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

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W.M.R.

Essays

Slowly, Slowly, Slowly, the Dumb Speaks: Third World Popular Culture and the Sociology of the Third World

Cameron R. McCarthy
Louisiana State University

And my non-fenced island, its brave audacity standing
at the stem of this Polynesia, before it, Guadeloupe,
split in two down its dorsal line and equal in poverty to
us, Haiti where negritude rose for the first time and
stated that it believed in its humanity and the funny
little tail of Florida where the strangulation of a nigger
is being completed, and Africa gigantically caterpillar-
ing up to the Hispanic foot of Europe its nakedness
where Death scythes widely.
And I say to myself Bordeaux and Nantes and Liverpool
and New York and San Francisco
not an inch of this world devoid of my fingerprint...
of friendly light
of fresh light
those who have invented neither powder not compass
those who could harness neither steam nor electricity
those who explored neither the seas nor the sky but
those without whom the earth would not be the earth.
(Aimé Césaire, 1983, pp. 47, 67)

This essay deals polemically with the representation of the third world and the status of third world popular culture and literature in the sociology of education. In what follows, I

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deliberately set myself in opposition to the subordination of third world people in determinist social theories by reasserting the agency of the oppressed and the decisive importance of popular culture in the ongoing struggle for political sovereignty in the third world. I believe that a radical encounter between current sociology of education and third world literature and popular culture is necessary for the emergence of new political understandings and for the development of new alliances and interventions over the presentation and representation of the third world in educational theories, classroom practices, and schooltexts.

Marxist theorists of education and other progressive writers often approach the culture of the differentially oppressed, what I call "popular culture" with considerable caution: as if "it" were a minefield (Hall, 1984; Saul, 1979). This distrust is pervasive in neo-Marxist accounts of schools and society which systematically subordinate the specific histories and experiences of oppressed women, minorities, and third world people. As an Afro-Caribbean writer, I find myself, perhaps, permanently out of sync with radical and social science accounts of the human condition which marginalize third world people in this manner.

We are simply deprived of structural positions to speak within the theoretical framework of class essentialist Marxism or for that matter the new wave strategies of periodization associated with postmodernism and poststructuralism now being forced marched into the field of sociology of education. I have begun to see contemporary Marxism as something of a classical realist text in which the subjective and omniscient speaking positions are reserved for white new middle class male intellectuals. Much of radical education theory is therefore part of the enabling linguistic competence of a peculiarly unreflexive community. In these frameworks, third world people are constituted as the objects of radical forms of intellectual tourism (Roman, 1987).

In the light of this, I wish to point towards a new arena of struggle—the terrain of radical educational theory itself. This

brings us to the question of who gets to define whom, when and how? It is fundamentally a question of who gets to generate theory about whom, whose experiences get appropriated, whose theories are considered appropriate, who has privileged access via old boy, or other networks to dominant journals, books, and general circulation. It is also a question of which debates shall have currency within Marxist and new-Marxist frameworks. It is in this ideological context that I believe non-synchronous arguments are long overdue. By invoking the concept of non-synchrony, I advance the position that individuals (or groups) in their relation to economic, political, and cultural institutions such as schools do *not* share similar consciousness, needs, interests, or desires at the same point in time.

The concepts of "popular culture" and "difference" have a meaningful centrality in what follows. It is important that I specify their meanings. The term "popular culture" is used throughout in opposition to the essentialist and possessive notion of culture as designating elite art forms, artefacts, and representations. By "popular culture," I refer to the historically grounded experiences and practices of oppressed women and men and the processes by which these practices and experience come to be represented, reconstructed, and reinvented in daily life, in school, in the workplace, and in the news media. In a related sense, I use the concept of "difference" to specify the organizing principles of selection, inclusion, and exclusion which inform the ways in which marginalized third world women and men are positioned and constituted in dominant social theories, social policies, and political agendas.

Much like the classical sociology of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, contemporary center-periphery theories of Altbach (1987), Altbach and Kelly (1978), Carnoy (1974), Gunder Frank (1969), and others have cast third world societies and third world people in terms of overwhelming, totalizing narratives (Said, 1986). In these accounts, third world societies are typically societies without agents—their agency already siphoned off in the subplots to the main dramas of capitalism,

modernization, and imperialism which are played out among the main classes and interest groups in the center countries. The men and women of these societies exist absolutely and only in the image and normative gaze of the first world. In radical accounts particularly, third world societies are allowed a very narrow set of determinations with respect to a far from benign imperialism—that is to provide the raw material and the reserve army of labor for a super exploiting capitalism.

This marginalization of the agency of the oppressed is achieved, I wish to suggest, by means of two discursive moves with respect to radical readings of third world relationships to imperialist centers.

The first discursive move in contemporary radical frameworks involves a strategy of defining colonialism/imperialism as a total economic system with a unitary and binding tendency radiating from coordinating centers of Europe or United States. Cultural practices merely flesh our an economic story of third world-first world encounters. For example, in *Education and Cultural Imperialism* (1974), Martin Cornoy paints a picture of metropole-periphery relations in which the encirclement of third world educational systems is complete:

> We hypothesize that the spread of schooling was carried out in the context of imperialism and colonialism—in the spread of mercantilism and capitalism—and it can not in its present form and purpose be separated from that context...The structure of schools, since it came from the metropole, was based in large part on the needs of the metropole investors, traders, and culture. As we shall show in later chapters, western schools were used to develop indigenous elites which served as intermediaries between metropole merchants and plantation labor; they were used to help change social structures to fit in with European concepts of work and interpersonal relationships; and, within advanced capitalist economies such as the United States, schools were used to fit white workers and later disenfranchised minorities into economic and social roles defined by the dominant capitalist class. (pp. 15-16)

Altbach and Kelly (1978) are even more definitive and categorical in their evaluation of first world/third world relationships:

> The third world is inextricably bound in a network of relationships with the West. Some of these relationships are related to the colonial past, to the sheer economic and technological advantages of the industrialized nations and to other "natural" elements in an unequal world. These elements constitute a part of the third world's dependency on the industrialized nations. Such dependency, in many areas at least, is probably inevitable under present conditions. (p. 30)

In neither Altbach's or Carnoy's accounts is there even a glimmer of recognition of agency or resistance among third world peoples to foreign impositions. In neither of these accounts is there a recognition of the production of politics or radical alternatives generated by third world men and women in their economic, political, or cultural relationship to the first. Third world educational and social institutions are presented as a seamless text on which the face of colonialism and imperialism is securely stamped and etched. There is no trace of indigenous struggles or determinations.

This strategy of totalization allows for a second discursive move towards the suppression of the agency of third world people. Western sociologists of education define the coordinating centers or metropoles as unilaterally setting the structural limits (via sanctions and rewards, evolving systems of dominations, etc.) of third world capacity, maneuverability, political action and cultural identities. These social theorists, in their accounts of the non-economic features of imperialism in third world societies, read these off from structural economic relationships pure and simple. They concentrate only on the formal arenas of education and culture and present third world cultures as unitary texts, as bastardized or counterfeit representations of first world societies. Altbach (1987) holds stead-

fastly to this monolithic view of the impact of the center on the periphery. Argues Altbach:

> The heritage of colonialism in much of the third world determined the structure of educational systems, the language of schooling, and many aspects of the curriculum. Links to metropolitan centers were imposed during the colonial period and in many cases remain to the present...The curriculum was also patterned on colonial practices, and change was slow. Foreigners had not only directed the educational system, but had determined the meaning of politics and culture. (p. 116)

Theories of center-periphery such as those advanced by Altbach (1987), Altbach and Kelly (1978), and Carnoy (1974) simply underscore the inadequacy of contemporary neo-Marxist and radical sociology of education accounts of imperialist domination in the third world. Many of these short comings are attributable to the fact that radical educators continue to ignore the critical domains of culture and ideology, namely, the domains of self production, representation, racial and sexual oppression, and generally, the non-class experience of struggle and resistance (Cudjoe, 1980). For all intents and purposes, these radical educators remain insensitive to the ways in which third world social actors define for themselves the conditions in which they live.

All of this poses the question of "the status of the experiential moment in any research" (Hall, 1984, p. 24) on third world educational and social environments. If we are to have a better understanding of the dynamics of domination relations in third world countries as well as a grasp of these dynamics in the peripheries of first world countries (i.e. the oppressed working class women and men, minorities and urban poor in the industrial centers of developed countries), then it is crucial that we pay greater attention to the areas of self production and mobilization in the cultural sphere. This would allow us to theorize and strategize around the fact that the heterogeneous forms of domination that now operate in our societies are

maintained and reproduced not simply as effects of economic structures but by means of the full-bodied orchestration of difference. The study of popular culture also allows us on the left to appreciate that oppressed people throw up their own forms of resistance as they encounter structures of domination in their daily lives. This is instanced in the Caribbean in terms of the emacipatory discourses produced in popular music forms such as calypso and reggae and in women's street theatre such as that of the Sistren Theatre Collective of Jamaica (Thomas, 1987). In this regard, the issue of re-presentation of real, social relations in education and other cultural institutions is of pivotal importance. School pedagogical practices, and curriculum materials are, like video, film, television, and rock music, popular cultural "texts" central to both the elaboration of domination and the forms of resistance that counter oppression.

For instance, the maintenance and reproduction of imperialist domination and western ascendancy since the sixteenth century has been articulated in part, by means of the systematic canibalization of the dominated peoples of the third world in the mass culture of developed countries. This involves a racialization of the publics of western capitalist countries and the construction of the women and men of Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa as the "other"...as wholly different. Dawn Gill (1982), in her semiotic analysis of recent social studies teaching material in England found that these texts constituted England as a hegemonic public vis-a-vis the third world. The importance of developing countries is defined in terms of what "they" provide for "us." These social studies textbooks provide the following type of narrative: Europeans are constructed as human agents who have organizational ability and are scientific and efficient business people who build roads and railways. Non-Europeans are presented as dependent peoples who have houses and roads built for them and are given jobs which enable them to survive. They are without talent or skills and they are passive recipients of aid.

Of the twenty social studies syllabuses Gill (1982) studied,

she found fourteen constructed third world countries exclusively in terms of "problems." Typically these problems are presented as internal to these developing countries. There is no attempt in these social studies texts to critically examine the economic, social or cultural relationships of developed countries to developing nations. Moreover, these social studies syllabus writers take western models of development for granted. To "develop" simply means to become more like Britain or the United States.

The editors for *Interracial Books for Children Bulletin* (1982) report similar findings with respect to the treatment of Latin America and Central America in social studies texts used in U.S. schools. In an indepth review of a "representative sample" of 71 social studies texts used in U. S. Schools, these editors report that:

> Central America is entirely ommitted from many of the most commonly used world geography, history, and "cultures" books used in U. S. classrooms...31 U.S. history texts were checked for their coverage of Central America. Seven of these do not even mention Central America. Fifteen texts limit coverage of Central America to the building of the Panama Canal, and most of these books either ignore or mention only in passing the U.S. military intervention that led to the acquisition of the canal...Not one of the 31 texts discusses the continuing involvement of the U. S. government—sometimes overt, sometimes covert—in Central America. (The Editors, 1982, p. 12)

Among those social studies textbooks that do attempt to address U.S./Central America relations in some detail, there is a tendency to portray the United States as:

> The "benevolent helper aiding the "backward people of Panama [and other Central American Countries] who need the U. S. to do such things as run the canal for them because of their "lack of skills, money, and military force." (The Editors, 1982, p. 10)

Popular social studies textbooks on Central America such as Robert Clayton's (1971) *Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies* represent these countries of Central America as fundamentally unstable. Argues Clayton:

> Central American countries have for years been politically unstable. It is not uncommon for one ruler to be assassinated and quickly replaced by another. This is another reason why this whole area could be a world trouble spot. (p. 44)

Though the treatment of Central America and the third world in social studies textbooks leaves much to be desired, starker examples of the marginalization and the manipulation of difference are reproduced in the popular film culture in the United States. In adventure films such as *Rocky, Red Dawn, Rambo First and Second Blood* and in space operas such as *Vee* and *Aliens*, thousands of alien people die in seconds on the screen and whole cultures are wiped out. American playwright, Rod Clark (1986) draws attention to the systematic disorganization of third world cultural identities and the racialization of the American public in the popular film culture. Clark asserts the following:

> No American kid growing up in this country hasn't experienced...the phenomenon of watching an old cowboy movie and cheering his head off as the "Indians bite the dust." Sometimes today when I am depressed at two o'clock in the morning...I turn on the television set and watch bad horror movies all into the morning. What makes me do this? Where do these energies come from? Why do we love movies like Indiana Jones? Why do we love space operas like Star Wars? It comes from emotional and psychological roots deep in us... which are materialized in our economic relationship to the Third World, Latin America, and the Caribbean. Imperialism is a deep-seated materialistic fantasy. (p. 13)

What Clark suggests here, and what I have maintained all along in this essay, is that "difference" is an organizing prin-

ciple in Western societies which has systematic effects in terms of its function as a prism through which social relationships of gender, class, race, and nation are viewed and given meaning and sustenance.

I believe that as educators, as cultural producers, as critical audiences, and as organic intellectuals operating within the university, we can intervene in this discursive field at the critical and strategic points of production and reception. For it is in the creation and consumption of the "products" of popular culture, the generation of school curricula, and the creation of news in the electronic media that uninstitutionalized experiences are processed and constituted as institutional knowledge and as legitimating cultural symbols. These then enter the chain of material and social circulation. It is precisely at this conjuncture of education and popular culture that we as radical academics, educators, as public school teachers, and socialist feminist and third world cultural activists can have important practical and political effects, for here lie unsuspected opportunities for political theorizing and action. Our project in the classroom might involve, first, submitting these representations of social relations to deconstruction and critique and, second, reassembling new images that reflect our new political understanding of the relationships in which we are imbedded.

One vital example makes such a project tangible. The radical curriculum project *El Salvador, The Roots of the Conflict: A Curriculum Guide*, generated by a politically active group of teachers of Oakland, California, challenges dominant representations of Salvadoran people by representing them as fully realized human beings and as women and men with a legitimate interest in social change and their own self-determination. There are a variety of ways in which this political project of "critical literacy" (Wood, 1985) can be expanded into the community through such vehicles as street theatre or community fora. In Jamaica, for instance, groups of working class women such as the sistren theatre collective have collaborated to use theatre as a medium to challenge simultaneously sexual

domination and cultural imperialism in their society (Thomas, 1987).

Here we are not talking simply about "textual politics" (Belsey, 1980). Developing a non-synchronous political space within education ultimately means dissolving the boundaries between schooling and popular culture. It means conducting what Gramsci (1983) calls a "war of position" (p. 88) at the same time that we create what Eagleton (1984) identifies as the "critical public sphere" (p.9). If we are to redress our previous mistake of seeing this sphere as the province of a rising bougeoisie, we must change our conception of which sites are the strategic areas of struggle. In this way, we can create a language of practical socialist feminist and third world politics that links what is "possibilitarian" (Wexler, 1976) in the humanist and liberal agendas currently existing in some educational institutions to more radical and structural demands for social change. Moreover, by expanding the social welfare logic of the state toward a logic amenable to the needs and desires of the oppressed, we can struggle with the issue of non-synchrony, of social difference and domination by race, class, gender, and nation.

As a third World speaker, I argue that the method most likely to disarticulate Marxism's economistic, racist, and imperialist reading of education entails listening to the non-synchronous voices from the perphery. This project inevitable means moving away from the current unwarranted privileging of the theoretical and political concerns of the imperial center. To reverse this first world optic in sociological discourses on the third world, I wish to point us in the provocative direction of third world literature and literary theories. I wish to point us in the direction of the language of negritude of Aimé Césaire (1983) Franz Franz, (1985) and Senghor (1981); the Macondo or peasant world of Marquez (1982), Roumain (1978) and Carpentier (1979). The radical women's geography of June Jordan (1980), Ntozake Shange (1983) and Jayne Cortex (1984). For example, Aimé Césaire in his "Cahier d'un Retour au Pays Natal" (1983) speculates upon the redrawing of na-

tional boundaries established in the discourse of imperialist old world cartography. In the redrawing of the map of the colonial/post colonial world, he negates the dialectic of domination between *first* and *third* worlds. Asserts Césaire:

> And my specific geography too; the world map made for my own use, not tinted with the arbitrary colors of scholars, but with the geometry of my spilled blood...For we know now that the sun turns around our earth lighting the parcel designated by our will alone and that every star falls from sky to earth at our omnipotent command. (p. 77)

By placing the third world in the position traditionally ascribed to the first, Césaire (1983) does not institute a new form of domination—a black power antithesis to white colonialism, rather he suggests a humanized alternative. Because Césaire's concept of dominant relationships is rooted in the history of struggle ("the spilled blood"), his reconstruction of the New World gets us beyond the abstractions of western sociology. A sociology that negates the specific histories of third world people. I argue, therefore, that the literature of Césaire (1983), June Jordan (1980), and others is a "literature of resistance" (Cudjoe, 1982) which has the explicit effect of decentering the autocratic, ruling first world subject in third world narratives.

Finally, I seek deliberately to place literature in opposition to sociology, since I believe that current mainstream and neo-Marxist sociologies in their discussion of third world societies are what Foucault (1973) calls "technologies of regulations" I argue for a genuine, interdisciplinary encounter between third world and New World literature and popular cultural forms and Old World derived sociology of education as the basis of an alternative radical discourse that would render audible the heterogeneous voices of oppressed raced, classed, and gendered third world subjects. For as the black feminist poet Ntozake Shange (1983, p. 22) reminds us:

> There is no edge
> no end to the new world
> cuz i have a daughter/trinidad
> i have a son/san juan
> our twins capetown palestine/cannot speak the same
> language/but we fight the same old men
> the same old men who thought the earth was flat
> go on over the edge/go on over the edge old men
> you'll see us in luanda. or the rest
> of us in chicago
> rounding out the morning/
> we are feeding our children the sun...

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FATMAH ABDALLAH. *THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT*

Play and Hermeneutics: An Exploration of the Bi-Polarities of Mutual Understanding

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Introduction: Hermeneutical and Technical Understanding and the Phenomenon of Play

The coupling of the two terms "play" and "hermeneutics" is meant to indicate that there is a deep natural affinity between the phenomenon of play and the character of hermeneutic understanding. This affinity is witnessed by the fact that Johan Huizinga's formulation of the play phenomenon in his text *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (1955), was used by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his *Truth and Method* (1975) as a clue to uncovering the distinctive character of hermeneutic understanding.

Note that this says more than that a classic text on the phenomenon of play has an intruiging place in the history of hermeneutics in this century. It also says more than that play is a possible object for hermeneutic investigation (although it certainly is that). More than these, the phenomenon of play somehow *exemplifies* the nature of hermeneutic understanding itself.

Clearly, attempting to detail all of the characteristics of hermeneutic understanding would itself be an unwieldy task, let alone paralleling such characteristics to features of play and attempting some contrasts, comparisons and the like. This paper has a more localized task, one which takes it's cue from recent work by Sutton-Smith and Kelly-Byrne (1984), in which it is maintained that theoretical forumlations of the phenomenon of play tend, in general terms, to display a "bipolar" character. That is to say, "if we...sort the theoretical elements into whether they contribute to the status quo of individual or social life, or whether they introduce novelty into the status quo, we find that all theories, to some extent, cover both

conservative and innovative functions." (p. 30)

One of the tasks of this paper is to demonstrate, in broad outlines, this "bipolar" character in the phenomenon of play as understood hermeneutically and to explore the ways in which play and hermeneutic understanding are mutually elaborative. The other task is a more critical one. I will be maintaining that a hermeneutic understanding of the phenomenon of play must set itself against what could be called, following Habermas (1971), a "technical" understanding of this phenomenon, precisely because the latter suppresses the bipolar character of play. And such suppression is not simply in the service of a "better" understanding of the phenomenon of play, but is in the service of the underlying interest of a technical approach. That approach favors a view of the world dominated by logic and scientific discourse, and thereby situates play in a secondary position of reproducing, developing, imitating, rehearsing or replicating such a world view. (Sutton-Smith, 1984; Sparisou, 1982). At best, play becomes formulated as a developmental necessity in the achievement of a world best understood under the auspices of scientific discourse.[1] In fact, Sutton-Smith (1984) goes as far as to say that a great deal of contemporary approaches to play have tended to "focus only on those kinds of play which would support certain cultural presuppositions and have ignored almost entirely those that would not support those presuppositions." (p. 59)

Clearly, a hermeneutic approach to play cannot itself claim to be free of such "cultural presuppositions," especially since the embeddedness of understanding in such presuppositions and the struggle for meaning, given such embeddedness, is *precisely* its topic. Perhaps both a technical and hermeneutic approach to play tend to reproduce the phenomenon of play in their own image. However, given the increasing predominance of an interest of play in the context of Early Childhood Education (Evans, 1975) and, also, given the dominance of technical approaches to play, an examination of play as conceived hermeneutically is essential to balance the scales. This is especially urgent since a technical approach to pedagogy in

general has tended to gain favor for reasons less appropriate to pedagogical experience itself and more appropriate to the bureaucratic organizations to which teachers tend to be accountable, even when the practice of teaching may not itself warrant such accountability.

In order to best demonstrate the bipolar character of a hermeneutic understanding of the phenomenon of play, it would be best to sketch out very briefly, the underlying interests that distinguish a technical approach from an hermeneutic approach:

(a) *Technical Understanding*

The underlying interest of this form of understanding is the control, manipulation and prediction of objects in the world (Habermas, 1971). The essential characteristic of technical understanding is its methodological character. It is the methodological character of technical understanding that makes possible the control, manipulation and prediction of the objects it studies. And, more often than not, such control, manipulation and prediction orient to measurement, calculation and deduction as a way of securing knowledge (Piaget, 1970; Jardine, 1984). The warrantability, justification or legitimacy of such knowledge is documented by pointing back to the method that produced it, a method which has, within a measurable range of probability, allowed the control, manipulation and prediction of the changes that an object will go through and what can be done to intervene in such changes in order to produce a specifiable result. Clearly, such knowledge has a place in the midst of pedagogical practice, since it is *possible* to understand "the changes that an object will go through" as a metaphor for education and the intervention of the teacher in the life of the developing child (Kliebard, 1975), and it is necessary, as a teacher, to keep this metaphorical possibility open. However, such technical knowledge has become rampant in education theory and practice, overrunning and closing-off questions of what its place as a possibility might be. This has occured because of the possibility, inherent in technical knowledge, of offering quarantees regarding development and

change the measure of which can be statistically documented, demonstrated and reproduced. But the latter are achieved at the cost of subsuming intersubjective and dialogical relationships between individuals and necessitate what Habermas (1971) called the "identification of everyone with everyone else." (p. 181) That is to say, *vis á vis* the methods of technical knowledge, each of us is replaceable with everyone or anyone else, such replaceability defining the "objectivity" of such knowledge (Jardine, 1984). It is in this sense that technical understanding is "monological". In light of the methods of scientific-technical discourse, there is only one "logos", one sense to be made, one voice to be heard. Technical knowledge therefore tends to develop a formalized language (Macdonald, 1975) which will help guarantee the univocal and monological character of its discourse and which will then provide a way of then reconstructing (Habermas, 1971) the phenomena it considers into precisely the sort of thing to which technical knowledge is appropriate. Any equivocal, metaphorical,[2] dialogical or analogical elements will be struck out ahead of time as indicative, not of the phenomenon itself, but of lack of methodical control. In this way, the phenomenon of play becomes legitimate to the extent that it can be lined up with technically conceived and technically reproducable "skills" (Misgeld, 1984). Research on play therefore tends to focus on how play will achieve specifiable outcomes. It tends, as Huizinga (1955) put it, to see play as serving something *other than* play— the acquisition of knowledge, the mastery of language, social indoctrination or enculturation, the rehearsal of social roles, environmental mastery, the working out of socio-emotional conflicts and the like. Research becomes focussed on "the way in which some measurement of play correlates with other measures of maturity or cognitive activity." (Sutton-Smith, 1984, p. 60). Pedagogically speaking, play becomes legitimate only to the extent that it can be demonstrated that children will (within specificable statistical limits) "get something out of it"— that "something" being a "skill" whose development can be thereby controlled, manipulated and predicted.

(b) *Hermeneutic Understanding*

The underlying interest of this form of understanding is the accomplishment, development and risk of intersubjective understanding. Its underlying interest orients "toward mutual understanding in the conduct of life." (Apple, 1975, p. 126) in which each of us is precisely *not* replaceable with everyone else, but rather, in which each of us finds ourself in the midst of a process of self-formation (Ricoeur, 1984) which is uniquely our own and which is worked out in concert with others. In light of this form of understanding, method cannot be first. Rather, what is first is dialogue, communication, negotiation, confrontation and the like. *There is no impervious method or pregiven standpoint from which such understanding proceeds, since it is exactly the question of where one stands in relation to others, risked in the orientation toward mutual understanding, that is at issue in hermeneutic understanding.* Thus, hermeneutic understanding is essentially dialogical, since mutual understanding presupposes at the outset that more than one voice is heard. Hermeneutics does not thereby produce an univocal technical language which expresses an interest in control, manipulation and prediction and which stands *a priori* to the phenomenon of play and demands objectivity and univocity. Rather, it begins with the multivocal (Ricoeur, 1970) interpretive language of everyday discourse which expresses the tensions, risks and possiblities inherent in the struggle for mutual understanding. It therefore stands *a posteriori* to the phenomenon of play as the struggle to achieve an understanding of the meaning in which we already find ourselves embedded.

What follows is an attempt to express some of the bipolarities inherent in "what play is in itself and what it means for the players" (Huizinga, 1955, p. 2) and to begin addressing what I see as the pedagogical significance of such bipolarities.

Bipolarities in the Phenomenon of Play

What follows are brief descriptions of some of the bipolarities that are evident in the phenomenon of play as approached hermeneutically, following, with some extrapolations, the work

of Huizinga (1955), Gadamer (1975) and Ricoeur (1984). These descriptions do not follow exactly the charactrerizations of the two poles as found in Sutton-Smith and Kelly-Byrne (1984). In fact, those authors avoid the use of the terms "innovative" and "conservative" because of what they see as "egregrious political overtones" (p. 30) and they substitute the terms "equibrial" and "disequibrial". I also prefer the latter terms, not because of a desire to avoide political overtones– when one deals with the possibility of mutual understanding, political ramifications, if not overtones, are inevitable– but because "disequilibrium" better expresses the fact that play can lead to disruption without necessarily leading to innovation. "Innovation" seems to include a sense of re-integration and stability, as if the new has been integrated into the old, or replaced it or the like. "Disequilibrium" however, portrays the polarity of play in such a way that re-integration is still at issue, still in suspense, still at risk.

1. Play is a sense-making activity, it is a "significant function" that "imparts meaning to actions. All play means something." (Huizinga, 1955, p. 1) It is a "creation of order" (Huizinga, 1955, p. 10), created and sustained in an ongoing way over the course of play and orienting to the "continuity and coherence" (Goncu and Kessel, 1984, p. 18) of that course for the players. It is in relation to this constructed/perceived order and meaning that the player orients his or her actions as meaningful actions, as the actions of a player. Whatever the underlying drives, instincts, structures, processes, etc, that can be theoretically postulated as explanations of play, "establishing play contexts involves the players orienting themselves and others to meaning and to the potentially varied and complex levels of meaning in their actions." (Goncu and Kessel, 1984, p. 8) This mutual orientation to meaning is a dialogical creation, even in the solitary play of the young child (Ricouer, 1984; Gadamer, 1975) and is constituted by the "to and fro" interplay of the players which preceeds the intentions of both.

At the other end of this polarity, we find the notions of chaos or meaninglessness. Play is, as Huizinga (1955) put it, "labile." (p. 21) The sphere of meaning created and sustained in play can be lost, broken, threatened, invaded or rendered meaningless, inoperative and the like. This can occur because of the "invasion" of an authoritative version of sense-making (where "ordinary life can reassert its rights" Huizinga, 1955, p. 21) or because of a violation of the internal sense of play from within, a breaking of the rules or a refusal to take the rules as governing ones actions (as in the case of the "spoilsport" who does not manipulate the rules, as would the "cheat", but refuses to condone the rules at all). The meaning created and sustained by play is always in danger, then of "a collapse of the play spirit, a sobering, a disenchantment." (Huizinga, 1955, p. 21)

The dialogical creation of meaning, and the mutual understanding achieved through the orientation of the players to that meaning, operates under the persistent possibility of collapse into misunderstanding and meaninglessness. The possiblitiy of collapse gives to play another level of bipolarity– that of tension and solution. "Tension means uncertainty, chanciness; a striving to decide the issue and so end it. The players want something to "go" to "come off." (Huizinga, 1955, p. 11) As we shall see in #3 below, tension, uncertainty and chanciness do not resolve themselves down solely to the individual prowess of the player, but are constituted by the fact that, insofar as the meaning of the play is understood dialogically, one is also involved with the "risk of an unknown partner." (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 186) Hence the centrality in the work of both Forbes and Yablick (1984) and Goncu and Kessel (1984) of the ongoing need for negotiation and dialogue in the achievement of mutual understanding in play, and given the risk of an unknown partner, the tension created by the fact that mutual understanding might collapse, risk and tension are therefore essential, since the individual

player can never guarantee ahead of time what the "to and fro" of play might be, might require, since it always involves an "other."

2. Play must be taken as an end in itself. In contrast to those approaches which understand play as in the service of something which is not play, Huizinga asks "what is play in itself, and what does it mean for the player?" (1955, p.2) As the touchstone for inquiry, then, he says that "we wish to take play in the way that the player himself takes it: in its primary significance." (p. 4) The meaning of the play for the players thus takes primacy over possible reconstructions of that meaning in light of some theoretical framework whose *ratio* falls outside of that created by the play itself.

This way of taking the phenomenon of play gives rise to several hermeneutically relevant bipolarities:

(a). Insiders and outsiders: Regarding the dialogically created meaning of a play situation, "this is for *us*, not for the 'others'. What the 'others' do 'outside' is of no concern to us at the moment. We are different, we do things differently." (Huizinga, 1955, p. 12) Thus, the meaning created by play involves a sense of inclusion, of membership, of belonging, as well as the polar opposite. Exclusion, alienation and the like are frequently evident in children's games. "We" are the ones who are "in on it" (cf. Huizinga's notion of "secrecy") and the "others" are "not in on it", they do not share the meaning which orients our actions, nor, in some cases, do they share the conditions for achieving membership.[3] This phenomenon has a striking parallel to Schutz's (1970) analysis of the stranger and taken up more recently by Barnes (1982) *vis à vis* curriculum development.

(b). Intrinsic and extrinsic meaning: Not only is play a dialogical creation of meaning, it is a meaning which cannot be measured through the imposition of some external, authoritative version of what it is about. "Inasmuch as it is a structure, it has, so to speak, found its measure in itself and measures itself by nothing outside it. It no longer permits of any comparison with reality as the secret measure of all copied similarity." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 101) Here we find that play, as the creation of a sphere of meaning which is its own measure, resonates with Husserl's (1970) notion of "horizons of meaning" which are not reducible to each other, James' (1950) notion of "finite provinces of reality" and, less directly, to Piaget's notion of a "stage". Each in their own way reference the integrity and viability of spheres of meaning and resist the reduction of "multiple realities" (Schutz, 1971) to some paradigmatic version of the real.

The pedagogical significance of this bipolar feature of play cannot be overemphasized. It not only references, indirectly, the recent cluster of literature on "children's culture" (Silvers, 1975; Sullivan, 1975; Misgeld, 1975; McKay, 1973; Speier, 1970a; Speier, 1970b; Misgeld, Grahame and Jardine, 1985 and others), which sets up the problem of "how we as adults may begin to discover a life-world other than our own." (Silvers, 1975, p. 48) It also sets up the hermeneutic problem of inquiry in general: the problematic of understanding something that is not our own and making it our own in such a way that we can retain its integrity. Pedagogically, we do not want to be the "spoilsport" (Huizinga, 1955) who withdraws from the game and "reveals the fragility and relativity of the play-world," (p.11) and robs it of its "illusion" (*inludere*– its "in play" character). We want, as teachers, to grant that when children understand the world through play, something viable is "at play." We must balance the ways of making sense that we bring to understanding children ("prejudices...are simply conditions whereby we experience something– whereby what we encounter says something to us" Gadamer, 1977, p. 9) with the possibility that children might understand differently and therefore bring those ways of making sense into question ("every experience worthy of the name runs counter to our expectations" Gadamer, 1975, p. 319).

3. The subject and the World: The "in itself" of play is not identifiable in a straightforward or unproblematic manner with the subject's experience. "The actual subject of play is obviously not the subjectivity of an individual who among other activities also plays, but instead the play itself." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 93) That is, play opens up a possible world of meaning which encompasses the player and in which the player finds him or herself. The activity of the subject or individual is therefore the exploration of a world of meaning which goes beyond that individual and directs his or her actions. Thus, when Ricoeur (1984) states that "it is in the participation of players in a game that we find the first experience of belonging" (p. 117), this must be taken quite literally. The player *belongs to* the play and is defined by it. Not only can play "at any time wholly run away with the players," (Huizinga, 1955, p. 8) but, in entering play, "we hand ourselves over, we abandon ourselves to the space of meaning which holds sway over us." (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 187) Thus the characteristics of play being charming, compelling, casting a spell, enchanting and the like (Huizinga, 1955). Thus also, the experience, mentioned above, of membership and inclusion must be understood in light of the "movement backwards and forwards...of play which, as such, has no substrate" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 93) of individual subjects whose identity, intentions and characteristics preceed play and direct it. Rather, the reverse is true. The play of contexts of meaning, worlds of meaning, take precedence as that in which the individual finds him or herself and as that "in, out of or against which" (Heidegger, 1962, p. 213) the self-formation of the individual emerges.

From this emerges one final bipolarity, one which, from the point of view of technical understanding, appears paradoxical, if not contradictory: on the one hand, methodological self-possession and self-'knowledge' in the sense of properties or characteristics that are attributed to oneself as the properties of an object (Heidegger, 1962)

and, at the opposite end, the hermeneutic presence of the subject is *too* secure. In play, subjectivity forgets itself; in seriousness, subjectivity is regained." (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 186) One can, then, "play with possiblities" without being governed by the utilitarian purposes of everyday life. Such "playing with possiblities" has its own risks, since, in playing (i.e., in giving oneself over), we run the risk that who we understand ourselves to be might be irrevocably changed, that the familiar ground that we took as our standpoint, our place *from which* we entered into play, might no longer be one that is unquestionably our own. That is to say, even though it is "only the support of the familiar and common understanding which makes possible the venture into the alien" (Gadamer, 1977, p. 15), such a venture does not leave the familiar untouched. The familiar becomes visible as *itself* constituted by possiblities of meaning in which one is "at home." (Heidegger, 1962, p. 233-4) In this way, as Huiainga (1955) and Gadamer (1975) document, play causes a shifting or a fluidity to occur between the notions of belief and make-belief, between the real and the imaginary, between the actual and the possible, between the metaphorical and the literal. This "shifting" or "fluidity" does not leave us with a simple relativism in relation to which each of us can be indifferent. Rather, it simply says that the reality of human experience is constituted by a "horizon of future..., still undecided possiblities." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 101)

Conclusions

The pedagogical danger of a technically conceived notion of play is that it begins with a normative version of meaning which then serves as an index or measure of the value and place of play. Normative notions of language, cognition, social development, emotional development are thereby used to test the proximity of play to the norm, the extent to which the child is moving toward or away from the norm and the like. It therefore begins by demanding the substitution of the possibility of self-

transcendence (i.e., the exploration of possible worlds of meaning which go beyond self-possession) with the self-possession of an authoritative version of the real, in which understanding begins only to the extent that it approximates that version and secures itself in the methods that *produce* that version. Once the methodological self-security of technical understanding is accomplished (as, for example, with logico-mathematical knowledge in Piagetian theory), its achievement is posited as the norm towards which understanding is tending. And, as Fish (1980) points out, "every norm is also a morality, and whatever is defined in opposition to it is not merely different, but inferior and inessential." (p. 102) Play is therefore either orienting to reproducing what is already technically understood, or it is inferior and inessential, "just" playing.

Play can be understood, however, as the exploration of possible worlds of meaning, an exploration of embeddedness in meaning and the creation and sustaining of such embeddedness. It is a free exploration ("free", that is, from the contingencies which drive everyday life to certain possibilities rather than others as a matter of practical-utilitarian necessity) of possiblities of mutual understanding. There is, in play, an experience of "detachment" from the compelling necessity of the "standard story of reality" (Fish, 1980), a story whose standardness compells us to see it, not as a possibility in which we have found ourselves, but as simply necessary, simply "the way things are", and, therefore, simply and obviously the measure of other provinces. Hence the "paramount" character of everyday life (Schutz and Luckmann, 1967), the power of the notion of "literal meaning" (Fish, 1980), the binding character of tradition (Gadamer, 1975), the tranquillizing character of what "they" say (Heidegger, 1962).

Pedagogically, play can provide the moment at which this "detachment" can be engaged. This "detachment" momentarily reveals the character of human experience as moving into as-yet-undecided possiblities. It can reveal, moreover, that the possibilities that are taken up in our understanding of the world, ourselves and others are decisions we have made,

whether by choice or by default, whether "by taking hold or by neglecting. The question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing itself." (Heidegger, 1962, p. 33)

One final note. In the introduction to this paper hermeneutic understanding was characterized as an orientation to mutual understanding *in the conduct of one's life.* This understanding, therefore, is not a matter of what I know "in theory" but of what I stand for, where I stand, what my place is in relation to others "in practice," that is, in relation to how I conduct myself *vis à vis* others. Thus, "knowledge is always a matter of lived, practical insight, and, understood in this sense, knowledge cannot be separated from questions of responsibility for the conduct of one's life. In the end, none of us know more than what we have learned to live with, what we have learned to use as knowledge relevant to the organization of our relations with others and to the acquisition of self-understanding, which can then orient further actions." (Misgeld, Jardine and Grahame, 1985).

The attempt, in technical understanding, to reduce the phenomenon of play and the nature of pedagogical experience in general, into an amoral mechanism for the control, manipulation and prediction of objects in which questions of responsibility, orientation and where one stands are ruled out, is an illusion. It is simply a way of disguising, under the guise of "objectivity," a deep moral reverence for the measurable, and for the safety, security and tranquillity such a guise produces. Clearly, then, if one begins with a reverence for the controllable, the manipulable and the predictable, the bipolar character of play must be suppressed, since revealling the possibility of meaninglessness, doubt, risk, chance, self-loss and the like reveals an understanding of human life that technical understanding will not allow— the movement into as-yet-undecided possibilities which its methods cannot encompass. It is here that the most powerful potential effect of a hermeneutic approach to play emerges. As mentioned in the introduction, a technical approach to pedagogical encounters is clearly a powerful, useful and irreplaceable possibility of understand-

ing, one which teachers must keep open as a resource upon which they can draw. A hermeneutic approach does not render a technical approach *false*, as if it had nothing at all to say, no place at all. Rather, a hermeneutic approach displays technical understanding *as* a possibility among others. Displaying it as such entails that the question of its appropriateness and place cannot be addressed by simply pointing to its technical character or the methodological feats it can accomplish. The question of the appropriateness and place of a technical understanding is a possibility is always as-yet-to-be-decided, practically, and concretely, over the course of the practice of teaching, as a question of how I should conduct myself, as a teacher, in relation to children.

Notes

1. Jean Piaget (1952) goes as far as to say that the world is not only *best* understood under the auspices of scientific discourse, but that children are "destined to master" (p. 372) this discourse. Play, in Piaget's work, is understood only in light of this psycho-biological destiny. See Jardine (1984) for a discussion of the "Piagetian picture of the world" and Jardine and Morgan (1985) for a discussion of the use of logicomathematical knowledge as a paradigm in Piaget's genetic epistemology.

2. A collegue and I (see Jardine and Margan, 1985) have recently completed a study of the analogical and metaphorical language usage in young children, and we have used this as a way of developing a critique of Piaget's genetic epistemology. The latter takes scientific discourse as paradigmatic, not simply of the discourse appropriate to science, but of rational discourse in general. It thereby ignores or devalues a rich resource of analogical and metaphorical language usage in young children. More often than not, it reconstructs children's metaphorical or analogical responses to an inquirer's questions into *failures to take the questions literally!* The paradigm of "literal responses" is thereby used in a highly uncritical fashion to "expose" the comparative "irrationality" of children's

responses to questions. In short, analogical and metaphorical language is seen as not having any *ratio* whatsoever (except, perhaps, as an unfortunate but necessary state on the way to scientific discourse).

3. In a presentation at the Bergamo Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, a collegue and I (see Jardine and Grahame, 1985) examined the applicability of a hermeneutic notion of children's play to disruptions in classroom interactions which have commonly been labelled "deviant." We found a striking parallel between the course of classroom conversations and certain features of children's play as described by Huizinga (1955). For example, Huizinga notes that play exists in its own, secluded "space" (a "playground" closed off from the "outside" world—a notion which parallels and supports the distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders") and has its own "time" (play "runs its course", "plays itself out"). We found, upon examining transcripts of conversations taped in high school "remedial" class, that the "disruptive", "off topic" conversations that would occur while the lesson was going on had their own course, their own meaning, and their own time—they ran their course and played themselves out. Most interesting, however, was the notion of "secludedness." The disruptive conversations tended to include conversational features which secluded them from the main course of the lesson and *both the students and the teacher did the work required to maintain such seclusion.* In one humorous incident that took place in a class on "The Uses of Fabrics", a conversation started at the back of the class about "edible underwear" and it was clear from the course of conversation (both the students' conversation and the attempts at compensations by the teacher) that neither the teacher nor the students wanted this side-conversation topic to enter into the main stream of the lesson. I would suggest that this is not only a need to avoid embarassment all around (although it certainly is that to some extent) but also a need to maintain the "secrecy" of the side conversation, without which it cannot remain "in play." The "disruptive" conversation at the

back of the room would be robbed of its "illusion" (robbed, that is of its compelling character which draws one into it) were it to become the "real" conversation of the class.

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HEZBON OWITI. *THE DONKEY RIDER*

Escape from the Classroom Routine: How Collegial Relations Sponsor Relief for Teachers

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The current interest in achieving excellence in all matters of national interest— business, industry, science— has fostered concern for achievement of excellence in education. Consequently, parents, school boards, and state departments of education are focusing attention on their schools, intent on making changes that substantially improve the quality of education offered to youth. Whatever changes follow from this latest wave of interest in making the schools safe for democracy, it is certain to have an effect upon the work experiences of teachers— the men and women who are directly responsible for the quality of educational experience available to students. The improvement of education is contingent upon understanding the behavior of teachers, whenever and wherever that behavior is influenced by their experience in the workplace.

Elsewhere researchers have investigated the effects of occupations on workers. For example. E. E. LeMasters (1975) reported on construction equipment operators whose deep sense of satisfaction with work was established and reinforced in meaningful ways by fellow workers on the job and at a tavern they frequented, called "The Oasis." In substance, the blue-collar workers sustained members through good times and bad, creating and maintaining patterns of behavior appropriate to what challenged or threatened individuals or the small group. Robert Schrank (1978) studied workers holding jobs in blue-collar and white-collar careers. Two themes which run throughout his report are that workers want occupations that are meaningful to them (See also Terkel, 1974.) and they want the amenities that make time spent at work satisfying. These amenities included opportunity to talk informally with colleagues, leave work early or late, arrive early or late, get a paycheck by the week or month, and so on: "the stuff of which

high levels of job satisfaction are made" (Schrank, 1978, p. 173). Studies by Schrank (1978), LeMasters (1975), and Terkel (1974) show that the improvement of work is more than simply adding or changing tasks in the set of discrete activities undertaken to complete some job.

The workplace is a social world within which the social processes of the wider world unfold. According to Rosabeth Kanter (1977) the organization structure of work in the U. S. promotes the notion that self-improvement—at the expense of others—is the ideal type, on individual and group levels (see also Turnbull, 1983, p. 74). Kanter (1977) argues that there is a strong relationship between the ways in which systems of work are organized and the potential for individual workers to benefit from opportunity, power, and balanced numbers of social types (i.e., sex, race, ethnicity). If the goal is to make the American workplace democratic (or excellent), then policies and programs intended to improve the workplace must respect the interaction of formal and informal organization structures (Kanter, 1977, p. 264). The importance of this latter point becomes evident through the definition of culture.

From the view point expressed here, culture is an anthropological concept used to explain what an individual has in mind as personal, internal knowledge that makes it possible for one to participate sensibly in social settings. Cultural knowledge is both created and received by human groups and is affected differentially by the individuals who make up the groups (Becker, 1982). The development of culture, as a product of interaction, is neither linear nor predictable. The culture of workers, whatever the job, emerges from the interaction of different individuals and the systems of organization existing in the workplace.

It is apparent that field based studies of informal group behavior among teachers have made significant contributions to our understanding of the education process. Three noteworthy studies are Harry Wolcott's (1977) study of educational innovation; Philip Cusick's (1981) research of small, informal groups among secondary school teachers; and Mary Metz's

(1984) report of faculty culture at a middle school. Of particular importance is the encouragement they provide for further investigations which give emphasis to understanding the functions possibly served by these informal organization structures.

The following questions raise concerns related to the interest in understanding better the faculty culture for the purpose of improving high school curriculum. What mechanisms have the teachers created in response to their workplace? To what extent do teachers rely upon voluntary, informal organizations for mitigating effects of teaching which are attributable to the structure of work? Are certain patterns of behavior which have been worked out by different groups of teachers perceived as crucial for work in school? On what basis do teachers resist policy which is developed by the formal organization of the school?

Teachers are workers in the same sense as plumbers, secretaries, managers, lawyers, carpenters, nurses, and so on. Of importance for planning and instituting changes in the context of the school is description and explanation of the activities teachers create and maintain for social events. Before making decisions about retooling schools for excellence, there is need for field based research whose primary objective is to describe and explain how and to some extent why schoolteachers do things in the way they do. Our actions relative to improving the quality of education in the U. S. must be informed historically, or else we risk making a reactionary response to this demand for excellence. The present study explores further the hidden curriculum of the high school through description and explanation of mechanisms used by teachers at one high school to escape from the situation.

This study occurred at a place called Roosevelt Senior High School, located in a town called Elmwood. These are pseudonyms for a real school and town in a midwestern state. Elmwood's population was about 25,000. Roosevelt Senior High School had an enrollment of nearly 2,000 students, a faculty of 100, one principal and two assistants. The researcher

gained partial membership in one of two informal groups, called cliques, whose combined membership constituted the social studies department at Roosevelt. The one clique was known as the Guards; the other was known as the Rebels. Guards tended to endorse the values of Elmwood's largely blue-collar culture, accept a greater variety of students, volunteer for co-curricular work, and make Elmwood their home. The ethos of the Rebel clique included rejection of Elmwood's small town values, preference to teach college preparation courses, little or no involvement in co-curricular activities, and living in a town outside of the district. During this study the teachers expressed a distinct preference for collegial relations within the cliques.

The Method

The approach taken for this study was natural history. A natural history approach to the study of teaching entails direct observation of events in a school based upon some conception of human behavior. The researcher begins by observing and analyzing events as they occur naturally in social situations. Techniques of data collection are chosen which enable the researcher to capture details that identify both explicit and tacit dimensions of a problem relevant to teacher. The explanatory principles of the method used here were developed by George Homans (1950), Robert Redfield (1955), and George Spindler (1982). The work of Louis M. Smith (et al.) (1984) represents current interest in natural history studies of teaching.

The method of data collection peculiar to this study was a product of the field worker's familiarity with ethnographic techniques and sensitivity to the character of events unfolding in the situation. In other words, technical features of the method were chosen as the problem gained definition in the field, not beforehand. In general, the role of participant observer was relied upon most often for access to and understanding of the high school teacher's work. Both planned and spontaneous interviews were used for obtaining an informant's

description and explanation of events.

A field study was conducted over a seven month period in the 1980-81 school year, during which time the researcher held a part-time teaching position in the school district. The researcher gained permission to conduct a case study of teachers at work from a member of the social studies department at Rossevelt Senior High School. Other members of the department and the school, including the chairperson, principal, and superintendent, were aware of the study and willingly gave their consent.

The two primary informants, Ross Abraham and Gary Zack, became abstract characters that are representative of other members of the department. In the field they were fourteen real teachers whose conceptions of teaching and moods, jokes, likes, and dislikes were sought continuously. Field work involved participation that would allow the field worker to feel like one of the teachers and to take on, at least for the time being, their beliefs. There was attendance at classes, hallway supervision, assemblies, department meetings, planning periods, and lunches. When teachers sneaked to the pool for recreation, the researcher followed along, held their towels, and kept time for laps and the return to work.

Field work included riding in the car pools of teachers, attending union grievance proceedings, sitting in on evaluations by principals, and watching the assistant principal reprimand them for leaving school without permission. When the men in this study stopped at a bar on the way home, the researcher was invited to join them for a few beers. We ate pizza and drank more beer on Friday evenings. We stayed up late on wintery nights to talk shop, warming ourselves by a wood stove while sipping herb tea. The wives, children, friends, and lovers of these teachers were as important to the study as colleagues. In truth, these high school teachers formed a community no less dependent upon one another than the tavern patrons in *Blue-Collar Aristocrats* (LeMasters, 1975).

From the beginning the researcher carried a small notebook to the field site. Whenever it seemed fitting, every word

spoken was captured in the notebook. During lapses in conversation as much of the setting as possible was described. On occasion note taking had to be postponed and the notebook kept out of site. Clarification of role and procedure in this manner helped insure that, as Spindler (1979) urged, "The ethnographer be an unobtrusive presence in the field situation." For example, it was not wise to record information when secret escapes were discussed or when the assistant principal gave his reprimand. Instead, as soon as possible afterwards the field worker would write down as much of the conversation as could be recalled from memory. Concerns about completeness and validity were relieved by having the informants read and comment on transcriptions.

Initially, ordinary events in the workplace served to sort data. Included were classes, preparation periods, and lunches. Description and dialogue were typed onto protocol sheets according to these divisions, with notes about date, time, and place. A separate notebook was kept for recording patterns perceived to be emerging as possible explanations or hypotheses. These perceptions were taken to the field on subsequent visits for further investigation. If data from the ongoing study supported an hypothesis, the hypothesis was retained and refined. If support was lacking, the hypothesis was discarded. Once aspects of the informal faculty culture, such as built-in and secret escapes, emerged as important foci, field study included a search for details which supported these explanatory concepts and led to other meaningful perceptions.

Eventually, the field worker must wrestle with Abraham Kaplan's (1963) basic scientific question: "What the devil is going on around here?" (p. 85) At this point analysis gives way to synthesis. Ethnographic description is examined in the light of existing literature and the researcher's understanding of the schoolteacher's work.

The activity of these teachers was viewed as an instance of a more general occurrence: development of culture among workers occurs in response to the situation at the workplace. The teachers in this study created and maintained patterns of

behavior which helped individuals get through the work day, work week, and contract year. As one of the informants explained: "Teaching? There is no meaning to teaching. Without these other guys I would have been gone so long ago it would make your head spin." The built-in and secret escapes of these high school teachers emerged during the field study as concepts useful for explaining the purpose served by the informal groups of teachers. In short, the informal groups functioned to help teachers cope with disappointing features of the job.

Escape from the Situation

In *Small Town Teacher* (1972) Gertrude McPherson used the category of evasion to explain how elementary teachers occasionally deviated from existing rules. In all instances, the teacher sought privacy and the two conditions necessary for performance of the deviant act were "informal group support and a social situation incompatible with exisiting rules" (p. 178). During this study, the researcher noted a pattern of behavior among high school teachers that paralleled McPherson's finding. The expression, "escape from the situation," is used to indicate that there were differences.

In particular, a belief of social studies teachers at Roosevelt which afforded justification for the deviant act was the need to "feel fresh." Additionally, escapes from the situation were not engaged in occasionally, by these teachers. They were instead of regular and frequent occurrence. Individual teachers could rely upon the informal system for identification and development of opportunities within the two types of escapes: built-in and secret. Through these escape patterns teachers realized relief from disagreeable and devitalizing aspects of their work in school. In this way built-in and secret escapes served social studies teachers at the high school in the same way that tactics like banking good pieces of work where the boss will not find them served furniture factory workers in Robert Schrank's (1979) study. Indications in the present study also show that where the formal organization inadequately attends to the problems people have on the job, (as is almost inevitably the

case) people will find a way through informal systems to make work more bearable.

In what follows there will be first a discussion of what the teachers meant by "feeling fresh" and then a discussion of built-in and secret escapes. In the end some thoughts are offered about the implications for curriculum.

Feeling Fresh

One day when the buzzer announced the start of another class, Ross Abraham looked up at the speaker and said: "You can't *escape* from the damn thing." Whatever was the emphasis for subject matter, the teacher had considerable pride in what was done in the name of educating youth. He always felt responsible for managing a classroom full of students for the five, fifty-five minute periods each school day. But, as Mr. Abraham explained: "You're responsible for the mood of the class, and there is a *tremendous* drain to psych yourself up for a performance to be up when you are not fresh." This work with adolescents "drained" the teacher. Late in the day or on days when one felt bad, the drain was worse. The teachers believed they needed to avoid this.

The drain affected Guards as well as Rebels. Gary Zack addressed the problem of feeling fresh from his clique's perspective with:

> One of the biggest stresses in teaching is the day by day being pumped up, being enthusiastic, and, of course, the stressful one where, twice this year already, someone might be insubordinate or you get a rebuff from the administration when you think you have an answer to a problem and it is not accepted by them. Those things can really eat away at you long after you leave here.

As the quotes from Mr. Abraham and Mr. Zack indicated, members of both cliques were aware that the students' definition of the situation impacted on the teacher's life. They also believed that aspects of their work in school which were controlled by the authorities for the school (particularly, the schedule), were emotional and psychological drains. Under the

circumstances, teachers created mechanisms through informal group activity which provided much needed relief from the routine of the classroom situation.

When the buzzer announced the beginning of the first class period of the day, it set into operation a series of sharply punctuated intervals of time toward the end of which every teacher worked. If one felt fresh at the start of class, before the last of the fifty-five minutes had elapsed, some measure of freshness was drained away. By the time the last class period of the day got under way, the teacher was "beat."

In the same way that the first buzzer marked progression toward the end of the school day, the first day of the school in the fall marked advance for teachers toward the end of the school year. If the drain of freshness was not explained by interaction with students in the classroom, it was that "administrators keep loading more and more shit on you." With two months of work remaining in the contract to teach, teachers said "it's survival" in answer to how things were going. With one month of work remaining, there was little interest in students, colleagues, or anything having to do with school.

Getting to the end of a class period, a school day, and a school year demanded conservation of freshness. To satisfy this need these teachers had evolved a variety of escapes form the situation (commonly referred to as "the trenches"), which effectively forestalled the drainage. As one teacher explained his behavior to the observer: "I don't know if you noticed last hour, but I was not doing what I had planned. I was too tired. This hour was the same. You need to be fresh to do a good job." When freshness was receding, it was important to escape from the situation through a built-in or secret escape pattern.

Built-in Escapes

One kind of escape was more or less obvious and was built into the lesson plan for the class by the teacher. As the following example demonstrates, it may appear to be a way of capturing the interest of students.

Every day at the start of class the teacher read a poem from

an anthology. he had not yet made the selection for this day and so he picked one. As he looked over a poem, he explained to the observer: "The class has gotten to the point of really liking these readings."

> As he read the poem, a girl was reading from a paperback, another was working on her bibliography cards, other students were busy with similar occupations. A few appeared to be listening while sitting up, slouching, or resting their heads on their desks. At the end of the reading the teacher said: "That was a bit obscure." There was no discussion.

Variations on the above built-in escape pattern allowed teachers to forestall lecture or recitation routines until they felt ready to begin.

While some built-in escapes had a remote linkage with subject matter planned for the course, others had none. Observations of teachers' activities showed how widely applicable is the lesson Schrank (1979) reports he had to relearn for most jobs he held: "How to work less hard in order to make the task easier" (p. 6). To explain its application to this study, on the first day of classes after the spring break a teacher cut his lecture short and gave his students handouts that would be used for the current lesson. They were distributed one page at a time and a stapler was passed around for fastening the pages together. While this was going on the students were free to engage in conversation among themselves. The teacher clearly had no intention of continuing any discussion of what had been presented in lecture. The time devoted to this exercise exceeded twenty-five minutes. This built-in escape pattern was repeated during the semester by teachers in both cliques. It allowed one to plan for a break while in the trenches.

Whenever the administration planned an assembly, the teachers could count on a built-in escape. At the designated hour all teachers were at their bases and all students were in their classes— everyone was waiting. Teachers knew that there would always be time before their students were released and there would be time when they returned, because of the

organizational effort the administration though was necessary to move so many students to one location. Typically, these leftover periods (ten to fifteen minutes) were used for no object lesson by teachers. They were used by teachers to preserve freshness.

Teachers resented being required to serve as "guards" for study hall sessions and transformed the assignment into an escape. As one teacher explained after settling the students down: "Now I'll doze off...R and R (Rest and Recuperation) period."

Department meetings also afforded an opportunity for escape. All that one needed were an appropriate vehicle and a disinclination to endure the ordeal. One vehicle was extra curricular activity; another was a student. With respect to the latter, if a student came up to the teacher after the last class of the day to talk about something, the teacher could tell another member of the clique to pass on word that he would be there late or not at all "because of the student."

The two day inservice session was an escape that was planned by the administration for the professional development of all teachers in the district. Teachers deftly changed it into an escape. The experience of escape at an inservice was explained thusly (with colleagues nodding assent) during the first day's morning coffee and roll break:

> This is where I have to be. I don't mean that derogatorily. It's just a statement of fact. It's a nice break from the trenches, especially this time of the year. The administrators don't trust teachers to do academic type things and they're right. Nothing else gets accomplished at these meetings.

Inservice sessions, assemblies, department meetings, and faculty meetings— attendance at these was required of teachers by the school authorities. Large blocks of time within each were considered by teachers to be wasted. Time was valuable to these teachers. As Dan Lortie (1975) notes, "we can think of time as the single most important, general resource teachers possess in their quest for productivity and psychic reward" (p.

177). The response of Roosevelt's teachers to the wasteful aspects of the bureaucracy within which they worked was to find opportunity for turning potentially wasteful time into productive time. Occasionally this meant taking time out in class to forestall the "drain" from their work with students.

Built-in escapes were mechanisms teachers used to remain vital for work in school. They were relatively easy to identify and administrators, aware of the tendency for teachers to take advantage of escape opportunities, looked upon the practice disapprovingly, but rarely took corrective action. When an administrator uncovered a secret escape, though, it was a different matter. These went against formal rules for teacher conduct in the school and some form of punishment followed. Teachers were as wary of discovery in a secret escape as factory workers were of the boss's discovery of perfect pieces hidden in the wood shavings (See Schrank, 1979, pp. 6-8). And for similar reasons.

Secret Escapes

Whereas built-in escapes were exposed to view and tolerated by superordinates, secret escapes were clandestine and not approved of. One's discovery in such an escape could lead to serious consequences. Regardless of the consequences, teachers frequently took part in them. As with other patterns of behavior important to the work of teachers, the cliques functioned to generate and develop secret escapes from the situation. The shortest and simplest secret escape was for one teacher to step into another's room during class time to talk about something that was thought important, whether of a humorous or serious nature. Both teachers might be holding class at this time. Also, teachers took advantage of sick leave days by calling in to say they were sick, when in actuality they wanted to free up a day for fishing, shopping or visiting. These were the common variety of secret escapes, and the administration dealt harshly with those who were discovered.

Teachers were expected to be in school throughout the time specified by the bargaining contract. However, there was no

time card to punch and, with eighteen entrances and exits to the school, one could slip in late or slip out early without detection. Teachers could leave early legitimately by signing out in the principal's office, but they resented the watch dog role assumed by the principals and preferred not to have the record of legitimate built-in escapes too long. The cliques had developed a way of avoiding this red tape. Members would secretly agree to escape after the last class of the day through exits in the shop, art area, or field house. Though against the rules, this secret escape was not an uncommon occurrence.

Those who rode in car pools found it particularly difficult to work out a strategy whereby four or five teachers could simultaneously escape unnoticed. One teacher explained the procedure as follows. Arrangements had to be made days in advance, the car had to be parked in a certain location in the morning, and when walking from the building to the car one had to affect a gait (a quick one) which suggested that one's intentions were "good." Despite difficulty the teachers were successful. As the event described below illustrates though, they could be caught in a collective effort to escape from school. The consequences, while expected, were unknown and feared.

> During third hour Andrew was called out of class by Bob, a member of his car pool. Bob, "white as a sheet," had to tell Andrew that when they were leaving early from school yesterday, Vincent Holmes (the assistant principal) caught them. Holmes had checked the sign out sheet and found only one teacher's name on it — Andrew's. He first "Vinced" Bob about it and Bob's only defense was that he was under the assumption that Andrew had signed all of them out. Andrew was to see the assistant principal before he left for home.
>
> Andrew explained that the clique had an understanding that whenever one of them needs to be home for some kind of appointment, he signs himself out, never signs out all of them, and takes full responsibility for the consequences, should there be any. No one complained. If the event was planned a day or so in advance

and somebody preferred to stay at school, he drove himself in for the day. They had not been caught before.

On the way to his meeting with Vincent Holmes, Andrew was "furious." In his opinion: "This is a nitpicking thing that administrators do to teachers. I'll admit that it was against the contract, but we are trying to save fuel and wear and tear on our cars. It's complicated to organize everyone. There are teachers who don't give a shit about teaching and bartend until 2:00 A. M. and sleep in school. I put work into preparing for my classes when I am at home. I strive to stay vital.

When he met with Vincent Homes, Andrew was apologetic and conciliatory. Holmes stated that it was school policy that people sign out and *they* (the clique) should do it. If concessions were made for any individual or group, the whole faculty would want the same privilege. "This is *not* to be repeated," Homes said at the end.

"I agree," said Andrew. After Holmes left, Andrew had one word of exclamation: "Prick."

There were other kinds of secret escapes, but the above examples were typical. Secret escapes were planned by cliques to relieve teachers of frustration, cynicism, and even hostility which they felt as a result of the structure of work characteristic of the institution. In particular, teachers were disappointed with inequities associated with, for example, the evaluation process, scheduling, discipline, and so on.

Administrators were aware that teachers engaged in secret escapes and took immediate punitive action against those who were found out—usually a verbal reprimand, intensive supervision, or non-renewal. The latter was not resorted to during this study, but was considered seriously by the superintendent on one occasion. Explaining himself after settling the issue, the superintendent said: "I really wanted to make this a precedent,

but decided to give the usual punishment: loss of accumulated sick leave, loss of pay, and intensive supervision." The superintendent did not explain why he avoided establishing a precedent. It may have been because of involvement with ongoing litigations.

Teachers knew that they were risking their jobs in a secret escape, but thought the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. They worked with others in their cliques to develop strategies for avoiding discovery. When caught they felt angry, for secret escapes were important breaks in the routine of school—they helped teachers conserve freshness. Accused of such a wrongdoing, a teacher protected himself and members of his clique by taking full responsibility and exposing no more of the plan or rationale than what he was accused of.

Summary and Conclusions

In sum, the teachers cooperatively evolved ways of escaping from their situation. Some were built into plans for the school curriculum and to take advantage of them was an easy move for a teacher—one that had little or no potential for unwelcome consequences. The results were worth the effort to recognize and use these opportunities: freshness was easily conserved. The other escape pattern was secretive and a teacher took serious risks when choosing to conserve freshness in such a way. That these behaviors had evolved within the cliques and that they continued to be a part of the teacher clique, is indicative of the importance attributed by teachers to "feeling fresh" for the work with students. It also underscores the importance of clique membership for teaching in a system which maintained a structure of work that tended to leave faculty out of the decision making process.

An assumption implied here is that involvement of faculty in the decision making process for the institution would not only result in policies which would meet more adequately the needs of teachers, but also would contribute to a greater sense of pride in work. The latter is important, as Schrank (1979) points out, because the actions of people at work give rise to

"serious doubts regarding a humans' intrinsic desire to work at all" (p. 207). In many ways, play more accurately explains the character of informal group activity among these teachers than any other word. In play as in work there are situations and rules for people to follow. A major point suggested by this research is that a bureaucratic structure which prevents participation in decision making for establishment of rules governing work situations may promote creation of rules governing play activity within informal systems which subverts the purpose of the formal system. In other words, the structure of work itself may be responsible for resistance of workers to work. Research of workers by Schrank (1979), LeMasters (1977), Terkel (1974) and others shows that similar results were obtained elsewhere.

The results of the present study also suggest that the intervention of indigenous faculty cultures by administrators and other superordinates must proceed with respect for the high likelihood of producing unintended outcomes. A modest proposal for improving the schools is achievement of mutual respect among faculty and administrators for their different but complementary cultures. The point for curriculum theorists is that the faculty culture is an important, if not powerful, feature of the hidden curriculum of the high school.

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ATESI. *MAKONDE PANEL*

Creating New Concepts to Clarify What Is Worthy of the Name "Education"

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Introduction

This paper will:

1. attempt to move toward creating a new concept (an educator's equivalent to a mathematician's zero).
2. offer a novel (to the writer) view of distinguishing any concept from the process by which concepts are related. This novel view does not amount to a new concept since it is looking at previously known concepts and processes in a different analogical manner.
3. look at the similarity between inquiry and gravity.
4. briefly comment on the value and/or political elements in creating new concepts.
5. provide no five except to agree with Jean Cocteau when he says, "angels fly because they take themselves lightly."

Part One

I have been working for some time on attempting to determine what is worthy of the name "education." A part of my time and energy has been spent in attempting to find an educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. The bulk of the paper deals with thoughts surrounding this educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. These thoughts are tantamount to an attempt to create a new concept.

The introduction of zero into western thought by Leonardo Pisano in 1202 permitted mathematicians to tackle and solve problems that were previously unsolvable?[1] Educators today are groping for solutions to numerous education problems. A fertile area for further investigation relates to formulating the roots of these problems. Educators today often feel a need for conceptual tools and processes that will allow them to do in their work of educating what the use of zero does for mathema-

ticians. Zero (the notation for a missing position - a placeholder) permitted mathematicians to take a quantum leap. Many educators would want to take this leap if it were possible. Antonio Porchia's idea applies here. "Set out from any point. They are all alike. They all lead to a point of departure."

This paper explores a direction from which this leap may be taken. The direction relates to a tool that, like zero, denotes nothing by itself but when used in relation to other conceptual tools may function to better clarify what is worthy of the name "education."

This paper will further explore some possible parameters of that educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. These parameters are highly polymorphous. There is the possibility that such a concept, process, thing or event is now and forever nonexistent. At first glance, the idea of an educator's zero is not a logical impossibility. The terms "mathematicians" and "educators" are used instead of the terms "mathematics" and "education" to include the human, translogical elements inherent in the use of such a tool. These translogical elements include a conceptualizer as well as what is being conceptualized.

Education is a clear fuzzy. Although educators have questions about what they are doing when they educate, they, as a rule, believe they know what they are doing during the act of educating. Time is another clear fuzzy in that we all know what time is yet when we are asked to define time, we have great difficulty in doing so. The notion of quality could also be included here. We all know what quality is yet we have difficulty in defining it. As Mark Medoff has said, "Deafness isn't the opposite of hearing, it's a silence full of sounds."

A fuzzy fuzzy [this educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero (hereinafter X)] is something I will use to help explain a clear fuzzy (education), but we know very little about that something. For instance, I would like to illuminate the clear fuzzy of what is worthy of name education. To do this I am looking for an educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. The notion of what that educator's equivalent might be

moves me to sniff around the idea that this X might be that which nudges clear fuzzies into the fuzzy fuzzy category. I say that because I'm positing that we mainly wonder about fuzzy fuzzies. Clear fuzzies seem to be sufficiently clear so that we don't frequently wonder about them. If we don't wonder, we probably will not involve ourselves in the process of expanding conceptions and not involve ourselves in extracting the full meaning from each experience.

This educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero may then be, among other things, that which helps us become curious. If it were of the form that permitted degrees of having it, it may also include that which productively intensifies curiosity. Although Richard Shelton did not apply his idea to traditional type educators, his quote fits that group; they are, "carrying a medicine for which no one has found the disease and hoping I would make it in time." This type of educator remains in abundance. Twenty some years ago a researcher found that inquisitiveness on the part of students is what teachers rated as their tenth most troublesome characteristic in their classrooms.

Since we are usually only curious about those matters that we desire to know more about, it may be useful to shift our focus to the space between what we know and what is yet to be known. I am suggesting that the major present focus of educator's attention is on what is known. What is known is frequently clear unless we are wondering about it. We usually don't wonder about ideas that are clear. Clear fuzzies are often thought to be clear and precise ideas unless we stop to ponder them. Clear fuzzies have degrees too. We can have technical questions about the functioning and uses of our feet, for instance, but we infrequently have that kind of question unless we are podiatrists or their like.

Educators more frequently have questions about what to do in their classrooms tomorrow but as they define education as, for instance, "the continuous reconstruction of experience," they are often mildly satisfied. Such a definition is capable of infinite refinement and elaboration. "Continuous," is largely

unbounded; as is "reconstruction" and "experience," yet when we are in the process of defining, we are doing a binding activity. We are, in a sense, attempting to bind the unbounded. Is it not true that it is one's memory that one forgets with?

Belief can inhibit wonder when belief, or any of its facets, is held to be certain, i.e. held unquestioningly. When I ask my students, "Who knows what gravity is?," most of them indicate that they know. In a sense, many of them do know but few know that they know very little about gravity. The same may be said for time, education, learning, knowing, believing and other ideas shrouded in polymorphicity. My students are relatively certain about those matters. They believe they know what they are talking about when they use those terms and they usually don't wonder about them. I expect that what holds for the majority of my undergraduate students regarding student certainty holds true for the majority of students in grades three through sixteen. As Robert Anton Wilson says, "We say 'seeing is believing,' but actually, as Santayana pointed out, we are all much better at believing than at seeing. In fact, we are seeing what we believe nearly all the time and only occasionally seeing what we can't believe."

Knowing gives us a reasonable certainty. Knowing reduces polymorphicity. Knowing something implies creating a unimorphicity. When context is highly limited, knowing can provide us with even greater certainty and less polymorphicity. Yet there is a growing concern to expand contexts. Contexts expanded indefinitely approach pure polymorphicity as contexts narrowed indefinitely approach pure unimorphicity. Approaching pure polymorphicity and its productive use may well surround the X. Such an X could assist us in coming to know that we don't know. To Plato and other educators, the awareness of one's own not knowing can literally do wonders. Unimorphicity can also stifle wonder in that we usually don't wonder about things that we know. Gravity, to many of my students, is a unimorphicity as I am using the term.

When Kurt Godel wondered whether one could prove that one couldn't prove "something" he was not bound by the

current constants of his day. When Werner Heisenberg elucidated his indeterminancy/uncertainty principle he was not bound by the constants of earlier physics. I know very little about an astronomer named Hubble. I mention him here because I have heard that some astronomers are now finding flaws in Hubble's constant which is a formula that assists astronomers to calculate distances by measuring the "red shift." As a result of some new evidence that points to flaws in Hubble's constant, the universe may not be expanding after all.

I mention Hubble because there seems to be some shifting of belief about some fundamental concerns in astronomy as Godel and Heisenberg provided ideas that assisted mathematicians and physicists to shift their beliefs about math and physics. Evidence continues to mount that we need some shifts in beliefs of educators. The evidence leads me to conclude that we need more openness to experience. This openness to experience is stifled by perceptual filters that are fogged with beliefs about the impossibility of certain experience. Can we experience nothing? Can we be aware of nothingness? Is the absence of something capable of being experience? Can we possibly have the educator's equivalent to the mathematicians zero?

The field of mathematics is often considered closed system as opposed to an open system that educators deal with. Trying to find an educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero is doomed, some may say, because of this difference between open and closed systems. Mathematical discoveries over the years have demonstrated that some openness exists even in mathematics. A totally closed mathematics would imply that mathematics is simply one big tautology. Is Einsteinian geometry more true than Euclidian? One simply works better for certain space than the other. The different spaces that each geometry is concerned with also relates to changes in time. Absolute time in Euclidian space and Newtonian physics has gradually shifted to time as a constant in Einsteinian space.

Perhaps the first matter that the possible X may do for educators is to help shift constants. This may be very difficult

to do in that some constants prevent others from emerging. If we temporarily forgot all constants we would probably be asking too much of ourselves. We can, however, wonder about and question some constants, especially those we have strong feeling for, i.e., the ones we are certain or almost certain about. Such wondering and questioning would permit us to deal with more paradox and ambiguity. As we as educators deal with more paradox and ambiguity, so will our students. As a result, we may all wonder more and become more self-directing.

When we perceive a short vertical line on a blackboard, we often conceive the idea of the number 1. A short horizontal line becomes a minus sign. Signs are everywhere. Some signs prevent us from seeing other signs. What signs do we now hold that prevent us from conceiving the X in relation to John Dewey's idea of education as the continuous reconstruction of experience? Some metaphors that we use prevent us from seeing other aspects of reality because some metaphors allow us to see aspects of reality that they themselves help to constitute. What are some of these metaphors? What contexts inhibit decontextualizing so that recontextualizing can occur? What constructs prevent reconstructing?

If we look at reconstructing, there seems to be an element of deconstructing that emerges shortly before a reconstructing. Perhaps this X functions more vigorously in the deconstructing phase of the reconstructing process. I say reconstructing instead of reconstruction to treat it as a present activity.

John Dewey said, "We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything."[1] I suggest that the "extracting...the full meaning" may include a "knowing" as we ordinarily use the word, and a simultaneous "not knowing." This "not knowing" element keeps the wonder and guessing going. The "knowing" alone inhibits it as our knowing of clear fuzzies often prevents us from wondering about them. The not knowing element of "extracting the full meaning of each present experience" fosters the use of clear fuzzies in the exploration of fuzzy fuzzies. That process of exploring is the relating of what we know to that which is unknown. We won't find the relations unless we look. We won't look where we "know" nothing can be seen. Looking at the nothing is what the "not knowing" element of "extracting the full meaning" is for. Getting our students to look at polymorphous events and processes includes some looking at nothing. We can synthesize when we do. Before a synthesis there is a void, an absence, a lack. Without this void, absence, lack, i.e., the experience of nothingness, there is no synthesis. Awareness of the present experience is the only experience that results in synthesizing.

Syntheses can be both meaningful and truthful. Dewey chose to use the term 'meaningful' in that truth can be relative as a truth in Euclidian geometry can be a falsehood in Einsteinian geometry but meaning can only be had in the present and it can only be had by a person who may or may not share the meaning with other persons. Truth is generally held to be timeless even though one always remembers it in the present. We don't guess that 2 + 2 = 4 will be true tomorrow. We know it will. As a result of that knowing, we inhibit wonder regarding the conditions and events under which it may not be true. The continuous reconstruction of experience is a continuous reconstructing which can only go on in the present. The destructing element of reconstructing can also only go on in the present. Dewey was implying that synthesizing can only happen in the present.

"Knowing" as the term is ordinarily used, does not fit the previously quoted Deweyan dicta as well as the term 'awareness'. Awareness subsumes knowing in that it can be posited that one can be aware without "knowing" (one can be aware of confusion) yet one can't "know" without being aware (except in some unconscious sense that I wish not to deal with here). Where "knowing" can prevent other "knowing," awareness facilitates other awareness. "Knowing" can prevent some awareness in the "knowing" that 2 + 2 = 4 prevents the

awareness that synergic coalescences can produce a 2 + 2 = 5 when contexts are expanded. Awareness expands contexts. "Knowing" can at times prevent expanding contexts. With different contexts, what we know changes and if it changes too much, we don't know as we once knew. That may be an element of experiencing nothingness (a strong candidate for the X). As John Ashbery says, "One must bear in mind one thing. It isn't necessary to know what that this is."

As has been mentioned by several writers, that which we are looking for is that which is looking. That holds whether we are looking to make "precise concept" a more precise concept or whether we are looking for the educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero. We are involved in the problem of seeing our own eye balls. When we are aware of this, we can see our own seeing. Certainly absence of evidence is not evidence of absence but what else may be said of that absence?

Nel Noddings and Paul Shore view intuition as an experience-enabling function in that it precedes and makes possible the experience from which knowledge is constructed.[3] They also believe that intuition as a source of truth has been discarded by modern philosophers. I have been indirectly contending that the educator's zero may assist educators in recarding (recontextualizing) intuition as a resource in extracting full meaning from present experience. Albert Einstein alluded to a similar idea when he said, "The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science. He to whom the emotion is a stranger, who can no longer pause and stand wrapped in awe, is as good as dead; his eyes are closed."

Since most of us would rather avoid looking that may or may not result in a seeing, I suggest that the X can be narrowed to primarily function at the stage of the intuitive process that precedes the first clear intuition. Noddings and Shore argue that intuitions form when there is subjective certainty and objective uncertainty. I have been writing about an uncertain X whose function seems to be to allow ourselves to live with higher degrees of uncertainty. Paradoxically, we can eventually

be more certain when we live with higher degrees of uncertainty because of the increased receptivity which permits us to be more aware of what we are experiencing as we are experiencing it.

If intuition is an experience enabling function that is the ground from which knowledge is constructed, the X could be viewed as that which enables one to begin or continue intuiting. For instance, unaware avoidance of certain experience can be disabling. We want to provide conditions whereby our students can be enabled. They can be enabled by fostering awareness of their indecisiveness, and by fostering awareness that they are creating their agony which helps generate unaware avoidance. If they, with their teacher's assistance, notice that they are agonizing themselves by deciding not to decide, then they have the opportunity to refrain from agonizing themselves through aware decisions instead of continually "practicing" habitual, unconscious self-defeating behaviors.

Sensing the concrete world is essential to a build-up of awareness and knowledge. An excessive need to know in advance what will happen before it happens is a major way of avoiding experience. Unaware avoidance of some experience lead us at times to have experience only in our minds. This prevents us from making contact with the real world of things and people. Once again, any experience can only be had in the present.

Right now we can remember the past and right now we can anticipate the future. We cannot have awareness at any other time. Our students too often are unaware that these are present remembrances and present anticipations. It is this excessive need for present certainty that results in our use of precision in our statements as a tranquilizer to delude ourselves into thinking that we know what we are talking about when we use terms such as education, democracy, learning, motivation, science, poetry, etc. It has been wisely said that it is better not to know then to know wrongly. The X can be that which sparks the insight that it is frequently wise to know tentatively and receptively.

Such tentativity and receptivity can lead us to agree with Jean Piaget's highest form of operational thinking; "the ability to hypothetically consider any state along a continuum of possibility as potentially equal to any other state, and return to the same state from which the operation began."

Knowledge of what will happen before it happens is, at times, very useful. Knowledge is power in the sense that we can control ourselves and more of our environment with knowledge. But an excessive need to know what will happen before it happens can greatly reduce receptivity to what is happening. Awareness of what is happening is reduced when receptivity is reduced. If we are not aware of what is happening most of our knowledge is useless for we cannot control what we are unaware of. We cannot extract any meaning from an experience that we do not have. If we are unaware of what is happening we are not having "that" experience.

Part Two

Thus far, I have created no new concept that amounts to an educator's equivalent to a mathematician's zero. I contend that I have been involved in the process by which concepts are related. The creating of a high level concept requires knowledge of discrete facts (the knowledge level of Bloom's Taxonomy-Cognitive Domain). It also requires a comprehending of the relations between these discrete facts that form a low level generalization (lower level concept).

> discrete facts=low level concepts=knowledge or memory level.
>
> comprehension level (where the relation between the discrete facts forms a generalization which is a higher level concept).
> When the student "learns" to apply his understanding of the generalization he would be functioning at Bloom's application level.

Where "comprehending of concepts" is the primary goal,

there seem to be less of a need for the students to operate at the higher cognitive levels, i.e., analysis, synthesis and evaluation levels.





The relationship between these high level concepts could be considered to form another, yet higher level concept which is superordinate to all lower concepts. The understanding of the superordinate concept requires the understanding of the

lower level concepts that comprise it. The explanation of the superordinate concept explains, by implication, the lower level concepts that comprise it.

Even if a teacher's goal were to develop within his students "the most superordinate of concepts," the concept itself and not the process by which concepts are related would be his primary goal. Perhaps we can get a clearer idea of the distinction between the concepts themselves, and the process by which these concepts are related, by considering the circles (see diagrams) to be concepts, and lines connecting the circles to be the process of relating concepts. (That process which generates new concepts.)

If the teacher's primary goal is to develop the high level understanding of a superordinate concept, there is little to suggest that connections will be made to other superordinate concepts unless the teacher makes the connection. Understanding of concepts (as the primary goal) does not (as directly or as assuredly) develop the sense of wonder which will bring the student to "throw out lines" to see what other connections (or relations) can be made with this superordinate concept that he or she now understands. Is it not true that those who are blind from birth don't have the faintest idea of what darkness is?

Where the primary goal is development of the ability to inquire, there is greater assurance that higher level wonderings (which will motivate the student to read, experiment, etc.) will be brought about. Where there is this sense of wonder, the internal feelings of dissonance pull the student to create connections so that "sense" and higher level meaning can be had. When one is an open-ender inquirer, he maintains a relatively constant state of productive tension which, as its name implies, produces. The production is greater meaning; a greater sense of coherence between and among all concepts. This productive tension also provides a greater readiness and motivation to create new concepts.

One cannot inquire in a vacuum. Data and higher level concepts are needed. When the primary goal of instruction is

development of the student's ability to inquire, the motivation to acquire the concepts he needs in order to form evaluate some high level theory is internal. Numerous educators agree that internal motivation is more effective than external motivation (grades, teacher approval, etc.).

How does a teacher "cause" this internal motivation? By creating a feeling of dissonance with the student— by demonstrating or showing (or even telling about) a discrepancy— something that the student sees or hears that is at variance with his expectations. This discrepancy opens a gap in the structure of the student's knowledge— a feeling of dissonance results. Feelings of dissonance motivate one to lower the feeling of dissonance to an acceptable level at which "sense is made. The "sense" is made by the student's manipulation of sense data to create notions (or concepts or ideas or constructs) that explain the discrepancy. Instead of inquiring into all of the universe at one time, the discrepant event limits the focus of inquiry.

My focus has been attempting to elucidate an educator's equivalent of a mathematician's zero. Although I have not created a new concept, I have moved toward its further delineation or I have helped us become more certain of its impossibility.

You knew all along that inquiry (the involving oneself in the process by which concepts are related) is how concepts are formed. What you may not have thought about is the similarity between inquiry and gravity. Inquiry is something like gravity in two senses. The first parallel between inquiry and gravity is that we can see their effects but we cannot see them. We know a small part of what they do but we don't know what they are. The sum of what they are is more than the parts that comprise them. The arrangement of the parts is itself an element that can't be seen apart from the whole. The second sense is that gravity literally holds the physical universe together and inquiry is the process by which we hold the world of thought together.

What I have been attempting to do is clarify the process by

which concepts are related by asking you to look at unseen "lines" between concepts and beyond presently known concepts. That is one way of creating concepts. When we involve our students in that process it is my belief that we are doing that which is worthy of the name education. As Frank O'Hara says, "There is nothing I can do for you and I am doing it, and that is poetry."

Another paper would be required to elaborate on one disconcerting but intriguing likelihood concerning the creating of concepts and the determining of what is worthy of the name "education" so I'll simply briefly mention it and then stop. Mature adult educators are writing to and for mature adult educators in the *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* and other professional journals. My hypothesis is that mature adult educators have already solidified and organized their sets of values to the point that mature adult writing by educators is often that which emanates from the values the writers hold. The result of this is that many attempts to determine what is worthy of the name education are frequently attempts to convince others to agree with ones previously formed beliefs and values. Inquiry is not value free. We see and hear what we want to see and hear. We perceive selectively and our inquiry relies on what we perceive.

The affective elements of our sensations, perceptions and constructions are often shunned because they can't be described or explained in detail. The educator's equivalent of the mathematician's zero may be that which relates to what I have heard is the French root for the word understanding which implies that when one understands, one forgives. It is difficult for me to forgive those educators who rape and pillage minds. If I understood more, I expect that I would forgive them.

Concepts are formed in many ways. "Science" has taught us to test hypotheses but it has not taught us to form hypotheses. Forming hypotheses includes an affective or value element. The testing of what is formed attempts to minimize and perhaps deny value elements. Value elements are frequently thought of as political. Political power is enhanced by

education. Education of the powerful has always been general education. General education since the days of Thomas Jefferson has been that which helps one judge for himself what will secure or endanger his freedom. Creating concepts is relating concepts in infrequently related ways. Judging for ourselves which infrequently related sets of concepts may help us secure or endanger our freedom is a part of creating concepts.

Judging for oneself is the crucial part. Modern schooling frequently not only does not promote judging for oneself but actively attempts to control minds so that one will not judge for himself. We can more easily forgive those rapers and pillagers of minds when we understand that their unenlightenment which fosters their pillaging and raping does not permit them to judge for themselves. This French notion of understanding and forgiving is very similar to the Eastern view that when one does something "wrong" he is to be pitied for not being more enlightened.

Conclusion

Like some modern motion pictures, I'd like you to choose the ending that suits you. Pick A, B, C, D, or E.

A. It makes no difference to differentiate an educator's equivalent of a mathematician's zero.

B. It makes no difference to clarify what will always remain fuzzy.

C. Both A and B.

D. None of the above because making a difference makes a difference.

E. Hounezayer's maxim holds, "If at first you don't succeed– so much for skydiving."

Footnotes

1. Boyer, Carl. **A History of Mathematics.** John Wiley, New York, 1968. ("The earliest undoubted occurence of a zero in India is an inscription of 876.")
2. Dewey, John. **Experience and Education.** Macmillan Company, N.Y., 1938, p. 49.

3. Noddings, Nel and Shore, Paul J. **Awakening the Inner Eye-Intuition in Education.** Teachers College Press, New York, 1984, p. 49.
4. Ibid, p. 88.

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Practical Teacher Education and The Avant Garde

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The concern with what teacher education is ultimately about has been resuscitated in recent years. On the one hand there are the various apologists for current economic regimes and conditions in the West whose reports and research prefigure a kind of programing of instructors who will transmit standardized forms knowledge. They represent teacher education courses as narrowly focussing on a specific kind of individualization, technocratic effectiveness and coordination of schooling to fit the requirements of an emergent economic order. The general effect of this trend is to make teaching an instrumental activity and teacher education programs that are implicated in it lose sight of the nexus of value, purpose and procedure that comprise education and social conditions (Popkewitz et al., 1986; Whitty et al., 1987). The discourse[1] of this contemporary settlement in education may be labelled as dominant.

On the oher hand, there is another tradition which is of major concern for the purposes of this paper. That tradition is visionary and is anchored in a genre of discourse that privileges the concepts of emancipation, liberation and democracy. Its avowed intention is to neutralize and exclude dominant teacher education discourse and to replace it with a language of 'possibility' and 'hope'. Teacher education in this tradition has the task of reconstructing educational institutions as a macro-social pre-requisite for the extension of public domains of debate, dialogue, and individual freedom and sociality. We refer to this counter-dominant discourse as the avant garde[2].

The recent spate of educational policy documents in Australia and elsewhere (See Australian Government, 1985; Apple,

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The recent spate of educational policy documents in Australia and elsewhere (See Australian Government, 1985; Apple,

1986a; Marginson, 1986; National Task Force, 1986; Queensland Board of Teacher Education, 1987) provide some examples of what we mean by a dominant discourse. On the surface these documents address visible symptoms of fundamental changes, particularly youth unemployment, that are underway in the world, national and state postindustrial or corporatist economies (Panitch, 1977; Dow et al., 1984).

Such symptoms are indexes of other changes such as the transformation of capitalism from within. In Australia, spectacular corporate take-overs in recent years are examples of the relative insignificance of private property and the obsolescence of the notion of free enterprise in today's world. Instead, economic power is located in corporations and private and public bureaucracies, and co-ordinated by the State. The use of information technologies such as computers and communications compound the real loss of jobs that occurs in such conditions, and reflect a progressive de-skilling of the workforce as machines are substituted for skilled labor and an increase in the range of low-paid unskilled work. Moreover, the reports neglect the nature of the dominant consumerist social ethic, so that the addiction to ownership of mass produced objects and images is left untouched (Lasch, 1986). Finally, elements of the cultural restoration movement sparked by religious fundamentalist attacks on modernity and shading off into the economic and social agendas of the New Right, are implicitly incorporated as the language of efficiency, competence, competition, and productivity becomes taken for granted in public and private life.

These documents then produce an educational discourse in which there are implicit assumptions that transnational capital and an international division of labor determine the economic direction of even the most powerful nations; that schools need to serve an emergent economy by providing 'flexible' workers; that 'education' at all levels should concentrate on human 'software' so that workers can be continously reskilled for unpredictable conditions; that information technology will provide a mechanism for reducing costs in a

restructured economy by capital-labor substitution. Primary and secondary schools are being reorganized everywhere to account for such imperatives. At the teaching work-force, curriculum knowledge is now readily discernible as hierarchically packaged structures that produce different kinds of students and which contain historicised and reified "facts". There are pressures to reduce teaching to scientific methods and technology, and to make student progress more 'efficient'; to scientize assessment and selection procedures, evaluation and pupil 'progress'. The bureaucratic workload of teachers has sharply increased as more time is demanded for the normalizing functions of schools (Apple, 1986b; Freedman et al., 1983). In short, education itself is constituted as a commodity and the logic of the new market place, including deregulation and privatization, applies to all levels of the system. Under corporatism,

> ...the social relations of schooling are systematically altered. The internal, formal culture of the school, its curriculum, is redefined. "Knowledge" comes to mean skill learning while the social teacher-student relation is reduced to inventories of individual basic competencies (Wexler, 1986).

Dominant and avant garde discourse in teacher education

Under the dominant discourse, school and education cannot be seen as relatively autonomous in the sense of being distant and simply affected by economic, cultural and social 'factors'. The so-called context of schooling is the relationship between knowledge production and an emergent social order.

Let us be clear about what we mean by this. The claim is not that schools are irrevocably determined by economic or any other forces so that everything that is done or thought about is in the interests of capital or some other monolithic category. Neither do we wish to argue that the changes noted previously are necessarily reactionary. Instead, we prefer to think about the discourses and practices of education as composing a field in which there are preferred claims to truth about depictions of

the objects and events to which the field is directed and how they are actualized. At one level, the field can be abstracted as policy statements of a highly rhetorical kind that, in turn, are transformed into functional requisites clothed in the constraints of education system bureaucracies. At another level, the field is teacher education lecturers, student-teachers and students who are positioned within the discourses and practices of an educational institution, be it university, college or school, and what they individually and collectively do.

Clearly there are potentials for movement on the part of teachers, students and administrators within such a field and the actuality is that people can, and do, passively accept, negotiate and oppose what is said and done (Morely, 1983; Hall, 1983). In addition, the discourses that make up the field of education, which are many, are in a constant state of interplay and transformation. Nevertheless, if teacher education is thought of as a social space, the field is a constraint that can be depicted in Foucault's (1980) terms.

> Each society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.

What counts as true in teacher education is produced within the discursive complex adumbrated above. By this we mean that 'teacher education' consists of a number of overlapping and often contradictory practices of knowledge production. Practices such as 'curriculum studies' or 'educational psychology' or 'teaching studies' contain their own internal rules that systematize and regulate what can be said and done, as well as how contradictions and inconsistencies are resolved. In addition, each is articulated with the other so there is always room for concepts, metaphors and models to be imported and which allows for novelty (Henriques et al., 1984; Laclau and

Mouffe, 1985; Frow, 1986; Bernstein, 1986). In addition, all such practices are informed by nomative assumptions that are produced from the interdependence of the social theory that educators use and the practices of schools. Hence the social (school) world is common-sensically represented in dominant teacher education discourse as consisting of 'pupils', 'individuals', 'classes', 'teachers', 'processes' and so on. The regime of truth of teacher education then can be characterized as a dispersion of regulated competing claims and agreements centered on the production of knowledge and practices in and about schools and teaching. It is organized in the departments of teacher education in universities and other teacher preparation institutions, State and private school systems, and coordinated by the State to serve educational markets (Wexler, 1986).

The dominant discourse of teacher education is not then a unified and logically coherent whole consisting of a finite set of elements. As Terdiman (1985: 57) proposes, there is no empirical 'proof' of the existence of dominant discourse because it consists of a 'moving and flowing network of practices and assumptions'. In teacher education it appears as a series of instances and traditions that have a relationship with each other and contest the form and content of teacher education while depicting it as eternal and inevitable in its objects and interests.

One such tradition is what we refer to as the realist genre[3] which is concerned with valorizing teacher work and knowledge so that teachers will be better prepared to act professionally. 'Professionalism' is this context is esstentially centered on teachers making their own decisions about curriculum and pedagogy. Teacher preparation of this genre is therefore directed by a complex pastiche of eclectic ideas about expertise gained in the transmission of knowledge in teacher education programs and in the milieu of schools. School-based experience is a necessary tenet of this tradition. We return to the realist tradition shortly.

Like all concepts and classifications, the contrasting of

dominant, realist and avant garde concels the overlaps and contraditions that occur in teacher education institutions and theorizing. We use the concepts analytically, but not simply in the sense of describing a particular 'style' of teacher education or a mere difference over definitions. Instead, we generalize Volosinov's (1973:23) insights to indicate what we intend. Volosinov argues that different classes use the same language, but that signs become an arena for class struggle because 'differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign'. Human communities then use words not in contemplation but in competition (Terdiman, 1985: 38; Foucault, 1980: 114) Our distinctions are those of power and the struggle over it.

There are two issues here. The first is that dominant discourse is the taken-for-granted, the 'normal' and the established, while the avant garde has a relativizing and estranging effect, is subversive of normality, and is heterodox. The latter strives to be sovereign, but in fact takes on alien elements of the dominant in its attempt to overcome them, to impose on them silence or radical meaning. Similarly, the dominant has to expend energy on absorbing or extinguishing the avant garde; or simply doing nothing thus confirming dominance. Whatever the dynamics, the dominant and the avant garde, the normal and the heterodox, are symbiotic.

The second issue is the correlation of the discourse and practices of teacher education with the emergence of a new economic order, social life and culture, the postindustrail, semiotic or corporatist society. The concepts of dominant and avant garde may be read as having a periodizing function such that dominant and avant garde may be seen as different responses to these conditions. We subscribe to Wexler's (1986) view that realist theory and practice is better characterized as a transitional stage, developed as it was from the socio-cultural-political upheavals of the 1960-70's and the reformulation of social theory in that period. Nevertheless, we will argue that the practices and theory of realist teacher education, reflecting the dynamics of the symbiosis between the dominant and the avant garde noted earlier, have been rapidly incorporated into the dominant field. Its central tenet, school-based experience, is now in our view the critical motor for dominant teacher education forms and content.

There are some immediately apparent ambiguities facing teaching education in such a scenario. They turn first on the relationships between the production of knowledge in teacher education institutions, and their object of interest, schooling (teachers, students and so on). Second, they profoundly affect the organization of courses and the kinds of knowledge they purport to produce. Central to both issues is the understanding that teacher education practices are involved in the production of schooling, and indeed, the production of society as R. Connell et al. (1982) point out, including the kinds of social conditions we ennumerated earlier. The work of teacher educators should then be apprehended as a form of cultural politics in which 'truth' about schools and teaching is produced and contested; that they have political and economic as well as educational roles to play. Critics of schooling as 'quasi-reproductive' institutions and of teacher education as an homologous set of practices would agree (See Wood, 1984).

What we wish to underscore however is that the outcomes of teacher education practices are both intentional and unintentional in the sense that programs are implemented that address some of the 'real' issues mentioned earlier and which endeavor to create reflective and critical teachers. At the same time, such programs produce the kinds of knowledge that allows for managing the easy transition of cohorts of new teachers into the already existing but changing schools for a corporatist order. We begin this task by a discussion of the concept of 'practicality', a central tenet of dominant teacher education practice.

The discourse of 'practicality'

The discourse of practicality does not exhaust what might be said about teacher education, teaching or teachers, nor is it an internally coherent, uncontested, consistent depiction of what teachers or teacher educators do. Rather, it is in our view,

an important signifying practice that functions metonymically to cue teacher education subjects to the already known and to mobilize a sense of the past associated with teaching for teacher educators. Our purpose in drawing attention to it though is to show how the discourse of practicality delimits what can be said about teaching and teachers while providing the dialogic space for making other kinds of statements drawn from other discourses.

'Practicality' privileges teacher work in the labor process of teaching. A host of papers have identified the major elements of teacher work as those concerned with the immediate,the particular, the concerete conditions and events in classrooms. In this perspective, teachers are primarily involved in routinized and typical, if unpredictable, events. There are two sides of the teacher's 'problematic'. One is captured by metaphors such as survival strategy, practicality ethic and public servant role. These metaphors construct teaching as constrained by always already exigencies of organizational structures such as time, teacher/pupil ratio and the need for control. It is then a relatively short step to the conclusion that teacher's work is determined, whether 'mediated' or not, by the peculiarities of the segmented labor market of teaching, by the political and economic structures of which education is a component. Practicality in this representation of teaching and teachers is evidence that teacher work is 'framed', so that the theories of reproduction 'work' and that education fulfills the functions of an ideological state apparatus.

The other side of the teacher's problematic is the proposal that while 'frames' indeed 'define an operational space for planning and subsequent actions taken by teachers and students', the uses of that space depend on ideas about teaching and knowledge, perceptions of constraints, and possible courses of action (Kallos and Lundgren, 1979). Teachers are thus invested with the freedom to act autonomously, and the focus is placed on the complexity of what teachers do (See for example R. Connell, 1983). But the routines and practicalities of dealing with the complexity take on a new meaning. The

strategies of coping are redefined as a proactive resource and a technology (Pollard, 1980). Classroom work becomes a skilled management of insoluble dilemmas by teachers whose roles are those of brokers of contradictory interests (Lampert, 1985). Teachers' personal practical knowledge is lit up as a special form of expertise, the recognition of which is seen as a way of enhancing the professional status of teaching (Clandinin, 1985). Moreover, the production and use of such knowledge is located theoretically in the objective relations of teaching rather than in the discourses about teaching that characterize the scholarly journals, curriculum guides, and especially teacher education programs (See Westbury, 1983). Olsen (1984) proposes that teachers know how to do teaching and what they know is 'embedded in their know how.' The routines of teaching thus become the 'highest expression' of what teachers know how to do. Teacher practice, teaching, becomes what teachers do, and the truth-claim is that the judgements about the practice are internal to the practicality of doing classroom work. Thus, practicality is an attempt to redeem the work of teachers in itself and as a site for contesting the oppression of the social and political order and the imposition of experts.

The contractions of practicality

The discourse of practicality raises a number of difficulties for teacher education programs as they are presently organized[4] in relation to what they do and their relationships with schools. In brief, the argument is simple. By redeeming teacher work and privileging practicality as the foundation on which teacher education programs are authorized, the effect is to simultaneously de-authorize teacher education as a practice and to 'professionalize' teacher culture within social theory. Some trends in teacher education practices signal this phenomenon. We discuss two of these before drawing some conclusions.

The first difficulty we wish to highlight as fundamental is what might be called the 'reality effect' (Hall, 1985). This is the

presupposition that the discourse and practices of teacher education are ineluctably directed by the 'real' practices and processes of schools, and ought to be. For many teacher educators such an assumption carries the weight of common-sense. What is wrong with this kind of claim is that it fails to account for the ways in which 'reality' itself is produced by the regime of truth that is constructed by the discursive practices of teacher educators, researchers and teachers. That is, the materiality of teaching is not in question: what we query are the ways in which researchers and teacher educators produce knowledge about and act in accord with it.

Consider the characteristic elements of practicality briefly sketched earlier, and the use made of them by teacher educators. Pre-service and in-service programs typically strive for authenticity by undertaking 'realistic' activities that increase a teacher's repertoire; that are 'craft-legitimate' for practitioners; that require a minimum of back-up resources; that have rapid pay-off in the classroom and so on (See Huberman, 1985). All of these reference the already known, what everybody common-sensically knows. In addition, the 'real' world of classrooms and teacher work defined by the practices of teachers, is articulated with a theoretical discourse about the importance, centrality or inescapability of those activites, significantly referred to as being 'realist'. The general point is that the mutual effects of the already-known and the discourses about it is such that 'reality' is, now, the previously established effects between them, rather than a pregiven entity that exists beyond the discourses of either teacher education or teachers. This is not to argue that the concept of practicality causes teachers to be 'practical', but to point to the symbiotic productive relationship between campus and schools that creates what teacher educators then refer to, and act in accord with, as real.

An important effect of discourse about the real is the differentiation between appropriate and inappropriate conceptions of teaching that seems obvious on the basis of an appeal to the 'truth' and credibility of practicality. 'Practicality' is of course always open to dis-articulation and transformation by

other conceptions of teaching and teacher work. Nevertheless, the 'practicality' concept draws its legitimacy from a collective professional belief in its value. Like the conventional meaning of art, practicality' would be nothing without the whole tradition...and without the universe of celebrants and believers who give it meaning and value in terms of that tradition' (Bourdieu, 1985: 137).

The reality effect profoundly shapes on-campus teacher education 'teaching' programs by calling into question the very point of on-campus courses about teaching. Teacher education programs are in principle motivated by an anticipated later effect-'good' teaching or some variant on that theme, and on-campus course and simulations are directed at that end. For instructors, usually former teachers, important elements of their personal identity are tied to experitse in the folklore of teaching and their charisma as (former) school practitioners. But they are left with re-inventing a sense of the past, with plagiarizing older plots and narratives to tell stories about teaching, but the realization that 'teaching' has already been invented (Jameson, 1985) by the discourse of practicality. 'Teaching' on-campus becomes a metaphor of reality in schools (Smith, 1979), and as such, crucially gets by without the referents associated with consumerism and the corporatist society, while sustaining them; that is, beyond history.

A good deal of theory about teaching reinforces this tendency. During the 1970's interpretive/hermeneutic social theory was articulated with elements of anthropoligical culturalism in an attempt to displace the dominance of positivistic psychological models of teaching and learning. The success of that movement and the consequent interest in the ecology of teaching and learning reinforces the discourse of practicality and the (un)-reality of on-campus courses about teaching whose referents and unity lie in the temporal and spatially distant site, schools. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that student-teachers, whose subjectivities are progressively re-produced by course work that normalizes practicality, and by school 'experience' during practicums,

recognize and are frustrated by courses about teaching which are the image of an image (Jameson, 1985) of practicality.

The second major difficulty is that the discourse of practicality, curiously, de-emphasizes pedagogical work as productive. We illustrate what we mean by returning to Olsen's work cited earlier. We do not criticize his work for its internal consistency or for misrepresenting the 'facts'. Rather we argue that it is representative of a genre of story-telling[5] about teaching that is bound by the reality-effect as constituted by the regime of truth about teaching.

It will be recalled that Olsen argues that teachers' teaching strategies are embedded in their know how. He also argues that 'if we want to study teacher practice—what teachers know how to do, we have to observe what they do'; and 'not "thinking" about teaching does not stop teachers from efficient practice'. These statements are made in the course of a critique of technocratic information processing models of teaching, and we agree with their intent. Nevertheless, we have serious reservations about them.

In the first place, we have argued that the concept of practicality is part of the definition of what it means to be practical. The discourse of practicality demarcates other discourses so that what counts as being intelligible in that discourse becomes the criterion for judging other claims. Olsen's position lends weight to the idea that what teachers do is 'teaching' and the criteria for judging the doing are internal to the practices. His notion of efficient practice then begs the question of what might constitute it, because the criteria for determining efficient (good etc.) teaching are already set in what teachers do. There is little to be gained by laboring the point that the political implications of this position force opposing views to establish their intelligibility according to the criteria that favor the dominant (natural) claim (Henriques, et al., 1984). Moreover, the position is an exemplar of the kinds of mechanisms described earlier in which teaching-cum-practicality becomes a timeless image cut off from the contemporary associations that produce its meaning now. Teacher practice,

teaching, becomes what teachers do and the truth-claim is that judgements about that practice are internal to the practicality of doing classroom work. The real danger is that pedagogy is undervalued in favor of instrumental teaching procedures that 'work', regardless of their (known) effects. The social (schooling) is postponed as an object of interest on the grounds of more pressing needs.

In the second place, by emphasizing the apparent producer of teaching, the teacher, as especially important (the interpretive/hermeneutic turn in social theory), Olsen's view suppresses the issue of what authorizes the producer (Bourdieu, 1985; 133). We have argued that the co-articulated discourses and practices of teacher education and teacher work accomplish this taks. In contrast, Olsen's practicality perspective leaves open the possiblity of misrecognizing teaching practices as the production by an individual teacher rather than as an effect of the system of objective relations which constitute teaching, the struggles of which it is the site, and the form of capital that is generated there (See Bourdieu, 1985). In this respect, the kind of 'thinking' about teaching that is available in the discourses of teachers is not inconsequential if it remains ignorant of, unfeeling about or accepting of the political outcomes of teaching practices. It is again but a short step to a view of teaching that is instrumental and technique-centered, and in which the signifying practices of schooling remain transparent. Teaching would then be apprehended as a kind of a priori set of activities which teachers do in order to distribute knowledge. Of course student (pupil) subjectivities are important in such a scenario but only as adjuncts to teaching, as hurdles to be cleared if learning (i.e., transmission) is to occur. Pedagogy as the engagement of learner, teacher and knowledge is assumed, but is productivity is denied. Donald (1985: 245), discussing hierarchically ordered forms of knowledge that are made available in schools puts it thus:

> ...this symbolic organization also generates a network of subject position in relation to these hierarchies—it defines what it is to be educated, cultivated, discrimi-

> nating, clever, literate and so forth. It therefore differentiates not only between forms of knowledge but also between people. And it also makes it possible for this system of differentiation to be presented not in terms of social conflict and antagonism. but as the natural consequence of the psychological and intellectual attitudes of the people who occupy those subject positions...

Finally, the discourse of practicality so common-sensically self-evident and eternal, is inherently political because in staking a claim to truth to which all other claims must subscribe if they are to be credible, it extinguishes heresies. To this extent, the struggle around what schooling and teacher education are about, like that over literacy (Giroux, in press), is part of a wider struggle for control over the knowledge, values and social practices of an emergent society. But in doing so it largely fails to recognize the changed circumstances of its theory and practice. In particular, the very theoretical insights that informed the school-based movement and much action-research in teaching, devised in the defense of teachers against the domination of 'experts', have now become a device to redefine knowledge production and consumption in teacher education. Interpretive and hermeneutic theory has helped to shape the representation of pre-service teacher education so that campus inputs have been absorbed into the schools and the former consist of little more than supervisory and administrative functions that facilititate the credentialling of teachers. This, together with the collapse of history into the present and the redefinition of reality into images in the discourse of practicality, leaves power/knowledge relationships unrecognized. Thus, by establishing the limits of the sayable, the discourse of practicality allows the imperatives of the public policy to remain as 'the unsaid to be said without being uttered', that is, without the speakers of it (i.e., teachers, school administrators, and teacher educators etc.) 'taking responsibility, for the enunciation of the message' (Frow 1986: 78). Teaching is consequently profoundly deracinated as it becomes more intense. The discourse of practicality is to this extent an effect, a symptom, of the post industrial society that ignores the political, economic, and social implications of schooling and the part played by teacher education as a site of knowledge production in that field.

The avant garde agenda

The collective belief in maintaining schooling as it is provides both the strength of discourses of teacher education and the field of struggle over alternative visions of what teaching is as a concept. The most interesting counter-dominant ideas of avant garde work turn on the notion of 'transformation'. This concept centers on the relationships between public schools, culture, and society in the present, and the ambivalent situations in which schools, students, teachers and teacher-educators find themselves. Transformation is both a visionary project and praxis. The intent of the concept is to register the conviction that schooling ought, and can be part of an on-going struggle for the restoration and maintenance of 'public spheres' and democracy (Giroux, 1985). To this end, transformation focuses on the purposes of schooling and the self/social empowerment of individuals and groups.

What the avant garde have in mind is that public education has lost sight of the responsibility to shape and reflect democratic social forms and the production of an active, critical citizenry. Their critiques of education expose the policy shifts in public education in recent years that have displaced a concern for equity and social justice in favor of schools modelled on the 'company store', instrumentally linked with economic modes of production (Giroux and MacLaren, 1986). Their analyses point to the dominant orthodoxies of educational practice in the 1980's—technicism, standardization, competency and narrow performance skills—that have well-documented effects such as: systematic marginalization of large numbers of students; intensification and deskilling of teacher work; centralization of control over curriculum; increased bureaucratic control and surveillance of teachers and

students. In short, the avant garde provides penetrating insights into the processes of schooling for a corporatist society.

In contrast to the profession which defines teaching as what teachers do and defends the logic on constrained practical action and its outcomes, the avant garde is concerned to reconstruct schooling for a different set of future ends. First, it should take a clear moral and ethical stand and this is usually tied to the standpoint of the victims of any society as the starting point for the critique of that society. Teacher education in this perspective should be concerned with

> ...which educational, moral and political commitments ought to guide our work in the field rather than with the practice of merely dwelling on which procedures and organizational arrangements will most effectively help us realize tacit and often unexamined ends...(Zeichner, 1983).

Second, teacher education programs should be based on a form of 'cultural politics' that uses social, cultural, political and economic dimensions as the 'primary categories' for understanding contemporary schooling (Giroux and MacLaren, 1986). The intent of such a curriculum is to make explicit the 'sociocultural dimension of the schooling forces', including the productive role of language in defining a way of life; the relationships between power and knowledge; the empowerment of students, the study of student cultures and history and alternative teaching practices. Significantly, there is a far greater emphasis on pedagogy as a category rather than teaching, to which we return in a subsequent part of this paper. A critical element cutting across all of these is the re-articulation of the language of domination into a language of possibility, vision and hope (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1987). In short, the agenda is that of preparing teachers who are willing and able (Zeichner and Liston, 1987) to fight against repression on the basis of their own expertise, and who are 'free from unwarranted control of unjustified beliefs, unsupportable attitudes and the paucity of abilities which prevent that person from completely taking charge of his or her life' (Siegel cited in

Zeichner and Liston, 1987). Such a teacher, capable of intelligent reflection on the social and knowledge and self, and attentive to the possiblities of human agency, is designated a transformative or resisting intellectual (Wexler, 1985; Giroux, 1986: Arnonowitz and Giroux, 1987).

There are many criticisms that have been made of the avant garde (McNeil, 1981; Sharp, 1982), and more that can be made. There is a strong tendency in this work to confuse discourse about convictions for the future with strategies for proceeding in the present. We do not wish to dwell on these, but instead take up the possibility that student teachers might indeed be prepared so that they possess the visions of the avant garde. Let us then assume closure on the avant garde agenda as contesting the discourse of practicality and concentrate on what it might mean for teacher education programs.

Changing consciousness and constructing affinities: an avant garde pre-requisite

We begin this task with Clandinin's (1985) reporting of a teacher's image of her classroom as a 'home' and its emotional and moral dimensions. Stephanie's moral views, Clandinin reports, were not neutral, but provided a 'judgemental standard for her practices'. For Stephanie, a classroom 'should be like a home and both a classroom and a home should have certain features'[6]. Similarly, Veeman (1985) reviews research that shows 'progressive' young teachers, despite having difficulties with their superiors, their colleagues and in the classroom, 'had more permanent innovative attitudes' than their more 'conservative' peers. Both these progressive teachers and Stephanie in other words possess representations with which they are able, contra Olsen, to think about what they do and which over-ride the exigencies which are routinely said to shape teachers' practices. We cite these instances simply to underscore the fact that the orthodox research literature already contains examples of how teachers use knowledge positions that are politcal in their effects and to make the point that potentially counter-dominant practice is not all that rare.

Yet this is the single element of teachers' practice that is typically denied in teacher education. The professional discourses that constitute what is objectivity and define the political as 'bias', or more usually for liberals, as 'emotive', leaves student-teachers 'free' to individually decide what the texts of schooling and course-work mean (See Henriques et al., 1984; Richards, 1986). Where, as we have argued, the dominant regime of truth is that of practicality and the emphasis is often directed at the 'problems' of beginning teachers, the overlapping texts set formidable (but not insurmountable) limits to what can be read from them. In our view, it is the knowledge position, the moral and ethical bases for doing teaching at all, that teacher-educators need to be clear about. A serious implication of this position is that it necessitates the active auto-ethnography of teacher education in the contemporary world and an intentional focus on why it is like it is, rather than on how it can better fit is apparently there today.

The root assumption of this possiblity is that avant garde teacher education programs are uncompromising in their intent that beginning teachers recognize themselves as resisting intellectuals in both new discourses about schooling which lay claim to knowledge and in alternative practices. Given what has been said so far in this paper, such knowledge and practice must intend to produce challenges to dominant definitions, explanations and practices in the consciousness of student-teachers. The ontology of such transformative work lies in the cultural materials a student brings to teaching and the experiences sui generis which enable them to recognize themselves in what Alberoni (1984: 20-21) calls an 'alternative interpretation of reality' or the nascent state.

> *The nascent state is an exploration of the limits of the possible within a given type of social system, in order to maximize the portion of experiences and solidarity which is realizable for oneself and for others at a specific historical moment* (italics in the original).

Alberoni argues that the nascent state emerges because of the coincidence of certain complex structural pre-conditions and

can be provoked by the deliberate intervention of 'missionaries, agents, or agitators'. The former are those circumstances where single persons and collectivities experience authentic contradictions and discontinuities between everyday and institutional life (schools for instance) and what they desire, so that the former become intolerable. Thus,

> ...What is a rebel?...what does he mean by saying "no"? He means, for instance, that "this has been going on too long", "so far but no further", "you are going too far", or again "there are certain limits beyond which you shall not go". In other words, his "no" affirms the existence of a borderline...(Camus cited in Alberoni, 1984: 53).

This is the 'fundamental experience', in which it is likely that regions of subjectivity are changed so that previously disconnected elements of knowledge and emotions are (re-) synthesized while some existing connections disintegrate. The restructuring of fields of experience oriented to new ends—liberation, enlightenment, self determination—is the basis for a shared affinity on the part of participants and which sets them apart. But the concept of the nascent state captures 'the *direct experience* of transcending everyday existence' (Alberoni, 1984: 31, emphasis added) rather than the utopian sense of only believing in the future perfectibility of institutions.

In Alberoni's view, the nascent state is more likely to occur in persons and groups whose social location lies between the privileged and the exploited, a position sometimes attributed to teachers. In any case, the nascent state provides an analogue and a necessary prerequisite for the intentions of the educational avant garde. If the concept is to contribute to the visionary agenda of the avant garde in teacher education, it brings with it a number of implications which we briefly explore.

Hope and transformative practice: the need for a new settlement

The achievement of the nascent state in teacher education is heavily dependent on creating the threshold conditions for it,

and pedagogical strategies are central to those conditions. by this we mean that the teacher education discourses of the avant garde are by definition produced in criticism of existing social conditions, in social theories that appropriate the status of 'truth' for their knowledge, and in the ways teaching is conducted and learning is actualized. Those discources though need to be more than *about* critical issues or critical pedagogy, or indeed about possibilities. They need to shape and critically inform the knowledge position that is being used in them while enabling student teachers to engage with their own and their students' subject positions and schooling. For the avant garde (and we suspect for many mainstream teacher-educators), the essential 'problem' is one of the adequacy of theorizing teaching, learning etc. in general 'without a consciousness of the conditions which produce, negotiate, transform, realize and return it *in practice.*' (Lusted, 1986: 3). This is why so much of dominant practice is caught in a history which it is unable to interpret, and why teacher education is a strategic site: its potential for liberationary educational work has not yet been fulfilled.

There are in our view two starting points for the development of a progressive pedagogy in teacher education that draw on Alberoni's insights and provide substance for an avant garde agenda. The first are the cultural materials that students bring with them, their multiple subjectivities.

In order to provide an example of the kinds of cultural materials we have in mind, science and mathematics graduates in particular can be identified (Smith and Saches in press) as recognizing themselves in discourses that implicitly rank knowledge in hierarchical order, although it would be a mistake to limit this observation to them alone or to their discipline knowledge. Concomitantly, many teacher-education students frequently have a strong instrumental understanding of 'education' and what it means to be 'taught' and to 'teach' so that undergoing a teacher education program is '*on condition* that it does not undermine or weaken or challenge the boundaries between 'private' and 'public' subjectivity' (Richards, 1986: 75,

emphasis in the original). Williamson (1985: 92), discussing the effects of prior education on students, takes up the point in these terms:

> ...many of them have experienced their entire education hitherto as some kind of external structure which makes either less or more assault on them, and which in almost *every* case, has made them feel that 'ideas' and 'complexities' and 'abstractions' are somehow weapons used *against* them, not tools for their own use.

This student identity issue can be evaluated pedagogically as a 'problem' of ill-informed students that must be corrected or as evidence that students have different combinations of class, gender, race age, and biography. Some combinations of the latter are more sensitive to scrutiny by teachers or lecturers (Lusted, 1986: 6), and in teacher education programs, the latter alternative is likely, given the liminal nature of the 'student-teacher' status (Smith, 1979).

The second starting point is an awareness of the mode, tenor and content of *specific* teacher education programs. Conventional arrangements are frequently divisive in the sense that they fragment knowledge, replicate existing school social relations in their form (i.e., they look and feel like 'school' programs), and provide little in the way of structural or intellectual coherence. While acknowledging that student knowledge is produced in the mutual interaction of teacher, knowledge and student, rather than in the intentions of instructors, the conditions in which it is produced in teacher education programs affect the possibilities for transofrmative work. In particular, as Connell (1983) has pointed out, work in a radical enclave such as a social foundations subject within an unsympathetic structure, is unlikely to provide the conditions for the transformation of student consciousness and action. Indeed, such enclaves may work in reverse, reinforcing and reproducing the very beliefs and practices that they critique because their institutional status is pre-given in the discourse of practicality. The 'voice' of a teacher education program,

namely its preferred messages, then needs to be generative, rather than merely supportive of, a critical and adventurous pedagogy and politics. We see little room for compromise on this issue.

The doing of avant garde teacher education is a pedagogical problem that has two main objectives, namely re-contextualizing the reality of schooling and realizing a counter-dominant practice.

The first objective is captured by Terdiman's (185:68) interdependent concepts of re/citation and de/citation: surrounding the dominant discourse in order to 'neutralize or explode it' and excluding or expunging it respectively. Central to the first concept is the relativizing of personal experience in schools. The object is to recover, make explicit, what is constitutive of personal and group representations of schooling that student-teachers have in order to question what is thought of as boundaries between the 'individual' and the 'social'. Both the representations and their attributed sources are thus made available for analysis by those who have produced them.

The task should be extended into the cultures of school students, parents and teachers so that further comparison between representations are established. The use of structured ethnographic-like field experiences make available narratives from a variety of voices that make up culture as field of struggle for the production of knowledge, including of course the discourses of education. The face-to-face investment of social self in such exercises is an important source of insight into one's own and others' presuppositions and is a part of the continuing process of identity making.

The kind of analysis of such cultural materials that is undertaken is crucial. We take Lusted's (1986: 9-10) point that it is essential to avoid closing the analysis around an assumption that people are manipulated and 'inevitably positioned' by the practices of schools discerned by school critics, that there is a simple correspondence between a particular type of discourse and extra-discursive reality (Belsey, 1980). Such a course Lusted argues 'neither brooks dissent nor appeals to the possiblity of debate with it'. Instead he recommends 'open ended and specific pedagogies' that account for context and difference, the social position of the group and the individuals within it.

Nevertheless, the kind of social theory that is adequate (facilitates the avant garde agenda) is not infinitely open-ended because the agenda, to reiterate, contests the discourse of practicality and requires moral and ethical judgements. Such theory, discursively produced in the process of conflict between discourses, must lead *in principle* to understandings about the concepts being used and the representations they imply or evoke about themselves and other representations. Fundamentally they must provide the (provisional) *means to think with* (Richards: 1986: 77) that simultaneously enhances the 'this has been going on too long' syndrome while providing a range of acceptable and possible options. This would seem to be the major pre-requisite of Terdiman's second concept, expunging the dominant discourse, and creating the conditions for an alternative reality.

There is a necessary second condition about which the avant garde literature seems curiously silent, but is central to the direct experience component of the nascent state. It is the concern with curriculum content and teaching strategies of the conventional teacher education field, glossed as 'curriculum' or 'teaching' studies. If the avant garde is to expunge the dominant discourse of practicality with its instrumental recipes and techniques of teaching, then it too needs an alternative curriculum and teaching *practice* that is consistent with its social critiques and which transcends the reality of the discourse of practicality[7].

The modes of resistance used by student=teachers to mystifying 'theory', and to domination by 'irrelevant' (foundations) courses, include a desire for immediate resolutions to the 'problems' and temporal proximity of beginning to teach. While such resistance is a symptom of the dominant discourse of practicality, experiences in a revamped teacher education program and radical theorizing alone is unlikely to expunge

such a tradition.

An avant grade teacher education program then requires an organic relationship with schools and teachers, but on its *own* terms[8]. That is, it needs to incorporate 'curriculum' studies on-campus and provide school-based exemplars of practice that embody the same principles that underlie the program; the direct experience of transcending everyday school life. Only then can avant garde teacher education produce its stories of hope on the experiential basis of hope-full teaching in hope-filled classrooms, of which there are many. The expectation of student-teachers in this vision of the practicality ethic would be to explore the 'normal' alternative of professional work provided by the school-campus link.

As a teacher-educator and a school teacher, the authors can think of a no more subversive move in the present teacher-education scene because it would unify the mission of teacher education programs and dissolve the differences between avant garde theoretical enclaves and work in schools. There seems little likelihood of such an eventuality without a struggle to forge links with the teaching profession and to re-formulate policy at the institutional levels. The centrality of education policy studies and teacher edcuation as political practice is thus confirmed.

Endnotes

1. By 'discourse' we refer to a regulated system of statements that establish differences between let us say 'teacher education' and 'law' and between different forms of teacher education theory such as psychological and sociological. Discourse is not simply words but is embodied in the practices of institutions, patterms of behavior and in forms of pedagogy. By 'dominant' discourse we wish to register the concept that the dominant 'is the discourse whose presence is defined by *the social impossibility of its absence*' (Terdiman, 1985: 61, italics in original).

2. By 'avant garde' we wish to register the notion of opposition between the primacy of producers and the primacy of market-

ings in the economy of teacher production; a distinction between newcomers and those who dominate. The avant garde is the voice of counter-dominance in the field of teacher education. See Bourdieu (1985) for an elaboration of this in the field of art.

3. Genre refers to the normatively structured sets of formal, contextual and thematic features or rules that are characteristic of ways of speaking in particular situations. As social practices, they produce what is taken to be "proper" meaning, appropriate speech and action, in particular settings. Rules in this sense are selection principles that govern the content and processes of social settings; the relations of power and solidarity between speakers; and the semantic medium. These Frow (1986: 68) refers to as field, tenor and mode respectively. Every text participates in one or several genres while not being irreducibly identified with any one. Thus, realist pedagogic discourse is fundamentally a set of principles for embedding and relating discourses, a "principle" of de-locating an element of discourse from its substantive practice and re-locating it according to the genre's own principle of selective re-ordering, the original discourse becomes an "imaginary" subject, signifying something other than itself, while pedagogic discourse remains a re-contextualizing principle, a genre. Speakers/writers/readers enter discourse by way of the subject positions pre-supposed by these principles in the structure of the genre. But, the kind and degree of the implicit pre-suppositions given by field and tenor, are always connected to other discourses so that discourse can be described as "a play of voices" (Frow, 1986: 159).

4. We draw on Australia experience here.

5. What we mean by this that the sign, in this case the truth of the *meaning of teaching* lying in teacher practice, is the story told about it by Olsen. That is, the truth of Olsen's propositions lie in his *narrative production about* practicality rather than in

teacher work as a pre-existing object. See Terdiman (1982).

6. The authors do not necessarily agree with the ideological accents of this metaphor.

7. To reiterate, the business-as-usual of conventional classrooms is part of the definition of the nascent state as it is being employed here. Avant garde teacher educators, if they are to be successful agitators, require that their discourses of hope and transformation be returned in the practice of student-teachers.

8. The practicum in Australia is more often than not incorporated by schools so that what is done may or may not realize what curriculum studies and foundations courses intend. Avant garde theory is particularly disadvantaged in such a setting because it is apprehended as impractical. Perhaps the key strategic issue for the avant garde in teacher education is the forming of alliances with schools so that collaborative practicums can become the 'normal' experience.

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Curriculum and Textuality

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Introduction

Post-structuralist perspectives, as evidenced in the work of Foucault (1970, 1972, 1979), Derrida (1982), Reiss (1980), and Said (1975, 1983) among others, developed as a response to and an elaboration of neo-Marxist theory. In the curriculum field, the influence of these theorists is beginning to be felt (see Bowers, 1980, 1987; Cherryholmes, 1985, 1987; Elbaz and Elbaz, 1981). In the present article we explore some of the implications for curriculum of post-structuralist perspectives, by looking at a study of autobiography and using it to examine conceptions of subjectivity and textuality as these impinge on curriculum.

We will begin with a number of working definitions of terms which will be used in the subsequent analysis. Our treatment of these terms will be extremely brief, the minimum necessary to orientate the reader, since we believe the terms and the approach itself can best be understood and their fruitfulness evaluated in contexts of use.

The term "discourse" is taken to mean "a particular use of language, of a system of signs that acts to put in order a 'signified' taken as in some way different from itself" (Reiss, 1980, p.2). The term refers, thus, to a dialectical process of sign production, where production is taken to mean both the process of production and the product; that is, the sign (the curriculum) is dialectically both the product and the producer of the subject. The sign puts in order, renders meaningful, both its signified and its subject, the speaker of the discourse. Discourse here refers to a widened field of interest: the scope of discursive analysis encompasses popular fiction, political

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pronouncements, journalism, advertising, fashion, sport, gesture (body language), as well as academic writing (the discourse of geography or of chemistry).

The historical scope of discursive analysis is reflected in the term "episteme", posited by Foucault; it refers to "an accumulation of discourses whose particular process of producing meaning characterizes a socio-cultural domain at a given time and place." (Reiss, 1980, p. 2) Such epistemes are relatively durable and slow to change even allowing for Foucault's notion of "coupure" or rupture between one episteme and the next. The current episteme, which Reiss terms the "analytico-referential", began in the 16th century and is only now giving way to a new episteme whose forms and limits cannot yet be clearly discerned.

The concept of "text" (seen in opposition to the "work" viewed as a definable object enclosing meaning and therefore given to interpretation) refers to what Barthes (1979) termed a 'methodological field'; unlike the 'work' viewed as a finished product with clear-cut parameters and an exhaustible content, the 'text' is a discursive activity, a production in language, in the materiality of which meaning arises. Further, the 'text' is plural, not in the sense that it encloses a plurality of meanings (as the ideology of pluralism would hold) but insofar as it exists in ongoing multiple relations to other texts (what can be termed 'intertextuality'). That is, the text (the sign, the curriculum), is a permutational, ever-mobile space, and within this text a multiplicity of utterances or discursive events criss-cross and interpenetrate one another.

> The Text is plural; it is not coexistence of meanings but passage, traversal; thus it answers not to an interpretation, liberal though it may be, but to an explosion, a dissemination. (Barthes, 1979, p. 76)

> The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a network...The book is not simply the object that one holds in one's hands; and it cannot remain within the little parallelepiped that contains it: its unity is variable and relative. As soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse. (Foucault, 1972, p. 23)

In pursuing the implications of the post-structuralist perspective, two issues serve as jumping-off points for our thinking through the basic notion of curriculum as textuality: 1) the conceptions of truth and fiction, and other basic distinctions which are uncovered by the opposition of work and 'text'; and 2) the conception of subjectivity which underlies the text. We will first illustrate these issues by drawing on an analysis of one particular genre, autobiography. We will then take up the two issues in turn, drawing out curricular connections and implications where we find them; we will be looking at implications on various levels, with respect to curriculum inquiry and criticism as well as specific curricular practices.

We base our argument on an analysis of autobiography first because autobiography as a genre is particularly useful in illuminating the issues identified above, and second because autobiographical writing has become pertinent both to the methodology of curriculum criticism (Pinar, 1981; Pinar and Grumet, 1976), and also to the recent interest in teacher biography (Butt and Raymond 1985; Connelly & Clandinin, 1984).

Lessons from Autobiography: Subjectivity and Genre

> We call autobiography the retrospective prose account which someone gives of his or her own existence, with an emphasis on the author's individual life and especially on the history of his or her personality. (Lejeune, 1971, p. 14)

> About six weeks ago Gertrude Stein said, it does not

> look to me as if you were ever going to write that autobiography. You know what I am going to do. I am going to write it for you. I am going to write as simply as Defoe did the autobiography of Robinson Crusoe. And she has and this is it. (Stein, 1953, 1960, p. 252)

The first statement tells us with irreproachable clarity that autobiography is a narrative similar to other narratives; it develops linearly from a to n, following a temporal sequence the logic of which is retrospective. The autobiographer always tells the story of a past and, within that past, the linear development of one's "own existence": what belongs to, or is owned by, the author alone, 'the history of one's personality'— a central core which is self-consistent over time. This statement constitutes a definition of autobiography along classic lines: it assumes the existence of a given and knowable empirical reality, and further assures us that the author of the autobiographic text is in a position of 'authority' with respect to a particular segment of that reality— his or her own life. Further, the details of this life are to be served up to us as essentially separate from other lives, as having a history and independent existence apart from the lives of other persons.

The second passage appears more difficult to grasp; it offers no firm moorings, much less a clear definition of autobiography. But on inspection it proves to deal with the same issues as the first statement, and to offer us an equally consistent, if radically different, view of autobiography. The first point to be noted is that the passage reads like a *preamble* to the 'autobiography" of Alice B. Toklas; the reader expects it to end with a colon, and be followed by the text of the autobiography. In fact it comes at the end of the text. Why? Stein is telling us that the beginning coincides with the end and the end with the beginning. The text cannot be completed and it is therefore suspended. The reader must, then, go to the beginning— which is the end— for autobiography (like fiction) is an act of ceaseless renewal: the story is never "told" finally, exhaustively, completely. The story of a life cannot be laid out in full detail from beginning to end; the significance of that life cannot be exhausted in a single narrative.

The second point to be made about this passage is that it embodies a gap between writing and speaking: the discourse is spoken by a voice which is other than that of the writing agent. The writing "I"— Gertrude Stein— speaks with the voice of a third person, the "she" of Alice B. Toklas. The story of Gertrude Stein, her autobiography, is Toklas. This mediation teaches us that the consistency and continuity of the "I" are mystifications: I am not the same person I was yesterday or ten years ago; given my relational nature, I cannot be writing my autobiography but the story of a series of old personae seen from a distance.

The third point follows directly: this third person, this mediator, is ultimately a fiction. *Robinson Crusoe*, a fiction written by Daniel Defoe, is to Gertrude Stein the autobiography of Robinson Crusoe (whose ontological status is fictional) as written by Daniel Defoe. And the autobiography of Robinson Crusoe coincides with the autobiography of Alice B. Toklas in that both are fictions: they are both appropriations of selfhood through fictive voices. The question, then, is not whether the "third person" coincides with the writing "I" of the autobiographer, as the passage by Lejeune above claims, but rather— what does this third person (or series of persons), in defying the myth of continuity, tells us about the world, and what subjectivity does it incarnate in its relationship to the world?

Thus autobiography cannot allow for that act of making present the self which the classic view of Lejeune's definition proposes. Since it is a fiction, it can only inhibit such presence. Like fiction, autobiography can only be a beginning, a ceaseless beginning (Said, 1983), because that is all there is, because consciousness in its temporal division, in its process of contradiction and negation, allows for beginnings only, for what cannot be completed. And the completion of autobiography— or biography, or history, or any other narrative— is posited within the discursive reality, a feature of the language we have available for talking about the self. Yet completeness is not a natural phenomenon: time is divisive, by definition.

Beginnings, then, make for the suspension of the text and reject any notion of completion or finality; the text is in essence a ceaseless process of production of meaning. And this concept relates within the same ideological configuration to the notion of mediation: the text "begins" through the voice of a third party because language accommodates the "other" by adopting the voice of another in its movement towards meaning. This process of mediation in turn erases the differentiation between autobiography and fiction; because possession of self is, like the completeness of a narrative of self, a feature of our discourse, a myth, one can only possess an "other". [1]

From this discussion of autobiography we can move on in a number of directions to a discussion of curriculum. First, the study of autobiography as truth, as a making present of the personality of its author and subject, contrasted to the view of autobiography as a fictional 'appropriation of selfhood' raises questions about the concept of genre itself and about the nature and position of the lines which demarcate this and other genres. What counts as truth or fiction, and why, are issues of significance for the study of language and literature in particular, but of even more significance for the study of texts in a wider sense. If indeed we view a text as something which "constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse", what follows for teaching which is centrally concerned with texts? Second, the examination of autobiography as a formal structure which treats of the self can be generalized to other formal structures in which subjectivity plays a role—in our case, curriculum. Thus the study of autobiography has relevance for the ways in which different forms of discourse (here, curriculum policy, programs, materials, school texts, reports of school events, curriculum criticism and research reports) make possible different conceptions of subjectivity. The passages treated above contrast a view of the self as a bounded entity having a beginning, end, linear development in time and possession of its own being and resources, with an alternative view in which the self does not develop in a single course but involves multiple personae, multiple lines of development and an indissoluble

relationship to other selves in the social web to which it belongs; what is the significance for curriculum of these two views? In the following sections the curricular issues involved in these two areas of concern will be explored in more detail.

Textuality in Language and Literature

The discussion of autobiography above argues for a conception of textuality that would have far-reaching implications for the organization and teaching of language and literature, and even more so for the way texts are viewed across the disciplines. Let us begin to examine these implications by first considering the debate around the issue of finding, and making, literary material relevant to students. (A review of work in this area is provided by Bailey, 1978.) The issue of relevance seems to arise out of a clash between two opposed views of the literary work seen as a particular kind of aesthetic or cultural object. On one approach, "the work of art is viewed as a complicated, delicate and beautiful machine, whose workings can be fathomed and understood through the processes of careful intellectual analysis." (Yeomans, 1975, p. 81) The other approach sees the literary work of art as an event which elicits in its reader a certain emotional response the occurrence of which alone validates the "work". Such an approach may be, but is not necessarily egalitarian, depending on whose responses are considered fit to validate the work.

The two apparently contradictory approaches are easily identified in literature curricula. The first approach involves teaching classic works of "great literature"; advocates of this approach basically assume the relevance of the classics as given, since in part what makes great works classic is their universality, a feature which, given enough exposure, students will come to appreciate. Nevertheless the construction of a curriculum based on this approach is no simple matter since it is necessary not only to select the most important works but to mediate among these and the abilities, attitudes and interests of particular students. One way of accomplishing this is to choose from among the classics those works the themes of

which seem most appropriate to the concerns of particular groups; another is to focus on teaching students specific skills of literary analysis which will enable them to understand the works. The latter option has been advocated even for the elementary grades (Sloan, 1975). On the second approach, works are chosen primarily for their emotional appeal to students without regard for their status in the literary canon. While advocates of these views don't necessarily intend it, one can see that the first approach, which really does assume the presence of analytic skills and academic "relevance structures" (Keddie, 1971) is likely to fare better in socio-economically advantaged contexts, whereas the second approach, especially its egalitarian version which abandons the aim of exposing students to 'high' culture, is apt to be recommended only for non-academically oriented and working-class students. Since the first approach is increasingly difficult to sustain, a number of sophisticated alternatives have been elaborated. For example, Yoder (1975) suggests a method in which the student is asked to monitor his emotional response to what is being read, taking notes, and then to "investigate specifically what it was in the work, in its content and technique, that caused him to have the reactions he had" (p. 315). Conversely Yeomans (1975) elaborates a 'growth theory of literature', based in Gestalt psychology, which

> focuses on the person's relationship to his language as a vehicle for self-discovery, growth, and increasing existential understanding of self and world—holding that a person's first responsibility is to himself, not to any given tradition and/or body of knowledge—and then works from these foundations toward and into the literary culture. (p. 82)

These rationales are of interest because despite the divergence of approaches, common assumptions are in evidence, in particular a conception of the literary work as object, not as text in the sense we have been advancing. Approaches which emphasize 'the work of art' and those which emphasize the immediate emotional response to it both rest upon a conception of the work, one of the underpinnings of which is the assumed dichotomy between 'fact' and 'fiction' and the view of fictional writing as conveying truth in an oblique manner, through the artful arrangement of its material, which was elaborated in our discussion of autobiography above. Further, we suggest it must be frustration with the restricted conceptions of truth and validation behind the traditional notion of fiction that leads some theorists and educators to retreat to a theory of literature which abandons, but does not refute, the accepted view of the work of fiction as aesthetic object. In the efforts at synthesis cited above, Yoder puts the emphasis on the work of art as an entity which "causes" certain effects in readers; he merely expands his view of the object to include a cataloguing, and an effort to explain rationally, those effects. Yeomans, on the other hand, sees the experiencing of the work of art as an object within a tradition as a distant goal of a learning process which starts with unique emotional reaction of the individual: the tradition serves as a resource "for expanding and deepening the literary response" (p. 83); now it is the response which exists as an entity to be enhanced, promoted, evaluated, but note that it is a "literary" response of a particular kind, thus ultimately dependent on the existence of appropriate literary objects to call it forth.

Thus the educational search for relevance in literature curricula implicitly honors the conception of 'work' rather than text, as well as the dichotomy between fact and fiction, and further posits a separation between the real lives of students and the content of literary 'works'. In trying to choose literary materials relevant to students' lives, or to make existing materials more relevant by reading them in a different way, the belief is that the curriculum can be brought closer to students, shaped and packaged for their consumption.

Underlying these views of the teaching of literature, underpinning the fact/fiction dichotomy itself, lie three basic oppositions; an opposition between literature and non-literature; between the real world and the academic; and between the activities of production and those of consumption. Scholes

(1985) has demonstrated convincingly the ways in which these binary oppositions operate in the apparatus of university English teaching:

> First of all, we divide the field into two categories: literature and non-literature...we mark those texts labeled literature as good or important and dismiss those non-literary texts as beneath our notice...We distinguish between the production and the consumption of texts, and, as might be expected in a society like ours, we privilege consumption over production...
>
> We distinguish between what is "real" and what is "academic" to our own disadvantage...and secretly despise our own activities unless we can link them to a "reality" outside academic life. (p. 5)

Scholes goes on to show how these basic differentiations operate in the structuring of curricula, teaching and even the social and working relationships within university English departments. For our purposes it is important to note the way that the three distinctions divide up what was unitary—human linguistic activity—into a hierarchical structure of separate subjects which seems to hold, for the most part, not only in the university but also in the lower reaches of the educational system. The approaches cited above clearly view "literature" as a special subject which students learn to "fathom", "understand", "analyze" and "respond to", all activities of consuming rather than producing; the highest development, toward which all literature teaching aspires, is "interpretation," and the teaching of this skill, like the displaying of it in academic papers, articles, and books, is our greatest glory." (p. 5) We do not, however, teach students to produce literature (since this would be a "real" activity of production, and there is no place for it in the "academic" world of the classroom); rather, "we teach something called "creative writing"—the production of pseudo-literary texts." (p. 5)

In schools the handmaiden of literature is a subject called "language", which deals with what Scholes terms non-literature, and also has its consumption and production dimensions. The consumption of non-literature is the sub-division of "language" known as "reading" or sometimes "comprehension". On the production side of the scheme, we are told:

> Actual non-literature is perceived as grounded in the realities of existence, where it is produced in response to personal or socio-economic imperatives and therefore justifies itself functionally...What *can* be produced within the academy is an unreal version of it, "pseudo-non-literature" which is indeed produced in an appalling volume. We call the production of this stuff "composition." (p. 6)

Scholes' indictment is harsh, but we don't have to look far to see that the oppositions he identifies are entrenched both in the organizational structure of schooling (language and literature are often taught by different teachers, for example, with training in different academic disciplines—linguistics and literature respectively) and in the conventional wisdom. The 'area' of language is further solidified by the elaboration of a repertoire of skills in listening, speaking, reading and writing, which are held to be a well-organized (skills can be broken down into subskills), neutral infrastructure beneath all linguistic expression.

This series of binary oppositions is itself a non-neutral infrastructure which not only organizes the activities of English teaching but contributes to the maintenance of social and cultural forms. Scholes proposes the deconstruction of the system of binary oppositions, not merely through critical writing but by a reconstruction of the practices of teaching and learning in our institutions, so that students will be provided with "the kind of knowledge and skill that will enable them to make sense of their worlds, to determine their own interests, both individual and collective, to see through the manipulations of all sorts of texts in all sorts of media, and to express their own views in some appropriate manner." (p. 15-16) In short, it is argued that the teaching of language and literature be replaced by the study of texts. This is precisely the thrust of our arguments earlier which sought to demonstrate that the

literary work be recast as one among many kinds of texts that fill various functions in the real world.

An awareness of the series of oppositions which have been discussed here provides a critical perspective which can be used to examine curriculum proposals. We conclude this section by demonstrating this point with reference to a number of projects and proposals in the area of language and literature.

Of particular interest is the work that has been done around the notions of 'language across the curriculum' and 'language in use'. For example, Elizabeth and David Grugeon (1979) describe a number of successful efforts to get children actively involved in reading and writing activities that "value the child's own language and experience" (p.60) and carry strong personal meaning. The assumptions around which such practice is organized include the ideas that "learning is personal and cooperative...the school is a limited language environment which can be enlarged...language can be developed it the child's world is brought into the classroom." This concern with accepting and expanding the child's world through language works to erase the real/academic split. Another objective is the "mastery of a constructed narrative shape (which) seems to enable the development of advanced skills of hypothesizing, speculation and the consideration of alternative possibilities." (p. 58) On one level this aim works in the direction of uniting the production/consumption dichotomy, but on another level, the development of distinct language skills suggests a literature/non-literature split, and this is confirmed by the way that literature is treated. While literature can be used widely to serve the development of language, it remains a separate subject identified chiefly by its unique forms:

> Stories and poems need to be encountered head on for what they are...it is chiefly through literature, and quite particularly through poetry, that the reader comes up against another individual's feelings conveyed through a particular verbal form. (p. 53)

The literature/non-literature dichotomy is also in evidence

in a widely-cited theoretical scheme developed by James Britton (1971). This scheme distinguishes three major functions of language—the transactional, the expressive and the poetic, and one of its strengths is that it proposes to teach students to produce writing in each of the three categories. However, a dichotomous opposition between language as skills and literature as form is retained in the two poles of the scheme. Thus transactional language "is an immediate means to an end outside itself. The form it takes...is dictated primarily by the desire to achieve that end efficiently", while the poetic utterance "is an immediate end in itself, and not a means, i.e. it is a verbal artifact, a construct", which must be attended to as a unity.

Reenter the distinction between literature and non-literature, supported by the splitting off of the real world, in which we use language to achieve ends, from the academic world of contemplation—as if poetry were never written to persuade, shock, incite or amuse; as if essays or letters could not be written simply to express appreciation or explore an idea.

Another scheme which aims to give students control of their own language use is the Language in Use Project (Pearce 1973), the objectives of which are as follows:

> a) to help teachers to generate in their pupils an awareness of the nature and function of language, and of the part it plays in their own lives and in the life of the community;
>
> b) to help in developing pupil's ability to use spoken and written English in the wide variety of situtations where, in a complex industrial society, they may be expected to use language.

However, this project was "placed quite firmly within the domain of the academic discipline of general linguistics" (Pearce, 1973) and "the underlying structure of the material is an explicit theory of language and how it is used." (p. 124) Why, one wonders, is such elaborate theoretical grounding necessary if the focus is on the functions of language in the real lives of pupils and their communities? It appears that the academic

apparatus (theories of language, of language learning and of language teaching) is necessary to legitimate the extensive preoccupation with non-literature.

The reliance on theory further seems to involve language use coming to be seen as primarily an individual achievement, with psychological-developmental parameters; the production of literary works is the model of individual achievement on which non-literary production patterns itself. This model can, however, be called into question. Certainly language development occurs in all persons closely intertwined with the shaping of individual personality and behavior patterns. But it is not therefore an individual concern, much less an accomplishment as our society tends to portray it. The social context is necessary for language development to occur. In imagining that language teaching can begin from the child's individual expressiveness and work outward, eventually reaching the stage of "using" language as a critical tool, we forget that language is much more than a tool for pointing to social reality—it is integral to the social fabric; in speaking we are immediately part of a social discourse, immersed in it, producing it, and sometimes already using it in an implicitly critical way.

The academic grounding of language curricula also serves an important role in social control. Illich (1981) has given us a historical analysis of the conception of "taught mother tongue" which reveals the act of teaching language as a tool for the enforcement of hegemonic values:

> The new state takes from people the words on which they subsist, and transforms them into the standardized language which henceforth they are compelled to use, each one at the level of education that has been institutionally imputed to him. Henceforth, people will have to rely on the language they receive from above, rather than to develop a tongue in common with one another. (p. 44)

One of the first authors of a grammar, Nebrija, is quoted by Illich as follows:

> Presently, they waste their leisure on novels and fancy stories full of lies. I have decided, therefore, that my most urgent task is to transform Castilian speech into an artifact so that whatever henceforth shall be written in this language may be of one standard tenor. (p. 43)

This passage returns us to our starting point, the role of literature. The sense of the quoted passage rests on an absolute distinction between truth and falsehood, between fact and fiction, between standard usage and 'fancy stories full of lies'. Here we see the connection between the basic oppositions we have been discussing and relations of power in society. In our efforts to equip children with better language skills, correct form, and even power over their own language use, we make use of linguistic and pedagogic tools which structure the curricular experiences of children, thereby controlling what passes for truth and what counts as fiction in our society. Thus any curriculum which allows a place for literature solely as artifact, as a unique form of creative production, teaches us implicitly about the nature of truth and fiction in a way that makes it extremely difficult later on to transcend the officially sanctioned fictions of the social context within which the curriculum is enacted.

One could generate from this discussion a series of specific recommendations for the teaching of language and literature (e.g. that we teach a range of 'correct forms'—dialects, kinds of slang, types of jargon, and that we teach children to analyze and understand what motivates the use of these different forms; that we teach storytelling, drama, and other ways of producing with words, emphasizing the oral as well as the written modes, the doing as well as the analysis, the communal as well as the individual aspects of this production), most of which have already been put forth in other contexts. But the main thrust of our argument here has been to show how the categories through which we deal with language and literature potentially set up mechanisms of control which tend to alienate students from their own language and from each other. Without an understanding of the operation of these mechanisms through discourse, the usefulness of any specific proposals,

however progressive, is likely to be diminished. The appropriate context to which to draw implications is that of curriculum as enacted in classrooms where teacher and students are at work producing new meanings. In this setting a variety of texts, carefully and critically used, can help students discover how they relate to the larger world, their place in it, and their own possible contribution to the changes that occur in the historical process.

Subjectivity in autobiography and curriculum

We have suggested that the notion of textuality which we have been discussing accommodates a new conception of subjectivity, for within the intertextual space the individual enunciation is a particular production *of* and *by* the sign; the individual is shaped by the discourse available to him or her, is spoken by language as well as speaking it. A change which follows on this is a transformation of our view of the author. In "What is an Author?", Foucault (1979) points out that the author function is related to particular forms of ownership, and further that it affects different forms of discourse in different ways. Thus, in earlier times "literary" texts required no author: narratives, epics, tragedies circulated without questions arising as to their author, whereas "scientific" texts (in cosmology, medicine and the like) of the time would be accepted as "true" only when identified with an author: "Hippocrates said..." Since the 17th or 18th century, this situation has been reversed: the literary text seems to require an author, whereas for scientific texts what counts is "their membership in a systematic ensemble, and not the reference to the individual who produced them" (Harari, p. 149). In our time, Foucault contends the "author-function" for literary works is again disappearing and in its place new questions may arise: "What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? What are the places in it where there is room for possible subjects? Who can assume these various subject functions?" (p. 160)

These are powerful questions for the curriculum field insofar as they point to the range of implications of the change in conceptions of subjectivity for curriculum: what views of self do different curricular arrangements foster or deny: what kinds of individual and collective expression are made possible by the curriculum; which needs, aspirations, experiences of individuals and groups can be formulated and are given legitimacy by a given instance of curriculum discourse? Barnes (1976) has given us some detailed examples of lessons in which teachers, intent on providing pupils with knowledge of a topic as they conceive it, effectively prevent pupils from bringing their own experience into discussion because the pupils' ways of talking about their experience does not conform to the language and concepts teachers wish to have pupils master. The examples of "language-in-use" curricula discussed above can also be read as efforts to accommodate a changing conception of subjectivity insofar as the language and experience of children is valued within the curriculum, and the existence of diverse language communities is honored.

Another example of an area of curricular discourse in which we have witnessed a changing response to Foucault's questions is the study of teachers' knowledge; the development of a new focus on the personal aspects of teachers' knowledge (Clandinin and Connelly 1987) reflects a significant change in this area of educational discourse. At one time the discourse of research on teaching operated only in the context of efforts to improve teaching, and the knowledge of teachers could not be formulated within this context, nor could teachers themselves take up the position of subjects within this discourse.

Today it has become almost commonplace to want to give the teacher's voice a hearing, although there are still divergent answers to questions about the appropriation of the discourse (Tripp, 1983), and the discourse itself still circulates almost exclusively in the academic context.

Foucault's questions in the above passage are addressed to the modes of operation of a form of discourse. We want also to be able to examine the nature of the experience which subjects

can formulate and convey within the discourse. In looking at accounts of teachers" knowledge, for example, it is not always clear whether we are looking at discourse which embodies a new conception of subjectivity or a nostalgic return to the insular self of the Lejeune quote above. What are the modalities of the conception of self to which the notion of textuality points? If we return to the passage cited in section II from *The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas*, we find three ideas around which to organize this new conception: suspension, or the constant renewal and non-finality of self; mediation, or the interplay of various personae in the self; and "fictionality", by which we refer to the nature of the relationship into which the self enters with the world around it.

One instance of an expression of subjectivity in curriculum which reflects these three modalities in an eloquent and moving way is Aoki's (1983) "Experiencing Ethnicity as a Japanese Canadian Teacher: Reflections on a Personal Curriculum." This text, for all its economy, allows us to raise a number of questions relating to its subject matter, its dialogical strategies, the hybrid nature of the text's fabric, and the textual intentions it encompasses.

Aoki's text is centrally concerned with what we termed "fictionality"– the subject's multi-faceted relationship to the world.

> Experiencing ethnicity has been and is experiencing being a Japanese Canadian in the time-space coordinates of my own historical situation into which I was born, and within which I have lived and I am now living. (p. 321)

A subjectivity is born "into" a historical situation and produces its meanings within a contextual life-world– "a dialectic of the individual being and the social being that I simultaneously am." (p. 323) An event takes meaning only to the extent that it is dialectically incorporated within the semiotic/curricular process of a living consciousness. And an autobiographical self is invariably organized in relation to the decisive historical events which contribute to its structuration and to which, in

turn, it contributes. Aoki's account of the removal of the denigrating term "Japs" from a textbook (p. 331-2) is a vivid example. In brief, a particular subjectivity, in its ongoing productive process, can only be conceived of as a structure always in the process of being filled with indefinitely multiple and variable curricular objects.

Aoki's experiences as a Japanese Canadian child in Japan and in British Columbia, as a teacher in Alberta, his various activities in the University of Alberta, his job offers during the war, his stay in Lethbridge, his professorship at the University of British Columbia, his meeting with Chief Maurice Wolfe and their ensuing dialogue, all constitute determining moments within this dialectical process. The texture of the text itself is indicative of the process; the mixture of curricular documents that make up this autobiography parallel these moments. The collage of letters, quotations, political documents, dialogue and narrative reflect the intertextual relationships that obtain within a personal curriculum. A curricular self, then, cannot be structurally limited to one form of expression for it cannot be reduced to one particular experience; in its multiplicity and production, it is always 'pluri-significative'.

Another aspect of Aoki's message is concerned with the multiplicity of the curricular self as it relates to the notion of "mediation" which we discussed above. In hi title Aoki refers to himself succinctly as a "Japanese Canadian teacher"; in the course of the text this title unfolds and expands in an almost endless series of permutations. A "blackhead" with a simultaneous sense of belonging and not belonging in the crowds of Tokyo which he visited as a youth, he was also a Nisei who experienced the evacuation– belonging and not belonging to those who 'relocated' him; as a teacher he was inducted into a "culturally-shaped world...governed by rules of conduct and socially accepted behavior" which at times pronounced him not to exist. Finally the dual nature of belonging and not belonging, the self that is a process of perpetual mediation between the contradictory demands of the world around him, becomes what is most human, most meaningful to Aoki– "the fullness of a

double or even a multiple vision" in which the sakura and the rose remain simultaneously in view.

We would like to suggest that this short autobiography introduces a new curricular paradigm in which the irreducible relationship between the curriculum and the person, the social and the individual, are preeminent. The curriculum is always a personalized curriculum (just as biography is curricular biography), and learning coincides with all situational phenomena that a consciousness encounters in its attempts to come to terms with its historical contingencies. This view contrasts markedly with the conceptions of curriculum, teaching and learning, and the subjectivity to which the former are addressed, that are typically conveyed by the field. Teacher training, for example, almost always includes a heavy dose of psychology, with the accompanying message that good teaching lies in the amelioration of individual student learnings which can be analyzed, compartmentalized, and managed with precision. Certainly this view of curriculum, teaching and learning has the merit of allowing for efficiency and ease of evaluation; but the exclusivity of the view is limiting, and the inability to step outside and see it reflectively is perhaps even dangerous. It is essential that teachers become aware of and able to critically examine the notions of self on which educational and psycho-educational theory rest. The study of alternative views of self, which might well draw on autobiographies as well as other literary and non-literary sources, is one way to foster such awareness and critical capacity.

Conclusion: Curriculum criticism as discourse.

The intent of this article was to develop a view of curriculum as discursive practice. There is a growing literature on the notion of reproduction from which we have learned much about the classroom as a social and historical setting in which power is deployed. Our underlying concern has been to question this process, to bring down the walls enclosing the classroom, by focussing attention on the linguistic forms which buttress the structure of curricular discourse and hence the world within

which teachers and students, as well as educational researchers and theorists live. We have used the notion of "text", as opposed to that of "work", as exemplified in different views of autobiography, and underlying these the series of binary oppostions which structure the standard view of language and literature, to illuminate the particular views of self and of knowledge which accompany the social and economic structure of life in industrial society and the power relations obtaining therein. We have seen how the notions of 'work', of fact and fiction, and the autonomous 'self' underlie both a limited view of literary knowledge and a limited perception of curriculum.

Looking at discursive practices, particularly as they evolve and change over time, allows us to see new forms emerging (one example being the way gender is now treated), and should thereby help us to identify 'openings' or points of weakness in accepted practices. In our brief examination of language and literature curricula, for example, we tried to demonstrate how the system of binary oppositions functions, and suggest that it is a powerful tool for the analysis of curriculum proposals. The identification of assumptions about knowledge and self and the demonstration of how these underlie discourse allows us to do more than simply point to the mechanisms of reproduction: it provides us with a teaching tool that can be used to show how these mechanisms function. Experiences that bring one up against the linguistic preconceptions of various subject matters and show how these are socially conditioned can serve as a practical starting point for movement toward non-reproductive school arrangements. And because we observe discursive practices changing, albeit slowly, we can see the hegemony as less monolithic and can give to teachers (and to ourselves) the hope of working within the 'emergent' forms.

Finally we can through discursive analysis raise the possibility of examining our own discourse for the assumptions concerning self, power and knowledge that underlie various forms of curriculum criticism. Indeed this self-reflexiveness becomes not just possible but necessary, since one of the

central implications of post-structuralist perspectives is that there is no privileged position from which one can speak without one's own discourse being itself put into question. However, it is precisely through the willingness to undertake a critical examination of the assumptions underlying our own discourse that we may acquire the means to make choices about how to speak, and write, and teach in ways that move toward the kind of social arrangements we desire.

Notes

1. This section is drawn from Elbaz (1987).

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CURRICULUM PROJECTS & REPORTS

Reflections of Theory and Practice with an Invitation

The "Curriculum Projects and Reports" section of the Journal is under new management, and as the new manager, I would like to take this opportunity to introduce myself and my view of the role that this section should play in the general discourse about curriculum, curriculum theory, and the schools.

My name is John Holton and I have worked as a curriculum director in a public school system in Delaware for the last four years. Before coming to Delaware I spent some five years working in a teachers college where I taught introductory foundations courses to undergraduates as well as history and philosophy of education courses to graduate students. I did my graduate work at Ohio State and studied curriculum with Paul Klohr.

The purpose of "Curriculum Projects and Reports" is obvious: to provide a forum for reports on curriculum work in the schools. But, is another such forum needed? After all, every day the mail is filled with offers from consultants, programs for conferences, and prospectuses for journals that all promise to provide accounts of innovative (but practical) programs that can be used for everything from improving student test scores to helping kids "just say 'No'!" And all of these enticing programs are backed up with reports of successful examples of "how to" in your own district or school or classroom. Not only are there many forums for reporting on curriculum, but we find that each brings us answers to all our questions. So we are faced with an important question of usefulness. If what we read is true, then certainty has returned to the world and, though

we may report, we had better report only great successes if we are to keep up with the trends of the season. In fact, it has begun to seem that there is no place for a forum like "Curriculum Projects and Reports"; the new certainty has made exploration superfluous. But, of course, there is need for "Curriculum Projects and Reports" because the "new certainty" is nothing but a passing phase.

One has a sense of the already-seen. We are now experiencing a boom in school reform and innovation and it looks and sounds much like earlier booms, as this evocatively described boom from nearly a century ago:

> The air is full of rumors. The editors of education journals and the arrangers of conventions have had to show themselves enterprising and on a level with the novelties of the day. Some of the professors have not been unwilling to cooperate, and I am not sure even that the publishers have been entirely inert.[1]

So William James reflected in 1892 about the promises made by the advocates of the "new science of psychology." My example from James is appropriate to my point since our boom also makes claims that it is based on a new science; that is, the "research-based" body of knowledge commonly called the effective schools movement.

As the drum-beaters for the new boom in "effective schooling" are apt to imply, if they do not make the claim outright: we have reached the end of the need for innovation. Like Moses, the researchers have led us to the promised land.

Witness Chester Finn, the director of education research at the Department of Education, when he was asked about the proposals made by the NEA and the AFT that each school district set up a laboratory school to experiment with curriculum and instructional arrangements. Dr. Finn's response to the proposal was that the idea was 10% good and 90% bad because, in his view, we know what makes schools effective and such experimentation is likely to confuse teachers about the directions that they should follow and the assumptions that they should make about their teaching.

As someone who works in the public schools I am bemused by the air of certainty that envelopes much of the curriculum conversation today. As in James's day, the air is full of rumors that portend the coming of a new age for schools. Much of what currently passes for new in schools appears to me to be meretricious, and so it is my hope to solicit reports about curriculum projects that are written from a quite different perspective; on that re-captures that freshness of vision that characterized the curriculum projects and proposals form the latter part of the last century, in the early years of the pragmatic revolution.

It is one of the ironies of the history of an idea that the pragmatic revolution with its legacy of pluralistic empiricism, temporalism, relativism, probabalism and fallibilism, and its secular democratic individualism[2] should be seen by those living in its tradition as providing a justification for a kind of intellectual absolutism. From a conception of science that was anti-formalist, the current dominant view of educational research is deeply committed to (a paradoxical) scientific formalism. The advocates of the effective schools movement provide an excellent example of this new formalism. In Dunkin and Biddle's 1974 summary of research on teaching, one was struck by the small number of positive findings reported in the book's nearly 500 pages. However, in the fourteen years since that report, the educational community has seen the rise of a major growth industry in education research whose products are consistent correlates between certain teacher behaviors and growth in student learning. "Research says..." has become a phrase to conjure with in schools and any program that aims to compete for the dollars of school districts must claim direct lineage to the pantheon of school research gods. To paraphrase a wonderful passage from William James's *Pragmatism* that is apposite to our description of the present formalist attitude in education; "When the first logical and natural uniformities about the classroom were discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty and simplification that resulted, that they believed themselves to have deciphered authentically

the eternal thoughts of the Almighty. His mind also thundered and reverberated in wait time. He also thought of guided practice, review, and independent practice and handed down principles like Berliner. He made Hunter's laws for teachers to follow; he made student achievement to vary directly with academic learning time; he established that checking the previous day's homework and reteaching where necessary. He thought of the archetypes of all things, and devised their variations; and when we rediscover any one of these his wonderous institutions, we seize his mind in its very literal intention"[3].

The argument of the scientific formalists runs as follows: "The promise of positive science for the social realities of schooling has finally begun to yield results that permit us to predict and therefore control what takes place in the school. Certain teacher behaviors linked with institutional arrangements create a powerful weapon against the social disintegration that has undermined the power of schools to create a prosperous and well-ordered society. The factors of race, social class, and economic power are less crucial than once was thought if schools are arranged around certain "research based" principles. Ignore them at your peril!

Now while the educational researchers are satisfied and have evidenced their satisfaction by a vigorous sales campaign that has mightily succeeded in convincing state legislatures and departments of public instruction that the Day has truly come, there is less certainty in the schools among the teachers and building and district level administrators. There is a vague malaise about what all the noise portends and about what the research portends. In my state, for example, the state legislature has mandated a new teacher evaluation instrument that is "research-based," new and more stringent requirements that principals observe their teachers three times each year (for non-tenured teachers, and twice in two years (for tenured teachers), increased training for administrators and teachers in "effective school principles."

Principals are worried about the number of hours that will be spent filling out forms and holding conferences with teachers. Teachers are concerned that the "instrument" used clumsily by insensitive administrators will force them into a kind of strait-jacketed instruction that emphasizes rote learning and factual recall at the expense of helping their children escape from ignorance. Finally, the "effective school movement" has almost ended substantive discussion about curriculum save those dealing with technical matters.

This malaise felt by school people arises from the traditional cliché about the conflict between theory and practice that is devoutly believed by us school people. The substance of the cliché is that the university-based educational researchers and scholars are so caught up with theory that they cannot understand the nature of the practical world of the schools. The old misapprehension that analogizes thusly: real: practical: wishful thinking: theory only confuses the issue and deflects us from genuine criticism.

But the cliché misleads us from the true cause of our discomfort with the research on effective schools. My view is that we in the schools have failed to recognize the importance of theory and have been misled by the protestations of the current phase of education research to be "non-theoretical." The school effectiveness research has sold itself as practical by asserting that because it is based on observation of "real teachers working in real schools" it escapes the burden of coming clean about its foundational theory.

But theory does matter. As Chesterton noted a long time ago:

> the most practical and important thing about a man is his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy it is important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the there of the cosmos affects matters, but whether in the long run anything else affects them.[4]

And so when we look for theory behind the science model that drives the school effectiveness research of course we find it. To somewhat oversimplify what we find, we may say that the researcher is counting "things" like "student-teacher interactions" in a classroom and then assuming that the things that are counted are (1) things or objects and (2) that they are commensurable.

When looked at in light of its foundational theory much of the research shows itself to be flawed even on its own terms. The objects of study are not "things" at all but are often simply ideas about classrooms that we find attractive. And even if we could count them as we would objects we need to remember that the results of each count are not commensurable. Under such conditions, the research findings are often merely tendentious. Thus, State Departments of Public Instruction who are interested in demonstrating that they are doing their job properly sponsor research that shows that, as measured by standardized tests, all children in the United States are—like those in Lake Woebegon—above average. The age of Reagan and entrepreneurship finds that "strong principals" are crucial to the effective school, for example. And so much of the research on effective schools seems to be an elaborately constructed demonstration of the obvious and easily accepted. It does not demand elaborate analyses of videotaped elementary classrooms to discover that it is better to tell children "Please do not hit Peter" than to simply say "Stop it!"[5] thus we have now "discovered" that if a teacher has clear goals for learning, his/her students are more likely to know what they are going to do. We also discover that if we want children to achieve in mathematics we need to spend time instructing them in the skills we want them to learn! (Of course, it should be noted that the contradictory view that children would learn mathematics without direct study also had been "discovered" by the same research paradigm.[6])

The most serious consequence of ignoring the foundational issues is that it encourages us in our natural tendency to scant our attention to the flux of experience as it comes to us before

we condition it with our concepts and categories. The prestidigitation that substitutes a conception of reality for the real experience, endangers our ability to continually reconstruct a cogent and useful picture of the world. When we begin to say that "higher order thinking skills" must be an important part of our curriculum, and when we have come to slide the "higher order thinking skills" into the conversation as if they possessed the same qualities of existence as carrots, we are in danger of, as happened for a time in California, adding a class in "higher order thinking skills" to the daily program in schools.

In my view, then what is most lacking in our discussions about curriculum is our failure to "imagine the real,"[7] that is, we have failed to stay close to the lived experience in the schools. When faced with the genuine richness of that experience, we have often expressed our fearfulness by ignoring the richness and by substituting a more orderly, understandable, and ultimately impoverished conceptions of reality. Or, to put it another way, we have missed the distinction made by William James when he observed that the "faith that truth exists, and that our minds can find it, may be held in two different ways."

> We may talk of the *empiricist* way and of the *absolutist* way of believing in the truth. The absolutists in this matter say that we not only can attain to knowing the truth, but we can *know when* we have attained to knowing it; while the empiricists think that although we may attain it, we cannot infallibly know when. To *know* is one thing, and to know for certain *that* we know is another.[8]

We are interested in seeing "Curriculum Projects and Reports" providing a forum for those who are working in curriculum in the schools and who are willing to break away from the absolutism that I tried to sketch in this essay. Thus, we are looking for descriptions of curriculum projects that do not avoid reflections on and revelations about the theoretical framework for the project. We are also looking for reports that do not stray too far from the living experience and that attend to the inconsistency and diversity of that experience. Of course,

we are also interested in the truth but we recognize that it comes to us in many ways and that like James's empiricist, we can never know when we have found it.

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Notes

[1]William James, **Talks to Teachers** (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1899), p. 6.

[2]Philip P. Wiener, **Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism** (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), pp. 191-204.

[3]A paraphrase of a wonderful passage in William James's **What Pragmatism Means.**

[4]G.K. Chesterton, **Heretics** (London:1905).

[5]Michael J. Dunkin and Bruce J. Biddle, **The Study of Teaching**(New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), pp. 134-157.

[6]**Ibid.**, pp. 93-133.

[7]Jacques Barzun, "The Imagination of the Real" in **Art, Politics and Will: Essays in Honor of Lionel Trilling** (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

[8]William James, **The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy** (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1921), p. 12.

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