

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

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Editor's Note

This first issue of the new quarterly series opens with Joseph Watras's informative and interesting account of the famous textbook controversy in Kanawha County, West Virginia. How to adjudicate among the interests of academic freedom, cultural conflict and class struggle is by no means self-evident. In the present political climate, adjudication may no longer be appropriate, however. It may well be time (some of you have insisted it is long past time) to openly abandon the judicial posture, and adopt a partisan one. No other group – certainly not the Reagan administration -- will defend our right and our duty to teach and think critically and freely. The controversy in Kanawha County is no isolated incident we can afford to forget.

The eroding political status of teachers – from kindergarten to graduate school – is also a concern of Professor Leonard's, if obliquely. His paper attacks our continuing loss of autonomy as teaching is bleached from the teacher, and made "scientific." He reminds us that the attentuation of the teacher to the technician depletes learning and teaching of mystery, of their archetypal significances. We need reminding.

In my piece I try to begin to understand how male-male relations are implicated in misogyny, how the organization of sexual energy in our (men's) bodies parallels social and educational organizations and hierarchies. It's an essay that has won few friends, but then that wasn't the point. If attention can begin to be paid to the myriad of ways men are with each other, and how those ways undergird and parallel forms of educational, social and sexual organization, then the irritation this piece has provoked will seem more tolerable.

The elusive concept and experience of creativity is described especially for teachers in the Phyllis Levy essay. I confess not to know with any certainty what creativity is, but I think Dr. Levy does know. Certainly her mentor, Ross Mooney, knows. Dr. Levy attempts to offer practical advice to teachers how they might exemplify "creativity" as they work with students in solving everyday school problems.

Landon Beyer thoughtfully reviews Philosophy and Education in his essay which comes next. His criticisms and recommendations are correct, I think. One wonders how long it will take our colleagues in philosophy of education to attend to the important contributions made by social and curriculum theorists during the past decade or so.

Craig Kridel offers us more slides of times past in his review of Bob Bullough's study of Boyd Bode. Reading his review those times didn't seem so bad for someone in our profession; but I shook myself and realized the present times must be hard times indeed for the 1930's to seem appealing, even if only for a moment.

W.P.

PROBLEMS IN MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION: THE TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY IN KANAWHA COUNTY, WEST VIRGINIA

Joseph Watras
University of Dayton

In September 1974, a group of parents and at least one school board member decided that reputable English language arts textbooks purchased by its school board in Kanawha County, West Virginia were offensive. They complained that the books threatened belief in God, inpugned the sanctity of marriage, disparaged the United States, made patriotism appear foolish, portrayed ethical norms as dependent on the situation, made slang appear as acceptable as standard English, and encouraged students to openly discuss family matters. The parents organized a protest. News of their demonstration received national attention for several months.

The controversy is important to us because it is one instance where efforts to encourage multi-cultural sensitivity backfired. It raises the issue of whether schools can teach values in a pluralistic society. The protestors complained that, although the intent of the texts was to show how different groups in our country hold different values and follow different lifestyles, a child reading them would be left with the impression that all values are foolish. The protestors argued that the texts would make it impossible for the schools to advance any values upon which a community could form. The protestors offered several solutions. The school board and the parents who favored these books came up with other possibilities for compromise. Ironically, all the suggestions to end the controversy were based on the same idea of tolerance that the authors of the textbooks used. Consequently, the controversy serves as a case study to illustrate how pleas for tolerance can disguise efforts to dominate others.

The textbooks that became the center of this controversy were published by reputable firms. They came from a recommended list of textbooks distributed by the West Virginia State Board of Education. A committee of five teachers with the help of twelve teachers on a secondary school textbook subcomittee and eight teachers on an elementary school textbook subcommittee spent

nearly two thousand hours making their choices. The committee and its subcommittees made their selections in accordance with a memo that Daniel Taylor, the State Superintendent of Schools, sent on August 16, 1973 to textbook publishers and county superintendents. In this letter State Superintendent Taylor asked that all language arts textbooks indicate, where relevant, that the United States is a multi-ethnic nation; that they show the variety of viewpoints, attitudes, values and contributions of minority and ethnic groups in relation to American institutions including the family, the dynamic nature of American society, and the processes of communication; that they show in pictoral illustration the intercultural character of our plurialistic society; and finally, that the books assist students examine their own self image.

The committee and its subcommittees chose three hundred twenty-five different titles. The basic texts included: Morton Botel and John Dawkins, *Communicating* 1-6, published by D. C. Heath Company; Allan Glatthorn, *Dynamics of Language* 7-12, published by Silver Burdett Company; Arrell, Miller and others, *America Reads Series* 7-12, published by Scott-Foresman Co. The committee also recommended a list of supplementary texts of which they suggested a limited number be bought. The supplementary texts comprised the bulk of the three hundred twenty-five titles. These included the following series: *Language of Man Series* 7-12, McDougal, Littel and Company; *Interaction Series* 4-12, Houghton Mifflin Co., *Breakthrough Series* 7-12, Allyn and Bacon; *Man Series* 7-12, McDougal, Littel and Co., *Man in Literature Series*, Scott-Foresman and Co. Other textbook firms such as Webster/McGraw Hill, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich, and Scholastic Book Series were represented on the supplemental textbook list.[1]

Surprisingly, when the textbook committee made its recommendations to the school board on March 14, 1974, few people noticed. Between March 14 and April 11 all the language arts textbooks were placed on display in the public library, but again, few peeple seemed to be interested. What became known as the Battle of the Books began on April 11, 1974. The Kanawha County Board of Education had to approve the purchase of new textbooks. At this meeting, Alice Moore, then a member of the school board, expressed a desire for the board to have more control in the selection of the texts. On May 16, 1974, the members of the textbook selection committee came to a board meeting to explain how the selections would advance the curriculum. Mrs. Moore raised several objections to the philosophy

underlying their composition. The meeting ended without the board taking action. Mrs. Moore repeated her complaints to the public. On June 27 the board met again before an overflowing audience. While they removed the eight most objectionable texts, the board voted three to two to adopt the remaining texts. By way of compromise, the board resolved to discuss ways of including parents on the textbook selection committee. The committee that had selected these texts was composed of teachers as the state guidelines recommended.

When the schools opened on September 3, they were hit by a strike. The parents who were dissatisfied with the texts expressed strong and often exaggerated resentment toward the schools. In response to this pressure, another group of parents formed the Kanawha Coalition for Quality Education on September 7. This division was termed the "creekers" against the "hillers." The names signified that those opposing the texts tended to be rural fundamentalists and those favoring the texts tended to be affluent suburbanites.

On September 11, the school board met again and voted to remove all books until they could be studied by a citizens' committee. The Superintendent of Schools, Kenneth Underwood, closed the schools from September 12 to 16 in hopes the tension would subside. The confrontation was so intense that the President of the Board of Education resigned on October 9. On October 11 Underwood announced he would leave. During this time violence in the form of shooting and attempted school bombings were reported. On November 9, the school board held a televised meeting. They voted four to one to return all books except the D.C. Heath *Communicating* and Houghton Mifflin *Interaction Series* to the classroom. The board added that students whose parents found any book objectionable did not have to use it. Further, they stated no teacher was authorized to indoctrinate a student to follow ideals of which the student or his parents disapproved.[2] On November 21, the board approved a set of guidelines for future text adoptions that Mrs. Moore submitted.

The guidelines were a restatement of the complaints Mrs. Moore made throughout the controversy. They asked that all textbooks recognize the sanctity of the home, not intrude on the students' privacy, not contain profanity, respect the right of groups to hold their own values, not encourage racial hatred, encourage loyalty to the United States, not defame our history, and teach traditional grammar. In addition to these guidelines, the board agreed to "... select three parents and one teacher to a

screening committee for each subject area that is under study for textbook adoption for a given year. This committee ... shall examine all books submitted by publishers ..." and eliminate those that do not meet the guidelines. Approval of three-fourths of the committee is necessary to retain any text for consideration.[3]

On October 14, 1974, the Kanawha County Association of Classroom Teachers voted to request the Teacher Rights Division of the National Education Association to conduct an exhaustive investigation into all facets of the controversy. The N.E.A. held open hearings in Charleston, West Virginia, from December 9 through 11, 1974. They heard testimony from many of the principal figures in the controversy, although few of the protestors took part.[4] They released their report in February 1975, entitling it "A Textbook Study in Cultural Conflict." The N.E.A. report was critical of many of the school board's decisions. The report said that when the school board adopted the guidelines submitted by Mrs. Moore, they moved from conciliation to capitulation.

The inquiry report of the N.E.A. argued these procedures for textbook selection were repressive. In that report spokespeople for the N.E.A. argued the guidelines and the committee rules constituted censorship that took away the teachers' right to teach. They added that if these rules were stringently followed all books would be unacceptable. The State Superintendent of Schools seemed to agree. On March 12, 1975, Dr. Daniel Taylor responded to a complaint filed by the Kanawha Coalition for Quality Education. He said that "the committee of five teachers must have the opportunity of examining all books listed on the state approved list." This meant the parents could only make suggestions; they could not make binding recommendations.[5]

What were the books like that led to such confrontation and division? They were well-known texts produced by respectable publishers. They contained stories and essays by noted contemporary authors, such as Langston Hughes, Norman Mailer, James Baldwin, and George Orwell. They contained cartoons, bright pictures, and exercises designed to make the stories relevant to the children. These books tried to show how different types of people in America live and how the values they hold dear vary. The books had stories that talked about different religious beliefs. Some stories spoke of the college radicals and their resistance to the draft during the Vietnamese crisis. Other stories mentioned consensual unions between men and women. Still other stories

talked about the problems minority groups faced. In short, the books, like most anthologies today, tried to portray the multicultural nature of our society.

What was wrong with the books? The problem was one that plagues all efforts to act upon a notion of pluralism. The books led to relativism. This occurred in the following way: the books tried to accurately present the viewpoints and values held by the people in the variety of groups that make up our society. They tried not to judge these viewpoints or values. Consequently, the authors of the selections or the anthologists refused to allow any view of life or value to appear more correct than another. The result was that the books made it appear as if the values a person held were things that served that individual and his particular group. Unfortunately, when a book or a school leads students to think a person's view of life is based only on his or her limited experiences or interests, those students may come to reject all values and hold to a set of superficially examined ones. After all, the students of such a school may argue, values are just opinions. They will not see any need to try to examine or think deeply about anything they believe.

The dangers of relativism are most clearly seen in the area of religion. The books tried to help the students realize that all religions had certain traits in common as well as obvious differences. But when religious beliefs are compared to myths, they seem to imply that religion is a myth. A religious person would call this blasphemy. This is what the protestors said in Kanawha County. Although the protestors said the way the books were selected was unfair, their basic complaint was not about due proces It was about the nature of the texts. At times, the concern for procedural questions disguised this deeper question. Most important, it had no basis. The school administrators clearly pointed out several times that they had strictly adhered to the letter and spirit of the law in adopting these texts.

Paul Cowan wrote about the controversy for the *Village Voice*.[6] He acknowledged that in the hands of a skilled teacher, the books might acquaint an Appalachian child to other cultures. In the hands of an average teacher with average children, he felt the books produced sharp disorienting jolts. Cowan gave several examples to prove his point. In one text, he pointed out, the myth of Androcles and the Lion is coupled with the biblical tale of Daniel and the Lion's Den. Also, he says the fundamentalists believe language is a gift from God to man. The books, he says, list divine inspiration as one of six theories of language. Other

exercises, Cowan adds, invite the student to invent their own gods. This exercise, he says, fundamentalists fear suggests God is a myth. Cowan notes the books consider standard English to be one of many dialects, the rules of which are relative to the group that speaks it.

Cowan goes on to say that the methods of teaching the books encourage are contradictory to the ideas of the fundamentalists. These parents, he notes, believe education means rote memorization. Now they see their children read about sports heroes instead of Miles Standish, and their achievement rests on their ability to answer provocative questions, not recite accurately. Cowan also notes the provocative questions led to trouble. He gives as an example an exercise after a story by Nat Hentoff about a fight over loud music between a father and his son wherein the teacher is encouraged to ask the students about tensions in their home.

The fundamentalists were upset about profanity and slang. Cowan reports that one book protestor complained that only twenty pages of Salinger's *Catcher in the Rye*, which the protestor said was one of the books, did not take God's name in vain.

Benjamin Stein of the *Wall Street Journal* found a bias in the books. He reviewed the D.C. Heath series *Communicating*. One story, he says, talks of cheating and asks the students if the act was bad or a little bad. Stein says the worst flaw is that the books do not encourage students to learn correct grammar. He says they show that unconventional grammar may be effective because the students translate speech from everyday conversation to standard English. Stein did not find profanity in the books. Nor did he find exercises that undermined the family. The bias Stein found was in a social studies text, *The People Make a Nation*, by Allyn and Bacon. He found a bias opposed to industrialization in favor of government regulation.

In the texts I surveyed, I found biases common to literature today. Black people tended to appear as pathological victims of white racism. They stole more than whites. They were angrier at the world than whites. They used drugs more than whites. This bias appeared in stories written by authors like Langston Hughes and James Baldwin. I think it occurred because the books, like literary journals today, seemed to overlook articles by these authors that have a kind or loving tone.

The protestors held fast to a central complaint. They said the problem with the books was that they made all values and viewpoints appear to be dependent on the situation or only true for the one who is making the perception. Some of the protestors ex-

panded this objection. They said that the books' leaning towards relativism was actually part of a conspiracy among intellectuals to use the schools to impose a religion. These parents called this religion "secular humanism." They said that this humanism was a religion that began to take an important place in schools through the influence of progressive educators. These concerned parents argued that school people and other intellectuals were trying to get the rest of the citizens of the United States to give up their traditional faith in God. The parents said these intellectuals wanted the citizenry to look to themselves or to other people rather than to religion for answers to problems facing society.

The feeling that the selection of the textbooks was part of a well-planned conspiracy to weaken the traditional values of Americans led two parents to file a law suit in Federal District Court against the Kanawha County Board of Education. The parents complained that they had to place their children in private schools at extra expense because the controversial texts undermined their religious beliefs. They said the school had violated its avowed position of neutrality in religious matters.

On January 30, 1975, Judge K. K. Hall wrote the order that dismissed the suit. He agreed that some of the materials in some of the controversial texts were offensive to the plaintiff's beliefs, choice of language, and code of conduct. But he said he could not find in the board's actions any establishment of religion nor anything that restricts the free exercise of religion. Nor did he find the board's actions violated the child's right to privacy. He suggested that this was a matter to be settled at the election polls, not the courts. Judge Hall noted that government must be neutral in matters of religion. It cannot be hostile to it or to non-religion. While judicial imposition in schools has occurred, courts cannot resolve conflicts of daily operation, Hall concluded.[8]

If Judge Hall's decision weakened the complaint that schools were imposing their own religion, one called "secular humanism," the protestors continued to feel that, as William Hoar expressed in an article in the *American Opinion*, educators were pushing their Deweyite attack on American culture.[9]

Both sides sought legislative aid to win the controversy. Protestors sought bills to prohibit secular humanism from creeping into the schools.[10] The Kanawha Coalition for Quality Education endorsed a proposal to the West Virginia legislators to allow teachers to express their own points of view in the classroom. One participant felt the only winner in these appeals to the Legislature was the State Department of Education. Alice Moore was quoted

as saying the state department was exploiting the controversy as a means to increase its control over state-wide textbook adoption.[11] The only legislative change that was successful was a bill that changed the date of seating of County Board of Education members from January 1 to July 1, following their election in May. This was signed into law on March 29, 1975.[12]

The books remained, yet the controversy died down. Answering a personal letter in 1976, Alice Moore said the protest took a quieter, more effective form. In November 1976, the school board levy was defeated – a rare event in Kanawha County, she said. Newspapers quoted Avis Hill, a spokesperson for the fundamentalists, as saying this was a clear message to the school board that they will receive no money until the schools are cleared up.[13] Mrs. Moore said in her letter that while, as of December 1976, the books were still in the schools, in practice the elementary books were used in only six of the more than ninety schools in the county. She added most supplementary texts on the secondary level were not being used. Some secondary texts that were objectionable in her opinion for instruction in non-standard English, she said, were being used county-wide. But she added, they were not blatantly offensive.

A spokesperson for the Kanawha Coalition for Quality Education, Reverend Lewis, wrote in a personal letter on May 20, 1976 that the demonstrations died down because Marvin Horan, one of the protestors who called for violence against the schools and the school people, was arrested and convicted. Further, fundamentalists ran for political office in an effort to enact change. Reverend Lewis felt that the high level of hostility could not be maintained for very long. He felt the tensions were still present. He said he was working to open communication between those involved in the protest. Lewis added that while the books were then in the schools, the local principal was generally advised by a parent committee as to whether they were suitable or not. Lewis believed this was working.

As an aside, in the election Lewis mentioned Alice Moore was a candidate. In her letter she said she was the only school board member running for re-election. She said she did not campaign. Her only real opponent, on the other hand, was endorsed by both Charleston's newspapers and the teachers' association. She won, she said, by the largest vote ever cast for a school board member. This vote led one observer to note that perhaps Moore's claim to be a spokesperson for more than one social group was true.[14]

We have to be careful in our search to understand why the controversy died down. Often efforts to preserve peace in a community are extended at the expense of the bonds that tie people to each other. That is what happened in Kanawha County. The solutions that were commonly discussed while the confrontation was high were based on a notion of tolerance or fairness that prevented people from thinking in deeper ways about the issues. They were like the decision of a parent to buy two television sets to end family squabbles over what shows they should watch. The complaints end, but they no longer have anything to share.

One suggestion that was widely proposed was to set up alternative schools. While this was not done, it could have been easily accomplished either within a building or between buildings. The children whose parents favored the books could go to a separate class or a different building. Those whose parents did not like the books could go to another. The committee sponsored by the National Education Association favored this approach. At times, the protestors seemed to approve of it. Some protestors sent their children to private Christian schools which is a variant of the notion of separate schools.

Easy as the idea sounds, it is dangerous. It skirts the problem of finding an ethic all can share in a way that does not guarantee the eventual failure of the fundamentalist perspective. The failure will result because those who attend the traditional schools will tend to be of a lower economic class than those who attend the progressive schools. In addition, the worth of the curriculum will be judged on the future success of the graduates. If the sons and daughters of upper class parents go to one school, the school may appear to fit the children for success in later life. Actually, the influence of family origins will have prevailed over that of the curriculum.

In a wider sense, the suggestion of separate schools implies a surrender of the ideal of democracy. If classes are segregated according to the beliefs of the students, the opportunities for all to learn and grow from each other is reduced. The strength of a democratic education is that it is based on the notion that people from all social classes and racial groups can learn and benefit from each others' ideas.

A second suggestion came from the protestors. Alice Moore suggested that schools keep the students physically together but philosophically apart. She said this could be done if we are willing to strip the curriculum of any content related to social values. Moral education, she said, no longer belongs to the schools.[15]

If the N.E.A.'s suggestion is undemocratic, Alice Moore's is impossible. As the committee for the National Education Association pointed out when it criticized Mrs. Moore's guidelines for text adoptions, such a position, if followed strictly, means that no books are acceptable. Despite these difficulties, this is the direction that the school board took to solve the difficulties. This may have occurred because the textbook supporters did not push for any other. In this regard a statement by Reverend James Lewis is suggestive. He is quoted by Catherine Candor as saying, "the liberal community is morally bankrupt, no longer having any ideals that it's willing to fight and die for."[16]

The third suggestion appears to be the most benign. It is not. This suggestion was to increase inter-ethnic sensitivity. West Virginia legislators adopted a proposal to require colleges of education to teach prospective teachers about the differences between rural, suburban and urban groups. The problem with this suggestion is that it increases the relativism to which the protestors objected in the original texts.

The difficulties with a quest for inter-ethnic sensitivity may be illustrated by one attempt at it. The panel that investigated the textbook controversy for the National Education Association held this was a case of cultural conflict. They used the work of Norman O. Simpkins, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Marshall University, to buttress the assertion. They said the culture of Appalachia, of which these protestors were supposed to be a part, descended from the original settlers in the region. Whether these assertions of cultural conflict were right or wrong, they were misleading.

First, Simpkin's arguments seemed to lead the committee into thinking of the dispute as a narrow or limited concern. It was not. Later commentators have shown us that such incidents were an important element in transforming fundamentalists into a powerful political coalition.[17] This does not mean there was a direct path from the controversy to the later prominence of Jerry Falwell. It means the controversy was based on concerns that are reflected in national politics. Because they saw the dispute as a cultural conflict, the N.E.A. panel lost sight of the importance of the questions the parents raised.

Second, the panel was so sure they were witnessing a cultural conflict that they overlooked what the protestors said. As a result, the suggestions the panel made to help the crisis ignored the problems of relativism implicit in the texts. Instead, the panel tried to accomodate everyone.

Third, the panel of the N.E.A., in describing the cultural differences, implied the inferiority of the protestors. The Appalachian culture, they said, was typified by isolation and distrust of outsiders. It suited the lives of those who had to work hard to survive. In a sense, in their diagnosis of cultural conflict, the panel blamed the protestors for the dispute. If the parents had not been so backward and uninformed, the panel seemed to say, the dispute might have been avoided.[18]

A solution to the problem is not as difficult as it might seem. Let me make three suggestions. First, public schools do have to talk about religion. Perhaps they can avoid denigrating religious beliefs by comparing them to myths if the texts and the teachers talk of what I would call energizing myths. They could follow the lead of William James showing that religious ideas that make one a better person are more energizing because they help you do more than myths that do not. No matter how they handle the issue, school people do an injustice to the complex nature of religious ideas and myths if they consider them to be ideas that cannot be proven true or false. These ideas have power over people's lives. That power attests to some reality. The aim of school people should be to help students realize how this power encourages growth or stifles personal development. This is no easy matter for it is often as difficult to determine the effect of an idea as it is to prove whether a concept refers accurately to a real object or event. Nonetheless, such an effort would help teachers avoid being excessively judgemental. Furthermore, it might happen that in the efforts to determine the effects of ideas that the class will come up with better intepretations than those of the teacher or the texts.

Second, teachers must be careful of techniques or material that shock the students. At the same time, they cannot hide behind the argument that teachers should acquaint students with a wide variety of information. The job of the schools is to widen the students' horizons by providing new ways to integrate information in a life-affirming manner. Many of my students who want to be teachers think it is necessary to shock someone to start him or her on an intellectual journey. They forget that the archetype of a teacher, Socrates, never shocked his listeners. He showed them the foolishness of many of their beliefs, but he never intentionally hurt them. He tried to take his listeners to higher levels of thought. Modern school books and teachers should do the same.

Most important, schools have to take a stand in favor of a community open to all. This cannot be done my mouthing cliches. And it is different than what is found in programs for inter-ethnic

sensitivity which often look at a patchwork of customs in order to advance community. One way to do this is for teachers to look at the ways racism colors all the thought and actions of Americans. It is significant, I think, that many commentators blamed the controversy on the racism inherent in the protestors. In part, they are correct. Signs appeared throughout the county calling for the removal of "Nigger Books." But this observation overlooks the racism of the middle classes that supported the texts. Both sides were racist, yet one side approved of the books. Another did not. The reason is, I think, because the books embodied a type of racism that serves the affluent. It is one of tolerance not open bigotry. But it is devoid of brotherhood. Had the books avoided the racism of the upper classes as well as the bigotry of the lower classes, the controversy might have been avoided or it could have led to higher understanding for all concerned. Better yet, had the books or educators acknowledged that racism is a basic problem facing American life, they could have limited the relativism that can destroy efforts to build a plurialistic society.

Once school people recognize the dangers of racism, they can agree that schools must to some extent influence family values even if parents object. No one can condone bigotry. Once racism is seen as an evil, school people will avoid solutions to educational problems that keep students from interacting. Democracy occurs when they come together. Once racism is seen as an evil to be avoided, educators will recognize that they cannot hide behind a facade of allowing students to develop their own perspectives or values. This does not men teachers or textbooks must continually fight against racism. On the contrary, just by realizing they cannot embrace racism, they will be taking great strides toward reinforcing a democratic community. In a community people do not think alike, but the diversity that arises springs from a mutual affection for life and a desire to know more about it.

In short, a recognition of the complex nature of racism in our time will help us come to grips with complex problems posed by democracy. The main problem in democracy is finding direction. Recognizing this doesn't give one direction. Acting in ways that try to bring people together instead of separating them might. Above all, we must be careful we do not hold to a shallow idea of tolerance so aggressively that we prevent anyone from holding any other values.

FOOTNOTES

1. Catherine Candor, **A History of the Kanawha County Textbook Controversy**, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1976, pp. 43-47.
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3. **Inquiry Report -- Kanawha County, West Virginia: A Textbook Study in Cultural Conflict**, National Education Association, Teacher Rights Division, Washington, D.C., February 1975, pp. 32-33.
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13. "Ban-the-Book Forces Defeat Kanawha School Board Issue," U.P.I., **The Intelligencer**, Wheeling, West Virginia, November 4, 1976, p. 28.
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15. Alice Moore, "Moral Education in the Schools: A Board Member's Perspective," **The School Law Newsletter**, Vol. 6, No. 4, p. 225-226.
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MYSTERY AND MYTH: CURRICULUM AS THE ILLUMINATION OF LIVED EXPERIENCE

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Introduction

The theory presented in this paper is that a philosophy which comprehensively describes the transcending tendency of human consciousness can be related to curriculum theorizing back into the mainstream of liberalizing humanistic thought in America.

The assumptions which underlie the vast majority of curricular thought, curricular practice, and curricular materials of the past several decades have been fundamentally positivistic. These assumptions are that the methods of science alone are capable of discovering facts, that provable facts circumscribe all that is worth knowing, and that the function of philosophy is merely to analyze the logic of scientifically grounded methodology. This positivism was apparent in the scientific management approach to curriculum building of Bobbitt and Charters as well as the concern for deriving and stating objectives which has remained the major preoccupation of most curriculum theorists since Tyler.

The paper does not take issue with positivism as such; it merely objects to the absolutizing of the positivist view and the restrictions that this absolutizing places on the kinds of questions curriculum theorists are permitted to ask.

To accomplish this task, part one of the paper describes the route of transcending consciousness and explicates the anchoring concepts of mystery and myth. Part two consists of three stories which serve to illuminate the connection between transcending consciousness and curriculum theorizing. Part three develops five practical rules which seem to grow out of parts one and two.

Consciousness and Story

The first task of this paper will be to sketch what is meant by phenomenology. Along the way the meaning of the terms mystery and myth will be clarified.

The phenomenology utilized here is borrowed to some extent from that of Eric Voegelin and it consists of a description of the experience of consciousness as it transcends itself to become aware of the body, the external world, the community, history, and the ground of being. (Voegelin, 1978)

Consciousness is fundamentally intentional and its intentionality presses consciousness to transcend itself to become aware of the body: the self-existing-in-the-world. Awareness of self-in-the-world constitutes the drive to understand all that can be understood about the relationships between oneself and the world and the relationships of things in the world to each other. At this level of transcendence, consciousness drives toward scientific and mathematical understanding. To fulfill this drive, human beings erect formal systems of concepts, terms, symbols and methodologies (the scientific and mathematic disciplines) each of which eventually generates questions which cannot be answered within the established form system. This incompleteness of any given discipline calls for further sets of concepts, terms, symbols, and methodologies which, once established, in turn generate their own unanswerable questions. (Hofstadter, 1979; Lonergan, 1958) Thus human consciousness transcends itself by first becoming aware of the self-in-the-world and as it asks about the world it continually attempts to transcend its modes of understanding it.

Consciousness also transcends itself in a striving to understand one's communion with other selves. It seeks to understand community and in so doing develops language, poetry, art, music, drama, ethics, politics, and technical competence. The inability of the formal disciplines of science and mathematics to answer all the questions which emerge within them is more than matched by the inability of any language to say all that it needs to say, the inability of technology accomplish what it sets out to accomplish. Further, the inability of ethics and politics to deal meaningfully with the myriad problems that emerge within them has given rise to the multiplicity of psychologies, sociologies, anthropologies, political and economic theories which populate what we now call the social sciences.

But this is not the end of the transcending tendency of consciousness, for conscious human beings are aware of the lasting of things: the comings and goings of the seasons; the expected length of human life; the lasting of reality itself. This question is about the strange category of the "known unknown" and by convention is commonly referred to as mystery. (cf. Lonergan 1958; Shea, 1978; Crossan, 1975; Voegelin, 1974; Barrett, 1979)

We are not sure of the meaning of reality and the meaning of time because we are born in the midst of things knowing no inner or outer limits, no beginning, no end. As Shea says, "Our first awareness is that we are swimming. We wake in the water. Our beginnings are not wholly our own. Our endings will most likely be beyond our control. We are middle people." (1978)

The universal human response to mystery has been to tell stories -- stories which create order and meaning within the question that is mystery. The first kind of story is a myth of origins providing a place for man, enabling him to transcend the narrow prison of his body to discern cosmic meaning in his ordinary experience. The myth provides direction and security to men and communities, but myths, like all formal systems, cannot sustain all the problems and anomalies which emerge within them and require apologetic tales to defend the myth. (Mehl, 1973) If one considers the first chapter of Genesis to be a myth proclaiming that all things are good, the story of Cain is an apologetic tale defending the goodness of God's work by showing that men, not God, bring about evil. But apologetic tales can only go so far. Tell too many and they soon become ludicrous and satire emerges to provide the gentle rain of mirth needed to sustain the myth. But the gentle rain begins to pierce too deeply and lest men become impotently cynical, parables emerge as challenges to the desperate and/or the self-satisfied believers in the myth. Parables expose the fact that the myth is a relative answer to mystery and not absolute at all. They challenge the individual not to reject the myth but to hold it in proper perspective and to transcend it, to chart new directions, develop new possibilities, reaffirm the intractable mystery of existence.

Yet again, however, the myth loses its grip on men and another story emerges to provide man's needed security and direction. This emergent is history: the awareness of a before and an after, a past transforming itself into a present and a hoped-for future. As a variant of myth, history justifies ideology, as in the opening line of the *Communist Manifesto*: "The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle." As the secularist residue of the movement toward God of the Christian myth, history likewise requires apologetic tales, satire and parable to sustain its ability to provide men with a sense of place in the world. For instance, if one were to consider the history of Civil Rights in America in this light, one would see the stories of Franklin, Washington, and Jefferson as the myth; the story of Plessy vs. Ferguson would be the apology; the Bre'r Rabbit stories and the Slave John stories would be satire; and the story of Martin Luther King would be the parable.

Consciousness and Curriculum Theorizing

The second task of this paper is to connect the notions of part one to a theory of curriculum. Some colleagues of mine insist that I run counter to the neo-Marxist trend in curriculum theorizing by advocating a re-mystification of curriculum theory. On the contrary, my purpose is to establish the illumination of lived experience as the aim of curriculum theory and practice. I am countering the neo-positivist psychic imperialism which relegates all non-empirical, non-behavioral or non-analytic approaches to curricular questions to a meaningless "affinity with affairs of the heart." (Pratte, 1979) By the above description of the path of transcending consciousness I am attempting to avoid the unwarranted dualism between mind and heart, theory and practice, which so frequently transforms itself into intellectual or pragmatic dogmatisms which would artificially restrict the spontaneous questioning of self-revising consciousness. A few stories may help clarify the point.

The first story is one that contrast Vittorino da Feltre and John Amos Comenius. (Mehl, 1972) Vittorino was invited in 1423 by the Gonzagas to educate their children along with other wealthy children and a selection of Mantua's poor of the same age. Gymnast, scholar, and committed Christian, Vittorino soon became as celebrated as Giotto had been a century before him as an artist par excellence. His materials, however, were children rather than paints, brushes, walls and panels. By teaching his fundamental commitments to knowledge, art and morality, Vittorino literally became his school. When he died his school died with him. Vittorino was the curriculum. Almost two hundred years later, however, Comenius became the original school bureaucrat. He reformed pedagogy in England and Sweden and developed a series of progressive learning experiences for young people from the age of six to twenty four. For all this vast scholarship and simultaneous sensitivity to the capacities of children at different ages, Comenius sowed the seeds of what has in the last half of our century been called the "teacher-proof curriculum."

Vittorino and Comenius were poles apart. The one exalted the person formed in body, mind and soul by the master; the other exalted the method through which children would come to adhere to the pre-planned objectives of a board of directors.

The second story concerns a faculty meeting of the Department of Teacher Education at Prestigious University. It is the seventh of a series of seventeen meetings of the revision of Prestigious'

Teacher Education Curriculum. Harvey White, noted analytic philosopher of education, has been clarifying the meaning of competency in the methods of teaching science as contrasted with competency in the methods of teaching language arts. The distinction, he insists, will serve the department well in the final states of its development of curriculum objectives. Nothing the general boredom in the room and the pained expression of several faculty members' faces, the facilitative department chairperson, Carla Rogers, calls upon the historian David Solomon. "What are you feeling, Dave?" she asked supportively.

"I think it is a waste of time for us to discuss objectives at all," Solomon began. "I think objectives have little to do with what actually occurs in our work with students, and I think that any set of pre-planned learning experiences serves only to distract us from our basic commitments. I think we ought to spend these meetings talking about the things we are committed to and the things we know about. Our teaching may or may not become any better, but it certainly will become more knowledgeable and more committed."

The third story concerns Bill Barrett, the young protagonist of Walker Percy's novel *The Last Gentleman*. Barrett lives a life of charming, respectable indecision. Astonished by the universal joy people seem to get from telling each other bad news, he moves through the world in a semi-conscious state subject to temporary fits of amnesia. Bill only becomes fully alive when he commits himself to a passionate love for Kitty Vaught and reaches out in supportive understanding to Kitty's outrageously cynical alcoholic older brother. Once Barrett decided to act straightforwardly from his heart to love and seek human understanding, "strength flowed like oil into his muscles and he ran with great joyous ten-foot antelope bounds." (Percy, 1974)

The point of these stories is this: Curriculum is an emergent of the commitments, the knowledge, the care and communicative competence of teachers. If there is any single process for the making of good curriculum it lies in a radical respect on the part of teachers for their own developing consciousness and that of each other. Honest talk with each other about their knowledge and commitments enables the transcending, self-corrective consciousness of teachers to grow in richness and power. Docilely to accept the domination of positivist ideology, on the other hand, restricts the openness of transcending consciousness, forces conversation among teachers to be abstract, alienating, boring, and destructive. I do not consider these effects to be of minor importance. In fact,

I view them to be open invitations to fascist control of curriculum for I believe, with Ernst Nolte, that fascism is fundamentally a "resistance to transcendence." (Nolte, 1965)

Vittorino represents the demand for committed, intelligent, artful teachers. David Solomon represents the need to raise the individualistic spare humanism of Vittorino to the level of shared experience, shared understanding, and shared commitment. Bill Barrett represents the contrast between alienated and fully-functioning consciousness. Teachers alienated by the prevailing dogmatic positivist ideology in education are bored and isolated. They are most buoyant when they are complaining about administrators, kids, or parents. Given the opportunity to live their commitments and reach out to each other by sharing them, there is hope for renewed strength and power in the curricula of our schools.

Rules for Curriculum Dialogue

The third task of this paper is to discuss its practical implications for curriculum. At first blush, it appears that the theory developed here is primarily aimed at the faculty of colleges of teacher education. This is not a matter of mere appearance, for the first task of curriculum renewal seems to me to be in the area of teacher education. The sum-total of what we have learned from Performance Based Teacher Education and Field Based Teacher Education is what we probably knew already, i.e., before you teach it helps to plan. What we have missed through these and other teacher education fads is that it also helps to know something and to be committed to something. In fact, many teacher educators seem to think a teacher who does not read books can teach reading, or that a teacher who is terrorized by the sight of a linear equation can teach mathematics. These same teacher educators tend to think of solutions to racism in terms of technical manipulations of district boundaries and bus routes, relegating the moral commitment and social knowledge of teachers to the realm of the unimportant. For these same people the task of philosophers of education is merely the clarification of language, thus obliterating the whole realm of what classical philosophy considered moral and practical knowledge. (Habermas, 1974)

The primary tasks of teacher educators are to develop their knowledge in the area to which they are committed, to teach what they are learning and what they are doing with their colleagues. Probably they ought to require teachers to major in some academic

discipline such as English, history, chemistry or mathematics and to develop education courses which are consistent with the knowledge and commitments of the teachers in the department. If someone is interested in developing objectives, learning experiences, evaluation instruments et. al. ... he should be encouraged to do it. He should be encouraged to promote his line of questioning, his way of thinking and viewing the world in the ongoing public conversation of a faculty committed to the education of teachers.

Elementary and secondary curricula would then follow as a logical extension of teacher education: an emergent of a community of knowledgeable, committed men and women.

The discussion of transcending consciousness does provide us with some rules which should guide the discourse among teachers.

The first rule is the rule of comprehensiveness. The course of consciousness follows a development of transcendence along three lines: 1) self-in-the-world; 2) self in communion with other selves; and 3) self searching the meaning of reality and time. The rule of comprehensiveness would insist that each of these lines of questioning, which ground all the areas of human knowledge (science and mathematics in the first place; language, the arts, technology, ethics and the social and behavioral sciences in the second place; and religion and history in the third place) would be attended to from time to time.

The second rule is the rule of the integrity of formal disciplines. Each discipline can be likened to a myth. It answers a range of questions and requires people who understand its concepts, terms, symbols and methodologies as well as persons who can explain the fundamental insights of the discipline to outsiders. In terms of Crossan's (1974) analysis it requires experts and apologists. The rule of the integrity of formal disciplines would require that any discussion of any discipline be conducted in such a way that everybody in the discussion can become aware of the range of questions dealt with by the discipline, the knowledge thus far generated by the discipline, and the probable course of future inquiry in the discipline.

The third rule is the rule of the relativity of formal disciplines. Parables expose the most pretentious of all formal systems, i.e. myths, to be relative and not absolute. The logical extension of Godel's theorem exposes the relativity of all the disciplines of knowledge (Hofstadter, 1980) In terms of Crossan's analysis, discussion of any discipline requires satirists to poke holes in them, laugh at them, and parablers to expose the limits of what they can really accomplish while challenging everybody involved to

transcend the discipline under question.

The fourth rule is the rule of historical contextuality. Discussion of each discipline must be done in the light of the historical context within which it arose. This rule should not be carried to the extreme of the genetic fallacy committed by John Dewey (1920), but the political interests and ideological bases of all areas of human knowledge do serve to uniquely illuminate the powers as well as the limits of any discipline. Further, they tend to provide a sense of each discipline as a shared search which pedagogically is a principle of unexcelled importance in terms of interesting students in active participation in the process of inquiry as well as safeguarding them against the perilous error of reification of scientific discovery.

The fifth rule is the rule of all-embracing mystery. Transcending consciousness has been shown to derive from the property of intentionality. The incompleteness and relativity of formal disciplines and myths drive men to discern new possibilities, new directions, new questions which will ultimately yield un-dreamt-of-knowledge. The rule of all-embracing mystery would, if followed, keep inquirers aware of the limits of human knowledge. At the same time it would generate rules for the discrimination of genuine disciplines and truthful myths from ersatz disciplines and mendacious myths. The fifth rule is crucial for the avoidance of dogmatism on the one hand, and relativism on the other.

The practice of these five rules in dialogue among teacher educators would hopefully enable them to get in better touch with their own transcending consciousness and that of their colleagues. The curriculum emerging from such dialogue may encourage future teachers to develop their consciousness in an open, transcending manner. Eventually such openness might break the shackles of positivist ideology and generate curricula based on human knowledge and commitment rather than technique.

This paper has been written on the assumption that the beneficiaries of the first instance of an improved curriculum are the teachers themselves. The assumption that one can develop an objectively sound curriculum grounded merely in needs assessment and sets of measurable objectives is rejected. That assumption, based on the positivist ideology, disregards the plainly observable fact that teachers bring their own persons to the concrete task of teaching in the specific circumstances within which they find themselves.

When they focus on the illumination of the lived experience

of teachers, curriculum workers are concentrating their attention on what is, in actuality, the operating curriculum in every school.

* * *

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CURRICULUM AS GENDER TEXT: NOTES ON REPRODUCTION, RESISTANCE, AND MALE-MALE RELATIONS

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Introduction: the Reproduction of Father

Reproduction theory, that is, the explanation of the context, structure and experience of the curriculum by pointing to its reproductive function for the socio-politico-economic status quo, has now been surpassed. Its mechanicalness, it reduction of the Subject to passivity, its obfuscation of structural contradictions and of resistance, have been condemned in several recent essays[1] and conferences.[2] With few exceptions, educational theorists on the Left now call for examination of resistance, not only as an empirical reality to be documented and understood, but as well, as a call for political action.

In the present writing I wish to situate reproduction and resistance theory oedipally. I do so not to reduce them to their oedipal status and functions. I offer this sketch in order to illumine feminist and gender issues which in their current stages of formulation, reproduction and resistance theory only tips its hat in acknowledgement of. While such courtesy is appreciated, it is insufficient. It denies the seriousness and scope of gender issues as it co-opts the anger and action of those who live them. Further, I believe the broad political project of which resistance is a historical, theoretical moment, is finally sabotaged by reducing feminist and gender issues to their political and economic concomitants.

What is the oedipal status of reproduction theory, and of its offspring, resistance theory? In a word, I see them as the analyses of the heterosexual son as he observes how the authority of Father is reproduced and can be resisted. The oedipal function of such theory is parallel to the action of the heterosexual son: the replacement, someday, of Father. Heterosexual sons become Fathers, and Fathers require sons, daughters and wives, all metaphors for underclasses. Father is reproduced, regardless the rhetoric of horizontal social relations, i.e. brotherhood and sisterhood. Educationally, resistance theory, nee reproduction theory, appears confined

to altering the content of curriculum but not its political consequences. The conversation of Father may change but not his position at the dinner table. Schooling in this sense is the story of the sons' and daughters' initiation into the Father's ways, and their consignment of the Mother, usually with her complicity, to the status of unpaid or underpaid laborer and sexual slave. The family drama is the cultural-historical drama writ small and concretely.

Understanding curriculum and curriculum theory oedipally is not fortuitous. The feminist and gay movements[3] have brought to attention issues of gender origin, identity, and prejudice. In curriculum studies, rapid theoretical movement is evident.[4] For instance, in a recent paper, Madeleine R. Grumet traces the gender history of pedagogy in American common schools during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. She concludes that the growing number of female teachers, i.e. "the feminization of teaching," functioned to ensure "pedagogy for patriarchy."[5]

Grumet argues that male administrators enlisted the assistance of female teachers to induct the children into his ways, ways which conditioned the boys to become docile, efficient workers, and the girls to become willing and grateful housewives and full-time mothers. Feminist analysis attacks this complicity and passivity, and in so doing has helped initiate and name the struggle beyond them. In curriculum theory this struggle and its naming have just begun.[6] It is a struggle that will be sabotaged by men who refuse to examine their role in its origin and necessity. Feminist literature has examined this role from points of view that are Hers; I wish to sketch it from His. Specifically I am interested in how male-male relations are implicated in male-female oppression. My focus will be primarily, but not exclusively, male pre-oedipal, oedipal and post-oedipal experience. While this focus may make this paper of minimal use to feminist struggle and theory, I hope it will be viewed as politically allied with them. However, men's analyses cannot be expected to coincide with women's, even if they originate with them.

I suspect that men cannot usefully appropriate feminist understanding and substitute it for their own. We cannot become "feminist men" for long or very deeply without denying our gender-specific life histories. As feminists have discovered for themselves, we must distance ourselves from those we learned to need and love and -- as feminists have documented -- violate. Such psychological distance from women is in the service of understanding our relations with them, not only from their point of view and certainly not from our taken-for-granted view. While feminist

understanding provokes an analogous process of our own, that process is undergone by ourselves. Further, I agree with some feminist separatists that women cannot fully support us without denying their oppression. If aware of that oppression, women have little good will to extend to us, at this historical juncture. Having relied upon women, traditionally, for succor, we face a difficult, potentially dangerous task without them. We men do exhibit "stunted relational potential."[7] Intimacy with women threatens us, but less so than intimacy with other men. I am suggesting that in order to understand our oppression of women, we must work to understand our oppression of each other. This work has begun in the culture at large, with men's groups of various but often superficial sorts. Our work with ourselves is well behind the work women have done with themselves. This analysis, I hope, can contribute to an acceleration of this necessary study of male-male relations.

Pre-oedipal Relations and Post-oedipal Distortions

To begin to understand male gender history, we can focus upon two items which influence that history. One is the nature of the pre-oedipal relationship with the mother; the other is the inferential character of paternity. Both are described by Nancy Chodorow in her *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender.*[8] This is a carefully argued work which delineates the constellation of elements associated with the fact that it is women who mother. Chodorow outlines the implications of that seemingly natural fact for ego and gender differentiation. The book focuses upon the experience of women appropriately enough, and tends to only hint at the experience of men. I will attempt to take that hint and suggest what male experience tends to be.

Let us begin with the second item, namely that paternity is necessarily inferred. The male seed is nameless and not easily identified. Even the physical appearance of the child cannot be relied upon to verify the identity of the father. Jokes about the "milkman" illustrate the commonness of male concern arising from the ultimate ambiguity of paternity. Chodorow suggests that this fact stimulates an anxiety which males attempt to mask and control by specifying rather precisely kinship patterns. He becomes excessively interested in the lines of reproduction, and in most cultures insists upon the use of his name to identify "ownership" of "his" children. The compensation appears to succeed. Fatherhood tends not to be the vague, inferred status that it is

Instead, it is the father who is the "cause" of children; the woman is said to only "carry" "his" baby. The woman becomes a kind of cocoon in which the father's creation incubates until ready for "delivery," surely not a woman's word for childbirth.[9]

Ambiguity of paternity is intolerable for men possibly because ambiguity of ego was renounced, an outcome of the oedipal crisis, and the second item of male gender history we will notice. Ambiguity of ego refers to the relative sharpness of ego differentiation. Chodorow argues that during the early phases of the pre-oedipal period, both mother-daughter and mother-son relationships are undifferentiated. During pregnancy the infant was literally a part of his mother, and during the early months the infant is totally reliant upon her. During this period the infant has no defenses and internalizes without much modification the emotions, and in the case of breastfeeding, the milk of the mother. The infant identifies with his mother; he *is* his mother. Only slowly, during moments of absence, does it begin to dawn on the infant that he or she is a separate being. Chodorow locates the beginning of individual ego differentiation during these moments. As soon as the process of ego differentiation begins, it begins to differ for boys and girls. The mother-daughter relationship remains less differentiated than the mother-son relationship. The mother knows that this girl-child will also know pregnancy, partuition, possibly breastfeeding. Because they are the same sex, and because it tends to be women who mother and men who do not, the mother projects "sameness" onto her daughter, permitting the elongation of their ego merging and interwining.

The son elicits a different response. He will not know pregnancy; probably he will not share the same experience of feeding and caring for "his" infant. The son is different than she, and she projects "otherness," sometimes eroticized, onto him. As a result, the process of ego differentiation proceeds more quickly for him than for his sister. By the time he confronts and is confronted by his father over each other's relationship to the mother/wife, and over their relationship to each other, the boychild is separate enough to experience his mother as separate and as an "object" of desire. The "otherness" projected onto him by the mother makes more facile his compliance with his father's demand that he move further away from her and from "women's things," that he see as strange and not-male the domestic, female world, more credible the stigma of "sissy," and finally more complete his repression of his initial identification with Her.

Chodorow underlines the matri-sexual nature of the infant's experience. She concludes that this mother-infant relationship leaves the daughter in a homoerotic position vis a vis her mother, a position she must abandon during the oedipal crisis. The boy is in a heterosexual position, a position reinforced by his later identification with his father. This analysis is incomplete, however, as it ignores the primal layer of social experience which occurs before the process of ego differentiation has advanced sufficiently to permit the mother to be an "other" to be desired. The initial relationship to the mother, a relatively undifferentiated and undefended one from the infant's position, suggests that underneath the desire for the mother is incorporation, in the case of the heterosexual mother, of that mother's desire for the father. If this is so, and the relatively undifferentiated mother-infant relationship would suggest so, then the primal layer of sedimented memory is heterosexual (again in the case of heterosexual mothers) for the girl-child and homosexual for the boychild. Only as both separate and distinguish themselves from her, do they experience desire for her.

From this view of the male child's earliest pre-oedipal experience, the oedipal admonishment to put away childish things, i.e. mother and female-associated items and feelings, is also a call to suppress his desire for the father. Thus the oedipal resolution for the son involves not only heterosexual sublimation, i.e. postponement and redirection of his desire for the mother, but it involves homosexual repression as well, i.e. the denial of desire for his father. This repression is reinforced during subsequent social experience as males "police" themselves, ensuring that no action interpretable as homoerotic is expressed. Further,young boys tend to seize upon the discovery of a feminized boy as an opportunity to locate, or more precisely dislocate and displace, their own repressed homosexuality. Heterosexual male relations are complicated by homosexual repression; they become fragile, easily sabotaged and conflictual. The result of contemporary male heterosexuality, because it requires repudiation of the initial identification with the mother, is misogyny, and because it involves repression of the internalized desire for the father, heterosexual warfare, literal and symbolic. With this conclusion, however, we have jumped ahead of our story.

We may surmise that the pre-oedipal period, with its vulnerability and increasing awareness of dependency, has terrifying moments for the infant. We can hear this in the screaming of the uncomforted infant. For the daughter this terror is comple-

mented by her submersion in the mother. For the daughter the oedipal crisis permits further differentiation from the mother, but it is a struggle for ego identity that often lasts long into adulthood, so powerful is the mother-daughter symbiosis. Ego identity and differentiation, according to some psychotherapists, is a common if not the most common presenting symptom in women seeking psychotherapy.[10]

As noted, the symbiosis of the mother-son relation is briefer as the mother projects "otherness" onto him, creating a distance from her which makes the construction of a male identity possible. It is an identity that must be acquired through repressing his earliest identification with the mother, and through observation of his father's ways. Because the father's relative absence from the home makes him an idealized, nearly imaginary figure for both boys and girls, the son relies upon the father's words as well for his picture of what is that men do and do not do. As he becomes more male (aggressive, assertive, competitive), more identified with his father, he comes to feel His desire for his wife overlaying his nascent desire for his mother. We have reached the moments of oedipal conflict as the son's desire for the father has been repressed, and sublimated into identification with him; he becomes a rival for His wife. The father now moves to remove his son to a non-competitive position with him, transferring that competition onto his peers, symbolized into social activities of various kinds, such as school and sports. The father achieves this "removal" by logic and by force. Although not communicated succinctly or even verbally at all, he persuades the son that he will be compensated for a) completing the repression of the now attenuated identification with the mother and b) for abandoning his desire for her. In return for his repudiation of the female in him, he can *possess* a female -- a wife, a lover -- later. In return for disowning the mother in him the son as adult obtains a "wife," i.e. a woman reified and externalized, whose actions and presence in his life he can regulate according to custom and law. This regulation is psychologically necessary for the male as her spontaneous movement would threaten evocation of Her inside; yet her presence in regulated ways satisfies his need for the woman he has denied internally.

If the son fails to accept the logic of latency, the father resorts to force. The careful father attempts to restrain the use of force as it inhibits the recently-acquired and developing personality characteristics associated with being a man, i.e. competitiveness, etc. Yet some force, some struggle, is necessary as it strengthens and hardens this imprinting. Excessive force may produce a defeated

son, one who sees no point in resisting the father, or in identifying with him, in the latter case feeling betrayed by the father's oedipal treatment of him. The successfully endured oedipal crisis produces a son who delays his desire for the female and intensifies his identification with the male. Because both consequences involve mechanisms of denial and repression, the son produced is one with an overly-determined ego, an ego with less access to emotion and to sedimented memory, i.e. unconscious process and content, than does the typical ego of the daughter. This overly-determined ego results in "stunted relational potential." Feelings of separateness and individuality become feelings of loneliness and dissociation. To "stand up on one's own and be a man" comes at the cost of debilitating repressions. Post-oedipal intimacy, especially as an adult, with a woman, tends to stimulate his repressed pre-oedipal, undifferentiated intimacy and identification with the mother. Adult intimacy with another man threatens to renew his repressed desire for the father from the early pre-oedipal period and/or his less-repressed rage from "losing" the oedipal competition for the mother. Condemned then to an overly-determined self, isolated from its own unconscious processes and content and capable of only attenuated forms of intimacy with others, the adult male in our time in our culture can be seen to seek refuge and escape from his condition in work (careerism and the problem of the "workaholic") and pleasure (hedonism, including sexual promiscuity and drugs like alcohol).

Seduction, not Resistance

The over-determination of the male ego makes the ambiguity of paternity intolerable. He compensates for the inferential character by claiming "first cause," the origin of creation. He further compensates with an excessive interest in kinship patterns, i.e. the lines of reproduction. In this sense the recent interest on the Left in reproductive theories of curriculum are patriarchical in nature, although given the political status of the Left in the United States it is the nascent patriarchy of the aspiring Son, not the mature and established patriarchy of the Father. As the son, leftist curriculum theorists search for room for resistance, which at one conference was charactertized as "non-reproductive" education.[11] It is oedipally significant that the inspiration for this move "beyond passive analysis" seems to have originated in Paul Willis' account of "the lads." It is the resistance of adolescent boys, of "boys being boys," a resistance the Father understands

as more-or-less normal, no final threat to His authority.

Thus the position of the reproduction theorist, and his most recent transmutation, the resistance theorist, can be likened to that of the son who observes the ways in which the Father (the embodiment of power and ideology) reproduces his status. Young and powerless, the pre-pubescent son is awed if angered at the power of the Father, a power which seems to reproduce itself lawfully. Older, he sees the relative contingency of the Father's position, and the possibility, indeed the duty, of resistance. Through "mobilization" and "struggle on all fronts" he can resist Him. We need only examine the subsequent history of the son to observe the outcome of this struggle: the son rarely wins this battle; he ordinarily replaces the Father by outliving Him. The point is that the son *does* replace Him; he occupies his position. Is it possible that resistance reproduces patriarchy?

I want to suggest an oedipal strategy which differs from the traditional one, in fact a strategy whose aim is dissolution of the oedipal complex, of the familial, social and economic structures which accompany it. This strategy shares the interest in "non-reproduction." It is a male who loses interest in his ontological and political status as "first cause," as the locus and impetus of generation. He becomes a degenerate. He no longer wishes to resist Him and thereby replace Him. Now the son seeks to sleep with Him. Such desire does not begin in love. Given the historical moment, it begins in the same fury as does resistance. But now the son turns on his father in a way the father is unprepared to co-opt. The son refuses circumcision, that index of the oedipal wound signifying male repudiation of the female and the father's consequent promise of the world for the son's complicity. Instead the son stares at the father, saying: "I refuse your ritual of manhood and its denial of the woman in me and of the woman who gave life to me. My mother, the source of my life, from whose body I came, in whose care I have lived, my companion and lover, but through whose complicity with you is also my traitor, as she turned me over to you, I stand by her, remain a part of her, and refuse your contract. I refuse to exchange her for you, her world (the private, expressive, intimate, relational world) for yours (the public, abstract, codified, hierarchical world). I refuse your lie (that I can have her again when I'm big like you, in the form of a wife, trading my mother for sexual object and unpaid laborer), and your repudiation of me (now that I have relinquished her, now that I am your "little man," you dispense your affection, such that it is, in units designed to manipulate me to achieve the

dreams you failed to realize), and I refuse to displace the pain from her loss and the fury at your deception onto all others female and male. I reject the whole oedipal contract, and in so doing retain my longing for you, a longing now laced with hatred. It's not your power I want now. It's you."

Phallocentrism is the embodied ideology of oedipally-produced male sexuality. Screwing and getting screwed are what homosexual men do literally, and what heterosexual men do to each other symbolically; one form of sexuality is the shadow of the other. In their contemporary expressions, both tend to be socially distorted as they are dissociated fragments of a forgotten human whole. We men are at war with each other, on battlefields, in corporate meeting rooms, in lecture halls, all symbolizations of and abstractions from the father wound and the mother repudiation. Homosexuality becomes the site of the politics of the concrete, of the body, the potential politics of authentic solidarity and mutual understanding. Let us confront each other, we the circumcized wounded ones, not on the battlefield as abstracted social roles and political pawns of the Father, but in bed, as embodied, sexualized beings fighting to feel what we have forgotten, the longing underneath the hatred.

Heterosexuality as Political Institution

Hocquenghem reminds us that the concept "homosexual" did not exist prior to the nineteenth century. The capacity and desire to sleep with same-sexed persons was presumed to exist to greater or lesser extent in everyone, hence the scope and intensity of efforts to prohibit homosexual expression. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, a medicalization of the socially deviant began to occur. That is, medical terms became employed to describe the culturally marginal and the socially deviant. This medicalization of the social terrain served the political and economic interests of cultural homogeneity, which accompanied industrialization and bureaucratization. By assigning such labels as "homosexual" which indicated illness, the medical and legal communities could identify, prosecute, and punish, under the guise of providing "helping services," those whose lives were viewed as intolerably outside the mainstream. Thus those who were observed (voyeurism, as Hocquenghem notes, accompanies Law and Medicine, themselves systematizations of desire) to sleep with same-sexed persons more often than not, and/or those who exhibited personality characteristics sufficiently incongruent with

protyptical feminine and masculine ideals, could be classified as pathological. Hocquenghem traces this story of increasing medicalization, i.e. the appearance of "homosexuals," during the twentieth century, and documents that, contrary to popular belief, homosexuality is being increasingly suppressed, if more subtly.[12]

The lie is that there is homosexual desire. Hocquenghem, following Deleuze and Guattari, [13] insists there is only desire. The polymorphous perversity, as Freud would have it, of infancy becomes codified into genital sexuality. The story of oedipus is in this regard the story of the production of heterosexuals, and the eradication, however unsuccessful, of homosexuals. Adrienne Rich describes heterosexuality as "compulsory," and as such "... needs to be recognized and studied as a *political institution* ..."[14] Politically it reinforces the position of the Father and guarantees its reproduction. Contemporary forms of heterosexuality tend to be phallocentric. For the male the phallus is the sign of his power as a man. Successfully socialized heterosexual women experience "penis envy" and desire its incorporation. While the phallus is the occasion for man's pride or shame, he does not sexualize it. It is as if that which a woman desires is unworthy to be desired by him. Thus he scorns the homosexual's interest in fellatio and in anal intercourse. In a phallocentric culture few homosexuals escape the fascination with the phallus; they concretize the heterosexual's fascination with its abstraction: power. Both groups reify their existence; both fail to see how the existence of each relies upon the existence of the other.

Men's (and many women's) fascination with the traditional masculine ideal, i.e. the macho man, is not without some merit. This ideal is comprised of several character traits which are admirable: courage, strength, fortitude. However, we must acknowledge that these qualities are the socially fortunate outcomes of oedipus; often as not the macho man utilizes his strength and courage to rob, rape, and kill. In both prototypes these characteristics are not chosen but conditioned; they result from repressing the pre-oedipal identification with the mother and resisting semi-successfully the authority of the father. His "manliness," that discernible way of being in his body, tends to come at the expense of being in his mind and heart. His maternal repression -- the more macho he is the more complete the repression is -- makes him clumsy interpersonally, primitive intellectually, and a neantherthal emotionally.

For his more civilized variations, the physical is abstracted onto

the social and intellectual. Boots and jeans are traded for three-piece suits (at least during the day), and his manliness is determined not by his muscle and phallus size, but the size of his bank account, stock portfolio, and corporate position. He trades physical strength for acumen and shrewdness, and the macho man's narcissistic experience of himself as a body is now mediated through the bodies of the women with whom he sleeps. These characterological prototypes are crude but common. Less common and less crude are academic variations, including one version we might call, not only for mischief's sake, the macho Marxist. He body and probably his bank account have been exchanged for a long list of publications, physical strength and corporate shrewdness for tough logic, witty asides, and a virtuoso knowledge of Marx, Gramsci, and Bourdieu. He vanquishes his oedipal foe not with his fists or by outpositioning him corporately, but via skillful argumentation, and cogent denunciations of idealist and revisionist tendencies in his opponents' positions. The macho Marxist substitues dialectical materialism for the crass kind. the terminal smile of the young executive on the make for the suffering frown and angry scorn of the wounded but resisting activist. The content of the personality and of the social relations which express and sustain it differs for each version of man. However the structure of the personality and social relations (competitiveness, aggressiveness, exhibitionism) does not. Each is interested in the phallus, his own or others; rather, each is interested in its abstracted social form: power. Each aggrandizes his own while diminishing his opponents'; after the battle all tend to return to nurse and lover for solace or celebration.

To attack patriarchy and fascism in their graduated forms requires attacking one's own internalization of them, however subtle their expression. We men are our fathers' sons; he resides within us, and his relation to his wife and to his children resides there as well. It is not only the Father we must resist, but our internalized relationship to Him. To be sure, working with one's relation to Her is useful and important. One can strive to become a feminist man. At some point, however, it is our repression of Her and identification with Him, one's "compulsory heterosexuality," that must be unearthed and confronted. Political attitudes and actions are informed characterologically as well as systemically. As well as a politics of the state, there is a politics of the individual, a hierarchy of internal object relations. If we are male and straight likely it is we have repudiated the woman in us for the fabricated male we were and He pretended to be. In our renunication of Her and

identification with Him we are committed to become Fathers ourselves, regardless the political content of our rhetoric. And in becoming Fathers we will require wives and children, and the hierarchization of power will be reproduced, however consciously denied or resisted. We might cease our longing to *become* the Father, and instead long *for* Him, seducing Him, bringing Him down to us, in bed, on the floor, no longer son -- father, now lovers. In the act of love we might become brothers, and as brothers we might help Her to become our sister. De-oedipalization is pro-feminist, and during the present historical moment, homosexual. It represents the decodification of desire, the dehierarchization of power. It is the de-territorialization of libido, the de-possession of persons. In the discovery and expression of homosexual desire, we crack the dam of repression, psychological and political. What is leaked stains the social fabric, altering its composition even if it is reincorporated.

Dirty Work

Hocquenghem observes that "the law is clearly a system of desire, in which provocation and voyeurism have their own place."[15] Systems of knowledge production and distribution, such as curricula, are likewise systems, or in the present context, codifications of desire. The knowledge we choose for presentation to the young is in one sense like the parts of our bodies we allow them to see. Both the physical body and the body of knowledge are cathected objects, and decisions and policies regarding them follow from our own organization and repression of desire. This is not to ignore the so-called internal logic of the curriculum, i.e. the epistemological considerations which accompany its formulation and presentation. Nor is it to ignore its political, economic and social functions. However, the present view does aspire to situate, although not reduce, these considerations and functions oedipally. Doing so reveals how curriculum reproduces compulsory heterosexuality and homosexual repression: the overdetermination of desire. Curriculum is the dictum of the Fathers, their conversation, rather pronouncements, to their children which seduce them to his reign, his power (phallus) at the center. And through the use of female teachers, as with mother's complicity in circumcision, (and female genital mutilation in Africa), the sons and daughters are delivered to Him. For sons, it is the circumcision ceremony in which they complete their repudiation of Her, and accept the wound -- the scarred penis, the over-determined

ego – which demarcates their initiation into the tribe of heterosexual men.[16]

For most the pre-oedipal experience is forgotten. It remains as "sedimentation," a primal memory of the nature of the world, a kind of "domain assumption." One aspect of this memory is how the world is known. As Grumet has shown, the relatively undifferentiated relationship between mother and infant is inscribed epistemologically as subject-object reciprocity and mutual determinancy. The mother or the infant is the "other" or "object," but object boundaries are blurred. If the infant son could speak, his words might be: "She and I, we are one. My crying brings her comfort, sometimes her irritation, and my laughter brings her smile, her laughter. No barrier insulates me from her love, sometimes her anger, her joy, her impatience and fatigue. I taste these in her milk as I inhale them in the air, exuded as they are from her organs and her skin." The primal experience of the world is Mother, then gradually it moves to the bed on which he rests, the walls of the room, and so on, a slowly expanding world experienced through Her, changed through Her and through the infant. During the oedipal crisis, the groundwork for which has been laid by the mother's projection of "otherness" onto the son as well as the son's experience of her absences, the son dissociates himself from this viscous intermingling of self and other, subject and object. He defines mother as "other," not me, as opposite. Father, the absent abstract one, identification with whom involves far less co-mingling than imitation of what I the infant observe, and remembrance of what He tells me to be, becomes the knowable "other." I am to become like the "other," depersonalized, desubjectivized, objectified. Father and I are separate, discrete, and it is possible to know what is He and that which is I. Rather than my subjectivity intermingled with objectivity in moments of continuous mutual constitution, subjectivity and objectivity are now divorced. My subjectivity becomes an intrusion upon my clear perception of what He is and what He tells me There Is. I understand that my emotions, fantasies, etc., are "smudges on the mirror," to be kept cleaned off if I am to replicate without distortion the world "out there." In the oedipal experience is the gender foundation for a series of epistemological assumptions associated with twentieth-century mainstream social science. These assumptions include claims of value and political neutrality, and the objective to discover, through increasingly refined methods of observation, quantification and analysis, the nature of human reality. Oedipally it is the heterosexual son attempting

to comprehend his father, a world that is removed yet discoverable, as it is the world into which father disappears each morning, and from which he returns, with stories, each night. It is this primal oedipal experience of father as a discrete "other" to be known, and of the world as alien but discoverable and knowable, that has become elaborately symbolized in modern mainstream social science.

The daughter's experience, as we have seen, is different. She retains a more-or-less undifferentiated relation to the mother; her sense of the world thereby remains more fluid than her brother's. Intuitively she understands that experience is flux, some of it beyond our words, much of it beyond our numbers. She understands that influencing one aspect of a situation alters all, and that quantification tends to freeze situation as it stops flux, and fixes aspects of experience to one level of conceptualization. During the oedipal period she complies with her father's desire for her, creating the distance from her mother necessary to feel her desire for her. Unlike her brother who must suppress identification with the mother, she maintains both that identification and desire for both parents. Thus a triangular relational configuration saturates her primal experience of the world. There is the relatively rigid, the demanding, the powerful and seductive: the father, world, objectivity. There is the relatively bending, the compliant, the intuitive: mother, self, subjectivity. Each influences the other; each contributes to the other's transformations, processes which she observes and perhaps reformulates. In this pre-oedipal and oedipal experience is the basis for a constructivist epistemology.[17]

For the son a more linear view of events, their causes and effects, is compelling. In repudiating his early mother identification, he commits himself to contradicting his initial experience of Her and the world as relatively undifferentiated and mutually constitutive. This commitment expresses itself in his efforts to contradict the inferential character of paternity. Recall that in order to deny the ambiguity of his causal status in semination, he posits himself as the cause, and the woman as the intervening variable, in the effect which is partuition. His compensation for his inferred status as father and for the loss of the feminine in his conscious ego knows few bounds as it extends into systems of kinship (his name replacing her in marriage and becoming the children's is the familiar instance which hints at his general obsession with lines of reproduction), sexual slavery (including compulsory heterosexuality and homosexual repression), and

epistemology.

In this latter domain he makes supreme systems of knowledge production in which knowledge of the objective world (a bifurcated, false concept in itself) is sought and systematized, and knowledge of subjective worlds, and their inter-relationships, is avoided or grudgingly accepted. We speak of "hard" research and "soft." Such gender values are expressed not only in the intellectual hegemony within disciplines, but in the power structure of universities across disciplines. The highest salaries tend to go to scientists, the lowest to artists. The apex of patriarchy is the age of science. Even the arts and humanities are increasingly masculinized as evidenced by the use of computer programs in historical research (which of course can be useful but which become ideological as they become *de rigueur*) and formalistic prose in literary and aesthetic criticism.

Where are we historically in the process of masculinzation? Its abstracted forms will lag behind -- given their relative autonomy -- the specifically gender formations, and these indicate contradictory tendencies. For males a subtle yet discernible demasculinization can be observed.[18] Its sign is an evidently increasing male interest in the appearance of masculinity, suggesting the loss of its substance. Specifically, traditional masculinity was unaware of its appearance. Beauty, and working to make oneself beautiful, were professions of the "lady," although this sex-role expectation varied across class and according to ethnicity. Men who were especially handsome, and certainly those men who spent time attempting to be, were somehow less masculine than those "rough and ready" types who knew women would love them for their prowess, for just being men, not for their moustaches, tight jeans or clear skin. I believe the interest in the signs of masculinity, including not only dress but cosmetics, small-bed trucks with over-sized wheels, the renewed interest in "working-out" and in athletics generally signal the loss of a more traditional masculinity, a loss we can loosely attribute to changing market conditions (i.e., the increasing importance of appearance and "style" in successful corporate life) and to the feminist movement (including some women's explicit eroticization of the male body, for instance in publications like *Playgirl*). The emphasis upon masculinity at the time of this writing signifies a reactionary response to the feminist movement, as it attempts to reaffirm masculinity. But in its absorption in signs not substance men disclose their defeat. The delicate and changing balance between the opposite sexes is now clearly upset.

While there is de-masculinization, men have yet to recognize it. The reactionary response to feminism will probably pass, although not easily or quickly. The deep structural changes men must undergo to achieve equity with women come very slowly, partly because some women fear to press too hard, and mostly because most men are unwilling or unable to initiate or sustain such changes. Instead they make surface alterations. Those middle-class men who apparently comply with their wives' and lovers' requests and demands for shared housework, parenting, and decision-making are only complying, on the whole. *The deep structure of sexism, the socially-induced, oedipally-produced desire to become the patriarch, is not changed.* Resentment accrues in unkowing men and possibly unsuspecting women. We can expect violent crimes against women to continue to escalate in the short-term. We can expect abstracted masculine forms such as conceptual formalism to solidify and proliferate as compensatory developments to the disappearance of conventional masculinity.

Reinforcing this tendency is pressure upon women who enter the work force (typically at unequal pay for equal work) to conform to male expectations and standards of conduct. Those few who have managed to enter the academic work force, for instance, are pressed to acquiesce to dominant research paradigms. Being a woman and an autobiographer or a phenomenologist is having two strikes against you in most departments. This comformity expectation often intersects with the developmental project of many women to extend and sharpen their ego differentiation from the mother. To achieve this distance, to contradict this symbiotic object relation, many women embrace the stark logic and conceptual neatness of mainstream academic work in most disciplines. It may be we men (men who refuse to participate in the reproduction of patriarchy, or at least attempt to refuse), joining with certain feminists (those who celebrate not contradict their matrisexuality) who might rediscover and reformulate hermeneutic research methods, methods which portray more fully, if more messily at first, the flux and multi-dimensionality of experience. Such an effort toward Reconceptualization cannot occur intellectually only. It involves a de-oedipalization of the person, and with it, a de-oedipalization of the intellect. The intellect of he or she who remains in a relatively undifferentiated relation to the Mother is not the masculinized, calculating, instrumental intellectual, caricatured in modern literature by Joseph K. in Kafka's *The Trial.*[19] Instead it is the intellect which portrays

the simultaneity of thought, feeling, and action, not of atomized individuals (those with over-determined egos, characteristic of the modern male) but those still connected, co-mingling, capable of community. It is the intellect of the mature Virginia Woolf. [20]

Similarly in schools we cannot rely upon all women to sabotage -- even if conditions were favorable for attempting so -- bureaucratization, standardization, and the bogus "individualization" of many classrooms. Grumet notes:

> So the male educators invited women into the schools expecting to reclaim their mothers, and the women accepted the invitation and came so that they may identify with their fathers. Accordingly, female teachers complied with the rationalization and bureaucratization that pervaded the common schools as the industrial culture saturated the urban areas. Rather than emulate the continuous and extended relation of a mother and a maturing child that develops over time, they acquiesced to the graded schools, to working with one age group for one year at a time. Rather than demanding the extended relation that would bind them over time to individual children, they agreed to large group instruction where the power of the peer collective was at least as powerful as the mother bond. [21]

Grumet locates this complicity with the father's agenda at the "crossroads" of male and female efforts to contradict their internalized object relations. The male attempts to recover the repressed mother in him by arranging her presence about him, a presence he regulates as he controls -- as administrator, schoolboard member, and textbook author and publisher -- the curriculum. His political control intersects with the her project to escape the symbiotic relation to the mother by gaining access to the public domain of the father. As Grumet concludes, "pedagogy for patriarchy" was achieved through the "feminization of teaching."

The culture of the classroom is a patriarchal one as it is drained of the personal, the intimate, the psychological, as it is drenched in competitiveness, task-orientedness, and achievement. The overdetermined ego of the male (with gradations of the macho personality as a result) is celebrated in literature as it is required to adapt to the demands of those who serve it, those who do its dirty work -- female teachers. She speaks in his absence, by his authority, and the tales of human life she tells the children ensure that the culture of the classroom is reproduced. Yes, there is resistance, as Willis as shown, autobiographers have always known and reproduction theorists have recently discovered. But it is the resistance

of the oedipally-produced son, a resistance that is tolerated because it can be coopted. The son must not be squashed, only repressed. He must complete the estrangement from the feminine by amplifying the aggressive and the angry. Of course he must not "get out of hand." As Black radicals have known, the gender of the enemy is male; it is "the Man." Resisting pleases the Father as it assures Him the son wants what He has: power. His son's lust for the Father has now been abstracted from the physical onto its political derivative. It is lust that will ultimately assure the complicity of the son in his Father's reign, and his Mother's domesticity and relative slavery.

Father's authority is communicated by his pretentious seriousness, his virility, his cold capacity to oppose and suppress the Other when he judges it necessary, to compete for scarce commodities (and to keep them scarce), by sons who serve as his policemen, his militia, his bureaucrats, his rebels (who underline his importance as they keep him mobilized), and by women who praise his achievements. attend to his wounds, and do his dirty work.[22] This authority of the Father is corroded primally by the son who refuses to obey or defy him, to be his cheerful clone or his frowning, with clenched fist, opponent. It is corroded by the woman who returns his lust with indifference. Authority is defiled by the son who stares at him with a partly secret smile, and winks. The Father's authority is demystified as it is returned from its abstracted form to its concrete presence, from the body politic to the body. The son's eyes only momentarily meet his Father's, but move quickly below them, wandering about his hips. The son who has not disclaimed his mother knows how she is humbled by His objectification of her, and now he uses this knowledge against Him. The Father is no longer Authority; he is a piece of ass. The mother's gaze may solidify her husband's cockiness, his fascination with his power over her, his sense of himself as Fuhrer. But the son's lascivious stare, which has embedded within it the rage of the oedipal challenge as well as the not-forgotten love of the wounded and wanting, this stare mocks Him as it transforms Him into an object of desire, a plaything, and dissolves his seriousness into panic. If the son fellates him, acting out concretely what the complicit straight son performs symbolically, the father's power flows from his body into the son's. The blood-swollen phallus becomes limp in its orgasm, and the son knows what heterosexual women have always known: the father's power is transient; it can be consumed; in a moment it is gone. Now is limpness, weakness, sleep. If the

father penetrates the son, the same dissolution of power occurs. However love is made, love is made. Father becomes lover. Even Freud knew that "the behavior towards men in general of a man who sees in other men potential love-objects must be different than that of a man who looks upon other men in the first instance as rivals in regard to women."[23]

"From Behind We Are All Women"

Patriarchy is in one sense phallocentrism. The location of power in the male, and its hierarchical arragement among them, requires the distillation of libido into the phallus. "The body gathers around the phallus like society around the chief."[24] The phallus symbolizes power, power which is organized vertically. This organization is a system of "jealously and competition," Hocquenghem writes. Of the phallus he says the following.

> It is the detached, complete object which plays the same role in our society's sexuality as money does in the capitalist economy: the fetish, the true universal reference point for all activity. It is responsible for the allocation of both absence and presence: the little girl's penis-envy, the little boy's castration anxiety.[25]

The phallus is a public organ. In locker rooms men compare its size. In parks they expose it, an act of exhibition, the aim of which is to frighten the female, and in so doing reassure himself. It reminds the little girl of Daddy's power. Rape is her ultimate reminder, his forced entry into her private body and psyche. The phallus symbolizes power, and like power it is aggressive. It seeks use. It seeks victims.

Whereas the phallus is social, the anus is private. It is hidden from public view by the buttocks, just as it is hidden from psychological view by its repression by the ego. This repression is necessary to the production of oedipalized individuals in competition with each other. "If phallic transcendence and the organization of society around the great signifier are to be possible, the anus must be privatised in individualized and oedipalized persons."[26] Phallocentrism is inversely related to anal eroticism.

Freud associated the anal stage of sexual development with the formation of identity. While Freud's theory is not a simple linear, maturational one, there is the suggestion that the anal stage must be lived through in order to achieve genital sexuality. Anal eroticism must be sublimated, or repressed, in order to reach phallocentrism. The "desiring function" of the anus is

replaced by an exclusively excremental one.[27] The relegation of the anus to an exclusively excremental function bifurcates the private from the public, the subjective from the objective.

These bogus divisions accompany the formation of bifurcated persons whose internal lives are kept discreet from their public lives. Private psychological material is excreted at home in order that it not interfere with efficacious public performance. Hocquenghem notes:

> Every man possesses a phallus which guarantees him a social role; every man has an anus which is truly his own, in the most secret depths of his own person. The anus does not exist in a social relation, since it forms precisely the individual and therefore enables the division between society and the individual to be made. ... Lavatories are the only places where one is alone behind locked doors. ... The anus is over-invested individually because its investment is withdrawn socially. [28]

One's private life is especially charged emotionally because it is withdrawn socially, because it is regarded as private. This withdrawal, the distillation of energy to the phallus, i.e. of conscious energy to the public domain, accompanies the particular vertical organizations of power characteristic of centralized states and corporate economies. The myth of the private individual keeps him politically weak and economically manipulable. It sustains the rule of the Father. Freud: "The entire Oedipus complex is anal." [29]

Surplus capital accumulation is made characterologically possible through anal repression; the jokes "he's a tight ass" are accurate. In fact, the character structure of the capitalist is such that the anus, in effect, disappears. The private self, the capacity to empathize and suspend ego boundaries, is repressed, buried under the mask, the persona, produced by social conditioning. In the present historical circumstances, the anus becomes more than itself; it symbolizes the body as well. Anal eroticism draws libido from its over-investment in the phallus and diversifies it throughout the rest of the body, de-territorializing not only sexuality but power as well. The anus does not lend itself to comparison and competition, and from the anal point of view, what criterea could be employed to judge them? Sexuality is equalized as it is diversified, not only within the male sex, but between sexes. After all, as Hocquenghem notes, "from behind we are all women."[30]

The over-regulation of the anus accompanies the over-deter-

mination of the male ego. The blocking of elan vital bodily mirrors the blocking of psychological life in the rigid male personality formation. Denying its undifferentiated relation to others, the individual male ego deludes itself into believing "what is mine is mine."

> Control of the anus is the precondition for taking responsibility for property. The ability to "hold back" or to evacuate the faeces is the moment of the constitution of the self. "To forget oneself" is the most ridiculous and distressing kind of social accident there is, the ultimate outrage to the human person.[31]

So it is when someone lets something "personal" slip during public conversation. Others are embarrassed or irritated that he has "forgotten himself;" he has excreted the private in public. The reduction of the anus to self-regulation and excretion accompanies the commodification of self.[32] Subjectivity becomes repressed, and its explication publicly thereby becomes one form of cultural sabotage. Autobiographical description, to the extent it escapes the commonsensical, becomes free associative and genuinely confessional, invites de-regulation of others.

> To reinvest the anus collectively and libidinally would involve a proportional weakening of the great phallic signifier, which dominates unconsciously both the small-scale hierarchies of the family and in the great social hierarchies. The least acceptable desiring operation (precisely because it is the most desublimating one) is that which is directed at the anus.[33]

To refuse to maintain the schizoid distinction between public and private, and to excrete in public what commodification requires we save for our wives, lovers, or psychiatrists, soils the social fabric. The seriousness of Father at the dinner table, the taken-for-granted naturalization of social life, cannot be maintained by the jokes, wails and confessions of the subjectivity-existing person. Subjectivity is suppressed intellectually across the academic disciplines as anal eroticism is repressed and organized around the public male organ. Father maintains his position by pretending phallic superiority, at least by persuading us that that is the name of the power game. He maintains his position by sitting "on his duff," hiding his private self from the scrutiny of others as well as from himself. He eradicates homosexuality because it threatens to bring his ass into public view. His reign depends upon its absence.

Anal repression accompanies a certain order of character struc-

ture indicated by constant and relatively high tension as the organism is under (unconscious) surveillance and regulation. The eroticization of the anus threatens this constriction, and no doubt this knowledge makes anal intercourse one of the most dreaded punishments one man can inflict upon another. The particular series of personality formations associated with macho men depend upon the over-determination of the ego as it has successfully suppressed the feminine in itself. Suppressed is not equivalent to gone, and the male regulates himself carefully in order to prevent its unwelcome surfacing. The masculine identity, based as it is upon repression of the pre-oedipal identification with the mother and the construction of identification with a relatively absent father, is in fact fragile and easily threatened. The intensity and pervasiveness of homophobia among men suggest this constant need to "remember oneself." Homosexuality in this context becomes a call for a return to pre-commodified forms of experience. Hocquenghem again:

> Homosexual desire is related in particular to the prepersonal state of desire. To this is linked the fear of loss of identity, as it is state of desire. ... The direction manifestation of homosexual desire stands in contrast to the relations of identity, the necessary roles imposed by the Oedipus complex in order to ensure the reproduction of society.[34]

The codification of desire according to Oedipus is the identification of individual self and social location. The biological interest in reproduction becomes culturally interwined in the socio-political interest in reproducing his status. The resistance of the heterosexual son initially angers but eventually pleases the Father as it assures Him of the son's interest in the power the Father claims. The resistance of the heterosxual son may result in the deposing of a particular father, but not in the deposing of the archetype -- Father. The victorious son discovers that it is the Father in himself he has resisted as he has resisted his father. Fathers are not deposed through resistance, only replaced. Vertical social relations continue. Fathers require children and wives as capitalists require workers. Brotherhood and sisterhood, concepts depicting horizontal social relations, are not opposite-sexed relationships.

Conclusion: Schooling as Circumcision, Curriculum as the Codification of Desire

From the viewpoint sketched here, schooling is a gender

ceremony in which, as Grumet has suggested, female teachers transfer their children, particularly their sons, to the Father, to patriarchal conceptions of economic, social, and intellectual life. Circumcision demarcates manhood, the point after which the son is regarded as a member of the tribe of Patriarchs. The wounded phallus and the scar, that remains are a cattlebrand indicating ownership and gender identity.

The culture of the classroom is patriarchal. Circumcision occurs symbolically. The wound is psychic, political and economic. The elements of the first category include hypertrophy of the intellect, loss of self to others, and internalization of the oppressor: the development of a false self-system.[35] Politically the sons are domesticated, conditioned to accept and participate in the "jealously-competition" system which sorts them according to class membership. As a gender ceremony of manhood, contemporary schooling compels heterosexuality as well, implicating it in the complex configuration which is suffering in the West. Homosexuality as it now exists is implicated as well. Many homosexuals, like most oppressed groups in initial stages of political rights work, tend to believe what their enemies say about them. Thus many homosexuals tend to believe in some measure that they are indeed a "third sex," unique, "queer." They tend to believe in a substantive category called "homosexual," not seeing that it is in the service of their own oppression, and in the "heterosexual's" self-delusion regarding his own gender composition. Homosexuals are often embarrassed over the relative prominence of sado-masochistic sexuality in gay life, not realizing that they only act out concretely and privately what "straight" men do to each other abstractly in the public domain. In schools, as in homes and offices, men get women to do their dirty work.

Curriculum like the oedipal complex is a codification of desire, a symbolization of libido into codes which are patriarchal in nature and fuction as it contributes to bifurcated personality formations, suppressing what subjectivity remains from the pre-oedipal experience. Curriculum theorists and social theorists of education have correctly identified curriculum as the conversation of the Father. Curriculum contributes to the reproduction of "civilization," but so does, finally, resistance to it. Resistance as a concept and as a call for political action is no doubt "beyond passive analysis." But it too is only a moment in dialectical understanding and action. Exposing its oedipal ties and functions suggests another moment coming, one in which we sons and fathers work to become brothers and lovers. It is a struggle

fought not only on the streets and in classrooms, but in bed. On that "site," curriculum might become the de-hierarchicalization of power and, indeed, the celebration of desire.

* * *

Notes

1. See, for instance, Henry A. Giroux, "Hegemony, Resistance, and the Paradox of Educational Reform," Interchange, Vol. 12, Nos. 2-3, 1981, pp. 3-26, and Michael W. Apple, "Reproduction, Contestation, and Curriculum: An Essay in Self-criticism," Ibid., pp. 27-46.
2. Philip Wexler, "Body and Soul," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1982, pp. 166-180. The papers cited in note number one were read at a conference entitled "Beyond Passive Analysis," held at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, Toronto, November 11-13, 1980.
3. Guy Hocquenghem suggests it is no accident that the two movements have been co-extensive. "Experience in Europe and the U.S.A. has shown that the women's movement and the gay movement have coincided. It is as if society culd not bear to see in man what it demands to see in women, as if to dominate women and to repress homosexuality were one and the same thing." Homosexual Desire. London: Allison & Busby, 1978, p. 126. Misogyny and homosexual repression are indeed related.
4. I review this progress in "Gender, Sexuality and Curriculum Studies: The Beginning of the Debate," McGill Journal of Education, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1981, pp. 305-316.
5. Madeleine R. Grumet, "Pedagogy for Patriarchy: The Feminization of Teaching, " Interchange, Vol. 12, Nos. 2-3, pp. 165-184.
6. The intial interest in sexism expressed itself in textual analyses, i.e. examination of textbooks, especially textbooks used in elementary schools, for sex stereotyping. In the past five years feminism has had a more theoretical impact upon the field. See, for instance, Madeleine R. Grumet, "Conception, Contradiction, and Curriculum," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 3:1. Also, Janet L. Miller, "Feminism and Curriculum Theory: The Breaking of Attachments," Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 4:2, pp. 181-186.
7. This is a conclusion of a rather elaborate argument concerning the consequences of women being primary caretakers of infants developed by Nancy Chodorow in The Reproduction of Mothering, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

8. In this section I will amend Chodorow's thesis to suggest that the initial preoedipal identification with the (heterosexual) mother places the son in a homosexual position.

9. Grumet, "Conception, Contradiction, and Curriculum."

10. See William F. Pinar and Lee Johnson, "Aspects of Gender Analysis in Recent Feminist Psychological Thought and Their Implications for Curriculum," Journal of Education, 162:4 (Fall 1980), pp. 113-126.

11. Jean Anyon, "Elementary Schooling: Distinctions of Social Class," Interchange, 118-132.

12. Hocquenghem, pp. 48 ff.

13. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Captialism and Schizophrenia. New York: Viking, 1977.

14. Adrienne Rich, "Compulsory Heterosexuality," Signs, 5:4 (Summer 1980), p. 637.

15. Hocquenghem, p. 52.

16. Phyllis Chesler takes seriously the idea of the father wound, and at one point suggests that male hetersexual promiscuity may not represent a search for the mother, but rather for the father, a search, given the homosexual taboo, that is bound to fail. Misogyny in this sense is related to the man's anger that she is not he.

17. In this section I have relied heavily upon the argument Grumet develops in her essay "Conception, Contradiction, and Curriculum."

18. A companion way to think about this process is the following. One consequence of the feminist movement has been a greater candor from heterosexual women regarding their sexual preferences and their appreciation of the male form, c.f. Playgirl magazine. Many men, especially middle class men, have become correspondingly more sensitive to their appearance, and groom themselves in order to amplify their sexual attractiveness to women. It is a short step to groom and appreciate one's body as it is attractive to women to appreciating one's body period. And it is a larger yet negotiable step to take from appreciating one's own body as an erotic object to appreciating other men's bodies as erotic objects. It would be an ironic outcome of that aspect of the feminist movement which has functioned to bring women's sexual preferences and voyeurism "out of the closet" if it initiated a process of male sexual appreciation for the male. In a word, feminism may produce male homosexuality on a scale not seen in the West since pre-Christian Greece and Rome.

19. Joseph K's rationality is an instrumental one. The questions he poses in attempting to comprehend his case begin "how," "who," and "what." "Who could these men be? What were they talking about? What authority could they represent?" (p.4) He asks such questions throughout the trial. Midway through the novel -- he understands nothing more of his case, despite his questions, only that his position has somehow deteriorated -- he continues

his questioning: "And there were so many questions to put. To ask questions was surely the main thing. K. felt that he could draw up all the necessary questions himself." (p. 114) K. never critically examines this method, this mode of cognition; being led by his executioners he maintains that " the only thing for me to go on doing is to keep my intelligence calm and analytical to the end." (p. 225) Franz Kafka. **The Trial.** New York: Schocken Books, 1968.

20. I would date this period of maturity from the publication of **Mrs. Dalloway** on. A characteristic passage which portrays the multi-dimensionality and simultaneity of experience is the following: "Yes, of course, if it's fine tomorrow," said Mrs. Ramsay. "But you'll have to be up with the lark," she added.

To her son these words conveyed an extraordinary joy, as if it were settled, the expedition were bound to take place, and the wonder to which he had looked forward, for years and years it seemed, was, after a night's darkness and a day's sail, within touch. Since he belonged, even at the age of six, to that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but must let future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at hand, since to such people even in earliest childhood any turn in the wheel of sensation has the power to crystallise and transfix the moment upon which its gloom or radiance rests, James Ramsay, sitting on the floor cutting out pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy Stores, endowed the picture of a refrigerator, as his mother spoke, with heavenly bliss. It was fringed with joy. The wheelbarrow, the lawnmover, the sound of poplar trees, leaves whitening before rain, rooks cawing, brooms knocking, dresses rustling -- all these were so coloured and distinguished in his mind that he had already his private code, his secret language, though he appeared the image of stark and uncompromising severity, with his high forehead and his fierce blue eyes, impeccably candid and pure, frowning slightly at the sight of human frailty, so that his mother, watching him guide his scissors neatly round the refrigerator, imagined him all red and ermine on the Bench or directing a stern and momentous enterprise in some crisis of public affairs.

"But," said his father, stopping in front of the drawing-room window," it won't be fine."

Had there been an axe handy, or a poker, any weapon that would have gashed a hole in his father's breast and killed him, there and then, James would have seized it.

In addition to her methodological interest for those of us interested in revising theoretical discourse forms, Virginia Woolf was an astute observer of gender politics, as this quoted passage illustrates. **To The Lighthouse.** New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1955, pp. 9-10.

21. Grumet, Madeleine, "Pedagogy for Patriarchy: The Feminization of Teaching."

22. Of course, this is hardly all that women do. Nor does this analysis dis-

close the ways in which women have used men's reliance upon them to control them (men). Simone de Beauvoir in her chapter on "romantic love" in The Second Sex details how the man's "for itself-ness," or the tendency toward isolation and independence, is the source for the woman's interest in man and becomes what she attempts to control. If successful, the man loses that quality which drew her to him in the first place. Thus the woman is caught between being enslaved and being enslaving, with no exit.

23. Sigmund Freud, "Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealously, Paranoia, and Homosexuality," in The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18, p. 232.
24. Hocquenghem, p. 82.
25. Ibid., p. 81.
26. Ibid., p. 82.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 83.
29. Freud, "On Narcissism: An Introduction," in op. cit., vol. 14, p. 101.
30. Hocquenghem, p. 87.
31. Ibid., p. 85.
32. Philip Wexler, "Commodification, Self, and Social Psychology," in Psychology and Social Theory, 1:2, provides an important explication of the process of commodification of self.
33. Hocquenghem, p. 89.
34. Ibid., p. 92.
35. William F. Pinar, "Sanity, Madness, and the School," in W. Pinar (ed.), Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists, Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975, pp. 359-383.

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See inside back cover for details.

CREATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE CLASSROOM

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How do successful teachers promote creative problem solving? A theoretical study which answers this question is reported in this paper. The conclusions are based on six case studies.

Within the first four sections of this paper, the term algorithm is defined, the teacher as consumer and creative problem solver is described,* and the stimulating teacher algorithm is developed. Specific instructional methods within the context of curriculum are presented along with research possibilities. Finally, personal reflections are offered.

*The Algorithm and Creative Problem Solving***

In the conventional model of schools, teachers are aware of workable and effective problem solving procedures. One procedure is an algorithm for multiplication of numbers. The goal of the conventional teacher is to train students to use algorithms, including predictable and constant procedures such as outlining, sentence diagramming, using the scientific method in experiments, and learning the division of fractions.

Consumers use known algorithms to solve problems; teacher-consumers teach known algorithms to students. Thus, these individuals function in the realm of known knowledge. Computers, using known algorithms, can also solve problems. Knowledge of the unkown can be explored only by the human mind. Since computers can work with known algorithms more efficiently, quickly, and cheaply, it seems that schools ought to attend to the realm of the unknown. Such schools would treat children as if they all had the capacity to invent new algorithms suitable for working on classes of problems yet unsolved, thereby presenting a challenge which could maximize creative problem solving.

Creative problem solving is the capacity of the person to use both the conscious and the other-than-conscious, to both "let" and "make" the solution come, to use the left and right brain

functions maximally, to use environment and self as sources, to tolerate both the chaos of confusion and the ecstasy of solution. The individual's use of this capacity can result in a procedure which works to resolve a class of problems. The process of creative problem solving cannot be defined apart from the nature of the person. The product of creative problem solving can stand alone, exclusive of the creator.

Creativity in problem solving is analogous to artistic creativity. Artistic creativity can mean a process that yields an empirical product or a process that does not necessarily yield a product. In the first case, the product is the focus, whereas in the latter case, the process becomes focal. Creativity in problem solving is more closely related to this first aspect because of the nature of problem solving. The algorithm used by the creative problem solver must lead to a solution that works to solve a class of problems. Conventional schools recognize artistic creativity, but scientific and social creativity are recognized only as extra-curricular activities.

Some problems will take a longer time to solve than others, therefore appearing to be only process. In these situations, in order to comprehend the existence of an algorithm, the human mind must be able to project the possibility of solution. A futuristic orientation allows the inclusion of problems-in-process and their potential for being resolved.

Creative problem solving requires pondering and results in a personal transaction with the knowledge. It involves both a conscious and subconscious trial and error search. From this pondering, the individual chooses the best answer. The selection involves aesthetics. In the conventional school model, students rarely have the opportunity to experiment with pondering since the school structure tends to deal only with the conscious and with known algorithms. The tendency in schools is to take quick, little steps in solving problems. Contemplating situations for several days would seem valuable.

There is no procedure (algorithm) for what the student does in the process of creative problem solving (inventing algorithms). The procedure differs for each individual in each situation. However, there can be an algorithm for what the teacher does to increase the opportunities for students to engage in creative problem solving. A goal for teachers might be to identify an algorithm for stimulating students to work on unusual problems.

In the model on the next page, the teachers are successful if the students get to know their own problem solving processes.



Figure 1

Process Model for Teaching Creative Problem Solving

find the solution to the problem, or identify an algorithm.

In order to envision a teacher who has the capacity to create such stimulating algorithms, it is helpful to contrast the teacher who consumes knowledge with the teacher who produces knowledge.

Teacher as Consumer

Certain teachers might be called consumers of knowledge (Mooney in Pinar 1975, pp. 175-207). Consumers of knowledge view their teaching in these ways:

> I am to be quite impersonal, to leave myself out ...
> I am to look for truths which exist on their own account, independent of me.
> I am to observe [or teach] but not to participate.
> I am not to be influenced by what I value.
> I am not to be concerned with what is "good," only with what is "true."
> [The information will speak for itself.]

I am to depend on logic and testable demonstration, not on feelings and imagination.
I am to use procedures approved by scientists, the Board of Education and administrators, not my own unproven ways.
My experience has little worth compared to the accumulated and tested experience of science [and the experts].
I must avoid making mistakes.
My job [as a teacher] is, therefore, to achieve that separation from nature which allows me most clearly to see nature's truth so that I and my students can fit ourselves to that which has to be outside of me and man (pp. 177-180, italics omitted).

Teachers governed by the attempt to gain complete "objectivity," to be impersonal and separate from their work, share the belief that this is valuable and achievable. Mooney writes that such schools are based on the following psychological reasoning:

A subject exists before a particular child comes to it and will continue to exist after the child has gone. A child exists before he comes to a particular subject and will exist after he has left it, whether he has learned the subject or not. The two, subject and child, are in separate systems and are independent of each other. They have no necessary connections.
The subject has its own conceptual order -- geometry for example. This order is necessary for the subject, is the subject, as a matter of fact. A student who learns geometry learns this order. When the student has fitted his mind with this order, then he knows the subject. He can be tested by conceptual order, and, if he gives responses which are 'right,' within the system, then he is developing a 'disciplined' mind in the subject.
It is the conceptual order of the subjects which makes it possible to stablilize the schools. The children are forever changing, coming by the thousands, staying a while, and passing through. This changing amorphous mass can be controlled by making the subjects a center of the system. Let the students come and be pitted against the stabilizing core of the subjects. Hire as teachers those who know a subject well and let them teach that subject. Group the students in convenient numbers and send them to a given teacher to 'get that subject.'
If a student does not 'get a subject,' mark him down, for, of the two things, the subject and the student, it is the student

who is in error and needs to be disciplined to fit the discipline. The 'subject' is the basic, elementary construction to which the student is to adjust. The subject is the creator; the child the created (p. 182).

The center of value, of right, of organization, of psychological action, is 'out there' in the subjects. The job of the student is to learn how to behave from positions in systems outside himself. The job of the teacher is to see that the students most quickly and easily fit themselves to these outside existences and controls (pp. 182-3).

And not only is the teacher part of the system described above, the teacher mostly likely was a "product" of such a system.

Schools described by this reasoning encourage the teachers to act as consumers of knowledge both during their time as students and as teachers. The teacher-consumer could live happily ever after in a school based on this point of view.

Creative Problem Solvers: Those Who Are Able To Invent New Algorithms

It is assumed that teachers must be creative problem solvers to develop a stimulating algorithm for maximizing the opportunities for students to solve problems creatively. Such teacher-producers would view teaching in these ways:

Whatever I realize of the universe, I realize from where I am, and no other being realizes life from where I am. This is my uniqueness, my being.

[I am] joined into ... all other beings, into the whole universe. I am an intimate inclusion within all. This is my universality, my belonging.

I am constantly spending energy, which, as it leaves me, calls for my constant seeking of renewal by fresh inclusions, taken from the universe into me. This gives my life a forward thrust.

I may be able to find a structured form that, fitting to the structure of my emptiness, grasped and taken into me, fits and fills my need.

I am not only a being with belonging in the universe, and a becoming out of these, but also a fitter, fitting the universe and me in a reflexive transformation (Mooney in Pinar, pp. 190-1).

This view is quite different from that of the teacher-consumer.

To highlight the distinction between the way teacher-consum-

ers and teacher-producers order their respective environments, one might consider the changes necessary for individuals evolving from the former to the latter. The following modifications are necessary:

1. A change in the kinds of judgments required.
2. An increase in the range of judgments required.
3. A shift in the focus of attention from the characteristics of the product to those of the production process.
4. A reverse flow in the dynamics of thought, being from product to person in consumption and from person to product in production.
5. A recognition of the fundamental and initiating status of the self ...[in the teaching process] (Mooney in Pinar, pp. 189-190).

The creative problem solver does "use" existing knowledge. The shift from the consumer view to the producer view does not imply an abandonment of knowledge but rather a change of view and type of engagement with existing knowledge.

The terms process, product, and algorithm have a specific relationship. A process is what persons do, whereas a product (output) is what is accomplished. An algorithm is a specified process which works to resolve a class of problems. Teacher-consumers respond to all types of input in the same way, regardless of the nature of the input. Teacher-producers use an algorithm which is responsive to the variation in the put. That is, teacher-producers interact with students according to their needs at any particular time. Both use algorithms, yet they are of very different types. The algorithms dictate the teachers' responses to students. The typical output of the first type is trained students. The ideal output of the second type is creative problem solvers.

The Stimulating Teaching Algorithm

It is assumed that classroom teachers are responsible to arrange the students' learning environment to maximize the opportunities for the students to reach their potentials. To understand this responsibility, one must consider several aspects of the problem, including 1)what is teaching?, 2) what is learning?, and 3) how are teaching and creative problem solving related?

What is Teaching?

Teaching is both an art and a science (Mooney, 1961, pp. 48-

49), because it requires the teacher to be completely aware of both self and the environment.



Figure 2

Teaching

(Based on the work of Professor Ross L. Mooney)

Teaching is a set of processes occurring in the context of a relationship between two individuals, a teacher and a student, in which the effort is to help the student to gain a more comprehensive understanding of herself or himself and the environment. In this effort, the teacher also gains a clearer understanding. Teaching involves the teacher's support of the student's efforts to understand these elements. The teacher holds the student's hand as the student finds the way along this path. At some points in teaching, the teacher might be the most efficient source of knowledge for the student; at other times, the teacher will be able only to offer encouragement.

Teaching involves four steps: 1) the teacher tries to re-create in her or his own mind the student's concept of the problem and by doing this. 2) helps the student to clarify her or his concept of the problem, 3) the teacher tries to keep the student's thinking in motion, and 4) tries to keep the interaction between teacher and student orderly.

1) The teacher tries to re-create in her or his own mind the student's concept of the problem.

Figure 3

Re-Creation of Student Idea





The teacher asks questions and the student answers the questions. Because the problems they represent are not clearly defined during the teaching process, the circles are wavy.

Note the following transcription from video tape of a teacher trying to understand the student's thinking:

1 Teacher: I want you to think of a problem that you would
2 be interested in solving that has not already been solved,
3 that we don't have procedures to solve.
4 Student: How about to find out if animals reason?
5 Teacher: Have you thought about that a lot? Have you thought
6 about how you would solve it?
7 Student: No.
8 Teacher: What have you thought about the problem?
9 Student: Well, not a lot. I just sort of imagine myself with
10 all of these animals, sitting and talking.
11 Teacher: When you imagine that they can talk, do you imagine a
12 Doctor Doolittle thing or do you imagine that
13 they are communicating to you in
14 other ways?
15 Student: Other ways.
16 Teacher: Like?
17 Student: Like, the gorillas, they have sign language.
18 Teacher: You're talking about science.
19 Student: Yeah, you know how the dolphins have telepathy?
20 Teacher: No I don't.
21 Student: Well, they have these radio waves that go out

22 and some people can tell what they are.
23 Teacher: But that's science again. That's something we already
24 found out through science.
25 Student: But I want to find out if they can reason.
26 I think they can ...
27 To solve the problem I would read up on science
28 that people know as fact ...
29 Teacher: Is that the first thing?
30 Student: Yeah ...
31 And I would probably see if I could live with
32 animals. You know, like that lady who lived with
33 the gorillas for a while. And so that they would have
34 me become, they would think I was one of them.
35 And then I would learn more about them that
36 way. That way I would learn more of their
37 habits.
38 Teacher: First you would look from the outside through
39 the eyes of the scientist and you'd look from
40 the outside getting ideas about the habits. Then
41 you'd look from inside and try and become
42 one and try and understand their habits
43 and learn about their habits as one -- as a
44 gorilla or as a dolphin or whatever. Right?
45 Student: Um hum. And I might try to be like a
46 gorilla.
47 Teacher: You would turn into a gorilla in your
48 brain?
49 Student: Well, first I would become one and I would know
50 myself that I wasn't. But they would think I was.
51 Then I would become one myself ...
52 Teacher: OK. I have a question. So they would perceive you
53 as one and then you would eventually start to
54 think of yourself as one, but would you actually
55 change physically, or would you stay the same
56 physically and would this just be your mind?
57 Student: I would stay the same physically. I'm
58 gradually looking from the outside to the inside.

The progression of this conversation can be matched with the progression indicated by Figure 3. In the beginning (lines 1-10), the teacher has no understanding of the student's concept of the problem. The teacher questions (beginning on lines 11, 16, 29, 38, 47, 52) are an attempt to gain a better understanding

of the student's reasoning. As the conversation develops beyond this transcribed portion, the overlap is maximized to the point where the teacher is satisfied that a recreation of the student's conception of the problem had been made. The student also seems satisfied. The teacher is trying to perceive the problem from the student's point of view.

2) The teacher helps the student to clarify her or his concept of the problem.

During the transcribed conversation, the student indicates that she is unclear about how she would solve the problem (lines 7 and 9). As the questioning progresses, she develops a better understanding of a specific method to solve it (beginning on lines 15, 17, 25, 30, 45, 49, 57). She indicated after the videotape was completed that these thoughts were new to her. While watching the videotape she wrote, "You made me start thinking about some things that I had never thought about before." Thus, by making deductions from the transcript and attending to what the student said after the recorded conversation ended, it seems that the teaching helped the student to clarify her own concept of the problem.

3) The teacher tries to keep the student's thinking in motion.

The teacher helps the student to move on after having reached a stop or a road block. In some situations, the student can cope with such blocks with no help. Yet, when the student is stopped, the teacher reactivates the process (asking many questions, one of which works).

Several teaching patterns move students beyond the road blocks. First, there is the *clarify/summarize/ question pattern* illustrated in the following transcribed passage.***

1 Teacher: [In response to student comment] You said, first
2 you'd deal with sources. Are you talking about going to
3 the library and finding out about organizations?
4 Student: um hum.
5 Teacher: So you look for what their souce was, and what else
6 would you ... What I'm interested in is not what the
7 final paper would look like but what are the
8 jiffy plan steps? I mean, if you were going about
9 solving this problem, step one would be what?

The question beginning on line 2 serves to clarify the student's comment. The uncompleted statement beginning on line 5 is a summary, restating that which has already been made clear. The questions beginning on line 6 act to propel the student on to new information. This pattern clarifies for both the teacher and the

student what is being said and what has been examined. It gives direction to further exploration of the topic. In addition to using this pattern, the teacher supports the student in clarifying, summarizing, and questioning.

Second, the teacher might use *examples* to keep the student's thinking in motion: Teacher: How do you figure out ways to deal with it? I mean, how do I start thinking about it? It's like if I said how do you run, you could tell me ... well you get the right shoes on, the correct clothes on, lean forward, you put your right leg out, and your left arm and then ... You know, you could tell me step by step. Now tell me the same kind of "step by step" to do what you do with your brain. Such examples remind the student of something already known that can be communicated. Examples remind the student how successful it feels to have this knowledge so the feelings can be transferred to the blocked process.

Third, the teacher might use *imaging*, or pretending, to keep the student progressing on the thought journey. The following is an example: Teacher: How about we'll image? Just close your eyes, and I'll close my eyes, too. And imagine yourself there, in bed, getting ready to go to sleep. And you decide to think about: it's the right time to think about this death thing. Can you just jabber a bit? Tell me what you're thinking. Imagining facilitates the teacher in freeing the student from the current time and place in which there might be blocking forces such as emotional tension. The student can be placed in a safe environment and then freed to further develop the concept. Imaging might also establish an affective setting desired by the teacher, in this case the feeling of pondering, of solving a problem, in order to help the student.

Fourth, the teacher may offer both verbal and non-verbal *support* to the student such as the nodding of the head, eye contact, leaning back in the chair, facing the student head on, and offering phrases like "take your time," "good," "interesting point," and "um hum." All of these send the message to the student to continue, that what she or he is doing is good.

Each of these four teaching techniques, the clarify/summarize/question pattern, use of examples, imagining, and use of supportive gestures and words, may be used by the teacher to help the student keep thoughts flowing in a communicable form.

4) The teacher tries to keep the interaction between the teacher and the student orderly.

The conversation between teacher and student is more than a series of unconnected statements or groups of statements. It is a pattern of groups of statements connected by conscious teacher

effort. At appropriate times in the conversation, the teacher makes *summarizing remarks, reinforcing remarks, and transition remarks.* The teacher also supports the students in making summarizing and transitional remarks which service to give form to the conversation so that both individuals feel that they are moving in a structured manner and achieving a desirable product.

The following quotations illustrate a summarizing remark:

1 Teacher: So you reflect on the day that you've had and
2 you plan for the next day. Your creative thinking is the
3 reflection because you're creating new things that
4 didn't happen and planning is pretty creative ...
5 Teacher: OK. That's good. Very interesting.
6 Teacher: OK. I'm going to push you now. Can you think
7 of another problem?

Such statements could be classified in the categories identified under question 3 – keeping student thought in motion. The position of the statement within the context of the conversation reveals the function of the statement more clearly than does an isolated transcription of the statement. Particularly, what the statement "causes" the student to do clarifies the function of the statement.

By trying to mentally recreate the student's concept of the problem, by helping the student to clarify her or his own conception of the problem, by trying to keep the student's thinking in motion, and by attempting to give order to the conversation, the teacher teaches.

What is Learning?

It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a comprehensive definition of learning. However, it is necessary to relate the concept of learning to what has been said about teaching, since teaching and learning are often paired conceptually.

Recall that the student's concept of the problem is expressed in Figure 3 as a wavy circular shape, which represents the student's unclear, unfinished understanding of the problem. The effort to resolve the problem is the focus of the learning effort. It is doubtful that learning occurs without a problem. Some need, disharmony, confusion, or disequilibrium within the learner must precede learning. In the present context, *learning is the process by which an individual effects the resolution of the problem.*****

If the student begins with even an unclear notion of what

the problem is, she or he may begin to clarify and modify that notion until she or he is satisfied. Depending on the student's needs, satisfaction might mean identifying a process for solving the problem, finding the solution, or identifying an algorithm. When satisfaction occurs, the learning process is likely to be finished. The teacher has two functions in this learning process, to help the student through this clarification/addition/chance process using the teaching techniques identified, and to extend the student's criteria for feeling satisfied, thereby improving the final quality of what is learned.

The destruction of the student's concept of the problem either by the student or by another will not be considered learning for purposes of this paper. Learning is a fitting process, the fitting of selected parts of one's environment into one's own conceptual structure (Kelly, 1963). What fits is learned, what does not fit is not learned. Mooney describes this process of making sense of elements in one's experience, that is, of fitting.

> If his [the person's] thoughts bring with them a feeling of expansion, a fresh togetherness of things not heretofore thought of together, of harmonious form, etc., then he knows to go on; if they bring feelings of blockage, frustration diffusions, etc., then he knows to pause or try a new line (Mooney, 1957, p. 17)

The learner is continuously selecting, ordering, and fitting, resulting in a finer formation of the notion of the problem. This process is indicated by the wavy circular shape becoming a clearer and clearer image.

How Are Teaching and Creative Problem Solving Related?

The creative problem solving act is the student's own process; that is, such activity is sustained by the student's personal abilities. The most that a teacher can do is to support and challenge the student while the student is involved in problem solving. The forms which this support take are identified in the first section of this paper and include the following: 1) trying to understand (recreate) the student's concept of the problem; 2) helping the student to clarify her or his own concept of the problem; 3) keeping the student's thinking in motion by using a clarify/summarize/question pattern, using examples, using imaging, and offering verbal and non-verbal support; and 4) keeping the interaction between the teacher and student orderly by making summarizing remarks, reinforcing remarks, and transition statements. The

process of creative problem solving occurs within the student; the teacher "holds the student's hand" while on this "journey."

There are several necessary conditions for this "hand holding" process to be able to occur. First, is an atmosphere of trust. The teacher and the student must view each other as human beings, each having the right to *not* answer a question, the right of privacy and the right of ownership. Such a condition might be established immediately, but it is more likely a result of a relationship which has grown over time. If the teacher and student trust a mutual friend, trust may be transferred. Trust must be present before the student will risk personal and vulnerable findings.

A second condition is that the teacher have a genuine interest in the student and an interest in the problem itself. The teacher has to provide signals informing the student of the desire to hear about what the student is thinking. The teacher is not naturally interested in the student and the student's creative problem solving activity. It occurs to some observers of teachers that, unfortunately, many are not motivated by such a genuine interest in student learning.

A third condition is that the teacher have extensive personal experience with creative problem solving. The teacher must know the feelings of forming the solution, coming to a block, and transcending the block. The teacher must know the tempo, rhythm and timing of creative problem solving. If these conditions are met, the teacher will *know* what the student is experiencing and will have a better sense of how, when, and why support is appropriate.

What The Classroom Teacher Does To Maximize The Opportunities For Students To Do Creative Problem Solving

Once the three conditions of trustworthiness, genuine interest, and personal experience in creative problem solving are met, the teacher can do specific things in the classroom to maximize the opportunities for students to solve problems creatively. The items below provide a beginning list to be expanded or adapted to the individual situation:

1. Arrange the furniture to provide for various types of learning environments, such as tables around which groups of students might work together, study carrels for individual study, and soft lounge chairs for comfort.
2. Officially open the "students to teacher" communicate route by providing for a place where students might sign up to

request a private chat.

3. Use student evaluation of the classroom situation to assess and readjust classroom procedures.

4. Share personal creative problem solving efforts.

5. Enlist the help of the students in creative problem solving efforts.

6. Create assignments which encourage students to develop new algorithms after having surveyed the field.

7. Use an appropriate amount of class time to guide the students in doing reflective thinking until they are able to do such thinking independently.

8. Attend to the teaching skills necessary so that students can begin to work independently. Such skills include reading, researching, note-taking, organizing, and communicating.

9. Provide study materials and resources which are relevant to the students' interests and problems.

10. Provide time for students to identify and pursue problems of interest.

11. Schedule time to talk to individual students about their problems.

12. Encourage students to talk to one another about their creative problem solving activities.

13. Provide class time for such student-student conversation.

14. Provide class time for formal voluntary student presentations to report progress in their problem solving efforts.

15. Encourage formal questioning by the audience of students sharing progress reports.

16. Encourage students to display or publish their work.

17. Provide students with help in securing the study materials and resources necessary for the solving of the problem.

18. Use multiple instructional strategies to facilitate the students' learning (e.g., use of learning centers, simulations, independent projects, audio-visual materials).

19. Encourage an interdisciplinary approach to problems, encouraging students to employ knowledge and skills from all appropriate content areas.

20. Emphasize language as an effective mode for communication about the problem. Encourage the students to develop language skill.

21. Provide the students with models of problem solving strategies and styles (see Ghiselin, 1952).

22. Encourage the students to work on the problem outside of class.

23. Encourage the students to work in class on problems which have heretofore been extra-curricular (e.g., to extend an interest in military history, in outer space, in magic).

24. Provide study materials and resources which might stimulate a student's interest, eventually resulting in the student's selection of the problem to pursue.

The list is not comprehensive but it provides suggestions for classroom teachers to maximize creative problem solving within their classes.

Curriculum and Schools

The stimulating teaching algorithm has application to curriculum and schools. Using it would change curriculum by shifting its focus from knowledge-consumption to knowledge-production. The school would have to be changed in order to be responsive to such curricular developments. For example, computer terminals might be necessary in all classrooms; textbooks might not be necessary for all students.

The focus for the stimulating teaching algorithms is the learning of the students. In the schools, the children ought to be honored for their capacities to move from pondering to product and back again (Mooney, 10/17/78).



Figure 4

The Capacity to Move from Pondering to Product

The process is the creative problem solving process. The product is an algorithm invented by the child as a result of pondering, or creative problem solving. The teaching algorithm described here would honor such a process. In fact, a basic assumption of

the algorithm is that moving from pondering to product and back again is valuable.

In order for this stimulating teaching algorithm to survive in the schools, support systems for those using the algorithm must be developed. This algorithm protects the student's ideas while in the forming stage. Not only is the conceptualization process of students *not* interrupted, but it is nurtured by the teacher using this algorithm. Such a support system must be considered for the teachers involved in such a process. Schools providing safety and support for individuals attempting to find algorithms increase the probability of success. Development and maintenance of a support system for all human beings in the school system seems like a direction worthy of pursuit.

Perhaps, the reason that conventional schools tend to stifle the capacity of the creative problem solver is that the algorithm creation process comes *before* the existence of the algorithm product. In order to plan, in the traditional sense of the word, the algorithm is needed *before* the learning experience. The teacher can set up certain conditions and provide supports for the students involved in creative problem solving, but the teacher cannot plan for creative problem solving to happen within the student. Many teachers would choose not to get involved in creative problem solving rather than relinquish some of their control over what occurs in students' minds. In creative problem solving, students must own the learning. The teacher cannot.

It seems appropriate that "consumer power" ought to be exchanged for the notion of "producer power" in schools. The opportunity for children to ponder may be crucial for the vitalization of schools. A related research question is: what specifically do schools do that destroys the child's capacity to work on problems for which there are no algorithms (as described in Liedke 1977)?

Another direction for research relevant to curriculum and schools is answering the question: how teachable are students? The students whose interaction with a teacher was transcribed earlier differed in their teachability. One was able to propel herself almost without the teacher. Another needed careful and thorough application of the stimulating teaching algorithms. That is, the two students differed as to their need for teacher support. The possibility of a new statistic emerges from this understanding – the *teachability quotient.* Such a number would clue the teacher into students' ability to support their own learning independently. The statistic would indicate the students'

varying places on a continuum extending from "self-teaching" to "needing teacher support in the learning process." In classrooms, students who were self-teaching could then be allowed to get on with their business without interference. The stimulating teaching algorithm would be useful in the teaching of those who were not self-teachers. The goal of the school experience would be to have all students be self-teachers. Therefore, for any one student, the statistic should change as she or he grew. The "teachability quotient" would be invented for and used by classroom teachers; the IQ is very useful to researchers of the classroom but sometimes serves to block the learning process rather than to facilitate it. Based on IQ some children are given less attention even though they might have little experience with self-teaching. Obviously, this teachability quotient needs better definition and further investigation. This statistic's power and use might be much greater for purposes of the classroom teacher interested in creative problem solving than is the current IQ statistic.

Further Research

Investigation of the creative problem solving process as it relates to discovering previously unknown algorithms has been revealed as a problem worthy of study. Directions for further research include the following:

1. Learning what the brain processes are like when the person is involved in algorithm formation.
2. Identifying the best kind of learning environments to nurture algorithm generation.
3. Identifying the environments that can be created by parents to encourage creative problem solving by their children.
4. Ascertaining if algorithms are a realistic notion for use in social activities like education (as opposed to their current proven use in mathematics).
5. Identifying genetic factors which contribute to the person's capacity to do creative problem solving.
6. Determining if the person's capacity to do creative problem solving is totally dependent on environment.

Quantitative and qualitative methods will be necessary to research these problems and questions.

Reflection

As a theorist, reflection upon one's work is appropriate. De-

scriptive theory can serve two purposes:

> ... for the practitioner, the question is what do I need to do; for the theorists, the question is what do I need to understand (Mooney, 1978, pp. 4-56).

The portion of my larger study not reported in this paper (Levy, 1979) responds to the first of these tasks:***** the stimulating teaching algorithm responds to the second.

The ideas in this paper are important to *people who have the teaching to do*, those who teach educational theorists, those who teach inservice teachers, those who teach preservice teachers, and those who teach the children.

* This paper is heavily based in the work of Ross L. Mooney, Professor Emeritus, Ohio State University. For his help and friendship, I am deeply indebted.

**This section is based on an interview and conversation with Professor Karl Kornacker, Ohio State University.

***This is the same teacher as in the first passage. It is a different student.

****This may be contrasted to a standard psychological definition: "The following definition may be offered provisionally: Learning is the process by which an activity originates or is changed through reacting to an encountered situation, provided that the characteristics of the change in activity cannot be explained on the basis of native response tendencies, maturation, or temporary states of the organism (e.g., fatigue, drugs)(Hilgard, 1956, p.3)."

*****Four case studies provided an empirical check for the algorithm. Each case study involved the researcher, a preservice teacher, and a student. The preservice teachers were prepared to work with the students using videotapes and discussions of strategy after the viewing. The preservice teachers' work with students was videotaped and analyzed. The discussions between researcher and preservice teachers were also recorded and analyzed.

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PHILOSOPHICAL WORK, PRACTICAL THEORIZING, AND THE NATURE OF SCHOOLING

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Introduction

In a recent brochure for a text related to the use of drama in schools, the advertisers allege that the "articles present *useful* rather than *theoretical* premises."[1] How interesting and odd, it seemed to me: the writers were praising a "practical" volume, and in the process were deliberately scornful of "theoretical premises" because of their alleged lack of usefulness. At the same time, they used an apparently theoretical form (presumably some version of deductive or inductive arguments, for which it makes sense to have premises) to sanction its practicality. How, I wondered, can one use the "theoretical" disparagingly at one moment (that is, as denoting the non-useful) and still produce a "practical" collection of essays by means of it?

In my own teaching and research, the relationship of theory to practice frequently becomes a fundamental pivot upon which turn a host of allied problems and issues; in some form or another the problem of how to conceptualize theory and practice, and their possible relations, must be addressed before discussion may proceed on other matters, or action may be taken in specific contexts. For instance, student teachers are often impatient with "theoretical" or "abstract" questions which, at least initially, they regard as having no clear relevance or value in the act of teaching. Again, some teachers are either amused or irritated (or some combination of each) by repeated queries into, for instance, the ethical and political views which underlie their activities. In short, "practice" is often taken by school people to mean what teachers in fact do with students within the confines of classrooms, while "theorizing" is presumed to be the kind of abstract speculating, analyzing, and debating that characterize what academicians do in colleges and univerisities. Now clearly these categories, and their presumed anatogonisms, serve a norma-

tive as well as descriptive purpose: talk of "practice" offers teachers (members of a beleagured and, for the most part, increasingly unappreciated vocation) the possibility of aligning with a particular set of norms and perceptions that culminate in a notion of "professionalism"; while "theory," which is not seen as concerned with activities rooted in the "real world of the public schools," becomes regarded as someone else's domain, and treated with indifference, suspicion, or even hostility.[2] Dewey hinted at these tensions when he observed:

> We are met ... with the belief that instruction in theory is merely theoretical, abstruse, remote, and therefore relatively useless to the teacher as a teacher, unless the student is at once set upon the work of teaching; that only "practice" can give a motive to professional learning, and supply material for educational courses.[3]

Such is the state of affairs, nearly eighty years after Dewey's remarks, that confronts those involved in education. Such are the assumptions that permit one to speak of the "useful" in contrast to the "theoretical" in education, without fear of rebuke or even, perhaps, correction.

Reconnecting the links between theory and practice, making good the belief that theoretical analysis can prove insightful for educational activity, are the underlying pruposes of Jonas Soltis' *Philosophy and Education.*[4] This is an implicit aim of the volume's editor when he says, or example, that this anthology seeks to "help the readers readjust their conceptions of what philosophy of education is and to come to see the many ways in which philosophy and education can be connected."[5] This notion is further elaborated when Soltis stipulates that the several authors in the volume were asked "to demonstrate a philosophical perspective and the clarification that could be provided by locating an educational topic in a subarea of philosophy."[6] Rather than attempting to explicate the traditional "isms" in philosophical discourse -- idealism, pragmatism, Deweyism, Marxism, and so on, Soltis divided this volume into philosophic subareas that could then provide insight into specific educational dilemmas or problems. In the process the relevance, value, and applicability of philosophic analysis could be displayed for the educator, to whom the book is addressed. Even Harry Broudy, who is clearly less than enthusiastic about this conceptual and organizational transformation of philosophical analysis,[7] admits that the division into subareas "is designed to provide them [i.e., school people] with another way to conceive of philosophy

of education and to match their concerns to its literature."[8] Thus the intent of the volume, like the N.S.S.E. yearbooks of 1942 and 1955, is to specify -- using the articulated subgroups of epistemology, aestethics, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of science, and metaphysics -- the good of philosophy for those involved in educational activities.

Using two representative authors and subareas, I shall indicate some general tendencies adopted to accomplish the overall purpose of the volume. I will critically explore what some of the guiding assumptions appear to be for these writers, and what this says about philosophy of education as a discipline. Having looked at the assumptions involved here, and assessed their adequacy, I will then offer some suggestions as to how the gulf between theory and practice may be bridged in a rather different way. I will offer some tentative suggestions about what these recommendations might entail both for the philosophy of education and the context of educational practice (especially teaching and, to a lesser extent, educational research).

Theorizing in Philosophy and Education

In "Education and the Concept of Knowledge," Professor Soltis outlines recent alterations in our conception of knowledge that seem especially interesting, and suggests how these might affect what goes on in schools. Soltis believes a sociocentric perspective is currently coming to the fore. It involves "an 'organic' view of mind, a 'transactional' view of learning, and a 'constructionist' view of knowledge."[9] Rather than seeing knowledge as inhering in individuals, the sociocentric perspective emphasizes that knowledge, learning, and epistemological inquiry itself are enmeshed within a broader context. This context consists of "reciprocal relations between an individual and his or her biological, social, and cultural inheritance, between individuals and groups, between public knowledge systems and the structure of both the natural and social worlds, and between any relevant mix of these in multiple combination." [10]

Following this introduction to the sociocentric point of view, Soltis tries to show how some interpretations of this epistemological perspective can mislead us into adopting positions which are unduly relativistic, and how we might avoid such dangers. The author reminds us of the socially constructed nature of reality brought out persuasively, for example, by Berger and Luckmann. [11] Yet Soltis suggests that though it is crucial to note

the contextualization of a socially constructed world, current circumstances do not represent the only possible such world; he pushes us to at least inquire into what alternative constructions might be possible, and how education might play a role in any such building process. A similar point is made with respect to language. Even though linguistic forms may preclude ways of seeing and making articulate our vision of the world, we are also aware -- ironically, in part through the vehicle of language itself -- of the dangers of such linguistic narrowness. Thus, though language may delimit freedom in certain ways, it may also propel this disclosure, and hence assist us in overcoming such limitations.

The sociocentric perspective, Soltis continues, also urges us to conceive of knowledge as more than "what is contained in heads and books"; it suggests that knowledge equally resides "in hands and actions as we take part in social living."[12] Apparently the author is here referring to messages received through cultural forms of life and institutional processes, things which may be unintentional and difficult to detect. Again, Soltis suggests that while this broadened conception of knowledge is valuable, we should not think of such tacit transmissions of knowledge in only a pejorative sense; such a more encompassing picture of knowledge allows us the opportunity to reflect on the appropriateness of the covert learning which emanates from cultural and institutional sources.[13]

The elaborated character of knowledge within the sociocentric perspective has, Soltis asserts, application for educational settings, specifically for the presentation of subject matter to students. Following from the broadened conception of knowledge already sketched, the author says that "sense-making and being able to act effectively are the social and individual purposes of knowledge. To achieve these ends, educators should help students see, appreciate, and gain skill in using the standards of reasonable judgment appropriate to the particular forms of knowledge being taught and learned."[14] Gaining knowledge involves more than just acquiring the respective contents of specific disciplines; it includes an invitation to explore and investigate ways of sense-making that can enlarge and enhance human experience. Knowledge so conceived can provide additional levels of meaning for our students. Recognizing changes in theoretical constructs, hence, can lead to correlative modifications in educational practice.

Lastly, Soltis details the importance of "the Kuhnian revolution" in the philosophy of science and suggests the contributions it can make to our understanding of knowledge within education.

The author applauds the notion of paradigm shifts but seeks to downplay the "incommensurability thesis" regarding perspectives generated within different paradigms. Partly through a review of Piagetian theories of development, Soltis urges a more active role for the learner in adapting, and adjusting to, conceptual change; this process suggests that individuals may indeed be able to cope with the kind of sweeping conceptual changes represented by paradigm dislocations. To the extent that conceptual change may be seen as propounding different world views, and even disclosing divergent worlds, we may set ourselves a fundamental educational task:

> To recognize that understanding different worlds is possible is to be in a position to do something about it. While *not* to recognize that possibility *may* be to be caught in incommensurable worlds forever apart, *to* recognize it is to be in a position to seek ways to understand empathetically and work within another's world to build bridges of reasonableness between the two. In many respects this is the key pedagogical problem of the educator in a pluralistic society. [15]

Understanding emerging conceptions of knowledge which diverge in important respects from previous conceptions, is thus seen as more than philosophically interesting: it has relevance for educational activity at all levels. By incorporating the insights of recent philosophical investigations in this area, teachers may expand the horizons of their students in ways that were previously unavailable.

Recognizing and articulating previously undisclosed worlds is also near the center of Maxine Greene's chapter, "Aesthetic Literacy in General Education." Professor Greene mourns the relative impotence of the arts within educational institutions, and contrasts this with the apparent resurgence of the arts in the wider society. She appeals to a rejuvenation of the "aesthetic impulse" in schools by urging that aesthetic experiences be given a more central role in general education. Further, she suggests that such experience requires a "distinctive mode of literacy," and that classroom teachers, art educators, and practicing artists "are potentially capable of enabling students to learn how to learn to be literate in this way." [16]

To help realize this kind of literacy, the author makes two substantive suggestions. Being careful to distinguish between attempts at developing aesthetic literacy from more traditional courses in art education, with their emphases on the history of

art and the creation of artifacts, Greene sees aesthetic literacy as concerned with the responsiveness of aesthetic participants. The issue to be addressed is how participants may interact with works of art in ways which provide meaning for the resultant experience.

> Like the critic, the teacher endeavors to orient the perceiver, to direct perception in such a way that the individual student becomes better able to discriminate details and discern emerging forms. Not only is attentiveness heightened if this occurs. A ground is created for the making of judgments, since works of art can only be praised or condemned with reference to the qualities they possess.[17]

Secondly, to accomplish these things, the educator must be prepared to indicate the relationship between our aesthetic and other experiences. Greene mentions three philosophical orientations for aesthetic inquiry that will clarify these relationships: the symbolic analysis suggested by Nelson Goodman,[18] phenomenology, and a content centered approach, where the arts are seen as one means by which situations, experiences, and actions become transformed and illuminated. Within each of these approaches, the goal is not for teachers to provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for any art form or aesthetic theory, but to understand theory "for the sake of discovering the modes of attending they can associate with aesthetic literacy."[19]

Attending to specific works of art from several perspectives permits meaning and significance to be revealed. To encourage such attentiveness, teachers need to become familiar with concepts such as "psychical distance"[20] and "aesthetic disinterestedness."[21] By distancing ourselves psychologically from the art work, putting our more usual, practical considerations and predilections "out of gear" with our perceptual awareness, we will be able to develop and enhance aesthetic literacy. We will be able to remove works of art from our more usual modes of apprehending and responding to events and objects that are characterized by goal oriented, means/end rationality with its concerns for utility and efficiency. Aesthetic perception, on the contrary, allows us to perceive and value features of our environment that are intrinsically valuable. To become involved with aesthetic objects is, thus, to "become absorbed in its [an object's] qualities for a time for their own sakes."[22] The point of aesthetic literacy is to open new modes of awareness and experience for the students, for educators to enlarge the ...

> province of meaning for those they teach, a province that may be opened to them through the doing of philosophy

> with respect to the several arts ... Not only will there be an awareness of things in their particularity, of beauty and variety and form. There will be a fresh orientation to the search for meaning in the many spheres of life. And this, fundamentally, is the point of aesthetic literacy.[23]

Bringing aesthetic possibilities to our educational endeavors may serve to re-establish the relevance and value of the arts for the lives of people; just as, following Soltis, changing epistemological views may contribute further to levels of meaning and vision.

The articles by Soltis and Greene, though utilizing distinct subareas from philosophy, conceive of the impact of philosophic work in a similar manner. Each seeks to document the value and importance of some aspect of their respective specialty for the province of education. Soltis explains how recent developments in epistemology may help teachers uncover new worlds for their students, while Greene suggests that aesthetic literacy can widen the province of meaning available to students as they become engaged with works of art. Each author seeks, in short, to conceptualize a particular aspect of a philosophic subarea in a way which might prescribe salutary changes in the thinking and acting of educators.

The tacit view of education contained in this collection of essays that I want to focus on here has to do with the nature of school processes and outcomes, and how these might be related to other concerns and domains. How we draw the boundaries around schools as places where educational exchanges take place is an exceedingly important question, yet one which is not systematically addressed by any of the authors.[24] Schools, for the most part, are conceived as the arena where certain activities manifest themselves – activities which are susceptible to philosophically sensitive prescriptions. Because the processes which occur within the educational domain are not analyzed for the connections with other processes and institutions, schools by default tend to be characterized as means: places where our best philosophic visions may be implanted. They are considered "background information" against which philosophy may ply its trade. Within this conception, classrooms are seen as fixtures where changes in epistemological schemes, aesthetic meanings, and rational discourse may, if only they are carefully analyzed and fully understood, provide the sort of assistance that will improve the quality of our educational endeavors. Schools are seen, in short, as "black boxes" into which the intrigues of conceptual analysis can be instituted so as to improve practice. If

we assume that schools are relatively autonomous institutions, concerned, say, with the dissemination of "knowledge," whether this be of an epistemological, aesthetic, or logical sort, we miss something important not only about education, but the role of philosophic inquiry into it as well. Let us look at this issue more fully.

In order to realize the commitment to link theory and practice detailed in the introduction to this volume, the authors necessarily had to assume certain traits of these phenomena as given, unimportant, or beyond the ken of their analyses. This is of course fully understandable. Yet what seems to have been almost uniformly accepted *a priori* is what kind of places schools *are*, what they "teach" (tacitly or overtly), why they do these things, who benefits from their doing them, and so on. The problem of linking theory and practice, accordingly, is understood as largely resolvable by revitalizing the way teachers and others think about issues involving a variety of philosophic subareas. It seems fair to see this volume as regarding the matching of educational concerns and philosophical literature, the linking of theory and practice, as an essentially intellectual one, to be dealt with by application of the appropriate form of philosophic discourse and analysis. In short, the links between theory and practice can effectively be established, on this view, by helping rational thinkers (teachers), who exist within and help support meritocratic institutions (schools) respond more carefully and thoughtfully to conceptual analysis (philosophy) and thus improve and enhance the quality of life within that institution (practice).

Now such a perspective is not mistaken on the face of things. We do commonly think about education in this way, and perhaps there is something especially appealing about this picture of schools for those doing work in the philosophy of education. Yet such a perspective seriously misperceives, in various ways, the nature of the schooling enterprise, and thus also misses another way to widen the nature of theory and of practice.

I want to suggest a few of the considerations which point to the misleading nature of the assumptions detailed above. First, there is a large body of historical evidence that schools, both in their original intent and in their continued operation, were designed to serve particular social, political, and ideological interests.[25] Such evidence detracts from the view that schools are meritocratic institutions populated with rational agents who serve the best interests of their clientele, and suggests some important features of school life may have less to do with academic

excellence and philosophic insight than we would like. Insofar as schools have served as agents of social cohesion and control, it misses the point to argue that the practice of teachers may be enhanced through more rigorous and sustained philosophic investigation. On the other hand, to suggest that schools are the sort of places where such activity *ought* to go on, is to fail to take seriously the task of *Philosophy and Education*, as well as to mistake the import of both philosophy and education.

This is closely allied to a second point. Jane Roland Martin, in her chapter dealing with curriculum theory, notes that philosophers of education "have not given curriculum its due"[26]; more specifically, Martin alleges that the hidden curriculum is "something philosophers of education have pretended does not exist."[27] Martin is largely correct on this, and the reason for this aversion has to do with those assumptions noted above about the nature of educational institutions and the place of philosophy in understanding them. Yet ignoring the phenomenon of the hidden curriculum may have consequences that we would rather avoid.[28] In pretending that schools are rationally bounded institutions within which reason and intellectual analysis reign, we risk the reinforcement of values, norms and dispositions which may undermine just those activities which we want to propel. By failing to take seriously the question of whose values dominate in those covert learnings which comprise the hidden curriculum, we may be blinding ourselves to the reality of practices and habituations which undermine our own best efforts.

Third, more attention must be paid to what Raymond Williams has called the "selective tradition" as this impinges on educational decisions.[29] In deciding questions about what content or forms of knowledge to include within schools, we need to articulate certain standards or criteria. From a virtual universe of educative possibilities, some way must be found to adjudicate between that which is central and justifiable from that which is more ephemeral or unwarranted. There are, of course, numerous criteria that one could suggest to help make such determinations, and the chapters by Soltis, Greene, and Ennis suggest alternatives in this regard. Yet the assumption that there are rational grounds on which to make such decisions, and that these do in fact comprise the center of this selection process, is not always warranted. While this may partially be the case, other factors remain undisclosed by operating on such an assumption. Questions concerning the relationships between knowledge and power (economic, social, and political); how content may be related to the con-

tinued oppression of people by race, gender, and social class; how ways of thinking, feeling, and seeing might be linked with the prevalence of ideological perspectives in the wider society, and so on, remain dormant, for the most part, in this volume. Now it might be argued, in reply to such allegations, that issues such as the ones raised are not the province of the philosophy of education, that they belong more properly to other domains or disciplines. I find such a suggestion not only implausible, but misleading as well, given the promise of this collection. We ignore questions such as those mentioned above at our (and our students') peril. It is not just that the volume fails to deal with a particular kind of issue or question; it is that, in important respects, it misconceives the nature of the educational enterprise, and the possible role of theory in its illumination and, perhaps, its eventual transformation.

What these considerations point to is the need to conceive of the nature of educational activity -- and hence also the domain of philosophy of education -- in broader, more contextualized terms. To forget, in making philosophical claims, that schools and classroom activities are social institutions and exchanges, with definite political commitments which stand behind them, is to be in danger of committing something like a category mistake. We must be aware of the multitude of interests and proclivities which the school was designed and continues to serve, so that we may understand more comprehensively what is at stake in our educational proposals, and the implications of our educational vision.[30]

Let me make these points clearer by offering one specific example of how this broadened conception of educational activity might reroute our philosophic analyses. Professor Greene makes the case well for a vision of aesthetic literacy and some of the implications of effectuating it in schools. While I have reservations about the kind of phenomenological perspective outlined in Greene's analysis,[31] I share many of her views about the necessity of aesthetic experience in schools and the potential of such experience for disclosing alternative meanings and virtually "new worlds" for our students. Yet to regard this as an intellectual problem of equipping school people with the appropriate means to perceive and value objects and events aesthetically, through the adoption of disinterested and psychically distanced attitudes, for instance, is to treat this as a conceptual problem exclusively. The tension between the underlying political interests schools embody and the relevatory impulse Greene suggests for aesthetic experience needs to be examined in understanding the current treat-

ment of the arts within schools. Unlocking new meanings, opening up possibilities for enlivened experience and action, discovering freedom within one's (aesthetic and non-aesthetic) life is, I would suggest, to engage in potentially revolutionary acts. To the extent that schools (their curricular, pedagogic, and evaluative practices) serve conservative interests in the literal sense of that term, we need to see the antipathy between aesthetic possibilities and the political aspects of school practice in a broader context. It is this sort of understanding which is blocked by Greene's article, as well as by the majority of the others in this volume. In this way, the notion of philosophic inquiry is diminshed at the same time that educational practice goes untouched. Some reorienting of the nature of these notions seems indicated, if we are to make good the promise of a unified vision of theory and practice.

Philosophical and Practical Work

In another review of *Philosophy and Education*, Harvey Siegel, citing the work of Scheffler, argues for the continued and expanded autonomy of theory if it is to be of practical value. "Theorizing in general, and philosophical inquiry into education in particular," Siegel remarks, "must be autonomous from particular problems if it is to provide the insight and understanding necessary for the solutions of such problems." [32] What Siegel is suggesting is a paradox: for educational theory to be practically efficacious, it must not take its problems from questions and issues of practice. Instead, educational theory must remain within its parent, "academic" (sometimes called "proper") philosophy. This, I believe, is to spuriously recast, from the opposite point of view, the theory/practice dualism embedded in the example with which we began.

One of the ironies in Siegel's review is that, in urging a more academic, less practically minded form of philosophy of education, the author uses Plato and Dewey as exemplary of the direction for philosophic inquiry into educational matters. One would be hard pressed to select two figures who so clearly and steadfastly reject the sort of blatant dualism embedded in Siegel's recommendations. Consider, for example, Plato's comment to Glaucon in Book VII of the *Republic*; regarding those who have successfully escaped the darkness of the Cave, Plato says,

> ... when they have reached the heights and taken an adequate view, we must not allow what is now permitted.
>
> What is that?

> That they should linger there, I said, and refuse to go down again among those bondsmen and share their labors and honors, whether they are of less or greater worth.
> Do you mean to say that we must do them this wrong, and compel them to live an inferior life when the better is in their power?
> You have again forgotten, my friend, said I, that the law is not concerned with the special happiness of any class in the state, but is trying to produce this condition in the city as a whole, harmonizing and adapting the citizens to one another by persuasion and compulsion, and requiring them to import to one another any benefit which they are severally able to bestow upon the community, and that it itself creates such men in the state, not that it may allow each to take what course pleases him, but with a view to using them for the binding together of the commonwealth.
> True, he said, I did forget it.
> Observe, then, Glaucon, said I, that we shall not be wronging, either the philosophers who arise among us, but that we can justify our action when we constrain them to take charge of the other citizens and be their guardians ... Down you must go then, each in his turn, to the habitation of the others and accustom yourselves to the observation of the obscure things there.[33]

The person who ascends from the Cave must not be allowed to remain aloof from those still bound within its darkness. For the true philosopher, abstractly perceiving the Good cannot become the only end of philosophical investigation. Having been bathed in the Good, and exposed to Wisdom, Beauty, Justice, and so on, the philosopher must, *because* of his/her wisdom, become involved in the lives and practices of those still attracted to shadows, images, and opinions. It is not that the descent back into the cave is "simply" a good idea, or even a morally obligatory act for the true philosopher; it is that, given Plato's conception of what philosophy, justice, and wisdom *are*, to not return is to have failed to pursue the Good. To say that the philosopher's efforts should not be guided by problems of practice is, thus, to make a distinction that, like numerous others for Plato, would not be intelligible.[34]

Instead of thinking about theory and practice as comprising distinct and separable domains which must somehow be reconnected, I would suggest that we instead view them as ways of dealing with similar concerns and commitments. Under such a

conception philosophical investigation could be seen as one way to understand, interpret, and act on those issues and problems which confront educators and others. This in turn would require a fundamental rethinking of some of our primary social categories: thought and action, meaning and involvement, and mental and physical labor.

What this illustrates is that the issue involved here is at once a conceptual and a political one, involving debate from both philosophic and social perspectives. But this is of course just the sort of unified presentation of multiple questions one might expect. One of the important consequences of this reorienting of philosophic inquiry would be the necessity of thinking about our work in political terms.

This does not mean that our philosophical sensitivity has to become blunted, nor that its rigor need be sacrificed. I am not suggesting that philosophy be reduced to the necessity of acting, or vice versa. Clearly philosophic analysis carries with it its own distinctive traditions, ways of proceeding, and characteristic forms of argument. Neither am I suggesting that educators must become members of any philosophy guild, at least as this would likely be construed in contemporary situations. Rather, what I am urging is a realization that theory and practice are categories which have been superimposed upon actual experience and which, in part, serve to cloud the interconnectedness, the univocal nature, of experience. One of the problems involved in any such reorientation, of course, is that the very language we use tends to obscure this as a possibility; but we need to keep in mind here Soltis's point that language can itself be used to transcend its own limitations and excesses.

I noted earlier how the chapters in *Philosophy and Education*, because they took for granted the context for the injection of their philosophic ideas, miss something of import about the possibilites for the field. Not only do the educational implications of the resultant philosophic inquiry suffer due to this, but so too does the nature of philosophical work itself. Since the context for the analysis is not fully articulated, the sort of philosophic work that might actually unify theory and practice is also unrealized.

What I believe needs to be done, as at least a partial corrective to such tendencies, is for several aspects of our conceptual and action-centered energies to be redirected. In closing, I will briefly indicate what some of these redirections might include, and what they would mean for the educational domain.

First, we need to be aware of the phenomenon of schooling as one kind of actual, lived cultural experience. Schools are not just the arena for the dispersing of knowledge, values, and information, but contain their own, often unique cultural forms. Their rituals, routinized activities, formal and informal message systems, patterns of evaluation, and so on, reinforce the domination of particular cultural forms. We dare not ignore this process. Continuing to think about schools as mere intellectual systems which can be modified via the injection of philosophical analyses will not increase the potency of our discourse. This is not to suggest that an awareness of schools as a complex of lived cultural experiences can somehow be added on to our usual way of doing philosophy. The recognition that schools are cultural institutions means that we must integrate our analyses with other, even divergent disciplines.

What this implies, secondly, is that the usual distinctions among the philosophy, sociology, anthropology, history, and psychology of education, need to be recognized as articifical separations which often obscure more than they reveal. The separation of people into discrete, autonomous, and even antagonistic disciplines, is injurious in at least two ways. In the first place, this dissection of education into specialized areas often leads to a lack of understanding across them. The result is that those trying to understand the possibilities for science education, to take but one example, may not be cognizant of how their efforts may be affected by changes in epistemology or analyses in curriculum theory. Parenthetically, this tendency toward increased specialization and isolation may be furthered by divisions of philosophy into subareas, as represented in *Philosophy and Education*. In the second place, separating education into autonomous subgroups militates against a more wholistic perspective. What results, all too frequently, from this lack of a larger perspective, are studies, analyses, and research reports which -- unlike the ones in the mongraph reviewed here -- address microscopic issues that are not synthesized, or debated with other areas and domains. What we might work toward, instead, is the kind of interdisciplinary approach to education which allows people to work on issues or problems from all sides, with researchers and teachers each seeing their efforts as linked with those of the other.

Third, these changes would necessitate major modifications in the way we prepare teachers, and the orientation of those involved in that process. I mentioned in the introduction to this piece that many teachers are not in the habit of thinking about,

and valuing, the nature of theoretical work. While this is partly due to the way theory is conceived by those who engage in it (and to some extent susceptible to the recommendations already made), this distaste for theoretical work is also due to the way we have thought about public school teaching, and the ways we have acted in teacher education programs. The tendency for teacher education to be carried on using a predominantly technical, ameliorative, and vocational model, is I believe, the dominant pattern in that area. Instead of regarding the preparation of teachers in vocational/technical terms, we need to take a more foundational and reflective approach in our efforts here -- one which seeks to uncover and evaluate the underlying perspectives, orientations, and assumptions of a given area. What we need are not better trained technicians, but people who can think and act in ways that are ethically defensible, politically just, and pedagogically sensitive.[35]

Fourth, far from downgrading the importance of philosophy of education (as Siegel, for instance, would have it), this approach would rejuvenate the field, in part by seeing theory and practice as different aspects of the same phenomena. All the philosophical rigor and sustained debate that can be mustered would be needed within the conception I am sketching here. What *would* be modified is the arena for, and meaning of, philosophy of education. Instead of considering the field as one which can enlighten and improve the practice of teachers and the exchanges in classrooms, this conception asks us to see philosophy *in* activity, and to see activity in philosophical work itself. At bottom, this view of things insists that all practice is theoretically complex, and all theory a species of work -- a view which highlights, instead of diminishes, the importance of sound and sensitive philosophic investigation.

Fifth, we already have available, at least in highly suggestive form, some clue as to what this conception would actually look like. The approach articulated here seems intimately related to two pieces of research: that by Paul Willis[36] and by Ann and Harold Berlak.[37] Both these efforts seek to integrate ethnographic investigation with philosophic acuity, in the process seeing schools as cultural institutions which embody social, political, and ideological commitments. In his study of "the Lads," who inhabit an English working class school, Willis makes clear that the commitments which help comprise the schools need to be seen within the larger nexus of cultural, political, and ideological meanings. In pointing to the contradictory nature of dominant ideological messages and how these are actually received in prac-

tice, Willis makes clear the interconnections among culture, theory and practice which lie near the heart of my recommendations. Likewise, the dilemma language offered by the Berlaks suggests one way of helping us see the problems facing teachers in all their theoretical complexity and action-centered urgency. Both these works may serve as an indication of the alternative direction I have suggested in this essay for the study of educational phenomena.

I want to end my remarks here on a note that is at once personal, theoretical, political and philosophical. My own sense of commitment to philosophy has been an important source of inspiration and motivation in a number of ways. Yet this admiration has been tempered by the distance I have sometimes glimpsed between philosophical discourse and the plight of those who have been more or less systematically prevented from leading lives characterized by fulfillment, personal meaning, and collective power; I have more than occasionally been bothered by the rather appalling notion that we can do philosophy apart from the concerns, interests, and predicaments of those around us. The notion that we may continue to provide abstracted philosophical analyses whose implications may be superimposed on those who live in "other worlds," seems to me increasingly suspect both morally and philosophically. Philosophy is at its best, it seems to me as I believe it also did to Plato, when "philosophy" and "life" are one. A commitment to unify theory and practice, to seeing educational, cultural, and political issues as homologous, must include a concern for those still shackled. An unconnected discipline may not be worth doing.

* * *

NOTES

1. Learning Through Dramatics: Ideas for Teachers and Librarians, (Phoenix, Arizona: Oryx Press, 1982), emphasis added.
2. Part of the problem here, I think, is that teachers are not, for a variety of reasons having to do both with the material conditions of their work and the quality of their preparation, in the habit of thinking through those questions which are regarded as theoretical. What this condition argues for is a different conception of what teacher preparation ought to consist in, and the kind of activity public school teaching is. Of course, all this will be to no avail if the material conditions of teachers are not coincidentally transformed. More will be said about this at the end of the present essay.

3. John Dewey, "The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education," in The Relation of Theory to Practice in the Education of Teachers, the Third Yearbook of the National Society for the Scientific Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1904).
4. Jonas F. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, The Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
5. Ibid., p. 2.
6. Ibid., p. 9.
7. For some interesting comments on the possible contradictions between the introduction provided by Soltis and that offered by Broudy, see David Nyberg, "Thank God for Babel: Analysis, Articulation, Antinomy," Educational Theory, Volume 31, Number 1, Winter 1981.
8. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 25.
9. Ibid., p. 97.
10. Ibid., p. 98.
11. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966).
12. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 103.
13. Though Soltis, interestingly, does not pursue this issue here, the kind of knowledge the author is pointing to has been the subject of considerable analysis by those who see the operation of a "hidden curriculum" in schools as an important vehicle for the inculcation of cultural norms. See, for example, Philip W. Jackson, Life in Classrooms (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1968); Elizabeth Vallance, "Hiding the Hidden Curriculum: An Interpretation of the Language of Justification in Nineteenth-Century Educational Reform," reprinted in Arno A. Bellack and Herbert M. Kliebard, editors, Curriculum and Evaluation (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1977); Michael W. Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," reprinted in William Pinar, editor, Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975); and Jules Henry, Culture Against Man (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), especially chapter eight, "Golden Rule Days: American Schoolrooms."
14. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., pp. 107-108.
15. Ibid., p. 111.
16. Ibid., p. 119.
17. Ibid., p. 122.
18. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).
19. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 130.
20. Edward Bullough, "Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle," The British Journal of Psychology, Volume V, pp. 87-98; reprinted in George Dickie and Richard J. Sclafani, editors, Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).

21. The concept of aesthetic disinterestedness has a long and controversial history in aesthetic theory. Among other things, the possibility of disinterestedness, as well as its desirability, range of application, and possibly injurious consequences, have been topics of dispute. The same holds true for the concept of psychical distance, which adds a psychological element to the general notion of disinterestedness. For a review of the role of disinterestedness and psychical distance in aesthetic attitude theories, see Landon E. Beyer, "Aesthetics and the Curriculum: Cultural and Ideological Form in School Practice," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1981; especially chapter three, "The Philosophical and Historical Development of a Presentational Aesthetic."

22. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 139.

23. Ibid., p. 141.

24. Two exceptions need to be noted in this regard: 1) the article by Jane Roland Martin, "Needed: A Paradigm for Liberal Education"; and 2) as far as I can understand it, the chapter by James E. McClellan, "First Philosophy and Education."

25. See, for example, Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America (New York: Praeger, 1971); Clarence Karier, et. al., Roots of Crisis: American Education in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973); and Joel H. Spring, Education and the Rise of the Corporate State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

26. Soltis, editor, Philosophy and Education, op. cit., p. 37.

27. Ibid., pp. 58-59.

28. As already noted, this issue seems related to some of the points made by Soltis in, "Education and the Concept of Knowledge"; also see note 13.

29. See Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," in Roger Dale, et. al., editors, Schooling and Capitalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976).

30. While it is important to see the multitude of interests which schools serve, it is important to understand that this is not a monolithic, inexorable reality which proceeds independently of people's conscious activities. Both students and teachers sometimes resist, transform, or reject outright the ideologically embedded meanings formed by schools. See, in this connection, Paul Willis, Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs (Westmead: Saxon House, 1979).

31. See Landon E. Beyer, "Aesthetic Theory and the Ideology of Educational Institutions," Curriculum Inquiry, Volume 9, Number 1, Spring, 1979.

32. Harvey Siegel, "The Future and Purpose of Philosophy of Education," Educational Theory, Volume 31, Number 1, Winter, 1981, p. 13.

33. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, editors, Plato: The Collected Dialogues (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 752.

34. While limitations of space prevent further analysis of this point, this

seamlessness is also apparent in Dewey's thought. See, for example, "The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education," op. cit.; and Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1916.

35. See Landon E. Beyer and Kenneth M. Zeichner, "Teacher Training and Educational Foundations: A Plea for Discontent," The Journal of Teacher Education, May-June, 1982.

36. Paul Willis, Learning to Labour, op. cit.

37. Ann and Harold Berlak, Dilemmas of Schooling: Teaching and Social Change (New York: Methuen, 1981).

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Pretext: An Essay Review of Robert V. Bullough, Jr. *Democracy in Education -- Boyd H. Bode.* Bayside, New York: General Hall, Inc., Publishers, 1981. (258 pp).

A WAY OF LIFE REVISITED

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To revisit the way of life Boyd H. Bode envisioned is to explore with Bullough a wing of Progressivism that has received comparatively little attention. We come into this relatively unexplored part of the larger Progressive forest with a guide who has found paths through it, paths which Bode himself would have urged us to take. In this respect, Bullough, our guide, lives up to Maxine Greene's assertion that history belongs "to the humanities because it deals fundamentally, not with impersonal lives of institutions, but with the continuing, sometimes desperate efforts of groups of men to choose, shape, and maintain what they consider to be the proper human way of life."[1]

This illuminating account of educational philosophy at Ohio State University leaves no doubt that Bode did indeed fight tough battles in his own time, often involving desperate efforts. Some of the revisionists who focus on this period of the 1930's in the history of American education would have us believe that Dewey and his disciples such as Bode were all pretty much alike. Through the typical revisionist lens, the Progressive educators tend to be viewed as relatively ineffectual, middle-class liberals caught up in the merging scientific-technological rationality of the times and oblivious to their role in supporting oppressive social and political forces. Or, they were naive reconstructionists who had no real sense of political realities. Bode fits neither revisionist stereotype.

Bullough's text portrays Bode as a committed intellectual and academic, one who truly believed in the power of ideas and one who was politically limited by his time and community. Bode's belief in ideas guards him against revisionist attacks for, through Bullough's account, we see a man whose life was changed and qualitatively improved by intellectual activity. Bode's somewhat unfathomable belief in the power of ideas differs markedly from the position taken by many of Dewey's disciples and inter-

preters; yet it is somewhat similar to the theoretical position Habermas takes in this later writing, i.e. the "iron cage" concept in which one assumes we are all imprisioned by a technologically and bureaucratically organized way of life, and the subsequent position that we, therefore, imprision ourselves. In his day, Bode sought to help educators penetrate the false consciousness of the arrangements that they assumed were necessary for their well being. Belief in the value of free debate and faith in a democratic way of life were the almost religious aspects of Bode's alternative. The power of ideas allowed one to break out of the iron cage. Bode did this for himself, and he attempted to help others do it for themselves. Penetrating the false consciousness of everyday activity and democracy as a way of life were Bode's tangible steps into the realm of political action.

Aside from those who worked directly with Bode or those who pursued graduate studies at Ohio State University in the period when his thinking still influenced studies of history and philosophy of education, few scholars have examined his work. Bullough's book is an invitation to do so. Bullough also invites curriculum historians to study the role of Bode's close friend and colleague, University of Wisconsin philosophy professor, Max Otto, as a philosopher of curriculum. While Bode was mentor to Harold Alberty and other curricularists at Ohio State, Otto served as mentor for Harold Taylor, curriculum innovator at the post-secondary level.

Bullough does not take his case for Bode through hyperbole and exhortation. An historical account is constructed through many hours of personal interviews with Bode's former colleagues and students and from heretofore unpublished personal letters and manuscripts. Many of these primary sources were discovered in the archives at Ohio State University and in the Max Otto papers at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin. These materials along with study of Bode's writing and other accounts of his life and work permitted Bullough to create a facsimile of Bode's world that respects the detail and dimensions revealed in these documents. In effect, he did not impose a comtemporary scholar's doctrinaire ideology of how he would have liked Bode to have lived and thought about education upon this data.

The reader is taken into the field of education between the two world wars. *Democracy in Education* is divided into five parts with each containing a series of imaginary dialogues between Bode and his colleagues or between colleagues of his time who address critical educational issues. Bullough, who describes his work as

an example of a "person-centered" history of education, explains his use of dialogues this way: "Dialogues are used because it is believed that this format is most capable of conveying both the spirit of the times and of the man. As nearly as possible the language utilized with the dialogues is authentic. The language is deliberately 'folksy' because Bode was folksy."(4) Although one might question the appropriateness of contrived discussions, the use of dialogue is highly effective in making Bode's thinking come alive. In addition, the dialogues are similar to a recent American History Association's call for storytelling as a historiographical mode of inquiry.

The titles of the five parts of the book suggest the content of each. Part one, entitled "Early Struggles," reveals Bode's early experience in the closed community of rural Iowa in which he lived until adulthood. Part two details the evolution of Bode's philosophy as a professional philosopher first at the University of Wisconsin and then at the University of Illinois. In both institutions, he was sought out by students and colleagues as a teacher-scholar. It was, however, when he joined the faculty of the College of Education at Ohio State University in 1921 that he turned more fully to the field of education for his philosophical studies. Bullough traces this stage in the evolution of his ideas in a significant section entitled "Philosophy Brought to Earth."

Parts three and four focus on Bode's concern about the common misconceptions of Progressivism in education and his views on curriculum making. In this period, around 1936, he wrote *Democracy as a Way of Life*. This work, built upon his own writing of the previous twenty years, served to reinterpret a conception of democracy generated by his friend and colleague, John Dewey. The distinctive position which emerged differed markedly from many of the prevailing Progressive views which Bode saw as being overly laissez faire. His *Progressive Education at the Crossroads*, written during the same period, extends these concepts into school organization and curriculum making. In this section, imaginary dialogues with colleagues W.W. Charters and Harold Alberty illuminate Bode's thesis about democracy and its relationship to schooling, namely that schools must aim to become laboratories of democratic living.

A final section of the book centers on the school and social reform. Bode differed from a number of his social reconstructionist friends in that he was convinced that schools were not the proper agency for evolving public policy. His dialogues with Norman Woelfel and John Childs flesh out this position.

Bullough's interpretation of a period of education history and the work of a significant, often neglected, figure in that history is humane without being sentimental. Yet, he clearly admires and respects Bode and finds much of himself in his ideas. The book Bullough has produced is an open invitation to examine with him the life of an individual who struggled to throw light on the tough issues and problems confronting education in his time. Many of these we still face in the 1980's. The book is indeed relevent. What more can be asked of an historical study?

* * *

NOTE

1. Maxine Greene, "The Professional Significance of History of Education," in Understanding History of Education, ed. Robert Sherman and Joseph Krischner. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1976, p. 53.

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