by the meanings and possibilities of others and imposed over the unheard meanings, and possibilities of children.[10]

Maxine Greenealso critiques the concept of learning by discussing the implications of the way learning is presently viewed for the development of individual meaning. Like Huebner, she perceives part of the problem to be the separation of knowledge of the world from the individual.

> Curriculum, from the learner's standpoint, ordinarily represents little more than an arrangement of subjects, a structure of socially prescribed knowledge, or a complex system of meanings which may or may not fall within his grasp. Rarely does it signify possibility for him as an existing person, mainly concerned with making sense of his own life-world.[11]

From this standpoint, learning is not an isolated phenomenon occurring within the individual, but a process that occurs only as the individual acts upon his world.

Given this interpretation of learning, Greene points out that schools do much to mitigate the inquiry and self-awareness needed to enter into this intersubjective relation ship with the world.

> The trouble is, of course, that most people are too immersed in daily life to be aware of how they constitute their worlds. Taking for granted the commonsense appearance of things, governing themselves by the recipes others impose on them for structuring the intersubjective

> world, they function habitually and compliantly.... It seems evident that the schools encourage immersion, deliberately or unthinkingly. The schools create the kind of reality that absorbs those within it and thereby serves to submerge consciousness. This, fundamentally, is the nature of the oppression they impose. This is what makes it so difficult for people to learn how to learn.[12]

In Greene's vision, instead of curriculum being a set of given facts, rules, or structures to be learned, it should be a set of possibilities and perspectives that the student interprets and orders to develop his/her own set of meanings. In this way the learner becomes a conscious subject, aware of his/her possibilities for choice, self direction, action, and ultimately transcendence.[13]

Another problem with the concept of learning, discussed by both Huebner and Macdonald, is the instrumental type of valuing that it fosters. Huebner contends that the focus on learning perpetuates a means-ends rationality by leading educators to ask what is to be learned and how. While these are important questions, they exclude other ways of valuing educational activity. Hence, effectiveness becomes the sole criterion for evaluation.[14]

Like the earlier historical critique, Huebner and Macdonald discuss the manipulative consequences of instrumental valuing. As Huebner states:

> The goal-oriented, person-shaping ideology of curriculum implies that youngsters can be molded to reach predetermined behaviors. The educational process is more complicated than that. The act of education is an act of human influence—or of "initiation," as Peters would say—and there is nothing more complicated or awesome. The school is the meeting ground of a man becoming aware that he has a destiny and a social group seeking to determine that destiny. It is this idea of destiny that curriculum thought has destroyed by making learning the most important single concept in its language repertoire. In a sense, destiny has been replaced by destination, and learning has become the only valued form of living in school.[15]

Expressing a similar point, Macdonald states that the means-end schema "violates the integrity of the person by segmenting his behavior and manipulating him for an end beyond his immediate experiencing in the curriculum."[16]

Value of the Aesthetic/Philosophic Critique

Together, these arguments presented by Huebner, Greene, and Macdonald have developed a case of sufficient strength to call into question the continued domination of objectives and learning as central categories of curriculum thought. Their critique has had the primary value of encouraging curricularists to shift their focus from instrumental valuing to other modes of educational valuing. This had led to increased interest in exploring qualitative evaluation[17] and aesthetic criticism.[18] The other major aspect of Huebner's aesthetic/philosophic critique—the concern for man's temporality—has not been pursued.

The Psycho-Analytic Critique

Almost all of the reconceptual literature with psycho-analytic foundations is post-critical in function and will therefore be considered in Chapter IV. The one article that does serve as a psycho-analytic critique of schooling is William Pinar's "Sanity, Madness, and the School."[19] His purpose in this article is to explore how schooling experience contributes to dehumanization —to "psychic deterioration." Drawing upon the psychoanalytic theory and social phenomenology of Laing and Cooper, Pinar identified twelve interrelated effects of schooling. The following list enumerates the twelve effects he detected and follows each with a capsulized explanation:

1. Hypertrophy or Atrophy of Fantasy Life

   A child may retreat into daydreaming to save herself from boredom, or conversely may refuse to allow herself to daydream. Adults may wrongly conclude the child is withdrawn or in the latter case assume that the child is unimaginative.

2. Division or Loss or Self to Others via Modeling

   Children are taught to admire and model themselves after others; they learn to be dissatisfied with themselves.

3. Dependence and Arrested Development of Autonomy

   Children become dependent on teachers and fail to develop self-esteem, self-acceptance, the ability to make choices, and other characteristics of autonomy.

4. Criticism by Others and the Loss of Self-Love

   One's self-worth hinges upon the approval and disapproval of others.

5. Thwarting of Affiliative Needs

   Schools operate in ways that discourage the development of healthy interpersonal relationships.

6. Estrangement from Self and Its Effect upon the Process of Individuation

   Schooling "numbs children to their own experience," to their own feelings. Schools emphasize cognitive development at the expense of feeling and self-understanding.

7. Self-direction Becomes Other-direction

   Children are trained to respond to extrinsic motivation rather than intrinsic motivation.

8. Loss of Self and Internalization of Externalized Self

   The outer voices and motives, the expectations of role become internalized.

9. Internalization of the Oppressor: Development of a False-Self System

   The child, responding to the alienation of schooling, learns to pretend to be something that he/she is not in order to "play the game."

10. Alienation from Personal Reality Due to Impersonality of Schooling Groups

    The impersonality of existence in large groups in schools contributes to the loss of self.

11. Desiccation via Disconfirmation

    The child's spirit is sapped through an impersonal schooling experience that makes one feel anonymous, unnoticed, unloved.

12. Atrophy of Capacity to Perceive Esthetically and Sensuously

    The dreariness and over-rationalized reality of schooling limit esthetic and sensuous sensibility.

Pinar concludes this psycho-analytic portraiture of schooling with this observation: "The cumulative effect of the schooling experience is devastating. We graduate, credentialed but crazed, erudite but fragmented shells of the human possibility."[20] While Pinar's critique stands as the only one of this sort in reconceptual literature, the body of literature in the wider field of education that describes the dehumanizing, alientating effects of schooling is far from scant. One need only consult works associated with humanistic education and the romantic radicals for similar interpretations of schooling.[21]

Pinar and Madeleine Grumet have been the major theorists developing the psycho-analytic theme of reconceptual literature, with some theorists newer on the scene contributing to that research, primarily through articles to the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing. As stated earlier, the major focus of this research is post-critical. Rather than attempting to probe further into the psychological effects of schooling on the student, these theorists have instead chosen to investigate the rediscovery of self, the relationship of self-understanding to one's research, and the relationship of the knower to the known. The discussion of these themes will be presented in Chapter IV. Since the major intent of these theorists is post-critical research, I will not offer critical commentary on Pinar's psychoanalytic critique of schooling, but instead reserve that commentary for assessment of the post-critical psychoanalytic work in the next chapter. The value of having focused attention on this critique is that it describes the set of concerns from which Pinar developed his method of currere, to be discussed in Chapter IV.

The Social/Political Critique

Introduction to the social/political critique. Of the four critical themes, the social/political critique of the curriculum field is the most extensively developed. Articles discussing this theme are presented in the two books of reconceptual literature edited by William Pinar, and are written by a range of theorists including Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Donald Bateman, John Steven Mann, William Murphy, William Pilder, and Michael Apple. In addition to these two volumes, the social/political theme is the main concern of both ASCD's Schools in Search of Meaning and Michael Apple's Ideology and Curriculum. In addition to these volumes, numerous articles have been published in a variety of educational journals by theorists such as Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, Thomas Popkewitz, Jean Anyon, and Philip Wexler developing the political analysis of curriculum and schooling. This section of the study will focus on the political discussions in the reconceptual books, as well as the articles of Michael Apple and Henry Giroux, due to the former's leadership role in developing and refining critical scholarship, and the latter's contribution to refining critical educational theory and extending it to the analysis of specific issues in education.

To set the stage for analysis of the social/political critique, it is helpful to consider the political values that guide the discussion, the intent of the critique, the need for critical educational scholarship, and the theoretical roots in which the discussion is grounded. The first of these items, the larger social and political vision that guides the critique, is reflected in the writings of nearly all the political critics in their concern for a society based on social justice and equality of outcome for all individuals regardless of race, sex, or social class. With this social ideal in mind, Dwayne Huebner has enumerated three rights that must guide discussion of both the larger society and the school:

1. The unconditional respect for the political, civil, and legal rights of the young as free people participating in a public world.

2. The right of access to the wealth in the public domain––I mean primarily the knowledge, traditions, skills that shape and increase a person's power in the public world.

3. The right of each individual, regardless of age, to participate in the shaping and reshaping of the institutions within which he lives.[21]

Michael Apple has pointed out that this concern for social justice is generated from not only personal ideology, but from empirical evidence that "the gap between rich and poor in advanced industrial nations is increasing."[22] He posits the following theory of social justice:

> For a society to be just it must, as a matter of both principle and action, contribute most to the advantage of the least advantaged. That is, its structural relations must be such as to equalize not merely access to but actual control of cultural, social, and especially economic institutions.[23]

The intent of the political critique is centered in the dialectic of domination and emancipation. Social/political critics have asserted that the inequities of the existing society are maintained through social, economic, political, and educational institutions that unconsciously function in ways that preserve the power and interests of dominant groups in society while excluding or limiting the power and interests of oppressed groups. The task of critical scholarship is to illuminate how that unseen domination takes place so that emancipation from those institutional patterns and their outcomes can be fostered. As Henry Giroux has pointed out, emancipation in this sense is based upon both critique and action. "It is aimed at criticizing that which is restrictive and oppressive, while at the same time, supporting action in the service of individual freedom and well being."[24] Michael Apple summarizes well the intent of critical educational scholarship:

> The intent of such a critique and of critical scholarship in general, then, is twofold. First it aims at illuminating the tendencies for unwarranted and often unconscious domination, alienation, and repression within certain existing cultural, political, educational, and economic institutions. Second, through exploring the negative effects and contradictions of much that unquestionably goes on in these institutions, it seeks to 'promote conscious (individual and collective) emancipatory activity.' That is, it examines what is supposed to be happening in say, schools if one takes the language and slogans of many school people seriously; and it then shows how these things actually work in a manner that is destructive of ethical rationality and personal political and institutional power. Once this actual functioning is held up to scrutiny, it attempts to point to concrete activity that will lead to challenging this taken for granted activity.[25]

As explained earlier in Chapter II on the historical critique, this type of critical scholarship is needed since these institutional patterns and the basic categories we use to guide our thought and action are based on taken-for-granted assumptions that are rarely questioned. Due to that nonreflective stance it is all the more important, as Michael Apple contends, to develop systematic criticism of those basic categories and practices in order to "produce problematic institutions and agents who fill them."[26]

The theoretical roots of this critical scholarship are primarily grounded in what Michael Apple has referred to as neo-Marxist argumentation.[27] The Marxian influence is evidenced by: the use of analytic categories such as social class and hegemony; the development of a dialectical, historical, and relational mode of analysis; and the explication of the significance of the critical theory developed by neo-Marxist scholars[28] for the development of a critical theory of education. What is important to distinguish concerning this theoretical orientation is that reconceptual theorists have borrowed the analytic tools and perceptions of the neo-Marxist critique of culture and ideology rather than the dogmatism of orthodox Marxism.

The early social/political critique. The initial social/political critiques of curriculum and schooling found in reconceptual literature are those published in Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory and in Schools in Search of Meaning. They were significant works because they introduced the broad outline of the social/political interpretation of the relationship between schools and the

larger society, and suggested partial explanations of how schools operate to maintain the status quo. two contributions will be noted briefly to provide the background information needed for analyzing the more extensively developed and systematic critique found in the respective works of Michael Apple and Henry Giroux.

The major assertion of the social/political commentary on schooling is that schools legitimize the existing society which is marred by inequality and injustice.

> We begin with the assertion that the schools serve to legitimize the present social structure. The present social structure, called advanced United States capitalism, is characterized by: (a) bureaucratic organization, (b) hierarchical lines of authority, (c) job fragmentation, and (d) unequal rewards. Fundamental to this system is the way individuals are allocated to the roles they will play in the hierarchy, and the justification on "objective" bases of unequal rewards. The schools serve this allocation function to a considerable degree. Education legitimates the social order by presenting a stance of objectively rewarding youngsters on measured cognitive achievement in the context of accepting the fundamental and critical nature of cognitive skills for success in the system.[29]

In this view, schools are seen not as neutral institutions, but rather as political agencies that serve the purpose of domination and social stratification.[30] Donald Bateman writes of the domination of the "poor by the rich, (racial minorities) by whites, women by men, and students by teachers."[31] Drawing upon the works of Paulo Freire, he asserts that schools maintain a pedagogy of oppression that mystifies reality, domesticates, and inhibits dialogue and creativity. John Steven Mann contends that schools serve the interests of the ruling or owning class over the interests of "people who will be exploited by the ruling class throughout their adult life."[32] Dwayne Huebner describes the contradiction between those interested in developing the future emergent in the lives of children and those whose interests lie with continuuing a future that stems from the "everydayness--the structures, orderliness, and meanings attached to the school and school related pursuits."[33] In all these cases, the school is seen as perpetuating the power of those groups that already have it.

Among the works in the early social/political critique, two theorists other than Michael Apple introduced the examination of specific ways schools operate to legitimize society. John Steven Mann outlined three forms of school activity that express ruling class interests: "control of ideology, control of knowledge, and control of training for the work force."[34] James Macdonald described three forms of consciousness (technological, bureaucratic, and consumer) that are prevalent in the larger society and are reproduced in schools. He maintained that these forms of consciousness influenced the development of specific schooling practices and social relationships, and that they can be seen as forms of false consciousness when viewing the contradictions between the interests of those experienceing the activities and those imposing the activities.[35] Both of these works, while providing interesting initial insights into the specific ways that schools mediate the interests of the larger society, lack a fully developed systematic critical framework for performing that function. Since the writing of these earlier works, social/political inquiry has made significant progress. Attention will now be turned to analysis of the more elaborate critical framework developed in the works of both Michael Apple and Henry Giroux.

The extended social/political critique. There are both similarities and differences between the social/political critiques developed by Michael Apple and Henry Giroux. Both use neo-Marxist argumentation in their critique of curriculum and schooling. Both analyze the various perspectives that have contributed to the development of a social/political critique of education: principally the political economists, and the social phenomenologists. Apple's primary focus and his principal achievement has been on the development of a critical framework for exploring the relationship of ideology and curriculum that includes the strengths

of those preceding perspectives but avoids their weaknesses. That task involves the construction of a set of critical categories and the develop ment of a critical theory that explains the power of those categories in illuminating the political nature of education. Giroux's research has given attention to refining these categories and suggesting additional ones. His major contribution, however, has been to explore the extension of the critical framework by revealing how it can be used to illuminate and reconceptualize specific issues in education. Moreover, his works also develops suggestions for countering the ideologically oppressive consequences of schooling.

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, critical work can be seen on a continuum from critique of what is, to post-critical, ongoing theorizing of what could be. Apple's critique is treated in Chapter III by summarizing what the use of his critical categories and framework explain about the ways that ideology is mediated through curriculum. Similar aspects of Giroux's work are also dealt with in Chapter III. Their respective works are treated as post-critical in Chapter IV by examining how the critical framework can be used to transform curriculum theory and practice. Here, the intent is to show that the critical framework has value beyond critiquing schools as they exist today; it can be used as a critical theory of education to expose the moral, social, and political nature of new educational issues, practices, and policies——to reconceptualize the way we perceive and address current problems and issues in education. Giroux gives more attention to this point, and this aspect of his work will receive attention in Chapter IV. Finally, the suggestions that both theorists have made concerning the relationship between critical theory and radical praxis will be explored in Chapter IV. With this preface as an explanation of how their research will be treated in this study, attention will now turn to summarizing the critical categories and what they reveal about curriculum and schooling.

The relationship of ideology and curriculum. To understand the social/political critique one must understand the meaning of the concepts of ideology and hegemony as they are used by Apple and Giroux. Secondly, one must understand the concept of cultural and economic reproduction, which explains how ideology is mediated through curriculum and schools. After analysis of these two overarching concepts, one follows Apple's argument by analyzing three specific ways that ideology is mediated through curriculum. These three areas of inquiry are:

> (1) The basic regularities of school experience and what covert ideological teaching goes on because of them; (2) what ideological commitments are embedded within the overt curriculum; and (3) the ideological, ethical, and valuative underpinnings of the ways we ordinarily think about, plan, and evaluate these experiences.[36]

From this point these areas will be referred to as: (1) the hidden curriculum; (2) the overt curriculum; and (3) curricular theories or perspectives.

Giroux's research has also contributed to analysis of those three areas; therefore, supporting points from his research will be used to complement Apple's framework.

Ideology and hegemony. Historically, interpretations of the concept of ideology have varied considerably.[37] Apple has described differences among these interpretations according to: (1) the scope of phenomena that are treated as ideological; and (2) the function that ideologies perform. He states that the phenomena can be grouped into these three categories:

> (1) Quite specific rationalizations or justifications of the activities of particular and identifiable occupational groups (e.g., professional ideologies); (2) broader political programs and social movements; and (3) comprehensive world-views, outlooks, or what Berger and Luckman and others have called symbolic universes.[38]

Functionally, he describes two main types, although he acknowledges others. In the first sense, he refers to the position that sees ideology as a form of false consciousness that distorts reality in the interests of dominant groups. In the second sense, he describes the view of ideology as a system of symbols that are the key to interpreting any social reality. Thus, he has pointed out that the concept of ideology has a dual role: it both provides meaning and advocates positions. He puts it this way:

> ... (A)ny serious treatment of ideology has to contend with both its scope and its function, with its dual role as a set of rules that give meaning and its rhetorical potency in arguments over power and resources.[39]

With this preface describing the nature of ideology, the question then becomes: how does the concept of ideology help social/political theorists of education understand how schools legitimate the existing society? To answer this question, critical theorists have investigated how schools distribute the meanings of dominant ideologies. It is the critical category, hegemony, that explains this process.

The concept of hegemony was developed by Antonio Gramsci and refers to ideological control through dissemination of dominant social practices, meanings, and values that become so pervasive that they saturate consciousness and become accepted as social reality. Apple has quoted Raymond Williams' discussion of hegemony liberally in order to capture the complexity of the notion, and for the same purpose it is worth quoting one of Williams' longer passages here:

> (Hegemony) is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary understanding of man and his world. It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced (as a) reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of a society to move in most areas of their lives. But this is not, except in the operation of a moment of abstract analysis, a static system. On the contrary we can only understand an effective and dominant culture if we understand the real social process on which it depends: I mean the process of incorporation. The modes of incorporation are of great significance, and incidentally in our kind of society have considerable economic significance. The educational institutions are usually the main agencies of transmission of an effective dominant culture, and this is now a major economic as well as cultural activity; indeed it is both in the same moment. Moreover, at a philosophical level, at the true level of theory and at the level of the history of various practices, there is a process which I call the selective tradition: that which, within the terms of an effective dominant culture, is always passed off as 'the tradition,' the significant past. But always the selectivity is the point; the way in which from a whole possible area of past and present, certain meanings and practices are neglected and excluded. Even more crucially, some of these meanings are reinterpreted, diluted, or put into forms which support or at least do not contradict other elements within the effective dominant culture.
>
> The process of education; the processes of a much wider social training within institutions like the family; the practical definitions and organization of work; the selective tradition at an intellectual and theoretical level; all these forces are involved in a continual making and remaking of an effective dominant culture, and on them, as experiences, as built into our living, reality depends. If what we learn were merely an imposed ideology, of if it were only the isolable meanings and practices of the ruling class, or if a section of the ruling class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely the top of our minds, it would be——and one would be glad——a very much easier thing to overthrow.[40]

Given the above explanation of hegmony, two points should be stressed. First, the concept reveals the role of schools and other cultural institutions in perpetuating forms of consciousness that result in covert social control, making overt forms of domination and repression unnecessary for maintaining the power of dominant groups.[41] Secondly, hegemony points to a complex set of cultural relationships, meanings and practices as mediators of dominant ideology, thus challenging earlier notions that suggested a deterministic relationship between the economic base and the school, with the latter being merely a mirror reflection of the economic structure.[42] This distribution will be explained further in the upcoming discussion of cultural and economic reproduction.

Cultural and economic reproduction. The explanation of how schools reflect and perpetuate the inequities of the larger society is developed in the discussion of cultural and economic reproduction. Within the past decade, this concept has been developed by two schools of thought: the political economists[43] and the new sociologists of education.[44] Henry Giroux has broadly stated the concept as: "A process which mediates the social practices and cultural beliefs necessary to maintatin the dominance of certain groups and power structures."[45] Both of these perspectives have interpreted specific ways that schools serve the process of reproduction. Apple, Giroux, and others have discussed the limitations of both perspectives and suggested a synthesis (involving the concept of hegemony) that provides a more comprehensive theory of cultural and economic reproduction.

The political economy approach, developed most extensively by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis in Schooling in Capitalist America, describes the ways that the school functions to reproduce among its students the norms and values needed for the workplace. Moreover, this perspective asserts that the hidden curriculum of school socialization teaches different sets of habits, practices, norms and values to students based on social class, race and sex differences, thereby channeling them into their respective slots to the labor market and maintaining the existing class structure. This argument is based upon the correspondence principle, which asserts that the school is determined by the economic structure; therefore the characteristics of the workplace are mirrored in the schools. Michael Apple summarizes the principle this way:

> Broadly, correspondence theories imply that there are specific characteristics, behavioral traits, skills, and dispositions that an economy requires of its workers. These economic needs are so powerful as to 'determine' what goes on in other sectors of a society, particularly the school. Thus, if we look at our educational institutions, we should expect to find that the tacit things taught to students roughly mirror the personality and dispositional traits that these students will 'require' later on when they join the labor market.[46]

Apple credits the correspondence theory with exposing relationships between schooling and society that were "hidden in the past."[47] Giroux discusses two contributions of the theory.[48] First, it shows that the school must be analyzed in its socio-economic context; that its function is understood by its relationship to the larger society. Second, rather than blaming teachers and students for educational failure, its class analysis of schooling points to the "structural dynamics of the dominant society," reproduced within the school, as the root of the problem. Giroux stresses the importance of this point because it contradicts the claim that education is neutral. In this regard, the correspondence theory exposes the rhetoric of neutrality as a piece of ideology which in its failure to see the relationship of schooling to society ends up supporting the inequities of that society as they are reproduced in the schools.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned contributions, the correspondence theory has come under attack for its limitation. The most serious flaw discussed by Apple and Giroux is its overdetermined, mechanistic view of economic reproduction. Consequently, Giroux has argued that "the correspondence theory fails both as a theory of reproduction and as a theory for educational change."[49] As a theory of reproduction it fails because it ignores the complexity and interrelatedness of cultural as well as economic factors that

mediate dominant ideologies. On this point Apple states:

> There is an exceptionally intricate relationship between economic captial and cultural capital, one that is more than that of the mere mechanistic reflection of 'base in super-structure.' As Raymond Williams, Louis Althusser, and other European Marxists continually remind us, reality is more dynamic, more complex, than reductive theories of correspondence can do justice to. This is not to deny the basic argument that schools, through their linkages with other institutions, seem to serve particular economic and social purposes. Rather, it is to begin to see how this actually operates in all its contradictions and permutations, without reducing cultural life to mere epiphenomena.[50]

On the second point, both theorists point out that the correspondence theory fails as a theory for educational change becasue it reduces schools and the actors within them to passive objects that are mere reflections of economic determination. It ignores the interplay of competing socio/cultural forces, and ideologies that create contradictions and resistances to the dominant ideology. Moreover, it fails to see that owing to those contradictions there is a degree of autonomous space within institutions that affords the opportunity to develop alternatives.[51] To underscore the political potential of these resistances, Apple has described studies of the workplace that reveal the development of both overt resistance through union actions and covert resistance through the informal norms of the workplace. He draws the parallel that if resistance exists in the workplace, then a correspondence between the economy and schools would also imply that resistance exists within schools. And indeed this is the point of a study Apple describes to support his conclusion, Paul Willis's Learning to Labour,[52] an ethnographic study of the ways that working-class male youths in England develop a counter-school culture that resists the formal and hidden messages of the school. However, in pointing out the overly deterministic implications of the correspondence theory, Apple also cautions that one must not adopt an overly romantic view:

> Struggle and conflict may indeed exist; but that does not mean that they will be sucessful. The success is determined by the structural limitations and selection processes that occur in our day-to-day lives.[53]

The second perspective that contributes to the understanding of cultural and economic reproduction, the new sociology of education, was given impetus by the publication of a collection of works edited by Michael F.D. Young in Knowledge and Control. This perspective is rooted in the phenomonological influence on social science. Its central premise is that reality is socially constructed; that individual interpretation of reality (subjective meaning) develops from continuing patterns of interaction of people (intersubjectivity) in their daily routines.[54] That perspective, applied to education, has led social phenomenologists to engage in anthropological studies of the classroom to discover how teachers and students constitute the meanings they attach to their life in schools. A second area of research has been to focus on the corpus of school knowledge itself to ascertain whose meanings are reflected in and transmitted by that knowledge.

In contrast to the political economy approach that views the individual as a passive determined object, the new sociology of education sees the individual as a conscious subject creating his/her own meanings and definitions of acceptable classroom practice, pedagogy, and curriculum. In this regard, the notion of the social construction of reality is helpful because it asserts the importance in educational theorizing of the will and intentionality of the conscious subject. However, this point is also viewed as a flaw by neo-Marxist scholars[55] because it fails to consider the material conditions that influence the selection, distribution, and continued dominance of particular meanings. As Apple puts it:

> The general principle of the social construction of reality does not explain why certain social and cultural meaning and not others are distributed through schools; nor does it explain how

> the control of the knowledge preserving and producing institutions may be linked to the ideological dominance of powerful groups in a social collectivity.[56]

In comparing the two perspectives, Giroux points out that both perspectives "posit an unwarranted division between the subject and the object, and in doing so eliminate the subject from reality."[57] In essence, the political economy perspective eliminates the conscious subject, whereas the new sociology of education overemphasizes the conscious subject and eliminates the influence of the material conditions of objective reality. Both perspectives have, however, contributed to the understanding of cultural and economic reproduction, by revealing important areas to investigate as mediating links of the dominant ideology. Political economists have shown the importance of examining school socialization through the hidden curriculum of daily routine and social relationships, while the new sociologists have added to that focus the sociology of school knowledge. In Apple's words: "Schools, therefore, 'process' both knowledge and people."[58]

Building upon the contributions of both of these perspectives and the critical scholarship that has critiqued them, both Apple and Giroux suggest complementary views of a more comprehensive theory of economic reproduction. Their views involve redefinition of old concepts, the incorporation of new concepts stemming from continuing critical scholarhip, and a suggested synthesis of the economic structural focus with the micro-analysis of cultural interaction.

First, Giroux points out that the correspondence theory, with its view of economic determination, needs to be informed by the concept of hegemony which "redefines the meaning of domination and reproduction," by pointing to culture and ideology as important hegemonic elements.[59] The exploration of the notion of hegemony has resulted in a more sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms of control by illuminating the interconnected roles of a variety of cultural institutions. Giroux links hegemony to social reproduction this way:

> A more comprehensive theory of ideology and social reproduction occurs when hegemony is related to all the major spheres of social existence. Kellner demonstrates this by identifying four major ideological realms. These include: (1) the economic realm, i.e., ideologies of production, exchange, distribution, etc.; (2) the cultural realm, i.e. ideologies of the private sphere, family, education, social groups, etc.; (3) the social realm, i.e., ideologies of the private sphere, family, education, social groups, etc.; (4) the political realm, i.e., ideologies of the state, democracy, civil rights, legal-judicial system, police and military, etc. While the dominant ideology inhabits and functions in all of these realms, there are contradictions both within and among the institutions that transmit their various ideologies.[60]

It follows from the relation of hegemony to reproduction that the notion of determination can be redefined, as Apple has done here:

> It (determination) can be thought of much more flexibly, as a complex nexus of relationships, which in their final moments, may be economically rooted, but which exert pressures and set limits on (rather than mechanistically determine) cultural practice. The focus here, hence is both on the kinds of partial autonomy institutions and cultural processes might have within these limits.[61]

This all encompassing perspective on the complexity of relationships between cultural institutions is referred to as "social totality," or, as Apple calls it, the theory of "social polity."[62] It creates areas of inquiry that connect consideration of : characteristics and outcomes of the mode of production; the social class basis of differential benefits of economic production; the ways that broad patterns of class reproduc-

tion are manifested in the daily lives of real people; and the origin and location of struggles that resist reproduction.[63]

In pursuing these areas of inquiry, Apple and Giroux, in separate works, recommend that a more comprehensive theory of cultural and economic reproduction must perform two functions. It must be general enough to analyze the structural determinants and limitations of the social order, yet specific enough to understand how those limitations and resistances to them are worked out in the daily lives of real people.[64] Two studies they refer to as representing this mode of inquiry are Education and Social Control, by Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, and the previously mentioned Learning to Labour by Paul Willis. Both studies use Marxian analysis as the macroscopic view of the social context, and link it to a microscopic analysis of specific school situations using ethnographic methodolgy. The value of this fusion of levels of analysis for a more comprehensive theory of economic and cultural reproduction is that it replaces the one-way determination, base-superstructure model with cultural analysis that is sensitive enough to detect both forces of domination and resistance.

The foregoing section on cultural and economic reproduction has traced the evolution of critical scholarship on this topic and has discussed the contributions that Apple's critique of ideology, particularly his relation of hegemony to curriculum inquiry, has made to the sophistication of the concepts of cultural and economic reproduction. It has discussed the refinements that both Apple and Giroux have made in the critical categories used as part of the critical framework and it has highlighted their contribution to developing a theory of cultural and economic reproduction that both overcomes the deficiencies of deterministic models of domination, and offers the possibility of emancipatory action. With this explanation of the critical framework and categories that are used to explain the ideological role of schools, attention will now shift to an analysis of the specific ways that schools reproduce the larger society. While the purpose of this analysis is to show how schools perpetuate ideological domination, the preceding discussion noting the existence of resistance to domination should be remenbered. It is necessary, however, to focus on the way schools mediate dominant ideology since identification of the structures and forces of domination are a prerequisite for informed emancipatory activity.

Three mediating links between ideology and curriculum. Up to this point the section on the social/political critique has summarized the concept of ideological hegemony and cultural and economic reproduction as the two major conceptual beams supporting the critical framework for analyzing the relationship between ideology and curriculum. At this juncture, the study turns to consideration of the three aspects of curriculum mentioned earlier that serve as mediating links for the reproduction of the dominant ideology in schools. Restated, they are: (1) the hidden curriculum; (2) the overt curriculum; and (3) curricular theories or perspectives guiding planning and evaluation.

The hidden curriculum and the regularities of school life

The hidden curriculum is a term initiated by Philip Jackson to refer to the process of tacit teaching whereby students learn the norms, values, and attitudes that are implicitly conveyed through the social structures and relationships of classroom life.[65] Jackson describes three features of classroom life that mediate those norms and attributes: crowds, praise, and power. Since this first description of the hidden curriculum, the concept has been treated in a variety of ways in literature on the political socialization of students,[66] resulting in a vagueness that has prompted Elizabeth Vallance, one of the early architects of the concept, to observe that it has "been stretched and reshaped so much in recent years that it has become difficult to see the real shape of (the concept)."[67] Both Apple and Giroux have extended the concept beyond the process of school socialization to also include the ideological values implicit in the selection and organization of the overt curriculum (the formal corpus of school knowledge selected for instruction). This

section will explore the ways they have used the concept to expose the ideological implications of specific features of school life, leaving the discussion of the hidden curriculum of school knowledge to the next section. The division, however, is artificial since the two areas interpenetrate each other.

One aspect of this analysis is to examine how curriculum if filtered through the commonsense practices of teachers in their interactions with students, or what Apple refers to as the "curriculum in use."[68] Another part of the analysis is to examine classroom practices and patterns of organization, which Giroux refers to as structural properties.[69] The important point to remember is that the analysis of the hidden curriculum at the level of classroom practice serves the purpose of providing specific examples to show how ideology is reproduced through the school.

The relationship between the commonsense practices of teachers and their ideological assumptions is discussed in a study of a kindergarten class, written jointly by Apple and Nancy King.[70] One of the striking observations concerned the set of values attached by both teachers and students to the separate categories of work and play. There was a strong division between the two activities, with work being considered more important than play by both the teacher and students. The children interpreted all teacher-directed activities as work and free time activities as play. All work had to be done at the specified time within the time allotted. Work was compulsory. The authors concluded that the values implicit in these practices tacitly stated that: work is something one is told to do; compliance and completion of tasks are more important than quality of performance, similarly, diligence, perseverance, obedience, and participation are more important than the quality of the work. All of these practices surrounding work and play were predicated upon the teacher's assumptions and values. The point Apple and King make is that educators need to examine the ways that ideological presuppositions work through them and influence the way they structure their classroom practices and pedagogy. As they state:

> What is the commonsense interpretive framework of teachers and to what set of ideological presuppositions does it respond? In this way we can situate classroom knowledge and activity within the larger framework of structural relationships which, either through teacher and parent expectations, the classroom material environment, the focus of important problems, or the relationship between schools and, say, the economic sector of a society, often determine what goes on in classrooms.[71]

It is primarily Giroux's work that provides insight into the second aspect of the analysis of the hidden curriculum, the structural properties.[72] Giroux builds his analysis on the framework already stated by Jackson's three analytical concepts—crowds, praise, and power—but links the concepts to a more political perspective. The three characteristics of school life affect students in numerous ways. Living in crowds, students learn to deny their own wishes—to be isolated within the group. Through the continued use of praise and rewards, students are constantly evaluated in regard to both academic performance and personality traits. Students learn about power, or more aptly, powerlessness, from the hierarchical authoritarian relationships of the classroom and school, and from their subjection to the teacher's exercise of formal and informal evaluation. Stemming from these three concepts, Giroux has postulated the following structural properties of the hidden curriculum: "a rigid time schedule, tracking and social sorting, delay and denial, hierarchical social relationships, the correspondence between evaluation and power, and the fragmented and isolated interpersonal dynamics of the educational encounter."[73] The fundamental point is that aspects of classroom social interactions, practices, and organizational structures can be identified that embody specific social and political values that often run counter to expressed ideals. Giroux points out that the purpose of identifying these structural properties is not to overstate their power, but rather to overcome them. The alternatives he suggests will be discussed in Chapter IV.

The hidden curriculum of school knowledge

The sociology of knowledge, in both its phenomenological and Marxist orientations, has strongly influenced curriculum inquiry into the relationship between the selection, transmission, and evaluation of school knowledge and the ideological presuppositions upon which those decisions about school knowledge are made.[74] Exposure of this relationship has changed the focus on knowledge––from the technical and psychological concerns of presenting information and inducing students to learn it––to illumination of the set of moral, social, cultural, and political values that the body of knowledge both reflects and excludes.[75] Apple has described the focus of this scholarship:

> The study of educational knowledge is a study in ideology, the investigation of what is consid-dered legitimate knowledge...by specific social groups and classes, in specific institutions, at specific historical moments.... In clearer terms, the overt and covert knowledge found within school settings and the principles of selection, organization, and evaluation of this knowledge are valuative selections from a much larger universe of possible knowledge and collection principles. As valuative selections, they must not be accepted as given, but must be made problematic––bracketed, if you will––so that the social and economic ideologies and the institutionally patterned meanings that stand behind them can be scrutinized.[76]

An important concept that Apple and Giroux have incorporated in their discussions of the sociology of curriculum knowledge is "cultural capital," a conceptual construct devised and developed by the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. Apple summarizes it as "the system of meanings, abilities, language forms, and tastes that are directly and indirectly defined by dominant groups as socially legitimate."[77] The concept is important because of what it reveals about the connection between the selection of curriculum content and social and economic domination. Apple, in explaining one way that Bourdieu's work establishes that connection, points out that schools base curriculum content and pedagogy on middle class cultural capital and in so doing ignore the fact that not all students possess "the linguistic and social competencies to handle middle class culture."[78] Just as economic capital is differentially distributed, cultural capital is also unequally distributed throughout society based largely on divisions of labor, power, and social class. The consequence of schools basing the form and content of curriculum on middle class culture is that students who do not possess that capital are, in effect, denied access to school knowledge. Apple summarizes the impact of Bourdieu's work this way:

> Bourdieu asks us, hence, to think of cultural capital as we would economic capital. Just as our dominant economic institutions are structured so that those who inherit or already have economic capital do better, so too does cultural capital act in the same way. Cultural capital ('good taste,' certain kinds of prior knowledge, abilities and language forms) is unequally distributed throughout society and this is dependent in large part on the division of labor and power within the society.' For Bourdieu, to understand completely what schools do, who succeeds and who fails, one must not see culture as neutral, as necessarily contributing to social progress. Rather one sees the culture tacitly preserved in and expected by schools as contributing to inequality outside of these institutions.[79]

To perform the ideological analysis of formal curriculum content, one must have a fine sensitivity to the types of questions to ask and the kinds of relationships to look for. The following list is a compilation of questions that Apple has articulated in a variety of his publications. They are presented here as examples of the kinds of latent meanings that can be inferred from scrutiny of curriculum content:

- Whose knowledge is it?
- Who selected it?
- Why is it organized and taught this way? To this particular group?[80]

– Whose cultural capital, both overt and covert, is placed 'within' the school curriculum?
– Whose vision of economic reality, whose principles of social justice, are embedded in the content of schooling?[81]
– Why and how are particular aspects of the collective culture presented in school as objective, factual knowledge?
– How, concretely, may official knowledge represent ideological configurations of the dominant interests in a society?
– How do schools legitimate these limited and partial standards of knowing as unquestioned truths?
– In whose interest is certain knowledge (facts, skills, and propensities and dispositions) taught in cultural institutions like school?[82]

Apple provides an example of this type of analysis in his study of the way social studies and science curricula treat the notion of conflict.[83] He posits that the topic is important because the way it is dealt with affects students' perceptions of both social and political action, and their rights to recourse. He found that the curriculum content almost completely omitted positive examples of the value of intellectual and normative conflict. He highlights the politically conservative implications of this condition when he states:

> Students in most schools and in urban centers in particular are presented with a view that serves to legitimate the existing social order since change, conflict, and man as creator as well as receiver of values and institutions are systematically neglected.[84]

Ideological implications of
guiding theories or perspectives

Apple explains the nature of this third interconnection between ideology and curriculum as follows:

> The final query seeks to make educators more aware of the ideological and epistemological commitments they tacitly accept and promote by using certain models and traditions--say a vulgar positivism, systems management, structural-functionalism, a process of social labeling, or behavior modification--in their own work. Without an understanding of these aspects of school life, one that connects them seriously to the distribution, quality, and control of work, power, ideology, and cultural knowledge outside of our educational institutions, educational theory and policy making may have less of an impact than we might hope.[85]

One of the ways that Apple has addressed himself to this area of inquiry is through his research on the social control orientation implicit within technocratic rationality and its contemporary manifestation in systems management. Also supporting Apple's research in this area is the work of Barry Franklin, discussing the political consequences of the policies and practices based on behavioral psychology. The ideological implications of both of these examples received extensive treatment in Chapter II of this study and, therefore, will not be repeated. Addressed here instead is Apple's analysis of perspectives underlying the educational practice of labeling.

In his discussion of the politics of labeling,[86] Apple points out that "expert" and "scientific" knowledge from clinical, psychological, and therapeutic perspectives is used to develop and legitimize labels used in schools that differentiate types of students. He contends that while the practice of labeling is intended to be a liberal helping device for better meeting student needs, more critical analysis reveals that it serves as another of the many mechanisms in schools that sort students into groups and channel them into slots that will lead to different social, economic, and educational possibilities and benefits. Moreover, these labels are socially constructed, based on problematic definitions of good or bad performance. Apple explains the implication:

> By using official categories and constructs such as those defined by and growing out of existing institutional practices——examples might be studies of the 'slow learner,' 'discipline problems,' and 'remediation,' curriculum researchers may be lending the rhetorical prestige of science to what may be questionable practices of an educational bureaucracy and a stratified economic system. That is, there is no rigorous attempt to examine institutional culpability.[87]

This means that the practice of labeling focuses attention on treatment of the student and diverts attention away from consideration of the inadequacies of the school itself, and the bureaucratic, cultural, and economic conditions that either caused the problem or caused the situation to be viewed as a problem. Furthermore, once labeled, the students tend to be perceived exclusively in terms of the label, as though his or her total being was defined by the label. What results is a conservative orientation of evaluation that "blames the victim" and leaves the basic arrangements of the institution in tact. Thus Apple's observations of the labeling phenomenon indicate that this seemingly neutral, scientific practice has latent political significance both for its effects on students as well as its effect in maintaining institutional stability.

In concluding this summary of the social/political critique, it is apt to point out that the examples from both Apple's and Giroux's research of the mediating links between ideology and curriculum indicate that there is a complex combination of interrelated forces involved in the process of cultural and economic reproduction. Apple sums it up well:

> It may be hard to see the results of our programmatic and intellectual labors as contributing to hegemony. Yet, by seeing how these elements fit together, relationally, with the actual structures of domination in a society, we can now begin to see the mechanisms through which cultural and economic reproduction operate in schools. In so doing we get a clear picture of why 'Them that has, gets.'[88]

Value of the social/political critique. The social/political critique has contributed to the development of alternative ways of thinking about curriculum that are similar to the contributions of the historical critique. Both perspectives have challenged traditionally held assumptions and interpreted the latent meaning of curricular theories or practices relationally, establishing their connection to the larger society. But the distinctive achievement of the social/political critique is the development of a critical framework through which to understand the interconnections between ideology and curriculum. The set of categories used to support that framework have become a new language for interpreting curriculum. The importance of this development is that it can provide teachers and other educators with the educational tools to identify the social and political roots of the educational problems they encounter. Moreover, it can replace intuitive teacher perceptions with a critical consciousness capable of penetrating mystification and promoting critical reflection on the constraints that impede their efforts.[89] Henry Giroux points to the need for this critical perspective in this statement:

> Though they (teachers) may recognize that many of the meritocratic notions about curriculum and pedagogy are flawed, they support a range of myths and beliefs about class and power that prevent them from developing insights that point to the political nature of their own practice or to the political source of the structural limitations imposed on them by existing social and economic arrangement.[90]

Thus the critical framework is essential for understanding the limitations and constraints that operate against teacher aspirations for change. Furthermore, critical understanding is a prerequisite for critical action.

Conclusion

The aesthetic/philosophic, psycho-analytic, and social/political critiques, with varying degrees of sophistication, have generated new areas of inquiry and new ways of viewing curriculum. The aesthetic/philosophic perspective, drawing upon the existential concern with experience, temporality, and "being-in-the-world," redirects attention from objectives and learning to concern for the quality of educational experience and the construction of meaning. The psycho-analytic critique, drawing upon the psycho-analytic theory and social phenomenology of Laing and Cooper, refocuses attention from concern for learning and outcomes or academic achievement of the psychic effects of schooling on the development of the self. The social/political critique draws upon the neo-Marxist critique of ideology and culture to change the curricularist's view from a microscopic focus on curriculum planning to a macroscopic view of the relationship between ideology and curriculum, examining the social and political meaning of curriculur decisions and practices. The next chapter will consider the alternatives each perspective has developed to address both the new concerns and the new visions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," in *Precedents and Promise in the Curriculum Field,* ed. Helen F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 94.
2. Dwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists,* ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Coproation, 1975), p. 219.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 220.
4. Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," in *Curriculum Theorizing,* pp. 238-239.
5. *Ibid.,* p. 239.
6. Huebner, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," p. 240.
7. *Ibid.,* pp. 241-243.
8. *Ibid.,* p. 242.
9. Dwayne Huebner, "The Recreative and the Established," in *Schools in Search of Meaning,* ed. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 35.
10. *Ibid.*
11. Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness," in *Curriculum Theorizing,* p. 299.
12. Maxine Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum," in *Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory,* ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 74.
13. *Ibid.,* pp. 70-71.
14. Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," p. 101.
15. *Ibid.,* p. 98.
16. James B. Macdonald, "The Person in the Curriculum," in *Precedents and Promise,* p. 41.
17. Various approaches to qualitative evaluation can be found in George Willis, ed., *Qualitative Evaluation* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1978).
18. Elliot W. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1979).
19. William Pinar, "Sanity, Madness, and the School," in *Curriculum Theorizing,* pp. 359-383.
20. The following authors are among the educational critics referred to as romantic radicals: Paul Goodman, Edgar Z. Friedenberg, John Holt, Herbert Kohl, Jonathan Kozol, Neil Postman, Charles Weingartner, George Dennison, Allen Graubard, Ivan Illich, and Charles Silberman. For an excellent review of their works see Henry J. Perkinson, *Two Hundred years of American Educational Thought* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1976).
21. Dwayne Huebner, "Poetry and Power: The Politics of Curricular Development," in *Curriculum Theorizing,* pp. 276-279.
22. Michael Apple, "On Analyzing Hegemony," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing,* 1, No. 1 (Winter 1979), p. 23.
23. *Ibid.*

24. Henry Giroux, "Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education," *Curriculum Inquiry* (in press).

25. Michael Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).

26. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

28. Neo-Marxist scholars often cited in reconceptual literature are: Max Horkeimer, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Antonio Gramsci, and Raymond Williams.

29. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret, eds., Introd., *Schools in Search of Meaning*, p. 11.

30. Donald Bateman, "Politics of Curriculum," in *Heightened Consciousness*, p. 60.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

32. John Steven Mann, "On Contradictions in Schools," in *Schools in Search of Meaning*, p. 97.

33. Huebner, "The Recreative and the Established," p. 29.

34. Mann, "On Contradictions in Schools," p. 97.

35. James B. Macdonald, "The Quality of Everyday Life in School," in *Schools in Search of Meaning*, p. 88.

36. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 23.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

38. *Ibid.*

39. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

40. Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Capitalist Theory," in *Schooling and Capitalism*, Roger Dale, et al., eds., p. 202, as quoted in Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, pp. 5-6.

41. Henry Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory: Notes on the Dynamics of Educational Reproduction and Transformation," *Curriculum Inquiry* (in press).

42. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 4.

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46. Michael Apple, "The Other Side of The Hidden Curriculum: Correspondence Theories and the Labor Process," *Journal of Education*, 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980), p. 48.

47. Michael Apple, Rev. of *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture* by Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *School Review* (November 1977), p. 145.

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49. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

50. Apple, Rev. of *Reproduction in Education*, p. 145.

51. Michael Apple, "Analyzing Determinations: Understanding and Evaluating the Production of Social Outcomes in Schools," *Curriculum Inquiry*, 10, No. 1 (Spring 1980), p. 55, and Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory," p. 13.

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54. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 27.

55. For a discussion of the Marxian critique of phenomenology see Richard J. Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978) and Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, *Education and Social Control: A Study in Progressive Primary Education* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

56. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 27.

57. Henry Giroux, "Teacher Education and the Ideology of Social Control," *Journal of Education* 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980), p. 8.

58. Michael Apple, "Some Aspects of the Relationship Between Economic and Cultural Reproduction," a paper presented at the Kent State Invitational Conference on Curriculum Theory, November 11, 1977, p. 9.

59. Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory," p. 8.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

61. Apple, "Analyzing Determinations," p. 59.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 62 and Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory," p. 15.

63. Apple, "Analyzing Determinations," p. 62.

64. *Ibid.*, and Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory," pp. 19, 22.

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68. Michael Apple and Nancy King, "What Do Schools Teach?" in *Humanistic Education: Visions and Realitites*, ed. Richard H. Weller (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), p. 36.

69. Henry Giroux and Anthony Penna, "Social Education in the Classroom: The Dynamics of the Hidden Curriculum," *Theory and Research in Social Education* (March 1979).

70. Apple and King, "What Do Schools Teach?" pp. 29-47.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

72. Giroux and Penna, "Social Education in the Classroom."

73. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

74. Apple and King, "What Do Schools Teach?" p. 30.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 31 and Giroux, "Teacher Education," p. 19.

76. Apple and King, "What Do Schools Teach?" p. 31.

77. Michael Apple, "The New Sociology of Education: Analyzing Cultural and Economic Reproduction," *Harvard Educational Review*, 48, No. 4 (November 1978), p. 496.

78. Apple, "Some Aspects,"

79. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 33.

80. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 7.

81. Michael Apple, "Cultural Capital and Educational Transmission: An Essay on Basil Bernstein Class, Codes and Control, Vol. III: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmissions," *Educational Theory*, 28 (Winter 1978), pp. 34-43.

82. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, pp. 14, 16.

83. Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum," pp. 95-119.

84. *Ibid.*, p. 114.

85. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, p. 14.

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 123-153.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

88. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

89. Giroux, "Teacher Education," p. 21.

90. Giroux, "Beyond the Correspondence Theory," p. 21.

CHAPTER IV
Exploration of Alternatives

Introduction

Chapter IV marks a transition point in the study. Whereas Chapters II and III discussed the reconceptual critique of mainstream curriculum theory, Chapter IV shifts to postcritical theorizing of alternative visions of curriculum discourse and practice. Chapter IV is the analysis of the ways that reconceptual theorists have responded to the questions and areas of inquiry that have been raised by the three critical themes discussed in Chapter III.

The format of discussing the aesthetic/philosophic, psycho-analytic, and social/political themes separately will continue. It should be remembered from the introductory comments in Chapter III that these three themes will not be given equal weight. This chapter will conclude the interpretive section of the study with an assessment of the contributions of reconceptual inquiry discussed in Chapters III and IV. The historical critique is excluded from this discussion because it does not serve the purpose of post-critical theorizing.

Aesthetic/Philosophic Alternatives

Critics arguing from the aesthetic/philosophic perspective raised three issues: (1) they exposed the problems of using objectives and learning as central categories for curriculum theory; (2) they revealed the need for developing ways other than the technical and instrumental for valuing educational experience; and (3) they replaced the limited scope of learning with the larger question of how curriculum can enable students to develop meaning. In the earlier critique the works of Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and, tangentially, James Madonald, were discussed. This section includes the work of Huebner and Greene as well as other theorists who, while not directly responding to the earlier critical literature, share parallel interests––and new ones also. The works that will be discussed in this section represent three ways that the aesthetic theme is being developed in current curriculum research. Two of these themes relate to the issues raised by the aesthetic/philosophic critique, while the third theme concerns the acquisition and transmission of aesthetic knowledge. The first theme explores the development of aesthetic rationality or criticism in the works of Huebner, Elliot Eisner, Gail McCutcheon, and Francine Shuchat Shaw. The second theme continues the analysis of Maxine Greene's discussion of meaning by exploring her research on the arts and humanities in curriculum. The third theme discusses Jose Rosario's research on the acquisition of aesthetic knowledge. Of the three issues raised by the aesthetic/philosophic critique, the only one not addressed in current aesthetic curriculum literature, and therefore not discussed in this secton, is the need for alternatives to the categories of objectives and learning, although Maxine Greene's discussion of meaning does present an alternative vision of learning. While Dwayne Huebner[1] and James Macdonald[2] have in earlier works sketched some alternatives, neither theorist has pursued sustained development of these alternatives. The significance of this omission will be discussed in the critical commentary to be developed in Chapter V.

Aesthetic criticism. Dwayne Huebner's work serves as a preliminary statement about the value of viewing curriculum aesthetically. This section begins with the tentative direction outlined in his research and continues with the work being pursued by others in developing a methodology for aesthitic criticsm.

Following from his critique of traditional curriculum theory, Huebner suggested that educational activity should offer alternatives to objectives and learning as the central categories of curriculum.[3] He identified two problems created by that shift in focus. The first is the problem of developing language to describe educational activity. The second problem is making explicit the value framework used to choose among alternative activities. To address these issues he devised five value frameworks that he also thought of as rationalities for viewing educational activity. He established the connection between values and rationality this way: "When values are explicated a rationality is produced which enables the maximizing of

that value."[4] The five rationalities he discusses are the technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical, all five of which, he contends, should be used in viewing educational activity. Since the main interest of this section is examining the development of aesthetic criticism as an alternative mode of curriculum theorizing, only that aspect of Huebner's discussion will be addressed here.

Huebner identified three dimensions of valuing educational activity aesthetically.[5] The first element is to view activity with psychical distance, seeing it as an object with characteristics apart from functional use. Second, educational activity can be valued for wholeness, balance, and design. Third, the aesthetic perspective reveals the symbolic meaning of educational activity. This means that educators interpret their lived world in particular ways and that those interpretations are reflected in the way they design educational activity. Huebner also mentions the possibility of using aesthetic criticism in assessing educational activity. Huebner's sketch of aesthetic rationality stands as an invitation to curricularists to break from technological rationality and explore other possibilities. Unfortunately Huebner's work does not surpass this explication with a more detailed analysis of aesthetic rationality in use. For examples that develop an application of aesthetic rationality, one must turn to the more recent research using aesthetic rationality as a form of educational criticism.

Since Huebner's work, Elliot Eisner has become the leading advocate for developing aesthetic rationality into a method of educational criticism.[6] He classifies it as a form of qualitative evaluation that has its roots in aesthetic criticism of literature, theater, film, music, and the visual arts.[7] While educational criticism is similar to case studies in sociology and anthropology, Eisner asserts that there are important distinctions.

> One of the most significant of these differences is in the conscious intention to create an expressive language in criticism that artistically renders the character of the expressive forms perceived in classroom situations. Said another way: the critical disclosure of classroom life would create a living image of that life so that the reader will have a kind of visceral understanding of what the place or material described is like. Criticism itself is an art form.[8]

Eisner describes the purpose of educational criticism as the rendering of the nature of educational activity into language so that others will understand it more deeply.[9] Unlike quantitative evaluation which seeks to illuminate those phenomena with greater complexity.[10] Gail McCutcheon, whose approach to educational criticism is congruent with Eisner's, describes its purpose this way:

> ...(A)n educational critic's purpose is to examine an educational phenomenon and illuminate it for others, thinking in public about it. A criticism that provides the reader a perspective on the character of that phenomenon--the classroom, the materials, the students' products, the buildings, the government decree, or whatever. Secondly, it reveals relationships among those qualities, their significance for present educational practice, yesterday's practice, and their significance in relation to principles from behavioral sciences, educational theory or current trends. Thirdly, it provides an example of the critic thinking aloud; the process of criticism, of encountering the classroom and thinking about it are revealed.[11]

Eisner and McCutcheon have discerned three interconnected processes involved in educational criticism: description, interpretation, and evaluation, or as McCutcheon terms it, appraisal.[12] Description is the critic's attempt to vividly portray those aspects of the classroom he or she has selected for attention. Interpretation is the process by which the critic reveals the meaning of the phenomenon that was described by analyzing it through "concepts, models, and theories from the social sciences and history."[13] In the third process, evaluation, the critic places judgment on the significance and quality of the phenomena observed. The critic's judgments are grounded in his or her knowledge of the history and philosophy of education.

Forms of qualitative inquiry, such as educational criticism, differ from quantitative inquiry in the principles that govern their claims to truth, validity, and generalizability. Both Eisner and McCutcheon have outlined principles that critics should use in their work to establish the credibility of their views. First, Eisner, in response to the assertion that qualitative evaluation is subjective, redefines the notion of objectivity in this way: "Objectivity is a function of intersubjective agreement among a community of believers."[14] With this view objectivity becomes established by consensual validation. According to Eisner, one way of achieving consensual validation is through structural corroboration, whereby pieces of evidence fit together and confirm each other. Complementing this process is the strategy of referential adequacy, which tests the critic's conclusions against the phenomena observed to ascertain if the conclusions adequately disclose the meaning of the phenomena.

Beyond the issue of objectivity, Eisner has also sought to explain how qualitative inquiry can yield lessons that are generalizable. First, he points out that with continued use and development the skills of criticism and connoiseurship are generalized beyond one object or event to a range of phenomena within a class or classes. In other words, what generalizes is the process of criticism rather than propositions or findings. The second type of generalization produced by educational criticism is the "acquisition of new forms of anticipation." In other words, as critics learn to recognize what is typical or distinctive phenomena in the classroom, they will develop generalizations about classroom life that will assist them in their inquiry in other classrooms.

Eisner and McCutcheon have outlined the aims, processes, and principles of educational criticism, thus providing a preliminary conceptual base for this form of inquiry. With this framework, McCutcheon has suggested applying educational criticism to four areas: teacher education, supervision of teachers, evaluation , and research.[15] In teacher education courses, she suggests providing students with written accounts of classrooms to enable them to develop their own generalizations about classroom life, or to gain different perspectives on classroom practices. She points out that the process of criticism would be valuable in supervising teachers. She envisions the supervisor acting as an educational critic/coach who would both provide the insight that criticism reveals as well as the assistance in developing improvements and changes. Her third recommendation is to use educational criticism in the evaluation of teaching, curricula, materials, school buildings, legislation, and student outcomes.[16] McCutcheon's observations concerning the fourth application of criticism, research, parallel Eisner's discussion of the ways that criticism can produce generalizations.

Francine Shuchat Shaw has developed a different methodology, congruence, for using aesthetic criticism in education. Congruence is a framework for "studying relationships in educational experience and environments."[17] The concept takes from aesthetics the notion that a work of art is "an organic unity" with a design composed of interrelated elements manifesting "a concrete and symbolic representation of ideas."[18] Applied to education, congruence views the curricular/instructional environment as a design relating elements of theory to elements of practice, with the entire scheme conveying many levels of realms of meaning. Congruence seeks to disclose the meanings embedded in those relationships. Shuchat-Shaw lists some of the relationships she has studied with this framework:

> With this framework, I have studied, for example, the relation of curriculum to instruction, the relation between the content and the form of educational experience, the relation of conceptions of knowledge and human nature to pedagogy; I have also used congruence as a framework to study the relation of the student's and the educator's biographies to subjects of study, and the relation of the educator's interior character and personal beliefs to her public, social character and professional commitments.[19]

The method she describes for carrying out these investigations is to juxtapose an author's theory or conceptual base for designing a curricular/instructional environment next to the classroom practice the author

developed to implement the theory. In essence, theory and practice are revealed side by side allowing for critical scrutiny of the harmony or discordance of the interrelated elements.

The works of Eisner, McCutcheon, and Shuchat-Shaw provide examples of the ways that aesthetic criticism is being developed into methods for educational criticism. What these works have in common is a focus on the total educational environment and the experience within it. Each theorist seeks to develop forms of description that render the educational objects of their scrutiny intelligible. They seek to illuminate educational activity by revealing its complexity, rather than producing simplified generalizations. These works are in their initial stages of development. Eisner has himself stated that aesthetic research has only begun to scratch the surface.[20] To a large extent, this is due to the fact that aesthetic criticism is little more than a five year old tradition, as compared to the roughly seventy year old tradition of empirical research in education. Other theorists are exploring aesthetic research as evidenced by articles in the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, the publication of a collection of such approaches in Qualitative Evaluation, edited by George Willis,[21] and by continuing doctoral research at Stanford University.[22]

Aesthetic ratonality and the development of meaning. Maxine Greene's critique of objectives and the notion of learning, discussed in Chapter III, exposed the passive view of the student and the reified view of knowledge that result from those central categories of traditional curriculum thought. It raised the issue of how curriculum can be envisioned and constructed so that it creates conditions that allow students to develop their own meanings and possibilities. Greene's answer to that dilemma is an argument for teaching the arts and humanities through an approach that inspires imagination and critical awareness.

In describing the role of the arts and humanities in education, Greene discusses the potential that involvement in the arts has for developing a critically aware orientation toward life, one that she refers to, after the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz, as wide-awakeness. She asserts that the purpose of curriculum should be to foster this wide-awakeness: "My concern is to enable diverse persons to break through the cotton wool of daily life and to live more consciously."[23] She points out that there are works of art and works in history, philosophy, and psychology that were consciously created to heighten awareness of and involvement with the world. These works, under the rubric of the arts and humanities, are central to her view of curriculum.

> If it is indeed the case, as I believe it is, that involvement with the arts and humanities has the potential for provoking precisely this sort of reflectiveness, we need to devise ways of integrating them into what we teach at all levels of the educational enterprise; we need to do so consciously, with a clear perception of what it means to enable people to pay, from their own distinctive vantage points, "full attention to life"[24]

The curricular implications of Greene's theorizing are revealed in her comments about curriculum content and the process for teaching the arts and humanities. Her approach to content involves choices from the arts, history, philosophy, criticism, and psychology that invite people to question the material, interact with it, interpret it, and connect its significance to their own life situations.[25] As examples of this approach she cites the works of Edward Hallett Carr in history, and from modern philosophy, the works of William James, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, George Santayana, Alfred North Whitehead, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. She advocates interdisciplinary study so that students will have a range of disciplines from which to pose questions pertaining to their life plan.[26] While she does not contend that the arts are the only realm of meaning that provokes critical consciousness, she does urge giving the arts and humanities a central place in curriculum and teaching one or another art form in all pedagogical situations.[27]

Greene's assertions about the process of teaching the arts reflect her concern for creating experiences that encourage students to encounter art, rather than passively observe art as a collection of reified objects.

She discusses various theories of art criticism that pose questions for the interpretation of an art work[28] She advances these theories, developed by Morris Abrams, as examples of the processes that students can use to attend to works of art, disclosing its different aesthetic dimensions.

Maxine Greene's discussions of the relationship between aesthetics and curriculum provide a conceptual base for linking aesthetic rationality to curriculum content and processes with the ultimate aim of developing an emancipatory form of education.

The distribution and acquisition of aesthetic knowledge. The three perspectives discussed here, relating aesthetics to curriculum, involve the question of meaning in education, but all three take a different focus on the concept. Aesthetic criticism is a method for disclosing and evaluating meaning in educational settings. Maxine Greene uses the arts to enable students to demystify knowledge and create their own meanings. Jose Rosario's research does not seek to disclose or construct meaning, but rather to ascertain what aesthetic meanings are transmitted in school and how that transmission occurs. In other words, Rosario's research is a sociological analysis of aesthetic knowledge. He relates Basil Bernstein's notions of classification and frame to this research, thereby establishing a link between the sociology of knowledge and aesthetic inquiry.[29] His investgations center on the following concerns:

> We know that aesthetic knowledge is de-contextualized, selected and organized, and then made part of the school curriculum for subsequent transmission. But how is it actually transmitted? What are the notions that children do come to acquire about art? Is the aesthetic meaning embedded in the curriculum transformed as it is filtered through pedagogical practices and then transmitted to children? How are children placed in art programs? What are the aesthetic codes being transmitted to children? These are the kinds of questions I prefer to raise. They aim at an understanding of how schooling actually functions in the socialization of children into orders of aesthetic meaning.[30]

Rosario's research has also begun to develop an historical grounding for these questions by investigating the treatment of these issues in the works of early curriculum theorists.[31] Furthermore, he discusses the possibility of using autobiography to discover what real scientists and artists can tell us about the process of creation. These findings would then be developed into theoretical formulations about the nature of aesthetic socialization. Looking at the connections Rosario has made between different forms of inquiry, it is apparent that his research has significance for reconceptualization that transcends its value for studying aesthetic knowledge, for he has demonstrated how one mode of theorizing can complement another.

From this discussion of the three approaches to aesthetic inquiry in curriculum, it can be seen that the aesthetic perspective is comprised of three different areas of research. The one unifying element in their respective approaches to relating aesthetics to education is the question of meaning, but each approach investigates that question differently. For example, aesthetic criticism views a wide spectrum of educational phenomena to describe, interpret, and evaluate that phenomena. In other words, the aesthetic model of rendering discloses the meaning, significance, and implications of the educational activity under scrutiny. Maxine Greene's discussion of the aesthetics and curriculum differs in that she is primarily concerned with the possibilities of art for developing curriculum content and pedagogical techniques that promote an interactive form of learning whereby students construct their own meaning. Here the focus is not on the meaning of classroom activity, but rather on the processes that the student engages in to interpret and evaluate their own situations. In essence, her work is an argument for using the arts to develop curriculum for critical consciousness. Jose Rosario's research complements Greene's in that he investigates how aesthetic knowledge is organized and transmitted in schools. In other words he explores what aesthetic meanings are transmitted in school, to whom, and how. Surveying these three approaches to aesthetics and education, it can be concluded that the use of aesthetics in curriculum has created new possibilities for qualitative evaluation, curriculum content, and pedagogy.

Psycho-analytic Alternatives

This section discusses the autobiographic research that William Pinar initiated and jointly developed with Madeleine Grumet. Their research is a response to concerns about alienation, the loss of self, the fragmentation of self, and other aspects of "psychic deterioration," outlined in Chapter III. These have led them to focus on the concrete analysis of educational experience and involvement with that experience as student, teacher, or researcher.

Pinar has broadly stated in various ways the purpose and value of autobiographic research. He has indicated that it can help the individual understand the nature of his or her intellectual development.[32] He further postulates that when educators learn more about their own learning they may discover common structures in the learning process that are trans-biographic and can be used to help other learners.[33] Third, he asserts that autobiography can humanize the researcher and enhance psychic integration.[34] Noting that autobiography can also have a political function, he contends that it is another strategy for personal liberation and control of one's life.[35] He states that the significance of autobiography for the curriculum field is that it shifts the focus from the discipline to the individual.[36] Instead of interpreting curriculum from the designer's point of view, currere reveals the student's perspective on his/her educational experience. The spirit of some of these assertions is captured in the following passage in which Pinar explains the purpose of the psychoanalytic focus.:

> By examining the history of ideas in the life of individuals who formulate them we can begin to understand––and not in the fragmented way which mainstream social science offers––the nature of intellectual development, the process by which the individual learns, a particular field for instance, but more generally and perhaps more importantly, the process by which one becomes less parochial, more understanding, more interesting, more humane.[37]

Currere, from the Latin root of curriculum, is the method of autobiography that Pinar originated. As he defines it, "Currere, historically rooted in the field of curriculum, in existentialism, phenomenology, and psychoanalysis, is the study of educational experience."[38] Concepts, themes, and areas of inquiry developed by these theoretical traditions serve as grounding for the orientation and methodology of currere. Influences from phenomenology are: (1) the notion of reciprocity of subjectivity and objectivity in the construction of knowledge; (2) the concept of the "lebenswelt" to refer to lived experience and the unconscious preconceptual realm that constitutes it; and (3) the method of distancing or "bracketing" required to become aware of the lebenswelt and the interplay between the subjective and objective––the knower and the known.[39] Madeleine Grumet credits the influence of existentialism with the concern for "the dialectical relationship of man to his situation."[40] Therefore the method of currere seeks to study not only the influence of the social milieu as well.[41] Psycho-analysis contributes understanding of the influence of the past on the present, the unconscious on the conscious.[42] The technique of free association to heighten consciousness of the present is also a notion borrowed by currere.

Pinar has enumerated four steps in the method of currere.[43] In the first step, the regressive, one returns to the past, brackets one's past experience in schools, and brings that remembrance of the past to an understanding of the present. In the second step, the progressive, one imagines the future, perhaps one's future intellectual interests or career. Pinar recommends this step because like the past, the future influences the present also. The third step is analytical. At this point one considers the present––the ideas, interests, people, and settings that constitute the present. One compares the "pictures" yielded from these three stages and looks for similarities, differences, and common themes that relate them. As a part of this stage, Pinar recommends using different interpretive systems (the psychoanalytic, gestalt, or political and sociological focuses) to view these past, present, and future pictures of one's self. In the fourth stage, the synthetical, one attempts to integrate the self-knowledge that has been gathered. Mind, emotions, behavior, and body are integrated into a more meaningful whole.

This method has been applied by Pinar to the analysis of the educational experience of literature, and by Grumet to the development of a method of self-analysis for pre-service and in-service teachers. Pinar lists four overlapping structural elements that comprise the notion of the educational experience of literature.[44] The first is the literary text itself. The second is the intellectual, historical, cultural, and sociopolitical context in which the text was written. The third element is the response of the reader to the text. At this point the reader begins the initial steps of the method of currere by recording the thought and emotions that occur while reading the text. The fourth element is the context of the reader, which Pinar divides into four subparts: biography, intellectual gestalt, conceptual lens, and psychological factors. In essence, each of these parts tries to ascertain why one responds to the text the way one does.

Pinar has demonstrated his own use of this process in his research.[45] Starting with the third element, he notes the themes that appear form the list of thoughts and emotions that occurred to him while he was reading. He expands upon the themes by writing an essay on each one. This is followed by the phase in which he writes about his biographic situation. The final step, analysis, relates the themes to his biographic situation, helping him to understand the relationships between his personal life and his professional interests and roles. This process reveals the relationship between the knower and the known since, as Pinar states, "Issues 'in the text,' it becomes clear, are issues 'in the reader.' "[46] He sees value in the use of this method for scholars of any field in helping them maintain awareness of their intellectual interests and future directions. He puts it this way:

> In a certain sense the method is one device by means of which the curriculum theorist—the scholar of any field—may work to cultivate his own intellectual development. If he feels himself arrested intellectually, he can be sure he is arrested biographically. If he wishes to focus upon his interests, he cannot do so without attention to the situation these interests are both cause and consequence of.[47]

If the connection between biography and intellectual interests were the only outcome of the method of currere, then one could argue that Pinar has simply discovered the obvious, which he himself seems to be aware of by his reference to the "obvious links between response to the text ... and the biographic situation."[48] The real significance of biographic work is the underlying assumption that heightened consciousness will lead to individual, and ultimately, social transformation. Pinar expresses that hope in this way:

> Part of what is uncovered during this work [the biographic] is the individual's participation in mainstream culture, his participation in the maintenance of present economic and political structures. Release from biographic situation permits release from his historical situation. This extrication permits him to live in a next stage biographically and historically. As increasing numbers of individuals so move, the weltanschauung begins to shift, and historical movement -- with corresponding transformation of political and economic structures -- occurs. This historical situation is dialectically related to innumerable biographic situations, and change in either finally precipates change in the other.[49]

Madeleine Grumet has adapted the method of currere in her work with pre-service and in-service teachers. Grumet's later work, not described in this study, develops a more extensive treatment of autobiography in connection with theater education.* A sampling of work is included in this study to provde an illustration of currere in use. The focus here is on the application of currere and is not intended to present a critical review of the full scope of Madeleine Grumet's work.

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* Portions of this study concerning the work of Grumet have been revised for this publication. For explication of her work applying currere to theater education see Madeleine Grumet, "Curriculum as Theater: Merely Players," Curriculum Inquiry, 8:1 (1978), pp. 37-64; "Songs and Situations: The Figure/Ground Relation in a Case Study of Currere," in Qualitative Evaluation, pp. 276-315; "In Search of Theater: Ritual Confrontation and the Suspense of Form," Journal of Education, 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980).

Grumet has developed a method of autobiography that involves journal keeping by teachers, followed by exchanges between the teacher and supervisor discussing questions that the two have identified as significant themes or issues from the journal material. Grumet's intent is to use the adapted currere to help the teacher develop the critical distance needed to "ask questions of their own work."[50] Grumet describes the function of supervision in relation to this goal: "The concept of teacher effectiveness requires that the teacher learn to hear, formulate and articulate her own questions about her experience of teaching and that the primary function of supervision is to establish a dialectic form of reflection upon experience that the teacher can then adapt to her own pedagogical practice."[51] In Grumet's early development of this approach, she does not place responsibility on the supervisor for establishing the dialectic. Instead the supervisor avoids questions that represent opposing views, preferring questions that elicit new depths and perspectives for the views presented.[52] Her hope is that teachers will develop dialectical reflection by providing the antithesis to their own observation of their work.[53] However, she does reserve the right to present opposing views. One senses an intuitive dynamic guiding her response to the teacher's journal that allows the teacher to hear the questions she asks, and that avoids pushing the teacher into territory he/she is not yet ready for.

The autobiographic work begun by Pinar and Grumet is being continued by other theorists who have published in the Journal of Curriculum Theorizing. At this point, Pinar and Grumet are expanding their psycho-analytic research into the new area of gender analysis.[54] It is not discussed here.

Social/Political Alternatives

The major value of the social/political critique has been to reveal how curriculum operates as an agent of cultural and economic reproduction, contribuing to the legitimation of the existing society by maintaining the domination and power of those groups that already have it. While the critics do not believe that, by itself, change in schools can change society,[55] they do raise the issue of how both curriculum theory and practice can be reconceptualized so that they serve the interests of emancipation rather than domination. It is important to point out that the social/political literature is not the only work that is written with an emancipatory intent. Both Maxine Greene's work on aesthetic education and William Pinar's approach to autobiography share the emancipatory focus. The question under consideration in this section is, in what ways has the social/political literature contributed to our understanding of how emancipatory education can be developed through alternative conceptions of curriculum theory and practice. To answer this question, attention must be focused on three aspects of the social/political literature: (1) the conceptual base provided to explain the nature of radical praxis; (2) application of the critical framework to specific problems and issues in curriculum; and (3) specific political strategies that have been suggested for effecting change in schools.

Praxis. The concept of praxis refers to the transition from critical consciousness to social action. An understanding of the nature of praxis is essential for educators committed to emancipatory education. Among those theorists who have discussed praxis, there is general agreement that while radical educators have limited ability to effect change in the larger society, they can create the conditions that promote critical reflection, leading, hopefully, to the development of critically aware individuals who will participate in social transformation. As Henry Giroux puts it: "The most that can be expected of such reform is that it will contribute to changing the consciousness and drives of teachers and students who could help to change society."[56] Thus, change in consciousness is seen as a precondition for political change.[57] However, these theorists also point out that change in consciousness without critical intervention in the world is not sufficient.[58] For example, Michael Apple argues curricularists to be what Antonio Gramsci called the "organic" intellectual, actively involved in "the struggle against hegemony."[59] He encourages curricularists to go beyond criticism, and become advocates for the economic, legal, and cultural rights of students, teachers, and oppressed groups in regard to a variety of current issues and practices in schools.[60]

Before arriving at the point of advocacy, however, one must understand how one moves from critical reflection to social action. One can envision the nature of praxis as a continuum with critical reflection as the beginning point and social transformation of oppressive situations as the end point. Maxine Greene posits that critical reflection is stimulated by the occurrence of what Alfred Schutz refers to as "experiences of shock" which awaken people to other views of reality.[61] A second and further point on the continuum is the deepening of critical awareness by connecting one's individual situation to the historic situation that provides the context, origin, and development of the conditions that shape one's life.[62] As

Giroux states, "...(W)e must turn to history in order to understand the traditions that have shaped our individual biographies and intersubjective relationships with other human beings."[63] The third point is the shared communication of this awareness with groups of people experiencing the same struggles. In this sense, praxis reflects collective action against the social forces of domination.[64]

Taken together, these three elements suggest that social action upon schools will be facilitated by: (1) a critical framework that exposes the contradictions of schooling, that creates "shock situations"; (2) teachers and students problematizing their individual situations by linking them to the historic conditions that gave rise to the theories, rules, relationships, and practices that govern their lives; and (3) teachers and students engaging in shared communication with other groups to overcome the forces or conditions that limit them. At this stage in the development of the social/political literature, these elements serve as the conceptual base for understanding the link between critique and social change. The next section will discuss how the social/political critique can be used to reconceptualize problems and issues in curriculum and pedagogy.

Application of the critical framework. The ability of the social/political analysis to surpass its critical function by also serving as a form of curriculum theorizing is demonstrated by its power to reconceive the nature and scope of specific educational topics or subject areas. Michael Apple's work concentrates primarily on the critical function, with a lesser degree of attention to the post-critical task of reconceptualizing current problems and issues in education. In contrast, Henry Giroux's work devotes greater consideration to the latter task. Consequently, this section will begin with Michael Apple's contribution to this investigation. However, it will concentrate primarily on examining Henry Giroux's work as a model for applying the critical framework to the task of reconceptualizing the theoretical foundations and parameters of specific issues.

Apple's study, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," previously discussed in Chapter III, pointed out that curriculum content in science and social studies both ignored and distorted the positive value of conflict in social collectivities. As a response to that finding he offers programmatic suggestions to reformulate the content of both subject areas in a way that includes knowledge of and experience with the positive role of conflict. In science he recommends that the following areas be emphasized: (1) the value of organized skepticism; (2) a historical orientation decribing conceptual revolutions that prompted major breakthroughs; and (3) consideration of the moral functions and controversies of science.[65] In social studies he suggests including: (1) comparative study of revolution (American, French, Russian, Portugese, and Chinese) to examine how revolutions as forms of interpersonal conflict address the human condition; (2) a more realistic account of the use of conflict to obtain legal and economic rights by women, minorities, and workers; and (3) involvement of students in exploration of their personal experiences within class and ethnic groups and within schools to encourage action upon those contexts.[66] With this study, Apple has demonstrated how the ideological analysis of school knowledge can be used to reformulate the content of two subject areas.

Turning to Giroux's work, his application of the critical framework is evidenced by his discussions of teacher education and various topics within social studies education. In regard to teacher education,[67] Giroux posits that the extension of the social/political critique to teacher education programs is important becasue the contention that schools are agents of ideological control raises questions about the training of teachers, since they are the educators who directly socialize students. He asserts that these programs are based on premises that define teaching as a technical problem. He suggests that the concepts of power, culture, ideology, and hegemony be used, first, as critical categories to examine how teacher education programs operate as agencies of economic and cultural reproduction, and second, to explore how the contradictions in the programs offer possible reforms. Following from that analysis he discusses several implications for the restructuring of teacher education programs. Briefly summarized, his suggestions call for

developing critical intellectuals who can begin to share a more radical consciousness with their colleagues and students. To that end he advises that teacher education programs should: (1) give students the theoretical and conceptual tools to counter mystification; (2) encourage students to reflect on and act upon the constraints that limit their actions; (3) develop dialectical thinking that uses critical categories to illuminate the relationship between schools and the social totality; (4) promote theoretical models that, rather than serving the interests of prediction and control, encourage interests such as "human understanding, contextual inquiry, aesthetic literacy, and social reconstructionism";[68] (5) provide heuristic devices that reflect different ways of talking and thinking about education; (6) encourage students to examine the relationships between their biography, their values, their experiences, and their teaching practices; and (7) develop historical criticism by examining the historical roots of educational theories and practices. Thus, Giroux's analysis of teacher education programs reveals how the critical framework can be used to expand the scope of those programs beyond the technical concerns and "methodology madness" that have dominated them heretofore.

Similarly, in other articles Giroux uses the critical framework to reconceptualize the focus of a subject or issue, revealing its political nature. For example, he critiques existing rationalities of citizenship education and suggests the outlines of an emancipatory rationality as an alternative.[69] In social studies education he discusses the implications of the hidden curriculum and suggests an alternative set of structural properties for classroom life as the basis for a more progressive approach to social studies education.[70] In "Writing and Critical Thinking in the Social Studies,"[71] he redefines the traditional focus on critical thinking by shifting the emphasis from learning to detect logical patterns to a perspective that makes knowledge, issues, events, and values problematic.

Beyond their value in using the critical framework to expose the political implications of various educational issues and suggest alternative theoretical formulations of those issues, Giroux's articles perform a second post-critical function. They suggest alternative values, pedagogical strategies, and classroom structural properties to counter the aspects of the hidden curriculum that presently serve as mediating links of cultural and economic reproduction. These suggestions are intended to establish the theoretical and structural conditions necessary for developing critical conceptual thought. His perspective recognizes that a pedagogy attempting to develop critical thought must attend to the interplay between the construction of knowledge, classroom social relationships, the personal history and existential situation of the student, and the social, historical, and political context of all three of those elements. In various works, he offers, as theoretical guidelines, the following assumptions:[72] (1) Transmission models of pedagogy must give way to classroom social relationships that encourage student questioning of the learning process; (2) Knowledge should be made problematic (knowledge should be seen as a historical and social construct; students should understand the relationships between theory and facts; students must learn to interpret facts in their historical and social context); (3) Critical reasoning must involve probing and reflection of one's personal history and biography; (4) Students must clarify values and link them to their consequences for human existence; (5) Students must learn about the structural and ideological forces that shape their lives. Beyond offering assumptions for radical pedagogy, Giroux has developed a writing-history model that embodies these assumptions.[73]

In discussing the structural conditions needed to counter the hidden curriculum and promote critical thought, Giroux envisions the following possibilities:[74] to counter the stratification of students, eliminate tracking; to counter the dehumanizing effects of evaluation, establish dialogical grading; to counter regimentation, use self-paced learning; and to reduce authoritarian hierarchical relationships, allow students to participate in the teaching role. With these suggestions Giroux has provided alternative assumptions and practices that will contribute to the development of emancipatory education.

Social/political strategies for change. The concluding section of Schools in Search of Meaning is the only work within reconceptual literature that deals in a programmatic way with political strategies that can be used to recreate educational institutions that reflect and embody the value commitments discussed in the social/political critique. The approach taken by the contributors to the book lists arenas for action and examples of action agendas. The four arenas that they identify for action are based on a notion of praxis that involves conceptual, political, and practical activity.[75] First, they recommend the continued development and sharing of a framework for "structural, social, and educational analysis," as well as the sharing of a language to convey that analysis. Second, they describe the necessity of developing support systems composed of allies who share similar ideological commitments and who can provide technical advice and a broader social legitimation of their change efforts. Third, they stress the importance of developing affiliative groups to exchange ideas and encourage each other's growth. Finally, they suggest the development of a common pool of resources and techniques for developing changes.

Going a step further, the authors provide examples of specific actions within each arena that can be pursued. The suggestions involve teachers, students, parents, professional organizations, teacher unions, and community groups in analyzing the curriculum, materials, teaching methods, and policies of the school to ensure that they protect the rights and serve the interests of all groups.

Accomplishments of Reconceptual Inquiry

In Chapters II, III, and IV, this study has discussed the four major themes that comprise reconceptual inquiry: the historical, aesthetic/philosophic, psycho-analytic, and social/political. The purpose has been to weave together the diverse reconceptual works to develop a picture of what reconceptual inquiry is. The intention in this section is to evaluate reconceptual inquiry with respect to its accomplishments and reserve critical discussion of its shortcomings for Chapter V. The critical viewpoint outlined in Chapter I will provide the framework for this analysis. Restated, the critical questions were:

1. How does the movement stimulate imagination?
2. To what extent have reconceptual theorists developed alternative assumptions to guide their work?
3. What alternative modes of theorizing are developed?
4. What different categories have reconceptual theorists used to refocus their perception of curriculum?
5. What alternative styles of expression have been developed?
6. What steps have been taken to conceive and develop the relationship of an emancipatory curriculum theory to radical praxis?

The capacity of these questions to serve a critical function can only be developed by viewing them dialectically. In other words, the questions can be used to assess, on the one hand, the contributions that reconceptual inquiry has made to the particular area the question delimits, and on the other hand, the problems and contradictions within reconceptual inquiry that prevent it from fully addressing the conceptual and practical challenges that the questions represents. This section will assess the collective contributions that the three reconceptual modes of theorizing have made to the areas bounded by each of the six questions. These contributions have already been thoroughly discussed in Chapters III and IV; therefore, my purpose is to merely coalesce the points that have been made in a way that recognizes what reconceptual inquiry can be credited for. In this way one can sense the cumulative strength of reconceptual inquiry.

Accomplishments of reconceptual inquiry. My assertion in this section is that reconceptual inquiry has had varying degrees of partial success in each of the six areas under consideration. The first area, stimulating imagination, is the area in which reconceptual theorists have had the highest degree of success. The primary contributing factor that success has been the excellent demonstration by each of the three

perspectives (and the historical as well) of the value of criticism in challenging taken-for-granted assumptions, in raising consciousness to a level that rejects old patterns and assumptions and envisions new ones. Each of the three perspectives has contributed a different theoretical concept to the critical task: the aesthetic uses the notion of rendering; the psycho-analytic has highlighted the phenomenological concept of bracketing; and the social/political has used the Marxian notion of negativity, as well as dialectical, historical, and relational modes of analysis. Shifting to the creative task of envisioning new possibilities, reconceptual theorists can be credited with exploring three new modes of theorizing that have produced, with varying degrees of sophistication and development, alternative assumptions for curriculum theory and practice.

The latter point leads to the second area of investigation, the development of alternative assumptions. Reconceptual theorists have generated critical assumptions about mainstream curriculum theory. They have extrapolated concepts from various theoretical traditions and have begun the process of elaborating those concepts into a foundation for their new modes of curriculum theorizing. They have made their value assumptions explicit. Finally, in the works of some reconceptual authors one can find propositions concerning curriculum knowledge, pedagogical techniques, and classroom social relationships. However, it should be noted that these assumptions must be culled from the diverse reconceptual works. There has been no formalization of research results producing a codified body of knowledge that one could recognize as assumptions of reconceptual inquiry.

Third, the argument that has been put forth in this study is that each of these three perspectives, in varying degrees of development, are alternative modes of curriculum theorizing. They each represent new ways of viewing curriculum and new methods for investigating curricular phenomena. What needs to be considered at this point in their evolution is the depth of their development.

Fourth, new categories for refocusing perception of curriculum have been offered with most success by the social/political critique. These theorists have explained the significance of the categories of ideology, hegemony, cultural and economic reproduction, rationality, and the hidden curriculum for exposing the political nature of curriculum.

Fifth, owing to the extrapolation of concepts from existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, and psychoanalysis, reconceptual discourse is being developed with alternative styles of expression. Moreover, the work of Eisner and McCutcheon developing written text as aesthetic criticism is also a new language for the field. This aspect of reconceptual inquiry, however, should be recognized much more as an offshoot of using different theoretical frameworks than as a conscious attempt to explain or shape curricular language. In fact, Huebner's original call to analyze the uses of curricular language appears to be the last attempt within reconceptual discourse to consider that issue.[76]

Sixth, reconceptual theorists have addressed the relationship of emancipatory curriculum theory to radical praxis by conceptualizing the conditions needed to develop critical consciousness and arguing for the selection of curriculum content, pedagogical techniques, and classroom social relationships that foster critical thought. All three perspectives have provided different contributions to the development of curriculum for critical consciousness, as evidenced by: (1) Maxine Greene's discussion of the value of the arts for developing wide-awakeness and meaning; (2) the psycho-analytic discussion of autobiography to promote individual reflection; and (3) the social/political discussion of curriculum knowledge, pedagogical techniques, and structural conditions needed to foster critical thought. Beyond the attention to critical consciousness, there has also been some attention given to political strategies needed to effect change. Viewing the amount of attention and research devoted to critical consciousness as compared to praxis, it becomes apparent that reconceptual theorists have produced far more knowledge about heightening consciousness than they have about effecting change.

Surveying the achievements in these six areas, a pattern begins to emerge that can only be sharpened after discussing the short-comings of reconceptual inquiry. At this point it is possible to state that reconceptual inquiry is much stronger in some areas than others. For example, it is strong in stimulating imagination of alternative possibilities through criticism. Past a strong critique, its post-critical work is less developed. The largest gaps in reconceptual inquiry as a whole appear in respect to the development of new styles of expression and a fuller understanding of praxis. This researcher's assessment of the gaps in reconceptual inquiry as a whole appear in respect to the development of new styles.of expression and a fuller understanding of praxis. This researcher's assessment of the gaps in reconceptual inquiry will be discussed in the concluding chapter, to which the study now turns.

FOOTNOTES

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2. James B. Macdonald, "The Person in the Curriculum," in *Precedents and Promise in the Curriculum Field*, ed. Helen F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966) and "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education," in *Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974).
3. Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," and "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings."
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5. *Ibid.*, pp. 226-227.
6. George Willis, "Qualitative Evaluation as the Aesthetic, Personal, and Political Dimensions of Curriculum Criticism," in *Qualitative Evaluation: Concepts and Cases in Curriculum Criticism*, ed. George Willis (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1978), p. 10.
7. Elliot W. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1979), p. 190.
8. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 191.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
11. Gail McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism: Methods and Application," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1 (Summer 1979), pp. 6-7.
12. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, pp. 203-211, and McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism: Methods and Application," pp. 9-13.
13. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, p. 211.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
15. McCutcheon, "Educational Criticism: Methods and Application," pp. 15-17.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
17. Francine Shuchat Shaw, "The Meanings of Congruence," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2 (Winter 1980), p. 178.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
20 Elliot Eisner, Preface, in *Qualitative Evaluation*, p. xvi.
21. Willis, eds., *Qualitative Evaluation: Concepts and Cases in Curriculum Criticism.*
22. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, p. 189.
23. Maxine Greene, *Landscapes of Learning* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978), p. 185.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 175-184.

29. José Rosario, "On the Child's Acquisition of Aesthetic Meaning: The Contribution of Schooling," in *Qualitative Evaluation*, pp. 208-226.
30. José Rosario, "Aesthetics and the Curriculum: Persistency, Traditional Modes, and a Different Perspective," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1 (Winter 1979), p. 148.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-154.
32. William Pinar, "The Voyage Out: Curriculum as the Relation Between the Knower and the Known," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2 (Winter 1980), p. 73.
33. William Pinar, "Currere: Toward Reconceptualization," in *Curriculum Theorizing*, p. 412.
34. William Pinar, "The Analysis of Educational Experience," in *Curriculum Theorizing*, p. 390.
35. *Ibid.*
36. William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976), p. 20.
37. Pinar, "The Voyage Out," p. 73.
38. Pinar, "Currere: Toward Reconceptualization," p. 400.
39. Pinar and Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum*, p. 38.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
42. William Pinar, "Search for a Method," in *Curriculum Theorizing*, p. 423.
43. Pinar and Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum*, pp. 51-63.
44. Pinar, "Search for a Method," p. 419.
45. William Pinar, "Currere: A Case Study," in *Qualitative Evaluation*, pp. 318-341; "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing," in *Liberation and Curriculum*, eds. Marshall Gordon and James B. Macdonald (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, in press); and "The Voyage Out."
46. Pinar, "The Voyage Out," p. 90.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
48. Pinar, "The Abstract and the Concrete," p. 27.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
50. Madeleine Grumet, "Supervision and Situation: A Methodology of Self Report for Teacher Education," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1 (Winter 1979), p. 208.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
52. Pinar and Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum*, p. 155.
53. Grumet, "Supervision and Situation," p. 160.
54. Madeleine Grumet, "Conception, Contradiction, and Curriculum," Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Boston, April 1980; and William Pinar, "Curriculum and Gender Studies," *Journal of Education*, 1, No. 162 (1980), in press.
55. Henry Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform: Toward a Critical Theory of Education," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2 (Winter 1980), p. 26.
56. *Ibid.*
57. James Macdonald, "Curriculum, Consciousness, and Social Change," Paper presented at the Kent State Conference, Kent, Ohio, 1977, p. 31.
58. Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform," p. 26.
59. Michael Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 166.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 163.
61. Greene, *Landscapes of Learning*, p. 101.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
63. Henry Giroux, "Dialectics and the Development of Curriculum Theory," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (in press), p. 8.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 7 and Greene, *Landscapes of Learning*, p. 107.
65. Apple, *Ideology and Curriculum*, pp. 99-100.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

67. Henry Giroux, "Teacher Education and the Ideology of Social Control," *Journal of Education,* 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980).

68. *Ibid.,* p. 23.

69. Henry Giroux, "Critical Theoryand Rationality in Citizenship Education," *Curriculum Inquiry* (in press).

70. Henry Giroux and Anthony Penna, "Social Education in the Classroom: The Dynamics of the Hidden Curriculum," *Theory and Research in Social Education* (March 1979).

71. Henry Giroux, "Writing and Critical Thinking in the Social Studies," *Curriculum Inquiry,* 8, No. 4 (1978).

72. Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform"; and "Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education."

73. Giroux, "Writing and Critical Thinking in the Social Studies."

74. Giroux and Penna, "Social Education in the Classroom," p. 31.

75. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret, eds., *Schools in Search of Meaning* (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 157.

76. Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings."

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See the inside back cover for details.

CHAPTER V
Evaluation of Reconceptual Inquiry

Introduction

At the outset of this study, I stated that I share reconceptual concerns and value commitments. At this concluding point in the study it is necessary to reaffirm my basic empathy for reconceptual aspirations, but to take a critical stance that identifies specific problems and gaps in reconceptual inquiry. While recognizing that the reconceptualization is a movement in continual development, this critical evaluation must rest squarely upon what the movement has accomplished at this point in time. In assessing the accomplishments of reconceptual inquiry I have stated that it has achieved partial and varying degrees of success with respect to each of the six criteria being used in this study. What needs to be constructed here is a more judgmental assessment that pinpoints not only the specific shortcomings of reconceptual inquiry, but also gauges where the reconceptualization is within the continuum of partial success and development. It is my assertion in this chapter that much of reconceptual literature creates a sweeping, landscape critique of schooling and projects alternative visions that while provocative, stimulating, and imaginative, lack sufficient conceptual development to convincingly meet its challenge to the curriculum field at this point in time. Put another way, the reconceptualization has produced excellent critical and visionary research, but has failed to push much of its post-critical inquiry of alternative modes of curriculum theorizing and practice past a drawing board stage of development. In this chapter, I will support the preceding assertion by identifying and discussing problems and omissions in each of the three reconceptual themes that have generated alternative modes of curriculum theorizing.

Problems in Reconceptual Inquiry

Judgments about problems and shortcomings do not spring out of air. They are defined by the parameters of the questions asked. The problems I have defined in this chapter result from a framework that applies the six critical questions to analysis of the ways that each of the three perspectives addresses the respective questions and issues originally raised by each theme as a challenge to the field. Hence, the intent is to judge each perspective against the criteria established by those six questions.

Some problems that I will discuss are defined by analysis that results from the interrelationship of the three perspectives. Since the nature of those interrelationships have been debated within reconceptual inquiry,[1] consideration of the way in which the interaction is framed is an important issue. The crucial distinction to be made here is that the interrelationships should not be conceived in a way that imposes the commitments, expectations, and modes of analysis of one perspective on another,[2] but rather, as an attempt to reveal how complementary use of perspectives expands the parameters of what can be considered as a solution to each perspective's commitments. With this explanation of the critical viewpoint taken here, the study will proceed with the analysis of problems within each perspective.

The aesthetic/philosophic perspective. The original critique that forged the interest in developing an aesthetic rationality discussed: (1) the limitationsof using objectives and the concept of learning as central categories in curriculum thought; (2) the need for developing new ways of valuing educational experience; and (3) the curriculum's role in developing meaning rather than learning. The aesthetic work that has been developed since that critique addresses some of these concerns and others that were not a part of the original critique.

The methods of aesthetic criticism discussed by Eisner, McCutcheon, and Shuchat-Shaw provide approaches to educational evaluation that address the need for valuing educational experience in ways other than the technical and instrumental. Therefore, they represent important contributions to that task. However, since these approaches are conceived as forms of qualitative evaluation, their efforts are focused on summative issues rather than the formative interest in designing alternative educational environments using

aesthetic values. What this means is that aesthetic criticism as presently discussed helps to evaluate educational phenomena——to make judgments about that which has already happened. It does not conceptualize or demonstrate the prior use of aesthetic valuing in the developmental stages of designing educational environments. Huebner defined this latter design problem as a task of the curriculum theorist.[3] To date this task remains a direction yet to be pursued in the further delineation of aesthetic rationality. In fact in reconceptual inquiry as a whole, there is little concern for design issues, with the exception of Greene's recommendations for an arts and humanities curriculum, and Giroux's recommendations for pedagogy. Moreover, some reconceptual theorists questions the value of even considering the design task as an important concern of the curriculum theorist. For example, Pinar attacks the concept this way:

> What I will argue is that one cannot, in any meaningful sense, design an educational experience. I will not only argue this point, I shall demonstrate it. The obvious yet evidently generally unknown fact is that one cannot predict human response, except in trivial matters and in artificially circumscribed circumstances, as necessary for experiments. Classrooms, while certainly artificially limited, are not sufficiently limited for the teacher to know with much certainty the response his or her lesson will receive.[4]

The result of questioning the notion of design and lack of attention to that task is a confusing stance: to design or not to design; and if not to design, what is the purpose of making educational values explicit to begin with?

This question can be pursued further by considering Huebner's concern for shaping the conceptual tools that curricularists use to design educational environments. He reminds curricularists of the importance of being aware of the values that work through them so that they can shape their technologies rather than be controlled by them, and he points to the importance of criticism in that task.

> It is necessary that he (the curriculum theorist) be conscious of his man-made equipment, his languages, his environmental forms. To be aware of these man-made forms is to be aware of their history, of their sources in human activity and intention, and continually to subject them to empirical and social criticism that they be not idols but evolving tools. All educators attempt to shape the world; theorists should call attention to the tools used for shaping in order that the world being shaped can be more beautiful and just.[5]

Therefore, the aesthetic criticism developed thus far can be seen as a first step in addressing that task. But beyond criticism, one must still ask——what is the relationship between values and design? Huebner's position is to raise awareness of values so that curriculum designs and educational environments can be planned in valued ways. Pinar's position seems to reject the notion of design because of its present associaton in mainstream curriculum theory with values that he does not choose. It is this contradiction between their two viewpoints that exposes a large gap in reconceptual inquiry. What Pinar's position doesn't account for is the possibility of developing an alternative way to conceptualize the notion of design. He associates it with predetermination of experiences. There is virtually unanimous disagreement among reconceptual theorists with the notion of predetermination. Certainly that was one of Huebner's major objectons to the dominance of objectives as a category for curriculum. But that doesn't mean that the entire concern for design must be abandoned. The problem is that reconceptual theorists have not yet developed a philosophic base to explore the nature of educational experience in a way that while valuing that experience qualitatively rather than instrumentally, also achieves a parallel transformation in the notion of design, one that is consistent with qualitative valuing. This point needs to be explained further.

Kliebard has pointed out that reconsideration of Dewey's work on the nature of educational experience would provide valuable insight into possible alternatives to instrumental valuing.[6] This investigation has

not been pursued. In fact, other than Huebner's existential concerns, no philosophic research has been conducted on the nature of educational experience, or on the problem of the separation of means and ends associated with objectives and instrumental valuing.

The point here is not to argue for Dewey's view of experience, but instead to point out that there is an existing philosophic base that can contribute to an understanding of educational experience and what planning means when emphasizing the experience rather than predetermined goals. By failing to develop this philosophic base and address the reconceptualization of the notion of design, reconceptual theorists have left the curriculum field in an ambiguous position. On the one hand they have generated a convincing argument against the continued domination of objectives and against the use of instrumental valuing in education.

On the other hand, they have failed to establish a reconceptualized view of design that sheds the consequences of instrumental valuing but retains the capacity to act; that allows curricularists to surpass the stage of using those values in the creation of alternative educational environments. Huebner's original challenge to the field was that curricularists should develop different conceptual tools; it was not intended to ignore the importance of tools or design. What I am arguing is that curriculum design is and should be an important task of the curricularist (reconceptual or otherwise); that the notion of design must be reconceptualized in accordance with values expressed by reconceptual theorists; and presently reconceptual inquiry lacks the philosophic base needed to reconceptualize that notion. I have stated reconceptual inquiry has assumed an ambiguous stance on this issue. It is an issue that must be resolved since to be aware of and state one's values without being concerned with the issue of design is simply to give lip-service to those values without being commited to them.

My concern here is a philosophic one, rather than a practical one. In other words, reconceptual theorists need to explore what philosophy can tell them about the nature of experience, about uniting means and ends, and about the existential discussions of being and temporality that Huebner has introduced into the curriculum field, to discover new ways of planning that differ from the means-ends, input-output models being used in mainstream curriculum theory.

There is a second and related issue connected to Huebner's concern for shaping the conceptual tools that curricularists use to design educational environments. The problem is created by the fact that aesthetic theorists have done little to replace, complement, or reformulate the conceptual categories that the critique has undermined. Excluded from my criticism is an earlier work of Eisner's conceptualizing different types of objectives,[7] and Maxine Greene's previously discussed works reconceptualizing curriculum for the creation of meaning rather than the consumption of knowledge that behavioral psychology refers to as learning. While their works are valuable starting points for alternative conceptual tools, they do not succeed as such since Eisner's work has not been pursued and Greene's work exists as a literary portrait of an alternative conception for curriculum rather than as a refined tool for planning. In essence, reconceptual theorists have failed to produce viable, legitimized conceptual tools that have heuristic value for the task of environmental design.

The political significance of this omission is that the curriculum field's existing conceptual tools and heuristic devices, while effectively challenged by the reconceptual critique, remain intact and continue to mediate the dominant technological rationality. To date, reconceptual theorists have failed to seize the radical implication of their observation that conceptual tools and structures mediate consciousness——the implication being that reconceptual theorists should recognize that beyond the use of criticism, they must fight the domination of the technological perspective by the development and diffusion of alternative conceptual tools, structures, and social relationships, ones that mediate different perspectives. Put another way, even though reconceptual theorists have produced a persuasive critique of categories such as objectives

and learning, those categories persist as the dominant view of curriculum influencing the consciousness of both new and experienced educators. To counter that view, reconceptual theorists must be concerned with not only heightening consciousenss, but also with the mediation and diffusion of alternative viewpoints. While some reconceptual theorists have begun that work, the aesthetic/philosophic perspective has failed to do so.

The third problem I have identified stems from consideration of the ways that a social/political analysis can contribute to the development of aesthetic rationality. The point to be made here is that the discussion of aesthetic rationality and criticism has for the most part been concerned with the development of a method for aesthetic criticism supported by a conceptual base extrapolated from principles of aesthetic criticism used in literature, theater, film, music, and the visual arts without examination of specific historical, social, political, or philosophical frameworks that the critic can use to interpret and evaluate. For instance, notably absent from the aesthetic discussion is the consideration of the tradition of Marxist aesthetics as a rubric for linking aesthetic rationality to the emancipatory intent of reconceptual work. Maxine Greene's work is an exception to this observation, since her work, which draws upon the Frankfurt School, has always remained committed to both aesthetic and political values. Moreover, she has discussed the importance of exploring theories thatprovide the content of questions asked when encountering a work of art.[8] What all of this means is that inasmuch as aesthetic rationality is concerned with the valuing of educational activity and the interpretation of the symbolic meaning of that activity, Marxist aesthetics would greatly enhance its ability to render that activity with both aesthetic and politicalsensibility.

From surveying the original aesthetic/philosophic critique, the alternatives it has generated, and the problems and omissions of that perspective, it can be concluded that the aesthetic/philosophic research can be credited with initiating new possibilities for qualitative evaluation, such as those developed by Eisner, McCutcheon, and Shuchat-Shaw, and with providing insight into curriculum issues in aesthetic education, based on the works of Greene and Rosario. Moreover, Greene's work has value beyond discussion of aesthetic education, for it has bearing on the entire issue of developing curriculum for critical consciousness. However, all of these contributions are, at present, sketches for alternative theorizing and practice, rather than fully developed conceptualizations. Given the dominance of quantitative research, the newness of qualitative evaluation, and the paucity of previous aesthetic research in the curriculum field, this finding is not surprising or particularly significant. What has been of more interest to this researcher than considering the sophistication of aesthetic criticism is the overall capacity of the aesthetic/philosophic perspective to address issues it has raised in critiquing mainstream curriculum theory. It is on this point that I have based my criticisms of the aesthetic theorizing that has been generated thus far.

I have asserted that much of reconceptual work lacks sufficient conceptual development to convincingly meet its challenge to the field. That conclusion holds true for the aesthetic/philosophic research in a number of ways. First, the original aesthetic/philosophic critique exposed the problems and limitations of the categories of objectives and learning, yet it has failed to develop alternative conceptual tools or languages to conceive of curriculum differently. This is not to say that it has not provided alternative assumptions. For example, when one combines Greene's discussion of meaning with Pinar and Grumet's work on the relationship between the knower and the known, and the social/political discussion on the sociology of knowledge, it would be possible to collect a set of assumptions that would provide the foundation for an active, constructionist epistemology rather than the passive, manipulative view of the student inherent in the behaviorist view of learning that has long held a central place in curriculum. But a loosely connected set of assumptions that must be culled from various reconceptual works is not a substitute for conceptual tools that provide refined means of expressing, mediating, and implementing an alternative view of curriculum. The concern for the development of alternative conceptual tools should not be misconstrued as a call for reconceptual inquiry to guide practice. Rather, it is my concern for the mediation of alternative views of curriculum that should be emphasized here. Reconceptual theorists have themselves identified conceptual tools

as important elements of curriculum that reflect one's underlying values and rationality. Failing to provide alternative conceptual tools, they have missed the opportunity to act upon their own observation by transmitting alternative views through those tools.

Second, the aesthetic/philosophic perspective raised the issue of developing new ways of valuing educational experience and it has addressed that issue by developing new ways to evaluate that experience. However, with the exception of Huebner's wrok, aesthetic/philosophic theorists have neglected to address the question of valuing not simply as an evaluation question, but also as a design question. Neglecting philosophic exploration of the nature of experience, the aesthetic research lacks the philosophic base to provide alternative views of experience and alternative conceptions of the notion of design that could avoid the instrumental valuing characteristic of technocratic rationality.

Third, reconceptual theorists have presented aesthetic criticism as a methodology without fully articulating aesthetic, philosophical, or political perspectives that could serve as the critical lens through which interpretations and judgments about classroom life are made. Therefore we are provided with the shell of the method but left unassisted with the actual judgments made in using the method.

In sum, the aesthetic/philosophic theme has enriched the curriculum field by pointing to the shortcomings of traditional patterns and stimulating imagination and visions of new ones. Moreover, it has begun the task of conceptualizing new possibilities. But lacking alternative conceptual tools, a philosophic base to develop alternative views of experience, a reconceptualized notion of design, and delineation of the use of aesthetic, philosophic, or political theories to support the method of aesthetic criticism, the aesthetic/philosophic theme simply has too many gaps to be able to offer the curriculum field a strong alternative curriculum theory.

The psycho-analytic perspective. William Pinar envisioned three possibilities that could be developed from autobiographic work: (1) the development of greater self-awareness concerning the relationship between one's biographic situation and one's role as researcher or teacher; (2) the exploration of the relationship between the knower and the known, with the possibility that such investigations might ultimately discover common, trans-biographical structures that can be used to help other learners; (3) on a larger scale, the facilitation of personal integration and liberation that could on a gradual cumulative basis lead to a shift in the weltanschauung and ultimately to a change in political structures. Pinar's work has been criticized by Michael Apple for failing to make his reports meaningful.[9] While I agree in part with this observation, it is clear from the possibilities Pinar has projected that the problem lies not with a lack of the sense of larger significance. Rather, Pinar has not yet communicated a conception of generalizability, or a substitute for it, that gives individual work a claim to theoretical significance, while protecting his concern that the individual not be made subservient to theory. This concern is reflected in his reaction to Apple's criticism:

> His (Apple's) concern is finally theoretical explanation in the tradition of mainstream social science, a tradition that, like academic philosophy, "apes the natural and mathematical sciences." It is a tradition concerned pre-eminently with discovering nomological knowledge of human behavior and action, knowledge which will enable us to comprehend action in reliably enough ways as to permit its prediction. In this respect, politically oriented scholarship does not reconceptualize the field. In this respect, such scholarship tends to function in politically and intellectually reactionary ways, as it continues the reduction of the concrete to the abstract, as it continues the reduction of concretely-existing individuals to evidence for theoretical explanation.[10]

Therefore, Pinar's concern is with recognizing the significance of particularity as opposed to establishing significance through abstraction and generalizability.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Elliot Eisner has confronted the issue of generalizability in his efforts to provide alternative principles to substantiate his form of qualitative inquiry. His response to that dilemma was to creatively reformulate the positivist notions of validity and generalizability in ways that supported qualitative inquiry. What I am suggesting is that Pinar should either, in a vein similar to Eisner, reformulate research principles to explain the significance of particular ity, or argue the case that generalizability is not a necessary condition for theoretical significance and provide us with alternative principles that illuminate and give credibility to the different kind of explanatory power that results from particularity. At present, Pinar's work lacks the principles to establish the theoretic significanc eof particularity, and substitutes instead the faith that individual work leads ultimately to the transformation of collective consciousness and political structures.

This is an issue that goes to the very heart of theory building. It is an issue that has ramifications for the entire question of developing alternative theories based on qualitative rather than positivist forms of research. If qualitative research methodologies are to gain acceptance as modes of theorizing their adherents must produce alternative principles and criteria that support their work. Pinar and Grumet have discussed the theoretical roots of the method of currere by explaining the concepts they have extrapolated from psycho-analysis, phenomenology, and existentialism. But they have not provided the principles and criteria that make the findings of currere meaningful in a way that transforms currere from a method for autobiography to a theory that can inform the curriculum field. The failure to provide what should be seen as a basic foundation for theory construction prevents this autobiographic research from fulfilling the reconceptual aspiration for developing new modes of theorizing. It is important to emphasize that what is being stated here is not that the method should produce predictions or generalizations as with the positivist definition of theory, but rather that the method should produce principles to substantiate a different concept of theorizing, one that either establishes the theoretic significance of particularity or presents a foundation that interrelates particularity with the abstract.

This problem can be understood more specifically by looking at the sencond possiblity listed previously for autobiographic work: the exploration of the relationship between the knower and the known, with the possibility that such investigation might ultimately discover common, trans-biographical structures that can be used to help other learners. This is an important concern for the curriculum theorist. The problem is that the autobiographic work to date, while valuable for the individual, has not yet linked what has been learned on the concrete level to the abstract level, so that the resulting knowledge can inform the curriculum field. This is not to call for, in the positivist sense, generalizable results that can be used as propositions. What it does ask for is the use of individual results for the curriculum field. Pinar appears to be arguing that the method's significance is its redirection of the field's focus on education from the curriculum designer's point of view to that of the individual living out the educational experience.[11] The problem, however, of going from the abstract to the concrete is that the knowledge yielded appears to stop with the individual—it has no place to go. What he hasn't accounted for is an explanation of how knowledge from the individual's autobiographical journey gets back to the curricularist so that the curricularist can better facilitate the journey for other individuals.

In sum, the method has great value for the individual, but until it establishes theoretic assumptions to explain the significance of particularity and its relationship to the abstract, its potential is only half realized. It is time to move on to the other half of this research.

The second issue I have identified with the psycho-analytic focus concerns the use of self-report in Madeleine Grumet's discussion of teacher supervision. This issue is of interest because self-report is a modification and application of currere and therefore provides the opportunity both to consider a form of the method in use, and to examine its capacity to serve a critical and emancipatory function with a particular population. As previously mentioned, Grumet's view of dialectic reflection is one that depends on teachers

to provide the antithesis to their own observations of their work, while the supervisor asks questions that deal with viewpoints the teacher raised. While Grumet does reserve the right to present alternative viewpoints in her response to a teacher' diary, the primary focus of her response is to elicit new depths to the self-observations and analysis of discrepancies, omissions, or themes in the accounts. The issue of concern stems from two problems that some Marxian critiques attribute to phenomenology: first, that phenomenology omits analysis of the context and conditions that influence the construction of the actor's meanings, and second, recognition that the actor's perceptions of events may not represent an accurate interpretation of the events as they actually are. Pertinent to these points, Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green explain how their Marxian analysis of teacher's pedagogical conceptions and practices avoids these limitations of the phenomenological perspective:

> Unlike the phenomenologist, we employ a concept of false consciousness and implicitly highlight in critical fashion the falsity, where it is substantively incorrect, and naivety, where it is superficial, of the actor's consciousness. We try to generate explanations of structures latent to the totality as they recognize it and thus go beyond phenomenological description which tends to be based squarely on the subject's here and now.[12]

The question under consideration here asks if Grumet's development of the method of self-report has the critical capacity to surmount the limitations that Sharp and Green have ascribed to some forms of phenomenological analysis. This is an important question because it focuses attention on the nature of the method's critical power, assessing its strengths and limitations.

It should be remembered from discussion in Chapter IV that the method of currere borrows concepts from existentialism and psycho-analytic theory in addition to phenomenology. Since Grumet has drawn upon existentialism to explore the relationship of man to his situation, it is evident that the influence of the social context on the individual is given attention in her work. Indeed, in her work on theater education (which has not been described in this study) one finds more extensive treatment of the influence of the social context on the individual. The crucial question to ascertain whether the method of self-report, as presently developed, can formulate a mode of analysis capable of penetrating the mystifying effects of ideology, illuminating the contextual influences on the actor's construction of meaning, and exposing the distortion of self-interpretation Marxists refer to as false consciousness, is to define the nature of the critical power of this method.

Throughout Grumet's development of currere, both in teacher supervision and in theater education, the critical tension she relies on to establish a dialectic is the phenomenological concept of distancing or bracketing, referred to as estrangement in her theater work. The reflective and analytic phases of the journal writing, accompanied by the questioning responses of the supervisor, serve to distance the subject from his/her experience creating the opportunity to question and reconstruct that experience. Contradictions in the text are used to help the individuals establish the antithesis to their work.

In this researcher's view, the strength of this method is that the individual learns to question the taken-for-granted nature of experience. This form of questioning encourages the individual to reconsider one's past experience, discovering patterns and themes that may serve to heighten one's self-understanding. Aware of one's development, the person becomes a conscious subject empowered with a self-knowledge that illuminates one's interaction in the present situation and increases one's capacity to act upon one's future.

The limitation of this method is that a process of reflexivity is content free, and therefore lacks a perspective or theoretic framework to assist the individual in the recognition of important points for reflection, in the interpretation of one's experience and situation, or in the evaluation of competing possibilities for future action. The supervisor, acting as dialogic respondent to the individual's journal has a perspective and a fund of knowledge from which to ask questions that suggest areas for exploration, and that sometimes offer information or points of view to challenge the individual's awareness of an issue. But the alternative insights that the supervisor could provide are tempered in this method, in the interest of drawing out the individual's account of their experience in greater depth. The question is, does this form of gentle counterpoint from the supervisor provide sufficient critical tension needed to counter the mystifying effects of ideology on the actor's consciousness?

This is not to posit an overdetermined view of subjectivity, but rather to suggest that a method that primarily asks teachers to probe further what they have recognized as worthy of exploration, places too much trust in the power of reflexivity to penetrate powerful influences on teacher perception, attitudes, and behavior that lie outside their individual biographic situations. The reflexivity that is derived from distancing one's self from one's concrete experience is an essential critical tool; but it is a limited tool precisely because the actor's individual experience and therefore the understanding that can be gleaned from it is limited. Moreover, simply because one has learned to be self-reflexive does not mean necessarily mean one has developed an accurate interpretation of one's observations. While Grumet's research shows theoretic awareness of the interaction of person and situation, her description of the method in use does not explain how it overcomes these limitations.

What is suggested here is that the method of self-report go a step further by introducing the analytic skills that enable individuals to interpret and evaluate their perceptions by drawing upon theoretic frameworks that can inform their experience. This step was included as the third phase in William Pinar's original formulation of the method. The point is that this is an essential part of the method; it allows for the relation of the abstract and the concrete; and its further development in self-report would greatly enhance the critical power of this form of currere.

Furthermore, Grumet's heavy reliance on a Socratic method of questioning assumes that it can develop a critical theoretical framework where none exists. Dan Lortie's sociological study of schoolteachers indicates that teachers' practices and behavior are based largely on preconceived, idiosyncratic assumptions developed from their own experience in schools.[13] Grumet's method of self-report provides a highly significant contribution to bringing those preconceptions to the surface and exposing them to self-reflection; it does nothing to transform the idiosyncratic nature of the teacher's reflection into a viable theoretical framework. As pointed out in Chapter III the provision of a critical framework such as that developed by the social/political critique can replace intuitive teacher perceptions with a critical consciousness capable of penetrating mystification and promoting critical reflection on the constraints that impede their efforts. While this is not a call to impose a theoretical framework, it is a suggestion that they be made available. Combining the strengths of Grumet's approach with this suggestion would result in a broader notion of the dialectic and a different epistemological method, ones that are rooted in the interplay between the concrete experience of the teacher and the capacity of theoretical frameworks to interpret that experience.

Discussing these limitations of the method of currere is use for teacher education is not meant to discredit the method. Instead this analysis seeks to distinguish between the strengths and limitations of the method, pointing to ways it needs to be complemented or extended. Such an analysis is in the interest of developing complex theoretic models that are consistent with the emancipatory intent of reconceptual work.

The social/political perspective. The social/political perspective exposes the relationship between ideology and curriculum and raises the issue of developing curriculum theories and practices that serve emancipatory interests. The perspective has achieved a large degree of success toward that intent as evidence by: the sophisticated development of a critical mode of theorizing; the outline of a conceptual understanding of praxis; the application of the critical framework to specific curricular issues; and the suggestion of political strategies to effect change in schools.

The social/political literature has been criticized for the abstract nature of its structural analysis and the exclusion of attention to the concrete existence of real people.[14] What this observation contributes to the social/political analysis is a reminder that first, with abstraction one runs the risk of distortion, and second, with the particularity of the concrete analysis of human experience one can avoid the pitfalls of overdetermined structural analysis by revealing the complex interplay of personal, cultural, economic, and political influences on an individual's life, and, more importantly, the individual's action upon his or her situation.[15] In other words, the social/political failure to relate the abstract to the concrete ignores the fine texture and detail of daily life. This omission diminishes its ability to offer complex theoretical explanations. These observations support the conclusion that just as the social/political perspective can complement the psychoanalytic focus, conversely, it can also be enhanced by the psycho-analytic perspective. Similarly, aesthetic theorizing can contribute to the social/political focus as noted by Elizabeth allance, who has discussed the application of qualitative evaluation to the analysis of the hidden curriculum.[16] Phenomenological case studies are also pertinent to this matter. To some degree social/political theorists have addressed the concern for concrete analysis by drawing upon the research of ethnomethodologic studies.

The call to relate the abstract to the concrete suggests to me two problems for future research by social/political theorists. First, the analysis lacks an elaborated theory of domination, emancipation, and praxis, as the critically reflective agency through which the individual transcends domination and moves toward emancipation, and praxis, as the critically reflective agency through which the individual transcends domination and moves toward emancipation. Certainly the theory has provided concepts with powerful explanatory power. For example, the notions of hegemony and autonomous space point to conscious and unconscious forms of domination as well as the existence of opportunity to resist that domination. The notion of critical consciousness, as the first moment in praxis, explains the rational conditions needed for emancipation. The problem hinges on the present understanding of praxis, which assumes that critical thought leads to critical action. What is missing from this interpretation is a deeper psychological understanding of the subjective factors rooted in the individual's personality and biography that provide or inhibit the motivation to take action.[17] Richard Bernstein, discussing Jürgen Habermas's conception of praxis, poses the problem this way:

> What seems to be lacking here is any illumination on the problem of human agency and motivation. In a new form we have the old problem that has faced every critical theorist: under what conditions will agents who have a clear understanding of their historical situation to be motivated to overcome distorted communication and strive toward an ideal form of community life? What are the concrete dynamics of this process? Who are or will become its agents?[18]

Future research on this dilemma would be benefitted by concrete studies from perspectives such as psycho-analysis, various forms of psychology, and phenomenology, each of which could illuminate the motivation and intentionality of the individual. Then our conceptual understanding of the multidimensional nature of domination, emancipation, and praxis would be much deeper.

The second problem for future research is also related to praxis. Since Apple has begun to investigate the ways that specific groups resist domination, and both he and Giroux have conceptualized the significance of the notions of resistance and autonomous space to correct the overdrawn analysis of the correspondence theory, the way is now open to consider the forces of resistance in a concrete analysis of group struggle for reform or radical changes in education. What the study of resistance would contribute to the notion of praxis is understanding of the cultural conditions, personal factors, and contradictions within organizations that can evoke and sustain resistance. It can illuminate the reasons for the success or failure of resistance and explore how individual resistance efforts evolve into conscious group struggle for change. In essence, investigating these relationships would balance the social/political perspective by enabling it to develop knowledge to counter hegemony. This means that greater knowledge of resistance would allow curricularists to create conditions that would foster in schools resistance to, and action upon the structural conditions, curriculum, and classroom social relationships that presently mediate the dominant ideology.

The study of resistance could take the form of concrete studies focusing on the analysis of collective action. For example, the historical struggles of teacher groups or community groups to effect change could be examined. Combined with the critical framework of the social/political perspective, the two approaches could yield information explaining the failures and successes of specific reform efforts, by concrete groups, in specific historic and existential situations. This information could produce a deeper conceptual understanding of the conditions needed for praxis, as well as technical information regarding resources and strategies for change.[19]

The social/political perspective has developed a viable theoretical framework that has significant explanatory and critical power in its present state; but there are gaps in its research that limit its power in crucial areas that would take it farther. The basic problem with the social/political perspective's research on the

relationship between ideology and curriculum is its lopsided stage of development, caused by extensive research on domination and lack of sufficient attention to the notions of resistance, emancipation, and praxis. What this means is that the social/political perspective goes a long way toward developing an abstract analysis exposing curriculum elements that mediate the dominant ideology, but does relatively little to illuminate a concrete analysis of the psychological and organizational conditions needed to counter the dominant ideology. It enables educators to critically understand the root cause of their situations, which by itself is a valuable contribution, since identification of the source of a problem is also identification of a target for change. To some extent knowledge of what is wrong produces knowledge of how to proceed. However, development of a more fully conceptualized understanding of resistance, emancipation, and praxis would greatly strengthen the social/political perspective's ability to not only heighten consciousness but also to transform the educatonal institutions in which we live. In this sense, the social/political theoretical framework is incomplete.

Conclusion

While the aesthetic/philosophic, psycho-analytic, and social/political themes have been discussed separately, respecting the fact that reconceptual inquiry is not a monolithic perspective, the evaluation of these three themes must be pooled to develop a composite assessment that indicates the staus of reconceptual inquiry as a whole. Earlier in the study I discussed the accomplishments of reconceptual inquiry and noted that a pattern of the strengths and weaknesses of its research could be discerned, in regard to the six criteria used in this study. After having discussed the problems in reconceptual inquiry that pattern can be more sharply defined.

Clearly the greatest strength of reconceptual inquiry is its critique of mainstream curriculum theory, challenging taken-for-granted patterns and stimulating imagination of new possibilities. The historical critique has exposed the influence and consequences of technological models on the curriculum field. The aesthetic/philosophic critique has challenged the dominance of objectives and learning as central categories in curriculum and has raised the issue of valuing educational experience in ways other than the instrumental valuing characteristic of technocratic rationality. The psychoanalytic critique focused attention on the dehumanizing effects of schooling on the development of the self. The social/political critique, with the strongest voice among the four, has revealed how curriculum often mediates the dominant ideology, thereby perpetuating and legitimizing the existing society. By raising these issues reconceptual theorists have challenged the curriculum field to reexamine its theories and practices so that it will be aware of the values those theories embody and the personal, social, moral and political consequences that result from them. Moreover, many of these theorists have urged the field to develop alternative curriculum theories and practices that are guided by a value commitment ot social justice. The effect of this critique is inspiring and at least to this researcher, convincing. The problems with mainstream curriculum theory are manifest. The issues that reconceptual theorists have raised are challenges from which the curriculum field should not retreat.

Beyond the critique, however, reconceptual achievements are less successful. Certainly there have been significant steps forward––but most of these steps are more tentative than firm, more sketchy than complete. Reconceptual theorists have provided alternative assumptions regarding values, theoretical foundations for curriculum, conceptions of curriculum, methods of research, and pedagogy. But the problems discussed in this chapter indicate that just as they have had much to say in these areas, they have also left much unsaid. Missing from their inquiry have been alternative assumptions about the design of educational experience, the theoretic significance of particularity as a research perspective, and a deeper understanding of praxis. They have begun new modes of theorizing but the gaps in each perspective point to the need for further conceptualization. New categories have been offered to interpret curriculum such as ideology, hegemony, and cultural and economic reproduction, but too little is understood about resistance, emancipation, and praxis. Moreover, reconceptual theorists have failed to sustain development of workable

substitutes for the categories of objectives and learning. Due to these omissions reconceptual inquiry is not yet able to offer the curriculum field viable alternative curriculum theories, although the social/political perspective is much closer to that goal. That is not to say that there are not pieces of reconceptual research which are helpful to the task of viewing and thinking about curriculum differently. That curriculum can be viewed differently is a point that reconceptual theorists have established. What they haven't done is fully develop their new modes of theorizing, nor have they addressed all the issues raised by their critique.

What do these conclusions mean for the potential of reconceptual inquiry? One way to examine that question is to consider the state of reconceptual inquiry in regard to the sixth criteria, the conceptualization and development of the relationship between an emancipatory curriculum theory and radical praxis. First, it should be stated that critics who claim that reconceptual inquiry has no practical potential are simply wrong. Several reconceptual theorists have attended to the practical value of their research, as evidenced by Elliot Eisner's and Gail McCutcheon's discussion of the uses of aesthetic criticism, Francine Shuchat-Shaw's conception of congruence to compare theory and practice, Maxine Greene's rationale and guidelines for an arts and humanities curriculum, Madeleine Grumet's relation of currere to teacher education, and Henry Giroux's applicaton of the social/political framework to the reconceptualization of specific problems and issues in education as well as his recommendations for radical pedagogy. While I do not question the practical potential of reconceptual inquiry, I do question its potential to make the transition from heightened consciousness to radical praxis. The nature of that task is significantly different from discussing the practical implications of one's theoretical endeavors. For reconceptual inquiry to be able to serve as an emancipatory theory that will lead to radical praxis, it must be capable of providing alternative theories and practices that can contribute to the transformation of both the curriculum field and schooling. In other words, I will be assessing the movement's radical potential rather than its practical potential. While the two factors are related, the former term connotes an emphasis on transforming extant situations, including but transcending the narrower concern for implementing theory in practical situations.

My reservations about the radical potential of reconceptual inquiry in this area are due to its failure to provide alternatives to some of the concepts it has critiqued. In previous commentary I have discussed the gaps in reconceptual inquiry that weaken its capacity to provide viable alternative theories. That weakness is important to the point being discussed here because inadequately developed theories do not have the strength to have substantial impact on the curriculum field. But it is also important to examine some of the same gaps to understand the nature of the elements that have been omitted and the implications of those omissions for the radical potential of the movement.

My assertion here is that in reagard to a number of issues that have radical and practical implications, reconceptual theorists have critiqued the approach of mainstream curricularists, but have failed to construct their own theoretic viewpoints. For example, reconceptual theorists have critiqued technological rationality and positivist research for their inadequate views of science, but, except for a few passing references to examples of more theoretically sophisticated uses of technology, reconceptual theorists fail to present their own view of science. Moreover, they do not adequately explain, given the problems with technological rationality, how curricularists can avail themselves of the value of technology but avoid its pitfalls. The suggestions that have been made seem to center on using technological rationality in combinations with other rationalities. The nature of the combination is left unexplained, as is the nature of the miracle that would allow such a combination of perspectives to exorcise the problems that reconceptual theorists have stated are embedded within the technological view. In essence, they have critiqued technology but failed to provide a reconstructed view of how they would have the curriculum field use technology and science.

In a second case, discussed previously, reconceptual theorists critiqued the predetermination and instrumental valuing of experience but failed to present their own philosophy of experience. Also missing from

their analysis of that issue is a reconceptualized notion of design that avoids the pitfalls of predetermination while retaining the capacity to act. Third, they have criticized the curriculum field's emphasis on technique over theory and its persistent tendency to exhibit an ameliorative orientation that continually seeks to guide practice. However, with the exception of one article by William Pinar, there is a conspicuous absence from reconceptual literature of any philosophical discussion about what the relationship between theory and practice should be. A fourth point, discussed earlier, is the lack of an elaborated theory of domination, emancipation, and praxis that explores the notion of resistance, and studies specific efforts for change. As a consequence of these omissions in reconceptual inquiry, readers are left wondering what reconceptual viewpoints are on a number of perplexing questions. What should be the role of science and technology in curriculum? How can curricularists act and yet avoid a technological notion of design? What should be the relationship of reconceptual theory to practice? How does social transformation occur?

What all of these omissions have in common is a connection to the issue of human agency. By failing to answer these questions reconceptual theorists have robbed themselves of several sources of enlightenment that can assist them in producing fundamental changes in both the curriculum field and schooling. The point is that neglecting to investigate action and change from scientific, philosophic, and political points of view (as well as other points of view), they have failed to develop additional kinds of knowledge that support the emancipatory intent of their work.

At present reconceptual theorists emphasize the importance of criticism and self-reflection, asserting that heightened consciousness will lead to action, but they do little to illuminate the conceptual tools, or the conditions needed to take action in transforming situations. In short, critique is not the only way to be in emancipatory relation to one's work. The role of constructive action as emancipatory work also needs to be explored. This is not to say that critique is not constructive. It is to point out that there are forms of action that reconceptual theorists need to explore if they are to meet their challenge to the field.

Returning to my original premise, I stated that for reconceptual inquiry to be able to serve as an emancipatory theory that will lead to radical praxis, it must be capable of providing alternative theories and practices that can contribute to the transformation of both the curriculum field and schooling. The success of the reconceptual critique can be seen as the first moment in that process. But the movement's radical potential is severly undercut by the nascent status of much of its work, combined with the failure to investigate human agency and the conceptual tools and conditions needed to transform the situations that have been critiqued. Of all of the problems with reconceptual inquiry, this is the greatest disappointment, for having inspired and provoked such crucial issues for the future of the curriculum field and education in general, it is finally many reconceptual theorists themselves who retreat from the issues the movement has raised. By continuing to rely on critique without exploring a more active view of emancipatory work, reconceptual theorists are vastly underestimating the magnitude of the struggle needed to meet their challenge to the curriculum field and fulfill their value commitments. Until they push their research forward, the reconceptualization will remain on the threshold, its potential promising, its future uncertain.

FOOTNOTES

1. This discussion can be found in Michael Apple, "Ideology and Form," in *Qualitative evaluation: Concepts and Cases in Curriculum Criticism*, ed. George Willis (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1978), pp. 459-519; see also William Pinar, "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing," in *Liberation and Curriculum*, eds. Marshall Gordon and James B. Macdonald (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, in press); William Pinar, "The Voyage Out: Curriculum as the Relation Between the Knower and the Known," *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2 (Winter 1980); and William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum* (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 89-110.
2. Pinar, "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing," p. 7.

3. Dwayne Huebner, "The Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," in *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists,* ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 266-267.
4. Pinar, "The Voyage Out," p. 75.
5. Huebner, "The Tasks of the Curricular Theorist," p. 269.
6. Herbert Kliebard, "Reappraisal: The Tyler Rationale," in *Curriculum Theorizing,* p. 79.
7. Elliot Eisner, "Emerging Models for Educational Evaluation," *School Review,* 80 (August 1972).
8. Maxine Greene, *Landscapes of Learning* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1978), p. 185.
9. Apple, "Ideology and Form," p. 513.
10. Pinar, "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing," p. 13.
11. Pinar and Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum,* p. 20.
12. Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, *Education and Social Control: A Study in Progressive Primary Education* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 35.
13. Dan Lortie, *Schoolteacher* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 81.
14. Pinar, "The Abstract and the Concrete in Curriculum Theorizing."
15. *Ibid.,* pp. 4-5.
16. Elizabeth Vallance, "The Hidden Curriculum and Qualitative Inquiry as States of Mind," *Journal of Education,* 162, No. 1 (Winter 1980).
17. Agnes Heller, *Theory of Need in Marx* (London: Allison and Busby, 1974).
18. Richard Bernstein, *The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978), p. 224.
19. Macdonald and Zaret, eds., *Schools in Search of Meaning,* ed. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 158.

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AIRLIE 1983

Postscript
1982

This study was completed two years ago as a dissertation in curriculum theory. It was born from my frustration with the oppressive qualities of schooling and my identification with the emancipatory spirit of reconceptual work. It represents the first step in my personal search for meaning in the field and is shared with the community of curriculum scholars in the hope that some of this discussion will be helpful to others and that it may serve to promote disciplinary conversation.

The study bears the customary problems of dissertations regarding scope and depth. It has been criticized both for being too critical and for not being critical enough. I have one major concern regarding how this study is received. Some have expressed fear that the criticism in this study serves to discredit reconceptual work and therefore stop future research. To the contrary, the intent of this work is to paint a portrait of the movement up to a moment in time, capturing its broad landscape to highlight what it has become and what it could be. Problems and omissions in reconceptual discourse are discussed in the interest of developing more complex theoretic conceptualizations that have the power to match the emancipatory intent of reconceptual work.

In the intervening two years since completion of this study reconceptual work has progressed, and some of the issues discussed here may be less problematic. For example, my critique of the social/political research pointed to the need for more inquiry regarding resistance, and in that time social/political theorists have given that issue much greater attention. Moreover, my own research has moved forward and I have come to have greater regard for the potential of aesthetic and psycho-analytic themes in reconceptual work, which I do believe are underplayed in this study. Future comprehensive overviews of reconceptual literature would contribute to further understanding and criticism of the movement by giving more extensive treatment to these themes.

Having addressed limitations of this study, I do want to stress what I believe to be the major achievement of this work. What is offered here is the delineation of one possible framework for criticism of the various forms of reconceptual work and the identification and discussion of specific issues that need further conceptualization to move reconceptual work forward. This is a significant step beyond the now trite observation that reconceptual theory doesn't relate to practice. To be most constructive, criticism of reconceptual discourse must move beyond that banality. Clearly, the achievement and promise of reconceptual work deserves thoughtful and vigorous scrutiny.

K.A.M.

Three Approaches to Curriculum Change: Balancing the Accounts

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Introduction

The process of changing the curriculum, variously described as innovation, adoption, implementation raises practical problems for curricularists, and at the same time begs theoretical questions. An important question arises at the point where theory and practice meet: how ought we to proceed to change people's beliefs about practice?

Richard McKeon[1] suggests an organizing framework for looking at this question; this framework has been used effectively by Connelly[2] to characterize a variety of approaches to curriculum problems. My intention in this paper is to use McKeon's characterization of the imperfections of three different conceptions of practice to analyse approaches to changing people's beliefs about practice now commonly advocated or practiced. Apart from the imperfections that McKeon notes, I argue, in the final part of the paper, that all of the approaches to curriculum changes discussed in the first part assume that talk about practice is unproblematical: that is, that the people involved will understand each other. The analysis of the imperfections of these forms suggests this assumption is unwarranted. Problems of communicaton inhere in all of the approaches; particularly the problem of how to translate innovative ideas into a language practitioners can understand. Resolving problems of translation in curriculum communication may be central to finding ways of improving the curriculum

To sum up this introductory part of the paper, what McKeon has to offer to an analysis of problems of curriculum change is a taxonomy of forms of approaches and, more importantly, an indication of their imperfections. McKeon suggests where the fracture points might be (to change the metaphor) in each of the forms. It is these fracture points that are interesting. These points occur at different places, but one of their common effects in practice, when stress does lead to fracture, is to make it more difficult for people with common problems to understand each other. However one may rate these approaches, none seem immune to the particular communicative weakness of their "breed" as the examples cited here will suggest.

The Sciences of the Practical

McKeon starts from the idea that it is possible to have a "science" of the practical and he identifies three sciences: the dialectic; the logistic; and the problematical. He sees these sciences as defined in their practice; that is, through an analysis of what is done in each of these approaches, it is possible to appreciate their nature theoretically: "The characteristic which sets the discussion of the relation between theory and practice today (is) a tendency to seek operational or existential principles for theory and practice in actions and in symbols."[3] McKeon views science as a rational norm, perhaps synonymous with it, and hence his use of the term might also be taken to connote rational methods of grounding action in knowledge. Thus, he outlines three "sciences" whose methods can be used to distinguish three conceptions of the practical.

The dialectic treats theory and practice as one thing. The dialectical proceeds through discussion of ideals: "(It) is peculiarly adapted to the exploration and formulation of ideals which throw light on the contradictions and potentialities of actual situations considered as approximations to the ideal at varying degrees of removal."[4] The dialectical has analytical power and the possiblitiy of increased understanding of what is entailed in ideals. The relevance of such power to the assessment of innovative doctrine is obvious. What is practical about the dialectic is the knowledge of particular circumstances; the science of it is "practical action adapted to particular conditions and situations."[5] From the point of view of the dialectic, beginning with well formulated procedures and seeking to implement them is not "scientific". Only

through a reflexive process, in which action informs knowledge and knowledge action, can a "scientific" end result; that is, a rational end.

In the logistic conception, practice itself has no knowledge to offer: "The practical is treated...as action motivated irrationally...the practical is, therefore, not a science."[6] The practical is conceived of as something in need of scientific guidance through the application of the methods of human sciences. From these sciences different principles of action can be derived, and different principles of action follow from the different sciences. The different principles compete with each other. McKeon notes that in the dialectic, practice and theory are one; in the logistic: "It (practice) is the application of general scientific laws to modify processes and operations in particular situations."[7]

The problematic conception is based on a method of solving problems akin to, but different from, those used by the sciences of man and nature: "Inquiry treats of problems as they occur and interms of particular issues they present... The problems of the practical are problems of influencing and determining moral, political and social actions.'[8] The problematic is thus what is more commonly now called the "practical".[9] McKeon emphasizes the importance, in the problematic conception, of the process of deliberation that men undertake to reach a conclusion, or to agree on a course of action.

Examples of the Conceptions in Curriculum

With this short description of McKeon's three conceptions of the practical, I turn to examples of curriculum change practice each of which, I believe, embodies one or other of these conceptions. This discussion of these examples will serve to show the usefulness of McKeon's typology, and more importantly, provide a basis for understanding, in curricular terms, the dangers inherent practically in their degraded forms.

I begin with the logistic, since most curriculum change practice conforms to this conception . I take, as an example of this approach, a package of instruments and procedures, developed by the R&D Centre for Teacher Education at the University of Texas, to be used by School systems in promoting curriculum change.[10,11] Judging from what the designers of these materials have written about these packages, it is apparent that a logistic conception of practice is at work. There are two reasons for focussing on the Texas package: first, the work is well known and reports of it appear frequently in journals and at conferences; second, the model is influential, judging by reports of it by other people.

Two components of the package can be identified: a scheme for diagnosing the concerns of teachers, in relation to use of innovation, along a continuum which moves towards "effective" use of the innovation. This is called the Level of Use (LoU) instrument. The other component is a psychologically based model for action called the Concerns Based Adoption Model, or CBAM for short.[12] These elements were developed from the work of Frances Fuller on stages of concern through which pre-service teachers are hypothesized to progress during their education training.[13]

Some of the assumptions of the CBAM model are these: "The individual must be the primary target of interventions designed to facilitate change in the classroom. Since change is brought about by individuals, their personal satisfactions...play a part in determining success or failure of change initiative.. The change process is not an undifferentiated continuum. Individuals involved go through stages in their perceptions and feelings as well as in their skill and sophistication in using the innovation."[14] Based on the CBAM, the LoU instrument is intended to measure the scientifically validated stages of concern. People are placed on this continuum on the basis of analysis of their self reports. From the analysis, an indication of their "needs" is derived, and the "change facilitator" tries to help the teacher move to a higher level of adoption.

The designers talk about innvoation as "treatment" and about the use of innovation as "implementation." Words like: "research data"; "studies"; "verified"; "reliable" and "instruments" are used to describe the development of the materials, and their use is couched in terms such as: "facilitators"; "delivery"; "diagnoses"; "intervention"; "targetted"; "developer"; "impact"; "treatment"; and "thrusts".[15,16]

Such an approach to change is logistic in these respects. First, practiceitself is seen in need of scientific control. The LoU isused to bring order out of chaos. Scientific precision is brought to bear on the problems of coping with change; people are told what their needs are and how to deal with them in terms of a pre-specified, scientific and general model which can be used universally. Experts are used to help people accomodate to the plans of the organization.

McKeon notes a number of dangers in the use of degraded forms of the logistic conception which I believe are reflected in the practice recommended in the Texas package. He notes that: "The logistic method has tended to emphasize the separation in action of the experts who possess technical knowledge from those who will benefit from it".[17] As well, the precisions theoretically possible though the method may be reduced in practice to sterile formalisms, and finally, the method is prone to error in application. What the sciences of the logistic study, according to McKeon, may not be in fact, those things which spur people to act. In short the use of the logistic method may lead to what Wise calls a hyper-rationalization of education.[18]

The potential limitations of the logistic approach to curriculum change can be seen in the particular case of the Texas package. The teacher is viewed as an object of manipulation by staff developers whose task it is to bring about compliance to system-wide plans. The particular reservations that teachers might have about the innovation, say its worth, are not considered. Innovation is reduced to a technical process rather than, from the dialetic view, a chance to examine the meaning of an ideal, or from the problematic view, a chance to discuss action amongst equals. The precision, that is, the reliability of the LoU is suspect. Given the complexity of organizations and the demands on teachers and the way the LoU was developed, it is hard to see how such an instrument could form a reliable basis for understanding of the problems teachers face in dealing with change which is the espoused purpose of it. Finally, the instrument may lack validity; it may be addressing the wrong questions. The instrument is derived from psychological theory; it is a form of derived implication from research in that field. What makes one confident that the particular problems of that field, and the language they are couched in, are germane to those in the field of curriculum change? What provides the bridge?

Apparently the bridge is made through the use of administrative language. The psychological language is mapped onto language that administrators speak, and in this way, may enhance the desirability of the package and the likelihood that it, as an innovation, will be adopted. Yet, the declared focus of the package is on the teachers. Teachers, however, do not speak the language of administrators. Will teachers understand the package? Are there multiple languages: one for those who will adopt the package; one for those who will administer the instruments and perhaps even a third for the teachers themselves?

To sum up this discussion, McKeon sees logistic methods degrading into abuses of power, failing to account for what causes people to act and not proving a knowledge base adequately rich enough in relation to the problem. As I have suggested, it would be worth examing the Texas package to see if such dangers had been recognized and dealt with. The question we have to ask, in the end, is whether or not one can trust logistic approaches to curriculum change? While this should remain an open question, there appear to be some important pitfalls in such an approach.

A dialetical conception of practice has been urged by Connelly.[19] He sees in the relationship between the researcher and the teacher the possibility of theory and practice taken as aspects of the same thing

and both being advanced through the resolution of differences in perspectives. This is one of the possibilities of the dialectic, as McKeon notes: (It) can be concrete without abandoning abstractions, since it can discover...a process which is at once determined by necessity and guided by the purpose of achieving human goods...Action-like thought consists in reconciling contraries in dynamic wholes."[20] McKeon is saying that the dialectic recognizes both the press of outside forces and determination to accomplish personal purposes. People are conceived of as both purpose-bound and subjected to influences from outside. Knowledge can be gained from finding out in practice how these contraries can be resolved. The notion of contraries is a powerful one for the field of curriculum change, and the dialectic provides a method for dealing with these.

Connelly suggests that both insiders and outsiders have a role to play in change that is in the short-run different, but in the long run, is part of a common commitment to improve the curriculum. A synthesis, in the long run is possible, and that can act as a governing principle for dealing with short run contraries.[21] Unlike the logistic, contraries are not necessarily resolved in favour of the administration, or the outsider; nor is it assumed that the consequences of the innovation are clear. One important practical value of the dialectic, is the use of an ideal to assess the implications of current and potential practice. This seems to have considerable heuristic value in curriculum change, given the complexity of some innovative ideas, the difficulty of finding common language to talk about practice and the need to learn from practice.

An example of a dialectical conception at work can be seen in the history of the Humanities Curriculum Project (H.C.P.) in the U.K. Similarily, the Elementary Science Study (E.S.S.) project reflects this conception. In either case charismatic figures (Stenhouse; Hawkins) set out to challange the way things were in classrooms by embodying in new classroom materials changes in teacher-student relationships. I'll use the H.C.P. example to show the dialectical character. As MacDonald and Walker note: "H.C.P. took the unusual step of spelling out quite explicitly a radical alternative to which established practice was quite irrelevant."[22] The project posed a challenge; it was an ideal around which discussion about practice itself could be joined. As they note: "It intuitively generated a prospect powerful enough to persuade teachers to depart from their secure territorial niches in order to explore its possibilities".[23] In this sense the project created conditions suitable for a reconsideration of practice, and this is what the designers pursued; teachers were asked to reflect on their authority in the classroom; to reconsider their traditional position of dominance.

What are some of the limitations of the dialectic approach? McKeon notes three. First, since action cannot wait on endless debate, "men may not understand what is at issue"[24] and in the end, there may be a tendancy to use coersion rather than argument. Simply, there may not be enough time. Secondly, the dialectic may degrade into the sophistic; that is, there may be a lack of checks on the argument, or a temptation to say what is pleasing, rather than that which is well founded. Finally, the ideal state around which the dialectic is joined may reflect the wishes of powerful groups who may abuse the dialectical process in their own interests.

MacDonald and Walker, in their analysis of H.C.P. use the notion of negotiation to describe what actually happens to curriculum project ideas. One way of construing negotiation is to view it as a degraded form of dialectic method forced upon projects because of time and political realities. They note that: "projects engage in image manipulation in order to disguise discrepancies between their own educational convictions and the convictions held by others, particularly, teachers...and academic critics".[25] They stress the gap between rhetoric and reality in curriculum renewal, and suggest that the rhetoric has a survival function; that is, critical acceptance, and adoption: Projects negotiate their way into schools by failing to emphasize the full extent and nature of the changes which a faithful implementation would bring about."[26] Pressures of time also take their toll: "The newly funded project will be sensitive to its historical and contemporary context... but it also has to act now."[27]

The press of time and the need to get accepted dilute the full dialectical potential of the innovation conceived of as a challenge to existing practice. Rather than disclose fully, the temptation exists to say what is pleasing; to short circuit the time it takes to engage in dialectical thinking. The ambitious may abuse their power and seek fame. These problems can be seen in curriculum projects which set out to challenge existing practices. Are these problems so grave that, although we may admire the heuristic value of a dialectical challenge to practice, we risk in practice, the use of the dialectical in some unacceptable degraded version? Successful use of the dialectical method may hinge on the scaleof its use. Perhaps curriculum projects of the large, central kind are simply subjected to too many stresses to be useful embodiments of dialectic method?

The final conception of practice is that of the problematical. In the problematical, the problem is the focus of action. By means of communication between those who might help, all of whom have equal status in the process, the problematic method proceeds through deliberation, persuasion, agreement to decision. Reid has argued in some detail for the use of this approach in dealing with problems of curriculum change.[28] He calls the approach "deliberative" and in developing it, has drawn on the work of Schwab.[29] Reid is concerned about: "Improving people's capacity...to make good decisions about teaching and learning".[30] In his discussion of the deliberative process, he distinguishes between "procedure" and "method". Procedure, as he describes it, is akin to the logistic method, in which general solutions are applied universally. The methodic, on the other hand, is an approach to problems in which the nature of the problem guides the steps to be followed. The process depends on developing skills of appreciation and of practical reasoning.

An example of Reid's conception of curriculum change practice as improvement in the process of deliberation can be seen in the work of Argyris and Schon.[31] They ask practitioners to reflect upon what they call the person's theories of action and governing variables. They distinguish between espoused theories and theories-in-use. Espoused theories are what people will say they follow; such theories tend to preserve an acceptable image. Theories-in-use are what actually govern actions and, they claim, have to be inferred from observation of practice. Governing variables are the constancies, the maintenance of which, theories-in-action-accomplish. Argyris and Schon argue that people can learn to improve their practice by coming to understand their theories-in-use, and by evaluating and changing the governing variables which control them. They have designed workshop approaches aimed at helping people examine their theories-in-use and criticize their governing variables.

Thus, in the problematic approach, curriculum change comes about through increased self-awareness and critical appraisal of personal goals. Unlike the logistic, no particular theoretical formulation of concerns is imposed and the way problems are to be solved is situation-dependent. Unlike the dialectic, no ideal challenge to particular practice is presented, although challenges to governing variables are.

There are liabilities associated with the problematical approach. First, narrow focus on the problematic situation may promote short-run oriented solutions in response to political and other pressures. The long-run goals, because they are harder to think about and less concrete, may be left aside. Second by arguing that the circumstances control the approach, the usefulness of say, general formulations, perhaps ones from social sciences, might be overlooked. Third, the specific may blind one to the potential relevance of general. Finally, powerful interest groups may control what is to be taken to be the problem, or how the problem is to be understood.

If we consider together the potential drawbacks that McKeon has pointed out for each of the conceptions of change, one common element is that of misunderstanding. Misunderstanding may occur in the logistic conception when the rich, but unsystematic language of practice is replaced by a systematic, but sterile language derived from other practices remote from those of teachers. In the dialectical conception,

greater potential exists for understanding, but there is the risk that the time needed to engage in dialectical thinking may force a move to sophistry; the abuse of the practictioner's language to convince them that what is being offered, the ideal, is not really a challenge to practice. By hiding the meaning of the ideal, its import may not be understood by either insiders or outsiders. In this case, the effort that is needed to try to map new conceptions on to the existing language of practitioner's is not made; mostly because the kind of communication between insiders and outsiders that is required does not occur easily in the school context.

The problematic perspective starts from a problem focus with no clearly defined ideal in mind to guide debate and challenge practice. The people involved start from a greater equality and have nothing but their ideas, as it were, to exchange. The problematic seems to offer the richest context for understanding; however, even here there are dangers which stem from its virtues. The pressure to oppose one language against another and strive for understanding is less present in the problematic than it is in the dialectical conception. The dialectical presents a coherent embodiment of the new ideas; a context in which to understand what is meant by the new terms. In the problematic, the people involved must develop for themselves a workable common language.

One of the most important barriers to this process are the facades, the linguistic facades, that exist in conversational and discussion encounters between insiders and outsiders. These facades must be penetrated by people involved in deliberation and by researchers who wish to understand how practitioners understand their work. One research thrust which would help people involved in deliberation to use that process effectively may come from a greater understanding of how teachers, elementary and secondary—it is important to distinguish between them—talk about their practice.

It is with this type of problem that my own research has been concerned—with a particular case of teacher translation of innovative ideas into practice. The point of the research has been to develop a greater understanding of how a group of secondary school teachers approach their classroom work, by using a framework derived from conversations with them. The systematic conversations with teachers were based on the use of Kelly's[32] clinical interview methods and yielded a rich array of terms and theories about teaching (in the teacher's language) that have helped make sense of the apparently strange things done with the project plans[33,34]. It became clear that what the teachers did made sense in their own terms, but more importantly for curriculum change, understanding those terms will make it easier in the future for outsiders to talk to them about how problems encountered in their classrooms might be solved.

Two central theoretical concepts in the research are dilemma and classroom influence[35]. It was found that the innovative materials created a variety of dilemmas for the teachers, but none so central as the apparent loss of influence in the classroom that teachers suffered as they tried to implement the project in its own terms. Their subsequent use of the project can be interpreted as a succession of project translations to promote greater influence within the loose boundaries set by the project. The project doctrine—its essential terms—was translated into terms which made sense to teachers within the theoretical structure of their own thinking. The meaning of the work they did was preserved in the process at the expense of the theoretical system of the project which was, in effect, scrapped. By talking to teachers about the dilemmas they experience in teaching and working backwards to the theories that help explain why these dilemmas exist, it becomes possible to understand what teachers mean when they talk about their practice.

Both the problematic and dialectical conceptions have a strong moral claim on those wanting to improve the curriculum[36]. The potential of these approaches can be realized in practice if attention is given to the problems of understanding that exist when insiders and outsiders attempt to "converse". It is in this conversational process that the really liberating, educational qualities of these conceptions inhere. Such a potential argues for increased research into the nature of the language of practitioners and how that language can be used to express new conceptions of school practice.

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Teaching Curriculum Theory

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Introduction

The major part of this paper consists of a dialogue in which one curriculum theorist tries to gain understanding about how another curriculum theorist teaches curriculum theory. Q is the name given to the first curriculum theorist, who primarily plays the role of questioner, and AB is a curricularist whose responses reflect our experiences in teaching curriculum theory. We have found that by assuming the role of our own questioner, we have been better able to clarify and understand our position. The paper is an attempt to ask: What conception of curriculum theory is implicit in our actions? We suppose that Q is actually a composite of many curriculum theorists whom we have known or read (Q is even partially ourselves). There is a sense, then, in which the Q in us enables us to autobiographically reveal assumptions that we previously knew less fully. The questioning portrayed here is, however, a secondary rendition of what took place during some rather lengthy automobile rides, traveling to and from work, sitting in restaurants, walking through campus, and talking at home.

The dialogue is intended to serve two purposes. One of these is to share approaches that we have found worthwhile for teaching curriculum theory. Very little has been written about this and it is our hope that an exchange of ideas on the topic might emerge among curricularists. Concern for the methodology in teaching curriculum theory seems justifiable in its own right as the subject for a paper. However, it leads quite thoroughly to a second purpose that is pursued in the dialogue; namely to explore the nature of assumptions that lie behind the problem of teaching curriculum theory. In other words, we have found that to explore the way in which we teach curriculum theory illuminates the curriculum theory in our own teaching and prompts us to seek sources of that theory in an effort to understand and defend it.

Finally, a briefer portion of the paper portrays implications, expressed as overall summarizations, that evolved for us during this study. We offer them to clarify our own sense of direction and to encourage others to reflect on them.

The Subject Matter To Be Taught

The scene was a dimly lit but rather quiet lounge in the hotel. It was mid-afternoon of their second day at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association. For years now, Q and AB had met at AERA and sometimes at other conferences. They kept in touch via phone and letter during the year. Although they considered themselves friends, they had never talked in much depth about curriculum matters. They did realize, however, that their orientations to curriculum work were quite different from one another, which might account for the fact that they did not press one another too thoroughly.

Q had been waiting about ten minutes, and when AB arrived he rose and greeted him with a warm handshake and smile as they had done so often. Even before both had seated themselves, the predictable portions of their conversation began: "How have you been?...And the family?...How's your work going?... What about the political climate?..." After about fifteen minutes, the most recent publications of the two had been chronicled, as had the usual information about the political malaise at one another's universities. For the first time in their conversations the attention drifted to students.

Q Do you have much trouble with your students?

AB What do you mean?

Q Well, I guess I mean motivating them to put forth serious effort, especially when it comes to curriculum theory.

AB Sometimes I do, but I've tried a number of different strategies over the years and have developed some that seem to work quite well.

Q You must have a good deal of emphasis on curriculum theory at your institution to have tried so many approaches. How many curriculum theory courses do you have there?

AB Actually, there is only one course in curriculum theory. It is called Curriculum Theory and Applications. When I say that I have taught a lot of curriculum theory, I also refer to other curriculum courses at both graduate and undergraduate levels.

Q That's interesting, but I'm not sure what you mean. Do you mean that you teach units on curriculum theory within other curriculum courses?

AB Not really. I've come to a different orientation to curriculum theory during the past several years, and recently I've done a good deal of reflection on it. It would take considerable time to explain what I mean. Do you have much time?

Q I was going to try to make the 4:05 session, but I'm intrigued. I think I'd rather hear more. Go on.

AB Very well. I was about to say that it makes little sense to elaborate on strategies for teaching curriculum theory without characterizing what I mean by it.

Q That makes sense. So, what do you mean by it?

AB This will probably sound strange to you---certainly it will sound global---I have come to view curriculum theory as something inside of persons. I see it as a network of assumptions or personal values that both emerge from and guide decisions and actions in teaching and learning situations. To draw from Dewey, they add meaning to experience and give direction to subsequent experience (1916, p. 76).

Q You're right, it does seem strange. As a matter of fact, it bothers me quite a lot. Where, for example, does this position put you relative to the two main types of curriculum theory?

AB Two main types?

Q Descriptive and prescriptive theory, of course. Perhaps you call them analytic and normative.

AB Could I have some illustrations?

Q Of course, but I didn't know that you'd need them. Take Fred Kerlinger and P.H. Hirst for example. Time and again Kerlinger has advocated the traditional scientific stance that theory should be a set of interrelated concepts or constructs, definitions, propositions, and relations among variables that can be used to explain and predict the behavior of phenomena within a

field of inquiry (1979, p. 64). You know, descriptive or analytic like atomic theory or gravitational theory. Hirst, on the contrary, sees education as an enterprise that requires prescriptive or action-directed theory, i.e., principles need to be formulated and justified that state what should be done in a range of practical activities. Curriculum policy statements or curriculum guides might be examples. (1966)

AB I see both as...

Q Let me anticipate. You are about to say that the descriptive and prescriptive need to be integrated. Remember, I was simply illustrating extreme differences. You and I both know that someone like George Beauchamp (1975) would clearly acknowledge the need for both. The descriptive, as can be revealed and refined through empirical inquiry is needed as a basis for defensible prescription. I think that most curriculum scholars would agree, don't you?

AB I'm not certain, but maybe you are right. My point is not to argue that your notions of prescriptive or descriptive theory are incorrect or worthless. Clearly, I don't hold that. It is just that I wish to concern myself with what I consider an alternative view (which does of course have prescriptive and descriptive attributes....What wouldn't?)
As for your anticipation of my responses a few moments ago, you didn't guess right. I wasn't about to jump on your dualism. I was about to say that I think both orientations miss an important aspect of practical inquiry.

Q You mean as advocated by Joseph Schwab in his essays in School Review (1969, 1971, 1973)?

AB Yes. I think that most empirical/descriptive research is theoretic, to use Schwab's language, or as Pinar (1978) describes it, conceptual empiricist.

Q Just what do you mean by theoretic and how does it differ from practical inquiry?

AB They can be contrasted relative to four categories: problem source, method, subject matter, and ends. The source of theoretic problems is in the generalized constructs created by researchers; the source of practical problems is in actual dilemmas. Whereas the theoretic researcher assumes that detached induction is the best method of inquiry, practical inquiry occurs through interaction within the context of situations. The subject matter sought in theoretic inquiry is generalizations that reach far beyond situations, while the practical seeks situationally specific solutions. Thus, the end of theoretic inquiry is knowledge qua knowledge or more realistically, information qua publication. The practical researcher seeks decision and action. (Schubert, 1980c).

Q It seems to me that Hirst is practical.

AB He may well be, but his definition seems too policy oriented, and I tend to think that policy, also, when it pertains to persons in a wide range of situations is as theoretic as overgeneralized empirical studies.
Again, however, I want to emphasize that I don't believe that I must deprecate the merits of empirical research or policy research to advocate my own position.

Q OK, I'll try not to emphasize the other positions. But it is indeed tempting. I'm still not certain why you claim that your position is practical.

AB I believe that most curriculum that occurs is created at the level of teacher and student. Even the most precise policy statements are vastly altered when mediated by the experiential stockpile of teachers and students. If there is any curriculum theory that has direct impact on the curriculum that is realized, it is the ever-changing theory of personal constructs within teachers and students.

Q What do you mean by realized curriculum, personal constructs, etc.? It sounds as if you have a new language as well as an odd viewpoint.

AB Let me take them one at a time. Decker Walker (1977) referred to the "realized curriculum" at an AERA symposium in New York a few years ago. He called for a study of the ways in which curricular purposes, content, organizational patterns, etc. actually affect the perspectives realized by learners.

Q That doesn't seem very characteristic of Walker, does it? He has focused largely on policy. His well known paper with Kirst (Bellack and Kliebard, 1977, pp 538-68) and his naturalistic model (1971) are primarily concerned with policy-making at the curriculum committee level and even further removed from teachers and students. That's his notion of practical as I see it.

AB I see another dimension, his emphasis on the specific character of curriculum situations. In his "What are the Problems Curricularists Ought to Study?" (1974) he argues that it is necessary to seek out significant features of each curriculum to be studied. It is from that standpoint that curriculum inquirers should explore personal and social consequences and sources of stability and change. Curricularists should investigate judgement of worth of the various features of those involved. Finally, they should seek to develop features that fit unique situational purposes. I am convinced that a major consequence of this orientation must be to come to know the realized curriculum or the way in which teaching and learning experiences affect those involved in them.

Q It sounds like what you want to do is study psychology. You aren't one of those reconceptualists are you? Nothing against Pinar, Grumet, etc., but what they study is certainly not curriculum.

AB First, I can't say that I'm a reconceptualist. I think that the term has been used too much to lump all persons together who strive to look at curriculum-related problems through different lenses. I don't think that there are card-carrying reconceptualists, so to speak. Those who, for example, contributed to Pinar's collections Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists (1975) and Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (1974) do have some commonality.

Q Such as?

AB They tend to draw upon backgrounds in the humanities. Some offer political perspectives, some phenomenological, and others psychoanalytical or literary. They are quite diverse but are alike in that they offer alternative orientations to mainstream curriculum books which seldom tap these sources (Schubert 1980). What does interest me is that several curricularists who participate in dialogue with those often labeled reconceptualists are concerned with studying curriculum in the social and psychological development of individuals. That is what Pinar and Grumet illustrate in Toward a Poor Curriculum (1976) and that is what Max van Manen has written about on several occasions (1980 and 1979) as the evolving life-worlds of human beings. The

point is that the curriculum worth studying is the curriculum which actually has impact on the lives of students. Moreover, it is the act (currere) of experiencing the continuous flow of impacts. In fact, I believe that Dewey's use of transaction (Dewey and Bentley, 1949) fits well in this regard. It's not just an impact but an interaction or interchange between person and environment.

Q I am really having trouble. This makes it seem as if curriculum is the holistic study of all that is important to human growth and development. That would involve every discipline. It seems ludicrous.

AB Perhaps curriculum must be interdisciplinary———

Q Oh, come on———I'm not against interdisciplinary scholarship, but we can't set our field up as the study of everything important.
This is precisely the reason that curriculum scholarship is so imprecise; some curricularists want to make it the study of almost everything. It also accounts for the chaotic lack of definition and direction.

AB Unfortunately, curriculum problems don't lend themselves to a coherent body of knowledge. Walker (1980) said it well when he argued in the 1980 ASCD Yearbook that nearly any knowledge can be relevant to some curriculum problem. Did you see the piece? He likened curriculum to a "huge marketplace of ideas and proposals" (p. 81). He said that curriculum writing is and should be as rich and varied as life itself. He noted his despair at the apparent lack of order and stability in curriculum writing, but concluded that "a rich confusion is the right state for curriculum writing." (p. 81)

Q Perhaps we do need some different or broader perspective. Perhaps we do need to be content with the ambiguities in curriculum inquiry. Maybe they are even productive, a more honest form of inquiry.

AB I believe so. Now, may we return to the idea of curriculum as being within the experience of students and teachers?

Q Just one major point. Clearly, it's impossible to change a whole field. There seems to be little, if any, precedent for thinking about curriculum as centering in the lives of students. Look at the power of the Tyler rationale (Tyler, 1949) for just one example.

AB I have; recently, I re-read the Tyler rationale, and I felt a bit guilty. I increasingly believe that the lockstep rigidity and the detached rationality so often attributed to it are the work of those who haven't read the book for a long while. He clearly substitutes learning experiences for acttivities or content that dominated the literature prior to his work. His emphasis on learning experience as interaction between learners and environmental conditions (p. 63) and his treatment of behavior as consciousness (thinking and feeling) as well as overt action, deeply influenced me. How, I wondered, can this have been omitted from most accounts? Was I reading too much into it? It did seem that these points were reiterated time and again. I had to know, so I contacted Ralph Tyler and talked with him. His response to my questions left no doubt in my mind that my most recent interpretations conformed to his intent[1] You asked about precedents... I mentioned Dewey a few minutes ago. Surely, he desired that curriculum be rooted securely in the life experience of learners. Many progressive educators shared this view. Perhaps

L. Thomas Hopkins expressed it most directly in the 1920s and 1930s, emphasizing a curriculum that he much later called the is curriculum as opposed to the was curriculum. He characterized the is curriculum as "celebrating the experiential" i.e., "it is what each pupil can take from the teacher–pupil relationship to help him or her better understand and develop the self...." (Hopkins, 1976, pp. 212-213). Recently, relating his experiences as an American history teacher on Cape Cod at Brewster, Massachusetts in 1911, Hopkins told of helping initially unwilling learners to find meaning in school by "studying the history inside of themselves" (1980). After his presentation I had a long talk with Hopkins, and have since increased correspondence with him. His influence has done much to help me reflect on the way that curriculum theory should be taught.[2]
In fact, Tyler and Dewey have, too, but if I don't move along, we won't even be ready for the morning sessions. Details on my latest thoughts about Dewey, Tyler, and Hopkins would be good topics for another discussion. Suffice it to say, I believe that they offer much in the way of justification for the way I have tried to teach curriculum theory.

Q Just one more thing; you know as well as I do that credibility can be enhanced much more by tapping well accepted sources in the intellectual community at large. Think of how B.F. Skinner, Carl Rogers, Jurgen Habermas, and Basil Bernstein are only a few who have been used to give credence to different curriculum positions. Who gives credibility to your view?

AB First, I don't believe that such sources were selected for the surreptitious intent of generating credibility. Secondly, if you want sources from outside of education, I can give many. Kenneth Boulding's excellent treatment of the image (1956) as a configuration of rules, roles, habits, feelings, and values that comprise one's orientation is something of a modern classic. Many of the personality theorists (you know, the one's treated by Hall and Lindzay, 1965) try to provide a holistic picture of the way a personal "theory" of living is generated. George Kelly's Psychology of Personal Constructs (1963) is a laudable example of an attempt to explain a person's processes based on the way in which events are anticipated. If you want literary sources, Jorge Luis Borges' metaphor of labyrinths (1964) is one among many that portrays the complexity of simultaneous contradictions that reside in any human perspective. An entire genre of German literature that focuses on character development is referred to as Bildungsroman and stems from Parsival through work by Hesse (Swales, 1978). If you wish backing from the hard sciences: John C. Lilly (1968) speaks of meta-programmes; Leslie Hart labels major psychological constructs prosters; and George Elgin Pugh (1977) argues for the biological origin of human values. There are many more. Shall I continue?

Q I get the message. I've just one more question. Why do you think it is so central to deal with this theory in teaching curriulum?

AB I hoped that that might be clear. Let me try to explain it this way. A person spends his/her life forming a kind of personal "theory". This "theory" (call it perspective, or outlook, or neurological map), I believe, is the prime value force that gives meaning and direction to experience. In turn, experience revises the personal "theory". Experience, generally, is the curriculum that forges this theory. Others can, of course, create aspects of the curriculum (hence school curriculum, home curriculum, work curriculum, media curriculum, etc.). The point is that if curricular experiences are created by forces outside a person (e.g., teachers) they must relate to the theory within the person if they are to give increased meaning and direction.

Q That sounds like Herbart's idea of "apperceptive mass". Surely, we've progressed since that

time, haven't we?

AB Many of Plato's ideas appeal to me. I don't have trouble with Herbart simply on the basis of time. May I continue?

Q Go ahead.

Methods For Teaching Curriculum Theory

AB I find it useful to look at teachers as persons who are growing a theory. They have experiential knowledge of curricula that they provide for students. They have beliefs about recurrent problems in their daily teaching lives. In short, they have a stockpile of experiences that governs their daily activity and is re-fashioned by it.
In most cases, they are unable to receive extant curriculum theory that is placed in their presence. They need to relate it to their own value structures.

Q How?

AB I'm only beginning, but I have developed some methods over the past several years that seem to be meaningful to teachers and other students of curriculum in both graduate classes and workshop situations.

Q Well, I've never heard of a curriculum theory workshop. Who would ever choose to attend?

AB Remember, I refer to a kind of theory that is the network of values and beliefs inside of teachers. If teachers and other students of curriculum can come to see that study of curriculum theory speaks to values that give them meaning and direction, they are receptive.

Q Your argument seems strong. What are your magical methods?

AB They certainly aren't magical, but I do believe that they are worthwhile. They are more like three aspects of one method. I try to help students clarify and strengthen beliefs, portray possibilities, and imagine consequences.

Q How did you arrive at this approach, and what are some examples?

AB Let me give some examples first; then we can discuss my arrival. Let me note them roughly in order that they developed. Later I'll explain why.

Example 1: Developing A Repertoire
My first college teaching was with education courses at the undergraduate level. For some reason I felt it essential that my students (novices to teaching in a general curriculum and methods course) should develop an array of perspectives (both theoretic and practical) on education and teaching. My own teaching experience prompted this, since I had come to believe that a broad context of ideas and practical approaches enabled me to be more defensibly inventive. Thus, I asked students to prepare an elaborate card file with the following categories: (1) description and commentary on an array of educational literature; (2) notes on interesting teaching strategies discovered from reading, talking, watching, and a host of other sources; (3) notes on materials and resources that might be useful for teaching; and (4) what I called "frequent thought cards", designed to portray expressions of ideas that occurred to the students and had something (even if remote) to do with teaching learning, and/or curriculum. It was the latter that

interested me most as I implemented the approach.

Q Why?

AB For two reasons, one positive and one negative. The negative is that I soon learned that many students were unable to provide a stream of thoughts or reflections that flowed from their experience. This bothered me considerably. They could gather teaching strategies and materials, and they could demonstrate exposure to the literature, but too many could not relate these tasks, exposure to school settings, and everyday educative experiences to an emerging belief system about education.
My positive response, however, was that the "frequent thought cards" helped me to develop strategies for teaching educational methods courses that fostered the development of a system of ideas that gave meaning and direction to students who were (or planned to be) teachers. Moreover, I was markedly encouraged by students who were able to take the "frequent thought card" assignment seriously. Their work demonstrated to me the need to conceive of curriculum theory as a network of ideas and experiences that is growing within teachers.

Q Why do you think this curriculum theory within teachers is so important?

AB Well, that goes back to my doctoral dissertation (Schubert, 1975). Based upon ten years of teaching experience and considerable interaction with teachers, I concluded that fluency of imagining alternatives and consequences was a key to successful curriculum implementation. The capacity to generate alternatives and consequences in the course of problematic events, I argued, is largely dependent on a rich context of ideas (from both experiential and scholarly sources). Such a context, as I said earlier, is a necessary form of curriculum theory.

Q OK, I will buy your idea as a reasonable (even neglected) form of curriculum theory. I won't, however, accept it as the only legitimate form. Clearly, we need descriptive and prescriptive theory as well as this personal type.

AB I won't disagree, but to discuss the details of the relationship among the three is beyond the time that we have here.

Q Very well. Tell me more about some other approaches to teaching your version of curriculum theory. How did you deal with those who could not respond fluently to "frequent thought cards"?

Example 2: Reflection Cards And Papers

AB As you might predict, I began to specify kinds of topics that I hoped would be treated within the domain of "frequent thoughts". In some classes, I asked students to write cards (and later papers) that elaborated upon the impacts of their involvement with class sessions, assigned and self-selected readings, and projects on their own perspectives on teaching and curriculum. In several classes, students were even asked to write elaborate journals on such topics. In the context of doing this, they were to focus on the ways in which their perspectives on teaching and curriculum took on new meaning and direction as a consequence of the class. I tried the journal in both an undergraduate methods class and an advanced graduate class in curriculum theory. The cards were tried in the methods classes and a graduate class in philosophy of education. The shorter reflection papers (3-4 pages) were used periodically in a graduate class on learning environments.

Q Did more students begin to grasp the notion of curriculum theory that you advocated?

AB More did, but they were still the ones who seemed to engage in philosophical reflection on their own.

Q Did you dicover any ways to reach the others more fully?

Example 3: Imagining Alternatives and Consequences

AB I began to involve teachers and other graduate students in the consideration of fictitious problematic situations. By drawing concrete dilemmas from my own teaching experience (and from that of other teachers with whom I had talked), I devised a set of dilemmas or problems. The graduate students were not merely asked what they would do in these situations, they were asked to imaginatively project an array of possibilities (alternatives). Next they were asked to imaginatively project probable consequences of acting on the alternatives. Finally, and most importantly, they were asked to probe sources of their "imaginings". As they did this, they began to examine, clarify, and revise the theoretical tenets from which they had generated alternatives and consequences.

Q This emphasis on alternatives and consequences seems highly related to William Reid's notion of the role of policy analysis in curriculum (Reid, 1978). Do you think so?

AB Yes, I do. However, his interpretation seems more oriented to the organizational level (which is the province of policy considerations) rather than the individual. I wish to emphasize deliberations that directly influence individual human lives and specific educational situations, rather than general categories of them.
The point here, however, is that by looking carefully at the kinds of possible alternatives and probable consequences that they projected (and by considering the values that they attributed to them), teachers and other curriculum persons could more directly confront the underlying perspectives from which the alternatives and consequences emerged. Thus, the alternatives and consequences that they projected were used as evidence for insight into the curriculum theory implicit in their decision and action.

Q How did you get students to project consequences and think of alternatives? I imagine that some were not able to do this well.

AB Practice helped. I gave them situations and encouraged them to brainstorm. Sometimes it helped to do this in groups. This was useful, but after a while I discovered that this approach, too, was more artificial than it needed to be.

Q How did you make it less artificial?

Example 4: Acting As Guest Speakers

AB I came to realize that many students had difficulty thinking of alternatives. This particularly was the case in a course that I was asked to teach on improving learning environments. A major feature of the course, as I inherited it, was to provide students with background and opportunity to propose an improvement in their learning environment. Most worked in schools or other educative institutions and were, therefore, aware of problems that could use improvement. Their dilemma, however, was that they lacked exposure to alternatives that might be applied to their situational predicaments. What would be good for them, I thought, is to bring in guest speakers on different kinds of learning environments. Due to lack of finances, this was impossible.

However, it occurred to me that when I taught in elementary school I used to help fifth and sixth grade students experience different viewpoints by role playing persons from different cultural or value orientations. I tried this at the graduate school level, and found very positive student response. It allowed me to unhesitatingly advocate a position as thoroughly as I could and defend it to the hilt. It allowed students opportunity to ask probing questions, and the responses did not carry the weight of the professor's word which "had to be accepted", as is often the case. As time passed, I developed about thirty advocacy positions on different orientations to learning environments. Sometimes these "guest speakers" argued with each other. In addition to this course, I have developed "guests" on different curriculum positions for my curriculum design and curriculum theory courses. The approach tied in nicely with three schools of curriculum thought that I traced from 1900-1979 in my recent curriculum book (Schubert, 1980a). Advocates from the social behaviorist, intellectual traditionalist, and experientialist persuasions frequently "visited" the class to respond to major curriculum issues. In addition, I recently used the approach in a series of workshops on classroom discipline, and in consulting on the role of values in curriculum, which appeared as an article in Curriculum Review (Schubert, 1980b).

In any event, it's a lot of fun, the response is favorable, and it enables students to generate responses to practical learning environment problems by considering an array of alternatives.

Q It sounds interesting, especially your emphasis on the students' practical situations. Have you pursued this more fully?

AB Yes, to some extent. I have developed some reflective activities to encourage students to view curriculum problems as central to their own lives.

Q What are they?

Example 5: Analysing Impacts On Outlooks

AB One approach begins by asking students to list the most important impacts on their outlooks. Individually, students think of events, persons, and environments that contributed to the ways in which they view the world and interact with it. Then they share and categorize these sources of major influence on their lives. They consider positive and negative influences. They attempt to specify conditions that made them susceptible to influence. Finally, they ask about the implications for curriculum. If education is an attempt to influence others, what can those who develop the subject matter of educative experiences learn from studying the quality of fundamental impacts on their own outlook or perspectives?

Q I am becoming more intrigued. I think I'd like to do this myself. What else have you explored?

Example 6: Reflecting On Teachers and School Situations

AB Another variation on this theme is to ask teachers to reflect on their own school experiences. I ask them to remember their own schooling and to select someone who they considered excellent as a teacher. (Clearly, the same could be asked of learning situations.) I ask the teachers to recall a good teacher or learning situation at several levels: primary, intermediate, junior high, high school, and college. They attempt to designate characteristics and circumstances that made them good. As they do this, they reconstruct their image of good teachers and good learning situations. They are encouraged to discuss implications of this for their own teaching.

Q Again, I find this interesting, but what do you do about the normally accepted subject matter of

curriculum courses? How do you deal with matters of specifying intents, contents, methodology, and evaluation, for example?

Example 7: Developing Curricula

AB I believe that it is imperative for students to be familiar with basic curriculum questions such as those summarized by Ralph Tyler in his Basic Principles...book. If students are preparing for curriculum scholarhip, they need background in these fundamentals.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that it is important for them to see these as one category schema for either prescribing or describing curricular phenomena. There are others that have, for example, been developed by Mauritz Johnson (1977), Decker Walker (1971), Joseph Schwab (1973), to mention only three. The point is that Tyler's is very useful and has had much impact. If I want to teach the rudiments of it, and maintain my position that curriculum theory should be taught with emphasis on the students' evolving perspectives ("theories"), then I must draw it from values that they believe are important.

Q How?

AB I often begin by asking them to imagine that they have been endowed with magical powers which enable them to bestow five to ten characteristics on all of the people of the world. I ask them to make a list that they would select. Generally, they choose characteristics such as consideration, compassion, critical thinking, empathy, courage, and the like. These are characteristics that they believe are very worthwhile; yet, they often lack clarification. I organize the students in small groups and ask them to share, ask one another clarifying questions, and arrive at a list of five characteristics that they all agree are worthwhile and can defend. Finally, they are asked to decide on one characteristic that is clearly a desirable virtue or excellence for others to have.
Next, the students are asked to imagine that they are curriculum developers for a school. The school is similar to many other schools except for the fact that the curriculum is to be built around the excellence or virtue that they have selected, rather than the traditional subject areas. It is their job to engage in deliberation exercises that center around Tyler's questions: (1) What is a statement of purpose that captures a salient feature of the excellence or virtue to be cultivated? (2) What kind of learning experiences would be likely to move the student toward the purpose? (3) How should the experiences be organized for acquisition by the students? (4) How should they be evaluated? After the groups pursue each of these questions, they share outcomes with other groups. Together they explore criteria which they used, overtly or covertly, to arrive at their decisions. They also are encouraged to discuss their perceptions of the worth of this procedure for developing curricula vis a vis others.

Q Have you tried to tie this closer to their own teaching situation? It seems interesting, but rather abstract.

AB It is clearly different from their own situations. I'm not sure that I would call it abstract. I agree that it would be very interesting to ask students (who are teachers) to focus on characteristics that they would like to provide for their class, and to go through the same process.
The major reason that I didn't do this is that I wanted the participants to primarily focus on the virtues or excellences that they deem most worthy for others to have. I wanted them to address the issue of whether education should fundamentally pertain to already established subject areas or whether the worth of such areas should also be viewed as problematic. To begin with subject area concerns might prevent this. Nevertheless, I like your suggestion and think that I might try it.

Q Yes, I do think that it is important for students to focus on their own teaching situations. I am a bit surprised that you didn't develop such an approach, given your position.

Example 8: Inventing From Practically Nothing

AB I have. For example, I am often faced with teachers who want new ideas and approaches for their subject areas. What is often more useful for them is to enable them to think of ways to invent, rather than to provide them with a catalogue of specific suggestions that may not apply to their teaching circumstances.

Therefore, I ask them to take an object from their purse or pocket that seems to be insignificant. Then I ask them to think of the larger idea that the object represents. For example, a false eyelash may represent cosmetics and the whole issue of personal appearances; a key may represent security; an eraser may reflect the need to correct; and so on. Perhaps I ask them to think about how the need for the object evolved or what the world would be like without it. The teachers are encouraged to build lessons that use the object as an organizing center, as Virgil Herrick (1965) used to refer to the term.

Sometimes teachers built lessons that fit their subject area needs and at other times they built lessons that required an interdisciplinary perspective. In either event, they often arrived at lessons or curricular plans that were quite new to them.

As a culminating activity, I have the students discuss reasons for their choices. Illumination of reasons can aid clarification of the curriculum theory within them.

Q Yes, that is in line with what I had in mind. I suppose that teachers derive much satisfaction from experiencing a curriculum class that pertains to their own situations.

Example 9: Thinking About Classroom Justice

AB I tried another approach that stirred considerable interest and controversy among my students. I was impressed by the conception of justice expressed by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971). I twisted the idea a bit to apply to classroom curricular experience.

I ask teachers to bring a class roster. Then I have them think about each student relative to achievement (How well students do what they are expected to do), happiness (how much satisfaction students seem to gain), and justice (how fair the situation is for them). I add that each of the ratings may reflect (especially if negative) more on the nature of school experience generally than on what the teacher has done. This eases tension.

The participants use a rating scale, such as a "very happy" to "very unhappy" continuum, for conceptual purposes.

Participants are then encouraged to identify patterns in the ratings and to note possible explanations for different kinds of patterns. They are further asked to re-assess features of their classroom life in order to determine if certain alternatives could be made to enable students who rated low to rate higher without lowering ratings for those who rated high in the first place.

Q How does Rawls fit in?

AB That's the next step. Students are to revise their classroom processes and procedures as much as they wish. As they do so, they are told that revisions should be made by them, as if they did not know which person in the class they might become. They might become the teacher, a major discipline problem, a wall flower, the brightest student, etc. How fair or just would the revised situation be for them regardless of whom they would become?

Q These are interesting. Are there any more?

AB Several, but I think that it is nearing time to go. Let me relate one more, however.

Example 10: Thinking About Outside-of-School Curricula
It has often occurred to me that the act of our living is curriculum. As Pinar and Grumet (1976) have said, it may better be characterized in the verb form, currere. In any event, even when we think of the Tyler Rationale, there is an implicit notion of purpose, learning experience, organizational pattern, and evaluation built in to our living and each of its interwoven domains.
As I have recently written in greater detail (Schubert, in press), we in curriculum work, might profitably consider such notions as the curriculum of the homes, workplaces, peer groups, media, non-school organizations, etc. Thus, I often ask curriculum students to select a dimension of their own life experience from which they derive considerable meaning, and seek to interpret it relative to a curricular scheme.
To look at one's own experience through curricular lenses often provides new perspectives that can reveal insights about both curriculum as a subject of study and the person engaged in that study.

Parting Words

Q Well, I did indeed find this to be an interesting discussion. You might even say that I learned something about curriculum theory today.

AB Whenever I am asked to discuss my views, it seems that I learn. So thank you for the questions.

Q It is always interesting to think about one's teaching. My thoughts just jumped back to when I began teaching in secondary school. When I explained something to the students I was amazed at how much more fully I came to know it myself.

AB The consideration of teaching seems to have some rather profound benefits. I remember how I was talking about my views on curriculum with a film-maker friend, who had been a teacher a for several years. He said what interested him most in our discussions was not what I said directly about curriculum theory, but instead the kind of curriculum theory that was depicted in brief descriptions of the ways that I taught. Actually, it was reflection on my approaches to teaching that helped me arrive at the position that I argued for earlier in our conversation.

Q I still find it interesting and a bit baffling that you find curriculum theory to be largely (or most importantly) inside of teachers.

AB That's a bit out of proportion since I see it as the sources of meaning and direction in us all. We need to explore the role of students as curriculum theorists. That is implied by much that I've said today, but it awaits much thought, and another day.

Q I look forward to that conversation.

Implications

Through the roles of AB and Q we have attempted to articulate and question our own evolving position on curriculum theory and how it should be taught. In the process we have tried to provide the following:

1. A case for the need to view curriculum theory as an integral process of generating meaning and direction in human lives;
2. An argument that certain extant curriculum positions (and non-curricular sources as well)

can be used to support this conception of curriculum theory;

3. An argument that the teaching of curriculum theory as an academic subject can be enhanced by relating it to the "curriculum theories" inside of students;
4. An example of two curriculum theorists learning from (or teaching) one another in the dialogue;
5. A set of strategies for teaching curriculum theory in a way that acknowledges the evolving theory within teachers and other educators;
6. An implied call for sharing of orientations to teaching curriculum theory among curriculum theorists; and
7. A hope that more curricularists will grapple with the problem of student roles in the curriculum process, even as relates to images of students as curriculum theorists.

FOOTNOTES

1. This relates to an interview conducted with Dr. Tyler, by the authors, on October 12, 1980 in Chicago.
2. The conversation occurred in Boston, April 1980, and involved L. Thomas and Hester Hopkins and Ann and Bill Schubert. Influences also derived from many letters, 1976 through 1980.

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AIRLIE 1983

See the inside back cover for details.

The Psychology of Curriculum Theorizing: A Conversation

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WR In a recent paper[1] I suggested a rough categorization of various contributors to the field of curriculum theory. It depended firstly on how people relate to the actual world of schools, teachers and students, and secondly on the extent to which they approach curriculum problems in an "a priorist" or, on the other hand, exploratory frame of mind—in the paper I drew an analogy with the "hedgehog and fox" description which Isaiah Berlin uses in his essay on Tolstoy.[2] Of course, I was not intending to suggest that things are really as neat and tidy as that, but the classification and the dimensions on which it was based did seem to have some power to help me and my students understand better what was going on in curriculum writing, and to see, or even predict, in what ways various people were in agreement or opposed to each other.*

Now it occurred to me that what I was talking about were adaptations to a vield of enquiry and that it would be interesting to see how plausible my characterisations were when viewed in that sort of socio-psychological light. Having had that thought the obvious step was to discuss it with you, since we have shared many conversations on all sorts of subjects, including education and curriculum, and because you have a practical knowledge of adaptations to academic fields through the work you do with university students as an educational counsellor.

So, we have both read some papers by people I would put forward as representative of the four types of theorist I talked about in my paper: the systemic, the radical, the existential and the deliberative. The authors of these were Mauritz Johnson, Michael Apple, William Pinar and Joseph Schwab.[3] And now, I hope, we have some material on which we can base a discussion about what I would call the "psychology of curriculum theorizing".

First of all, from your reading of these authors, how plausible do you think my classification is?

JW Well, I think that you have made a good choice in defining these four positions. They are, as you suggest, adaptations of a field which lends itself to a variety of usage. But these four themes which you illustrate can also be regarded as a continuum of making a more overt or covert, and stronger or milder use of the field in order to live through some vicarious experiences which are necessary for the benefit of these writers.

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* To quote from the text in question: "The groups I want to distinguish on the basis of the two characteristics I have described are: the 'systemic', consisting of those who accept ends and means in terms of a priori notions of control, planning and innovation; the 'radical', comprising theorists who trace connections between curricular forms and structural inequalities in society; the 'existential', embracing writers who, starting from the standpoint of the individual who is the subject of the curriculum, discuss its relationship to his or her personal growth, and the 'deliberative', covering those who emphasise curriculum decision-making as transactions between morally engaged individuals in the context of social institutions. These represent respectively: system-oriented 'a priorists'; system-opposing 'a priorists'; system-indifferent explorers, and system-supportive explorers ... (T)he groups....do, I think, represent important and enduring positions on questions of social philosophy. It is precisely because I see them as enduring positions that I have avoided the use of labels such as 'traditionalist', or 'reconceptualist'. These represent what is transient: the relative social or academic standing of a given school of thought as a given time". (p. 162)

WR So you would see the field of curriculum as offering to the individual a particular set of intellectual possibilities, and then how the individual engages with that set of possibilities is dependent on his or her own character?

JW Yes, I think about curriculum as a part of educational problems generally, and all educational problems are subject to this kind of use and abuse. I think, for example, that psychology, as a part of the educational field, also provides a suitable hunting ground for the spirit of human dissatisfaction; it can also be seen as a vehicle for hopes of putting all things right one day. I think psychologists themselves often play this kind of game, particularly when they have educational problems to cope with, because then they are no longer concerned with themselves as individuals but again with the upbringing of the children, which triggers off this kind of fantasy of 'what happened to me in the past', 'what is happening now' and 'what will happen to people in the future', or to our children, or to the future generations as extensions of ourselves.

WR Should we make a start by looking at some of Michael Apple's work? You've been reading the third chapter of his 'Ideology and the Curriculum', and I've been looking at an earlier paper called 'The hidden curriculum and the nature of conflict', to see how representative he might be of the category that I called 'radical'.

JW Well, one point which immediately comes to my mind after reading Apple, and as against Pinar, is that Apple's writing and his approach, what he says and how he uses curriculum studies, might explain quite a number of his own personal misgivings, pains and joys. But I think that he, of the four writers, is probably least aware of what his writing does to him, whilst Pinar is more aware of it, or most aware of it. And also there is in Pinar's writing a classical psychological transformation from his public concern about curricula, when he repressed his strong drives, to a changeover to his more intricately personal game where the repression is no longer necessary and his concern for the problems of curriculum studies diminishes; that is, his public concern diminishes when he drops his defences and allows himself to indulge in writing about his private affairs. There is a common turn of affairs with most people.

WR You're talking about the two halves of his paper?

JW Yes, let me explain. When he goes into 'The Voyage Out' he begins to be concerned with public affairs, and as long as the pain connected with his personal affais is repressed, the public affairs are foremost; the pain is being expressed as concerns of public affairs. As soon as the pain can be safely played out in private life, vis-a-vis concrete individuals—his friends and companions—the need for repression goes and therefore the need for substitution of repression also goes and he becomes Pinar himself: lonely, uncertain, satisfied, or more or less satisfied, with what is going on around him.

WR Which is in fact his central preoccupation?

JW Yes, you are quite right. I think a person of his age, with his powerful intellect, would play that kind of game.

WR Well, I think he does in fact say this.

JW Yes, and that is why I say he is aware of it. But Apple is not; he gives me the impression of not seeing through himself.

WR Is it that he doesn't see through, or that his paper is exclusively on the level of the first half of Pinar's paper?

JW Yes, he somehow does not permit himself to descend to the overt preoccupation with his own personal affairs.

WR But he doesn't want to experiment with his own personal affairs. He wants to regard, perhaps, his own personal affairs as something that's settled, or beyond argument?

JW Yes, and I think he is covering up from the very beginning. It is not for me to conjecture from Apple's book whence his preoccupations, but if the exercise is of our disputation is to look beyond schemes of intellectual traditions in curriculuar studies it is not beyond that scope to say that the basis of Apple's thesis is very visibly his secret preoccupation with power, and to a no less healthy degree, with sex. Both are severely repressed and skillfully and creatively sublimated into a scholarly peroration. Just look at the key-words of the chapter headings. First, chapter 1: 'On Analysing Hegemony' which, mainly, really means dominance. Second one is, 'Economic Reproduction'. Third one, 'Control of Everyday School Life', with the help of Nancy King. Fourth one is 'Social Control', with Barry Franklin—comrade in arms? Fifth one is 'Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict'. Whose conflict? Apple's? Sixth one, 'Systems of Ideology of Control: strategies of repression'. There is no need for a comment here, is there? Seventh is, 'Politics of Labelling'. Knowing who your friends and your foes are?

I have not read the whole of the book for the purpose of our dialogue, so I'm going by my readings of Chapters 1 and 3. I promise myself to read, one day, the whole of the book, but now I'm talking about his vocabulary. It happens that at this moment I open the book on page 103, and see that Apple says: "However, with the understanding of the social milieu in which 'curriculists' 'operate' (he's already making an army in uniform 'operating' in 'the field!'), there must also be a continual attempt to bring to a conscious level and act against those hidden epistemological and ideological assumptions that help to structure the decisions they make, the environment they design, and the traditions they select". To me, these are militant words, and they express concern with power, and with organizing power to some 'military' end.

It is also my impression that chapter 3, dealing with the 'Economics and Control in Everyday School Life', written jointly with Nancy King, contains distinct sections, and consequently styles, of writing. It seems that Nancy King is more benign, perhaps less inwardly hurt when she contributes to the section on 'Ideology and curriculum in use'. It is sufficient to look at first sentences in most paragraphs written in sections before* and after this part**, to see this difference. The key words in most paragraphs, in the first two and the last sections, contain expressions suggesting that the writer seems to be angry, suspicious, and militant: 'tacitly', 'laying to rest', 'least attractive', 'misleading', 'mindlessness', 'critics', 'argue', 'problem', 'focus', 'task of dealing', 'argues', 'honest with outselves', 'social control', 'undesirable', 'be aware' ... etc. Such terms and sentiments are either largely absent in the first sentences of the section on 'Ideology and curriculum in use', or are modified into milder descriptive formulations which, I think, belong to Nancy King. It is therefore, I think important to make a provision for this difference when we discuss Apple's style of writing and to disregard the more benign section on pages 50-57. It just does not fit the prevailing style of Apple.

WR Would you see his use of the word 'commitment' as military?

JW Yes, because it seems to me an attempt to hide some of his covert preoccupation under some overt commitment which enables him to conceal it forever. As such, it is similar to a planned military manoeuvre.

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* The beginning of the chapter on p. 43, 'Schooling and the Cultural Capital' and 'Meaning and Control in Curriculum History'.

** 'Beyond a Rhetorical Humanism.'

WR I see. Yes, I think I follow that.

WR The other thing I picked up was his insistence -- and perhaps this is one of the things that he brings to the scene that other people don't -- his insistence that conflict and competition are functional, that he wants to see things in terms of conflict, and that he writes of conflict as being a good thing. He doesn't want to talk about consensus.

JW No, he does not. Because, you see, to my way of 'clinical' thinking, when people write about some deep concerns of their own under the guise of concern for other people, this writing brings them relief, because they are letting these concerns out a little. They 'ventilate' their problems. This might often help them to manage their private concerns. And if a person finds himself in a conflict he may even come to insist that the conflict is sweet because it enables him to write about it not as a conflict within himself but as a conflict within society. So, again, he 'can again have his cake and eat it.' He is thinking about his own conflict, but writing about other people's conflict. Therefore conflict becomes a very dear currency of inter-personal, or intra-personal transaction. It's something which he cannot afford to lose because it sustains his comfort of living in a relative state of well-being by 'working through' his conflicts vicariously.

WR Yes. He writes a lot about politics and the structure of society, and so on. How realistic would you think his conception of politics is? Could he be said to be somebody who is close to the reality of how decisions about curriculum get made?

JW No, I don't think so. I think that he's building up a fantasy of how they are going to be made when his ideological transformation takes place, and when people will realize to what extent they have been taken for a ride by the so-called 'hidden curriculum,' which conspires to constrain things to stay as they are.

WR Would you want to move on now to contrast Pinar with Apple, or do you want to emphasize more the things that they have in common?

JW There is one thing they have in common and that is that they are both indicating their concern with feelings rather than with the cerebral transformation of information. Though, when Apple touches on this he never goes into the stage of, what I call the 'hypothalamic' view. Pinar, however, touches upon it more sensitively and more pointedly. In this, of course, I join them in the sense that to me the 'hypothalamic' view of human life is the most important one. It is there where the fantasies of wrongs and rights, and the anxieties and pleasures are crudely intermingled with the primary processes of life, and where the feelings are hottest.

WR Can you explain that a bit more? What do you mean by 'hypothalamic'?

JW What I mean by the 'hypothalamic' view of the human creature, is that there are certain needs which human beings must satisfy whether they like it or not. Life is maintained primarily by the autonomic process of orchestration of the variety of basic needs and functions of the organism, such as oxygen intake, thirst, temperature, readiness to seek pleasure, to display aggression, to feel pains of hunger and stirrings of the sex drive. All of them are intimately concerned with crude, emotional, impulsive behavior and regulated largely by learned patterns of control from the outer regions of the brain -- the cortex. A very simplified view of all this can be presented as an interaction between the instinctual primary drives transacted by the compact hypothalamic region of the brain and the learned secondary motivations which are outcomes of the primary drives processed by the refined classifications and programs in the cortex.

WR Now this could be seen as requiring regulation so that whatever the hypothalamus produces is interpreted as requiring more of X, or less of Y -- you've eaten too much, or you need to sleep. So from one point of view, people could look on that as regulative or they could look at it in

quite a different way, as giving themselves the opportunity to experiment, to see what happens when you press it a bit further? It strikes me that Apple is of the first type, that he is essentially regulative.

JW Yes, except that, to make a point, I would amplify your rather mild list of needs, which are commonly available in the 'full stomach and roof over head' culture, and say that the interpretations of the 'hypothalamic' needs might include feelings of anger, that you would like to hit somebody, or worse, or that you have not enough pleasures of being a 'top dog,' or of not having enough love, affection or sex. I think that Apple, as is typical of the millenarian frame of mind, seems to be afraid of releasing too many of his own noisy tunes of the hypothalamic orchestra, while Pinar is saying "well, let's see what happens when we listen to these tunes."

WR Pinar strikes me as having a basically experimental attitude towards life.

JW Yes, because he is less of an integrator than Apple. Apple is a compulsively total -- and hence a totalitarian -- strategist. What I should also say is that only oxygen intake is free of social connotation. The rest of all these human needs, even temperature control, depends on winning the support of other people, and this turns these basic individual needs into social concerns and they become both individual and social operations.

WR Well, here of course we come very close to the curriculum.

JW Yes, because the curriculum, conceived as pedagogic activity arranging for the development of competence to cope with life, supplies the power to exist. Apart from oxygen it has to supply, add, or even withdraw everything that the human mind and body need.

WR But it can also teach people that it's their duty to be regulative, or that it's their duty to be experimental?

JW Precisely. Because education must give control to the individual. Not only control, but it must give him an awareness that the control of his life can only occur through the control of and cooperation with other people, since he is not just an individual but also an individual within a group or within the social, and basically sociable society. His individualism is only as good as his oxygen. The rest has got to be extracted from other people for a very, very long time; and it also has to be shared with others.

WR You mentioned the word "tactics" there, which raises an interesting thought in my mind. Pinar, in your terminology, would be a tactician because he speaks of having limited goals, limited targets, doing things gradually, doing things slowly, whereas Apple seems much more concerned with grand strategies.

JW Yes, Apple is, as I mentioned, a compulsive strategist.

WR And yet, in a way, the whole thing gets turned on its head, because you seem to be suggesting that it's the tactician who is mobile and experimental and that the strategist, whom one would think of as having grand designs for change and evolution, is in fact locked in some kind of frozen position. Now is that an exaggeration?

JW No, not at all. You're quite right, because if I've given the impression that the tactician is mobile, I only say the tactician is mobile within the framework of his extensive fantasy. How mobile he really is we don't know. In fact, to me, Pinar as a tactician is more mobile because he is trying to explore. His mobility will depend on the territory, as yet unkown, of his exploration. Whereas,

for Apple his territory is already outlined. Humanity, which must be regulated by the pre-conceived ideas, is the territory . . . and he can allow himself to fly over it backwards and forwards without paying any attention to detail. Because of his millenarianism he has already explored it all in his dogma of total mis-regulation of the present rules and regulations in order eventually to impose his brand of prescriptions for total freedom, even perhaps under some form of totalitarian control.

WR Yes. I think I've found the passage I wanted now. Pinar talks about "modest ambitions," he uses the phrase "modest ambition." He also quotes, approvingly, from someone who talks about the "the intellectual who is incessantly on the move."

JW Yes, but millenarians, as I know them, don't approve of nomadic existence, they must collectivize. So Pinar's position will not be as acceptable to Apple's type of mind.

WR Do we want to leave those now and look at the others?

JW I'd like to pursue Pinar a little bit more, if I may say so. An important part there is that there seems to be a vestige of sex trouble in Pinar. In the first part he repeats quite frequently the phrase "giving himself up" – for the sake of the submission to knowledge, or something like that. And he also "offers himself up to social experience," and then there are sexual connotations of rigidity and passivity where he stresses the other people but in a rather passive way.

WR Using "other" with a capital "O"?

JW All with a capital "O." He talks about the "theorist must give himself up." He also says at this stage that the theorist is often seduced, which is another word with very strong sexual connotations. He means, I think, arrested in some way. Stopped. That he no longer develops as he wishes.

WR Yes.

JW And then he talks about a position that is firm and unyielding, which also has a very strong sexual connotation which is, I would think, a rather more healthy one for the male. And then he switches over from preoccupation with sex to preoccupation with power to some extent. He is talking about current transitions from one thing to another and he takes what I call the hypothalamic view of the problem of curriculum. It goes deeper than the perceptual level, and it goes deeper than the intellectual level; it is 'subcortical' rather than 'cerebral.'

WR This is the level of getting down to basic instincts?

JW Instincts, or perhaps something like that. I call it going back to the hypothalamic view of the world. The view of the most important things: the supplies of the vital things of life and also preservation of life which engenders our deepest feelings about what is happening around us. And I would say that this is where he becomes preoccupied with power, and also with fear of doom. He says". . . empty of guidance and disci plinary meaning." That's where he uses this kind of imagery.

WR But whereas other people might want to simply disguise that feeling, to overlay it with some intellectual apparatus, he would prefer to confront it?

JW Yes. He ways "we give ourselves up to experience." Yes, that's confronting, but in a rather typically feminine way.

WR Also "we give ourselves up to experience" suggests that we lay ourselves open to all kinds of possibilities that we've not thought out, that we don't go to meet experience with an already established

framework for interpreting it.

JW Yes, you're quite right, because he says "one cannot design educational experience." He says "one can only test," so to speak. "The classroom situation," he says, "contains too many variables to permit experiment"and to create some kind of methodology to treat it. The best thing is to sense it through living through it, which is really a par excellence point of individuality and existential experience. I'd agree with him there. And then, naturally, he goes from there on to his 'Voyage Out,' where he becomes himself and no longer preoccupied with matters of social organization as far as curricula are concerned. He becomes a person when there's no longer a need for him to suppress his deeper feelings about himself, whether they are feelings of power, or importance, or potency; all these inner drives can now come out. And he finds himself in a normal situation of coping with his friends in another setting. And then his curricular intellectualization ceases and he becomes a tester of the bare, personal experience which, I think, he wants to present as an evidence of what can happen in living through curriculum. He seems to want to imply that curriculum is life.

WR Yes. I think the basic concern with curriculum is still there, but that he's trying to explain through his account of the 'Voyage Out' his conception of curriculum as the relation between the knower and the known. That is, he wants to talk about his experience along with his friends in relation to the book that he was reading, which could be seen as something which could form part of the curriculum. It could be the curriculum of an undergraduate course, or it could be the curriculum of a high school, I suppose, but it's a curriculum object, if you like, which he wants to explore: his own personal relationship with that object, which is different from anybody else's personal relationship with it.

JW Yes, but you see, the choice of book, of Virginia Woolf's The Voyage Out, is not a choice of chance; it is really something which attracted his attention. I think Virginia was all right as long as she was running away from the voyage in, to the voyage out. When she did the voyage in, she committed suicide -- when the voyage out was no longer possible, and no longer dragged her away out of herself. So he's hiding something. In fact what he is trying to do, by using the book and illustrating the 'Voyage Out,' is basically using another defense mechanism from the voyage in. In the first part of his writing, when he was concerned with the overt social aspect of his concern with curriculum, he was using repressed sexual imagery which was sticking out from his narrative. Now he no longer needs to repress that, but he is still desperately running away from himself. Very cleverly and very artistically, I should say.

WR But, overtly he's looking for himself.

JW Yes, he's overtly looking for himself, out. Because he may not want to look for himself, in. I get the impression that he's trying to express himself, to drag things out from himself and from other people by travelling out and out and out and out, away from himself, while he really would like to travel more and more into himself. An intellectually sophisticated man, at his age, would do that sort of thing; something which a somewhat romantically inclined boy from a non-intellectual background would do for a little while, at sixteen. I think that intellectualization prolongs sexual maturity and confidence in personal power for at least ten years because it becomes a game which enables a person to draw out his conflict in small doses via discussions, reading and writing – all of which are verbalized substitutes for action.

WR Well, is this another aspect of the differences between Apple and Pinar that we need to think about? Pinar is certainly more concerned with the individual.

JW Both Apple and Pinar are, I think, concerned with themselves. But Pinar plays it through concern with the individual, while Apple plays it through concern with the mass of individuals. Whereas Pinar identifies himself with the friend-soldier in the battle of life, Apple, I should imagine, would say "that's no good, there's only this chap who's got one rifle. We must have the army and look

towards the army, how we can organize them to help us to battle through en masse." What I maintain is that people are using the excuse of intellectual games in curricular studies, in education or philosophy, sociology, theology or any other area of theoretical studies as a means of exercising their own problems and working through their own problems. But they are doing it in different structures and different kinds of people; these substitute activities are, of course, quite legitimate and necessary.

WR Yes. Well, in that case let's move on and see how you would categorize Mauritz Johnson in those terms, after reading his paper called "The translation of curriculum into instruction." Is he also exercising his own personal fantasy?

JW Oh yes, I think he is. But he, either by nature of his training -- I don't know whether he is a mathematician or whatever he is – or by his first loyalties and commitments, appears to me to be a person who controls himself very successfully and therefore advocates that other people should be controlled, or teach themselves to control themselves through systems. In a sense he gives me a picture of what I would call an "engineering model" of his control and of curriculum control where, in attempting to look into the machinery of the educative process, to see how it works, or to conjecture how it works, you try to arrange working models. This is because, since you cannot really see inside it as it works, because it moves around too much, you develop some kind of model whereby you use symbols to stand for certain realities and then manipulate them according to engineering principles of moving parts. Eventually this would enable you to say, "well, what can we learn from this or that model?" I suggest he thinks that a suitable model of education or curriculum can act as a framework for instruction, to form the bases of instructing people how they should proceed within pre-structured educational requirements.

WR But the focus is on the system and not on people as people?

JW Yes, it is focussed on the system, where people are perhaps the equivalents of the granules of sugar going through an intricate flow of pipes in the factory. His first 'flow-chart' system on page 136 begins with the 'cultural content' as a first 'source of energy' for the machinery of 'translating curriculum into instruction.' There is not one 'flow-chart' in his paper which has a reference to an individual learner or teacher. It is all a system, as you say. I would think this is because his concern for himself is probably not so threatening to his ego; he might be concerned, like all other people are concerned, about themselves, about their identity, what they do, what the meaning of life is to them, but his is not a persecutory concern; it doesn't occur to him every second, you see. The strength of his ego is such that he thinks that if he can, or prefers to put up with structures, then others also can. His working systems give him plenty of time when he can relax and just think about something else. So he develops a cognitive and rational system of control. There are millions like him who like to have a little system, so they know who and where they are.

WR Is he enabledto be secure because he's developed this system, or is it because he's a secure person that he therefore looks to this kind of framework for conceptualizing curriculum?

JW I think it is because he is more socially secure and, for some reason or other, can afford to be less concerned with escapes from himself, or with sharpening the outlines of minor or of major strategies for obtaining more power. He can afford to become rational most of the time, and because his anxiety is reduced by the system, he can afford more time to elaborate how he sees social problems. I think that people who are somewhat conservative and somewhat tender-minded can afford to do that; they say "well, let's control ourselves by some sort of act of co-operation which could be described and which could be examined." And then they seem to say "let's train ourselves to be just like that and use this framework, so we all control ourselves and everybody learns how to control themselves through this." They want to have a book of tentative rules, a constitution, a code, or a Bible.

WR But, as opposed to Apple who wants to see things, or see virtue in seeing things in terms of conflict, Johnson would want to see things in terms of what's agreed, what there's consensus about. He wouldn't want to introduce conflicts, dissonance?.

JW No, no. His is the mentality of a flow chart. He says "Things are like that. We can see it, or we can approximate to a representation of the reality of the social dynamism, or social interaction through symbols and through sketches and diagrams." He doesn't think these diagrams are completely right, but he uses them as a means of regulating his perception and therefore of controlling both social and individual activity. He seems to be essentially a model making thinker.

WR Yes, though he's not what I would call a 'pure type' of systematizer, by any means. First of all he makes quite a few references to people who are not normally thought of as being within the engineering paradigm of curriculum. He talks about Dewey and Herbart and even Aristotle and he does use phrases about flexibility and compromise which imply that he does not see his system as being totally effective, or totally true. But at the same time his vocabulary also shows a concern with efficiency and usefulness and concepts of that sort.

JW Well, I agree this is a kind of an engineering framework. Things work, things can work, but of course from time to time we've got to control them, and we've got to realize how they work and why they work, and why they may not work. But, generally, they are controllable. If they go wrong, we know how to put them right. So what we need is instruction on how to proceed, and systems will give us this power of instructing us how to proceed. He wants a blue-print because he needs one for himself, or rather because he probably uses some such device to conduct his affairs.

WR And he just won't see as problematic things other people see as problematic, like for Pinar the dilemma of the individual, or for Apple the problem of the location of power in society. These are things that can be left to somebody else to take care of?

JW Yes. He believes in what I would call a sort of spontaneous benignity of human-beings and of their readiness for co-operation and help as an unquestionable principle of life. He believes in reasonableness.

WR He would be an optimist.

JW Yes. He would be an optimist who, I would think, would say to himself in an emergency, "Well, we know how this particular gas is going to behave; it is lighter than air; so if I crawl on all fours I can perhaps attempt to rescue and reach a person there." He would take a calculated risk that things would work out all right. He would stay in and turn some dangerous machine off. I've seen people doing that in emergencies: getting quite close to badly malfunctioning, damaged machinery, trying to stop it because they knew how it worked.

WR Yes. So he could be to some extent a risk-taker, but a very calculated risk-taker?

JW A very calculated risk-taker indeed.

WR But not a risk-taker of the Pinar type, who would say "Let's swallow these pills and see what happens."

JW Yes. Johnson would say, "We know so much about this pill that I can afford to take it because I can always take a drink of water and neutralize it." He is a cautious fellow.

WR One thing that interests me about theorists of that type, is that they are not much concerned with problems which are political and social, and tend to regard that sphere of human activity as being somewhat unproblematic. Yet they focus their interest on the school system and work closely with it. Why choose a very labor-intensive system to work with when they could be working with oil refineries, or something that highly capital-intensive, which would seem to be closer to their mentality?

JW People can't lay off humanity, you know. And people with an engineering mind are equally fascinated by it; they use their assets and their strength in reducing things to systems of controls, checks and counter checks as a slow-motion systematic exploration and manipulation of of what is happening to humanity; and schools and other social institutions provide them with a facility to do just that.

WR Yes. There's an element of extraversion?

JW There is an element of sociability, which is one of the main features of extraversion, but there is also a control through stability, through saying "Well, we can enjoy ourselves looking at it and analyzing it, and we can perhaps develop a wonderful system of helping people to understand how the system of humanity works."

WR And do you find any sort of sexual imagery in Johnson?

JW Now this is a very difficult question. You are challenging me to offer speculations about sexual activities and fantasies transacted through, or even transformed into, a 'flow-chart,' or into a 'critical path analysis' where every operation can be planned, foreseen and performed in a well-outlined manner. Who knows how far the style of intellectual life reflects loving, particularly with relatively stable, self-controlled, benign people? With such people the romantic artistry of loving may exist alongside the applied science of living. With secure people, when things tend to be well controlled, even extravagances can be switched on and off. But since loving involves, invariably, a fantasy of touching, a kind of substitution for touching enabling exploration of hot, emotional issues through a system of symbolic gloves, perhaps in order to reduce undue excitation, is often found in using letters or figures and diagrams and other kinds of mental algebra.[4] Johnson apparently uses these to create his "system of theoretical instruction" -- that's what he calls it -- which might appear as an inquiry into the mechanism of intimate relationships. Since not everything of the innermost life is accessible to view, he must be careful how he explores it, so he can substitute parts of the machinery of intimacy by the more theoretically manageable means of letters and symbols. And it is essentially a gentle inquiry, and there must not be any harm in it at all. I think that with engineers, like with most people, their sexual and existential imagery would probably be fused. The complexity of the human being and of the human relationship might, however, in fantasy be readily transformed into the complexity of the machine; particularly now, in the era of advanced technology. To think of people as robots is a highly consoling imagery: you can activate them, switch them off and forget that they are still there when you want to go fishing. You can even install a time switch, or arrange for a switching off to safety routine. You can do such a lot of things with people, and to people, once you 'flow-chart' them into a clear division between the emotional and the intellectual. But I have no reason to conjecture that Johnson plays such games.

WR Well, let's move on now to the last paper. I had a fourth category that I called 'deliberative.' We've been looking at Schwab's paper "The Practical -- a Language for Curriculum" as representative of that. My notion was that people of this type shared with Johnson the concern to be, if you like, relevant, useful to those who were having to actually provide the curricula as opposed to being outside critics or concerned with curriculum in a highly personalized way, but that he was different from Johnson in that he was much more free-ranging, much more exploratory; and he would differ from Pinar in focussing more on education as an institution. Now, does that seem to add up in terms of your reading of the paper?

JW I thought that Schwab, being more cautious, plays the game of an observer rather than of a general in the field who would create a strategy for some sort of action. His views on page one hundred sixteen onwards suggest his flights of fancy. The first flight is the flight of the field itself, and a translation of its programs. The second flight is upward and the third flight downward. And then, in the end there is that flight onto the side-line, into the role of an observer, commentator, historian, critic of the contributions of others to the field. I think Schwab enjoys being a 'side-line' man. He can have his cake and eat it by sometimes joining in the fray, sometimes stepping out of it, just to watch the game.

WR But, at this point of the text he is in fact criticising other people for engaging in the flights.

JW Yes, but he recognizes that this is also a most comfortable position for them to be in because they aren't longing for close involvement. He is involved, and he begins his paper by saying that things are wrong; things are going to pieces.

WR The field is moribund.

JW Yes, the field is moribund. Yet he is not upset and consequently probably not as aggressive as Apple was, who opened his chapter with "laying his enemy to rest," having obviously already killed him. There's a certain despair with Schwab that the field is moribund and therefore he appears to say "Let's get into it and see what is happening -- but I do envy people who are standing on the outside."

WR You think he envies them?

JW I think so, yes. We do envy our enemy's position very often, because it seems more advantageous, although we call it stupid.

WR Yes, but I don't think he regards them as enemies, nor does he call them stupid, does he?

JW Well, he might not, but he gives me an impression that he thinks that they are.

WR He's a little sad about it?

JW Yes. But if you are a gentle person, you don't call your enemies enemies you call them opponents, and you don't call them stupid you say they're a little misguided. I was using strong words while he was using probably the most gentle ones.

WR It seems to be characteristic of Schwab that he wants to avoid firm rules. He talks against rules and he talks against applying right principles when decisions have to be made. How do you interpret that?

JW Well, on page one hundred seventeen he talks about "flight to the state of innocence," which implies, presumably, some kind of regret of having lost innocence. Then he also refers to "virginity once lost cannot be regained." So there's an indication of some kind of personal regret, perhaps some kind of action, or some kind of occurrence which he wishes had never happened to him. It may also be an indication of guilt. If there is an indication of guilt it can only come from fear of the consequences, and the fears of the consequences are really always social: that somebody will disregard us, or will not regard us as worthy of being ourselves, so to speak, and therefore guilt implies also regret that there is a powerful influence which can threaten our sense of well-being. The powerful influence is usually some sort of social institution, or some institutionalized restrictions. Since guilt usually involves sensitivity to restrictions, it is not pathological. In that sense it is a healthy, not a psychopathic phenomenon. Psychopaths feel no guilt at all. A person who feels a sense of guilt is sorry that he's done something, he is afraid of the power of revenge, or of punishment, or even of his own punishing moral discontent. But he's not going to demolish all the rules; he's going to suffer them, to give people means of doing something about their guilt and thereby of not feeling guilty in the future. So Schwab will at most only try to create a softer institution with many more loose ends.

WR Yes. I think, in fact, Schwab uses words like "moral" and "ethical" more often than the other three writers we've been looking at, and that may relate to what you've just been saying. I'm wondering about the compatibility of Schwab's pointing the finger at people who fly from the field in one direction or another, and at the same time his willingness to say to people "but you must make your own decisions."

JW Well, it is also in the nature of guilt to seek scapegoats, because people have to transfer their discomforts onto somebody else. You must allow people who feel sometimes guilty, to find some slightly worse transgressors. It brings them a certain amount of relief to say, "Well, I did wrong things, or did not do right things, but some other people are also like that." It is comforting. It is best, of course, if the transgressors cannot be harmed, but merely hated. Satan serves this kind of purpose in religions. The sad thing about guilt is that it can be largely imaginary. People who do not transgress at all can feel terribly guilty at times, or for a long time. When I meet such extra-sensitive people I despair. There is nothing anybody can forgive them. They can't even forgive themselves, and they know it and sense it. There is only sense of angry alienation, like in Dostoyevski.

WR So we create the conditions under which they can do those things?

JW Yes. You have got to recognize that to some extent people can't help themselves being wrong, or to imagine themselves doing wrong. And this is really in a liberal tradition, isn't it? You can never prevent crime because it's human nature to commit it, but, mind you, we can try to create conditions which can diminish crime, at least the large phenomena of criminality, and that's what liberal education is about.

WR Because people have a feeling of freedom, they don't need to transgress?

JW Well, I don't know so much. It seems to me that transgressions may also derive from boredom or from too great a measure of security or freedom. I would agree that liberal education

would aim at a substantial measure of freedom which it is in the power of the individual to regulate. Therefore, institutions should be restrictive of excesses but should not induce unnecessary guilt.

WR Now from what you're saying, presumably Schwab could have adopted the same course as Pinar and confronted his guilt or whatever other problems, on an individualistic level, or in relation to how he interacted with his friends? But he chooses instead to talk in much broader terms about institutions, and people's behavior in institutions, theorizing and so on.

JW He seems to me to be more secure in himself as a person than Pinar, even though he feels guilt, but also because he feels guilty his conscience is more socially directed and therefore he must always take into consideration other people, and he would not like to be completely selfish and run away into the flight of experimentation and say "Let's see how I feel about it"; or into a sort of existentialist position where people pretend that they can do everything, test everything, see how it goes. You see, he seems to know that it will not work. He thinks that people should take notice of what they do and plan something within the bounds of possibility where it cannot be hurtful to other people. He's very obviously genuinely socially concerned.

WR So when he talks about "flights," he's forbidding them to himself as well as to others?

JW Yes. He may be consciousnesly restricting his own flights of fantasy because he knows that life would be impossible if everybody did that. Probably, he realizes that possession of absolute power by everybody would lead to anarchy, so he must relinquish this desire and say, "Well let's reduce it a little bit. We can have a little bit of power but when we have it, we must share it with other people." But some people are not doing it now, you see; they're standing idly and watching it; they should be involved, they should have moral responsibility in what's going on.

WR Do you see Schwab as being essentially cerebral, or do you find sexual, emotional imagery in him, too?

JW Oh, he's not completely cerebral, no. To me, a completely cerebral person has got that coolness of detachment from the warm sides of life and, therefore, it's bordering on the psychopathic. The cool cerebral view is empty of conscience, and empty of guilt, and Schwab is not. Therefore, his view is, I would say, really a compromise between the cool cerebral, and a largely hypothalamic view to which Pinar would like to lead us at times, or even always.

WR Well, let's look now, then, at how plausible this fourfold characterization is; my scheme: the systematizers, radicals, existentialists, and deliberators. Incidentally, do you think "deliberative" would be a good adjective to apply to the way Schwab operates?

JW Oh yes, yes. It's between the cerebral and the hypothalamic. It's an exchange between what a person would like to do and what can be done in the light of deliberation on experiences and hopes.

WR Trading the one off against the other.

JW Yes, constantly.

WR Now the first question I want to ask is whether this scheme is in some way defective, in that it totally omits some significant personality type we just haven't considered at all.

JW To my mind, the existence of a distinct personality typology is really always in question. I would say we can adopt some kind of model, and in this context, because it is related to social phenomena, it might be more appropriate to regard it as a phenomenon of social attitudes rather than of personalities. There is a linkage between social attitudes and personalities, but it is highly complex. I would say that I am not at all sure Johnson is the kind of "stable extroveted" or sanguine person he appears from my interpretation of his writing. I would say that Pinar might be an emotional extrovert. So might Apple, only Apple's extraversion is more controlled than Pinar's, depending more upon the structure of his millenarian fantasy than on salvation through conflict, or exploration. But I would think that here we can use the "social attitudes" model and say that the Apples of this world are socially tough and therefore long to develop foolproof social systems and strategies to bring about some kind of millenium of total order once and for all. Apple can be regarded as a tough conservative, or a tough radical, you see, depending which side he finds himself on. It really makes very little difference. Tough radicalism is only tough conservatism in slow motion; an initial passing phase on the way to conservatism. History of social events must, by now, go beyond mere confirmation of the facts of this transformation. It postulates a far more penetrating question, delving into the deepest recesses of the inner life of the individuals who must go through these transformations. So far, the psychological study of social attitudes remains, to my mind, entirely superficial. Thus, to me Apple seems to be playing the tough radical game but, probably, if his millenium were ever attained he would become a tough conservative very quickly, you see, because his system must not be changed. Power will have to be secured by maintaining it. The aims sanctify the means.

Now Johnson, I would think, is rather a tender conservative with less tenderness and more conservatism there. That is, he is a person who will tend to say, "Well, in order to behave ourselves we must look at how the game is commonly played and then lay down some rules, and then change the rules very carefully so we don't hurt one another."

Pinar, of course, is a kind of Rousseau type: "Let's love on another, and when everybody's allowed to love one another and everybody will love themselves and other people, life will be absolutely marvellous because love would regulate our personal relationships." He does not seem to anticipate that then, since everybody would have a belly-full of it, the people may squabble, or become petty-minded out of sheer boredom with the surfeit of benevolence.

Schwab, of course, is a little bit of a mixture of all these things and he may stand somewhere in the middle, I think. He seems to make excursions, and his view of what I would call the middle of distribution, is shown by flights up and down and right and left.

WR This is true, whether we look at tough-minded, tender-minded, radical, conservative, or whether we look at emotionally labile, stable, introverted, extroverted. You'd still put him in the middle?

JW I'd still put him somewhere in the middle, but I still think that he must suffer some kind of regrets ... or bruises, mental or otherwise, which drive him to use curriculum studies as an exploration of his inner life -- past, present or future. But, generally, he would be in the middle, as a kind of both free and bound electron.

WR So you're suggesting that perhaps my schema was a little bit too rigid, and that we should think in terms of what I call "a priorists" being a priorists, and it doesn't really matter whether they call themselves radicals or conservative, because both are facets of the same thing. We simply have a category of people who, for one reason or another, bring to whatever they're studying a set of fairly fixed presuppositions, and we then have categories of people who are more exploratory, but tend .... Now how would we divide them as between Pinar and Johnson? I don't quite see what the right terminology would be.

JW Well, I would think that a psycho-physiological terminology of exploratory and integratory drives would apply here. Some people prefer to play the game either on one side or another; whereas Schwab is using both -- he's clearly in the middle, you see. He is exploratory and integratory. I also think that if he used his sensitivities for teaching other people, he would probably be a very good teacher because he would encourage people to be both exploratory and secure in their integration of knowledge, and then get them to challenge themselves to explore further and further. He would probably be able to create that kind of condition; whereas the others might have driven people to follow them into extremes which many people would ultimately reject.

WR Yes. You're suggesting to me that people like Johnson are in fact much more flexible than I've made them out to be, and I can see justification for that.

JW Yes, they are more flexible, but also much more cautious.

WR Yes, I see. So perhaps what divides the Johnsons and the Pinars is that the Pinars are risk-taking explorers, whereas the Johnsons are cautious explorers who want to have an apparatus of symbols and diagrams, whereas Pinar will march out with a fig leaf?

JW Precisely. Although at times I felt that Pinar would like to march out without a fig leaf! Johnson wants to check the new experience against the old experience all the time so he doesn't lose control of it; while Pinar would say "To Hell with it; the weather is nice, and I am really oppressed by heat; let's do something else."

WR Yes, that's interesting. Now what I want to come to next is the question, in terms of what should be learned and how it should be learned; what can these various people uniquely contribute to the debate?

JW Well, I would think they should contribute to the debate by admitting that they are pursuing their own hares over somebody else's field. And this would be the greatest contribution to knowledge if we realize that for the most of the time we play fanciful games, and that we use life as a stage upon which to play our games: you know, "The whole world is a stage ...."
It would also be a tremendous contribution to education, because people might then try to form the more perceptive attitude: that they are not only their own knowledge makers, but that by spinning out their covert fantasies through overt commitments, they are inadvertently their own curriculum makers.

WR So you want to say, "Look at all these people who are saving all these different things. Now the lesson we learn is not that we prefer his message to his, but that we learn that they all have different messages, and they're all legitimate messages in one way or another, and we should

be encouraging people to see curriculum as something which they make for themselves."

JW Yes, but I would also say, "Let's be clearly aware that these people produce these legitimate points of view as an exposition, or an elaboration of their own pains"; that is, we would have to admit that our own pains might be different from other people's pains and that we should regard them as valid as anybody else's.

WR But doesn't this mean that you are effectively agreeing with Pinar? He wants to talk about curriculum as the relationship between the knower and the known. You also want to talk about this relationship between the knower and the known, so you seem to be supporting him.

JW Yes, with one proviso. I think that purely individual interpretations, without a sense of guilt for possible transgression from p erusing these interpretations in a way that they may act against other people, would be damaging to society.

WR Then there has to be something that pulls you back to the center?

JW Yes. Something must be there constantly that pulls you back to the center, and that something means a recognition that other people have also a right to live their lives, so to speak, without being constantly pushed to the extremities of zealotry, or fanaticism of putting everything right.

WR Which, in a way, is Schwab's central message. He talks about the necessity of all those who are going to be involved in the consequences of a decision, making a contribution to it.

JW Well, I would think that my affinities lie, basically, with Schwab, with some excursions toward Pinar. I would say I have more than an intellectual understanding of Pinar's position. But I have a fear of Apple's perception of curriculum because it has millenarian implications and could therefore lend itself to totalitarian abuse, and I cannot really agree with this. I don't suppose he can allow himself to see that. Since I'm not very good at using symbols as substitutes for living things, I have an understanding, but not as much sympathy, with Johnson; and no sympathy at all with Apple except that I regard him as a very able writer.

WR He writes very well.

JW Very well indeed. And intellectually he is very much "together," but he harangues the reader with an incessant stream of socio-political jargon, which is another indication of how harassed he must be by the stresses of his innermost conflicts.[5]

WR Yes, and presumably the other strength of the kind of position that Schwab adopts is that he would say to people, "You mustn't just follow the curriculum which panders to your own interests as you see them, you must also experience this, and this, and this ... which you may not wish to experience."

JW Yes, precisely. But it sounds as heroic as it is deceptive. I am against forcing people, in any way at all to experience things I fancy would be good for them -- or anybody else.

WR But it prevents people from becoming totally idiosyncratic.

JW Yes, maybe. But it also prevents people from training themselves to remember that other people have rights and that social guilt, as a consequence of trying to assert my right against other people's rights, is a healthy phenomenon. Besides, people are born of mothers and not yet out of test-tubes and they can't live idiosyncratically except when they become totally mentally disarranged.

WR To what extent do you think that these people would be able to talk to, and understand one another? For example, would you see Pinar and Johnson as able to have some kind of useful dialogue?

JW Yes, yes. Pinar and Johnson could have a useful dialogue because Johnson would like to be Pinar from time to time, and Pinar would like to be Johnson from time to time.

WR Are you sure he would?

JW Oh yes. From time to time. If Pinar had a real job to do, like organizing some activity, or an educational institution, or something else like that, he would then want to use Johnson's system.

WR But he'd try to keep out of organizing?

JW Yes. But if he found himself in a position of having to ..... Most of these writers don't come down to the classroom reality, except for Apple. But that's ... we must remember, with the help of Nancy King, who presumably acts as a protective down-to-earth female interceding between the grand designs of the commanding and demanding father, and the boisterous exuberance of the children. If Pinar found himself in a position where he had to do something, he would envy and admire Johnson's system as he could then have a bit more time to lark about, because the system would presumably work by itself. So I think they could understand one another, because neither Pinar nor Johnson are envious of one another. Johnson couldn't possible live Pinar's life; he would shudder at that. And neither could Pinar live Johnson's. So they would not interfere. You see, if they were competing for a girl-friend they would probably think, "Oh well, of course if she likes Johnson I couldn't live with that, so that's all right," and vice versa.

WR Well, do you see any two here who really would have great difficulty in understanding one another, or even talking to one another?

JW I think that Schwab and Apple would have difficulty.

WR Why do you say that?

JW Apple is really an absolutist, and he appears to project his conflicts onto others and say, "In the name of the multitude, let's organize them differently to what they are organized now. We know that they are driven by hidden curricula, there are hidden things in us or in other people, and people can be directed by things which they do not know but which possess them. So now we're going to have something which will abolish all this, and we will direct people to some sort of pure existence where the scheme of things would be within their own, but socially shared control". You know, all that millenarian stuff. But this is suspiciously too perfect for old Schwab. He would say, "Good gracious, there are so many things wewould have to arrange and to control." Schwab is a biologist, isn't he? So he would

probably ask, "Do you really want to know everything about how the living cell operates? You're after something impossible; and you can create monsters."

WR Whereas Pinar and Johnson, although you could say in some ways they had little streaks of absolutism in them, nevertheless are also at the same time flexible people?

JW Yes, they are much more flexible people. Yes. Pinar simply wouldn't have time to pursue his absolutism; he would get bored with it. And Johnson would just not feel any need for absolutism, because things have got to work apart from himself. He's only just tightening up the system, to make it a little bit better by being more efficiently manageable than it is now. He doesn't want to create a new system; he wants to understand it, make it work, make it predictable, make it amenable, make it mendable, make it into the "teach yourself how to do it," so to speak.

WR Now, to finish on a somewhat realistic note, how would you see the possibilities of these different kinds of people actually influencing what's done in education, bearing in mind that public education at any level is really some kind of vast bureaucracy? What kind of interaction and influence is possible between people of these various and different kinds, and people who actually run educational systems?

JW Well, if I had as powerful intellect as Apple, but minus his compulsive streak, or could be as meticulous as Johnson, I would try to call the bureaucratic bluff from time to time, and I'd say, "You seem to arrange things to suit you. Why do you pretend they must suit other people? What about having some discussions about all that? Or some experimentation? Or both?"

WR But, Apple would have to become the commissar before he could do that; otherwise I can't see administrators understanding his ideas.

JW Yes, psychologically he appears to be a very suitable candidate for that position. He is the only one who seems to be hiding the other side of himself. The others have either nothing to hide, or they are conscious of it, or at least to some extent admit it and therefore it gives them that kind of looseness which is more human.

WR Yes. I think Pinar has some interesting and important things to say about the nature of education and teaching, but could you see educational administrators being influenced by him?

JW Yes, but mainly through some very powerful, satirical novel, or film or play.

WR And what about the other two: Johnson and Schwab?

JW Johnson could sell his systems to educational administrators through management studies; he would appeal to people of that sort.

WR But they would never be effective because they'd simply disappear into the bureaucracy.

JW Yes, they would probably disappear into the bureaucracy.[6] And Schwab, I regret to say, is too reasonable altogether to have an influence at all. People wouldn't take much notice of his reasonableness. In spite of longing for the reasonable solutions in life, people generally get a kick from sometimes secretly admiring the unreasonable and the extreme. You see, reasonableness is only an outcome of consenting to the wishes of others, simply because many people realize that they can't have their own way all the time. But, having been, as we all are,

in positions of contemplating the sweet fantasy of absolute omnipotence and then giving it up, leaves a precipitate of unreasonableness in the human heart which retains its powerful attraction for the whole of life. To me this is very important, for I can discern that many ordinary people seem to sense that the energy needed to be reasonably creative by degrees, to develop any skill or craft, comes from the constant suppression of the desire to have it all complete in one big "smash and grab" of all the forces which prevent instant satisfaction of complete mastery and possession of whatever people fancy to possess. Fantasy is the real essence of life and, as I said at the beginning, reality comes only where fantasy becomes blocked. That is why extremes have their attraction and reasonableness, while a middle-of-the-road political party, has a difficult task to keep going. It appears to have not enough of the suppressed momentum of secret wickedness, you see. No burning destructive powers, no black holes, no anti-matter to keep creating the matter of life in constant opposition to the devious forces of death. That is why the Schwabs of this world do not have so many followers -- until people become frightened of the extremes; whilst Apple, often without even realizing it, will always be able to persuade people of the possibility of some kind of millenium. To use a metaphor, I think that the Apples of this world seem to wish to create educational greenhouses, where conflicts in competition for light and sustenance are initially encouraged, but they still remain greenhouses, not meadows. I suspect that the Pinars and Schwabs and Johnsons would prefer meadows, though the Johnsons would advocate some hedges all round, or perhaps one here and there to keep it a bit neater and perhaps more safe. People spinning out their curricular fantasies must be aware of their own "captive minds," which would put barbed wires round humanity -- in the name of "Ordnung und Freiheit," in that order!

Besides, curricular theories, to me, like all theories, are essentially extensions of the persons who propound them: intellectual elaborations of personal and social interplay; the mini drama of their private marionette theater written out in hopes of a performance at the world's stage. Essentially just mere flesh made into words, that's all. So we would, should, or perhaps even ought to treat it at best with a sense of frank and spicy humor, and at worst with a measure of reasoned suspicion. But that's my very private opinion about all theorizing in education, including of course psychology and other areas of study.

WR Perhaps we ought to conclude by admitting that we ourselves have enjoyed working out our fantasies over the last hour and that no one should take all this as some kind of definitive statement about what motivates curriculum theorists to write and say what they do. At most it has been an enjoyable journey of exploration with some thoughts encountered on the way that my suggest further pleasant possibilities of investigation for ourselves and for others. And like all explorers we will have made mistakes about what we found and occasionally thought that "windmills were giants." So readers of our private conversation will have to forgive us for that.

NOTES

1. "The deliberative approach to the study of curriculum and its relation to critical pluralism," in Martin Lawn and Len Barton (eds.), *Rethinking Curriculum Studies: A Radical Approach*, London, Croom Helm, 1981.
2. Isaish Berlin, "The hedgehog and the fox, " in H. Hardy and A. Kelly (eds.), *Sir Isaiah Berlin: Russian Thinkers*, London, Hogarth Press, 1978.
3. We looked at Maurtiz Johnson's "Translation of Curriculum into Instruction" as an example of writing from a systemic viewpoint, Michael Apple's *Ideology and Curriculum* (chapter 3), and "The hidden curriculum and the nature of conflict" (radical), William Pinar's "The voyage out" (existential), and Joseph Schwab's "The practical: a language for curriculum (deliberative). The Johnson and Schwab papers were consulted in the editions contained in the collection: *Curriculum, School and Society: An Introduction to Curriculum Studies* (eds. P.H. Taylor and K. Tye, NFER, Windsor, 1975) pp. 114-135 and 135-155. The Apple papers are in his *Ideology and Curriculum*, London, RKP, 1979, and in William Pinar (ed.), *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*, Berkeley, McCutchan, 1975, pp. 95-119. Pinar's paper is in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 2, 1, 1980, 71-92.
4. This would certainly be the case with introverted people. Instances would also occur among the more sanguine, stable extraverts. (JW)
5. After our conversation, I read more of Apple's book, and particularly the chapter "The hidden curriculum and the nature of conflict." I am now more than ever inclined to think that his preoccupation with conflicts goes beyond what he sees, or wants to see – sometimes quite rightly – in education. The frequent recurrence of the word "conflict," and the imagery dealing with it is unusual. What is most characteristic, however, is that he maintains that conflict can be solved only by "commitment." He finally eschews the choice and flexibility which he has advocated in his critique of education, saying: "One has no choice but to be committed."

Psychologically, I must admit, it is one of the most effective means of terminating reactive depression (depression resulting from reaction to an important current situation) stemming from a conflict of wishes or desires. But there are other ways of dealing with it which do not necessarily imply a surrender to one way of coping with life. It makes me wonder how much therapeutic value the author obtained from writing his book. The outcomes of such releases of creative energy vary. For some it brings relief, for others stress.(JW)

6. Bureaucratization is, however, a natural tendency in any institution. It stems from the two basic psycho-physiological mechanisms of advantageous adaptation: habituation to aversive, but non-toxic stimuli, and the life-maintaining "familiar, therefore pleasant" principle. That is, we get addicted to routines and actions which, in the past, have released us from an excess of tension accompanying exploration. (JW)

Rational Curriculum: Teachers and Alienation

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A number of converging influences drew the three of us into undertaking this project. The first was that delightful sense of trusting one another's intellects, a sense which grew over the course of a year's intensive study together. The second influence was the content of our study. We began with some early Marx, eventually read Capital I——slowly, carefully——went on to Schroyer and are continuing——still——slowly——to grapple with Habermas. A third influence was a shared sense of futility respecting our efforts to educate prospective and practicing teachers. It seemed so clear that our interest in developing critical consciousness among our students——graduate and undergraduate——has been in general blocked by pervasive cultural forces. Our students'——and often our colleagues'——orientation to the world as to what is possible and what is not, excludes, at the outset, the exercise of meaningful criticism on the norms, the goals, the aims of social, political and educational life. This is not to say that students and colleagues do not ever criticize their world and their work. They do, but it is often more complaint than thoughtful criticism and it is rarely normative. A fourth and final influence on this study was the fact that a local school district has been developing and instituting an up-to-date curriculum management system——what we call a "rational" curriculum——over the past few years and they were willing to allow us to interview some of their teachers.

The crucial influence, however, has been the third one——our professional frustration, our lack of success in getting our students to be reflective about education. It brought home to us the precise relevance of the literature we had been studying. The convergence of theory——social critique——and practice——alienated workers——could not have stood out in any sharper relief for us. Following Marx, Habermas and Schroyer, it seemed valid to infer that since culture frustrates development of critical capacities, or alienates us from our species-being, to put it in a Marxian way, the perceptual apparatus of teachers would be essential and meaningfully non-critical respecting their work. Necessarily, then, such false consciousness or alianated perception would disclose itself in teachers' talk about their work: i.e., about their teaching, their organizing, and their managing the curriculum. Our problem, stated simply, was to increase our understanding of how teachers view their work and to raise questions about how this view might be connected to alienation.

The school district in which teachers were interviewed had for several years worked to develop a new curriculum management system (NEMS). The new system included a statement of objectives, the development of pre- and post-tests related to the objectives and the use of a computer system to track student test results. Learning activities for students had been developed by teachers and coded into the program. Because the system was new, interviewing teachers about how the system affected their teaching provided an excellent opportunity to come to understand how teachers perceived their work and the degree to which they had reflected upon the purposes behind what they were doing.

Methodology

The method used to obtain information about the teachers' view of their work was a semi-structured interview. Each of twenty teachers who volunteered were asked the same series of questions and their responses were recorded on audio-tape and later transcribed.

There were two major reasons for using interviews rather than a questionnaire. First, we wanted the teachers to have an opportunity to provide some of the structure for their responses which we hoped would

ndicate their perceptions, attitudes, and understandings of their work. By using an interview method, we oped to get more of the teachers' actual views rather than what they would see as being the acceptable vay to respond. Second, the interview allowed for the asking of clarifying and probing questions to help eachers elaborate their views. The interview, therefore, provided a fairly rich source of information on ıow teachers talk about their work, and in turn, an indication of how they think about teaching.

Each teacher was asked to respond to the following statements and questions:

1. Describe how you use NEMS (the New Management System——this is not its real title) in your teaching.
2. What does NEMS allow you to do that you would not otherwise do?
3. What does NEMS require you to do that you would rather not do?
4. How does NEMS change the ways in which students spend their time?
5. Why do you think the district has gone to the time and expense of developing a program such as NEMS?

The typescripts from each interview were read independently by the writers who inferred from the teacher esponses to the above statement and questions the teachers' view of teaching, the learner, the priorities ıeld by the teacher, the teachers' feeling of potency, and whether the interview indicated reflection by the eachers on the means or ends of schooling. By having teachers talk about the curriculum system and then nferring from their talk, we hoped to capture what was most salient in their thinking about their work not heir capacity to think about any one of the topics. We would most likely have received different responses f we had asked the teachers directly what their views about teaching, learners, etc., were. However, we vould then not know what was salient for them, but what they had the capacity to think about. We would ıot expect the teachers interviewed to either agree with or necessarily understand the inferences which were made from their responses. Through this method, we hoped to capture the ideas and feelings which were likely to influence the teachers' behavior, even though the teachers were not consciously communicating these attitudes and ideas.

The inferences made by the readers separately were then compared. No essential differences were ound; though we used different phrases at times, the meaning of these phrases seemed to be the same.

The final step was to use the inferences that had been made from the typescripts as an indication of eacher alienation or non-alienation.

The essential question we asked as we studied the typescripts of the interviews was what views did the eachers hold in common that might be an indication of how their personal perceptions reflected the professional culture in which they worked. Did their talk suggest alienation as described by Marx, Habermas and Schroyer or was there evidence that the teachers talked in ways that showed a movement away from alienation?

Indication of Alienation or Non-Alienation

Because this study concerns itself with teachers alienation, it is reasonable to ask what would be indications of teacher non-alienation. That is, how might a non-alienated teacher talk about his/her work? In considering this question, it became clear to us that there is simply no such creature. The most appropriate way to speak about non-alienation is in terms of movement away from alienation; such movement vould be shown by increased talk about liberation and recognition of more alienating conditions. In effect, vhat we envision is a continual and never ending struggle against alienation. We take this struggle to be a defining characteristic of our species being. The teacher moving away from alienation should give some evidence of this struggle in his/her response to the questions we asked.

Karl Marx, in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts discusses various "features" of alienation which provide a useful way of organizing our discussion not only of alienation, but also of what we would take as indications of movement away from alienation. Among the features Marx identifies are: (1) Estrangement of the worker from the product of his labor; (2) Estrangement from the act of production; (3) Estrangement from one's natural being, and (4) Estrangement from other men.

Student learning is commonly viewed as the "product" of teacher labor. This suggests that the nature of a teacher's relationships to content and to students is an important indicator of alienation or movement away from alienation. We would expect that a teacher moving away from alienation would talk in ways that indicated that they: (1) Treated students as ends rather than means; (2) Involve students in important curriculum decisions; (3) Saw subject areas as tools for solving human problems; (4) View knowledge as dynamic.

The teacher's act of production involves the processes of teaching which include the planning and implementing of lessons. We would expect a teacher moving away from alienation would talk in ways that indicated: (1) Active involvement in establishing (and questioning) educational goals; (2) That they are students of teaching; (3) Willingness to change plans according to student needs. And so on.

The nature of a teacher's relationship to his species being is seen most clearly in how he views human nature and human learning. That is, what does the teacher take as being the essential characteristics of humans? We would expect a teacher moving away from alienation would: (1) Value education as an end in itself rather than as a means to something else; (2) Show concern for questions of fairness and right in the classroom; (3) Recognize and honor human curiosity and creativity in its many manifestations; (4) See human differences as enriching life.

Teaching is obviously an interactive affair; teachers work with people. An important indication of alienation or movement away from alienation is found in a teacher's relationship to students and to other teachers. We would expect a teacher moving away from alienation would: (1) View other teacher's problems with understanding and empathy; (2) Enjoy professional relationships; (3) See opportunities to share professional and personal understandings with students and other teachers; (4) Provide opportunities for interaction and free discussion in the classroom; (5) Stress the affective aspects of education.

Demographics of the Teachers Interviewed

The teachers interviewed all came from the same school district. The school district is a medium-sized district in a rapidly growing metropolitan area in the western part of the United States. The teachers taught in grades kindergarten through eight, and had been teaching from two to sixteen years. Both male and female teachers were interviewed. The schools selected for study were schools that were seen by the central administration of the school district as being effective schools in implementing the new curriculum program. The principals of the schools were requested to ask those teachers who had the best understanding of the new curriculum system if they were willing to be interviewed. All teachers asked by the principals volunteered and were interviewed during school hours. The interviews came during the last three weeks of the school year. This seemed to be an especially appropriate time for teachers to share their views about the meanings which their work held for them. Teachers were interviewed from two different elementary schools and two middle schools.

In summary, what we claim to have done was to ask teachers to discuss their perceptions of a new curriculum management system by asking them to share how the system had affected their teaching. We then studied the responses of the teachers, looking for indications of alienation or non-alientation. We argue that others reading the typescripts of the interviews for the same purpose would come to conclusions that would be essentially the same as ours.

On the Categories of Analysis

Our interpretations of the interviews will be discussed under two general headings, "Positivism and Teacher Alienation" and "Teacher Objectification of Self and Others." We came to these two categories inductively, as a result of many hours spent attempting to link up the disclosures of alienation that permeated so much of the teachers' discussions of their work. Positivism is the dogmatism of our age, "both a world view and a form of life," as Habermas argues throughout Knowledge and Human Interests (Trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro, Beacon Press: Boston, 1971, p. 210). Its spirit dominates every profession, especially those, like education, which make claims to being scientific. Thus under the governance of a so called "rational" curriculum, such as we studied, one developed supposedly scientifically, that is positivistically, it is apposite that we should ultimately find teachers' views of their professional activities marked by a variety of expressions revealing an inability to reflect upon the ends and means of education and an insensitivity to their objectifying themselves and their students. Positivism and objectification, then, stood out for us as the major categories of analysis for understanding the alienation we encountered.

Positivism and Teacher Alienation

A principle characteristic of positivism is its reductionist claim that only one particular method of inquiry reveals knowledge or discloses the truth of things. This method is, of course, that which supposedly marks the practice of the 'hard' sciences and which yields quantifiable data, i.e., solid facts, real knowledge, truth. Technocratic or alientated consciousness accepts this standard as an indisputable truth needing no justification. Positivism takes as a given that any endeavor involving a truth claim must necessarily emulate the vaunted methodology of the hard sciences and present its claim in quantified form. This outlook is reflected in many aspects of teachers' talk about their work. It colors a whole set of interconnected attitudes ranging from the way knowledge itself is talked about to descriptions of the proper means for attaining it, and for demonstrating that it's been got. Rather paradoxically, one of the more forceful indicators of a positivist professional consciousness is a negative one, the almost total absence of any normative reflections from teachers on the purposes of schooling and teaching. It is disquieting to realize that twenty intelligent teachers could engage us in serious discussions of their work without hinting at a need to evaluate teaching and schooling from some normative perspective. They seem to accept at face value whatever they construe as the districts's reasons for creating the NEMS program in the first place. Learning and good teaching are indicated by test scores which tell what has been learned.

In general, teachers understood the reasons for the creation of NEMS to be tied to raising reading and achievement test scores. Raising these scores is accepted as a perfectly worthwhile thing to be doing in public education. As one teacher stated: "The reading level as a nation has been going down for years and that it's a very serious problem, and I feel that the district is seeing this...and we need to do something about it. We need to bring our kids more up to their grade level and their potential." This teacher is representative of our sample in her outlook on the obvious desirability of making sure that young people read at grade level as an aim of education. Not only is this simply accepted as a goal of education, but the grade level standard itself seems to be an article of faith among these teachers (many of whom were reading teachers.) And articles of faith, as we know, are held to be indisputable givens, existing in the nature of things. Thus, from such a perspective, it would be the height of folly to bother thinking about the educational value of raising reading and achievement scores and the meaning of the grade level standard.

The unreflected upon acceptance of program purposes as natural educational aims shows up in the links that are discussed between NEMS and the Iowa Test of Basic Skills. The fact that teachers in the NEMS program spend part of their working day implicitly or explicitly preparing students to make good scores on the Iowa test does not seem to be bothersome or problematical. Such action is not seen as a possible perversion of the teacher's calling or as a dimunition of professional status. On the contrary, such work is viewed as right and good, or as the logical consequence of a rational curriculum. In her discussion of some

of the overall values of NEMS, a teacher ventured that "And another big factor is the Iowa Basic Test. And everything that is covered in the NEMS is on the test; I know that. And I've really been happy about that. Because then we haven't had to spend this extra, extra time developing other programs to help with the test (ITBS). And I think it really helps the kids a lot too." Another teacher, again expressing general approval of NEMS, notes that it is "correlated with the Iowa test," a seemingly unexceptionable fact. But she goes on to explain that students who do well on NEMS materials will also do well on the Iowa test, "And as the case is,...they will reflect my ability." When asked to elaborate on that statement, she offered, "My teaching ability. The better they do on the Iowa test, the better I look as a reading teacher. So, if I can meet those NEMS goals, if I know those kids are passing on those NEMS goals, then I know they should do well on the Iowa test and I should look good." This was said without hint of protest or even a modicum of doubt about the fairness or desirability of such a procedure. Rather, her view accepts this practice as a fact of life; this is reality and reality is unassailable. Consequently, it is entirely appropriate to attempt to enhance students' achievement or skills scores because that is her understanding of the educational aims of NEMS and the "natural" purpose of education.

Those for whom the connection between NEMS and the Iowa skills test was not obvious nevertheless acknowledged a link between the two. The principle which links NEMS and the Iowa test is logical consequence. The implicit argument on this view is that if a rational—i.e., sytematic—curriculum is adhered to, rational results must follow, among which will be higher achievement test scores. One teacher volunteered that, "I have never been told, "Okay, you must teach this to prepare for the Iowa." But what we've been able to accomplish through NEMS is that our scores have been going up just by simply having an organized program. I don't believe we teach for the Iowa. I think we teach NEMS and that has just been a nice side bonus." From the standpoint of alienation, this teacher's remarks are interesting precisely on the grounds of their naivete." They indicate still another facet of the grip of positivism on teachers' professional consciousness. This, so to speak, "logical consequence" outlook takes at face value, as a given, the notion of a domain of knowledge that is defined by a relationship between NEMS and the Iowa test which is both natural and logical——the hotter it gets the more the mercury rises! Furthermore, the educational value of the domain of knowledge encapsulated by this naturally logical relationsip between the two elements is also accepted as nonproblematical. The underlying positivistic presupposition of this view point seems to be that because NEMS and the Iowa tests were created by experts they must be closed off to non-expert evaluation as educationally desirable.

The positivism that precludes normative evaluation of educational aims does foster talk centering on methodological topics. Much of what teachers said to us about their work with NEMS dealt with technical issues in testing, the scope and sequence of curriculum, and instructional goals (or IG's as they like to say in NEMS country). These three topics are, certainly, tightly interrelated in fact, just as they were in teachers' talk, but instructional goals and testing seemed to get the most attention from our respondents. Characteristically, their talk about instructional goals and testing is either laudatory or technically critical, but never normative. NEMS instructional goals are looked upon with considerable favor: "I like the way they set up their goals;" "it focuses your teaching;" and, voicing that attitude toward expert authority as benign which sustains positivism and alienation, "I think NEMS is there to help a teacher, not to take away their teaching ability. It's just kind of a way of saying this is what should be taught..." This favorable outlook on goals was most succinctly expressed by one teacher who said, "I think the greatest thing that NEMS has done for the whole school district is to define what should be taught in a reading class so that the teachers know what they're supposed to teach, and what goals a child is expected to have successfully mastered by the time they're in certain grade levels in reading." Another teacher reflected both the favorable acceptance of goals and the technical criticism that flourishes within the technocratic consciousness of professional teachers: "I look at the NEMS goals and I base my program on these goals, but maybe not in the same

order that they are." The pervasive fact that stands out is that NEMS goals are used imprudently, thoughtlessly, just contrary to what a really scientific professionalization of teachers would permit, but which is highly appropriate for the positivism of their professional lives. Typically, the only discrimination that is exercised in respect of NEMS goals deals with such inconsequential technical adjustment as the order of their appearance; that they all will appear is never a question; it is a given.

The unsettling theme that runs through what teachers have to say about NEMS is that they do not want to decide about goals—instructional or larger—they do not want to engage in normative struggles. Partly this occurs because the teachers don't feel they are knowledgeable enough to do this. They take it as right, proper and desirable that these decisions are to be made by others, by experts removed from the classroom teacher. We heard teachers say, in respect of their coming into the NEMS program, "I was just happy to see things laid out," or "What NEMS did for me was give me a starting point. It told me the goals that I need; what the kid at that level should be doing." Again and again, the point is made that from the teacher's perspective the only serious issue is the technical one of methodology. If teachers think they are free to choose methods of presenting materials they seem to think of themselves as exercising optimum freedom of choice. So a teacher with considerable classroom experience found that "it (NEMS) didn't dictate how I would teach something. It just gave me guidelines on what I should teach. Then I could put my own method." Or one who teaches in a team situation related, "The first step we take is to look at the NEMS goals that have been outlined and we look at the materials that we have available. We take the NEMS goals and plug them into these materials..." and therefore this "is a wonderful organizational tool... it gives a real focus, a real purpose." Because teachers do not reflect on the goals of education at any level, from the classroom to the universe, having had their critical capacities leached out of them or bundled up under a Gordian knot by positivism and capitalism, they do not realize that ends and means cannot be so neatly separated as they have been led to believe. Hence, they do not realize that dictation of goals or ends necessarily creates limitations on means, on the beloved methods of teaching. Here in their own realm of professional operation, they clearly evidence the delusion associated with false consciousness, with alienation.

It is not surpising then to encounter confusion, even contradiction in teacher's accounts of the limitations that NEMS imposes on them. In some, there were yet vestiges of thoughtfulness or reflection indicating to them that something did not quite add up in their appraisals. The incipient problem, however, was never pursued; instead, it was dropped and such limitations or impositions that could have promoted critical discussion passed on into the realm of the given, the unchallengeable. Here at some length is a pristine example of this process:

> "I guess it doesn't keep you from doing things, and it doesn't require you to do things either, by the same token. If you are going to be involved with the program, then, of course, you have certain things you need to do. But in no way does it come in and say this is the way it must be done. But, it requires you to teach materials that are going to accomplish a particular goal. In other words, we can't just jump around and talk about a hundred different vocabulary things and expect kids to be able to pass a test. So, yeah, it does require you to have an objective and pursue it. Probably a better objective than I would write for myself as I prepared to teach on a daily basis."

The power of the expert to instill faith in their dictates while promoting distrust of one's own abilities is evidently strong.

Teachers' criticism of NEMS goals and of the testing that the program requires is totally congruent with their professional, alienated consciousness. Flaws within this system exist as mere operational imperfections

that can be refined away in the course of expertly guided practice. No attempt is made to go beyond complaints about practical discrepancies to take a look at structural factors in order to determine whether or not there may be deeper lying causes for problems than refinements in technique can touch. NEMS goals were sometimes said to be too narrow, too confining. Working in NEMS was "more restricting than allowing...It requires you to teach very specific goals." Moreover, NEMS goals did not provide enough freedom to use professional judgment "because you are fighting to get the concepts of NEMS taught...you teach their goals, instructional goals so that your child can pass them off and go onto the next year. If you fail as a teacher to teach those goals, it puts the child further behind. So I think in NEMS you have to do it. Have to commit yourself." Surely encroachment on professional freedom by a too restricting curriculum warrants serious criticism. But, in keeping with positivist, alienated professional consciousness, the critical point cannot be sustained. It gets diverted from the possible structural target to focus on difficulties within practice that refinement presumably will clear up. "Theoretically, it's a great idea." "The idea is great. But in practice it's really limiting." (Interestingly, the teacher who recognized that her freedom was importantly curtailed by NEMS goals spent the rest of the interview pointing out what she thought were the admirable features of NEMS and ended it by declaring, "I like NEMS.") Alienation makes us love our chains.

The process of testing received the greatest amount of criticism from NEMS teachers. A large number of teachers had complaints to air about NEMS testing procedures. True to alienated form, they were disgruntled with various applied aspects itself. Once again, problems were talked about non-normatively, as if every issue in their professional lives would be sure to yield to a rather simple pragmatic adjustment in technique. Teachers described the tests as inadequate because too easy, only requiring to "get eighty percent right to pass," and also inadequate because too difficult: "I think the tests aren't very good...the tests are too difficult for the concept." And again, "The tests that are given on a third or fourth grade level, the readability is not third or fourth grade readability...The test they read is still sixth or seventh readability. There is no way they can read the test." These problems are taken as practical pedagogical issues that fine tuning will remediate. Or, as it was optimistically asserted, "There could be a question on some of the tests, but that's being perfected."

The sheer volume of testing that students had to undergo and the concommitant amount of time required to do so much testing was generally decried: "There is a lot of testing and at times, students get tested out," whereas, "At times as a teacher I felt all I do is administer tests." Testing is looked at as going on "All the time...From the very beginning of day one." "There's a tremendous time in test taking in NEMS," and it was felt there should be "less time testing." Compared to other programs, students in NEMS "spend a lot more time testing. They spend a lot more time doing paper and pencil work and less discussion. All this testing "takes up a lot of extra time" which, while it might have important program payoffs, prompted one teacher to observe that "I don't think it should rule your entire classroom." The only remedy that was offered was to do less testing and to use teacher-made tests, but testing itself as educationally desirable was never doubted; it was never talked about as in the realm of that which might be questioned from a normative viewpoint.

One of the most important issues embedded in the denoted inadequacies of the NEMS testing process is that kids who do not read well suffer most from these very inadequacies. It was allowed that "The tests have been a little more difficult for my lower readers." And in respect of testing, "they get two chances basically." But, "if they fail it the second time, then we move on." Young people who have difficulty reading are said to "very rarely master." They get written off because they "won't read anything to begin with. They just look at a test and mark anything," nevertheless, their reading problems notwithstanding, they are made to take the "same test time after time." It is hardly surprising that these students, as was remarked, "don't respond to it." Not that this would seem to be a problem of the utmost professional

concern. NEMS is, as we have seen through the eyes of these teachers, a curriculum dedicated to raising reading and achievement test scores. Yet the program seems to have a built in bias against the young people who most need what it purports to offer, those who could benefit the most from whatever is of educational value in NEMS. Given the socio-economic facts about those who are most likely and least likely to succeed in schooling, there are dire implications attending the inability of NEMS testing to serve the needs of those who have trouble learning to read. This inherent inability to even recognize normative problems for what they are imposes a paradoxical limitation on technological consciousness which is brought home by this situation. Unfortunately, such limitation points in unpleasant directions, suggesting ugly truths about the conservative, bourgeois, classist and racist nature of positivism.

To summarize the findings discussed so far, teachers' responses to our questions showed no normative talk; teachers accepted testing as the natural means of evaluating learning; teachers did not question the goals nor did teachers seem aware of the ways in which goals dictate the methods used to reach goals. There was no evidence in any of the interviews that teachers had reflected upon the assumptions underlying paper and pencil tests of learning or the assumptions such tests make about the nature of the human being. What we found most disturbing was not the educational positions taken by the teachers interviewed, but rather that these positions were accepted without evidence of reflection, as natural, as the only possible alternative. Given our earlier discussion of alienation and non-alienation, we found evidence only for alienation in the topics discussed so far. Further the teachers in the interviews said nothing that would indicate that they were beginning to think about or struggle with the nature of their work.

Teacher Objectification of Self and Others

A very significant manifestation of the teachers holding a positivist view of their professional world is found in the objectification of themselves and others. Evidence in support of this interpretation is found in the way the teachers speak of (1) the virtues of the program in terms of serving efficiency; (2) individualization; (3) needs; (4) students, and (5) other teachers.

When the strengths of the program are discussed by the teachers "continuity" and "uniformity" are consistently mentioned. The assumption is that efficient programs require standardization of treatment and outcome. These values can be compared to those associated with increasing teachers' options and providing increased opportunities to develop one's distinctive teaching potential creatively and imaginatively. Typical of this "standardization" talk is one teacher's comment that NEMS provides a "smoother education." It is good, one teacher asserts, "to have a uniform system and (to) know when a child transfers within the district this is what they have been working on—third grade goals." Yet another teacher supports this view by stating that the program gives "me a good continuum that I can follow." It makes certain I "touch on each of the concepts that they think are important...

...It makes sure I don't leave parts out that I might not be interested in and dwell on other parts...Rather than stay with what I feel interested in." As a whole the teachers agree that we need programs "just to standardize things..."

The teachers showed little awareness that standardization could serve to limit both teacher and student growth. Nor did they suggest that there might be other ways of approaching education; they take standardization as necessary and natural, and efficiency as the most appropriate concern of program developers.

The full impact of this view is most clearly portrayed when the teachers speak of serving student needs. Without exception when speaking of meeting needs, the teachers spoke of them in terms of "lacks"—that is, a particular student did not master a specific content goal as determined by post-testing. There is very little indication of thought about whether what is provided on the computer printout is in fact a "need": The

printout "gives you a clear picture of what your students' needs are." Once such a determination is made about a particular group of students then it is the teacher's responsibility to marshall resources to fill the gap.

The program itself is often justified in terms of "meeting the needs of (the) kids." While this kind of talk appears, at first glance, to be very student oriented one comes to recognize that needs are not viewed in a personal way. That is, needs are talked about as though they exist separately from human beings—they are to be filled by prescription: It has been a "real challenge to read (the printout) and tell the kids what they need..." It is clear that student needs are not generally what youngsters would choose to call needs unless, as is most often the case, the students internalize what is "objectively" presented to them—a print-out of needs. "Good" students do, according to teachers, find motivation in fulfilling their printout needs: "...the higher kids have seemed to grasp it and really enjoy it because I've told them, "Look, this is what you're doing. After you've achieved five tests you can go over to a learning center and work on (the) concept...for the next day." The kids have been really self-motivated. They really have."

Like the teachers' talk about needs, their talk about individualization which is also given as a legitimation for the program, has little to do with educating individuals. That is, it is the view of these teachers that individualizing means that we must recognize variations in rate of learning while insisting that the goals of learning (and outcomes) are the same for all peple: "I teach each skill, each NEMS goal that my students need to be taught...I teach those (goals) that are most needed and I teach that to a class, straight to a class and after that they take a test, and if they do not pass the test, then I do individualize instruction...I never have more than three students together...We go over the things they missed and teach the whole test again..."

Furthermore, the way in which the necessity to individualize is addressed is in terms of ability groupings based upon test scores. Students move from one group into another. It is not necessary for the teacher to think about , nor actually deal directly with, the student who is being individualized: "We gave the preliminary test that put the children in the goals and then we placed them in the goals according to their needs..." The system, through tests, makes these very important decisions—they are being taken as being objective, accurate and proper. In this process, the student is abstracted in terms of finding his importance in relation to program determined group needs—needs which are defined in respect of test performance on skill and content mastery—which, through the management of materials, are fulfilled.

At this point a general comment about the "amount" of teacher talk about students required mentioning. We were somewhat surprised by how infrequently the teachers spoke about students as persons. In general what talk there is about students, with one or two exceptions, is talk about students as objects of of teacher/program action. Things are done to students in the name of doing things for them. They are viewed essentially as passive. Furthermore, there is little, if any, awareness demonstrated that each person creates his own experience out of the encounters presented to him and that, therefore, to expect sameness of outcome is naive at best. The essential point is that while much of the teachers' language is "humanistic" and they believe what they are doing is educative, they see students as objects.

While students are objectified so are teachers who seem relatively unaware of the limitations on their professional growth and potency of a teaching role that centers on management and clerking concerns. The objectification of self is most clearly seen when attempts are made to identify the sources of problems with the program.

Probems are not seen as being located within the structure of the system itself, but rather with the humans charged with working within it. Specifically, students and teachers are seen as being responsible for the lack of system efficiency. One teacher, for example, identified as being problematic her inability to cover all the required goals in a manner that would lead to goal mastery for all of her students. The

tests, it seems,force upon her a recognition of the great diversity found in her student population: "the course spectrum (range of test scores) of where the students are falling continues to get wider and wider..." Rather than see this as a necessary expression of difference, she asserts that the development of a different "management system," one that will not allow the "group to become so spread out," could remedy the situation. The problem, in this case, is taken to be found in the diversity and unpredictability of students rather than in the program's approach to working with youngsters. Diversity is not to be desired but managed away. Underscoring this point a teacher remarks, that if the students will only do what they are told, "there's just no way they can go wrong. Which is a real good feeling (for) their self-confidence."

Some student populations were identified as being unwilling to work with the system, to their own detriment. As discussed earlier, "slow" students were specifically identified by some teachers (particularly the middle-school teachers interviewed) as a major source of problems: "They very rarely master. I can put in a card at the end of this year and give the same placement test that I gave them at the beginning of the year and they will still come out not passing the test that we passed and worked on diligently for a month...Give them the whole placement test again and they will fail it. You're working," she asserts, "with kids with a low self-image that won't read anything to begin with. They just look at a test and mark anything. It's been very hard to get them to do it." The problem source is identified here as being in the kids' attitudes. There is little recognition that these attitudes themselves may, in some very significant ways, have been encouraged by participation in the program; the student blocks the effectiveness of a good treatment.

Teachers also considered themselves to be major sources of problems which can and must be remedied by greater standardization and uniformity. "The program, I think, is pretty well developing, it's still coming along. If anything,where we have a hang-up...now...must be teachers."

For a few of the teachers, recognition of difficulty was taken as a personal failure which manifested itself in a kind of guilt. In general, there is a working assumption that if only all teachers would get with the program there would not be any problems: The problem is with people. First year teachers are singled out for attack as are teachers who are lazy or who have their own favorite areas for instruction. It is asserted that what is needed is a "safeguard" that will protect the youngsters from such persons—persons who don't "know what teaching really (means)." Furthermore, teachers need to be forced to do their jobs: "...what (the program developers) we're trying to do is bring up those scores again (reading scores) to force the teachers to focus in on what the students need...I think that's a very basic cornerstone."

In spite of claims to the contrary, the system, through heavy reliance on testing and specific objectives, has established a very clear model for teachers which does not include room or time for reflection nor for the idiosyncratic behavior. Teacher performance is judged in terms of student performance which is judged in terms of test scores. Whatever is necessary to raise such scores is recognized and accepted as being the central concern of teachers: "It is much easier," one teacher comments, "to come in and do something that's...creative...that you can turn the kids on, that the kids will enjoy...(but) they need capital letters. they need punctuation. I really think if it wasn't laid out that you'll do this and this, you would have teachers doing more of their own thing and I think the students suffer because these are the years they are supposed to be getting a foundation..."

One can only infer what kind of models of learning are presented to the young teachers who are willing to sublimate so much of their own passion for learning to the system. It seems clear, however, that passion for learning is not considered of primary importance when compared to "getting a foundation." Doing one's "own thing" as a teacher however well, is viewed as an aberration that must be rooted out regardless of the cost. Though few of the teachers viewed themselves as guilty of such sins they believed that others, somewhere, were and accepted the price all must bear for such imcompetence.

In reading the protocols one is struck not only by how boring they are—there is so little variation in response—but also, as mentioned, by how little talk there is about students. Most of the teachers believe, for example, that the program has not fundamentally altered what students do in school except, as a few noted, that more tests are taken. They do not see how the system shapes what youngsters are permitted to experience and how they experience, nor how it affects their own professional lives. They believe, firmly, that as teachers they would be spending more time doing it. One can only conclude, therefore, that the values inherent in the program are consistent with these teachers' values. They feel potent when they have the opportunity to select materials. They define participation in curriculum in terms of further clarifying established purposes and coding materials to identified goals. They believe learning is additive and that testing is the proof of learning. They believe that a "smooth" education which is predictable is most desirable. They like having results that can be communicated in quantified form to parents. They feel somewhat harrassed by the pressures of teaching and see the system as making manageable what, in moments of reverie, must seem overwhelming. They like working with young people but have a job to perform that does not permit much room for exceptionality or the unpredictable. In short, they view themselves and their students as means rather than ends. Their job is to produce an efficient education. The student's job is to work through his education which willproduce results (rising test scores) he can see and feel proud of. It seems clear that what transpires in schools "happens" to teachers and students. Education is not its own end; it finds its meaning in providing a narrowly functional set of experiences through which students passively move and teachers carefully chart. Teachers and students are not initiators of experience, but recipients of treatments—they are consumers. They are not possessors of needs demanding expression but humans with "gaps" that must be filled. In short, to teach and to be a student is to participate in a dehumanizing and objectifying experience and to come to like it—to like what Erik Fromm calls our "chains of illusion."

Conclusions

If our sample of teachers is representative, our findings are not unexpected but still somewhat depressing. Certainly the world view communicated by teachers to the students in their classrooms as the natural, given, only sensible position will be narrow and not likely to help students to consider anything but acceptance and compliance, or perhaps a self-destructive form of rebellion as a possible response. The popularity of positivistic curriculum systems among teachers becomes clear because such ways of presenting curriculum matches their view of the world.

We wondered, as we studied the interviews, what had happened in teachers' liberal education or educational foundations courses since no evidence appeared that they had, in fact, studied in ways that would encourage them to reflect upon the meanings and alternatives present and possible in their work. If the courses they had taken required reflective thought, such activity did not seem to have transferred beyond the confines of the course. A definite impression is that the teachers had learned well that the reason for schooling, including higher education, was to pass tests so that they would be ready to pass the next series of tests—again, without reflection upon the purposes underlying such activity or whose aims such activity served.

The next question is, of course, what can be done to help teachers to realize their own potency and begin to reflect in serious fashion upon what teaching and learning should be? Here it seems one must be careful not to fall into the trap of a positivistic view and assume that all that is necessary is to "plug in" the right formula and the result will be a more thoughtful and human person. What is clear is that the question needs to be raised as often as possible in whatever context available and that the solutions offered need to be examined with as much thoughtfulness as the group discussing the issue can muster. Habermas' concept of "conversation without domination" comes to mind as a phrase that captures the flavor of the

process that should occur. However, the phrase probably doesn't sufficiently suggest how difficult it is to start or participate in such a conversation. It could be that the positivistic, alientated view reflected by the teachers in this study is too pervasive to be changed. It is difficult to get anyone to question that which seems so completely natural. But for those who don't see the narrowly positivistic view as the only alternative there is at least an option to resignation. Programs that help teachers to study their own action using the framework of critique might begin to help teachers become aware of the domination that exists in their professional and personal lives and the ways in which they unnecessarily dominate their students. We can only wonder what would have happened if our purpose in interviewing our twenty teachers had been to help them question their work and, if we had sufficient time, could we have asked questions and responded to teacher answers in ways that would have helped them become aware of what they were doing in their work and whether this was the most socially and personally enhancing way for them to spend their time and energy? At least the possibility for helpful conversation seems to be present.

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Curriculum Theorizing and the Possibilities and Conditions for Social Action Toward Democratic Community and Education

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Last year at the Curriculum Theory Conference I was in the midst of attempting to articulate connections between individual growth and self reflection and sane and effective social action.[1] My interest in these relationships evolved from a realization which has been dawning within me for a long time. This realization has tended to structure my professional interests including my choice to enter the field of foundations of education and my attraction to much of what is going on in the reconceptualizing of the the curriculum field.[2] Specifically the realization is that the "democratic" conception of society that allegedly emerged in Western civilization and came to fruition in the new world is at worst simply a lie and at best a cruel distortion. Many recoil at such a stance, but my position is not without support in the literature.[3] Some few others now or in the past have also asserted that something fundamental is wrong; something that cannot be fixed by legislative tinkering, constitutional amendment, or curriculum reform narrowly conceived.

This is, however, not to deny that there were good intentions and bright hopes to begin with. As one ally, Lewis Mumford, puts it:

> This attempt to make a new beginning rested on the valid perception that at various points something had profoundly gone wrong with man's development.[4]

Unfortunately, however, the attempt to wipe the slate clean and begin all over again took the infantile form of escape from origins and the past rather than genuine confrontation, struggle, and transcendence. There was, in short, a futile attempt to escape history and tradition——the cumulative effects of time——by simply trading these for unoccupied land. Quoting Mumford again:

> Western man explored every wilderness except the dark continent of his own soul.[5]

Failing that his entry on the American continent brought the same psychology of dominance and fear which had shaped the institutions of the old world. There was no real transformation. No genuine cultural creation occurred. Such "democracy" as existed was the happy and temporary accident of an abundant, rich, and beautiful land.

The land ran out rapidly; and since that time, except for increasing levels of technological cleverness, material prosperity,and military power, nothing much has happened. We fought a bloody internal conflict followed by a period of barbaric industrialization. During this time an economic oligarchy was successfully formed and passively accepted by most people. Next we participated in a world war; then another world war, and the trend continues. Throughout all of this the health and well being of most people has been a very low priority in our "democratic" society. A few specific examples follw:

1) In the early part of the century small children were addicted to opium in various forms while their overworked (and often pregnant again) mothers were assured of the harmlessness of those calming (and profitable) teething tonics.[6] (Moreover, a safe and effective contraceptive still does not exist, and the necrophillic "right to lifers" are hard at work trying to make the situation even more difficult).

2) Sane public transportation systems have been continuously undermined and subverted in order to pave the way for all to be thoroughly dependent upon the private automobile. Muchmore could be said concerning this issue but in the interest of brevity I shall refrain.

3) Our present economic system is based upon a job structure which generally relegates one to a soft and sedentary job or to a harsh and onesided use of the body. Moreover, the leisure time activities which are most heavily emphasized and serve the most people are sedentary and vicarious. Although there are hopeful signs away from this, it still seems in general correct to say that we have fallen too much into sedentary and vicarious life.

Example after example could be given to demonstrate our spiritual, ethical, and aesthetic bankruptcy. The third example is intended to convey that this condition is mirrored among other things by an accompanying physical degeneration: by the conspicuous lack of overall generally good bodily health. In short, our fallen spiritual, ethical, and aesthetic selves have their visible side--our fallen bodies.[8] The situation is grim and needs to be portrayed as such by all levels of curriculum reconceptualizing and educational philosophizing. Our country seems to be in the position of the character in Pink Floyd's, "The Wall," who cries in anguish:

> There must be some mistake. I didn't mean to let them take
> away my soul. Am I too old? Is it too late?

The seeming necessity of a genuine confrontation with the past, of understanding origins and development from origins led me to the notion of "cultural psychoanalysis:"[10] a process applicable to cultural forms which parallels and provides a context for individual self reflection. Both processes involve attempts to confront the past, transcend limiting structures of thought, and retrieve that which has been suppressed and denied by these limiting structures.

In last year's paper, toward the end of arguing for the necessity of thorough self reflection as a complement of responsible social action, I used the concept of cultural psychoanalysis to examine the dominant thought trends (world views or symbolic forms) in Western civilization. Among other things, I concluded that since these trends have been dualistic and increasingly mechanical, they have also acted to progressively deny and suppress the poetic, imaginative, and organic nature of ourselves and the qualitative aspects of reality. This is another way of saying they have alienated ourselves from ourselves, from others, and from nature.

My most general conclusion from all of this is that it is "closing time"[11] on Western civilization as we have known it; and that genuine democracy, if it arises at all, will arise out of the ruin, demise, and collapse of the dominant forms of this civilization. The remainder of this paper contains a more specific and concentrated application of cultural psychoanalysis to ourselves, our history and present society. The aim is to yield and stimulate insights into the conditions and possibilities for social action toward a higher form of democratic community than we have known or than is perceived possible within the dominant modes of the past.

Those involved with the origins and foundations of present day American institutions are examples par excellence of the mechanical, dualistic, and abstract thought patterns of Western man. The bases of our revolution and our constitution are the interlocking trio of Lockean philosophy, Newtonian mechanics, and Deism. This is the case of even the more "radical" figures who were involved with the American situation. For example, in The Age of Reason, Thomas Paine[12] admits of an early interest, and perhaps talent for poetry but says that he deliberately repressed it "as leading too much into the field of imagination."[13] In the same book Paine asserts in a similar vein that a mill is the universe in microcosm

and that only in mechanics can God be revealed. Hence, when we confront our past in sufficient depth we find that our much daunted American Revolution was at core based upon a tired and mechanistic materialism.[14]

The poet, William Blake, was a contemporary of Paine and an admirer of his honesty as a thinker. He was also initially a warmly sympathetic observer of both the American and the French Revolutions. He wrote poems about each of them expressing his high hopes for their eventual positive outcomes. As time passed, however, he became increasingly disillusioned and prophesized with amazing accuracy the dismal consequences of both revolutions.[15]

As suggested, Blake did not deny that authentic revolutionary impulses were present in both instances. The overt intent was to smash the structure of tyranny and create a better world. However, neither the American nor the French revolutionaries had an adequate grasp of what creation implies or a reliable vision of what a better world is. Their lack was spiritual and aesthetic; under such conditions a revolution, even if it smashes a tyrant, will not be successful in the end, i.e., it will not smash the structure of tyranny. Either another personal tyrant will replace the earlier one (as in the French Revolution), or a tyranny of custom will become established so powerful that a personal tyrant will not be necessary (as in the American Revolution).

Blake's visionary prophecies still ring out to us today with surprising relevance. Among others his work can provide inspiration, insight, and tools to confront and transcend our current stalemate. For instance, his assessment of the American Revolution includes the notion that the failure to awaken man's imagination and spirit brings an inadequate and fallen concept of liberty as a leveling out and as granted by external nature. Locke, Paine, et. al. were champions of human rights, but the rights were conceived as "out there" automatically granted by the natural order and passively received by man. Such an inadequate conception of liberty according to Blake, leads to "a placid ovine herd of self-satisfied mediocrities."[16] It encourages an atmosphere of pervasive dull mindedness in which exist many persons who are not vigilant of the actual quality of life nor have any awareness that it depends largely upon them.

In short, the current habits and forms of our society have been derived from a philosophy which posits basic reality as a static and rational form separate from us which we are obliged to accept passively. Such qualified democracy as there is occurs within the preformed reality. Perception, the beginning of knowledge, is a passive affair which by definition de-emphasizes the human powers to form images and to make these images into art forms. Beginning with a subject-object dichotomy, Lockean consciousness posits the object as impressing itself upon the passive senses of a passive subject who then turns completely away from the object to "reflect" upon its abstracted qualities.

Such liberty as exists in this situation exists within a group of uniformly dulled out perceivers; the modes of thought which bring humans to a passive acceptance of reality also bring a shutdown consciousness. A good citizen is one who puts desire in bondage to reason and shuts down her/his potentially active powers of perception. He or she is one who perceives without effort or struggle and thus adds to the security of common perception. In short, communal perception of reality based upon the least common denominator, blank slates receiving the same abstract messages become the valued modes. Active, imaginary, visionary perception is feared and, this being the case, the fully present person who refuses to be the blank slate is often resented and hindered.

The resentful responses are not surprising for the passive modes of perception upon which our democracy is based lead only to despair in the end.[17] Through our passive modes we see but a "fallen world," i.e., the so called physical world as it presents itself to the passive senses is a fallen world to active, imaginary perception. What we call observable reality is not the same to the awakened imagination as it is

to subject-object consciousness,[18] the normal consciousness for our present and historical forms of democracy. This "normal" consciousness, because it is split, approaches reality by way of caution, restraint, fear, by imposing abstractions, rather than as a fully present and awake human being. Moreover, our shutdown and split consciousness is a vi cious cycle. We derive the idea of necessity from the passivity with which we see things and we tend toward passivity the more necessity seems to reign.[19]

For Blake the central problem for social and political emancipation is the release of the creative imagination—the freeing of ourselves from the fears and restraints which shutdown our visionary powers and prevent our full presence in the ongoing struggle to create. Moreover, Blake is by no means alone in his attitude; there are other potential allies in our attempt to reconceive the meaning of democratic community. Contributing to the remainder of this paper is a diverse and motley group: 1) Giambattista Vico, the eighteenth century Italian philosopher who challenged the assumptions of the mechanistic and materialistic philosphy of the Enlightenment; 2) Walt Whitman, America's poet and seer of democracy and the creative imagination; 3) Harold Rugg, a key founder of the foundations of education field, an important historical influence in curriculum theorizing, and a 20th century philosopher of the imagination; 4) Mary Daly as a representative of the current feminist theology movement.

Vico's major work, The New Science of Giambattista Vico, is a book concerning the origins and transformations of the human world—of human institutions and knowledge, and various modes of human consciousness. This philosophical and historical work confirms the intuitive notions of visionaries like Blake and Whitman that true origins derive from the creative imagination and are sacred. They are poetic and possess religious inspiration.[20] From the Vichian perspective, we have as yet no true origins. Again, our early leaders lacked the necessary vision. The only thing dulled out Lockean-Newtonian-Deistic thought could do with religion was to separate it from the state and relegate it officially to the "private world." The "founding fathers" feared the excesses of religious conflict and understandably so, but in vain did they attempt to vanish their presence from public life and discourse.

Overt religious practice was admittedly left a matter of private conscience, yet, the "public" god was also there in the form of that passively perceived, objective, material order and its absolute laws. Moreover, the private sphere reinforced this as most theologies, regardless of differences in detail, presented the same external and separate form of god. These gods, although a bit more mysterious and irrational than the god of Lockean philosphy and Newtonian mechanics, are equally effective in shutting down creativity and inducing passivity. In short, whether we are speaking of a baptist or a bureaucrat (or the likely combination of the two) the overt private and covert public religions work to exalt routine and passivity, to produce boredom and banality, and above all to confirm an uninspiring conception of moral good as conformity. Once more the outcome is dullmindedness, and what we must never forget—the repressed violence and destructiveness which is its shadow side (A. Eichmann was after all a good bureaucrat).

All of this, according to our own poet-seer, works squarely against the very conception of religion which is necessary for authentic democratic communion. Whitman continually insisted that without a religious foundation our democratic politics and plentiful economy are worthless.[21] He spoke often of the necessity of a completely new sense and appreciation of religion for any democracy of the future. Moreover, the sense of religion he referred to is the same as what Blake referred to as "true" religion as opposed to religious idoi atry or false religions which postulates some kind of unknown and mysterious God outside of man to which man must give unquestioning obedience.[22] The only religion which can provide a foundation for a democratic community is one which in Whitman's words is based upon the "divine pride of man in himself."[23]

From this perspective, if we are to move toward a higher form of democracy, we must not continue to cower in the unreal separation of church and state. We must take a stand to proclaim the desirability of heightened religious consciousness implied by the common ground of all major world religions, the poetry of visionaries like Blake and Whitman, the philosophers of the imagination, and the most inclusive aspects of contemporary feminism. That is, we must not be afraid to say in our curriculum theorizing and our educational philosophizing that women and men must stop looking outside of themselves for salvation; that human development will be severely arrested until we move toward full consciousness that what we call god, the divine indwells in every person; that all humans are capable of the same cosmic consciousness as the Buddha, Jesus Christ, Blake, Whitman...[24]

After asserting the universal and infinite potential, however, we must hasten to add that its development is neither natural nor given. It does not come without ceaseless struggle for the perfection of our being in order to engage in authentic creative work and communication. Moreover, one can only endure the struggle if one has a passionate commitment to it. This mention of passion brings us to another fatal flaw in our conception of democracy which was recognized early on by Vico.[25] It rests upon a philosophy which grew out of a fear of passion. Yet only passionate commitment can bring trustworthy allegiance.

In our new religious communities it should be obvious that we are no longer speaking of priests and congregations. Rather we are speaking of communities of artists who identify the divine with the creative imagination and for whom the worship of God is self-development. This is what Whitman points to in his poetry when he writes:

> Each is not for its own sake, I say the whole earth and all
> the stars in the sky are for religions sake.
>
> I say no man has ever been half devout enough,
> None has ever yet adored or worship'd half enough,
> None has begun to think how divine he himself is, and how
> certain the future is.
>
> I say the real and permanent grandeur of these states must
> be their religion,
> Otherwise there is no real and permanent grandeur;
> (Nor character nor life worthy the name without religion,
> Nor land nor man or woman without religion.)[26]

Whitman also spoke of this near the beginning of "Democratic Vistas" when he writes:

> Our fundamental want today ... is of a class ... of native authors, literatures, far different, far higher in grade than any yet known ... and, as its grandest result, accomplishing (what neither the schools nor the churches and their clergy have hitherto accomplish'd and without which this nation will no more stand, permanently, soundly, than a house will stand without a sub-stratum), a religious and moral character beneath the political and productive and intellectual bases of the States. For know you not, dear, earnest reader, that the people of our land may all read and write, and may all possess the right to vote – and yet the main things be entirely lacking?[27]

This is only one of several places that Whitman emphasizes the same point: that a religious consciousness inspired by creative art and vice versa are the deepest and most important structures of a democracy. He says it again in the "Vistas" when he writes that America demands a "poetry that is bold, modern, and all

surrounding ..." and which "must place in the Van and hold up at all hazards the banner of the divine pride of man in himself (the radical foundation of the new religion)."[28]

Harold Rugg, among a few other Americans,[29] saw the problem several decades later and continued the work of Vico, Blake, and Whitman in a twentieth century context. He also had a vision of communities of artists. This vision included a special and important group of "artist-teachers." Rugg had in mind teachers whose perception is visionary and active. In Rugg's words these teachers have put themselves "in the creative path"[30] and "know the creative act internally, in its own terms, through having experienced it within their own bodies."[31] Rugg later did extensive inter-disciplinary research on the creative act which culminated in his final book published posthumously, Imagination. In this work he speaks of the need of the freedom to create as a second freedom. He elaborates on this notion in several ways referring to it variously as a state of relaxed concentration, as the freedom to associate freely, as freedom from self censorship which comes from the internalized conflict of "I" and "They."[32]

The idea of this latter freedom brings us back to undivided consciousness——the cosmic consciousness we mentioned earlier——and for which another name is androgynous. This term implies that a vitally important condition for a higher form of democracy is a feminist revolution in the most inclusive sense of the word. Such inclusiveness, is manifested currently by aspects of the feminist theology movement. This movement in its most vital and lively dimensions seems definitely the heir apparent of the visionary artists and philosophers of the creative imagination——Vico, Blake, Whitman, Rugg, and others. In short, the feminist theology movement is perhaps the nearest thing that we have to the beginnings of an appropriate new religion and is certainly one of the most fertile sources for promoting a new religious-aesthetic consciousness. Within this movement God, Be-ing, the creative imagination are one. In the words of Mary Daly, "the form destroying, form creating transforming power which makes all things new."[33] To participate in God, means, among other things, to cease being the projected "Other." More specifically it means to cease nurturing the bureaucrat so that he is forced to face himself in all of his weakness, insecurity, and dependency. With no one to project upon he can perhaps begin to dimly perceive that he is a hideous botch compared to what he could be and probably the more so the more economic and political power he possesses.

In short, women are speaking of the possibilities and conditions of a higher form of democratic community; and women must speak before the works of Blake et. al. can contribute to a workable vision and provide real inspiration for the modern. They are speaking, among other things, of beginning by negating and transcending dulled out, bureaucratized patriarchal space now. One important concept is boundary living[34] which implies a mode of being which refuses to drain all of our energies fighting for equal rights in that dull-minded space. Instead the idea is to work now to create a new social reality at the boundaries or just outside established institutions in which there is support for repudiating traditional duties and obligations. Within that space and emanating from it can come an all-out exuberant and creative attack upon dull mindedness and its fascistshadow. Through wrath, humor, defiance, art, and many other modes, the banal and boring bureaucratic monster can be slain; and the ground which supports him——the false tolerance of the dull which has emerged from Lockean liberalism——can be thoroughly exposed and discredited.

Within the new space also can emerge a celebration of creative existence as well as multiple expressions of the conditions necessary for such existence. For example, through dialogue, poetry, painting, drama, play and other forms we can live and portray the alternating rhythms of the creative path. First there is the movment from the subject-object awareness of ordinary consciousness to a merging of these into a world of lover and beloved or in Buber's words, I and Thou. This is the plane of sexual love, and wonder. It includes childlike delight in the beautiful and varied forms and processes of the natural world. This moment in the creative process is a relaxed and restful stage in which imaginative receptivity is at its height and in which energy is garnered for later creative effort. The active moment in the creative process brings

us beyond the union of lover and beloved to an active struggle to forge a union of creator and creature, of energy and form. Blake called the active, formative moment of the creative process Eden or the higher paradise.[35]

To live according to these rhythms rather than in confomity to external cues and stereotypical molds is one important way of developing personal presence or what Daly calls the "Power of Being"[36] and Whitman calls "the main thing."[37] Such development is necessary in order to become an artist-teacher capable of functioning in a community of peers working to turn education toward the fulfillment of democratic communion and creation.

If small visionary communities of artists and other such means seem to be puny measures in light of overkill, overpopulation, and nuclear wastes, we can return to Blake for a dose of qualified optimism. His ideas of the historical process are the opposite of Hegels and seem to illuminate our present situation much more fruitfully: Every advance of truth and freedom (triumph of the creative imagination) forces error and tyranny to consolidate itself into more obviously erroneous forms. History exhibits a series of crises in which a sudden flash of imaginative vision bursts out, is counteracted by a more ruthless defense of the status quo and subsides again. The evolution comes in the fact that the opposition grows sharper each time and will one day present a clear cut alternative of eternal life or extermination.[38]

FOOTNOTES

1. "Self Reflection, Social Action, and Curriculum Theory Part II," forthcoming in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (Winter, 1980). A paper of the same title designated Part I and written by my close friend and colleague, James Whitt, will also appear in this issue. The two related papers were presented in a general session at the 1979 Airlie meetings.

2. A major theme in the early emergence and later development of the Foundations field is a vital concern with achieving and maintaining democratic community in the context of the modern industrial social order. Dewey, Rugg, Kilpatrick, Counts, Bode, et. al. all shared this concern however different their individual thrusts might have been in terms of how social and personal reconstruction should proceed toward this goal. An examiniation of any of their works will reveal that they all grappled constantly with this concern in an interdisciplinary context. See, for example, Harold Rugg, *The Teacher of Teachers* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers), 1952; George Counts, *Dare the Schools Build A New Social Order* (with a new preface by Wayne J. Urban) (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press), 1978.

In the past few decades the Foundations field has become tragically fragmented so that the early and once developing vision seems to have been eclipsed except in isolated instances of individuals and small groups. The early spirit of the foundations field in its concern for human emancipation seems to be more thoroughly expressed by the reconceptualist group in curriculum than anywhere else in the field of education. They are addressing themselves to the same problems with renewed vigor, new ideas, sources and experiences, and with a more exclusive emphasis. I first became acquainted with the work of this dynamic group through a work edited by Bill Pinar, *Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution and Curriculum Theory,* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation), 1974, and one written by Pinar and Madeleine Grumet, *Toward a Poor Curriculum* (Debuque, Iowa: Kendale Hunt Publishing Company), 1976. The discovery of these works of emancipatory intent was to me like a reprieve from wandering in a virtual wasteland with little or no place to relate and dialogue about my professional interests and creative inspirations. Since that time I have examined the work of many others in the group and have found similar inspiration and common interests. To mention only a few of the works which have inspired me: Florence Krall, "Navaho Tapestry" and "Indwellings: Reconceiving Pan" both forthcoming in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing;* Jose Rosario, "Harold Rugg on How We Come to Know: A View of his Aesthetics," *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing.* Volume Two, Issue Two (Summer, 1980), pps. 269-274; Janet Miller, "Women: The Evolving Consciousness," *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing.* Volume Two, Issue One (Winter, 1980), pps. 238-247; Barbara Mitrano, "Feminist Theology and Curriculum Theory," (Unpublished paper), 1978, 33 pages.

3. See, for example, Lewis Mumford, *The Pentagon of Power: The Myth of the Machine*, Volume II (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich), 1970.
4. *Ibid*, p. 14.
5. *Ibid.*
6. For a fascinating report on this subject see William Daniel Drake, Jr., *The Connoisseur's Handbook of Marijuana* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books), 1971, pp. 54-57. Drake lists a number of teething tonics containing various forms of opium (heroin, morphene sulfate, codeine, powdered opium) and has retrieved old ads exhalting the healthiness of these concoctions.
7. For an excellent recent statement of this problem see Deborah Baldwin, "Off the Track: How America Lost a Sane Transportation System." *The Progressive*, Volume 43, No. 7 (May, 1979), pps. 12-17.
8. Walt Whitman suggests this same notion in his poem, "I Sing the Body Electric:"

> Have you seen the fool that corrupted his own live
> Body? or the fool that corrupted her own live body?
> For they do not conceal themselves, and cannot
> conceal themselves.

in *Walt Whitman Complete Poetry and Selected Prose*, Edited by James E. Miller, Jr., (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), 1959, p. 75. Norman O. Brown also advances the notion that the outward form of the body is a visible manifestation of one's aesthetic and spiritual condition. See Brown's *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press), 1959; and his *Love's Body* (New York: Random House), 1966.
9. Pink Floyd. *The Wall.* Recorded by Pink Floyd Music Ltd., lyrics by Roger Waters, 1979.
10. Littleford, *op. cit.*
11. Norman O. Brown, *Closing Time* (New York: Random House), 1973.
12. There has been a tendency to separate figures like Paine from the more "conservative" figures who acutally wrote the United States Constitution. This inquiry suggests that the separation is specious and that we explain nothing by saying we had a decline in our revolutionary temper. The "decline" was simply one inevitable outcome of an original deficit.
13. Thomas Paine. *The Age of Reason.* (New York: Modern Library), 1946.
14. I am indebted to Northrop Frye for directing my attention to this aspect of Paine's thought. Frye makes the point that such an outlook "can have no permanent revolutionary vigor, for underlying it is the weary materialism which asserts that the deader a thing is the more trustworthy it is; that a rock is solid reality and the vital spirit of a living man is a rarefied and diaphanous ghost." N. Frye, *Fearful Symmetry. A Study of William Blake* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1947, pp. 66.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Ibid*, p. 67. Such an attitude of dull mindedness leads to a dismally corrupt and decadent society which tends towards mass hyteria and war fever. This is vividly portrayed in the poem, "Jerusalem," in *Blake Complete Writings* edited by Geoffrey Keynes (New York: Oxford University Press), 1969, pps. 620-747.
17. For a succinct application of these Blakean ideas to the problems of contemporary life see: Theodore Rosak. *Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendance in Postindustrial Society* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company), Inc., 1973, p. 277. Blake expresses these ideas, among other places, in "Vala or the Four Zoas," *op. cit.* pps. 263-372.
18. This point is vividly illustrated in Blake's "A Vision of the Last Judgement," *op. cit.*, pp. 617, when he writes: " 'What,' it will be question'd, 'when the sun rises, do you not see a round disk of fire somewhat like a Guinea?' O no, no, I see an innumerable company of the heavenly host crying 'Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord God Almighty.' " I question not my corporal or vegetative eye any more than I would question a window concerning a sight. I look thro' it and not with it." '
19. This idea is also dealt with in Blake's "Jerusalem." *op. cit.*
20. *The New Science of Giambattesta Vico* translated from the 3rd edition by Thomas C. Bergin and Max H. Fisch (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1970. For Vico the origin of all human knowledge and corresponding cultural institutions is "poetic wisdom." In the new science he suggests a "tree of knowledge" whose trunk is poetic wisdom or the creative and inventive power of the human psyche (p. 72). A modern scholar, Giorgio Tagliacozzo, has taken up where Vico left off and actually constructed such a tree which, if adopted as a model for curriculum building, could be used in such a way as to make the

creative imagination central in the process of general education. For more detailed information on the tree, see: 1) Georgio Tagliacozzo, "General Education as Unity of Knowledge: A Theory based on Vichian Principles," *Social Research* (Winter 1977), pps. 768-795; 2) Michael S. Littleford. "Vico and Curriculum Studies," *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (Summer, 1979), pps. 54-64.

21. Whitman, "Democratic Vistas," *op. cit.*, pps. 460-461.

22. The God of official and orthodox Christianity was to Blake an example par excellence of false religion. Referring to this God he writes: "So you see that God is just such a Tyrant as Augustus Caesar; and is not this Good and Learned and Wise and Classical? ... For thine is the kingship, or Allegoric Godship, and the Power, or War, and the Glory, or Law. Ages after Ages in thy descendents; for God is only an Allegory of Kings and nothing else. From "Annotations to Dr. Thorton's 'New Translation of the Lords Prayer. " *op. cit.*, pps. 786-787.

23. Whitman, *op. cit.*, pp. 491.

24. This concept is developed among other places in two fascinating books. One is a relatively well known nineteenth century work which is still in print: Richard M. Bucke, *Cosmic Consciousness: A Classic Investigation of the Development of Man's Mystic Relation to the Infinite* (New York: E.P. Dutton), 1969. Bucke was a close friend of Walt Whitman's and the latter provided inspiration for Bucke's writing project. The other is a relatively recent and unknown book: Preston Harold, *The Shining Stranger: An Unorthodox Interpretation of Jesus and His Mission* (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company), 1973. Harold, like Bucke, presents Jesus as only one among several of history's great truth bearers; all of these great persons conveyed the same essential message: that the "Kingdom of God" is within each of us and that human development is arrested as long as we look outside of ourselves for a "savior" to solve our problems.

25. Vico's emphasis on man was always as more than sheer rationality or intellect. Fantasy, passion, emotion are given equal importance in all areas of human life. For instance in his education work, *On The Study of Methods of our Time*, translated by Elio Gianturco (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.), 1965, he asserts strongly that effective education must consider and address itself to human passion and sensuality.

26. Whitman, "Starting From Paulmanok." *op. cit.*, p. 18.

27. Whitman, "Democratic Vista." *op. cit.*, p. 457.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 491. In particular Rugg was inspired by Waldo Frank, Randolph Bourne, and Van Wyck Brooks.

29. Harold Rugg. *op. cit.*, p. 274.

30. *Ibid*, p. 270.

31. Harold Rugg, *Imagination* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers), 1963, p. 94.

32. Mary Daly. *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation* (Boston: Beacon Press), 1973, p. 43.

33. *Ibid*, pps. 40-42. In addition to Daly other important figures in the feminist theology movement include: 1) Sheila Collins, *A Different Heaven and Earth* (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1974; 2) Rosemary Ruether, *New Woman New Earth* (New York: Seabury Press), 1975.

34. Frye. *op. cit.*, p. 49.

35. Daly. *op. cit.*, p. 28.

36. Whitman. *op. cit.*, p. 457.

37. Frye. *op. cit.*, p. 260.

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Shaping the Educational Imagination: Class, Culture and the Contradictions of the Dominant Ideology

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Introduction

We are witness, at this time, to a rapidly expanding interest in the relationship between education and ideology. In particular, there is a bourgeoning attempt to understand the theory and practice of education by viewing it in the context of the wider system of values, beliefs, moral and aesthetic judgements that are representative of a specific society.[1] Such ideology, it is suggested, structures our understanding of the meaningof education and the practices that accompany it. While much of the analysis has claimed its theoretical origins in Marx's theory of ideology, it is my belief that much of it reflects, instead a kind of radical functionalism.[2] This notion is supported by a perspective in which it is suggested that in class-dominated societies all ways of thinking,institutional structures, and cultural products, represent the ideology of the ruling class. This has resulted, in some of the recent critical studies of education in the United States and elsewhere, that interpret the shape of education as reflecting, entirely, ruling class interests and ideologies. Indeed, some such analyses appear to bear a Marcusean stamp in their tendency to obliterate the significance or existence of any ideology but that of the ruling class. In their recent review of educational research, Karabel and Halsey argue:[3]

> "In an effort to show the role of the educational system in the reproduction of social inequality, neo-Marxists propose a theoretical framework that suggests a virtually 'perfect fit' between schooling and other major social insitutions...but the process seems to work so smoothly and is based upon such an imposing system of domination that one must wonder how it is that educational change ever takes place. For if the educational system is not only a product of a structure of class domination, but also a vital component of the process by which that structure perpetuates itself, there would seem to be no way out of a ceaseless process of self-reproduction. Precisely such a vision of endless capitalist domination marked the work of...Herbert Marcuse.

It is unfortunate that such a perspective is found not only in studies which stress the political economy of schooling (particularly 'revisionist' educational history, theories of 'correspondence', etc.), but also among those concerned with schooling as part of the process of cultural reproduction. While the latter has had the merit of stressing the mediating importance of the structuring of knowledge and symbols in educational institutions, they have still, commonly, reverted to a 'transmission-belt' view of socialization. Beginning with the work of Pierre Bourdieu there has been a tendency to view 'cultural capital' merely as the accumulated configuration of meanings, knowledge or practices of only the dominant groups or classes in society (which are then simply delivered or transmitted to members of society via agencies such as schools). It has minimized the extent to which such 'capital' is the result of a continuous process of selection, exclusion, incorporation and extirpation of meanings that arise from the entire field of human practice or experience (it is precisely in this regard that Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony is so important).[4]

The other problem with studies within the 'cultural reproduction' perspective is their reductive propensity to view the requirements of industry as directly determining "the subjective and cultural formation of particular kinds of labour power."[5] As Michael Apple notes, cultural reproduction" is not only created by the downward imposition of meanings about what important social and cognitive knowledge and values are. Imposed meanings which correspond to those required in an unequal labor market are often actually rejected

by working-class students. Because of this rejection of both the social relations of the school and its curriculum, domination and reproduction are much more subtle than we have supposed."[6]

It is important to note that tendencies towards the over-determination of culture, or over-consistency at the institutional level is not necessarily the logical conclusion of this theoretical framework. Marxist thought throughout the 20th century is replete with attempts to develop a less mechanical concept of the relations between the cultural and ideological "superstructure' and the economic 'base'. In the writings of Gramsci, Korsch, Lukacs, Raymond Williams, and others, there is a concern with the development of a perspective in which the elements of the 'superstructure' are more than mere reflexes or epiphenomena of the productive system. While culture and ideology are certainly constituted to ensure the continuation, maintenance and reproduction of the social and economic structure they cannot be understood as only reflecting the needs, imperatives, rationalizations, etc., of the dominant class/es. Following Raymond Williams we reject the view that in a class-divided society "there is a 'polarization of mental activity' around the ruling class so that if the ruling class is 'bourgeois' all the mental activity is bourgeois."[7] Thus, while recent critical scholarship of education has shed important light as the way education (as a part of the cultural/ ideological 'superstructure') functions to stabilize or reproduce a class-divided society, and maintain the basic contours of power., wealth, etc., this cannot be said to tell the whole story. Ideology – and that part of it that constitutes education – is more than a simple reflection of the ideas, beliefs, values, etc., of the dominant class or classes. It is, instead, a complex field of meanings and values which, at all times, contain responses that go beyond those emanating from one class alone. Thus, Williams asserts, that, in fact, the consciousness of a society is always more diverse, and not limited to the economically dominant class.[8] The body of intellectual and imaginative work which each generation receives as its traditional culture (and from which is constituted 'cultural capital') is always something more than the product of a single class. It will contain ideas and meanings that have survived from pre-existing forms of society, as well as including the influence of new meanings, values, and practices which are continually being created alongside the dominant culture. It is precisely this that makes the notion of hegemony, and hegemonic domination, a much more complex process than one of simple 'socialization' by the ruling class of their ideology – it involves the incorporation of diverse, sometimes oppositional, ideas, meanings, and practices.

From such a perspective, education in the United States during the 20th century, may be viewed as reflecting the complexity of competing class interests and ideologies in that society. It may be understood as operating in ways that both articulate with the needs of the economic structure, as well as in ways that may be at variance with it. Education may be seen to contain both the sum of responses to the imperatives of the productive system and the contradictory components of ideology in liberal-capitalist society. Such an approach posits a far more complex set of relations between education, ideology, and economic structure, than is suggested, for example, by the 'correspondence principle'. Education itself, may reflect the 'residues' of previously dominant ideologies; it may be part of the present ideological matrix in which control and domination are founded; and it may also represent the arena in which such control is resisted and alternative world-views proposed.[9]

In attempting here to relate particular configurations of education to ideology we have utilized a sociology of knowledge methodology. Following Marx we have taken as a starting point the notion that in class differentiated societies ideologies take on a class character. Thus different views are developed by the members of different social classes because of their differing ways of obtaining a share of the social wealth, their differing roles in the social organization of labor, and their differing mutual interests.[10] Following Gramsci we believe that it is more accurate to recognize the existence of a 'hegemonic' ideology or culture, within which alternative modes of thinking, social relations, values, etc., develop in opposition. Our approach is also influenced by the work of the French Sociologist Nicos Poulantzas who, following Althusser, asserts that economic, social, political and ideological instances' are 'only in the final analysis' a determined part of the whole. In the immediate sense, each of these elements possesses a degree of autonomy, a life of its

own. No element merely reflects or responds mechanically to another. Contradictions and conflicts are a far more ubiquitous aspect of the social system than correspondence. Poulantzas argues that in addition to the dominant groups, the interest of subordinate groups also interact with and impact, the social policies of the state. From such a perspective education in the United States may be viewed as a far more complex structure than both 'correspondence' and 'cultural reproduction' theorists might admit.[11] Such a view is reinforced by Poulantzas' claim that the "dominant ideology does not simply reflect the conditions of existence of the dominant class... It is often permeated by elements stemming from the 'way of life' of classes or factions other than the dominant class or faction."[12]

From the above, education in the United States might be best understood, not as reflecting the interests of one social class (commonly, in 'revisionist' history, the industrial middle class), but as the response to a complex and heterogeneous configuration of elements – including ideologies that are 'residual', 'emergent' as well as presently dominant. It is suggested in this paper that the structure of education in this country can be understood not only as a response to middle class interests and ideology, but also to surviving 'aristocratic' traditions (albeit, 'imported' ones), as well as reflecting aspects of the ideologies of lower middle-class, working class, or other subordinate groups. Thus, for example, while the transformation of education into a commodity, exchangeable in the market for money and prestige, is a quintessential reflection of bourgeois ideology, we may also note the persistence of an aristocratic 'residue' in American education. The notion of the 'Harvard Man' and other elite educational identities (similar to graduates of 'Oxbridge' in England, or the 'Grandes Ecoles' in France) signify the continued existence of such an ideology which imputes not only intellectual superiority but also moral superiority to an exclusive social group.[13] In addition, and as we shall see at greater length below, the 'residual' aspects of the present culture are also manifested in the continued (though, of course, eroded) attachment of education to notions of a general curriculum and liberal studies; the configuration of the academic curriculum: and the exclusive nature of school as the site for educational experience.

In this paper then, education is viewed as the effect of specific ideologies – ideologies which represent the 'world views' of particular social classes or groups. Such an approach was earlier suggested by Raymond Williams in his study of competing ideological impulses in the history of English education. While the concerns of such an approach are potentially immense, we have restricted our discussion to a particular aspect of educational practice – that which reflects the consequences of the social division of labor. While education is considered here in the context of specific ideologies, we are also concerned with the interaction of those ideologies, and their educational consequences, in the present era. Such an approach, it is hoped, will contribute to a genuinely dialectical understanding of the theory and practice of contemporary education.

Culture and Civilization - The 'Aristocratic' Influence

The separation between the experiences of the everyday or material world, and those associated with education received its first theoretical formulation in ancient Greece and reached its most extreme form in the English Public Schools (where any activity considered remotely vocational was an anathema). While it is an educational form that is closely associated with the ideology of an Aristocratic social class, it is still a fundamental characteristic of American education. Experiences that provide the matrix for education are held not to occur in the world of work, of community, political life, or family, but behind the doors of special institutions. The organizing principles of academic knowledge underline its separation from human experience and 'everyday' social reality – its compartmentalization and structuring, its abstractness, and the reliance on literacy and symbolic experience.[15] School itself often appears to represent the antithesis of genuine human activity. The experiences of the classroom are almost always vicarious, symbolic, and abstract – 'make believe' activities in a 'make believe world. Indeed, despite the current popularity of 'correspondence' theories in which home, school, and work, are viewed as providing an essentially unified or corresponding set of experiences, it is clear that for many, if not most students, the experience of school is one of massive discontinuities. It is pervaded by the feeling of its 'unrelatedness' to the life of the individual.

Nor should the phenomenon be limited to the domain of the poor or working class. It is increasingly an overtly displayed symptom of middle class youth.[16] For many students it may be the essential discontinuity of experience, not 'correspondence' that marks the relation between life at home, at school, and at work. Despite the often stultifying and alienating nature of work, for many, it is preferable to the unreality of the classrom. Such a perspective also makes clear the infinite preferability of young people to television as a medium of communication over the textbooks of the school room. As Caleb Gattegno expresses it; it is "a medium that brings home life in the raw, not signs and symbols that one has to interpret."[17] Or, at least, it appears to do so.

The distinction between 'educational' and 'non-educational' experiences rests on the separation (suggested by theorists of the Frankfort School) that has historically existed between man's activity in the realm of 'culture' and that in the realm of 'civilization.'[18] While the latter contained activities in the daily round of existence (work, community, family, etc.), the former was viewed as representing the crystallization of man's imaginative efforts to grasp the nature of our social and natural world. Such a distinction forms a central element in the account of the history of modern culture given by Herbert Marcuse. In what Marcuse calls the period of affirmation, a sharp distinction was developed between the mental and spiritual world on the one hand, and the material world on the other.[19] This rift in an intensifying form is characteristic of bourgeois culture. As it does so there is an increased need to express this inner dimension in external social life – a goal that is, within bourgeois society, impossible to attain: "The concept of the soul in its romantic version becomes the concept of that portion of the personality which strives to fulfill necessarily unexpressed and unacheived disires. The soulless regions are the regions of material life; the soul seeks an ideal beauty and an ideal happiness which cannot be real. When finally the bourgeoisie are only able to preserve their own social and economic order by politicizing it through and through and subjecting the individual wholly to the demands of that order, then the realm of the inner in which the individual has preserved a small area of private freedom from the external demands of bourgeois life must come under attack."[20]

It is also a distinction made by Raymond Williams between culture as a body of intellectual and imaginative work (what is sometimes referred to as "high" culture), and the term used in its anthropological sense, and as a whole way of life.[21] The limited definition traditionally applied to culture, has its origins in the historical separation between mental and manual activities. This separation was underpinned by the division of society into classes. Those occupying the dominant social positions applied a hierarchical value structure to the activities performed. The practical and functional were separated from, and relegated in status to, intellectual and aesthetic concerns. The notion of culture was attached to the latter activities, while the former – the material reproduction of society – assumed the character of a commodity, engendered contempt, or sometimes paternalistic concern.

Education reflected these distinctions in its abstract, scholastic separation from activity and experience in the real world. While the individual in bourgeois society was constantly having to engage in tasks that would legitimate his position, the aristocratic 'gentleman' was able to command deference from social inferiors not for what he did, but for who he was – an individual 'cultivated' by his exposure to the intellectual and aesthetic experience of 'culture'. Such experiences constituted a realm entirely distinct from those contained within 'civilization'. Where the influence of aristocratic ideology has survived, the important characteristic is the notion that the educational institution (school, college, university) provides a set of experiences (the transmission of 'culture'), that enable the graduate to command deference from his social subordinates, not simply for what he can do, but, more fundamentally, for who he is. It is, to this day, quite enough to have gone to Yale, or be a 'Harvard Man' to claim ones social position. What is of the essence here, is the type of person emerging from these institutions, not the vocational credentials he carries. As we shall see below, this is only the extreme expression of the more pervasive ontology associated with 'being educated.'

Writing in "Democracy and Education," Dewey summarized the separation we have described in the following way:

"Of the segregation in educational values...that between culture and utility is probably the most fundamental. While the distinction is often thought to be intrinsic and absolute, it is really historical and social. It originated so far as conscious formulation is concerned, in Greece, and was based upon the fact that the truly human life was lived only by a few who subsisted upon the results of the labor of others... It was embodied in a political theory of permanent division of human beings into those capable of a life of reason and hence having their own ends, and those capable only of desire and work, and needing to have their ends provided by others. The two distinctions, psychological and political, translated into educational terms, effected a division between a liberal education having to do with knowing for its own sake, and a useful, practical training for mechanical occupations, devoid of intellectual and aesthetic content."[22]

While little remains of the aristocratic notions of a liberal education devoted to 'knowing for its own sake', where education is traditionally conceived of in its developmental (i.e., non-vocational) sense, it is sought, not in the world of our 'everyday' social experience, but in an academic curriculum which provides experiences sharply separated and qualitatively distinct from it. The consequence of sharply differentiating 'educational' from 'non-educational' knowledge has been explored by some of those associated with the 'new' British trend in the sociology of education. Michael Young, one of the initiators of this school, has argued that one must reject:

> "the assumptions of any superiority of educational or 'academic' knowledge over the everyday common sense knowledge available to people on being in the world. There is no doubt that teachers' practices...are predicated on just the assumption of the superiority of academic knowledge that is being called into question."

It is argued that by ensuring that educational experiences are seen as neither readily available or accessible (i.e. except through specialized agencies—predominately, those of the state), education may be used to restrict or regulate the entry of individuals into the class structure. The hierarchical arrangement of educational experience facilitate the unequal distribution of cultural 'capital' and the reproduction of the division of labor. As Young and others have documented, activities that are most dependent on manipulation of abstract symbols ('bookish' knowledge) and furthest removed from applied or actual field experience, are generally characterized by the most status (e.g. the superior prestige of theacademic curriculum over vocational areas such as home economics, technical drawing etc.). At the simplest level, even out of school excursions—field trips—are generally conceived as expendable or frivolous educational activities—'add-on's' to serious school work.

While its effect on curriculum is of undoubted significance, the separation of 'culture' and 'civilization' has, in my belief, implications for education even more consequential than those perceived by the British sociologists. It butt resses the separation of activities undertaken for their intellectual, aesthetic, or 'self-actualizing' values, from those 'merely' utilitarian or functional. It underpins the view that what exists for the majority of us as the daily round of human activity (work, etc.) can be of little or no educational value—tasks that are predominately instrumental, rather than socially or personally enriching. It is a view that has supported the historically impoverished nature of much human activity and experience. The overcoming of the separation between 'culture' and 'civilization' would require a radical extension of educational experience into everyday life. Education would need to become coterminous with our wider social experience so that activities which comprise our economic, communal, familial, or political life would be pursued, fundamentally, because of their self-determining or self-actualizing possibilities. In seeking to implement a radical extension of educational experience into everyday life, we would need to reconsider the structure of our soical institutions: work, for example, which is for the majority of people, no more than

an instrumental activity, would need to be reorganized to ensure its creative and developmental possibilities; politics, likewise, which for the most individuals is represented by the perfunctory experience of the ballot box would need to become an on-going participative process. In this respect, the argument for the democratic management of our social and economic institutions becomes increasingly an educational one. The emphasis in the organization of such institutions would move from a concern with efficiency and bureaucratic rationality to the possibility of providing experiences that are intellectually, aesthetically or emotionally enriching.*

While the legacy of aristocratic ideology has been the continued separation of 'culture' and 'civilization', it has also provided a notion of the former that claims a comprehensive view of human knowledge or understanding. It is a view that is reflected in a holistic educational perspective. It eschews narrow understandings or specialized concerns. While the content of curriculum following from such a perspective has been, and persists in being, one of contention, a view of 'all-round' human development informs it. It is a belief that has placed it, at times, in the same camp as progressive educators struggling to stem the tide of vocationalism and utility. This is particularly apparent in the current effort to maintain a commitment to a 'general' or liberal-arts curriculum in higher education in the face of increasingly functional and utilitarian demands. While the decline of the liberal-arts tradition may be documented, it should be emphasized that the erosion of the general curriculum does not indicate the total demise of the influence of aristocratic ideology on education. Such an influence is located in the more fundamental division of 'educational' from 'non-educational' experience—what Norman Birnbaum describes as the radical break between familial routine, daily human contact, work,—and culture. It has made culture (and, we may assume, education) "something narrowly symbolic—devoid of an infusion of instinctual energy and lacking an emplacement in routine." He continues: "The development in the family, neighborhood and workplace of partial or limited systems of meaning, often without direct relationship to the larger structures of society or the movement of higher culture, has had terrible consequences. Precisely as higher culture has been infinitely more complex, more inhabitants of industrial society have become culturally more constricted or impoverished. The theoretic possibility of a qualitatively new human mastery of the environment remains. In practice, the higher culture which could liberate new potentials is encapsulated in forms of organizations which effectively deny the possibility."[24]

Education for 'Life' and 'Culture' — the Bourgeois Compromise

As we have indicated, the use of bourgeois ideology, and its philosophy of utilitarianism, have had a fundamental effect on the nature of education. There has been a relentless movement towards a specialized, vocational, and instrumentally oriented curriculum and pedogogy. This movement has formed the cornerstone for the studies of the revisionist historians in American education. At the same time, however, the notion of a school system in which the curriculum, through differentiation and specialization, has become entirely utilitarian or functional, appears not to be entirely accurate. American education, for example, has never approached the kind of specialization found in European education. While in no way ignoring the social selection process characteristic of American schools, this is a far more generalized differentiation than the close articulation with specific occupations intended by those corporate leaders and sympathizers described, by Joel Spring, in his history of education in the early 20th century.[25] Indeed, if we are to

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*In an unpublished manuscript, Richard Rapacz notes that a learning theory was of the very essence of Marx's notion of a humanized society. The humanization of society meant the distribution of experiences to each individual so as to ensure the fullest development of abilities, needs, and potentialities. It is significant, however, that Marx contended that it would be the society of abundance that 'would resolve the problems of distributing experiences because consumer and citizenship responsibilities would be of more importance than production responsibilities once were, in an age of scarcity. Abilities would be shaped and produced in individuals according to their needs.'

judge by the present level of demand to make education 'useful', to introduce 'applied' studies, and to teach job and 'life' skills, the school curriculum is still far from being entirely utilitarian. Nor has the school very successfully articulated with the occupational structure.[26] Despite the introduction of institutions such as the junior high school, and vocational guidance, described by Spring as part of an accelerating process of differentiating students for occupational purposes, it is clear that the needs of the corporate structure have not been the only determinant of school organization, curriculum, etc. The 'career-education' movement of our own era is but one more attempt to 'solve' the perennial 'problem' of the under— and over-supply of skilled or professional workers.

A fundamental problem in the analysis of Spring and other revisionists is the absence of a dialectical perspective in their studies. The overwhelming impression is of a mechanical determinism where each aspect of the educational system is the mirror image of the economic structure. There is little sense of the way in which educational ideas in the era of bourgeois domination contain contradictory ideological impulses. Thus, for example we may note that out of the ideology of liberal-capitalism emerges not only the 'corporate' ideas of Herbert Croly but also the radical-liberalism of T. H. Greene. Indeed, much of the revisionist scholarship overlooks the centrality of the bifurcation in bourgeois ideology—a separation that is rooted, ultimately in the class divisions of capitalist society. The tensions that result from these are manifest through the structure of society, and have formed an enduring aspect of the social and political history of our civilization. While, as is well known, the bourgeois class came to power with the demands for individual freedom, democratic rights, and equality, such demands rapidly became the nemesis of a part of that class which had more to gain from an authoritarian and hierarchical stabilization of the existing contours of power, wealth, opportunity, etc. In our own era of monopoly capitalism important transformations of bourgeois ideology have taken place so as to ensure its continued congruence with corporate needs and goals. Central to these has been the ascendance of a calculative-instrumentalist rationality, and a version of individualism that is expressed through success in climbing the bureaucratic occupational ladder.

At the same time, however, such versions of bourgeois ideology have not been exhaustive. Petty bourgeois demands for independence, and a freedom unfettered by social institutions (usually those of the state rather than business), has continued to be a constant theme of American social life. Indeed, as a number of recent writers have suggested, the period of the 1960's has given a powerful and enduring impetus to such tendencies. Notions of individual autonomy, anti-bureaucratic values (e.g. 'humanistic' concerns with the 'whole person'), self-sufficiency, and expressiveness, have become increasingly pervasive aspects of the contemporary culture.

In what ways such tendencies are related to the social class nature of the society are unclear. Certainly, however, the recent emergence of a massive social category (called by Goran Therborn, the 'new' petit bourgeoisie) employed in white collar and professional roles in the bureaucratic structure of both government and business may be an important ingredient in this development. The peculiarity of this social and occupational group is that it is composed of individuals whose educational preparation and professional socialization has raised expectations of work in which notions of autonomy, flexibility, self-regulation, and personal 'growth' are significant features. Such notions have often been sharply divergent from actual experience in bureaucratic settings—frequently characterized as manipulative, rigid, authoritarian, and unfulfilling. While the individuals in this category readily classify themselves as middle class, their growing emergence may well lead to a continued exacerbation of the tensions that are a part of bourgeois culture or ideology, and increasing contradictions in the expectations of schooling. Such contradictions are already apparent in the political domain where there is evidence of a breakdown in some of the typical 'left' and 'right' ideological categories.

The ideology of contemporary society thus maintains a demand for educational activities that are both corporate—integrative and also enhance the 'free' development of the individual. To ignore the chronic

demand by educators for 'individualized curriculum', and a pedagogy that is organized around notions of 'individualization,' is to lose sight of an important and permanent tension in American education—one rooted in the bifurcation of bourgeois ideology and the structure of class society. This tension might go some way in accounting for the differences in climate between schools at different levels—for example the more child-centered elementary school versus the bureaucratic high school. The former, with its greater distance from the occupational structure, having secured a more developmental orientation, while the latter is compelled to emphasize the calculative and institutionally integrative. The pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey may certainly be understood as the quintessential attempt, in liberal-capitalist society, to resolve the contradictions between education's corporate-integrative and individual-developmental impulses.

In the enthusiasm to subsume all aspects of education under the needs of the corporate economic structure, it has been found necessary to dismiss important, if less tractable, phenomena. Education is viewed solely in terms of the 'process of school' (or what is referred to as 'the hidden curriculum'). Little effort is made to demonstrate how the traditional academic curriculum (certainly a central aspect of educational practice) corresponds with the needs of corporate capitalism.[27] It would be difficult, I believe, to demonstrate such a correspondence. While it is clear that education in the United States does, certainly, reflect the dominant bourgeois ideology, its character cannot be understood as a mere reflection or epiphenomenon of it. As we have earlier argued, education, like other social practices, contains not only responses to the dominant ideology but also ones contained from 'residual' ideologies, as well as emergent ones. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the technical tracks of the comprehensive high school, or in the vocational school itself. These institutions represent anomalous and generally inefficient attempts to resolve contradictory ideology demands. While, on the one hand, they come closer than the academic curriculum to providing real activities and genuine experiences to students, they are still encapsulated in organizational forms that ensure that they are no more than simulations. It is a clear consequence of the division of labor andthe separation of 'culture' and 'civilization'. It is this separation which compels all that is designated as 'educational' to be located in socially-isolated institutions. It is clear that if the issue were merely one of technical skill or proficiency nowhere would surpass actual field training. Indeed, given the rapid rate of technical change, only at actual field sites is it possible to receive the kind of 'state-of-the-art' experiences that are immediately useful.[28] In short, the purpose of the vocational track or school is not so much technical training as it is socialization of individuals towards their (inferior) positions in the social division of labor. The status differentiations between vocational and academictracks is reflected in the low morale and apathetic . attitudes so characteristic of technical or trade schools. This viewpoint is proposed by the French Sociologist Nicos Poulantzas in his analysis of schooling and the division of labor. The main purpose of the capitalist school, he says, is "not to 'qualify' manual and mental labor in different ways but far more to disqualify manual labour (to subjugate it) by only qualifying mental labour."[29] While schools divide students between those fit for mental work and those suited to manual labor, training for the latter does not really take place: "The worker does not acquire his basic professional training and his skills in school (they cannot be 'taught' there), not even in the streams and apparatuses of technical education. What is chiefly taught to the working class is discipline, respect for authority, and the veneration of a mental labor that is always 'somewhere else' in the educational apparatus."[30] Poulantzas argues that the vocational training prgrams in schools (which in all countries are overwhelmingly filled with the children of working class families) are far less effective as actual programs of technical preparation than as means of reinforcing a particular ontology. They legitimate the differences between those with or without the capability of engaging in 'mental labour'. In short, most of what goes on in school via the curriculum does not represent a direct training for work—but is intended to locate an individual on one side or the other of the mental/manual division of labor.

It is clear that in the distinction that the present process of schooling makes between mental and manual labor, and the hierarchical value system it embodies, the system of education inbourgeois society maintains and continues the heritage of previous ideologies. In particular, it perpetuates the separation between 'culture'

and 'civilization' inherited from aristocratic ideology. It is, however, an impoverished notion of 'culture' laying only hollow claim to providing acomprehensive understanding of the human polity. The formal system of education reflects this notion in the increasing loss of conviction that surrounds its claims to provide intellectual, aesthetic, moral or other kinds of development. Education in its cultural or development sense has become little more than the "inculcationof a series of rituals, secrets, and symbolism...whose main purpose is to distinguish it from manual labour."[31]

Goran Therborn discusses these notions and its implications for the capitalist organization of work. He says:

> The principles of capitalist organization of the work process were formulated with unsurpassed candor and explicitness by Frederick Taylor, architect of the so-called Taylor system of 'scientific management': 'The manager assumes...the burden of gathering together all of the traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the workmen and then of classifying, tabulating and reducing this knowledge to rules, laws and formulas.... All possible brainwork should be removed from the shop and centered in the planning or lay-out department.'
>
> It should be noted that this subordination is quite distinct from the pre-capitalist, feudal or mandarin, contempt for manual labor. What the bourgeoisie sets against it is not possession of general 'culture', good breeding or manners, but specific mental activities—mental labour.[32]

The Radical Response—Unifying 'Culture' and 'Civilization'

In an earlier paper exploring the relationship in the U.S. between radical movements, ideology, and educational ideas, this writer had argued that during periods of profound social upheaval a 'radicaleducational mode' emerges which challenges the dominant educational beliefs.[33] Such, I believe, is the case during the early decades of the 20th century, as well as during the period of the 1960's and early 70's. I have suggested that the particular structure of educational ideas that emerges may be understood as the expression of an ideology which isconcerned with the establishment of equalitarian social relations; the democratization of power, resources and culture; and emphasizes the value of social solidarity and collectivism. While such ideology has traditionally been associated with working class movements, it is clearly not limited to them (it may also, for example, be identified with the student movement of the 1960's). The 'radical educational mode' is evidenced, I believe, in a number of other situations, such as the Leninist period of the Soviet revolution, in France—in 1968, during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and generally where there is a profound challenge to institutional hierarchy and social inequality.[34]

It is suggested that the structure of educational ideas that emerges as a product of such situations contains (among other things) the following elements:

1. Change in the rigid separation of education and other human activities, i.e. the attempt to move educational experience out of the classroom and into the activities of work, community, politics, family, etc.
2. Related to the above point, abstract ('bookish') knowledge and the unrelatedness of academic concerns are challenged by forms of knowledge grounded in daily life and common experience.
3. The notion of education as primarily non-vocational, having a broad 'humanistic' concern (i.e. not a training for technical or professional skills).
4. Education as the means of producing a wider social consciousness and cultural 'understanding'.

For those operating within the 'radical educational mode', the activity of work-place, home and community become important experiences of the educational process. The classroom is no longer an exclusive or even superior repository of educational knowledge. Such a perspective is the effect of egalitarian values which compels the transformation of our understanding of culture—and, as a result, education. In situations

where there is a movement to limit or eradicate hierarchical social relations, there is, at the same time, an inevitable challenge to the prevailing notion of culture. No longer is it identified only with the intellectual and aesthetic concerns of a minority, but is perceived as representing (in Freire's words) all human creation. Culture exists, then, wherever man makes the world the object of his knowledge, submitting it to a process of transformation, altering reality. The workshop as well as the museum become repositories of culture. Culture, and education, become synonymous with the entire range of human activity and social experience. The street, the factory, and the town-hall become included as the loci of culture, and are the legitimate sites of educational experience. Education in the 'radical mode', unlike previous traditions, no longer reflects or affirms the distinction (opposition) between 'culture' and 'civilization'. It represents, instead, its synthesis and unity.

The 'radical educational mode' reflects a resistance to the ontological effects of specialized, and fragmented social experience (leading to, what Marx so quaintly refers to as 'bourgeois idiocy'). It aims at an education that will encourage the 'all-round' development of the individual. In this important sense, such an education represents a return to the aristocratic tradition of a 'humanistic' education.* It is a break from the instrumental, technicist, and specialized notions of education that reflect bourgeois ideology, with it s emphasis on 'basics', 'competencies', and vocational training. It is, for the 'radical mode', a belief that the majority of people are able to overcome the fragmentary experiences of their society and develop a comprehensive understanding of the human polity; a sense of the interdependent nature of society and social activity. In 1901, May Wood Simons, writing in the International Socialist Review, asserted:

"The School today is an unnatural life caluclated only to prepare one for future work. It has no relation either with home or society... Today so called education ends with the classroom instead of all life being an education... For education to be of value it must present a unity in the thing taught.... The pitiable ignorance of our city population of anything to be found in the country and of our country fold of great manufacturing establishments of the majority of our whole population of any part of actual life outside the narrow confines of their own work, must be a source of wonder to future generations...."

Conclusion

While in this paper we have accepted the notion (apposite to Marxist theory) that the structure of education in any society may be understood as embodying the dominant ideology, this we believe, tells only part of the story. Unlike explanations that utilize a 'correspondence' theory of education, or some variant of it, educational practice here is believed to contain not only the ideology of currently dominant interests, but also the influences of ideologies that are both 'residual' and 'emergent.' In short, we have rejected a crudely materialist view of ideology that sees it as merely the epiphenomenon of the dominant economic class, and one in which the experience of other social classes or groups find no expression at the level of ideas, values and meanings. Education in the United States, we believe, can only be adequately understood as the result of a complex interaction of ideological perspectives and influences. This, it must be emphasized, is not to deny the validity of the work of revisionist historians in revealing the way in which a bourgeois class has come to have a central influence over education in the U.S. Such a understanding, however, must be set beside the influence of other social groups in the forming of American education. Such groups may form part of the 'power bloc' that dominates society, or (to a much more limited extent), be part of the subordinate social strata.

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*While some aristocratic associations may seem paradoxical, notions of a 'harmonious', well-rounded' individual resonate strongly with the image of 'socialist man' – this image is reflected in the writings of Marx, Owen, Morris, Mao, and others. In China, following the Cultural Revolution, the principle of 'all-round' development is emphasized. Each person is encouraged to develop morally, intellectually, and philosophically.'

Notions of education that are rooted in aristocratic values and beliefs form an almost undeniable aspect of American education. The liberal arts and academic curriculum, and the moral superiority associated with certain kinds of educational experience, provide continuing evidence of its presence. Recent attempts at Harvard, for example to revive the 'Great Books' tradition (in the face of the overwhelming movement toward specialized and professional training) speaks to the ability of groups within the 'power bloc' to spurn (at least temporarily) some of the more pervasive ideological tendencies. Indeed, paradoxically, it represents an assertion of their own social superiority . At the other endof the spectrum, an active radical tradition is only weakly in evidence. Nevertheless, among students a hostile rejection of schooling (particularly, secondary schooling) continues to pervade American education. Vandalism, violence and apathy continue unabatedly in the nation's schools. Such 'unconscious' radicalism provides the catalyst for deschooling propositions like those recently formulated in the reports of the National Panel on High School and Adolescent Education, or in the Carnegie Commission on Secondary Education. While such propositions undoubtedly reflectthe movement toward a more vocationally-oriented education, they also reflect a growing recognition of the limits of schools as the matrix of educational experience. Partial deschooling (and the use of the wider social environment as the locus of education) is clearly sought as a matter of expediency (in the face of mass dissatisfaction and alienation among students). It may also, however, represent the initial (if grudging) acceptance of the need for a radical redefinition of the nature of education in the United States. At the wider level it is clear that the social and economic crises of the 1960's and 1970's are manifest in the intensified struggle of social classes around educational goals. The present movement to restore 'basics' in schools, implement 'competency' testing, etc., may be understood as the bourgeois (or, more correctly, petit-bourgeois) attempt to re-assert the traditional promises of the division of labor with it's clear hierarchical separation of mental and manual work. Such a separation is founded in the school's selection and affirmation of those individuals apparently possessing the capability for intellectual labor (and, of course, the exclusion and denigration of those lacking it). It is, of course, precisely upon such distinctions that the fortunes of the 'new' petit bourgeoisie ride (in particular, their 'special' capability for white-collar or professional work). The present educational reaction is spurred, in part, by the economic crisis which has left an 'over-production' of educated candidates for white-collar and professional positions—an economic crisis that has plunged schools into what Habermas calls a 'crisis of legitimation.' It is significant, however, that the petit-bourgeois reaction to the legitimation crisis of schooling more commonly describes the issue in terms of the erosion of educational standards—i.e. a breakdown in the traditional measures of ability (which have underpinned the school selection process and consequent social division of labor), rather than in terms of the economic crisis itself.

The 'back to basics' movement is thus supported by an ideology which resists a critical social or political perspective, preferring, instead, appeals to 'traditional' (or reactionary) notions of the 'corrupting' effects of 'progressive' or 'radical' educational demands. In this, however, it is not altogether incorrect in the assessment that such demands may, indeed, undermine the epistemological bases of the division of labor. Whether through the demands of working class groups (in the U.S., usually minorities) for a curriculum that more nearly addresses their own particular cultural experience, language needs, social concerns, etc., or as a result of the demand by sections of the middle class for more 'individualized' or more 'open' educational experiences, the traditional bases of school selection (uniform measures of comparison of 'ability', common understandings of 'success', 'failure', etc.) are indeed threatened.

It becomes clear then that the struggle for 'educational standards', 'relevance' in curriculum, 'individualized' pedagogy, etc., are intimately connected with the ideological struggle among social classes, and fractions of classes, centered around the issue of the social division of labor. All of this must be set within a framework in which the present fiscal crisis of the state is necessitating a massive withdrawal of capital from social and educational expenditures. Actions which may indicate a declining sense of the significance of traditional forms of schooling among, at least, a part of the dominant economic groups in the society.

Nevertheless, while educational policy-making remains the prerogative of a select group within the professional and social hierarchy of the country, it also represents, in my belief, the response to an agenda set, in part, by those excluded from these groups. While public policy may reflect the attempt to ensure conditions that maximize the resources and power of those occupying the ruling circles of the society, such policies have historically needed to take into account the experiences and demands of those excluded from these circles. Such a perspective does not argue for the existence of a balance of counterveiling power. We are under no illusions about the relative inequality of power among those setting public policy. It does, however, assert the need to understand education (and other areas of public policy) not as the consequence of the unchallenged and unyielding dominance of any special group, but as the effect of the ongoing struggle between classes, interests, and ideologies.

FOOTNOTES

1. The attempt includes a diverse set of intellectual perspectives and concerns including those encompassed by studies in the 'Hidden Curriculum', the 'Revisionist' work in educational history, the 'Reconceptualists' in curriculum theory, and the 'new' sociology of education in Britain.

2. For a further consideration of the tendency see the author's forthcoming paper, "Functionalism, Ideology, and the Theory of Schooling: A Review of Studies in the History of American Education," *Paedogogica Historica,* Vol. 21, No. 2 (1981).

3. Jerome Karabel and A. H. Halsey, *Power and Ideology in Education* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 40-41.

4. For an excellent discussion of this see Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," *New Left Review,* No. 82 (Dec. 1973).

5. Quoted in Michael Apple, "The New Sociology of Education: Analyzing Cultural and Economic Reproduction," in *Harvard Educational Review,* Vol. 68, No. 4 (Nov. 1978), p. 497.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 497.

7. Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780-1950,* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 273.

8. For a synthesis and development of thse ideas see, R. Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford University Press, 1977).

9. Such an approach attempts to utilize Williams' notations of 'residual' and 'emergent' cultures.

10. M. C. Cornforth, *Dialectical Materialism: An Introductory Course* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1952).

11. For an elaboration of the position see the author's "Education and the State in Capitalist Society: Aspects of the Sociology of Nicos Poulantzas," *Harvard Educational Review,* Vol. 50, No. 3 (August, 1980).

12. Nicos Poulantzas *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books and Sheed and Ward, 1973), p. 203.

13. For an excellent discussion of Aristocratic ideology and education see R. H. Wilkinson, "The Gentleman Ideal and the Maintenance of a Political Elite," in P. W. Musgrave (Editor), *Sociology, History and Education* (London: Methuen, 1970).

14. R. Williams, *The Long Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

15. This formulation of the organizing principles of academic knowledge is drawn from Michael F. D. Young (Editor), *Knowledge and Control* (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1971).

16. "School is not as 'real' as work, which means that one can be less responsible and adult-like in School because 'School is not the point of life,' – work is." Quoted in report on 'The Crisis in Minnesota Classrooms', by Dennis Schapiro in *Mpls., St. Paul,* Sept. 1980.

17. Caleb Gattegno, *Towards a Visual Culture* (N. Y.: Avon Books, 1969).

18. A theme that has formed an important element in the Frankfurt School of Social Research's critical theory view of culture. See for example Theodore W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *Aspects of Sociology* (Boston: Beacon, 1972), esp. Ch. VI.

19. Such ideas were originally formulated by Marcuse in a number of papers published between 1934 and 1938 in the *Zeitschrift fur Sozial forschung* – Journal of the Institute of Social Research. The ideas constituted a first statement of the thesis which informs the whole of his later work.

20. Alasdair MacIntyre, *Marcuse* (London: Fontana, 1970), pp. 14-15.

21. Williams, *Culture and Society*.

22. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961) pp. 260-261.

23. Richard Rapacz, "The Growth of English Education and the Birth of Socialist and Marxist Theory of Education" (Boston University: unpublished manuscript).

24. N. Birnbaum, *The Crisis of Industrial Society* (Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 136.

25. Joel Spring, *Education and the Rise of the Corporate State* (Boston: Beacon, 1972).

26. For some further discussions of this see, for example 'Correspondence' in *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (May, 1976), pp. 234-245.

27. The limited (and, I believe inadequate) response to the nature of the curriculum is expressed in the statement of Bowles and Gintis that "one is struck more by the irrelevance of the material than by its utilitarian value" in *Schooling in Capitalist America* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 168.

28. Joan B. Garrard, "Vocational Education: Changes Needed in the 1980's" (Unpublished paper, University of North Carolina at Greensboro).

29. Nicos Poulantzas, *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975) p. 266.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 266.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 268.

32. Goran Therborn, *What Does the Ruling Class Do When It Rules?* (London: New Left Books, 1978) pp. 43-44.

33. H. Svi Shapiro, 'Radical Movements, Ideology, and the Sociology of Educational Ideas,' *Social Praxis*, Vol 6/3, No. 4. (1979).

34. See, for example, Stephen Castles and Wiebke Wustenberg, *The Education of the Future* (London: Pluto Press, 1979), or H. Svi Shapiro "Education and Ideology: A Sociological Study of Educational Thought in the American Radical Movement, 1900-25" (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Boston University, 1978).

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AIRLIE 1983

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Body and Soul: Sources of Social Change and Strategies of Education†

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In the past decade, the United States has experienced a deepening economic crisis and a decline in the quality of life (Castells, 1980). The search for security in material reward and in cultural meanings which offer consolation for material deprivation and uncertainty speeds up and appears in a caricatured and bifurcated form. Careerism in work and fundamentalism in belief are the most evident expressions of the frantic fashion in which individuals try to solve dilemmas posed by the current character of social change.

The social theory of education, despite its claim of detachment as science or critique, is an integral part of these social and cultural changes. The liberal or progressive view of faith in education as the basis of social reform developed during an earlier period of social expansion and belief in a democratic culture (Welter, 1962; Wexler, 1976). The current view of education as cultural reproduction began as a critique of the liberal social theory of education. Cultural reproduction theory belongs to a later time, when commitment to a common culture has become less tenable as a result of the salience of social fragmentation and class division. The most insightful intellectuals see prevailing social arrangements and patterns of culture as partial, deceptive, and socially oppressive. Withdrawal of faith in education is an aspect of this more general removal of commitment from a system of symbolic interpretation that has lost its claim to universality and its capacity to compensate for socioeconomic deprivation with cultural consolation. Cultural meanings, and the institutions through which they are transmitted, are identified with social domination. The intellectual work of this period is the work of the critique of culture as ideology, and the demonstration of ways in which the acceptance of ideology in general, and through schooling in particular, blocks the realisation of the interests and needs of deprived, and potentially ascendant, social groups (Young, 1971; Brown, 1973; Bourdieu, 1977; Apple, 1979a). This disenchantment is connected to an affirmation, among intellectuals, of the endogenous cultures of the oppressed as more authentic and socially accurate than the official culture. It is also marked by a withdrawal of faith in cultural institutions which become identified with social class domination, and begins to seek a social basis for the future outside of cultural institutions such as schools (Bowles & Gintis, 1976).

But the cultural reproduction view, though it has provided valuable criticism of education, is as inadequate to the demands of the current crisis as the liberal view which it supplanted. Though cultural reproduction shows how a suppressed class is created through education, it fails to develop an alternative, liberating perspective, an alternative cultural basis for meaning and personal identity (Dreier, 1980). The open mass withdrawal of commitment to the prevailing culture—which takes a variety of uncertain, ineffective and distorted forms—makes the intellectual pronouncement of cultural reproduction appear redundant and irritating.

Here, I wish to discuss a third possibility—a critical theory of education, which moves the study of education away from cultural reproduction to cultural change. First, I will review the divergent trends of Marxism—Gramsci, Trotsky, and the Franfurt school—which are the historical forebears of a critical theory of education opposed to the cultural reproduction view. I will then apply these strands of Marxist theory to the current cultural crisis. Finally, I shall attempt to develop a positive alternative for curriculum in the schools—as an aid to the development of social change movements.

There is an element of romanticism in the vision of education which I am about to present. I share with Buber (1963, p. 157) the feeling that:

> The goal is greater than mere liberation. It is a regeneration of the very being; it is an inner renewal, a rescue from physical and spiritual deterioration, the turning from a fragmentary, contradictory existence to a whole and unified way of life; it is a purification and redemption.

But a romantic element is I think a proper part of a theory of education. It is a refusal to continue the bourgeois disjunction of the "freedom of the soul" and "...the poverty, martyrdom and bondage of the body" (Marcuse, 1968, p. 109), in favour of an integral vision: body and soul.

Foundations of a Critical Theory of Education

The dominant theoretical tendency at present in the critical social theory of education has stressed the extent to which education is social structurally determined, the depth of the operation of cultural domination through schooling, and the ways in which the culture and microstructure of the school enables perpetuation of the macrostructural functions of capital accumulation and social legitimation (O'Connor, 1973; Bowles & Gintis, 1976). These initial insights are then modified. The central tenets in the model of a political economy of schooling and of class cultural rule by the transmission of ideology as educational knowledge, are significantly qualified. The concept of the totality is replaced by an awareness of relative institutional autonomy. Structural integration gives way to the description of internal contradictions (Wexler, 1979). Domination is mitigated by study of class conflict and student resistance within the school (Willis, 1977; Apple, 1979b). From this perspective, the sources of social change are found in an historically unfolding set of structural contradictions located primarily in the economy, in the contradictory character of capital, and also in the cultural autonomy and resistance of a working-class culture against a hegemonic middle-class school culture. While the empirical work necessary to develop this paradigm has only just begun, it is already possible to note its neglect of the historical character of capitalist development; an elaboration of the specific ways in which working-class cultures are or can be mobilized into an effective resistance and opposition; analysis of the macrostructural and historically changing relationship between cultural and economic patterns. On the whole, however, the school remains, in this view, embedded within the larger dynamic of reproduction.

Marxism is a divergent tradition. Here I will summarise the historical predecessors of a critical theory of education. I must emphasize that it is not my intention to counterpose a group of 'true' Marxists who provide the foundation of critical theory with a group of false Marxists who provide the foundation of cultural reproduction. Marx himself was sharply sarcastic about the search for forebears (1978, p. 595):

> And just then they seemed engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something entirely new, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle slogans and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language.

But he also recognized the positive side of such activities (1978, p. 596):

> The awakening of the dead in those revolutions therefore served the purpose of glorifying the new struggles, not of parodying the old; of magnifying the given tasks in imagination, not of taking flight from their solution in reality; of finding once more the spirit of revolution, not of making its ghost walk again.

In reviewing some of the divergent trends of Marxism, my intentions follow the second quote, not the first. I wish to magnify and sharpen the alternative to a cultural reproduction theory, not refute it by a recourse to 'ghosts'. Further, the discussion of divergent views in Marxism represents an attempt to develop dialogue, not an effort at refutation: the cultural reproduction view of education, and its alignment with

the structuralist tradition to which I oppose myself have in recent years developed an interest in previously neglected cultural phenomena. And the tradition which I affirm, critical theory, has sometimes considered the possibilities of emancipatory education while ignoring the social basis for cultural awareness and pedagogy, its actual mode of production.

At their extremes, each of these tendencies represents, theoretically, the current popular caricatured separation of work as careerism and values as fundamentalism. Against the automatic laws of motion of capital are placed noble cultural aspirations. Production is raised against belief, necessity against freedom. The relative merits of materiality and spirituality are debated, but now in the language of social science. This theoretical repeat of the split between the language of the body and the language of the soul, between what exists and what is possible, helps block conscious initiation of effective collective action. For such action, while it moves toward the realization of the cultural goals announced by the emancipators, always moves from some concrete place. Social and educational change is, as in Buber's description of creative education, "bound up with history and tradition".

To go beyond the present situation, we require a dialogue between cultural reproduction theory and critical theory, and a concrete analysis of the possibilities of social change. The seemingly orthodox answer to the question of the cultural basis of social change is that the working class, as the historically ascendant social group, embodies in its own everyday practices the cultural vision for a future society. If this were so, then the task for education would be to foster the articulation of this historically progressive culture, and to prevent its encapsulation within the falsely universalistic culture of the decadent class. The analysis of working-class cultural expression in the school, the identification of the means for its elaboration, and the destruction of the culture which contains and suppresses it, would be a first task. For this view, the current emphasis on working-class 'resistance' within the schools is correct, and should be theoretically and practically cultivated. The tradition which harbours the future is already contained in the superior vision of the most oppressed. Lukacs (1971, p. 21) believed that orthodox Marxism itself is working-class culture: "Historical materialism grows out of the 'immediate, natural' life principle of the proletariat..." While he admits of some reservation on this point, I think it is fair to argue that in general Lukacs saw in proletarian life conditions and culture not merely a valourized cultural formation, but the only one capable of grasping historical social reality—a culture whose free enactment coincides with the transformation of the entire social structure:

> Thus the unity of theory and practice is only the reverse side of the social and historical position of the proletariat. From its own point of view self-knowledge coincides with knowledge of the whole so that the proletariat is at one and the same time the subject and object of its own knowledge. (1971, p. 20).

The proletariat is the universal excluded class, and with the realization of its practical freedom and cultural expression, class itself is abolished and the new order initiated.

Gramsci

It may be disputed whether Marx shared this faith in the unfettered expression of traditional working-class culture, even as an adequate point of departure in the making of social change. For, he wrote that it was only in the practical activity of revolution that this class could throw off "the muck of the ages".

Gramsci's position is less doubtful. While working-class culture contains 'good sense', it also includes much ignorance, superstition, and self-destructive folklore. Formation of organic intellectuals of the working class requires both practical activity and an education for discipline, literacy, and knowledge of classical culture as constituents of self-knowledge. While there are recent disputations about whether Gramsci

favoured a conservative social organization of schools (Entwistle, 1979; Giroux, 1980, pp. 307-315), there is no denying his belief that effective self-formation requires the integrative incorporation of the "whole cultural past of modern European civilization" (1971, p. 37).

For Gramsci, one resource of social change is the appropriation of a wider culture, and its embodiment in the self-production of people working to change their society. Education and instruction, although not necessarily bureaucratic or authoritarian schooling, includes attachment to a traditional culture as a source for cultural change. On school learning, Gramsci wrote: "It is necessary to enter the 'classical,' rational phase, and to find in the ends to be attained the natural source for developing the appropriate methods and forms" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 24). A traditional culture, 'classical culture', is a cultural resource for the reformulation of working-class good sense. Education in such a culture can provide both the vision ('ends to be attained') and cultural tools for a 'new humanism', and a transformation of everyday life.

The new culture is not, as it is for Lukacs, a reflection of the natural conditions of working-class life. On the contrary, it requires formation through a variety of educations. This view is closer to acknowledging the self-damning aspects of the working-class culture of the lads whom Willis (1977) studied than it is to any exaltation of their culture as 'resistance'. Nor does Gramsci leave much doubt on the importance of the process of appropriating existing cultures to form a new culture (Gramsci, 1971, p. 325):

> Creating a new culture does not only mean one's own individual "original" discoveries. It also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in critical form of truths already discovered (emphasis added), their "socialization" as it were, and even making them the basis of vital action, an element of co-ordination and intellectual and moral order. For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the real present world, is a "philosophical" event far more important and "original" than the discovery by some philosophical "genius" of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals.

Trotsky

Trotsky, unlike Gramsci, is little quoted by contemporary critical cultural theorists. Perhaps that is because it is more difficult to ignore how much the dynamic element of Trotsky was, as he writes, centered in politics, "but very much at the expense of technology and culture" (Trotsky, 1975, p. 189). Trotsky, whose work can less easily be historically abstracted, provides an even more forceful instance of the view that the development of a new culture requires the appropriation of existing, bourgeois, cultures. The new culture is hardly a simple, natural expression of the culture of the proletariat. First, cultural change requires the mass diffusion of existing culture (Trotsky, 1975, p. 193):

> The main task of the proletarian intelligentsia in the immediate future is not the abstract formation of a new culture regardless of the absense of a basis for it (emphasis added), but definite culture-bearing, that is, a systematic, planful and, of course, critical imparting to the backward masses of the essential elements of the culture which already exists.

Secondly, the creation of a new culture includes no simple-minded reflection of bourgeois culture as 'hegemonic', nor a negative interpretation of what is fashionably now called cultural reproduction (Trotsky, 1975, p. 191):

> Our epoch is not yet an epoch of new culture, but only the entrance to it. We must, first of all, take possession, politically, of the most important elements of the old culture (emphasis added), to such an extent, at least, as to be able to pave the way for a new culture.

Thirdly, historical materialism is not the inevitable expression of the proletariat. On the contrary, this fundamental theoretical cultural tool of major social structural transformation, this cultural material force in history, this world-historic example of the importance of culture in the process of social change, is created in the process of appropriating a traditional, namely, bourgeois, culture (Trotsky, 1975, pp. 196-197):

> Marx and Engels came out of the ranks of the petty bourgeois democracy and, of course, were brought up on its culture and not the culture of the proletariat. If there had been no working-class, with its strikes, struggles, sufferings and revolts, there would, of course, have been no scientific Communism, because there would have been no historical necessity for it. But its theory was formed entirely on the basis of bourgeois culture both scientific and political, though it declared a fight to the finish upon that culture (emphasis added). Under the pressure of capitalistic contradictions, the universalizing thought of the bourgeois democracy, of its boldest, most honest, and most far-sighted representatives, rises to the height of a marvelous renunciation, armed with all the critical weapons of bourgeois science. Such is the origin of Marxism.

Fourthly, the current fetishization of working-class culture generally, and in schools, as 'resistance', has its precursors in the claims of the Russian 'Proletcult', or proletarian culture movement. But to Trotsky, this appeal to authenticity, as a legitimation of the progressive character of working-class culture, unnecessarily restricts the horizons of future cultural development to the low current standard of a class struggling for material survival. Against the ideal of the authenticity and superiority of working-class culture, Trotsky (1975) writes (p. 209):

> "Give us," they say, "something even pock-marked, but our own." This is false and untrue. A pock-marked art is not art and is therefore not necessary to the working masses. Those who believe in a "pock-marked" art are imbued to a considerable extent with contempt for the masses...This is not Marxism, but reactionary populism...

Fifthly, and most important, the appropriation of existing cultures is necessary to the construction of a future in which proletariat culture does not simply supplant bourgeois culture, but ceases to exist. The aim is not the circulation of classes and their cultures, but the end of all classes. Toward that end, a 'cultural apprenticeship' is necessary (Trotsky, 1975, p. 225): "This class (the proletariat) cannot begin the construction of a new culture without absorbing and assimilating the elements of the old cultures."

The Frankfurt School

Neither the critique of cultural knowledge as ideology, nor the idealization of a working-class culture, nor the simple assertion of emancipatory belief, can provide a theory of education for social change. A recognition of the dialectic of culture is required. The third stream of the critical tradition, which insists on maintaining a complex tension between materialist and idealist moments, the Frankfurt school, offers insight into this dialectic.

Bourgeois culture is, according to Marcuse, an affirmative culture. It contributes to social reproduction not simply through its contents. Education is not just an indoctrination in false consciousness as cultural reproduction theory charges. Rather, the repressive aspect of bourgeois culture is its function, which diverts cultural goals from realization in concrete social relations by assigning culture to a transcendent and segregated realm above and beyond everyday life. It encapsulates cultural goals as high culture and permits, in daily life, the uncritical acceptance of the status quo.

When education contributes to social reproduction, then, it is more by the ephemeral place which it assigns to culture than by the simple fact of class-cultural transmission. Cultural education qua 'culture', "surrenders", as Marcuse writes, "the earth to bourgeois society and makes its ideas unreal by finding satisfaction in heaven and the soul..." (Marcuse, 1968, p. 100). Not the content of bourgeois culture, but its use as sublimation and substitution for embodiment and realization in actual social relations, is the path by which culture prevents change and contributes to social reproduction. The "freedom of the soul" is an excuse for "...the poverty, martyrdom, and bondage of the body" (Marcuse, 1968, p. 109). The "idea of love" prevents the overcoming of competitive individualism and isolation by "real solidarity" (Marcuse, 1968, p. 111). Beauty is identified with an abstract, illusory idealized form, rather than concrete enjoyment and sensuous pleasure.

But the dialectic of this sublimated, socially affirmative culture is that by the enthronement of its social failures as consoling ideals, affirmative culture and art offers a 'counter-image' to existing social reality. This counter-image provides the "critical and revolutionary force of the ideal, which in its very unreality keeps alive the best desires of men (women) amidst a bad reality..." (Marcuse, 1968, p. 108). It contains, as Marcuse writes, with customary poetic underlining, "...not only quiescence about what is, but also remembrance of what could be...it has planted real longing alongside poor consolation and false consecration in the soil of bourgeois life" (Marcuse, 1968, pp. 98-99). This traditional European culture, even during the bourgeois epoch, gives a vision of the possible from which social reality may be critically grasped and surpassed. "The task to be accomplished", Horkheimer & Adorno wrote as late as 1944, "is not the conservation of the past, but the redemption of the hopes of the past" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972, p. xv).

The pedagogic question of how such a vision can be communicated in the midst of social relations which continually disconfirm it, and what the social and educational conditions are which turn affirmative culture into a critical force, was resolved for the Frankfurt school by the events of history. With the spread of the commodity-form as the organizing principle of social life, and the development of a one-dimensional institutional structure which flattens social contradictions and absorbs all opposition, the social means for the realization of the ideals of affirmative culture recedes from historical view (Marcuse, 1966). Not only does the social structure prevent realization, but the ideals themselves, the cultural traditions which provide a vision for social change, disappear. The traditional cultural basis for hope, opposition, and change is itself destroyed. There is no traditional culture to progressively appropriate, as Gramsci and Trotsky thought possible earlier in the century. Even further, the very dispositions and capacities which are necessary to appropriate such a culture, not to speak of realizing it socially, are receding from reach. We enter a period of barbarism, which is expressed in the Soviet empire as totalitarianism, and in the West, in the one-dimensional, commodity society.

It is not simply that truth is no longer an end in itself, or that objective reason, the shaping of social relations according to valued ends, such as justice, is replaced by subjective, instrumental, calculative, and adjustment-oriented reason. Rather, it is that thinking, thought itself, as the conceptual moment of distance from what is, the cognitive means to go beyond the opacity of 'fact', to its historical production and future transcendence—this thinking is so much transformed into adjustive, instrumental calculation that there is no time or inclination for distance from the immediate field that is necessary to create concepts (Horkheimer, 1947). Thought that is socially rooted in momentary conforming adaptation can apprehend, classify and calculate. But it loses the capacity for synthetic construction and the imagination of what is not fact. Thinking splits into cliche on the one hand, and an imitation of the machine on the other (Horkheimer, 1947, p. 56, 1972, p. 25):

> Thinking in itself tends to be replaced by stereotypical ideas. Thinking objectifies itself to become an automatic, self-activating process; an impersonation of the machine that it produces itself so that ultimately the machine can replace it.

Thinking is instrumentalized by its absorption into, and mimesis of, the social necessities of commodity production. Critical reflection, contemplation, indeed, even the desire for meaning, which rests on an aspiration for the contextualizing of fact and experience in relation to some totality, are sacrificed. They give way in the force of surplus mastery, the destructive domination of nature, an internalization of corporate efficiency logic as thought, and the use of subjective reason to maximize social 'fitting-in'. Spontaneity, joy, sensuality, the very instinctual, bodily bases of cultural hopes, our human claim to happiness, and the moving force for social tranformation, are destroyed by the rules of abstractness and extrinsicality which typify the dominant mode of social relations: "No object has an inherent value; it is valuable only to the extent that it can be exchanged" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972, p. 158). Neither culture nor language can provide the tools for transcending a society where the very goal of individuation itself, "has at last been replaced by the effort to imitate..." and where "...the most mortal of sins is to be an outsider" (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972, pp. 156, 150).

The dialectic of affirmative culture collapses with the rise of the culture industry. Culture 'amalgamates with advertising'. Discourse is 'sales talk'. Words are 'trademarks'. Language is used not for elaboration, but as an 'incantation'. The possibility of a thinking, feeling, imagining, creative subject is reduced to 'shining white teeth and freedom from body odour and emotions'. Culture is brought down to earth as an ancillary of commodity capital. The possibility of final transcendence is transformed into a constant series of cultural initiation rites, by which the individual attests loyalty to the system. In so doing, the self is abolished. Culture is supplanted by the commercial propaganda of advertising. In this view, the prevailing cultural dynamic is not class-cultural reproduction, but cultural destruction, and the translation of all the potentially critical elements of traditional cultures—the cultural 'means of resistance'—into the affirmative language of the commodity.

The stand to be taken against such a world is no longer the appropriation of a traditional culture and the struggle to enact its hopes as social reality. Instead, individuality can be preserved by negation, by a refusal to participate. The best that can be hoped for culturally is to preserve the counter-image inherited from the past. The effort to develop motivation by which to effect social change as a redemption of cultural promises gives way to a need only to conserve the hopes of high culture against the corrosiveness of mass culture. The role of the intellectual is reduced to archivist, preserving cultural vision as a record for some future time after the contemporary barbarism has passed. The sad irony of the Frankfurt school is that the critical theorists who sought to develop the dialectical, contradictory core of historical-materialism concluded that history has flattened the contradictory dynamic of change. The social analysts who saw beyond the economist tendency of European Marxism to acknowledge the creative role of culture and the psychological bases of social change, ended by documenting the incorporation of the psycho-cultural dimension as another moment of domination. "The realm of freedom", Horkheimer (1978, p. 221) concludes, "is the backwoods. Those who remain loyal to theory are a remnant...".

Critical Theory and the Present Conjuncture

Despite the brilliant insights of the Frankfurt School, their vision of contemporary society has, fortunately, not come to pass. The contradictory character of social organization has not given way to complete integration and incorporation by a barbaric social order. Cultural meaning is not simply a vehicle of social domination. There are increasing attempts to create new cultural meaning rather than passively absorb the dominant culture. The sources of these attempts, and the possibility for social change, are based in a society which requires contradictory social patterns for its maintenance. The sources of social change are in a social condition which in the asymmetrical and unsynchronized character of this society, unintentionally brings forward and activates the human capacity for interpretive, symbolic, cultural activity as a necessity in the production of individual identity and social legitimation. The 'need for meaning' is neither the historical constant suggested by Weber (1946, p. 281), nor is it historically extinguished by commodity-

logic as Horkeimer & Adorno (1972) believed. Rather, such a need changes, historically, according to the inherent contradictions and disjunctions of the social formation. To fulfill the promise of a critical theory, we need an analysis of current social contradictions.

I can, of course, only sketch the nature of current social contradictions in this paper. In critical theory, the fundamental contradictory social tendency is between the social and the private. The conditions of modern production are social and cooperative, yet the appropriation of the result of production remains private. This contradiction, which is daily enacted in the structurally antagonistic relation between labour and capital, is, of course, the most coercively defended and culturally well-obscured social contradiction of capitalism. One path toward its popular acknowledgement and toward an understanding that a social arrangement like this inhibits social progress and deforms individual development, is in first naming less mystified social contradictions. There are some contradictory tendencies that are readily recognized by those who enact them because they are closer to the surfaces of everyday knowledge, commonsense and conscious interest. Some contradictions are experienced as well as enacted.

These are 'psychological problems', and problems which resonate to the dominant ideals of the culture. One can treat these problems—more salient to the individual—first, communicating the specific connections between personal stress, conflict, ambivalence and socially patterned contradictions. The ultimate aim of such understanding is to demonstrate that the full realization of culturally patterned, personally held, and viscerally experienced ideals cannot occur without restructuring the patterns of social organization which produce ideals and desires, and simultaneously frustrate their realization.

Take for example, the ideal of individuality and self-realization. The competitive individualistic grid placed upon the organization of social production, the dominant popular belief in a utilitarian imagery of a market of free individual exchange, and the ideal of self-gratification in the character of the consumer, are all sociocultural patterns which reinforce the ideal of individual self-realization. Despite the enormous cultural effort to avoid under-consumption through the social production of consumers, the "sales effort" (Baran & Sweezy, 1966, p. 112) of advertising, and also schooling (Larkin, 1979), the social site for primary identity, for individual self-realization, remains work (Moberg, 1980). For the 'new working class' this is expressed in the model of the career. But important segments of this new class of professionals, like the older working class, now face an increasingly uncertain market for employment, and a heightened rationalization of work practices. The continuing need for capital accumulation through exploitation, the current "fiscal crisis of the state" (O'Connor, 1973), and the stagflation of the "second slump" (Mandel, 1978), seriously affects this new, professional, relatively unorganized group.

The social service sector, which once provided opportunities for this rising class-segment, is a place where ideals of individual self-realization are especially task relevant and culturally acceptable. Yet, it is precisely in the social service scene where rationalizing, hierarchizing, standardizing and routinizing practices, along with budget cuts attendant upon the fiscal crisis, are particularly felt (O'Connor, 1973; Castells, 1980, p. 162). Thus the anchoring of a cultural ideal of self-realization in work is contravened by the expression of economic contradictions as imbalances in labour force supply-demand ratios (job insecurity), and a more rationalized and constrictive organization of the workplace.

Individual responses to these developments include re-evaluating the ideal, and searching for extra-work gratifications, as adaptations to the identity problems generated by a changing and contradictory social organization of work. The magnitude of these problems, and the depth of the psychological malaise which results, leads also to institutionally sponsored efforts to solve them. Such, for example, is now the case with teachers. The National Education Association reports that in 1980 41% of teachers say that they would not enter their professions again, compared to 19% just four years ealier. The NEA further reports that it has instituted 'stress workshops' for teachers, and that it "can't keep up with the applicant demand"

(The Wall Street Journal, October 14, 1980; p. 1). The structural blockage to a realization of a cultural ideal is experienced as psychological stress. The institutional response, in this culture, is the therapeutic solution.

But it no longer suffices. Increasingly, employers and the scientific consultants, driven by the goal of increased social productivity for private profit, begin to locate the problem of productivity in individual dissatisfaction with a de-skilling (Braverman, 1974) and alienation in the organization of work (Shepard, 1977). Elements of social restructuring, such as job-enrichment, flexi-time and even some workplace democracy, are now offered as goads to productivity and profit. Indeed, freedom in work does improve individual satisfaction and productivity (Moberg, 1980). Castells (1980, p. 58) describes the contradiction between the social conditions of innovation and the hierarchically social organization of production. He notes (p. 57):

> In other words, the process of technological innovation can only be effective under conditions of production that evade capitalist logic...It implies, primarily, that there must be a great deal of initiative in the process of production, which basically contradicts the model of authority in the organization of a capitalist firm.

The social situation of employees in the social service sector, such as teachers, and the demands of technology are both relevant to the cultural ideal of self-realization and freedom. The ideals of individualism and the experience of work are familiar. But, the cultural work of developing knowledge that a realization of other ideals may require social restructuring is more difficult.

In the United States, for example, the ideals of community (Slater, 1970) and internationalism are not as deeply internalized as individualism. It is less obvious how the social production of community can be separated from current tendencies toward imperialism and corporatism with which it is structurally linked—separated to then be developed as a distinct social alternative. The present national and international industrial agglomeration heightens economic, social and informational interdependence. It produces the social conditions that might serve as the occasion for awareness of a human community. But, this awareness currently remains partialized, and fragmented according to private interest and socially outmoded parochialisms.

The unintended creation of the material basis of an international human community by the economic-military imperialism of the Eastern and Western blocs is paralleled by less global contradictory tendencies which press forward the possibility of community. For example, a major psychological problem is the experience of loneliness and isolation (Lowenthal et al., 1975). At the same time, the social relations of interdependence and cooperation which already exist, are structured in a divisive and disconnecting way. The corporate and privatized structuring leaves both the social bases of community and their potential to alleviate the experienced problem of loneliness and isolation undeveloped. Pervasive individualistic ideologies block recognition of the relation between potential social relations that can meet the vaunted need for intimacy, and cultural taboos against 'collectivism'. Such taboos, which are an intentional part of the sales effort, suppress the social restructuring that could realize the possibilities of community already contained within individualizing corporatism.

One further brief example of contained contradictions derives from Marcuse's analysis of the appropriation of eros through repressive desublimation, its transformation into an attribute of commerical products, and the simultaneous rationalization of play (Goodman, 1979) as 'fun' (Henry, 1963) and 'leisure' (Aronowitz, 1973). This systematic appropriation suppresses the possibility for the actualization of eros and play within social relations. The expression of these possibilities is currently increasingly removed from the range of a broad-scale realization in everyday life. This occurs not only by socially patterned compartment-

alization and fragmenting surplus specialization, but also by the translation of a cultural ideal into an assimilable, but opposite form. Freedom becomes consumption.

In each of these examples–self-realization, community, and play–mass personal stress occurs because the social arrangements which might alleviate it, and for which a social basis already exists, remain undeveloped in the face of the opposing conventional, dominant and culturally buttressed, social tendencies. Self-realization is falsely inhibited in the name of efficiency, community in the name of national, corporate, and tribal interest, and play in the name of leisure-as-consumption.

Cultural Mobilization and Education

Knowledge of alternative social and cultural possibilities within the present social order is a necessary condition of social change. An additional requisite for effective change is to make the cognitive connections between individual problems, their social sources, and the existence of social resources which can lead to their solution. But social change does not occur merely by articulating contradictory social tendencies, or even by showing that alternatives are possible which can meliorate individually experienced problems. Social change also requires a reorientation of personal commitments, collective changes in ways of being and seeing. I believe that to accomplish this also requires a process of cultural mobilization.

Social formations are reproduced and maintained because people are attached to their routines as elements of their self-constitution and identity. Even in the face of cognitive counter-evidence, they continue to try to solve problems in customary ways. Unconscious commitments, as well as rational cognitions, connect the self to the social. Organized, mass, social changes occur when existing social arrangements are experienced as hopelessly unsatisfying and unrewarding to such an extent that people withdraw their emotional, as well as their cognitive, commitments from the social relations in which they ordinarily constitute themselves (Wallace, 1956). Such a change is also painful, because it includes a self-denial, a renunciation of social identity to pursue untried and unfamiliar solutions.

This is not the kind of change usually described as evolutionary, adaptive change, or as the cumulation of a small-scale changes, or as immanent societal development (Moore, 1963; Appelbaum, 1970). Rather this type of change has more in common with collective action and social movements (Wallace, 1956, 1961; Smelser, 1963).

There are several reasons for using collective behavior as a model to describe change. If we are indeed living in a period of socioeconomic and cultural crisis, then the type of social changes which are likely to occur have more in common with historical crisis behaviours than with ordinary social change processes. More importantly, collective movements are a possible model for a radical pedagogy. Rather than document the kinds of social and cultural reproduction which currently occurs in schooling, or argue, in the tradition of liberal educational faith, that the task of schools is to provide equality of opportunity, I am suggesting that schools can provide a basis for cultural change.

My intention is to ask what education would be like if collective movements for social change, which usually orginate and make claims outside of established cultural institutions, were instead to be developed within existing institutions. What would education be like if the dynamics of cultural revitalization movements, which Wallace (1956, p. 25) describes as "...deliberate, organized, conscious efforts by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture", became the model for pedagogic activity? I recognize, of course, the existing structure of interests and controls which makes such a transformation of education quite difficult. But I also recognize the possibility and need to construct at least the pre-conditions for social change within existing social institutions.

A collective change movement requires, first, a personal experience and a social sharing of dissatisfac-

tions and unmet needs. Our cultural ideal of self-realization, which places a premium on need gratification and eschews suffering as a moral virtue, makes it easy to find such dissatisfaction. Secondly, knowledge of alternatives and belief that these alternatives can be brought into being decreases willingness to accept frustrating conditions as inevitable. The development of an understanding of social contradictions as alternatives is then a resource in the sequence of producing change. Thirdly, there is a long initial period of "cultural distortion" (Wallace 1956, p. 269). Early attempts to find new solutions are often very limited, regressive or self-destructive. Current patterns of social 'deviance' would suggest that we are now in such a period of partial, personal, and regressive solutions to the collective problems posed by the ascendence of the less progressive aspects of contradictory social tendencies. Fourthly, the early false starts toward cultural mobilization are usually followed by some reformulation of existing social resources as a new cultural vision. Traditionally, this vision begins with the religious inspiration of the person who then becomes the leader of a movement. If, however, cultural norms inhibit traditional authoritarian individual leadership, and if social conditions produce a mass of individual selves with open boundaries, then it is possible for new cultural visions to be developed simultaneously as a collective vision (Wexler, 1981a). If the movement succeeds, social relations are indeed reorganized to meet individual needs more effectively and to generate continuing commitment to the new ideals and social arrangements. The success of the movement is followed, according to Weber (1946, p. 245), by institutionalization, and the "routinization of charisma" into either a traditional or rational-legal basis of authority.

The point of this sketch is that the development of change from a base of contradictory social tendencies is not automatic or inevitable. The individual dissatisfaction produced in the current crisis, for example, is only an initial condition for the realization of existing alternative social possibilities.

I am suggesting that social transformation requires a process of cultural mobilization. In this process, cognitive understanding is combined with experienced individual frustration, and an emotional and imaginative commitment to a sociocultural alternative. Cultural revitalization movements, which are ordinarily religious movements led by a single individual, are an example of a process of basic cultural reformulation and the accomplishment of new commitments. These movements provide an ideal-typical model for cultural change. The question is whether they can also serve as a model for education as cultural change.

Towards a Pedagogy of Mobilization

It seems far-fetched or romantic to suggest that mass collective change movements could indicate an alternative pedagogy. We are accustomed to thinking of public education as socially neutral and social movements as intensely partisan. But, what the ideology-critique of educational assumptions (Curti, 1935; Wexler, 1976) and the cultural reproduction approach to education (Apple, 1979) have accomplished is to make it more difficult to believe that schooling is now, or ever has been socially disinterested and culturally neutral. The issue is whose cultural vision is being implemented, and whether it is possible to replace an institutionalized dominant vision with an alternative, through an intra-institutional process of reorganization.

Unlike the traditional model of individually led change movements described by Weber (1946), Wallace (1961) and Smelser (1963), Buber sees the creation of the cultural change which occurs in education as a collective, cultural act (Buber, 1963, p. 151):

> Neither the will nor the imagination of an individual, even of a genius, produces these patterns. They express the deepest life of an entire epoch, and its character and desires at the same time.

In the description close to the view that education is an aspect of a cultural movement, Buber (1963, p. 154) indicates that the content of education changes with the development of the collective movement:

> National education is true creative education as long as it strives toward a certain ideal pattern of a human being, the pattern of the liberator. But when liberation has been effected, the ideal pattern fades and national education ceases to be true creative education. So if education wishes to remain faithful to its task, and not decay into nationalistic convention, it must set itself a new and greater purpose. The educators cannot think up this purpose. They can, however, derive it from the super-national norm of their own national movement, a **norm which must now be developed and expressed particularly in education.** (emphasis added)

Our contemporary 'supra-national norm' can, I think, be found among those elements of traditional and bourgeois cultures that critical theorists aimed to appropriate by and for a rising class, in part, by means of education. The concrete cultural content of this 'supra-national norm' is found in the redemptive hopes of bourgeois culture, and in the critical skills necessary for their social realization. The theorists of the Frankfurt School believed that these hopes and cultural skills were being driven from the stage of history by the ascendence of the commodity society. On the contrary, I think that cultural desires and social patterns, like self-realization, community and play, exist now as the suppressed aspects of contradictory social tendencies. If, in the present historical conjuncture, the possibility of realization is in the appropriative, collective, democratic transformation of existing cultural institutions, from the centre, then mass education can become creative cultural activity.

For education to function as a medium of cultural mobilization, it would have to include elaboration of cultural goals and provision of skills necessary for their realization. If schools were to become a site of cultural mobilization, then they would include, as the foundation of curriculum, stages of collective cultural movements. The path of education would then be modelled on the path of collective social action.

First, this would mean that a primary pedagogical task is the production of self-awareness (Pinar, 1975). Personal commitment to a social alternative which experienced deprivation makes possible, does not become an effective individual motive as long as awareness of deprivation is blocked by repression, ignorance, and sublimated self-expression. The uncovering of socially enforced individual repression by pedagogic intervention is the beginning of a process of need articulation necessary for cultural mobilization. The articulation of individual needs is then redirected, by a cognitive social pedagogy, to collective historical experience and to the relevance of braod-scale social rearrangements.

Development of this social understanding entails a danger of jettisoning the personally concrete for the conceptually abstract (Pinar, 1980). Abstract assertions of critical terminology like class, contradiction, or totality as curriculum concepts do not by themselves produce cultural mobilization directed toward social liberation. Education for social understanding means to develop the use capacity to process information through the filter of these organizing concepts (Wexler, 1981b). The development of critical social concepts and their transformation into aspects of identity and self-constitution requires communication, in a language of social explanation. The development of a language of social understanding means more than the construction of a conceptual social grid. It also facilitates the acquisition of empirical, concrete knowledge. Commitment to ideals of self-realization, community and play, and to the language of social attribution and understanding, which is a means towards their realization, is incompatible with social ignorance. Communication of social understanding also implies a repertoire of emotions. Without empathy, social understanding also implies a repertoire of emotions. Without empathy, social understanding remains formalistic and unattached to the particular life of the other that stands behind a vitalizing general social language. Without hope, the capacity to imagine social alternatives is a head-game, lacking force and true self-engagement.

These aspects of cultural mobilization—experience and articulation of needs, cognitive social understanding, and communication—can be seen as the first part of an agenda for curriculum. The crucial creative

stage in cultural mobilization is the production of a new cultural vision. "Mazeway reformulation" (Wallace, 1956) requires a cognitive capacity for conceptual switching or information reframing. Where education is a medium of cultural mobilization, gestalt-learning and conscious contextualizing of discrete information within a totalizing, but differentiated frame, would be practiced. Cultural visions have also to be legitimated and translated into more familiar and engaging terms. The process of legitimating vision implies an education for an awareness of the values of others, not as pure tolerance, or compartmentalized values-clarification, but as an appreciation of social biography. New cultural visions become popularly transformative when they are embodied in instrumentally effective, practicable forms of social organization. Without the learning of social practicality, cultural vision remains aloft in heaven and hidden in private soul, and so functions as a bourgeois affirmative education (Marcuse, 1968).

Conclusion

The cultural reproduction view has enabled us to document aspects of cultural domination in education and its place in a broader dynamic of social reproduction. The present social conjuncture highlights the continued existence of social structural contradictions, and the incapacity of current arrangements to accomplish a smooth and integrated reproduction of the social formation. These failures have led, in the United States for example, to the rise of fundamentalist social movements—not to cultural reproduction but to cultural revitalization and mobilization. Rather than accept these movements as aberrations, I suggest that they reveal a possible alterative to cultural reproduction, as a practice and as a theory. The movements demonstrate that reproduction is only one type of collective cultural process. To appropriate the historical possibilities which they indicate, collective action can be explored as an alternative to the structuralist view of social dynamics, both generally and as applied to education. Here, I have offered only a beginning toward the exploration of that alternative—one in which collective cultural mobilization is moved from the periphery of an exceptional case, to the centre, as a model for understanding and affecting processes of social and educational change.

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Feminism and Curriculum Theory
Part One:
The Breaking of Attachments:
Feminism and Curriculum Theory

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Letting go––of someone or of some thing, some idea or belief or feeling––is a life task for many of us. We cling to that which is familiar or comfortable, or needed, oftentimes building convoluted rationales for our insistence on enveloping, holding on to that which we believe is love or friend or right situation. The clutching becomes part of the configuration, the space in which we try to stop the natural processes of movement and change, and in our desperation to capture the moment and to preserve it beyond time, we sometimes destroy that which is at the center of our attention. And so, we long for the awareness of when we should stay, when we should push for yet another link in the chain of connection, when we should quietly wait––or when we should let go, move on, see beyond the boundaries which may have silently encapsulated us. We understand that the letting go allows us new freedom, a chance to soar, to move and change and grow. Yet, how difficult it is to uncurl the fingers, loosen the grip, feel the last hesitant touch of the familiar as it slides from our opened hands.

We are at the moment of loosening, of letting go, I believe, in our attempts to reconceptualize curriculum studies. The focus of our reconceptualization is to understand the nature of educational experience and so we study analyze and write of theories of the reproductive function of curriculum, of resistance, of transcendence, of consciousness. Recently, issues of gender, including feminist and homosexual perspectives, have enlarged the analyses. However, much of our work remains rooted in polarity, in a tightened grip which closes around the particular perspective in a protective, isolated and sometimes defensive and defiant gesture. We are intent upon elucidating our own perspectives and are unable to loosen the grasp, to let go.

If we wish to allow a spectrum of perspectives to guide us in our movement toward a new world view, then, we must work toward the creation of inclusive and fluid ways in which we may acknowledge and embrace one anothers' rootedness and, at the same time, allow the constant movement and shifting which signals greater understanding.

The feminist perspective by no means has been free of the stasis, of the locked embrace which thwarts and stifles. In the rush to speak, to break the silences which had for so long rendered women formless as well as voiceless, the feminist movement created polarities, fear and defensiveness among women and men. Finding voice, breaking centuries of silence, many feminists fought for equality and, in the excitement of new-found essence, tightened their grasp, ironically mirroring the male prototype of power, and ultimately, control. The clutching drained energy away from the original feminist vision of a restructured world.

Betty Friedan, in her new book The Second Stage, notes the effects of that clutching, and argues for a conscious move into the second stage that may not be a women's movement, per se. She notes that men may be at the cutting edge of the second stage. Women were reborn, in effect, merely by moving across into man's world. In the first stage, it almost seemed as if women and men were moving in opposite directions, reversing roles or exchanging one half-life for another. In the Second Stage, as envisioned by Friedan, we will go beyond the either–or...to a new wholeness: an integration, in our personal lives, of the masculine and feminine in each of us in all our infinite personal variety – not unisex but new human sex. Friedan challenges us to let go:

> How do we surmount the reaction that threatens to destroy the very gains we thought we had already won in the first stage of the women's movement? How do we surmount our own reaction, which shadows our feminism and our femininity? How do we transcend the polarization between women and women and between women and men, to achieve the new human wholeness that is the promise of femin ism, and get on with solving the concrete, practical everyday problems of living, working and loving as equal person? This is the personal and political business of the second stage.[1]

So, while the femi nist perspective has included expansion as well as contraction, transformationas well as regression, there emerges from that ebb and flow a deep respect for the interconnectedness of the human experience and a faith that we can move toward that new wholeness. What Friedan envisions as the second stage and what many feminists have experienced within the paradoxical fight for equality may well serve as the loosening agent, the catalyst which enables those of us working in curriculum to let go of rigid stances and, simultaneously, to acknowledge the necessarily contradictory and polarized viewpoints which have contributed to the understanding of the diverse nature of educational experience. As we continue to enlarge our vision of the possibilities of educational experience, and as we continue to reconceptualize the curriculum field, I suggest that we look to the feminist vision as a way in which to acknowledge our uneasiness with our multiple explanations for the sources and functions of curriculum. By recognizing the uneasiness which we attach to the lack of one apparent direction or form which some feel our work should exemplify, we then may begin to let go of preconceived or limited viewpoints and assumptions. Feminists through their efforts to describe and analyze the omission of women as autonomous human beings, offer us examples of ways in which we might let go of some of the limitations imposed by compartmentalization; feminists are reconceptualizing the existence of women and are beginning to encode knowledge in a radically new way.

Dale Spender, in her introduction to Men's Studies Modified: The Impact of Feminism on the Disciplines, discusses issues which seem to be fundamental in the exclusion of women from the construction of knowledge: One is the polarized and discrete categories of objectivity/subjectivity. As Spender delineates ways in which feminists have moved from a defense of the personal to a critique of objectivity as a distinguishing feature allocated to the dominant group, she notes that women first attempted to construct new knowledge about women in the male-defined mold of objectivity. The resulting contradictions and gaps in the attempted analyses impelled, moved women into fresh ways of perceiving.

> "Women came to realize that the knowledge which men constructed about women (from their deviant physiology and psychology to the definition of women as non-workers) was frequently rated as 'objective' while the knowledge women began to construct about women (which has its origins in the role of a participant rather than a spectator) was frequently rated as 'subjective.' When men checked with men, their pronouncements were usually seen as credible, but when women checked with women, their explanations were frequently seen as illogical, irrational, emotional and liable to be dismissed by men. The hypothesis arose that legitimacy might be associated with gender rather than with the adequacy of an explanation, and this has led Adrienne Rich (1979) to comment that in a patriarchal society, objectivity is the name we give to male subjectivity. But there is a significant difference between the way men have checked with men and often presented their explanations as the complete and only truth, and the way women are checking with women and offering their explanations as partial and temporary 'truths.' These partial and temporary truths about women, which have their origin in women's experience of the world, are being fed back into the various disciplines and are changing those disciplines. And by putting women into codified knowledge, feminists have transformed not just the knowledge itself but the processes whereby knowledge is produced."[2]

I believe that in our work thus far, we have moved from the linear and compartmentalized perspectives which have characterized the traditional curriculum field. We too have altered the processes by which we perceive and conceive curriculum and the objectification of knowledge. We have challenged the very foundations of traditional curriculum by investigating the numerous aspects of the construction, organization and distribution of knowledge. Curriculum theorists have directed attention in particular to sources of curriculum from a variety of perspectives; those who work from the Neo-Marxist approach attempt to reveal the contradictions that are inherent in educational experience, and to expose the structural relations that link class interests to curriculum. Those who work within a hermeneutic framework focus upon the experience of individuals within a schooling situation and utilize autobiography as one mode of reflection and expression of what is human about educational experience.[3]

In particular, the growing body of work which attends to issues of gender and psychosexual and ecological dimensions of curriculum reflects the transformed processes which are enabling us to reconceptualize curriculum studies. Sandra Wallenstein[4] and Barbara Mitrano[5] have addressed feminist concerns in curriculum theory and teacher education. Florence Krall has explored the connections among ecological, personal and curricular concerns.[6] William Pinar, Madeleine Grumet, and Peter Taubman have examined the relations among gender, sexuality and curriculum.

Grumet, linking gender and epistemology, analyzed the psychosexual dimensions of curriculum, and elucidated ways in which curriculum functions to perpetuate the law of the father and to contradict the inferential character of paternity through control and predictability.[7]

Taubman's work, focusing upon discourse and specifically upon the "discursive analysis" of Michael Foucault as means by which to detach an interpretive system from the phenomena it supposedly signifies, explores the underlying concepts of the "feminist movement" and "gay liberation" as products of discursive systems which may become rigid and separate from the persons who are represented by such concepts.[8]

Taubman's analysis raises the question of the function of the languages which constitute curriculum discourse: his analysis extends, for example, Gayle Rubin's concern in attempting to construct a theory of women's oppression. The theory initially borrowed from disciplines created within an intellectual tradition produced by a culture in which women are oppressed, and thus ran the risk "...that the sexism in the tradition of which they are a part tended to be dragged in with each borrowing."[9] With extensions of such concern, Taubman's work forces us to examine our curricular language, our specific discursive system, as possible convoluted representation of the ways in which we name ourselves and our varied worlds.

Pinar explores Guy Hocquenghem's Homosexual Desire as extension of the gender considerations raised in the Grumet and Taubman papers. Hocquenghem focuses upon those who are on the edges of society and who, "estranged and culturally free from the mainstream, represent most explicitly 'revolutionary potential'." Pinar traces Hocquenghem's argument which draws upon as well as extends and alters Freud's interpretation of homosexual repression as essential to the maintenance and development of civilizations.

In examining Hocquenghem's work, Pinar heeds Wexler's claim that representational or correspondence theories of the curriculum function to diminish the autonomy of the subject. Pinar admits that:

> Curriculum as gender text risks this representational fallacy. To the extent curriculum is viewed as mere reflection or representation of gender, curriculum becomes of moment in a larger system, and the possibilities of anything but systematic change are obscured.[10]

Acknowledging this risk, Pinar notes that analysis of curriculum as gender text may function to make

curriculum appear "...more contingent and historically constructed, necessarily subject to political and psychological critique."[11]

He extends these possibilities by examining the oedipal status of reproduction and resistance theory in order to illuminate feminist and gender issues. Pinar situates these theories oedipally as

> The analyses of the heterosexual son as he observes how the authority of Father is reproduced and can be resisted. The oedipal function of such theory is that of the heterosexual son: the replacement, someday of Father. Heterosexual sons become Fathers, and Fathers require sons, daughters and wives, all metaphors for underclasses. Father is reproduced, regardless of the rhetoric of horizontal social relations...[12]

As Pinar analyzes the male pre-oedipal, oedipal and post-oedipal experience as precursor to understanding how male-male relations are implicated in male-female oppression, he suggests that in order to understand men's oppression of women, men must work to understand their oppression of each other.

I agree with Pinar that "men's analyses cannot be expected to coincide with women's, even if they originate with them."[13] The process of understanding, however, can be analogous to those processes undertaken by feminists. Both men and women must continue to not just accomodate one another in the analyses of gender issues in curriculum and curriculum theory, but must also work to extricate and to move beyond the patriarchal model which still characterizes education. We cannot compete with one another, or establish hierarchies which categorize one gender analysis as superior to another, for, if we do, we will only compartmentalize and ultimately eliminate the new perspectives which are only now emerging. We then will only erect larger barriers in our quest for a new world view. Men and women are now working to dismantle those barriers; at the same time, we must acknowledge the still predominant world view of educational experience. As Spender notes, "Whether it be educational theory or practice which is analyzed, it can generally be claimed that it is a product of male experience and remains firmly within male control. Patriarchy is the educational paradigm."[14]

We need to encourage one another, then, in our collective endeavors to help expand the shape of human life beyond the artificial boundaries of hierarchical and perjorative classifications. I believe that we must listen carefully to one another's analyses; heretofore un-named experiences are now being named and we must allow our new interpretations to inform and to alter not only our work within the sphere of theory but also within our daily lives. How will our understanding of the gender-related issues which permeate our educational experience ultimately change the content as well as process of our teaching, of our own lived curriculum in their varied manifestations? How will we integrate our research which points to the the underlying patriarchal system which institutionalized the behavior of women as teachers, as those capable of teaching the ABC's and the virtues of cleanliness, obedience, and respect, while men taught about ideas, and organized the profession? At the same time, how might we attend to those voices from the history of teaching, some of whom, as Nancy Hoffman reveals in Women's "True" Profession, her collection of autobiographical writing of women teachers from 1914 to 1907, chose

> Work and independence over a married life that appeared, to them, to signify domestic servitude or social uselessness. The accounts of some women tell us that they chose teaching not because they wanted to teach children conventional right from wrong, but in order to foster social, political, or spiritual change: they wanted to persuade the young, move them to collective action for temperance, for racial equality, for conversion to Christianity. What these writings tell us, then, is that from the woman teacher's perspective, the continuity between mothering and teaching was far less significant than a paycheck and the challenge and satisfaction of work.[15]

How might we hear those voices as perhaps early indications of internal resistance to the development of expected gender specific behaviors and attitudes? How might we extend our analyses of the patriarchal paradigm of education so as to acknowledge the form of the taken-for-granted as well as to respond to the spirit and courage of those women and men who struggled beyond form and propriety, beyond what Ann Douglas has termed the sentimentalization of status?[16]

There is no one way in which to approach the working through of these questions and countless more that have been raised as a result of our attempts to more fully understand the complex and interwoven nature of educational experience. If we recognize the diverse perspectives which have informed the understanding of curriculum as process and project, then we do not wish to reify a form of inquiry or a mode of awareness. I believe that feminist's awareness and acceptance of an evolving and fluid conception of educational experience, and an understanding of the uneasiness which necessarily accompanies evolvement suggest ways in which we may proceed with our individual concerns and yet reach out to receive and incorporate the visions of others.

> Because this new style is still being formed, it is not possible to categorically define it. What can be said is that it is personal and political and this constitutes a significant difference. Rather than separate the personal and political from the production of knowledge, feminists are attempting to bring them together and in this synthesis they are striving to construct more accurate, adequate, and comprehensive explanations than those which emerged under the reign of objectivity, and male supremacy. Feminists have focused on 'research on research' and been extremely critical of the way in which knowledge has for so long been presented as a fait accompli with little or no acknowledgement of the part played by the personal in the process of producing such knowledge. Instead of trying to be 'detached,' feminists are blatantly 'involved' in the knowledge which the researcher is presumed to be 'outside' the subject matter being researched, feminist contributions frequently testify to the way in which women are changed by the research process. This is a concrete example of the way women are trying to bring politics and knowledge together.[17]

To let go, then, becomes part of our work together. To let go of reservations, of isolation, of encapsulization is a frightening act, for it requires that we become blatantly involved in the living out of what we think could be. The private and silent relinquishing of attachment to a particular stance is frightening; the permanence of comfort slips from our reluctant fingers—but the possibilities that await our opened arms are infinite and beckoning. The promise is the future embrace of a new world for us all.

FOOTNOTES

1. Betty Friedan, *The Second Stage* (New York: Summit Books, 1981), p. 41.
2. Dale Spender, ed. *Men's Studies Modified: The Impact of Feminism on the Disciplines* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, Ltd., 1981), pp. 5-6.
3. William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet, "Theory and Practice and the Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies" in *Rethinking Curriculum Studies*, edited by L. Barton and M. Lawn, (London: Croom & Held, 1981).
4. Sandra Wallenstein, "Notes Toward a Feminist Theory" in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 1:1.
5. Barbara S. Mitrano, "Feminism and Curriculum Theory: Implications for Teacher Education" in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 3:2.
6. Florence R. Krall, "Navajo Tapestry: A Curriculum for Ethno-Ecological Perspectives" in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 3:2.
7. Madeleine R. Grumet, "Conception, Contradiction, and Curriculum" in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 3:1.

8. Peter M. Taubman, "Gender and Curriculum Discourse and the Politics of Sexuality," *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, 4:1, pp. 12-87.
9. Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, ed. Rayna Reiter (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975), p. 200.
10. William F. Pinar, "Gender, Sexuality and Curriculum Studies: The Beginning of the Debate." Paper presented at American Educational Research Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, April 1980, p. 12. To be printed in *The McGill Journal of Education*, Vol. XVI, No. 3.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
12. William F. Pinar, "Curriculum as Gender Text: Notes on Reproduction, Resistence, and Male-Male Relations," p. 1. *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*, forthcoming.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
14. Spender, p. 157.
15. Nancy Hoffman, *Women's 'True' Profession: Voices from the History of Teaching* (New York: The Feminist Press and The McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981), p. xviii.
16. Ann Douglas, *The Feminization of American Culture* (New York: Avon Books, 1977).
17. Spender, p. 7.

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See the inside back cover for details.

Emerging from Women's Studies: A New World View and a New Goal For Educators

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A feminist is someone who believes in change—a change in the status of women. Feminists differ, however, concerning the amount and kind of change. Therefore, among feminists there exists the whole political spectrum from conservative to radical. The need for change is clear when one examines the facts. On the national level, 51% of the population is female; yet only 1% of women hold top jobs; and 60% of all working women are clerks, saleswomen, waitresses, and hairdressers. A secretary with 13 years of education earns 38% less than a truck driver with 9 years of education; and a nurse with 14 years of education earns 5.8% less than a delivery man. For every salesman's dollar earned, a saleswoman earns $.40. On the international level, 23-33% of all households in the world are female-headed, and these female-headed families have 50% less income than male-headed families. Two-thirds of the world's illiterate people are female; 80% of the women in Asia and Africa cannot read or write. Furthermore, more than half of the women in all developing countries are anemic.

Such facts are raising women's consciousness. The existence of women's studies and the women's movement has raised many questions that are forcing more and more women to analyze and understand power—such questions as: why are there so few women in the government although53% of the voters are female; Why, though women are known for their expertise in sewing and cooking, are the top chefs and fashion designers male? Why is it that the gap between men's and women's wages nearly doubled in the last 20 years? Why does a woman earn $.59 for every $1.00 a man earns?

To explain how this unequal situation came about (where we have 51% of the population subordinated to the other 49%), several theories have been proposed. Some speculate that it was simply due to biology, to woman's particular role in reproduction and her smaller size. Without birth control, the female was extremely confined by almost constant pregnancy. Less constrained, men could be hunters and hence in control of protein, which was highly valued. They were also warriors and therefore responsible for community protection, which was of prime importance. Generally larger and stronger, the men could control the women physically—with violence, if necessary. Women today are still socialized to choose as a mate a person superior in size, education, and earning power. This sets up a situation in which the male has greater power in the relationship. In Against Our Will Susan Brownmiller suggests that men and women are unequal by "anatomical fist." Because women could be raped, they needed male protectors. Hence, women gave up power in exchange for protection. Philosopher Azizah al-Hibri explains the origins of inequality in yet another way. She points out that women had a visible connection with the future and hence immortality, because they had the power to create life and produce food out of their own bodies. But men saw themselves as having no visible connection with immortality. The male's only possible connection seemed to be through the development of culture and technology. Hence, men were motivated by "womb envy" to achieve. They felt compelled to control, master, and conquer nature. Still others propose the psychological theory that misogyny is created by the male's need at puberty to separate his male identity from his mother's female identity; to deny her power over him, he must see women as inferior. All of these theories aim to explore the origins of the patriarchal power system.

There have been few cultures, if any, that have not been patriarchies. Therefore, the women's movement seeks to change patterns of behavior and attitudes that have existed for thousands of years. The first major women's movement in the United States took place between 1848 and 1920. It was started by

women involved in the anti-slavery movement who had discovered that they were not allowed to speak in public and that while the black males could vote, no female, white or black, had that right. The more recent women's movement was begun about 1968, supported largely by women involved in civil rights and new left politics. These women discovered that they were expected to type for and sleep with the men; but, in general, they were expected to keep quiet and not assume leadership. When challenged, black civil rights leader Stokeley Carmichael said: "The only position for women in SNCC is prone." But why has the women's movement sprung up at this particular time in history? It is not very well organized; it is just happening spontaneously everywhere.

It is occurring because the reality of our lives has changed. There is much lower infant mortality; hence, women can produce fewer children to have a reasonable number survive. Rapid population growth combined with diminishing resources has led to the ideal of zero population growth. The availability of contraceptives backed by abortion has provided women with the right to choose how many children they want. The right to a college education, gained by women just over a hundred years ago, has led to higher expectations: women want to do more than spend their lives reproducing. Better medical care has led to fewer deaths in childbirth and longer lives for women. Therefore, a smaller percentage of a woman's lifetime is spent raising children. She is free to turn to other activities. Likewise, inflation has convinced couples of the need for two incomes. Finally, changing mores find divorce preferable to suffering, battering, lack of sex, or incompatibility.

The women's movement is not the cause of all these changes; it is merely the adjustment mechanism. It encourages us to alter our attitudes so that we can adjust to this new reality. But it is bringing with it much more than concepts of equal pay and equal job opportunities. It is bringing a new system of ethics, a new philosophical framework, and a revolution in epistemology. And through all of this, the women's movement has brought into being a new world view.

The development of approximately three hundred and fifty women's studies programs across the United States is an integral part of, not just a response to, the women's movement. Women's studies programs are the contribution of academic women to the national feminist goal of improving the status of women, not only in the United States but also throughout the world. There are an infinite number of ways that a woman may choose to contribute to the goal of improving the lives of women; and education, as a medium, is an obvious choice for those who have decided to devote their lives to teaching. Many academic women have found themselves motivated not only to teach but to do research about women. The ultimate aim of women's studies teaching and research is the transformation of the college or university curriculum. The existence of women's studies has encouraged faculty to include materials about women and to re-evaluate traditional content from a feminist perspective. For example, the reading of Shakespeare's Othello changes when the tragedy of Desdemona becomes more apparent. This new perspective has also led faculty to question basic assumptions in their disciplines. In psychology, for instance, should how "normal" one is be judged by the extent to which one conforms to sex roles? In sociology, should problems in the black community really be attributed to the fact that many balck males are raised in female-headed households?

Historically, universities and their courses of study were created and developed by and for men. Naturally, these academic men taught and did research from a male perspective. This perspective, like any other perspective, influenced the assumptions made, the methodologies used, and the conclusions reached. From this intellectual work emerged a set of values and a world view rooted in the male experience. Within the male academic perspective, there were variations based upon culture, religion, and other factors, but most of these men were of the same elite class. The point of view of the poor man and certainly that of the woman, the minority, or the colonized individual were omitted from the curriculum simply because representatives from these groups were not on the university faculties or among the administrators.

Out of subsequent liberation movements came an awareness of the perspectives and materials omitted from the university and college curriculums; and with the research that developed out of black studies, Hispanic studies, women's studies, and third world studies, faculty began to see how these new perspectives modified fundamental assumptions, procedures, and beliefs within the disciplines. The need not just to add to but to modify the entire curriculum became apparent. As knowledge increases or is seen differently, truth is often other than what it was thought to be. As the "truth" evolves so too do value systems and the world views based upon them.

Probably the most radical changes in the curriculum will occur because of women's studies. The introduction of feminist perspectives into the curriculum ideally brings with it the perspectives of all women—including those who are lower class, minority, gay, handicapped, or third world. It even brings with it the perspective of the men's liberation movement. Hence, the perspectives, values, and interests of all the other liberation movements are interwoven with those of the women's movement. Out of such a multi-cultural feminist perspective could emerge a curriculum that would actually encourage students to work towards the realization of equality. Mission statements might be written in such a way as to commit universities and colleges to the philosophical principle of equality. Faculty with expertise in such relevant areas as black, feminist, and third world studies could be sought for regular departmental appointments; and faculty development programs in these areas could be encouraged. What should be realized is that women's studies has set off an epistemological revolution that requires an adjustment in educational goals and in classroom and research activities within every discipline. Even more important is the recognition that the theories evolving from women's studies are merging into a new philosophical framework, a new world view.

In Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest, Carol P. Christ explains briefly why a feminist perspective challenges and transforms the traditional world view:

> As women begin to name the world for themselves not only will they create new life possibilities for women, they will upset the world order that has been taken for granted for centuries. ...The subordination of women not only has been taken for granted...but the assumption of women's secondary status also has influenced philosophers' and poets' perceptions of the nature of authority and hierarchy, and of the relation of spirit and flesh, humanity and nature, body and soul: All of these subtle and not so subtle relationships will be challenged and... transformed as women begin to write out of their own experience.[1]

The new world view articulated by feminist philosopher-theologians such as Mary Daly, Rosemary Ruether, Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Marjorie Suchocki, and Carol Christ is wholistic. It challenges, in Christ's words, "the adequacy of dualistic, hierarchical, and oppositional ways of viewing the world." To clarify, Christ tells us that traditional philosophers have viewed the "dualisms as oppositions in which the inferior continually threatens to overwhelm the superior. Hence, the name 'war' is given to the relations between spirit and flesh, culture and nature, man and woman, reason and emotion, and 'man' is warned to remain perpetually ready to do 'battle' with flesh, nature, woman, and the emotional realm." When feminist women question their own subordination, they also question this dualistic, hierarchical, oppositional way of thinking. For, "if women are different from but not inferior to men, then perhaps nature is different from but not inferior to spirit. Indeed, what has been called irrational—emotion, intuition, and sometimes even poetry—may not be inferior to the modes of thinking that have been called rational" (pp. 25-26).

The dualistic, hierarchical, oppositional mode of thought is replaced, in feminist thinking, by a more flexible and wholistic model. For example, the rigid categories of male versus female, masculine versus feminine, and heterosexual versus homosexual have been shown by scientists and psychoanalysts to be simplistic and frequently oppressive to individuals. If "the extent of variation within each sex identified as 'female' or 'male' is as great as any differences that exist between them,"[2] then a spectrum of female to

male may be a more appropriate image than the sharply dualistic one. Similarly, to say that those personality and behavior characteristics labeled "masculine" must belong only to males and those labeled "feminine" only to females is to deny every individual the whole spectrum of choices. This denial not only separates the sexes but also sets them in opposition to one another. Likewise, to deny the possibility of shifting sexual preference or the likelihood of bisexuality by rigidly labeling individuals heterosexual or homosexual denies the reality discovered even by such pioneers as Freud and Kinsey and endorsed more recently by Bruno Bettelheim and Jungian psychoanalyst June Singer. In her book Androgyny: Toward a New Theory of Sexuality (1976), Singer points out how such a rigid heterosexual-homosexual labeling system created unnecessary fears in her patients.[3] The practice of polarizing male and female physiology, processes of masculine and feminine socialization, and same-sex versus "opposite" sex eroticism are made worse by the assumption that male, masculine, and "heterosexual" seems to endorse the domination of women, the denigration of the feminine, and the repression of those labeled homosexual.

The domination of women has led to today's situation in which women make up 1/3 of the world's labor force, put in 2/3's of the work hours, and get only 1/10 of the world's income. The denigration of the feminine has led to a lopsidedly masculine and, therefore, macho-like value system. Homophobia and the repression of homosexuality have encouraged a rigid and crippling adherence to sex roles. Hence, more flexible definitions of female and male, gender, and human sexuality and the consequent elimination of dualistic, hierarchical, and oppositional approaches to these fundamental aspects of reality are essential if we are to move towards a more wholistic and egalitarian world view.

Similarly, when women seek equality and their right to choose the kind of education they want, they are re-defining the "nature" of the female and attacking the concept of the "opposite" sex. In 1880, when Barnard College for women was being proposed and there was talk of admitting women to classes, Mr. Morgan Dix, a trustee of Columbia University, made clear how a re-definition of the female threatened the world order:

> An enlarged mind is a deformity in the feminine organization, and ideas are as superfluous in a woman as they would be in a bottle of Lubin's extract. They are more than superfluous, they render the possessor uncomfortable to men as lords of creation. They nip the bud of man's egotism, they cut the flower of his self-love, they damage the stalk of his conceit. They cause, moreover, the preacher says, cold shivers to run down his magnanimous back. Now the chief object of the Almighty in the creation of women being to please men—particularly those who are a little narrow in the upper story—it follows that this petition for opening Columbia College lectures, and indeed the whole movement for what is called the higher education of women, but which is really higher disagreeableness, is a wrong, a monstrous wrong, a high-heeled rebellion against the order of the universe.[4]

The women's movement creates a change in "the order of the universe," a change in the traditional world view as radical as when Copernicus announced that the sun, not the earth, was the center of the universe. The discoveries of both Copernicus and the feminists suggest that the universe was not created for man, as is suggested in the Bible. The feminist declaration that Eve was not created primarily for Adam's pleasure threatens to change the mythology that has served as a model for many male-female relationships. Certainly, feminists today are proposing to change the definition of woman, the mythology that goes with that definition[5] and, in turn, the world view that follows from the definition.

But how does the individual woman move from a sense of her own psychological and political malaise to a new world view? In New Woman New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation, Rosemary Ruether suggests that the expansion from self to universe may be described as a four-stage process. The first stage is purely "subjective and psychoanalytical." The focus is upon the self; the consciousness is

gradually raised and "debasing self-images" exorcised.[6] This awakening can resemble a spiritual quest with the woman asking such questions as, "Who am I? Why am I here? What is my place in the universe?"[7]

The second stage in the process of moving towards a new world view begins with the recognition that "purely individualistic concepts of consciousness are insufficient." The individual consciousness is a product of socialization shared by females as a group. Therefore, women have problems in common like "dependency, secondary existence, domestic labor, sexual exploitation, and the structuring of their role in procreation into a total definition of their existence." To alter the way in which females as a group are defined and socialized, the woman begins to envision "a radically reconstructed society where work and home stand in a different relationship allowing men and women to particpate equally in both spheres."[8]

In the third stage, the woman becomes conscious that although all women share common problems, they "are also divided against each other by their integrationinto oppressor and oppressed classes and races." Ruether rightly points out that white middle-class and upper-class women will fail to connect with women in oppressed groups if they ignore "their own class and race privileges." In this stage, the special problems of lower-class, minority, and third world women become clearer.[9]

In the fourth stage in the movement towards a new world view, feminist women acknowledge that a vision of a just society "must reckon with the ecological crisis." As Rosemary Ruether states in New Woman New Earth:

> If women and oppressed classes and races are not to be cheated of their future in a world of dwindling resources, horded by the present power holders, we must seek the fundamental reconstruction of the way resources are allocated within the world community. This implies a fundamental reconstruction of our basic model of interrelationships between persons, social groups and, finally, between humans and nature. Our model of relationships must cease to be hierarchical and become mutually supportive, a cooperative model of fellowship of life systems. (p. 31)

The new world view, created out of feminist theory, practice, creative writing, and scholarship, embodies, therefore, a new—egalitarian rather than hierarchical—model of relationships. Rosemary Ruether concludes that "there can be no liberation for women and no solution to the ecological crisis within a society whose fundamental model of relationships continues to be one of domination." It is necessary to transform the "world-view which underlies domination" and replace "it with in alternative value system."[10] Man will have to learn to respect both women and nature and cease to regard them as having been created for his "use." What theologians refer to as the hierarchical ladder is what in the Renaissance was called the Great Chain of Being—God at the top, then men, and, still lower, women, then children, animals, plants, and minerals. This herarchical system must be replaced by one that can be represented, not by a ladder, but by an egalitarian circle. No longer should everything be seen in terms of "up or down, dominant or subordinate, superior or inferior, better or worse."[11]

Concerned about ecology, women are also questioning the macho-like attitudes of scientists that stress mastery and conquest of nature at any price. Women are questioning the ideal of infinite progress if it requires infinite exploitation of resources; and they question scientists' right to do research (for example, nuclear or DNA) no matter what the political or biological dangers. Feminists are suggesting that in scientific as in economic, social, and political planning, justice and a concern for the future will require changes in our values and priorities.

A respect for women and a respect for nature should be accompanied by a general respect for life as it is expressed in the philosophy of nonviolence. The survival of life on this planet may well depend upon our

ability to bring into being not only social justice, conservation efforts, and pollution controls but also disarmament and a general acceptance of the principle of nonviolence. What is called the feminization of society––the promotion in the public world of positive feminine values––should include strategies for making aggressive and violent behavior an unacceptable way of settling differences. There are many ways by which attitudes towards violence could be modified through what and how we teach.

In short, this new world view that has emerged from the women's movement and from women's studies research emphasizes the interdependence of all people, the interdependence of people and nature, and the sacredness of all life. Its vision is organic, wholistic, and non-hierarchical. Its focus is upon the quality of our institutions and relationships. Increasingly, feminist theoreticians and writers are stressing that our very survival depends upon our shifting away from the world view of dualism and domination and upon our conscious movement towards the androgynous vision. We would teach almost every course differently if our goal as educators was actually to teach for change and help bring about greater social, economic, and political equality and a greater respect for life. The feminist world view that has emerged from women's studies could provide the philosophical framework necessary for transforming the curriculum.

FOOTNOTES

1. Carol P. Christ, *Diving Deep and Surfacing: Women Writers on Spiritual Quest* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1980), p. 24. Subsequent references to this book will appear in the text.
2. From a manuscript for an introduction to women's studies textbook (p. B-7) written by women's studies faculty at Hunter College with the help of a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities.
3. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor/Doubleday, 1976. See Chapter 20.
4. Annie Nathan Meyer, *Barnard Beginnings* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1935), p. 35.
5. See, for example, Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
6. Rosemary Ruether, *New Woman New Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 29.
7. Women's spiritual quest seeks answers to these questions according to Carol Christ in her book *Diving Deep and Surfacing* (p. 8).
8. Ruether, pp. 29-30.
9. Ruether, p. 30.
10. Ruether, p. 204.
11. Elizabeth Dodson Gray, *Why the Green Nigger: Re-Mything Genesis* (Wellesley, MA: Roundtable Press, 1979), p. 19. A more recent edition of this book has been printed under the title *Green Paradise Lost*.

The Women's Movement: Putting Educational Theory into Practice

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For anyone interested in the process of adult learning, unlearning and relearning, no contemporary development offers so great a natural laboratory of educational experiments as the Women's Movement. With no promise of immediate or even distant material advantage, millions of women and some men have voluntarily organized into therapeutic instructional groups, carried out individual study projects, communicated results to others, developed data, analyzed societal media and messages, analyzed personal behavioral attitudes and skills and, as a consequnce, have meaningfully challenged as individuals and groups, almost every assumption our society holds dear. For educators, one of the most instructive aspects of the Women's Movement is the effectiveness with which it has adapted good educational practice. Indeed, feminists have had more dramatic success in reeducating adults than have educators themselves. Perhaps because feminists have practiced the theories the educators only preach, they have developed educational strategies at once powerful, non-hierarchical, loose, and voluntary. Will they be able to retain these structures as their ideas move out from the underground to become a priority of the educational establishment itself? Will they be able to avoid the temptation to mandate a raised consciousness? Let us hope so. For feminists have proved that education which derives from a great moral principle, which goes forward in an empowering and supportive environment, which is characterized by choice, voluntary commitment and democracy, works in practice as well as in theory. Isn't this the news all of us Deweyans have waited all these years to hear?

For anyone interested in the process of adultlearning, unlearning and relearning, no contemporary development offers so great a natural laboratory of educational experiments as the Women's Movement. Whatever the eventual fate of specific places of legislation, the Women's Movement, when viewed as a purely educational and reeducational enterprise, has been incredibly effective. Indeed, except for the educational efforts of fledgling communist parties abroad, the sheer audacity of the movement's educational ambition is unparalled. People, especially women, have learned to apply a whole new socio-political perspective to their lives. They have dared to believe that everything they had believed true might be false. While analyzing past perspectives, feminists have simultaneously been developing new perspectives, new attitudes and new behaviors. Clarifying their life's values has become for many a feminist a more full time career than it is for Sidney Simon. Women and some men have learned an amazing array of new personal and organizational skills. Feminists have produced, disseminated and digested enormous amounts of audio-visual materials. Classics such as The Republic, Antigone, Lysistrata, and the writings of Susan B. Anthony, John Stuart Mill, Lucy Stone, and Mary Wollstonecraft have all been read and reread. When integrated with the works of modern feminists like de Beauvoir, Friedan, Millet, Greer, Janeway, and Brownmiller, they have taken on deeper meanings and more immediate relevancy.

With no promise of immediate or even distant material advantage, millions of women have voluntarily organized into therapeutic instructional groups, carried out individual study projects, communicated results to others (through letters, newsletters, pamphlets, magazines, books, slide shows, movies, lectures, and conferences) developed data, analyzed societal media and messages, analyzed personal behavior, attitudes and skills and as a consequence, have meaningfully challenged as individuals and groups almost every assumption our society holds dear.

Meeting in homes, stores, clubs, and schools, before work, after work, during weekends, and lunch hours, the movement's educational efforts have gone forward with little money, less organization, and dramatic effictiveness. From the notion of consciousness raising, through the strategic use of guerilla theater, role

play, peer teaching and informal information networks, to a most effective integration of theory and practice, the Women's Movement in just a little more than a decade has become the movement whose time has come. With no support and often the flagrant hostility of every societal institution, ideas easily dismissed in 1966 as the ravings of man-hating, bra-burning women, became in 1975 the official educational policy of the United States.

For educators, one of the most instructive aspects of the Women's Movement is the effectiveness with which it has adopted good educational practice. Feminists have, with incredible effectiveness, made operational the ideas, insights and practices educational philosophers and theorists have engendered and promulgated. Ironically, feminists have had more dramatic success in reeducating adults than have educators themselves.

Success has rarely crowned the adult reeducation efforts of the educational establishment. Perhaps this is so because adult education when practiced by educators rarely reflects the best educational theory. Educators seem to have little faith in the educational prescriptions they offer others. It is not unlike the quip made of the church hierarchy, "Doctrine is made in Rome to be believed elsewhere." Feminists have put into practice educational ideas educators themselves have been too cautious and too conservative to trust. Feminists have had the strength of the educational establishment's convictions.

As one studies the educational success of the Women's Movement, particular attention should be paid to the tone or attitude feminists have been able to engender: an attitude or tone very carefully and consciously cultivated consisting of sureness, optimism and openness. The difficulty of maintaining this positive attitude can be understood if one considers the hostile atmosphere in which the feminists of the 1960's began their efforts. Misunderstood by the public, regularly satirized by the negative media coverages, denounced by public leaders as "unnatural", feminists were further alienated from others by the very fact of their own newly developed conviction. Feminists' newly honed perceptions continually butted against the perception of those mired in the conventional wisdom. Yet through it all, feminists maintained a positive posture. For a determination was made early on to see each woman as a potential convert, each male a potential ally.

Just the other day a male colleague asked me if feminists accept the fact that some women will always choose to be conforming, dependent and docile. "No," I answered. "For feminists there are and always will be two kinds of women, indeed, two kinds of people: those who are feminists now, and those who will be feminists tomorrow."

The determination to see every human being as a potential participant is quite real. All feminists are simultaneously conscious of the newness of their own knowledge, in touch with their own recent ignorance and painfully aware of the need for popular support. The idea of "Come aboard when the spirit moves you" really sums up the movement's approach to the world. One strategy for keeping the spirit of openness alive has been the discouragement of elitism. Although many well-known feminists are honored and beloved, every effort is made to make the most recent arrivals feel they are getting in on the ground floor. Converts learn that while much has been done, there is still much, much more to be done. The presence of each new member assured the rest that additional needed efforts will be undertaken and new insights gained.

Reflect for a moment on this one issue of attitude and tone. How many educational establishment attempts to convert teachers to new, different, and/or better curriculum and instructional priorities, practices, and policies could be described as exhibiting so open and positive an attidude? Think! Have attempts to convert teachers been characterized by a spirit of shared adventure, a determined effort to be tolerant of delayed commitment, an easy admission of shared personal limitation and an acceptance and integration of participants' newer insights and perspectives? Rather, has it not been a common experience for teachers to

be "sold" the use of barely developed and frequently untested teaching strategies and/or curricula? Have not the "sellers" viewed themselves as experts and the teachers simple-minded consumers? Do not these self-proclaimed experts typically distance themselves both intellectually and emotionally from the classroom experience? Are not the teachers attempts at input and revision often viewed as a "corruption" of "pure" ideas? Don't all of these factors often create a division between the "convincers" and the "convincees" which result in an atmosphere of hostility and negativism. Is it not also true that these kinds of environments stimulate teachers' feelings of inferiority and limitation? Doesn't this create a poor basis upon which to build a desire for continuing education and reeduction?

Indeed, one of the commonly indicated problem areas for those working to reeducate teachers in the negative feelings that are often aroused in adults when they must indicate ignorance or the absence of skills and abilities. These feelings act to limit the adult's ability to enthusiastically enter the learning process. To admit a need to know is to admit a corollary ignorance. If that admission of ignorance is demanded in an environment in which the one person in authority is thougt to embody knowledge com= plete and fixed, it is easy for an atmosphere uncongenial to learning to be engendered. The ability to be comfortable with one's own ignorance is one that the feminists have been most successful in helping to develop. While the feminists have not quite made a virtue of ignorance, they have certainly succeeded in politicizing it positively. For one of the basic tenets of feminism is that sexism robs both women and men of half the world of knowledge, skills and ability. By dichotomizing those aspects of the world "suitable" for men's hearts and minds, from those "suitable" for women's, all of us, feminists argue, have been deprived of participating in the full range of human learning experiences that a more egalitarian society might have permitted us. Thus the notion "we wuz robbed" is one of the basic slogans of the Women's Movement. It is a notion thought to apply equally to women and to men. The feverish efforts to repair information, skill and ability gaps results from the enthusiastic individual and group declaration that there is at least half a world of learning to catch up with for all of us. The idea of shared ignorance has been a persistent characteristic of feminists' educational efforts. Having convinced people that the learning gaps they suffer result not from individual sloth and stupidity, feminists have little difficulty liberating themselves and others from a need to deny personal limitations and ignorance. Thus we see people positively rushing for instruction in every area of living from assertiveness training to fiscal management.

Many official educational establishment ventures appear to share two of the characteristics commonly found in feminist educational ventures. One is a belief in the correctness or rightness of the goal, the other an initial optimism. Yet even in these two respects differences are quickly detected as one looks closely. Take the matter of goals first. The goals of establishment educational ventures are most often quite specifically defined before the educational process begins. Thus the input and insights of participants are often unwelcomed, unwanted and positively counter-productive from the perspective of the person "in charge." The goals of the Women's Movement can best be thought of as a "compressed conflict" in that they are vaguely specific: choice, access, opportunity. With goals such as these, participants input, insight and even redirection are not only acceptable, but genuinely welcome. This genuinely positive attitude toward participants' contributions builds commitment and enthusiasm.

The second characteristic feminists and establishment educational ventures appear to share is initial optimism. This optimism is a direct reflection of both groups' sincere belief in the worth of their goals. If, they reason, our goals are so valuable, desireable, and correct, how can others fail to appreciate them?

Here again it is particularly ironic that it is the professional educators who often turn out to be the group with unrealistic educational expectations. It is they who repeatedly fail to accurately assess the diffficulties involved in changing or developing adults' knowledge base, attitudes and skills. Despite all the evidence of past, failed attempts at educational change, each new group of educational reformers are sure it's going to be not only easy but quick. So when unexpected, unpredicted obstacles and problems arise,

dejection, pessimism and hostility replaces the initial optimism. It is easy to understand why feminists have always appreciated that their reeducation efforts would be long drawn-out efforts. Believing women and men to exhibit different intellectual, social and emotional patterns as a result of behavioral shaping begun before the dawn of consciousness, they have had little trouble appreciating the enormity of their task. Nor have they tended to underestimate the influence and power those opposed to their views, enjoy.

The sources of the feminists' realistic view of their educational task is easier to comprehend than their optimism. One might view their optimism as a legacy from earlier feminists, those whose efforts peaked at the turn of the century. Overcoming much greater obstacles than do present-day feminists they gained for women their most basic rights. Most memorably expressed in Susan B. Anthony's dying words, "Failure is impossible," optimism is the fuel which drives all revolutions. Todays feminists having learned their history or her-story well are almost reverentially respectful of their forebears. Here, too, we see a clear difference between the feminist and many establisheent reformers who are often almost eerily a-historical. The early feminists, too, were great and successsful educators. They identified the issue of sexism clearly, intelligently and urgently. First they explicated and documented the social, political, economic, religious and educational inequalities of women. Next, they began the process of communicating their perspective to others: their goal, to transform a sexist society into an egalitarian one, their methods: meetings, lectures, books, pamphlets, articles, political action. Present day feminists have pursued the same kinds of intellectual methods, but added something new. They added a strikingly new educational strategy, one that deserves the close attention of the professional educator.

"Consciousness Raising" is the new strategy in the feminists' educational semi-system. While earlier feminists were aware of the internal damage suffered by the victims of discrimination, their energies were primarily directed at restructuring societal laws and institutions. They believed, with some justification, that women's internal, psychological state would change as a consequence of societal and institutional change. Today's feminists have generally taken a different approach to this issue. While in complete agreement with the belief that external rules, laws and customsmust be rendered egalitarian, they believe internal psychological states and responses must be remediated simultaneously. Women raised in the second half of the 20th century were doubtlessly better prepared to deal directly with the problems of internalized prejudice than those raised in the middle of the nineteenth century. Social scientists since the 1920's have been explicating the corrosive effects of discrimination on the victim's ego, energy and aspiration levels. Older theories of the un-conscious and sub-conscious effects of early experience on later attitudes and behaviors have also been widely disseminated. Thus, radical feminists put these two notions together and invented a "cure" for the problem of internalized sexism.

Consciousness Raising is the process by which an individual's early socializing influences are revealed, compared, contrasted and analyzed within a group setting. It is an entirely voluntary process in which groups of women, groups of men, and groups of women and men come together each week to discuss topics that tap some aspect of the socializing process. Topics might include: aggression, appearance, aspirations, attitudes towards one's body, confidence, etc. Members speak in turn but only of their personal experiences. After each member's presentation, other group members may ask probing questions but no advice is given, no judgements are made. At the conclusion of all individual presentations the group attempts to detect patterns in the responses of the members. This allows one to attempt to determine the impact of societal assumptions, values and expectations on oneself and on others.

It takes an extended period of time to create the environment of mutual trust which is necessary to the consciousness-raising session. Much discussion time is spent guaranteeing confidentiality at each group's inception. Trust is also built in beginning groups by dealing with low-risk topics first. Additionally, the environment is mutually supportive, accepting, non-hierarchical, and free. People who have participated in Consciousness Raising generally view the experience as both positive and necessary for revealing and ulti-

mately revising values, attitudes and behavior that have limited their growth. For some, the support offered by the CR group enables the initiation of new activities—from learning to drive to finding paid employment. For others, the group support renders difficult life experiences more bearable. For still others, the CR group has led to spin-off groups formed to deal with specific problems: new mothers, older women, widows, divorcees. Other responses to the CR experience has been the development of specific instructional groups whose need is revealed through the consciousness raising process. Attendance at courses that deal with Women in Literature, Women in History, Sexism in Schools, is another kind of response from individual women who've been through the CR experience. The formation of specific skill groups—auto mechanics, money mangement, self-defense—is yet another development from the needs expressed by individual members of CR groups. Awareness of how much personal potential has been stunted through a rigid sex-role socialization process grows in the supportive consciousness raising environment. As one is freed to understand the roots of one's own limitations in a non-threatening, non-judgemental atmosphere, one also becomes free to seek new knowledge skills and abilities. Surely those of us interested in in-service or continuing education for teachers can see the possibilities inbedded in the consciousness raising model.

Regularly held seminars are seen as crucial to the success of education majors during their student-teaching or internship periods. During these seminars, students debrief their experiences and, in an environment of personal security, receive the support and advice necessary for growth and development. Why do we consider this need limited to the student-in-training? Why have we failed to see the importance of continuing this kind of seminar as a necessary condition for teachers' continued growth and development?

Estelle Fuchs, in her book, Teacher Talk, details the process by which teachers become socialized to their jobs. The process includes a decline in the teacher's expression of a need to grow and to know. It may be that what Fuchs describes as a settling-in process is the trade-off of an awareness of personal growth needs for the more urgently needed and necessary feeling of personal security and confidence. What is clearly needed is a structure where support and encouragement is given while an openness to continuing growth and commitment to novelty is maintained. The pre-service student teaching seminar, revised where and if necessary, to be less judgmental, less hierarchical, more depth oriented—in short, more like a CR group— offers promise as a strategy to support teachers continuing educational renewal.

A young teacher who once studied with me devised an amazingly effective and original curriculum to deal with the issue of death with her class of first and second graders. Although she believed her efforts were both successful and significant, she was never able to implement the curriculum after her initial trial. The curriculum required so much psychic support on her part for the children that she was "drained" by the effort as well as depressed from dealing with the children's fears and sadness. I find this a not uncommon experience for teachers who embark on difficult experiences or projects with children. Of course, while the nature of the subject matter of a death curriculum exaggerates normal teaching difficulties, the difficulties exist in all taxing, novel experiences. Even teachers who believe the new experiences to be worthwhile, tend to move toward those experiences where psychic costs are most manageable. Would not a more productive solution be a structure which offers teachers support in their efforts to attempt novel and difficult enterprises with their students? This same structure would also help support their struggles to develop, enhance and enlarge their personal competencies.

It is my thesis that the Women's movement has had great success in educating adults to new attitudes, skills and behavior. It has had even greater success in releasing the urge to learn which often lies dormant in adults. Earlier, I indicated that this success was all the more impressive because it rested on the voluntary commitment of the participants. Feminists now find themselves in an ironic position as a direct consequence of their success.

As increasing numbers of political, social and educational leaders have become convinced of the validity of the feminists' perception, new regulations, orders and titles are being issued by educational leaders demanding the elimination of sexism in the schools. As a result, the idea of female equality is rising from its status as an underground, establishment-challenging position to an establishment-approved and supported one. In sum, non-sexist education is going legitimate. What will be the fate of the educational strategies that served so successfully until now? As the message of female equality gains legitimacy will the powerful, non-hierarchical, loose, voluntary educational strategies become systematically pre-empted by the tightly structured, hierarchical, coercive, typical in-service educational structures? Will the feminists themselves forego the urge to mandate courses for administrators and teachers who are unwilling to present their consciousness for voluntary raising?

It appears so easy to achieve one's ends through mandated education that perhaps this is the moment when the professional educator can be most helpful. This help might best come in the form of warnings to feminists to be wary of the temptation to make a raised consciousness a requirement. Feminists like still innocent professional educators should beware of teachers and administrators as captive learners. The skill with which they can resist unwanted and unsolicited insight and information has been carefully honed through years of large-scale efforts to indoctrinate them. Educators might better learn from the successful strategies of feminists. For feminists have proved that education which derives from a great moral principle, which goes forward in an empowering and supportive environment, which is characterized by choice, voluntary commitment, and democracy, works in practice as well as in theory. Isn't this the news all of us Deweyans have waited all these years to hear?

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AIRLIE 1983

See the inside back cover for details.

Teachers and Teaching in the Nineteenth Century: St. George, Utah

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In her plea for peopling educational history, Geraldine Clifford concludes that "it is possible to conceive of historians recreating people as we know them to be: an uneven mixture of naivete and shrewdness; of yielding and stubbornness; of the narrowest self-interestedness and generosity; of inertness and energy."[1] The intention of this paper is to uncover some of this "uneven mixture" as it was expressed in the schools of St. George, Utah in the latter third of the nineteenth century.

In the lives of teachers in the early days of schooling in the Mormon Kingdom this mixture was heavily influenced by an all-pervasive concern for the moral uplift of the people and the recognition that they seldom attained the lofty vision of possibility held before them. Education was viewed in "Zion" much as it was viewed by proponents of the common school movement.[2] It was looked to preserve and strengthen morality and to inspire a sense of duty to the community. Teachers were viewed not only as examples of what a moral life ought to look like but also as servants of the "Most High" in bringing light to those less fortunate. Tension between the realities of life on the frontiers of the Mormon Kingdon and the vision of what the children of God, the "Latter-day Saints", ought to be served as a source of joy and disappointment for teachers; souls were at stake. The concern for moral education generally expressed itself in a pervasive concern for discipline, respect for authority, obedience to "Law", and mastery of moral aphorisms. A good teacher was one who embodied the community's moral standards, who had the strength of character to maintain control and discipline and who had sufficient knowledge of the fundamentals to be able to lead class recitations.

Of those individuals who engaged in teaching, not all were equally inspired by lofty ideals of service. For many, teaching was simply a relatively easy way of earning some extra money or produce during the winter months when farm chores were lighter and employment less available. For others, particularly women, teaching offered a source of income relatively compatible with family and child-raising responsibilities. For most, it appears that the motivation for beginning teaching was a combination of a desire to serve and a need for income.

In this paper we will primarily focus on the work of two teachers who taught in St. George begining in the latter 1860's: Martha Cox and Richard S. Horne. Martha Cox is a representative teacher of the period: female, poorly educated, religiously motivated, hard working, in need of extra income and committed to education as a vehicle for "uplifting" young heathens. Her decision to become a teacher represents a resolution of a personal conflict over how she might live a life worthy of her religious ideals——ideals that for a season, she chose to neglect. In a sense then, she viewed teaching as a vehicle for her own salvation. Richard S. Horne, on the other hand, represents the unusual and exceptional in early St. George education. He was comparatively well educated for the period. Unlike most teachers he viewed teaching as his profession——not as a side line——and he was a student of educational methods. For a decade he represented to the citizens of St. George the best in teaching. Like Martha Cox, he shared a vision of education as a tool for the moral perfection of humankind.

Before continuing to the body of this paper, we should briefly comment on our source materials. We have relied entirely on primary sources: diaries, journals, and recorded recollections. The gaps that exist in the account we present, particularly in terms of conveying a better picture of classroom interaction, are there because we have not been able to fill them. In reading numerous journals we have found that even for teachers, school matters occupied a relatively minor place in their thought particularly when compared

to the importance of religion and church activities in their lives. We hope, however, that our future efforts in other locations will yield the data necessary for a fuller account.

Background: St. George

St. George was founded as a result of a "call" extended by President Brigham Young of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to a number of families to settle a region in the southwestern tip of what is now the state of Utah. He announced the names of those who were to go in the general conference of the Church held in Great Salt Lake City in October, 1961. These families were to sell their properties and travel to the "Southern Mission." Brigham Young believed, according to one of those called, that as a result of the civil war, "cotton goods would be much higher in price—too high for the people of Utah to afford what they would need. Therefore, he felt that it was now the proper time to settle the valleys of southern Utah, where this plant could be grown in sufficient quantities for our own needs, and probably some for trade." (Bentley, p. 5)

By 1870, St. George was a struggling but growing community of over 2,000 inhabitants divided into four ecclesiastical "wards." Each ward had its own school house which often doubled as a meeting house for religious services. And, from time to time, private schools were established as money-making ventures; though in both cases collecting subscriptions was difficult. Education was, from the begining of settlement, viewed as being of considerable importance. Some individuals, Richard S. Horne, for example, were explicitly called to St. George to serve as teachers. And, school was held prior to the erection of any permanent buildings in the city. "Sister" Orpha Everett held school in a tent before moving into the "willow" school house which was viewed as an important improvement but nevertheless it was quite primitive: "In the center of this willow school house was a flat rock which supported a post in the middle of the room. This rock was used for a desk when the pupils wished to write, or rather when they had writing materials." (Miles, p. 1) (Jarvis, p. 2)

The school curriculum had two major purposes: first, to train the young in the rudimentary skills necessary for learning coupled with instruction in a few "facts"; and secondly, to train the young to hold the right moral and religious principles. This second purpose is clearly conveyed in a statement published in the Dixie Times, the local newpaper, of January 22, 1868: "By education men become easy to lead, but difficult to drive; easy to govern but difficult to enslave."

We turn now to a brief consideration of what life was like for students in the St. George schools of this period.

School Recollections

A fairly typical school experience was had by Josephine J. Miles (1872 or 1873): "The school was held in the west room of (Orpha Everett's) home. There were no conveniences of any kind—a four legged, long stool furnished seats. There were no desks, blackboards, charts or maps. We had few books, but were just past the stage of having an old Book of Mormon, or other Church book for a reader. I was the proud possessor of the corner of an old slate (upon which to write)." The lessons consisted mainly of reciting: "We would begin at 'Washington, Olymphia' (sic) repeated twice, and go chanting across the continent to 'Maine, Augusta'. We also learned the Great Lakes and the rivers in the same manner. It was customary too, to chant the multiplication tables, and we learned these things very thoroughly. This chanting was also useful in helping to drown the other noise in the room (sic)." (Miles, p. 4).

In 1877 Josephine Miles was a student in the First Ward School where Annie W. Romney taught. "Sister" Romney was a veteran teacher who had studied at the University of Deseret (later the University of Utah). Such training was a rarity. More commonly the teachers were young people, like Martha Cox, who had themselves recently completed their grammar school courses. Mrs. Miles recalled that it was under

;ister Romney that she "learned the fundamental principles of grammar, which (she had) never forgotten, 'rom 'Pinee's text.' " "We memorized," she reports, "many rules, the meaning of which became useful ater. It was years before 'Two negatives make an affirmative,' meant anything to me." (Miles, pp 2-3)

Other students of the time had similar experiences: "The only thing I remember clearly of those early lays was standing up and reading the primer thru (sic) without stopping." (Bentley, p 12) What perhaps nade this easily endured was the realization that school would only last for three of four months during he winter. But clearly, for some students, even this brief period was too long to endure. For example, William D. Johnson Jr., a teacher called to St. George to establish a commercial school, lamented because 'there was no convenience for the teacher and children so wild and rude (sic)." And, indeed, the children were wild and rude.

Children who were not engaged in class reciting were expected to either be quiet or work quietly on ıssigned tasks. Breaches of this rule resulted in punishment: "I was fond of drawing pictures (doodling), ı crime in those days—by some unknown process of reasoning, it was considered much more instructive :o sit and gaze on the bare desolate adobe walls, than to have wreaths of smoke curling gloriously from our :himneys, so there was always some little spy calling out: 'Teacher, she's drawing pictures.' They had to ɔe promptly erased by the primitive method... Thus, perhaps, many an artist was nipped in the bud." (Miles, p. 4) Another student recalled that he was punished by Miss Cook a "stern disciplinarian" for his nisdemeanors "by being required to kneel down by her and put (his) head in her lap." This was a great embarrassment. (Snow, p. 3)

Not all of the school day was work, however. Occasionally the day was broken up by a spelling bee which was a favorite activity of students and community alike. In fact, evening spelling bees served as weekend diversions for St. George citizens. Champion spellers were recognized and treated with great honor—at least until the next champion emerged. In general, however, life in the classrooms of St. George was a constant strugge between teachers, who demanded obedience, and those students who often would not or could not give it.

Martha Cox

While a typical teacher in many respects, Martha Cox's decision to begin teaching is perhaps unusual. As a young person she was guilty, as she later reported, along with others of her age, of enjoying life a little too much. She was guilty of a sin that was of particular concern to Richard Horne; she attended "too many parties." In short, she took life too lightly: "That was a gay season (1868) for St. George. The influence of School and Study bore light weight against that of theaters, parties and balls. Whenever it happened that I awoke in time to get off to school in the morning I went. If too much of the morning was spent in restoring the strength lost from the night before, I stayed home and prepared for the dance on the following night or wove a few yards of cloth as many people still held to the home weaving. The routine of my life was that of every other girl in school. The teacher (obviously, not a good one) was interested in theaters, music and balls, concerts, courts and councils and rarely came into school any earlier than the rest of us. The young lady who assisted the teacher was very frequently absent. As I was about the most steady in attendance among the lady pupils I had the privilege of hearing her classes (recite) when she was not there." (Cox, pp. 117-118)

One can only speculate as to whether or not the behavior of this teacher and assistant was a source of community concern. Because of high teacher turnover it may have been that such behavior did not prompt immediate censure. Nevertheless, it was of sufficient concern to one respected citizen to motivate him to confront Martha on her irresponsible behavior. Apparently, his words prompted a crisis of conscience: "The words fell on me solemn-like and prophetic and I pondered on them deeply. 'What profit is there finally,' I said to myself, 'in all this round of never ceasing labor? ... in weaving more cloth to buy more

dresses. When my day is past – my warp and woof of like and labors ended and my body gone to rest in the grave. What is there to mark the ground of which I trod? nothing.' and (sic) the thought made me weep."

After some reflection she spoke with her friend and former teacher "Brother" McCarty who counselled her: "Plant in the minds of men and the harvest will be different... Every wholesome thought you succeed in planting in the mind of a little child, even, will grow and bear (sic) eternal fruit and will give you souls of joy––that you will not ask to be remembered."

His words both lifted her hopes and frightened her: "His words, though they enlightened, brought to me an awful sadness of soul. (sic) I was so ignorant. I could realize how dense was my mind. I saw that I had hitherto lacked ambition for I had been content to dance, laugh and sleep my leisure time away, never supposing that I might reach a higher plane than that which enabled me to support and clothe myself." (Cox, p. 119)

Her situation apparently worsened. As she walked the streets of St. George she saw that there were so very many children who were destined to lives of idleness; this troubled her. One day she happened across some boys playing marbles who had "stolen out of school." A conversation ensued: "I said to the boys... 'if I were your teacher I'd be sorry to have you out of school." A large fellow responded: "Oh the old woman's glad we're out." Disturbed by this remark she told them that she was "sorry to see them growing up without education." "If you're sorry for us" one replied, then "why don't you teach us? We wouldn't stay out of school if you taught us." A bit dejected, she responded by saying, "I wish I knew enough to teach you...and I'd see whether you would." One little fellow then spoke up and said: "I should think you'd teach us that you do know."

Here was a new thought. Maybe Brother McCarty was right. There were many children who knew less than she did. Gradually, she came to the resolve to try to teach, but first she felt she had to increase her knowledge and strengthen her character: "I was wanting in that pride and dignity so requisite in the make up of a good teacher which I could never hope to become." (Cox, p. 120)

Her new resolve gave her renewed hope. It also prompted her to engage in some rather extreme behavior, behavior that is sensible when seen from the perspective of a deep and insistent concern for her own salvation. She broke off relationships with old friends and then shocked some of her former friends by eventually entering into a polygamous marriage with a man who represented the standards of morality she sought to achieve. Shortly after her marriage she became an assistant to "Brother" McFarlane who was teaching in the First Ward School. Her salary was $20 a month in produce, a welcome addition to her struggling family's income. Her husband's other two wives, one of whom was childless, supported her in her efforts.

She describes the school in this way: "This was a 'mixed' school and my task was to teach the little classes. The little miserables of St. George who seemed to be continually evoking a bang from Mac's mahogany ruler. There was one called 'Tutt' Larsen who seemed by his very visage and appearance calling out for a rap on the knuckles. His punishment came generally for being late. On such mornings I would see a grey eye applied at a knot hole in the door. When I came before the door with my class that aperture would open and Tutt would glide snakily into his seat at his place in the class. That winter completed the educational era for Tutt." (Cox, p. 124)

Martha made considerable progress during that winter toward realizing her goal. Even greater progress came when she entered, in the winter of 1869, Richard Horne's school then located in the Fourth Ward. She attended classes with her step-daughter Rettie who, though three and one half years her junior, was in

the same class. She describes Horne and his school in this way: "This was the best school of the town and the teacher was my ideal of what a teacher should be. Good governing ability – he had perfect order and much method." (Cox, p. 125) In the spring she returned to Horne's school: "This was at an expense and great sacrifice but I felt that I must get some training as a teacher if I ever succeeded (sic) in giving me 'street boys' instruction. I had those idle marble players ever on my mind." (Cox, p. 128)

In September she felt she was ready to begin her own school. She was about nineteen years old and very determined. Her petition to the "Trustees of School" to teach in the Third Ward School was denied: "They would not listen to my proposal – my rude boys would smash the windows –break the benches and in fact make a general destruction of the property. Besides they did not think Ihad the ability to teach." (Cox, p. 128)

Failing to secure a position she decided to start her own school. A friend agreed to let her use, for one month free of charge, a hall her friend Brother McFarlane had earlier used for his school. Another friend gave her planks and blocks for seats and yet another gave her a large 2' x 4' bread board which was painted for use as a blackboard.

Then she took a "piece of white chalk from (her) husband's tool box..." and all that remained was for her to obtain some students. She visited prominent families throughout the town soliciting scholars, but she was to be turned away: "When I reached my friend's home and she learned the results of my visit to the 'select families' a cloud settled on her face, and she said, "I guess your plan is a failure.' " (Cox, p. 129)

"I told her, 'That is just what Sheriff Hardy says. It will be a failure because I have your house. He will not let his children have the association of yours.' " "Anxious to know the objectionable feature of the association of her boys I had to tell her... This changed her mood somewhat. She said she would not let me have the house if I took Hardy's children..." Just at what appeared to be the moment of defeat a prominent woman came by and inquired if Martha would be willing to take her children in the school. Soon "the class filled to overflowing – some came for the love of learning and others because no fee was attached to the registration..."

The month ended and she faced a dilemma: rent was soon to be due and she had not thus far charged any fees. At the prompting of her husband's other two wives she moved the school into their home while the husband was away. Again, it flourished until the Trustees of the Third Ward School called insisting that the pupils in her school properly belonged in the Ward School. Apparently, her school was causing a significant cut in the school subscription. While struggling to decide what to do, she was called to serve as a teacher in the Fourth Ward Schools. This settled the issue.

During those early years, Martha Cox knew little more than many of the scholars she was responsible for teaching. Her primary virtues seem to have been her concern for children, her "stick-to-it-ness," her commitment to education and her high standards of personal morality. She was not an exceptionally talented teacher technically, nor was she particularly imaginative, but, she was reliable, sincere, disciplined and apparently demanding. Edward H. Snow, who later rose to considerable prominence in Southern Utah, attended her school in the Fourth Ward and recalled that primarily the scholars were "drilled in concert on the lakes, rivers, capitals, etc., for geography and to read and spell (which) was about the extent of the curriculum." (Snow, p. 2) Martha Cox was in many respects typical of the teachers of her day. What is perhaps most unusual about her is that she used teaching as a vehicle by which to settle her conscience and thus to serve her God.

Richard S. Horne

The arrival of Richard S. Horne in St. George in the fall of 1867 and his involvement in the community's schools marked what one pioneer recalled as being the beginning of a "period of great improvement in method." (Miles, p. 3) Horne was called on a "mission into the sunny clime of our modern Dixie" by Brigham Young on October 7, 1867. Without hesitation he began preparations to make the arduous 300 mile, month-long journey south. At age twenty-three Horne was a veteran teacher of four years experience and was coming to be recognized in Great Salt Lake City as a very capable teacher. The citizens of St. George were delighted to receive his services as reported in the Deseret News of March 12, 1870: "The Fourth Ward has been enabled to secure the efficient services of Elder Richard S. Horne during this winter; he has been long and favorably known as a first-class teacher in your city (Great Salt Lake City)."

Leaving his school in the Fourteenth Ward was a painful experience. Horne began teaching school in Great Salt Lake city with "few scholars, and poor accomodations" but his competence as a teacher had attracted a class of over 80 which, incidentally, required the local parents to provide improved conditions. In his farewell address, Horne reminded his scholars to avoid the dangers of idleness, of becoming "drones," and reminded them as he had so often before, that when "Battling with the roughnesses of this world there is but One far above who is ever merciful, and willing to assist all who put their trust and confidence in Him. Lift your hearts in supplication to Him," Horne urged and "He will strengthen you." With but few more words, Horne bid his scholar-friends a dramatic "farewell, perhaps forever."

Horne took a simple philosophy of education with him to the frontiers of the Mormon Kingdom. "Education," he told his new scholars, "is the life of the world, and gives understanding to all men, and without it you would be like the wild Indians whom you so often see begging for subsistance. I know," he said, "there are none of you who would like to be as they are. To prevent it, you are sent to school to refine your intellect and store your minds with wisdom..." (Horne A, p. 70)

Unhappily for Horne the scholars he encountered in the basement of the St. George Social Hall that first winter had many of the traits that he associated with the Indians who were so widely feared and scorned. The youngsters of St. George, Horne remarked, need "to be coaxed and dragged into their studies." They are too "free" and usedtoo many nick-names" and "slang phrases." Names like "Dad" and "old man" were especially irritating to him. Furthermore, they would "leave when they please without given excuse; obey rules when they please" and mind the teacher's "counsel when they please." They are, he asserted, "Too officious." But perhaps most insulting was the tendency of some scholars to leave school for the day after Horne had begun teaching. (Horne B, p. 1) In short, the pupils of St. George needed to learn to be civilized and socialized before they could encounter wisdom.

Horne pinpointed the most fundamental cause of the pupils' poor behavior as being a lack of "mind." If only the young knew better, he believed, they would behave better: "Some look but see not; and listen but hear not; absence of mind the cause." (Horne B, p. 1) The cure, of course, was education. Horne saw his responsibility as not only providing an education but also encouraging the pupils to "lay aside everything foreign to studies." He was extremely demanding.

To alleviate some of the "foreign elements" Horne emphasized discipline, an effort consistent with Church-wide Mormon efforts to shore up communities against outside "polluting" influences. As part of this effort he also introduced programs on Friday afternoons "for the entertainment and development of students." (Miles, p. 3)

A central device in his discipline effort was to replace the use of student names with numbers. Horne refers, for example, to "No. 23," who needed a "copy book" and "No. 17" who "recited perfectly." He also refrained, on occasion, from listing names in his roll books, preferring to use numbers. (Miles, p. 3) He

first developed this system in Great Salt Lake City with the avowed purpose of helping to limit social class distinctions which, he believed, resulted in prejudices unbecoming scholars. (Horne B, p. 2-11) The number system also, as one can imagine, increased the formal character of the classroom which apparently made it more difficult to disrupt the class recitation.

While there is no record of what was included in the Friday afternoon programs there are a number of moralistic plays in existence written by Horne. It is reasonable to assume that Horne wrote these plays and enlisted student participation in them for his Friday programs. The extant plays center on specific moral problems, such as intemperance or immodesty of dress, found in the community. The plays were intended to convey a message as well as being entertaining. The central purpose of these programs was to induce the scholars to make commitments to lives pleasing to the Lord and, where necessary, to purge contrary traits and behaviors. One also suspects, given Horne's belief that the pupils went to "too many parties," that the Friday afternoon programs were intended to provide "proper" social activities.

One of Horne's plays is entitled "Extravegance in Dress." The second decade of the Mormon presence in the Great Basin brought increasing social class distinctions. Some community members, particularly women, displayed their wealth by overindulging in fine clothing which Horne believed sometimes led to ill feelings on the part of those less fortunate. Martha Cox, for example, reports how as a young girl in St. George she was occasionally made to feel ashamed of her rough-woven hand-made clothing.

"Extravagance in Dress" tells the tale of how May and Charles, upstanding young people in the community, through their friendship and love, convince Thomas and Jane that they have gained the "displeasure of all" their friends because of "excessive use of fine clothes..." Before winning the day, and fearing that Jane would never see the light, May remarks with heaviness of heart: "I am truly sorry you do not consider your own personal standing in society of more consequence." Jane, weakening, responds: "I sometimes feel as though my friends were jealous of me because I am able to dress better than they are; and then again I am forced to believe that I am not doing as I ought" But," she bolsters up her spirits, "it is only for a moment. When I feel that thought stealing into my head I throw it away, and do not listen to its promptings." Eventually rightousness prevails and Jane repents: "You may well look astonished, dear May, but I have been considering upon the advice you gave me this morning, and am convinced that I have been acting a very foolish part in this school room since I entered it, and hope to improve from the experience of this day." (Horne A, p. 60-69)

In addition to school plays there is evidence to suggest that Horne presented formal lectures on topics he judged to be of interest and importance. A lecture on intemperance begins portentiously: "Intemperance is the mother of sin and wickedness. There is far more misery——real, gloomy misery, caused by intemperance than by swords, pistols, guns or any kinds of weapon. This may seem a strong assertion to one not accustomed to allow himself to compare the two together, but on reflection it will readily be seen that more horror accompanies a drunkard's life than a soldier's." Horne wrote a sad tale of a "beautiful woman" who has the misfortune of being "united to a man given to indulging to excess in the use of strong intoxicating liquors." The play is a tale of misery where ultimately we come to "discover the form of our once happy wife of years ago, lying upon a few old rags with a light torn blanket as covering; moaning under the pangs of hunger and starvation... Her husband, once so noble and manly, had yielded to liquor's poisonous influence and become its complete victim..." (Horne A, pp. 55-60)

Most of the school week Richard Horne's pupils apparently spent their time like other students in St. George, reading and reciting: "(I) am so much better pleased with ready recitations." (Horne B, p. 1) But, perhaps somewhat uniquely, he introduced competition into his recitation periods. Martha Cox recalls: "A prize was to be given to the student who carried the greatest number of credits. Rettie was bending every nerve to the attainment of it. I felt sure she would get it for no one had more perfect recita-

tions than she... Rettie was a sad little girl in her dissapointment (sic) and I was angry over the gross injustice as I called it and said many hard words in expressing my thots (sic). She answered my complaint with these words: 'If I study only for a prize I don't deserve, all are aware and I am glad I did not get this...' " Horne kept records of his pupils's recitations and awarded "credits" for the performance. To strengthen their recitations he urged his pupils to practice "vocalizing various selections." (Horne B, p. 1) The best students, the most obedient and best reciters, received prizes. Apparently the competition was keen.

Horne also stressed composition and play: "A lazy pupil in play will be lazy in study." In addition he worked within the community to obtain more and better textbooks for the purpose of improving and standardizing recitations. (Miles, p. 3) The increased availability of books proved to be an important factor in strengthening St. George's educational offerings particularly given the limited preparation and knowledge of the teachers.

During his lifetime Horne was recognized and honored as being an exceptional teacher. It was the fortunate scholar who received a number and a place in one of Horne's schools. Those who were so fortunate left his classroom presumably more moral and intelligent than when they entered. Horne apparently viewed himself as being on the front lines in the battle against immorality and ignorance which expressed themselves in lack of obedience, intemperance and improper language. For him, as for Martha Cox, life was very serious business. Truth was known and for those willing to pay the price of attaining it salvation was promised. If his students could only grasp the importance of always remembering God and of avoiding becoming "drones" then there was hope. While plays, lectures and play activity were somewhat unusual educational experiences for the scholars of St. George their purpose was to insure that these lessons were learned and learned well.

Conclusion

Teaching in the schools of St. George during the last third of the nineteenth century was difficult at best. Students were unruly. Materials were scarce and subscriptions difficult to collect. But, teaching did offer a modicum of community respect and the possibility of a modest but relatively secure income. But, perhaps most importantly, to individuals like Martha Cox and Richard Horne, it offered an opportunity to do God's work; to bring civilization, culture and Truth to the frontiers of the Mormon Kingdom within which a person could not be "saved in ignorance." The "uneven mixture" these and other teachers brought to the classroom was expressed in some differences in teaching methodology and discipline techniques and punishments but, comparatively speaking, these differences pale in importance when compared to the unity of vision that guided educational decision-making.

FOOTNOTES

1. Geraldine Clifford, "Saints, Sinners, and People: A Position Paper on the Historiography of American Education," *History of Education Quarterly*, Fall, 1975, p. 268.

2. Frederick Binder, *The Age of the Common Schools: 1830-1865* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974) pp. 10-11.

3. Mary Ann Mansfield Bentley, *Autobiography*, Utah State Historical Society, A 1561.

4. Martha James Cragun Cox, *Diary and Notebook*, Brigham Young University, Special Collections, Mq 270107/L 839.

5. Richard S. Horne (A), *Essay Book*, Archives, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Ms d 1688, Bx 2.

6. Richard S. Horne (B), *Journal*, Archives, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Ms d 1688 Bx 1.

7. Eleanor C.W. Jarvis, *Diary*, Utah State Historical Society, A 551.

8. Josephine J. Miles, "History of Education in St. George" a paper presented at a meeting of the Daughters of the Pioneers, St. George Chapter, Sunday, January 29, 1923. Archives, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Ms d 2213.

9. Edward Snow, *Autobiography*, Brigham Young University, Special Collections Mor, M 270.1 Sn 6121.

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An Ontological Grounding For Curriculum: Learning to Be In-The-World

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Critiques of the process of schooling and of curriculum content and logic have done much over the past decade or so to repoliticize issues of knowledge and control, as Michael F.D. Young formulated the issue in his now classic call for a "new" sociology of education in 1971. The theoretic traditions most often invoked by the "new" sociologists, as well as the "reconceptualists" in curriculum theory, are the sociology of knowledge and a Husslerian and Schutzian phenomenology, aimed at ferreting-out pools of commonsense social knowledge, as they are transmitted in the classroom and as they are linked to class ideologies. Knowledge is analysed in terms of its social sources, its control and transmission (as if it were a commodity), and its representations in curricular and "hidden curricular" forms. Unfortunately, this rather narrow concern for uncovering epistemologies in everyday life, as if they were "things" which could be abstracted and catalogued has led to a somewhat static and one-sided depiction of social control. The assumption is that social control is rather directly and unilaterally maintained by controlling and regulating the stock of social knowledge at hand. This epistemic orientation is largely responsible for the revival of interest in the work of the early twentieth century Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (1971); and in the development of the notion of hegemony, Gramsci attempts to wed the notion of knowledge control or ideology with an active view of human will, which assumes that the individual actively participates in the daily construction of social reality and the reproduction of culture. Hegemony is used to explain stability within contemporary capitalist society through the assumption that epistemic systems expand outward from the economic base or infrastructure to incorporate all spheres of everyday social logic. The individual is presented as a somewhat unwitting actor in cultural reproduction, unable to "see" or "know" the world in new ways. While hegemony is an attempt to avoid a total reification of knowledge and the process of knowledge control, it fails to give us the full picture of the individual as an existing participant in the world, exercising choices, and making a life. What we need, I want to suggest, is a better theoretical understanding of contemporary modes of being-in-the-world as well as knowing-the-world. What we know about the world always leads back to a more fundamental and encompassing question of how we exist in relation to the world, as intentional participants in the assemblage of a given social reality. That is, what one knows (the issue in epistemology) must be subsumed, in all phenomenological analysis, under the rubric of how one exists as an active subject in the world (the ontological issue.)

To date, few within the field of education, with some important exceptions (Dwayne Huebner, 1975b; William Pinar, 1975, 1981), have applied a rigorous phenomenological ontology to the analysis of what goes on and what gets produced at the level of consciousness in classrooms. I want to explore several directions in which ontological analysis and ontologically-grounded ethnography may lead us. I want to suggest that schooling involves the learning of particular modes of being-in-the-world which sustain a fundamentally conservative conception of the individual and his or her relation to the larger society and act to preserve rather than challenge existing capitalist structures and social relations. Paul Ricoeur (1970: 45) notes in this regard: "Epistemology is only a part of this broader task: we have to recover the act of existing, in the positing of the self, in all the density of its works."

Much of what I want to present is based upon the ontological framework developed by the twentieth century German philosopher and social theorist, Martin Heidegger, whose relevance in educational analysis is still largely unexplored. Heidegger (1962) accepts Husserl's phenomenology as a methodology, or more accurately, a lens, through which to examine the form and character of existential modes of being-in-the-world. But he insists that we go beyond a more "factical" phenomenology which abstracts and categorizes

the phenomena of everyday life so that they no longer appear to be humanly constructed and humanly experienced, but take on a "thing-like" character. From a sociological perspective, Heidegger's work is particularly important, for he explicitly aims at an ontological description and critique of the self as a sociohistorical entity. He uses the term "Dasein", in German literally "being there", to refer to the self; from its everyday sociohistorical context. Although I will revert to the English and use the term "self" to refer to the active, intentional aspect of being-in-the-world as a constituent part of the world, it must be understood to incorporate the Heideggerian meaning of "Dasein". In Heidegger's most important work, Being and Time (1962), and in much of his more overly political work, as best represented in The Question Concerning Technology (1977), we have an account in minute detail of the "inauthentic" or alienated mode of being-in-the-world characteristic of contemporary post-industrial society. Concurrently, Heidegger attempts to "see through" this inauthentic selfhood to a potentially more authentic, less alien ated mode of selfhood, which would make possible the transformation of existing social orders and relations. To Heidegger, one historical epoch is transcended only through a thinking about the self and the world differently, so that the self is recognized as standing in a new relation to the world and to others.

Being-in-the-world as an analytic construct.

To Heidegger, the self exists only in the performance of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object, separable from the world in which it operates. "Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression of being, and the self always "finds itself" as grounded in a particular worldly situation, requiring its participation. Being-towards-others is an irreducable aspect of this grounded being; so that "so far as Dasein is at all, it has Being-with one-another as its kind of Being" (1962, 163).

The self is not only in the world, it is "thrown" within the world. In each case the self is its possibilities, according to Heidegger, and is them in such a manner that it understands itself and the world in these possibilities, and in terms of them, projecting itself upon them (1962: 225). Temporality thus becomes an essential dimension in any analytic understanding or description of Dasein, the contextualized self. As Dwayne Huebner (1975b: 244) notes:

> The present is the moment of vision when Dasein, finding himself thrown into a situation (the past), projects his own potentiality for being... The point is that man is temporal; or if you wish, historical. There is no such "thing" as a past or a future. They exist only through man's existence as a temporal being. This means that human life is never fixed but is always emergent as the past and future become horizons of a present.

Because the self is in each case its possibilities, it can (but Heidegger would say generally does not) "choose" itself with some deliberateness. In having an emergent and historical potentiality-for-being, the self always stands in one possibility or another; it constantly is not some possibilities, and waives these possibilities in its everyday throwness.

Being-in-the-world, language, and hermeneutic rationality.

One of the important implications of Heidegger's work in educational analysis has to do with his ontological conception of language and rationality, since both are central elements of the school curriculum, in both tacit and overt forms. To Heidegger the issue of being-in-the-world is coextensive with the issue of language, for language is the "primal dimension" with which being is made intelligible (1977: 41). The fundamental Greek experience of language was, Heidegger believes, one in which reality revealed itself for what it was. Language identifies phenomena, which are to be understood as aspects of the fabric of everyday life which show themselves in themselves, and take on meaning in doing so (1962: 51). Language is also a social rather than individual production, and this social character expresses itself in discourse, which, Heidegger notes, was synonomous with language for the Greeks (1962: 209). Discourse is not to be under-

stood primarily as a deductive process of cause and effect reasoning, linking one objectified phenomenon with another, but rather as a hermeneutic process of uncovering what is ready-at-hand, so that it takes on significance in terms of opening up possibilities. Ricoeur (1970: 8) describes hermeneutic rationality as "the interpretation of a particular text, or a group of things that may be viewed as a text." In this case, hermeneutic reasoning takes the form of a demystification, a reduction of illusion, a battle against the masks behind which things appear to stand (Ricoeur, 1970: 30). Heidegger views discourse as the primary technique for "letting something be seen" in this manner. As the Greeks understood it, discourse is both the calm, self-possessed surrender to that which is worthy of questioning, as well as the active venture after sense or meaning (1962: 180). Language serves in discourse to summon a thing forth, so that it shows itself in its sociohistorical essence and becomes accessible to us in its particular implications. Language also serves to clarify the past and "share" it with others in terms of present possibilities, and it is thus for Heidegger the central tool for social transformation.

In these terms, much of what goes on in schools may be said to represent a de-skilling of individuals away from their authentic potentials for language usage. This de-skilling involves an atrophication of discursive and writing capacities and a neglect of hermeneutic rationality in the curriculum, as instruction becomes increasingly dominated by a narrowly instrumental rationality from which insight and interpretive thought are barred. Huebner (1975a: 230) writes of this type of controlling language:

> Forcing responses into preconceived, conditioned patterns inhibits this participation in the world's creation. Limiting response-ability to existing forms of responsiveness denies others of their possibility of evolving new ways of existing.

The issue becomes political to the extent that this ontological de-skilling serves to block children's capacities for transformative thinking and to block their potential for a more complex and radical sense of being-in-the-world. Language itself, as the tool by which Heidegger believes individuals interpret everyday life, is made to give us this authentic function in much of the curriculum.

Individualized instructional systems represent perhaps the clearest educational analogy of an inauthentic, reductionistic conception of language. I observed one year in a school which employed one of these comprehensive individualized instructional systems. Children worked on their own or in pairs on self-guiding instructional workbooks and worksheets, tailored to their pre-tested "skill levels". When they completed the assigned materials following several weeks of work, they took a standardized post-test to determine whether thay had "mastered" that learning objective and could move on to the next higher objective, and a new packet of self-guided instructional materals. The language used in the curricular materials was simplified and standardized as much as possible in an attempt to eliminate vestiges of ambiguity, which might confuse pupils and require some form of verbal explanation by the teacher. The teacher, after all, had little time to dialogue with children, since the teacher's time, under such systems, is largely taken up in correcting papers, record-keeping, and test-giving. Over and over again in their school work, children at the school encountered the same or similar bits of phrasing, such as:

> "circle the word that...," "put an X on...," "find the missing term...," "group the following...," "write the number of... on the line next to...," "put the correct words...," "choose the phrase that...," "solve the following...," "complete the following sentences with...," etc.

Responses on the part of pupils were also simplified and standardized. Children were rarely asked for involved, interpretive responses, and in fact did little actual writing, if we mean by that something more than: choosing items from multiple choice lists, linking items in column "A" to those in column "B", completing sentences, and answering specific questions based on the manipulation of information provided

in charts, graphs, and short essays. Children were presented with small chunks of narrative text, abstracted from the source, and asked to instrumentally "mine" the text in order to "extract" bits of data which can be used in answering questions. This type of curriculum represents an extreme form of language reductionism, and in use by children it generated something qualitatively different than a Heideggerian conception of "reading" or "writing".

Efforts such as this in curriculum theory and design to reduce language to a set of logical operations and manipulable "bits" of data is, of course, consistent with a dominant objectivist paradigm in education and in linguistics. The "science" of language is aimed at stripping it of its everyday, commonsense meaning so that it can assume a more instrumental, rigidly-bounded and pre-defined form. Language is perceived to be a "problem" to the extent that it contains ambiguities and is reflexive, that is, takes its meaning from a lived context, as an inseparable element of that context. Ricoeur (1970: 50) observes: "Symbolic logic despairs of natural language precisely at the point where hermeneutics believes in its implicit 'wisdom.' "

The curricular metaphor for language usage in this case is one that depends upon the computer: the curriculum "programs" the pupil, who is then asked to use this information in various carefully-defined derivative situations. Language is stripped of its context, made non-dialectic, and thereby robbed of its power as the central tool for social transformation. As Paul Goodman (1972: 87) has observed, there is a "disposition to treat language and communication as a calculus of forms and a processing of information that could dispense with human speakers and hearers altogether." The necessity, in redirecting curriculum theory and linguistics, is to reestablish language to its authentic and primordial ontological form as discourse and liberate human grammar from reductionistic logic.

A related implication of Heidegger's work in education has to do with the way children learn to understand being-in-the-world in terms of the juxtaposing of subject and object. The self and the world confront each other under conditions of estrangement, so that intentionality becomes defined in terms of mastery over a world of "things" which "stand-over-against" the individual (Heidegger, 1977: 150). Heidegger shows us that the roots of this ontological stance may be traced back as far as the Greeks, although he associates it most directly with the rise of modern science, technology, and capitalist modes of production. Descartes, as the European philosopher who first establishes this subject-object split as the foundation of all we know about the world, comes under particular criticism from Heidegger for his severing of the self from its "within-the-worldness" (1977: 131). The self-consciousness of the subject, which Descartes proclaimed, grows to full proportions under advanced capitalism as both an individualistic "will to power" and mastery over the external world, and as an individualistic withdrawal from the world into a privatized sphere of family life, consumption, and self-gratification. In both its active and passive forms, this ontological stance serves to "sever" the individual from a real world of struggles, commitments, and actions which have sociohistorical consequences. In everyday life the individual thus "fools" itself into believing that it remains outside the world, even if it is not (1962: 89).

Children learn this ontological logic in schools through the promotion of an individualistic, competitive spirit, where one's own "success" is made dependent upon someone else's "failure"; through the commodification and externalization of all individual achievement in the form of graded assignments; and through the suggestion that a topic of inquiry is merely something to be "mastered" and made to serve a utilitarian function on a test. All of this represents an objectification and a distanciation of experience which makes the world "stand-over-against" the self in a way that blocks the accessibility of the world.

Schooling and the dimming-down of anxiety.

A final way of viewing schooling from an ontological framework which I want to explore is to analyse it as a form of anxiety-control. To Heidegger, the crisis of contemporary capitalism is precisely that of anxiety-control. We must recall that being-in-the-world as a thrown actor in an historical drama, is a basic

and unavoidable state of being. Under normal conditions, as I will explore more fully shortly, this being-in-the-world is not recognized in its authentic form, and the individual turns away from the world and the possibilities for action revealed in the world. Anxiety, then, is the shocking recognition of one's own "thrownness" in the world, in which one is constantly making the present and choosing the future. Heidegger says, "that in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the world- as such" (1962: 230). Anxiety brings the self back to this basic fact and confronts it with its own possibilities and potentialities. In anxiety one also confronts the "profundity of world shock" (1962: 157), the unsettling and unnatural sense of "not-at-homeness" in the world. But it is precisely within the darkness of this knowledge, according to Heidegger, that one also glimpses, and becomes aware of the possibility of, more authentic modes of being. Anxiety thus represents to Heidegger the psychological driving mechanism behind inquiry and insight. It is the "call" of being-in-the-world more authentically, and Heidegger regards it as an inherently "truthful" and insightful stance.

Heidegger politicizes this understanding of anxiety by showing how it is "dimmed down" in everyday life, and transformative thinking thereby blocked, through identification with the false or manufactured "they" of mass culture. In this consensual "they", life is made to give up its mysteries, uncertainties, risks, and struggles; since there are no real dangers to face and no real conflicts, there is consequently little need for individual commitment or action. Heidegger (1962: 165) remarks:

> The "they" maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it... Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency... which we call the "levelling down" of all possibilities of Being.

The "thrownness" of being is in these ways characteristically experienced as a "falling", according to Heidegger, in which the self "loses itself" in the publicness of mass culture, so that it is constantly "disburdened" of anxiety. The self drifts towards an alienation in which its own most potentiality-for-being is hidden from it. Heidegger (1962: 222) writes: "Falling Being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquillizing; it is at the same time alienating."

There are several existential modes in which this "falling-alongside-of" may be expressed in everyday life, which bear directly upon schooling. One of these existential modes Heidegger identifies as curiosity, a form of "looking-at" in terms of dwelling autonomously alongside-with. Curiosity does not make a phenomenon "present-at-hand" in order to tarry alongside it and understand it; but seeks only to see and to have seen. It is a constant craving after the new in such a manner that the self is disburdened from waiting for something to happen (1962: 397). In this existential stance, the individual is so little devoted to the "thing" itself, that when it obtains sight of that about which it is curious, it already looks away to what is coming next. To this extent, Heidegger identifies curiosity as a "not-tarrying" and a "never-dwelling-anywhere" characteristic of contemporary Western society (1962: 398). One sensorily consumes entities in curiosity, and one also disposes of them. This existential stance of factically regarding the "objects" of the world is also inherently ahistorical. The individual is uprooted from history and made to dwell in an ever changing but historically meaningless present. Curiosity, as Heidegger uses it, does not direct our attention to the critical examination of the phenomena of everyday life, in which events are unconcealed and made to take on meaning within larger contexts. Neither does it lead us to active involvement in the ongoing task of reconstructing social institutions and redefining social knowledge. Instead, curiosity takes on the character of a passive consumption of the "newness" of objects produced by mass culture. Intentionality is deflected from its authentic, active form, and is represented merely in the choice of one predetermined object or product rather than another.

Curiosity, as a motivating agent in the learning process, has almost uniformly been praised by educators, from Jean Jacque Rousseau, to Granville Stanley Hall, to John Dewey, to Jean Piaget. These and other educators have associated curiosity with exploration, questioning, excitement, and the pursuit of truth. But Heidegger makes us aware that curiosity also has its inauthentic form, a form he sees as dominant in contemporary Western culture. In the Heideggerian sense, curiosity takes on the flavor of exploration which is superficial and short-term, which occurs without struggle or anxiety, and which is consequently incapable of revealing the fuller significance of everyday phenomena. One sees this form of curiosity, I believe, in many "flashy" textbooks designed to "grab" children's attentions, and even more dramatically in children's television programming. Public television's Sesame Street has, in this regard, explicitly adopted the commercial networks' model of curiosity-arousal and of never-tarrying-anywhere for long. Children are presented with a short, visually stimulating message; then, normally within ten-to-twenty seconds, it is time to move on to another attention-grabbing instructional "packet" of videotape. The assumption is that young children have short attention spans, although this assumption may be largely self-fulfilling; for curiosity-arousal and satiation is the hidden programming of such television shows.

Another way in which anxiety gets dimmed-down in schools is through conveyance of what Roy Schafer (1976) calls a "romantic vision" of life. The romantic vision celebrates "the power of positive thinking" and shuns "negativism." Life is perceived as a quest, and according to Schafer (1976: 32):

> The quest follows the pattern of the wishfulfilling daydream... In this daydream, ideals are represented by virtuous heroes and heroines while threats to the ascendancy of these ideals are embodied in villains. The romantic vision is, implicitly if not explicitly, regressive and childlike, particularly in its persistent nostalgia for a golden age in time or space that is the essential destination of the quest.

The romantic vision is perhaps best embodied in public education in the curricula of social studies, civics, and American history. Children are, for the most part, told to ignore the very real and present dangers of the arms race, the continuance of racial and sexual inequalities on a massive scale, the possibilities of ecological destruction. Students most often are taught to view the excesses of the system as the excesses of individual "villains", such as the "robber barons" of the early twentieth century, or Richard Nixon, a recent example of someone who has come to exemplify power corrupted. The tacit assumption is that while these "villians" will occasionally appear, leadership on the whole is wise and benevolent and strong. Each new crisis is surmounted in turn. In this process of romanticizing history and culture, the world is made to give up not only its dangers, but also its contradictions, mysteries, and absurdities. Choices and consequences become simplified and idealized. A less naive and more generative vision of life, according to Schafer (1976: 35), makes one aware of:

> the necessity to act in ignorance and bear the fear and guilt of action; the burden of unanswerable questions and incomprehensible afflictions; the probability of suffering while learning or changing; and the frequency with which it is true that only in the greatest adversity do people realize themselves most fully.

Through curiosity arousal and the romanticization of everyday life, real anxiety in contemporary society is constantly being dimmed. The self is accomodated if it has any tendency to take the easy way or accept the easy answer, and is disburdened of its being along the way (1962: 165). The child in school who persists in feelings of anxiety in the face of these daily reassurances and distractions risks being labeled maladjusted.

Towards a radical ontology of education.

While Heidegger focuses upon an ontological critique of alienated selfhood in contemporary society, he

also provides the framework for a radical or authentic pedagogy; for as Heidegger would say, in every critique is also its "freeing claim" (1977: 26), a new synthesis, a transcending form. The development of more authentic modes of being-in-the-world thus amounts to a reappropriation of what has always been present, as an unchosen possibility. According to Ricoeur (1970: 45): "I must recover something which has first been lost... Appropriation signifies that the initial situation from which reflection proceeds is 'forgetfulness.' "

The world is always turning and moving before the self, in Heidegger's ontology of everyday life; and in this turning, things are revealed to us occasionally in a clearer or less distorted light. This revealing takes the form of an "in-flashing", "in-blinking", or insight, in which something concealed previously comes into unconcealment. The insight of hermeneutic rationality not only reveals the essence of everyday life, it "summons us to our potentiality-for-being" (1962: 347).

Heidegger, it seems to me, provides a strong grounding for a radical reconceptualization of pedagogy in contemporary Western society. He insists that we not get caught up in attempting to specify the precise shape and substance of a non-capitalist society, or the ordering of events which will bring it about in a "planned" fashion. That, he argues, is not primarily what the moment demands (1977: 56). What is needed is a return to hermeneutic rationality and discourse, and a looking-into-the-face of anxiety. This serves not only to reveal what is at hand, it also reveals an authentic "opening way" down which the throwness of being may be directed. Heidegger argues that we should be teaching our young "preparedness" more than anything else, preparedness to the signs and symbols of everyday life, for "signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something" (1962: 111). William Pinar (1971: 183) observes:

> History is continually unconcealing. In specific situations, in a classroom for instance, we attune ourselves in order to see that which our everyday eyes do not see. We must close these eyes, listen, and discover what lies concealed... It is a matter of allowing reality, of which I am a spokesman, to speak itself.

Curriculum as a form of critical preparedness or attunement is well documented by Ira Shor (1980) in his account of teaching at the City University of New York during the open admissions era of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Shor worked primarily with working class pupils, and in his attempt to help them recognize the political nature of their everyday lives, he presented them with a number of symbols, each of which had to be revealed in terms of its social significance and its linkages to other important social phenomena. One such symbol, or metaphor, was the common American hamburger, and I now want to quote from Shor's account:

> One day, I walked into the college cafeteria, and was surrounded by the hot grease smell of frying burgers... I bought a hamburger and took it to class. What better way to extraordinarily re-experience the ordinary? The burger is the nexus of so many daily realities. It's not only the king of fast foods, the lunch/snack/dinner quickie meal, but it's also the source of wages for many students who work in the burger chains. In addition, the spread of fast food franchises is tied into the suburban dispersal of the American city. This dispersal is further connected to the automobilization of American life. The car, the suburbs, and the burger thus connect central themes of everyday life. So, I was able to hold in my hand a weighty interstice of mass experience. My students had eaten, cooked, and sold countless numbers of hamburgers, but they had never reflected on all this activity. I brought a burger to class and interfered with a major uncritical flow of mass culture. It was a lucky break, played out on a hunch... We passed the burger from person to person, so that people could touch it, smell it, carefully look at its texture and color. The empirical reports were interesting. Close up,

on reflection, many of the students found the hamburger repulsive. It was greasy; it was a mess of ugly colors; it was rubbery; it ran with ketchup; the lettuce was limp; the roll was stale, and so on. We were all surprised at this response. When I read back to the class a composite of their descriptions, the burger took a strongly negative shape. I next asked people to attempt a diagnosis of this object. The obvious problem suggested by our work so far was: If the burger is unattractive, why do we eat so many of them? Why are there so many fast food restaurants? Why are so many things put on top of hamburgers? Are they nutritious? What did we do for restaurants before the fast-food empires began pushing the burger? (1980: 152-163).

One further implication of Heidegger's work for the development of a critical pedagogy, implicit in what Shor is talking about, is that nothing ever gets understood or accomplished on either the individual or social level without struggle. Our contemporary society offers individuals a flight from anxiety into the manufactured consensus and values of mass culture, so that much of what presents itself to us each day for reflective analysis gets noiselessly passed-over. The task of critical educators is to help individuals face ontologically-grounded anxiety; for it is only in the face of anxiety that one is empowered to act more authentically and recapture that which has been appropriated.

Just as capitalism requires the reproduction of a certain taken-for-granted epistemology, so it also requires the reproduction of inauthentic modes of being-in-the-world. I have suggested that this inauthenticity may be located in schooling in the reductionistic treatment of language and writing, in the severing and distancing of school learning from a real social context, and in the dimming-down of anxiety through curiosity and a romantic vision. I have also pointed to some of the ways we may reappropriate a more radical conception of pedagogy, based on hermeneutic rationality.

In this paper I have neglected the important methodological issue of how curriculum analysis and ethnographic research in classrooms may be grounded ontologically as well as epistemologically. Ethnographic research, particularly, must address the issue of how pupils and teachers experience their school lives, develop collective and private school identities, and relate themselves to both the formal curriculum, and the "hidden curriculum" of tacit meaning about "work", "play", "authority", "reading", "interpreting", etc. We need to know more about the functional or pragmatic uses of language in defining the classroom situation, that is, in defining the appropriate ontological relationship between the individual and what is going on in the situation. We also need to analyse student choice, for in an ontological sense students exercise choice every moment of the school day. The issue is not whether pupils exercise choice, but how these choices get "made", in what context, and with what consequences. My hope is that ontological analysis along these lines will help us better understand how dominant modes of being-in-the-world get reproduced in classrooms as teachers and pupils work with the curriculum, and also how they may be transcended.

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AIRLIE 1983

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A Full Curriculum for the Gifted Handicapped

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Preface

Curriculum in special education often heads in the direction of the exceptionality served. The emotionally handicapped deserve, and are required by Public Law 94-142 to receive, careful and specific instruction. Those who advocate for the gifted urge imaginative and creative instruction. Rarely do these two emphases of specificity and imagination meet unless one is teaching learners who are both gifted and emotionally handicapped. In the present case, the students were identified, certified, and placed according to the latter exceptionality. My hope was that they might also be identified and certified as gifted, or at least that they might be served according to their needs. They needed a full curriculum.

One requirement for providing a full curriculum for the gifted handicapped is that it should be comprehensive. Another requirement is that the form as well as the content of the curriculum should be imaginative. However comprehensive I might have hoped my curriculum would be, I never dreamed it would take the imaginative form it finally received. For one thing, making poems is a burden. For another, poetry takes the writer where it will. Nonetheless, curriculum as I saw it is and must be poetic or imaginative at its base.

The way in which the curriculum developed, then, was in sonnet form. There are thirty-eight sonnets (with thirty-seven titles). The sonnets should be read as seven sets of five or more poems each. The first set is about the "model" for the curriculum; the second set is about the students; the third set is about "regular" teachers; the fourth set is about administrators; the fifth about support personnel; the sixth about special education teachers; the last set of (eight) sonnets will be described below. The first poem in each set of five is introductory; the second, third, and fourth poem in each set deals with three different types of characters within the set, and the fifth poem of each set reflects upon the first four poems of the set.

At the risk of being officious, I will say a few things about how to read the poems described thus far. On the surface level, I hope to amuse and to delight. If the reader does nothing more than count the end-stopped or slant or masculine rhymes; or quarrel with the iambic pentameter; or find the concluding couplets unearned; I will not be at all surprised. I will be disappointed if the surface stops the reader rather than urging him forward to deeper levels. At a slightly deeper level, therefore, I hope the exaggeration and fun and humor will not be missed. My hope is that the reader will allow the texture to refer him to the "mimesis," the action dimension of the curriculum. (As I suggest in dissertation, there are three serious types of action in the curriculum.)

At the mimetic level, the action level, I wish to warn the reader about misplaced concreteness. As you, the reader, grasp the action of Creel, Mrs. Feel, Troy, Wispy, and Bluff, do you feel that they are real people or that they are imaginative? Are they unique or are they epiphanies of the archetype appropriate for that poem in the set? That in turn will depend upon where you think reality finally resides. One final clue: look for the author as one of the characters in the poems. Is that character's position the same as that of the author? The hint here is that a poem and a poet cannot play favorites, even if the author is writing about himself.

So much for imagination. The curriculum for the gifted handicapped should also be comprehensive. Exceptional learners and special education are often short-changed because of a lack of curriculum comprehensiveness. Teachers of the gifted develop humanistic curricula; teachers of the handicapped develop

behavioristic curricula. Little curriculum theorizing and less curriculum criticism is done. In order to overcome this bifurcation I have done three things. First, I have limited myself to seven ideas of one philosopher. Although Whitehead develops them, he argues that they derive from Plato. They are comprehensive in that they deal with everything. I have rendered my "prehension" of them poetically and placed them last in the last set of eight sonnets. Although unacknowledged, these ideas often form the framework of texts used with the gifted. Jacob Bronowski's The Ascent of Man comes to mind as an example. Second, I have used a typology of myths or world views that constitute ideal types of world views presently viable among students and educators: the Greek, the Judeo-Christian, and the Modern world views. For example, in the first six sets of sonnets, the three different types of characters within the set are each modeled upon one of the three different world views. One character is "Greek," one is "Judeo-Christian," and one is "Modern." Third, and this is suggestive and heuristic in nature, the seven ideas (Eros, Harmony, Ideas, Mathematical Relations, Physical Properties, Psyche, and the Receptacle) and the three world views (Greek, Judeo-Christian, and Modern) are used to discover the curriculum.

The handicapped need every prosthetic device we can develop to aid their learning and to overcome their limitations. While the emotionally handicapped are often several grade levels behind their peers, their reasoning and their intelligence is often normal or above. The seven ideas and the three world views, when presented to the emotionally handicapped, provide reasonable overviews or structures that help them deal with the curriculum despite the fears and the feelings that beset them. On the other hand, the comprehensiveness of the seven and the heuristic nature of the world view typology is a challenge and not an insult to their giftedness. A curriculum adequate for the gifted handicapped needs a flexibility and pluralism that challenges an adventure in ideas, but it also needs a limit and a structure (not a dogmatism that behaviorism wrongly provides) that will enable both teacher and student to "come down," to find a center.

The concluding attachments are two songs composed by the author that were used as part of the curriculum for the gifted handicapped. (For more on this see ERIC No. ED 201 131, by the author, on music.) The following are but a few of the resources for the curriculum suggested here:

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MODELS TO DISCOVER THE BIG PICTURE
To hold the content, the proper form had
to be chosen. But form presupposes
World view. Absolutist says: "All are bad
Except mine." Relativist: "All roses."
A typology avoids these extremes.
Each position within is serious
Option to the other two. While it seems
A three-way Procrustean bed, I must
Argue it is an heuristic rather
Than a constitutive hypothesis:
A canvas for each to fill in, rather
To constructive thought. I would be remiss
Not to acknowledge Macdonald, Whitehead,
Tillisch, Warren along with my poor head.

COURAGE TO CONFORM
The first model is behavioristic:
Realism, technology, Skinner.
Everything out there is real, simplistic.
He who hypothesizes is sinner.
We may say: This is model of control.
Fit out objectives, quantitatively
Measure them, program in behaviors! Roll
Them around to suit status quo! Seem free!
This is called the modern story. Hero
Does not act. No God. Time can but declare
Politics is all, everything for show.
World is meaningless, feeling is despair.
To be serious in this world one must
Have courage to conform, and not to trust.

TREASON IS HUBRIS
The second model is Greek and classic.
The real world does have its thoughts and ideals.
Education is more than rhetoric.
Timeless archetype tied to pig that squeels.
Hermeneutics lead to understanding.
If time recapitulates eternal
Return, then perfection is demanding
And failure to think is infernal.
This is the tragic story. High treason
Is hubris. The hero acts. God is fate;
Man, crushed by his own ironic reason,
Discovers the truth when it is too late.
Here the serious character can show
Faith in a universe where one can know.

LIBERATION IS TELIC
In the last model man's liberation
Is telic, and each group realizes
Its own destiny. An orchestration
Rather than solos for the queen's prizes.
Symbolism is not just another
Way to understand; religion, language
Art, commerce, games, law all barely cover
The lure in stone and man from age to age.
The redemptive story starts with a fall;
God is not the enemy but the friend.
Suffering is not the way out of all
Life, it is time and the way it will end.
This is the sculpture, poetry, music, dance
With the courage to accept acceptance.

BASSACKWARD
I've taught many exceptional learners.
Model one is used most on retardates,
And model three is used on foreigners,
Model two on gifted, with some debates.
This is bassackward. I should think control
Might best suit our gifted; understanding
With various minorities; moral
Development with lower functioning.
I have read and practiced my share of Bloom,
Renzulli, Torrance, Guilford, Piaget
In my own style and in my own classroom.
After twenty years, if I had my way
With these three models, I would discover
Student action and method to cover.

THE STUDENTS

THE THREE

Three students in my room: one was modern,
One classic, and the last was redemptive.
First student was a momma's boy. To learn
Manhood he needed father who would give
The image he could oppose and then learn
His selfhood. The second was most active
Mentally. Knowledge was his chief concern.
The third one in Eden wished to live.
One: suicide more manly than deceit.
Two: onion of knowledge ends up empty;
Three: Act dispatching guilt is not defeat.
I don't know who was best served of the three
If I knew the key, the link, or the latch,
I'd give each his appropriate match.

BERT

Had a self-denigrating, cliche look,
An inward, blowing-up-balloon, unsweet
Gesture. His actions admitted he took
All his mother's commands and would repeat
Them mindlessly. But he had soon forsook
This when he knew that while life would defeat
Attempts at suicide, I would not brook
Efforts to infantilize: all would treat
Him as mature. Slowly his mistrust
Began to grow. Played tennis like a girl.
Pulled his long sweater down to show his bust,
And page boy bobbed his hair to make it curl.
Yet underneath, a coward's vicious turn
Allowed his habits to be dull or burn.

CREEL

A pout, a purse of lips, a snarl, a sneer,
And if I plead, he plies one more sad mask;
And if I tell, he turns one more deaf ear;
And if I threaten, he will softly ask
What kind of scheme I have to keep him here.
His face will flatten like a leather flask.
At home he gobbles t.v. trash. If near
He retells it verbatim: easy task.
He is afraid to eat alone at lunch.
Even Christmas party he will resist.
Would not take gym, feared dressing with the bunch.
Tell a dirty joke? Ah, he will insist.
His math teacher told him to bring his "paccy,"
Unless he could stop being so damned sassy.

FRITZ

A gargantuan head and rabbit-faced
And made more rabbit-teeth-like when he smiled.
A toboggan on his curly locks graced
His head. Fifty pounds should have been filed
off his legs, his rear, his neck, and his waist.
He went back twice through the lunch line and piled
His plate high both times, all pounds and no taste.
He never won a girl, though self-styled
Romeo. His desk was like squirrel's nest.
His sheets so filled with scribbles, could not know,
Translate, what he wrote. At the very best
He saved himself by his clever bon mot.
Inherited cruelty's digression;
Never knew love except in counsel session.

THE MATCH

I do not mean to be so hard on Bert.
I've been a modern character myself.
He needs to be outside the school to hurt,
Or hurt, to seek, to find, to work for self.
Creel sounds less tragic than I think he is.
The school, like fate, will grind him down. Beauty
Will escape him. At law he'd be a wiz
If he could separate truth from duty.
Fritz has not fallen from his innocence.
Some day He'll learn that once he was a spy,
A bully, and a baby. His intense
Skill bathed in love if once he learns to cry.
A wholesome curriculum for these three
Will be a part, and quite apart from me.

THE TEACHERS

IDENTIFICATION
Cars move into the parking lot. Students
Tattle on each other. Bus comes and goes,
Classes fill and empty and for their stints
The teachers try v.t.r., picture shows.
Blacks and whites mingle, rich and poor consort,
Students have their minor victories while
Lonely ED's ride the city transport.
Ages shift. Power moves covered with a smile.
Where do wasted whose suffering is so
Religious fit into contests, or proms?
Can teacher's love, care, or discipline go
Very far in undoing hate of moms?
Teachers identify with athletes
And cuties, no way with student defeats.

WIREY
He likes to pause before he makes his point.
Cocks his head, winks his eye, makes a question
Mark in the air with his thumb so that joint
Of time is like crisp air before the fun.
He teaches history and is a coach.
Need we say both? I respect him as both.
Nice things to say of Creel. Above reproach
As mainstream teacher. A Black. Upon oath
To uplift. Takes natural pride in brother:
A backfield star and student president.
He is well-liked but has no pull. Smother
Him or bang him, but you will make no dent
In his fierce pride. He knows what can beguile
The handicapped to brag and never smile.

MRS. FEEL
She knew Fritz was bright, but had the courage to
Describe him as he was, give him an "F,"
When he had failed. She has a bit of Jew
In her to set you searching. Was not deaf
To tragic needs, seemed like doggish cost.
Sharp, clever, acerbic, at times remote.
Many students would like to have got lost
Between her knockers, yet she shared a note
To that effect with me. Although she knocked
Dullards in her classes, she sure was one
Excited gal, went off almost half-cocked
Just about the way they asked a question.
Every faculty needs one Mrs. Feel,
Just to make sure appearances are real.

GUSTA'S
Glasses have big lens, hiding her charming
Eyes. Her friends love her. She does cheer leaders.
When I first met her it was disarming
To look at her as she talked of "bleeders,"
And I questioned her medical knowledge.
She revealed facts behind her dogmatic
Statements, competence beyond the college
Trim, suffering that forgave erratic
Views. She remembers seminal events
By which a school renews itself. She gave
That touching hand to Bert that was defense
Against days humorless when he was grave.
She also took it as a victory
When death overcame our friend on faculty.

THE LAST FIVE
Talent shows and cheering crowds and the warm
Feeling of success, granting wishes, jive.
Moving about as though one could form
The universe or be in the last five.
Something in the media that snapped
The performance of the normal: really
Worse than that of the handicapped,
That no one normal is able to see.
Tests, instruments, devices of torture,
Observation, scrutiny, discussion.
No wonder that the labeled are unsure,
Worse than having a concussion.
But we must keep looking for our own hype,
Not to impose but to discover the type.

THE ADMINISTRATORS

HARD TO SEE

It may be hard to see why principal
In office, or secretary at front
Desk, or counsellor at the center, shall
Have the slightest effect on the stunt
We call the I.E.P. for the gifted.
But in fact principal is decision
Maker of the school, and when all is said
And done, the counsellor has the vision
To put the student on the honor roll
Or not, and secretary is at once
Sole taker of an incredible toll
On the bad manners as well as presence
Of all students. Giftedness is not
A matter of certification; is
Sensitive social activities.

MISS WEAVER

A slip of a girl with Farrah Fawcett style.
She fills the air with emergency spots.
Her pink and green outfit casts a profile
That sure compares with what must have been Lot's
Undoing. Call me a chauvenist,
But every office needs a syrupy
Voice on the intercom, a Calvinist
Couldn't help fantasize over if he
Had heard her. She helped one of my students,
An unlikely waif; cut her hair; lip stick;
Eye shade; took her home and told her to rinse
Her clothes. Event was paradigmatic.
Is not above a savage slam on males;
Her first voyage took wind out of her sails.

TROY

Troy was a big mountain counsellor:
Butter milk complexion and sky-blue eyes.
Dignified in her canary yellow,
Professional. Could not, would not, disguise.
She early got the team close by the throat,
Yet learned from them in many, many ways.
Attended I.E.P.'s, did them by rote,
Helped students get out of each private maze.
Official in state association,
Attended P.D.K. with me and say
How theory related to vocation,
Knew her job was house of brick without straw.
She'd back Fess down. Did not know ambition
Kept her from rising from her position.

FESS

The principal looked like a Daniel Boone.
He ambled cross the yard as his domain.
His poll-brown hair and his fall-brown eyes soon
Put you in composure you could maintain.
Expertise appeared in unexpected
Ways. He knew if you were mad and said so.
His office hours never neglected,
In social chats was always on the go.
While he would not knife you in the back.
He never would defend you, honestly
Saying he would not. My judgment this lack
Will make it hard for him to get degree.
He told me when I made it to third base;
Scapegoating me was one big sad disgrace.

THREE PROBLEMS

If you work with the handicapped who are
Gifted, you need a leader who can feel
The three problems you face with them. By far
The most dramatic is the great big deal
They make their injury in rebellion
Against all authority. Handicaps
They can handle. One becomes a hellion
Precisely when one is able to lapse
Into gifted non-conformity. Since
Your principal lets you run your class,
Giftedness, handicaps, adolescence
Presents no problem. But what gets your ass
Is head hunting, scape goating, turfism.
And those who prefer knifings to schism.

THE SUPPORT PERSONNEL

THE UNSUPPORT TEAM

The Public law assures the handicapped
Of a free appropriate and public
Education. Hurt youth must not be scrapped.
For parent and child, due process' stick
Assures least restrictive environment
From non-discriminatory testing.
A team-written I.E.P. will prevent
The burden of the learning from resting
On the student's shoulders. Instead a team
Of psychologist, liaison teacher,
And social worker will raise the old dream
Of equal opportunity once more.
For students in my class, what do you think?
Snoopervisors and a cretinous shrink.

ORPHANANNA

Has complimented me on my green pants;
Brought me a shirt with a hippo singing.
Does not sing in my class, nor does she dance:
Artistic approach leaves her hands wringing.
She wants to build an empire; is a
Fanatic in building it. Her baby
Last year did not hurt her plans. In their way,
Peers and students are steps to victory.
I told her I was on to her small game.
She was "on to me," in recessional
She sanctimoniously said. As lame
Excuse, said that "this was not professional."
I will not say she is a hypocrit;
A pushy modern without any grit.

WISPY SPURS

He grew tired of doing mountains of WISC's
And he wanted to move to the city
He sings in opera, talks of its risks;
He talks of England, how it is pretty.
I invited him to house and to church,
To go with me to P.D.K., somehow
Never worked out, I was left in the lurch.
First he was neutral when there was a row,
But the two girls finally made him give in.
So he left his post on the A.P.C.
Debate on I.Q. always with a grin,
Insists it is fixed in classroom with me.
Instead of being a radical avant
Garde, he is a dangerous dillettante.

FLUBADORA

A great advocate, afraid to visit
Filthy homes, homes with fleas, homes with no rugs.
Innocent, burdened with big thigh and teat.
Red hair aflame for everything but bugs.
Says that my body messages proclaim
Fear after she pounds my music program.
With me by herself she is very tame;
With the protecting group she is a ham.
Wants to wear her tap-dance outfit for laughs
To come to my class to lecture on God.
Self-proclaimed expert on Harmin and Raths.
Because I love my job, she thinks me odd.
I can't believe that such a social jerk
Could love a job doing social work.

INVERSELY PROPORTIONATE

Obviously the cost of I.E.P.
Skyrockets if team works on it all day.
Instead of debate on I.Q., Wispy
Should interpret scores in a learning way.
The teacher must find the mode the learner
Enjoys, but social worker can visit
The home and find out how money earner
Teaches the child the gross from the exquisite.
Liaison teacher can hear the teacher's
Plans and observe to see if they are taught
And help, instead of being a preacher
Counting the recruits whom she thinks she's caught.
To best serve students, it is hard to tell
If what is needed is this personnel.

THE SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHERS

ACTION

One curious question goes unanswered.
Given models, curriculum, people,
Isn't my sonnet form a bit absurd?
Like saying "plus" not "cross" on the steeple?
Good question! I had intended to be
Expository, epical, dramat–
Ic. But the outrageous theft of my three
Students deprived me of the fireside chat.
I regret that I have no spring rhythms;
Typology, no monolithic God.
But in the face of present cataclysms
We may more honor Hopkins, Donne or bard,
Trying to imitate in sonnet form
Action to which each actor must conform.

KNEE

He trained his aide to be a good teacher.
He dominated students, pushed them hard.
Late he admitted he was a preacher.
Revealed his fears to the team, but this marred
His image as a leader. He jousted
With an old timer for department head.
When he learned the team wanted him ousted,
Was he a leader or one of the led?
He worked to certify for the G.T.
Cried when all of his gifted kids were misplaced.
Got support of colleagues on committee.
By team humiliated and disgraced.
For a person who feels that all is control,
They made him feel like jailbird on parole.

BLUFF

She has a shock of blond hair, rooster style,
High forehead, lovely figure, athletic
Gait. Bouncy. Cute clothes and a wide smile.
Girlish, single, and down to the last lick
An educator, has her doctorate,
Teacher in physical education.
It did not seem to be for her too late
To marry, but why follow convention?
Worked with Creel in tennis, but only if
He did his music and so earned the right.
She said his swing was good, his serve was stiff.
His stroll to court was fast, his game was tight.
Androgynous service she provided.
Ironic, kept from being one-sided.

MELLA

Knows no distinction between rich and poor;
Talks and giggles with timid girls and barks
At rude boys. Laughs at absent-minded boor;
Able to distinguish straights from the narcs.
Bloom's taxonomy and Renzulli's triad
May not be second nature to her;
Loves her mother and lives without her dad,
But will serve as aide-nurturing other
To the gifted. Her own talents in art,
Quiet efficiency, a modest sum,
Reveal an education-without-books smart,
A lovely heart and lots of sincere wisdom.
To keep bright imagination alive
She knows that gifted just have to survive.

END

Oh God, I have talked of models that tapped
The special educators; regular
Classroom, mainstreaming teachers; handicapped
Students; support personnel: peculiar
As they may be; and the people in the
Administration. Now I am convinced
Exceptional learners, whether they be
Gifted or disturbed, or both, are incensed
By unctious management mechanicals;
Crave imagination or morality,
Tragic or redeemed by historicals;
Can write their own script for their own t.v.
Oh God, though you may be our fate or friend,
May we as learners come to know our end.

REFLECTIONS

IDEAS
Wire grass hid the wound, thought cut in and out,
Spring had filled the trees with rounds and lozenges
While all the ideals waiting there, no doubt,
Could gape at past, or future, history's hinge.
One steady feeling out beyond my reach
Formed with the grace of wisdom's skill the hands
That pull us out and gentle do beseech
Us ponder what we have done in foreign lands.
A house, its architecture and design
Can pull sounds from forsythia bugle
Or start a trend, shape earth, or house the blind.
Bear usage, arm space, remain so frugal.
Beauty, truth, and values urge forth process:
Reality, ideas in nature's dress.

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES
The soil beneath, the hot air pressing in,
The flowers bright, the smell of earth, the weight
Of flesh upon my legs, the call of ten
Different birds, the new-mown grass that's straight
Before me: all these things physical are
No more real than thought. Their going and their
Coming is less permanent than oaks or seas, star
or galaxy, but each a passage share.
Enjoyment and self-creation stir.
Each becomes an object for its brother.
Past in all its richness moves a free blur,
Into future-like recurring other
And in the passage of enjoyment
The mind is only body that God sent.

EROS
How round her mouth, how straight her legs pointed
Out in luring leisure, gathering to
Vast silence like the Lord's own annointed.
He pondered her eyeshade of wrinkled blue
And in his mind he heaped her honey hair
In ways of Taoist dalliance or climbs
At night of sacred coils into the air.
She expressed her passion in the beat of times
She flicked her finger at her silkenness
Of slip to a slide down stocking to its end.
His fantasy in fashionable stress
Could tred as slow as apathy to friend.
He stroked her dress, her arm, and her laughter—
Tipped nails as in joy he wrapped around her.

HARMONY
Harmony is morning green and yellow rays
In mist. When rule of sun is established.
Like pain in goinn, spikes in golden haze
Shoot down into the myrtle that wished
It had the dew of daybreak. A towhee
Sings in full voice, while wren and robin, jay
And cardinal cry and call. A sweetpea
Like mantis climbs to white empodded spray.
The heated air in nature takes no thought
Of man or matter, window falls, or plugs
And signs, or dogs and trains: All to be brought
Before the final assize just like thugs
Or saints, to magic circle mushroom ring,
And judged by deeds and all the fruit they bring.

PSYCHE
The eye cue of a one-eyed cat goes far
Beyond your ordinary clues of man
And beast. She knows her master by his car
And scampers from his bed when he might fan
The air with folded paper. She lifts her
Head to compensate monocle vision,
Crosses legs and puts her paws in prayer-
Fashion when it is hot. Her chief mission
In life is to raise her intellect. Proof?
Instructional enrichment games hold no
Terrors. She plays charades. Puns. And can spoof
You every time you think you're in the know.
Her life, untouched by ambiguity:
Blindness faces with equanimity.

MATHEMATICAL RELATIONS
The chance for chaos is no greater than
The chance for order though chaos is not
Evil. Assume order: there is chance man
May measure and may estimate or spot
The points along the great continuum
Where matter changes over into life;
Or separate the difference from the sum;
Identify the passage in its strife.
God at base imagines all in feeling
And unity of life is not abused.
Galileo found his cleft mind reeling
In strange fancies with forms concisely used.
Power is striking down all enemies
Or tenderness in passage as we please.

REFLECTIONS (Continued)

THE RECEPTACLE IS
Heard in our being only when no voice
Is speaking. Like the scent of tea olive
Surrounding us without our choice.
We receive when we are not the one to give.
We understand the part; we know the whole.
Like idle chatter among friends, warm rhyme
Sustains love in death, bearing aged soul,
Knowing that only as we move in time
Can we create ourselves, and so can God.
If emergent freedom can envisage
Mental dimension of a lump of sod
Or matter of a holy pilgrimage,
Then holy passage will not stay unless
Reality is both form and process.

God is no exception to this rule:
Needs no metaphysical compliments.
Is instance of idea-matter pole,
Nature primordial with consequence.
World as body, God knows no future, since
Future is not real. Loves. Is limited.
Absolute in relation to immense
Universe, absolutely related.
All form and function in creation swing
Into life and motion, ideal presence,
Envisage all and move unrelenting
Toward higher levels of concresence.
Metaphysics makes objectivity:
A healing truth in creativity.

LIL

Whatever happened to Lil, I doubt she's alive.
I never had all my fill of her here inside.
When she worked with Hol, I saw her once or twice,
She was either naughty, or very, very nice,
And her drink was filled, but never filled with ice.

Oh, whatever happened to Lil I hope she's alive.
I never had all my fill of her here inside.
When she worked in Jimmy's shop I met her in the room.
She took away their money, and made the boys all swoon;
Told them to clean up the place, and handed them the broom.

Oh, whatever happened to Lil, I think she's alive.
I never had all my fill of her here inside.
Now she owns a shop, I think in Paris, France,
Turning out men's skivvies and fancy underpants,
The kind that leaves you free just when you're out to dance.

Oh, whatever happened to Lil I know she's alive.
I never had all my fill of her here inside.

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CAROLE'S SONG

We are learning today all the things that we know,
And the things that we know are most surely to grow,
We are feeling today all the things that we feel,
And the things that we feel are most certainly real,
They are real.

We are knowing today all the things that we learn,
And the things that we learn in our hearts always yearn
Like the warmth of a love that helps us to know
That the love we have learned is as pure as the snow,
As the snow.

The seed that will grow in the brown earth below
Is as real as the winds up above that do blow,
For the seed that will change into grass that is green
Is living below all the snow that is seen,
That is seen.

The limb that has lost all its leaves is so bare,
Till it greens up in spring with the leaf and the pear,
Though our love is unseen as the seed in the ground
It is full as the fruit when it's ripe and it's round,
And it's round.

(Repeat the first verse)

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Summer 1978

A PLAYLET
Time As A Horizon for a Curriculum

Conrad Pritscher
Bowling Green State University

Scene: A K-12 Curriculum Committee meeting.

Narrator: Barton Lowdegger has been invited to help a school system create a K-12 curriculum that will better facilitate individualizing of instruction. Herb Lewis, curriculum committee chairperson, calls the meeting to order.

Herb: Welcome. I'd like to begin immediately by introducing Dr. Barton Lowdegger. Dr. Lowdegger is a world famous seminal thinker whose provocative thoughts are only now beginning to be practically applied to various scientific and social endeavors. Dr. Lowdegger wants to be interrupted at any time if you wish to ask a question or to make a comment. It is my pleasure to introduce Dr. Barton Lowdegger.

Barton: Thank you, Herb. I'd appreciate your help in introducing this topic. Would you be willing to do that?

Herb: Certainly. What kind of help do you want?

Barton: Simply give a brief gist of what you said to introduce me and then ask 'To what do you owe your great success'.

Herb: Okay, here I go. Dr. Lowdegger is a world famous seminal thinker. Tell me, Dr. Lowdegger, to what do you owe ---

Barton: (interrupting) Timing.

(Laughter by audience) Slight Pause.

Barton: Timing is the focus of my remarks today. I think we will agree that a curriculum would not be a curriculum unless it structured the time of its students. So we talk a lot about time and each of us knows what time is, yet, when we are asked to explain it, we find that to be very, very difficult to do. I won't, therefore, explain time but I will elaborate on some distinctions between clock time, that is, chronological time, and psychological time in an attempt to show how students' needs and society's needs can be better met as a result of moving toward balance between the ways in which time functions.

Debbie: I'm already confused, but I'm not sure about what.

Barton: I am too. If we look at our confusion as a source of wonder, it can be helpful. This elaboration on distinction between chronological and psychological time will hopefully move us toward better describing a curriculum that includes an expanded temporal dimension. Better descriptions of curricula can lead us toward more powerful explanations of curricula, and more powerful explanations can lead us toward more powerful and efficient curricula.

Boris: Can you give an example of a distinction between psychological time and chronological time?

Barton: Yes. Just imagine yourself for one minute severely stubbing yourtoe and imagine the high degree of pain that comes with it. Okay, now imagine yourself for one minute involved in a highly

pleasurable activity. You probably would find that the one minute of pain seemed very long in relation to the one minute of pleasure. What makes the pleasurable experience seem short and the painful experience seem long may be viewed as another kind of clock. Now our using two or more kinds of clocks, while we deliberate about how to structure the time students have to their running of the course (their curriculum) can give us an edge that one clock alone won't give us.

Milt: Can't this be condensed somewhat? Can you get more to the point and I hope you don't say something like, 'Time is that Being which, in that it is, is not, and which, in that it is not, is.'

Barton: I notice you are familiar with Hegel. I, too, hope I don't just say something like that. I'll try not to be overly verbose. I want to here mention an assumption at the foundation of my comments. The assumption is that a positive stimulating experience leads one toward dynamic balance. I am further assuming that balance between and among the forces within one, and balance between the individual balancer and outside forces is an irreducible idea. I am positing that balance is like an equilibrium that one maintains as he moves toward becoming the person whom he has the potential to become.

Carrie: I'm getting glimpses but you are being very general. Can't you be more specific and concrete. I'd like to get started on our planning.

Barton: I can appreciate that. I'm betting that your curriculum planning will be easier and more productive if you pay attention to the differences between the chronological clocks on the wall and the psychological clocks within your students. I want to say just a bit more about my assumptions before I invite you to get into small groups to exchange views and generate ideas. I am assuming and contending that by disintegrating the idea "timing" into several subprocesses, and then integrating these subprocesses into a larger process, we will have another way to view what we call a curriculum. A word that encapsulates this integration of subtimes into the larger view of time let's call integrating time. Integrating time is that which we are involved in when we are effectively timing. Effective timing is a global process similar to the process of exploring, to the process of creating, to the process of educating ourselves, to the process of actualizing and similar to the process of full functioning. These words signify processes that are for themselves whereas the learning of square roots, for instance, is not usually for itself, but rather, learning square roots can assist us in our exploring, creating, balancing and in our effective timing. Now in your small group I'm asking you to discuss one of the following ideas that integrating time can be divided into. These are Hugenholz's divisions that I find useful. Group one will discuss and hopefully come to some conclusions about their ideas of animal time; Group two will do the same for human time; and Group three will do the same for vital time.

Small Groups exchange ideas as follows (movement into groups)

Group One

Milt: I think animal time can be characterized as discontinuous, durationless, static and somewhat overwhelming.

Mary: What comes to me is a time of instants without horizons and the past, present and future are unrelated and disconnected. Also, the future is beyond control and oppressive and time is without direction without choice.

Tim: I think of animal time as time without choice.

(Camera moves to Group Two)

Becky: When I think of human time I think of self realization, freedom, the new, a time of discovery about more of me, more of my environment, and a time for expanding my consciousness.

John: I see human time as a time where I am receptive to redefine myself and what I notice, a time of choice, creativity and probably change. I see myself as more flexible in human time.

Frank: Nothing is coming to me. I'm still confused about what this is all about.

(Camera moves to Group Three)

Sam: I see vital time as a unity. In it I feel connected to people, things and events.

Jill: I agree with Sam and I see vital time as fluid, dynamic where past, present and future intermingle and define each other.

Phil: I think of finding comfort in routine activities where time passes quickly. I also see, in vital time, a liking for planning, and anticipating results. I wouldn't feel pressed or feel behind schedule and I visualize a high degree of faith in a stable and a certain future that is closely connected to present concerns and requirements.

Narrator: Their discussion continues for forty-five minutes. Each small group reports to the large group and their reports state essentially what you heard. Herb now continues the meeting with:

Herb: I was impressed by your reports. I'd like Dr. Lowdegger to respond to those reports.

Barton: With pleasure. I, too, am impressed. I noted the similarity between your conclusions and Hugenholz's regarding those divisions of time. Before I attempt to do some putting together of these kinds of time, I'd like to add a few preliminary remarks about time with the hope that they will be useful for you in your curriculum deliberations. As all words, do, the word "time" relates to experience. The word "change" also relates to experience. Time is a means of organizing change. Change occurs continuously in a dynamic interactive universe. Some change appears to be changeless such as sunrise and sunset. In other words sunrise and sunset continue to occur whereas some changes, such as a particular perch eating a particular minnow, is a change that seems to occur only once. Any change that continues to occur, such as sunrise and sunset, can be used as a means to organize events that do not repeat. If something endures which is to say changes changelessly, there is no other event by which to organize it. If there is nothing else to organize it, it can't be explained in the way that non-enduring events can be explained. The events that do not continue to change, and are therefore organizable, may be described as discontinuous. In other words, we know events by their relative discontinuance of change. One change can be differentiated from another on the basis of differing degrees of discontinuance. A process with no differing degrees of discontinuance, such as the general process of timing, has no other coordinate or superordinate process to be differentiated with and, hence, remains publicly inexplicable (at least it can't be explained to the degree that subordinate processes can be explained). I see you have a glow that just arose. Would you please say what that's about.

Herb: Mary, you look excited.

Mary: I'm disturbed by our old curriculum and excited about possibilities. Our old curriculum was overly concerned with too many students doing the same thing at the same time. With so many minutes or hours (or Carnegie units) of this or that, it is assumed that students become educated, and if they don't, it certainly isn't because teachers and administrators didn't do what they were supposed to do, that is to say the covering of so much material in so much time. There is often little time for the student to wonder and find out about events and processes that are important to him. The student doesn't often focus on what is genuinely puzzling for him because many teachers "teach" only what they know, and what many teachers know is often not puzzling to them. That is similar to saying that many teachers don't know that they don't know. Teaching what they don't know is analogous to the teacher's becoming a fellow inquirer.

Jim: That fits. I'm now remembering some research that Garrison and Force did about 20 years ago that included the fact that inquisitiveness on the part of students was what teachers rated as the tenth most troublesome characteristic in their classrooms. I would like to suggest that we develop a curriculum that includes experiences that attempt to develop students' ability to become effective timers so that they will integrate the positive elements of animal time with human time, vital time, and chronological time. I think many of us would agree on that and the tougher questions deal with how this could best be done. The conditions of a responsive environment and a freer atmosphere are probably necessary. How to provide these conditions is beyond the scope of my comments here, but a clue to getting students to become effective timers would be for a school administration to attempt to provide the conditions whereby the teachers view their teaching behavior and their curriclum as effective timing. We have had, in recent years, much evidence that teaching behavior and our curriculum have generally been in need of an overhaul. We, as educators, have made some noticeable advances. We will continue to make advances if we knock over ladders that are no longer functional for educating in an accelerating age of self reliance and leisure. Certainly we want to assist students in their preparation for a meaningful career. Yet I noted in a book entitled Real Time that agricultural man spent ten years of his 35 year life expectancy in work, and eight years, that's 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, in creative and leisure time, including childhood play). I'd like us to consider whether or not our curriculum would do more for our individual students and society by focusing on the wise use of creative and leisure time and by developing self reliance.

Barton: Well, I'm amazed by what I'm hearing. I'm glad that this is being video taped for the school board. You (pointing to Boris) would like to add something.

Boris: (upset) Yes, I'm still not satisfied with your explanations, Dr. Lowdegger. I want to add that we can account for, which is to say, tell to the satisfaction of our superiors, account for the accomplishment of specific goals through the use of chronological time. Verifiability and falsifiability are at the heart of accounting when the goals are clearly specified. Now it just so happens that chronological timing is at the heart of verifiability in that we use common standards to make judgements concerning whether or not we have accomplished what we have set out to accomplish. The most common standard that we use to measure, or verify, or account for other standards is chronological timing. Without chronological timing some experiences would be random and we would not know whether or not we were doing what we wanted to do. Now my question is, is what you are saying falsifiable?

Barton: First, let me assure you that I have no intention of doing away with chronological timing. I want, however, to use other kinds of timing too. I think you will agree that your curriculum,

at rock bottom, ought to be designed to help all of your students become more intelligent.

Boris: I agree with that.

Barton: Well, if intelligence is evidenced not only by the development of means to goals that are desirable, but also by development of what goals are desirable, then chronological time is not adequate to measure, verify, account for, what goals are desirable. I am suggesting that integrating time which can be conceived as psychological time can be a clue to accounting for, verifying, and measuring what is desirable to accomplish. With only chronological timing, we could not know whether or not we are accomplishing what we want to accomplish. Determining what are desirable goals can be done by expanding conceptions and by questioning the foundations on which we are basing our curriculum. We won't expand our conceptions and and question the foundations on which we base our curriculum unless we wonder. Now wonder is a feeling and we won't know what is desirable unless we attend to feeling.

Boris: I'll need to give that some thought. I wonder what B.F. Skinner would say about that.

Barton: My guess is that B.F. Skinner has other concerns. I'd like to attempt to discuss the notion of integrating time as a foundational idea on which you may build a curriculum. I will try to relate what the three groups have reported about animal time, human time and vital time. Once again, this integrating time may be partially viewed as psychological time. Integrating time is evidenced when a student thinks and feels (is aware of) some gap in his feeling/notion gestalt. He is aware that he has some chronological time to deal with this semi-uncomfortable state. He has some confidence that he can integrate the experience that created the puzzlement into some greater degree of meaning. He feels productively tense and is desirous of a "better" connection between the present experience, what he remembers from the past, and what he predicts (in a reasonably open way) about the future. He believes he has some control over his present and future. He has some direction but at times, not as much as he wants. He is aware of some gaps in his cognitive and affective substructures. Such a state described above has some similarity to the positive aspects of animal time yet it overlaps with vital and human times as well. These three psychological times are hierarchical in the sense that the above mentioned modified aspects of animal time are necessary conditions for balanced operation in vital time and human time. I'm suggesting that integrating time may be viewed as a synthesis of what is powerful in the other three, and that at different chronological times (which includes different ages) an individual might find experiencing more of one kind of time more productive than another. An aspect of vital time that you reported that I would delete from integrating time is the aspect of only finding comfort in routine. There would be a liking for planning, working out schemes and anticipation of results, found in vital time, but these would be balanced with the feeling for the novel, spontaneity and, at some times, a lack of anticipation for results in integrating time. Human time is tempered by integrating time since in integrating time there is no strong striving for a broadening of horizons. This integrating time could be characterized by an openness to the present which does not imply merely immediate need gratification. In integrating time there is time for actualities as well as possibilities, conformity as well as creativity, temporary stagnation as well as change. As the past is open to redefinition in human time, it is balanced by some acceptance of present definitions in integrating time. The present is time for new choices as in human time. But this can be interpreted to include choosing old choices in integrating time. The perpetual renewal and everlasting growth of human time is balanced by allowance for retrogression that is chosen in integrating time. Integrating time is expanding and flexible but it would permit expansion by accepted narrowness and move toward flexibility by permitting some rigidity. It is now that we remember the

past, and now that we anticipate and predict the future. Yaker, Osmond and Cheek end their book, The Future of Time by saying, 'Before man is the great task of realizing the hour, not seeking all answers to all things, which in the end may be unworthy of knowing. The book has been a tour through a variety of garden paths dealing with this knowing. In the end some bad things in time are worth having. But sometimes we make the present bad only so the future can be brighter. Paradoxically, how to live in the future may in the last analysis be a function of the living in the present.' Living in the present, not merely surviving, implies that we know how to live in the present. This knowing is not strictly logical. If you would give the job of teaching students how to live in the present to a teacher who operates strictly on logic, strictly with his left brain, you would confront this teacher with a dilemma which his excessively developed logical side abhors for he wouldn't be living in the present and his logic, by itself, only using his chronological clock, wouldn't show him how.

Boris: I'd like to interrupt you to suggest that you now give us a demonstration of how to live in the present.

Barton: Well, simply notice what is going on in and around you. Each of us, including yourself, is living in the present. I see our task to increase our understanding of how we are now living in the present. Awareness of our present experience is the key to that understanding. Without the awareness and understanding, a new and more powerful curriculum will probably not be synthesized. I'm guessing but it seems to me that you are giving a left brain, a highly cognitive demonstration of living in the present. I agree with Henri Bergson who seems to call our cognitive pole, intelligence, when he says that a function of intelligence is to mask mobility, whether it be in movement or in variation. A function of intelligence is to mask duration. If the cognitive pole of intelligence did not mask duration, events would continue to endure. If events continued to endure, one event would be indistinguishable from others. We then would know nothing from strictly a cognitive point of view. To know only cognitively we must stop present experience so that knowledge,as we ordinarily use the term,must be knowledge of a past event. As whole persons we are more than our cognitive poles. As whole persons we can and do live in the present. Living in the present implies that we bridge gaps and that we operate with some degree of simultaneousness.

We can conceive of this gap bridging as simultaneously using, being, and/or having what is good or powerful from our Apollonian sides, and using, being and/or having what is good or powerful from our Dionysian sides. This simultaneousness can be equated with bridging the gaps between living reality and thinking about, between feelings and notions, between the whole and its parts, between dissonance and consonance, between knowing and not knowing, between 'the one' and 'the many', between stimulus and response, between subjective and objective, between event and process, between our right brain and our left brain, between our romantic side and our classical sides, between value and fact, between science and religion, between the covert and the overt, between the "is" and the "ought", between free will and determinism, between contingency and necessity, between being and becoming, between permanence and change. To ask if we can revel with Dionysius because we have reasoned with Apollo, or to ask if we can reason with Apollo because we have revelled with Dionysius is to miss this sense of simultaneousness.

Boris: This is completely confusing. I suggest we adjourn to digest or perhaps vomit what may be poison.

Herb: Dr. Lowdegger has more to say and I think most of us want to hear him.

Barton: Thank you, Herb. I would like to add that living in the present implies that we are now involved in experience. If concepts are extracted or abstracted from experience, experience occurs before, during, and after the formulation of a particular concept. There is no "between" experience for an individual. Timing is a way of differentiating one experience from another. Chronological timing excludes knowledge of the subjective other, and we do have such experience as indicated by our experience of shame and fame. By implication, an integration of chronological and psychological time may be a horizon on which we can view events and processes that would foster positive self concepts and the meeting of higher level needs. A framework of higher level needs has been posited by Abraham Maslow. The chronological timing seems to be more directly tied to meeting our basic needs for food, clothing, shelter and rest. An integration of the chronological and psychological timing seems more closely connected to the basic psychological needs which operate after our basic physical needs have been reasonably well met. A brief summary of Maslow's hierarchy of needs is as follows:

1. Needs for a feeling of protection, safety and security.
2. Needs for a feeling of belongingness, as in a clan, gang, family, group, etc.
3. Needs for respect and self respect.
4. Needs for actualization to free ourselves for the fullest development of our potential.

The needs at level one must be reasonably well met before the needs at level two can operate as motivators. Being a hierarchy, level two operates and those needs must be met before level three can operate——then three before four. All of these four levels obviously operate only after our needs for food, clothing, and rest have been reasonably well met. By using both kinds of clocks, we can attend to needs which people are naturally motivated to meet. An unmotivated student, in most cases, would, within this framework, be one whose proper need level has not been plugged into. Our goal here is not to provide an instrument or a set of verbal questions which if asked by a teacher and answered by a student would determine precisely on which need level a given student would be operating at a given time. Our goal is to make a case for paying greater attention to the feeling aspect of timing than we have in the past. A teacher, it seems to me, will not attend to, or be aware of, a student's feelings unless he attends to, and is aware of, his own. To claim that a curriculum does not deal with feelings is to treat a curriculum more as a body of knowledge than an activity. Plato reminds us that, "Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder." My comments, in part, have been an attempt to wonder out loud about whether or not timing is a horizon on which we wonder about other events and processes, and whether or not various events and processes, particularly those that deal with teacher-pupil relations, may become clearer as we view this horizon. It has been suggested that the center of this horizon is embodied in the notion of living in the present which amounts to more than immediate need gratification. By living in the present, we will be moving in the direction of solving more actual problems and we will be dealing with fewer imaginary ones. It seems that schools are moving in the direction of giving more attention to an integration of psychological and chronological time, but the devastating effects of a lack of integration will probably be with us for some time. Evidence of the devastating effects can be seen in a report which states that the subjects were asked to indicate the categories of people who were directly involved in creating situations which were experienced by these subjects as having had a highly negative effect in their lives (situations that seemed to retard growth and/or situations that seemed to have a strong negative effect on the subject's self-concept). The category of people listed most frequently was the category of teachers who showed up in 84 of the 257 interpersonal experiences that were noted. Next came parents and so on. Other evidence of the devastating effects of this lack of integration can be deduced

from the statistics given by a psychologist (Banks) who states that 8% of our children will become psychotic and will be in a mental hospital at some time in their lives. Another 16% will be what he calls profoundly neurotic; another 16% will be what he calls deeply neurotic; and another 16% will be what he calls mildly neurotic. That leaves less than half of our children to grow up to be reasonably well-adjusted adults. I don't intend to blame schools for all of society's ills. I do believe however, that some ills won't even be noted unless we use all the tools at our disposal. Our psychological clocks can be such tools when they are integrated with our chronological clocks. This integrated clock can help us and our students to know when to stop collecting new information and start producing new ideas. This integrated clock can also tell us when to stop producing new ideas and to intensify our evaluation of them. Lastly, this integrated clock can tell us when it is time to abandon one direction and to embark on others.

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Pretext: Essay Review of Soldiers of Light and Love, by Jacqueline Jones. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980, 273 pp.

The Missionary Teachers and the Freed People: Contradictions, Ironies, and Lessons from the Post - War South

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Soldiers of Light and Love: Northern Teachers and Georgia Blacks, 1865-1873[1] is a sensitive, well-balanced, and fascinating account and assessment of the "missionary-teachers" who came to Georgia after the Civil War to teach the freed people.[2] Throughout the work the author, Jacqueline Jones, provides expert treatment of the complexities, contradictions, ambiguities, and ironies involved in the freedman's work; and in light of them remains consciously ambivalent in her final assessment of this attempt to "transplant" the New England school to the southern black community.

Contradictions and ambiguities are evident from the beginning as Jones presents and develops the world view of the teachers and their sponsoring societies in relation to the freed people and the context of southern society. Although the Freedman's Bureau coordinated the various education programs in the South, most of the work was done by freedman's aid societies supported by protestant evangelical congregations in the North.[3] In Georgia, the American Missionary Association (Congregationalist) was dominant, but throughout the South there were other societies backed by other protestant denominations and all shared a common ideology.

Throughout the book Jones pursues as a major theme the interplay between the strength of idealism and the tragic flaws in the world view of mid-nineteenth century evangelical protestantism. On the positive side, she points out that the societies and their workers were radical abolitionists. They were authentically and firmly committed to both political equality and economic independence for blacks. They worked from a vision of an egalitarian and casteless society which was backed up by God's law. The slaveholder was guilty of the hideous crime of interfering with divine sovereignty. He was responsible for denying the slave's accountability to God, for stunting his moral sense, and for forcefully removing his moral agency.

Although ultimately responsible for their own behavior, the freed people had been "degraded" and victimized by the institution of slavery for which all (including the teachers!) must share guilt. Slavery was the "country's sin," and freedman's work provided both the opportunity to expatiate guilt (receive salvation) and regenerate the damaged characters of the freed people (give salvation). Hence, the women and men who came south to teach the freed people were highly motivated with a spirit of moral fervor and vision, a keen sense of duty, and a willingness to sacrifice self in extremely hard work for an ultimately meaningful cause.

Furthermore, Jones stresses that the relative absence of racism in the societies and their attitude of racial equality made their workers utterly unlike any other group in American society with the exception of a few non-evangelical radicals like William Lloyd Garrison. They differed not only from the overwhelming majority of southern whites but also from most northerners, including Republican politicians and military officials.

On the other had, Jones also emphasizes that the northern societies and their workers were narrow minded, self-righteously moral, and incredibly rigid in a number of ways. They were completely culture bound and lacked all of the conceptual equipment and sensitivity of the modern anthropological consciousness. This condition not only brought them into conflict with the very people they were supposed to be assisting, but it also led them to ignore the harsh realities of southern society to such an extent that their efforts to combat racism ended up as ineffectual at best and at worse aiding the forces of the status quo. Time after time Jones points to the tragic combination of the societies' egalitarianism and their unexamined notion of northern white cultural superiority.

Jones' research reveals that the missionary educators were prepared for and expected to alienate the

southern whites with their fervent egalitarian ideology. The hostility of the native whites, in fact, often seemed to heighten their sense of self righeousness and the conviction that they were continuing a holy war to combat wickedness and establish God's moral law on earth. The fact that their evangelical world view brought them into stark cultural conflict with the freed people in many crucial areas and helped undermine the black peoples' efforts at collective self help was never understood, much less dealt with, by the teachers and their sponsoring societies.

Like the earlier common school reformers, the missionary teachers were narrowly focused upon establishing a particular form of personal morality among their charges. Individual character reform (through "moral" education) among the freed people was the key to a better life for them. It was also the sine qua non of a better society as moral education would contribute to the social integration and stability and the conformity to yankee values so desired by the nineteenth century protestant reform mentality. Through this moral education the blacks would eradicate old vices and learn new habits of self control, love of hard toil, thrift, future orientation, sexual repression, temperance, and punctuality. The freed people were seen as plastic beings (children) who could be "uplifted" out of degradation (moral laxness) and molded into "ebony puritans."

Since only negative characteristics and lacks in black culture were perceived by the yankee educators, they were shocked and offended by all black efforts to establish and control their own educational institutions and perversely attempted to thwart these attempts. In Jones' assessment, this was the greatest tragedy of all.[3] They were also shocked and offended by the patterns of interaction, behavior and value of the other institutions of the emerging Afro-American community. For example, not only did they tamper with all expressions of autonomy in the realm of education (and with much success) but they also aggressively attempted (with virtually no success) to tamper with the religious practices and values. The freed people's religion of joy and collective hope expressed in spirited and sensuous worship services was merely a symbol to the teachers of the former slaves's general degradation and social pathology and of his need to be converted to the true religion of guilt, self denial, and scholarly sermons.

As suggested earlier, the rigid enthnocentrism of the missionary educators not only brought them into a mutifaceted conflict with the black community, but also led them to ignore the harsh realities of postwar southern society. In light of these realities, their position was ludicrous, yet they never perceived it as such. They perversely continued to insist that hard work, self control, and thrift would lead to a better life for a people who even after emancipation were routinely cheated out of the fruits of their labor. Moreover, not only in agricultural labor, but also in the northern factory, wage slavery was beginning to become a problem. Neither the southern agricultural worker nor the northern factory worker could be said to "own his labor" in the sense that the protestant ethic assumes. These were extant and emerging facts of the cases that the northern teachers were simply too rigid to confront. Their resistance in confronting these realities is related to a cardinal feature of their world view which differentiated them from radical abolitionists like Garrison, and which resulted in their being economic and political conservatives in spite of their strong abolitionist sentiment. They believed that except for the "sin" of slavery there was no need for reform of economic and political institutions nor any reason to agitate for civil rights. Eradicate slavery and its effects through education and moral suasion, and all will be well. These stubborn efforts to "uplift" the black people tell us much about the values, life styles, and neuroses of the teachers, but almost nothing about the needs of the freed people in their grinding poverty. In retrospect, it is difficult not to project an unconscious or subconscious sadism on their persistent efforts.[5]

Contradictions and ironies are also evident in Jones' assessment of the classroom situation. On the positive side, the teachers were Pestalozzian in outlook, in line with the common school reforms and the prevailing mentality of the New England normal school. They were, at least in theory, committed to arousing the interest of children and leading them to think independently, rather than merely going through a mechanical transmission of information. The societies discouraged physical punishment except in extreme cases and the teachers were committed to trying to "govern" their classes through means other than fear. They also

attempted to secure many audiovisual aids and to relate the various subjects to one another. Their curriculum included not only the three R's, but also geography which they taught in a broad manner so as to include a number of other subjects (e.g., botany, anthropology, history).

On the other hand, due in part to their narrow mindedness and protestant ethic, they did insist upon a rigid and punctual daily routine in which the students were supposed to be quiet at all times except when called upon to recite. The details of Jones' research reveal, however, that classroom rigidities probably had more to do with the utterly inadequate physical conditions in which the teachers were working than with their ideology. Most of the teachers in the urban areas had at least seventy students and some had as many as two hundred. Poor light, inadequate heat and ventilation, and overcrowding were commonplace. Some classes met in former chicken houses and slave quarters.

Weighing the influence of these conditions, Jones' speculates that discipline problems were much greater than the glowing reports of the teachers reveal. Moreover, she surmises that the awful physical conditions distracted educators from a more difficult issue which still surfaces frequently in American education: a single curriculum for ethnically diverse pupils. Physical conditions could be blamed for all discrepancies between expectations and results.

In addition, these classroom and other difficult social conditions combined with the evangelical ideology to produce another deep and tragic paradox. The evangelicals were genuinely zealous about racial equality and yet their interaction patterns with black people were often the same as those of the whites native to the slave societies; blacks were rewarded for acting out the subordinate role in relation to white persons --southern or northerner, former slave holder or abolitionist.

Soldiers of Light and Love is not only an important piece of research concerning black history, education, and race relations in post civil war America, it also provides important and fascinating insights concerning the history of another oppressed group in American society -- women. In the area gender relations Jones also focuses upon the interplay of contradictory elements and paradox. On the negative side, the Freedman's Bureau had a separate and inferior position for women. Their policy was explicit in affirming that women were incapable of exercising administrative authority. The private societies concurred wholeheartedly and assigned all administrative positions to males and most classroom teacher and social work positions to women. They also paid women less than their few male counterparts.

Nevertheless, Jones finds that in spite of all of this subordination, the southern teaching experience was a joyous and life-affirming one for many who participated. These young women as a group were primarily the daughters of New England and Midwestern professionals, farmers, and skilled artisans. Most of them were highly educated (had attended college, normal school, or academy) and had common school teaching experience. The newly "feminized" profession of teaching provided one of the few outlets for the talents and energies of capable young women who otherwise would be confined to a home (father's or husband's) in a dull and constraining "cult of domesticity." The progressive industrialization of the North had increasingly stripped the middle class woman of her productive function. As Grumet has stated concerning middle class women, "at the onset of the industrial era we find mothers and daughters penned up in the parlors with literally nothing to do"[6] other than exert "moral" influence on their families.

The opportunity to go south was doubly attractive in that it allowed the young teachers to escape completely, at least for a time, the domestic routine of their families. Certainly adventure, autonomy, spiritual growth, and other non-material rewards were amply present even though funds were always in chronic shortage and salaries were always low and undependable. Once the young women reached the south, they frequently challenged the authority of male administrators on a wide range of issues (e.g., salary, classroom procedures, administrative decisions) relating not only to the classroom situation, but also to life in the missions' "homes." Jones attributes this self assertion to the teachers' keen sense of professionalism drawn from education, self confidence in their abilities, and a self righteous and morally superior attitude about their "great work."

None of the women's assertive and adventuresome spirit can, according to Jones, be attributed to a genuine

feminist impulse but was instead female assertion within the "nurturing" and "self sacrificing" sex role. Paradoxically, these women were able to turn the potentially destructive call for self sacrifice into a positive growth experience. They were able to find excitement and adventure in an escape from the narrow confines of middle class conventionality, fulfill the desire to do creative and meaningful work, and challenge their "superiors" all in the name of the self sacrifice which animated the Victorian feminine ethic of "true womanhood." Jones' analysis suggests that perhaps the northern women derived a great deal more satisfaction and benefit from the project than the blacks, and that certainly overall it was more a victory for the northern women than for the freed people. The teachers were ineffectual in fighting racism at the social level, yet they carried on the fight in a heroic way under exasperating and fatiguing conditions (physical and social). Moreover, in a modest way they did challenge contemporary notions of what a woman should do or be, and they did risk comfort and convenience for the possibilities of spiritual growth and fulfillment. Jones concludes her work with qualified celebration of the women: "Perhaps on a modest scale, the triumph was theirs after all."

Certainly there were few tangible signs of success just as there was scant tangible reward within the overall context of freedman's work. Although they did seem to provide the rudiments of an elementary education to those they saw regularly, the teachers never reached more than five percent of the state's black children and most attended sporadically due to fluctuating economic conditions and harrassment by the native whites. The sole exception to this was in higher education (especially Atlanta University), and even here the major theme of a tragic interplay between racial egalitarianism and the rigid attempt to impose northern white culture was present. The higher school provided a classical education which, according to some scholars, created conditions which estranged the educated black person from his own people while failing to allow full participation in the larger society.[7]

This reviewer is intensely interested in Jones' research for a number of reasons connected with professional projects and educational experiences. Broadly speaking, these interrelated projects and experiences are encompassed in the following: 1. For several years I have been a student of both history and anthropology, and have often used modes of inquiry and conceptual structures from both disciplines to explore and illuminate educational issues and problems similar to those explored by Jones; 2. For over a decade I have been involved in working for civil rights for women and minority groups and professional autonomy for public school classroom teachers. These activities have been carried on at both the theoretical level in writing and research as a university professor and teacher educator, and in practical events as a public school teacher, a graduate student in foundations of education and a lobbyist; 3. I am a woman whose public school education occurred in the context of southern society and in a family situation in which New England and Deep South cultures clashed and intermingled. In a very real sense, Jones' research and analysis shed light on aspects of my own childhood and family that had never been perceived before.

From all of these interrelated perspectives, my response to Jones' scholarship and writing is so positive that it merits the word appreciative. Her work is careful, thorough, deeply reflective, and very readable. It presents valuable historical information and insights not only about two oppressed groups, but about the nature and development of common school reform ideology in the nineteenth century, the cultural conflicts and gaps among north and south, black and white, male and female, and the interplay of religious, economic, and political forces in the postwar South.

In some sense the work also provides a microcosm of the workings in a particular situation of the prevailing modes of thought and social habit which arose out of the interaction of protestant theology and the progressive industrialization of American society. These modes and habits are of more than historical interest for, although they have changed in detail, they are still very much alive and have surfaced all too frequently in the intervening years. This realization should provide a reason for humility as well as increased determination as it demonstrates the grave difficulties we have in transcending obsessive-compulsive habits and constructs which fail to confront the complex realities and relationships of social-educational situations.

In spite of their evangelical idealism, the northerners were quite mechanical and reductionistic in the way they viewed reality. They reflected the prevailing "democratic" philosophy of the time. This philosophy was based squarely upon a notion of atomistic individualism which has the effect of obscuring our mutual connections with each other and the natural world. Since the whole is merely the sum of its parts, evil fragments can be eradicated without any need to examine the economic and political system as a whole network of complex relationships. Slavery is simply an evil part stuck on to a basically good system and the freedmen are simply separate individuals in need of rehabilitation. One is reminded here of another group of idealistic reformers, the "Muckrakers," who came several decades after the northern teachers. The Muckrakers deplored the degrading conditions of the factory system and other problems that were the consequences of rapid industrialization, just as the evangelical teachers deplored the degrading conditions of the slave system. Once more the mechanical and reductionistic formula, the whole is merely the sum of its parts, was operating. The key to reform was thought to be controlling the aberrations of a few greedy men. If this were done, the country would be restored to a healthy condition.

For more contemporary manifestations of atomistic thinking one need only look at much of contemporary educational research. More specifically, a recent manifestation of the mechanical constructs reminiscent of the nineteenth century reform mentality is the "cultural deprivation" ideology which emerged in the 1950's and early 1960's, simultaneous with the beginnings and early development of the Civil Rights Movement.[8] This ideology commanded immense amounts of expenditure for research, publication, and programs, and remained strong for a number of years before it was at least seriously challenged by perspectives from anthropology and linguistics. Minority group cultures were defined as negative and deficient. Context and relationships were ignored. The "learned" research and pronouncements of the social scientists and educators who subscribed to this ideology were as devoid of modern anthropological and linguistic awareness as the theory of the evangelical teachers of the nineteenth century, and with much less excuse. Moreover, the "cultural deprivation" ideology provided the same basis for blind missionary zeal among the young teachers as did the evangelical world view. Similarly, it provided no basis for asking questions concerning the appropriateness of the structure, content, and methods of any given curriculum and education setting for pupils coming out of diverse cultural backgrounds. The children were simply lacking morally and intellectually because they had been victimized and degraded. The teachers in both cases were called upon to provide salvation by uplifting them to the current cognitive and moral standards of the American middle class.

The story of school integration in the South also includes echoes of Jones' assessment of the interaction of north and south and black and white in the postwar South. Cases after case reveals that the perspectives of the black community were frequently ignored completely during the process of integration and that more often than not, regardless of location and physical fitness, previously all back schools were closed while the white schools remained opened and were "integrated." Northern and southern whites colluded in this process which frequently had destructive consequences.[9]

Finally, Jones' research reminds us that, like the missionary teachers, today's public school teachers remain formally subordinate to more highly-paid administrators within the context of a rigid and complex bureaucracy. Although some progress has been made, women are still vastly underrepresented in administrative positions and continue to occupy most of the classroom positions, especially at the common school level. Even though the teachers and their pupils (like the evangelical educators and their freed people) are ostensibly the reason for the bureaucracy's existence, male administrators are still empowered to make rules and policies which violate the experience and knowledge of the teachers and defeat the goals of education.[10] This reminder of the profound lingering of defunct forms suggests the urgent necessity of gender analysis in public schools and teacher education.[11] It is past time for the education profession to authentically confront the fundamental sexual dichotomy that has been built into Western culture from its origins; and which reached an extreme during the Victorian era from which we have yet to recover.

Footnotes

1. Jacqueline Jones. *Soldiers of Light and Love*. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press), 1980, 273 pp.
2. Although Jones limited her research to Georgia, in many ways her book illuminates these educational activities in the South as a whole. The patterns in Georgia in broad outlines are the same as those of the other states.
3. It is worth noting, as Jones has pointed out, that in spite of the absence of tangible results in all except higher education, the southern adventure is worth noting because it was a unique blending of private and public participation in social welfare and the first time the federal government participated in state and local educational efforts.
4. These attempts to establish schools were partly political in nature and were related to other political acts in which the freed people were beginning to collectively resist the continuation of virtual slavery after the war through such means not only of establishing schools, but also of withholding labor and breaking contracts. The latter were done in defiance of the plantation wage system and other forms of peonage. The establishment of schools was done in the face of harrassment from native whites. Since the slave codes and later state law prohibited teaching slaves (and later free blacks), literacy (although many of them acquired the skills on the sly), the establishment of schools was an important practical and political act for the black community. Yet the northern educators failed to appreciate or encourage any of these activities. In the educational realm, in particular, they did not even see the desirability of *sharing* control with the freed people, much less in fostering independence (in a concrete as opposed to an idealistic way). This is especially tragic because within this context of self help the freed people demonstrated extraordinary commitment to education in terms of resources, time, and political awareness. Jones' emphasis on this commitment is important as it is all too easily lost to our historical consciousness.
5. According to Jones, however, there were a very small number of teachers who accepted the reality that in the face of pervasive racial prejudice black charater reform would make no difference. Those who saw racial prejudice as the major problem engaged in other kinds of activities than attempting to "elevate" the freed people.
6. Madeleine Grumet, "Pedagogy for Patriarchy: The Feminization of Teaching," *Interchange* (Volume 12, Numbers 2-3), p. 176.
7. Paradox, contradiction, and ambivalence also characterized the legacy of the missionary teachers and their societies. The beginnings of the establishment of a state-supported school system in Georgia coincided with the decline of the aid society programs. Ironically, it seemed to the northern educators that the state finally decided to provide the minimum assistance to black public education to get rid of the yankees and their horrid notions of social equality. The southern whites, as might be expected, established an inferior and segregated system for the blacks. Yet the northerners were powerless to insist upon an integrated system because the freed people were not in favor of integration either. Here Jones clears up a common misconception that the northerners somehow sold out to southern white mores on this issue. Her research helps the student of history to realize that there is no good reason why the freed people should have wanted their children to go to school with the children of former slaveholders.

To add insult to injury as far as the northerners were concerned, many blacks, poverty stricken and ambivalent about the yankee educators, hastened to send their children to the free public institutions. The outcome of all of this discordant activity was further paradox. The native whites, no doubt, would have liked to completely thwart the black desire for education. Yet while acting out of self and racist motives in a complex cultural situation, they providentially, at least minimally, served wider social ends in the long run. The inferior and segregated system spurred initially by the efforts of the freeman's society and combined with the continuing self help efforts of blacks was reaching forty percent of the black population by 1880, and by 1915 seventy percent of all Georgia blacks were literate. However, Jones is careful to point out that the increasing literacy rate did little to combat problems of racial prejudice and discrimination until education was combined with collective economic and political power and vigorous agitation in the civil rights movement beginning in the mid 1950's. This movement drew on a broad base of literate blacks, but it did not rely upon individual "character reform" to change society.

8. This ideology was around in even cruder form when the public schools were dealing with the diverse immigrant groups in American society during the first two decades of the twentieth century. For a brief account and references on this version of "cultural deprivation," see Lawrence Cremin, *The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education 1876-1957* (New York: Random House), 1964, pp. 66-75. Cremin summarizes the views of Ellwood P. Cubberly and other educators who subscribed to the "Americanizaiton as Anglicization" ideology of the early twentieth century.
9. This writer's doctoral research was conducted in a Florida school system which is exactly described in the above text. The black high school was in good physical condition and had a convenient location. The predominately white high school was overcrowded. A seemingly intelligent decision would have been to use both schools, as both could have been integrated without violating federal guidelines. Instead, much to the dismay of the black community, the black high school was permanently closed as a high school, and more than 1200 black pupils were "dumped" into an already overcrowded situation. Confusion and violence were the results. See Michael S. Littleford, "Case Study of a Desegregation Administrative Policy upon a Social Subsystem," *Journal of Negro Education* (Spring 1973), pp. 170-175.
10. This is a major theme in Grumet, *op. cit.*, and is further confirmed by numerous empirical studies of recent conditions in urban school system. See, for example, Elizabeth M. Edddy, *Becoming a Teacher: The Passage to Professional Status*, (New York: Teachers College Press), 1969.
11. Unfortunately, there are still many educational theorists who baldly deny the urgent necessity of gender analysis. Very little has been done in educational theorizing, and almost all of that has been done during the past decade. Nevertheless, it is a beginning. Grumet, *op. cit.* is an example of such work. See also: William F. Pinar, "Curriculum as Gender Text: Notes on Reproduction, Resistance, and Male-Male Relations, " forthcoming in *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing*; William F. Pinar and Lee Johnson, "Aspects of Gender Analysis in Recent Feminist Psychological Thought and Their Implications for Curriculum," *Journal of Education* (Fall, 1980), pp. 113-126; Peter Taubman, *Gender and Curriculum: Discourse and the Politics of Sexuality, The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (4:1), pp. 12-87.

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

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