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

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Ms. Margaret S. Zaccone, JCT
53 Falstaff Road
Rochester, NY 14609, USA

Manuscripts should be addressed to:

Dr. William Reynolds, Editor
University of Wisconsin-Stout
Menomonie, WI 54751

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Main Editorial office: Education Department, University of Wisconsin-Stout, Menomonie, WI 54751

Staff:

Margaret S. Zaccone, Chief Administrative Officer, Rochester, NY
Dorothy Horton, Administrative Assistant, Rochester, NY
Joe and Sally Krier, Technical Assistants, Mac Home Publishing, Menomonie WI
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—W.M.R.

Essays

The Politics of Pedagogy And The Building of Community

Michael W. Apple
University of Wisconsin, Madison

In this period of what has been called the conservative restoration,[1] it is difficult to keep progressive visions alive and to not slowly slide into cynicism. Just as difficult is the struggle to keep the critically oriented tradition in education from becoming so overly esoteric, so hermetic, that it is totally cut off from the real politics of real people in real institutions.[2] These are complex issues, ones that are as much collective as they are individual. Because of this, they require a collective response. Yet, this in itself necessitates the building of a community in which such responses can be articulated, shared, challenged and rebuilt.

Those of you who have read any of my books may remember the special acknowledgement I give to a particular set of people in each one—the Friday Seminar. For the past seventeen years, every Friday afternoon has been set aside as a special time when my doctoral students, visiting scholars from other institutions, and I meet to read each others' work, to support each others' research, to help plan political and cultural action, to simply find respite in conversation personal and political about the realities of our and others' lives, and so on. I want to focus on what happens in the Friday Seminar, not because I believe it is so totally unique—many of you may have similar experiences—but because I think it

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can tell us something about the realities and the politics of our discourses and practices in educational institutions.

What I have to say may be deceptively simple. It is a story of the conscious attempt by one limited group of people to maintain a sense of community, one both grounded in an ethic of caring and connectedness and at the same time one meant to challenge each others' thinking, in a kind of institution where this is difficult to maintain. I want to briefly tell a story about tensions, conflicts, moments of exhilaration, and the struggles to keep a small scale "community" functioning even in the face of material and ideological conditions that make it even more difficult for this to go on. This will require that I situate this story within those conditions.

It is important to state at the outset something about the participants in the Friday Seminar. *All* are or have been politically active. All come from a background of having engaged in concrete action to change prevailing economic, political and cultural inequalities or to defend gains that have been made. For many this continues, unabated. For others, especially those from other countries with oppressive governments that are unfortunately backed by the United States, to engage in overt action while they are here would mean possible deportation and jailing. Even with this, however, the flavor is openly political. These overt similarities mask important distinctions, distinctions that make the continual rebuilding of a sense of community essential.

There are on the surface two groups of people in the seminar and, while the differences should *not* be overstated, they do signify somewhat different orientations. One group, usually the larger one, studies in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction. By and large, these are individuals with a background in teaching and curriculum development either here in the United States or elsewhere. Their affiliations, while no less political, center around rigorous analysis of and action on the politics and practices of classrooms, teaching, and curriculum. Another group works with me in Educational Policy Studies, specifically in the Sociology of

Education. Again, this is a very political group. Yet, their concerns are often slightly more distanced from the political dynamics of actual school settings and involve, say, the politics of technology, of popular cultural forms, the role of the state and class dynamics in struggles over educational policy, among others. Both groups, however, are theoretically sophisticated. Members of both have a history of struggles for democratic possibilities. Both are equally committed to continuing those struggles and to make a difference in education, broadly conceived.

It is important to understand the geographic differences of the people involved in the larger group, however. A simple listing of the countries is not sufficient to convey the utter importance of this, but it is indicative of not only widely divergent educational experiences but distinct cultural, political and economic histories as well. For example, over the years members have come from Japan, Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Nigeria, Puerto Rico, Costa Rica, Columbia, Canada, England, Ireland, Israel, Barbados, Dominica, Granada, Australia, New Zealand, and various parts of the United States.

The experiences of the individuals involved are wide ranging as well and are often cross cutting. They include presidents and organizers of teachers unions, faculty members of colleges and universities, members of feminist movements, cultural and educational leaders in newly emerging socialist governments or in other democratic nations, members of dissident groups in nations with repressive regimes, researchers from institutes of social and educational research, educational and community activists, animal rights activists, elementary and secondary school teachers, and so on.

Race, class, and gender have all played a significant part in constructing different experiences as well. At any one time the group is usually divided equally between men and women. There is always a significant presence of African American, Afro-Caribbean, and/or Hispanic members. Class differences are often registered as well in the institutions out

of which people arose, from elite institutions to small teachers colleges. They are signified as well by those who come from somewhat advantaged backgrounds (actually very few) to those—like myself—whose class trajectories are rooted in working class economic instabilities and poverty and who went to undergraduate school at night. Finally, issues of sexuality have surfaced as well as gay and lesbian politics and experiences have provided distinctions[3] (and as well have provided points around which solidarity is formed among all the participants).

These relations are never stationary. People complete their degrees; they leave to do research or to return to jobs or feel compelled to leave to continue more pressing political struggles in the countries and institutions from which they come. New members arrive each year. They too bring their political/educational agendas. And since all who arrive *are already* politically engaged, they too wish to be heard.

The material conditions in this group then—differences in political experiences, agendas, and priorities—have meant that community has had to be built along particular kinds of lines. And, just as importantly, that it has to be continually rebuilt, cared for, consciously nurtured.

All this has of course led to tensions, ones I certainly feel. What is my role in all this? Am I a "leader," "only" one among many participants? Can community be sustained with so many seemingly contradictory political commitments, with some participants still believing in the predominance of class while others are just as committed to feminist and/or anti-racist forms? Can the socialization that all of us have experienced to a certain degree as professors and graduate students—competitiveness, point scoring, aggressively pursuing arguments even when the style may interfere with the formation of collectivity, leading as opposed to listening, etc.—be overcome? Does a masculinist style pervade our discourse too often? Does theory always count more than personal experience? Are we sometimes in danger of losing a sense of the realities of the everyday lives of teachers?[4]

The theoretic debates and the arguments about political/educational priorities and practices are often grounded in these collective and biographical experiences. The decentering of the marxist problematic in which all things are explained in class terms has had to occur. The relevance of feminist analysis and of theories of racial formation have had to take center stage. This has occurred not "only" because of the compelling case that has been made for the irreducibility of gender and race in our theories and actions,[5] but just as crucially because of the lived experiences of the people involved. Theory, politics, and autobiography merge here.

Because of all this, the idea of difference plays itself out in particular ways, forcing a *decentered* unity upon the Friday Seminar. This decentered unity involves both the theoretical/political level and the level of everyday interaction in the group itself. Let me initially focus on the issue of theory.

In political and conceptual terms, what has happened is that we have had to acknowledge that the commonly accepted privileged points of view from which action and analysis were supposed to come from—and these again usually centered upon class dynamics—have ceased to take *the* center stage.[6] As Laclau and Mouffe put it in their argument about the dominance of class analysis in most radical work, "The problem of power...cannot be posed in terms of the search for *the* class or *the* dominant sector which constitutes the center of a hegemonic formation."[7] Such a center in fact will always elude us. Rather than one central logic of power, there are multiple "centers"—with class, gender, sexuality, and race among the most important. As they go on to say, "All of them are contingent social logics which...acquire their meaning in precise conjunctural and relational contexts, where they will always by limited by other—frequently contradictory—logics."[8]

These are of course rather heavily laden abstractions, but by deprivileging, decentering, the traditional emphasis on class relations and power and placing it on a more parallel plane with these other dynamics, we are able to come much closer to an analysis of the social dynamics and possibilities

of progressive action in education.[9] This also enables a more intense focus on the politics of social movements which, as Wexler has argued so well, may be the most important harbingers of social change in education.[10]

In political terms, this has also meant that our focus on radical democratization should not exclude a priori any possible sphere of political action. "Juridical institutions, the educational system, labour relations, the discourses of the resistance of marginal populations construct original and irreducible forms of social protest, and thereby contribute [to] the...complexity and richness on which a program of radical democracy should be founded."[11]

An explicit focus, then, on relations of power—with a conscious attempt to live out a theory and practice that does not necessarily privilege any one relation as primary—has to be built. The debates continue; they are never settled once and for all. The tensions over this continue as well and these are never only theoretical but are deeply related to our individual and collective biographies as classed, raced, and gendered subjects. However, in the very recognition of the tensions and in their tentative resolution in plurality a community based on this recognition is somehow still basically maintained.

Historically, other things have bound the community together as well. Among the most important was the shared experience of working with student teachers. Because of the downturn in fellowships and scholarships, a large proportion of the members of the Friday Group—at times fully three-quarters of its members—were employed as supervisors in the teacher certification program at the University. They officially worked twenty hours a week, though real hours were often much more than that given their commitments to their students and given their structural position as the "buffer" between schools and teachers on the one side and the university and student teachers on the other. Each of the members of the Friday Group who was a supervisor also taught a seminar for the 10-12 student teachers in her or his care. These seminars were often attempts to repoliticize the

experiences the students were engaging in and to explore more democratic and critical pedagogical and curriculum practices.

The shared experience of supervising and teaching created a bond not only of joint discussions over how the seminars should be organized, what should be taught, and how they should mirror the democratic commitments the supervisors avowed, but also a bond of joint exploitation. As the fiscal crisis of the state deepened and the University budget became tighter, student loads increased for supervisors, hours were cut back, and the labor itself became increasingly intensified. While this did create pressures, it also acted to cement social relationships in personal and political ways among many members of the Friday Group.

The fiscal crises did not ease and in fact worsened. Working conditions had become nearly intolerable for many of the supervisors and it became clearer that the primary reason for their being at the university—the rich political/educational environment of their graduate education—began to suffer. Choices between reading, collective action, and getting through the intensified schedule of a supervisor's week with all its daily crises and time consuming activity had to be made. And often the personal goal of graduate study had to take a back seat to the equally ethically compelling goals of simply earning enough money to live on and pay for tuition and books and doing one's best in assisting students to become reflective and politically sensitive teachers.

These conditions had a multitude of effects. Many members of the Friday Group fled supervision. They looked for positions as research and project assistants on the various large federally funded or foundation supported research projects housed in the Wisconsin Center for Educational Research or in individual departments. Others competed for lectureship positions in the program, positions that might have been even lower in pay at times but where the load was not so extreme and where more respect was given.

The intensified conditions also lead to other problems. One of the things that historically bound the Friday Group

together was a program of joint readings. On most weeks we read important material suggested by a group member. The schedule of such readings was democratically arrived at. The readings were often at the forefront of the debates in economy, culture, and politics and in gender, race, and class. A slow but real change evolved. What early on in the career of the Friday Seminar often included entire books moved almost imperceptibly to shorter single articles. Where almost no one would miss the opportunity to read and discuss the material, increasingly the work load everyone was experiencing often forced members to only skim the reading or sometimes to not read it at all. Even those who did not have an opportunity to read the weekly material always felt free to come, get a gist of an argument and participate and this sense of community did not change. However, the number of members who could not find the time to add even one more reading to this already nearly out of control schedule increased measurably.

Yet to only talk about the material conditions of supervisors' lives risks marginalizing the many foreign students in the Friday Seminar. Since most of them could not be supervisors—they had not taught in the United States and, hence, were harder to place in such positions no matter what their personal excellence—they had usually been employed on various research projects or on small stipends from their own nations. As the world economic crisis deepened, the effects were visceral on these people.

The altered economic conditions had a profound impact on participants from other nations. While it was always more difficult for students from third world nations to find support or to generate enough money even to come here—given the exploitative economic relations between the United States and the third world—it now became significantly more threatening. The sacrifices "foreign students" had often been called upon to make to engage in graduate study, especially for those students who were dissidents in their own nations and therefore were never high on the list for government assistance, were always extreme. Now an exceptional amount of

time and physical and emotional energy had to be spent finding employment at the university. This was simply draining. The effects could even be seen on such simple matters as schedules. Whereas before, schedules could almost always be organized so that the time for the Friday Seminar could be kept sacred, for many of the foreign students the positions they were able to get left them with little flexibility. Not only were they sometimes exploited in terms of hours of work, but the time itself was not always easily arranged so that Fridays were set aside. This could and did lead to tensions, not usually in the Friday Seminar but in terms of the students having constantly to negotiate hours so that there was indeed time to participate on Fridays. And they too found it harder and harder to keep up with the reading.

Community is best developed out of shared experiences. With the loss of the shared supervisory experiences, and the increasing difficulties of finding support for foreign students, something of importance was missing, something that had indeed bound most people together. When this was coupled with the tensions that did, *and should*, evolve over political, educational, and theoretical agendas, one could begin to feel, in an almost visceral way, the partial splintering of some of the solidarity that had been so painstakingly built over the years. This was itself made even more problematic by a large turnover in the group in which three people completed their Ph. D.s and six new members arrived to study with me all in the space of one year. Thus, not only was the group now appreciably larger but in many ways it was now a new group.

This required a conscious attempt to come to grips with the tensions in the group itself. Nearly a month was spent specifically focusing on the dynamics, on the contradictory agendas people bring, on what could be done. At times it was emotionally laden and could have been damaging not just to the group but to specific individuals as issues were raised that could easily have become personalized—the dominance of men, of those whose first language was English, of those who were "more advanced" theoretically or who were "more apt to speak first." Sometimes, genuine anger surfaced.

Yet, through it all, the ethic of listening and of caring that had been part of the history of the seminar seemed to provide the ultimate backdrop. As issue after issue was raised, more people talked. Members self-consciously held their own, sometimes very strongly held, positions in check as they listened to those who often spoke less. The sense of the special quality of the interactions, of the special space Friday afternoons still created, and of its possible fragility in the current conservative restoration not only in education in general but at universities as well, somehow maintained itself. "Somehow" is not quite the appropriate word, of course. It took hard work for it to be maintained. It took people taking personal risks. And it took people sacrificing individual agendas and reaching down inside themselves to rebuild the norms of collectivity for the preservation of the space.

Concrete action at the university helped reestablish these bonds as well. The politics of pedagogy does not simply involve how or what one is teaching, but the rights of others who are "being taught" to jointly participate in creating the pedagogical environment. As Giroux and others put it, it involves the politics of student voice. Yet, the formal graduate programs in which all of the members of the Friday Seminar are involved has little place for students' voices. By focusing the groups' agenda on ways to stop the marginalization of such voices and on ways to reintegrate issues of gender, race, class, and sexuality, as organizing frameworks into the pedagogy and curriculum at the university, a decentered unity—one that allowed for multiple political voices, but one that was still a *unity*—again began to come to the fore. Actions are being taken now and are beginning to have some effects on the processes of priorities in hiring, on what courses should be offered, on possible student representation on *all* important committees and so on.

Another focus was on the exploitative relations of employment of those members who were still supervisors. Here too all members seemed to rally around an issue of lived experience and sought to elaborate steps—perhaps demands is

better—that the institution itself could take in reducing the intensification of the supervisors' work and giving them more autonomy and control. Here too gains have begun to be evident.

I do not want to romanticize what I have said here. Tensions still exist. The decentered unity that we are trying to construct is exactly that, a construction. Like all social constructions that strive to be democratic, it is a fragile construction, especially in times when so many of the economic and ideological conditions that are certainly not missing in the life of an educational institution can work against it.

This story is not necessarily generalizable of course. But some lessons may be useful. A community, no matter how carefully nurtured and no matter how politically astute and committed its members, does not sit isolated from the contradictory economic, political, and cultural dynamics of the institutions in which it resides. Nor does it sit isolated from the race, gender, and class dynamics of the larger society. No matter how strong the political commitments toward democracy and against relations of oppression in education and elsewhere—perhaps because of them—it will be difficult to maintain the bonds among people in times of fiscal and ideological attacks on the things we hold dear.

Yet, caring and connectedness, a sense of mutuality, trust and respect, and a freedom to challenge others, can be rebuilt and maintained. This seems to require a recognition of the plurality of possible political interests within a broad shared progressive framework. Of course, we know all this at the theoretical level, especially those of us who have written or read extensively on the necessity of moving beyond the class and economic reductionism that was so prevalent within the critical tradition. Knowing theoretically and knowing it bodily are two different things, however. This is why it also requires constant attention to the politics of whose voices are heard within the group. It requires patience, a willingness to live through difficult times when internal

dynamics seem to threaten group unity. Finally, and of considerable importance, as well, is the focus on concrete action.

In this case, a community of people that is split in so many interesting ways, but unified in so many others, is based on one over-arching commitment, to alter the dominant politics of culture and the ways pedagogy and curriculum are now carried on. These politics are not only somewhere "out there," in the supposedly "real world." They occur "right here" in the day to day lives of all of us who work at universities. Our best analyses can be usefully refocused on our own daily experiences and on acting collectively to alter the conditions that often make these experiences less compelling and rich than they should be. Such collective action will not be easy. It will not always be successful. But in the process, the community that is built will enable the political knowledge that people like the members of the Friday Seminar *already have* and are gaining to come into practice in our daily lives. Reflection and action combined to solve real political/cultural problems—isn't this what praxis is all about?

I have discussed one kind of community, in reality only a limited one since its boundaries extend only as far as the walls of the university. As many of you know, those boundaries need to be extended well beyond that institution, to the politically committed teachers, community organizers, feminist, gay and lesbian, anti-racist, and labor groups, and others who will provide the context for larger social movements. It is these social movements that will enable us to move toward a society based not on exploitation and domination in all its forms but on a society organized around the common good. As a political activist and as a former teachers union president, I am constantly reminded of how important it is that we participate in those larger struggles as well.[12] Not only might we teach, but perhaps more importantly we might allow ourselves to learn even more important lessons about constructing the decentered unities we call communities of struggle.

I have told a seemingly simple story here. Yet my account needs to be deconstructed, for there is another politics working here. This story is told from and through one voice—my own. However, my role in the group remains largely invisible in this account. Who am I representing? Have I exploited the group for "academic" reasons? Does the very act of presenting a public account of a group that has been so important in my own development, as well as in all its many participants' development over the years, do more that commodify these experiences? The "professor," acting out the role unconsciously of a member of the unattached intelligentsia, puts her or his name on a paper based on a community's experiences. The community is displayed at that ultimate marketplace in which cultural capital and personal status provide the cash—AERA. Whatever benefits accrue from the public display, the sale, of this commodity come to me.[13]

When I presented a draft of this paper at the Friday Seminar, the discussion was intense. Had I gotten the story right? Who had I marginalized in the categorizations of difference I had pointed to? Wouldn't it have been better to stress the similarities, including the fact that everyone there had come to study with me and that was the most crucial bond?

Haven't I underplayed the crucial positive moments, the very real reasons that the Friday Seminar is worth talking about in the first place, the utter importance of the role of the Seminar in fostering the *continuing* political and educational growth of all its members? People come in partly formed by their past political and educational experiences and are reconstructed in significant ways by the internal politics and pedagogy of a group that is always in formation yet always somehow "there" to enable them to question and go further. Aren't feminists radicalized over racial issues in the group? Aren't those so deeply committed to class analysis transformed by the feminist impulses that provides such a strong focus in the Seminar? Isn't all of this what gives the Seminar a good deal of its meaning?

Other questions and issues emerged as well, ones that were equally political and *needed* to be raised. By decentering myself, had I presented an accurate picture? And, finally, shouldn't a paper such as this be collective?

The discussion *was* intense, but never was it rancorous, never was there a question of a lack of trust or caring. (But, of course, here I go again—*my* voice, *my* construction). It was agreed that I should present the paper—corrected, added to, made more complicated. It is clear that a "complete story" (yet, as we know, there can be no such thing) would have to be collective. It would have to enable the voices of all participants in the Friday Group, past and present, to speak, to deconstruct and reconstruct their individual and collective stories, to be authors of their own lives.[14]

So what started out with a simple aim—to tell about the experience of building and rebuilding a space where progressive people could come together to support and build upon each other—is not so simple after all. The Seminar has a politics. So does the telling. And in telling, and struggling with the power relations involved as the teller, new political questions again should and did emerge. The act of keeping the Friday Group alive is, as the members reminded each other during our discussion, a political act in and of itself. The political questions I have raised here emerged from that collective experience, once again proving to this "voice" how much he owes to that collectivity.

Notes

I would like to express my profound thanks to the members of the Friday Seminar at the University of Wisconsin, Madison for their comments, support, and above all, constructive criticism. Without such commitment to support and challenge each other at the same time, none of us can grow.

1. Ira Shor, **Culture Wars** (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
2. For further discussion of the politics of this issue, see Michael W. Apple, **Teachers and Texts: A Political Economy of Class and Gender Relations in Education** (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).
3. The conceptual problem of how we are to think through the contradictory nature of these relations is dealt with in Michael W. Apple and Lois Weis, "Ideology and Practice in Schooling," in Michael W. Apple and Lois Weis, eds. **Ideology and Practice in Schooling** (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), pp. 3-33 and Cameron McCarthy and Michael W. Apple, "Class, Race and Gender in American Educational Research," in Lois Weis, ed. **Class, Race and Gender in American Education** (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), pp. 9-39.
4. The politics of a pedagogy that has to take all of this into account and the difficulties involved are laid out exceptionally well in Elizabeth Ellsworth, "Why Doesn't This Class Feel Empowering?," unpublished manuscript, Department of Curriculum and Instruction, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1988.
5. See, for example, Apple, **Teachers and Texts** and, especially, Michael Omi and Howard Winant, **Racial Formation in the United States** (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986) and McCarthy and Apple, "Class, Race and Gender in American Educational Research."
6. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, **Hegemony and Socialist Strategy** (London: Verso, 1985), p. 87.
7. Ibid, p. 142.
8. Ibid.
9. On the implications of what has been called the non-synchronist parallelist position, see McCarthy and Apple, "Class, Race and Gender in American Educational Research."
10. Philip Wexler, **Social Analysis of Education** (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988).
11. Laclau and Mouffe, **Hegemony and Socialist Strategy**, p. 192.

12. For more detailed discussion of the importance of these larger struggles, see Michael W. Apple, **Education and Power** (New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, ARK Edition, 1985).
13. The question of who benefits from research has of course been deliberated for quite some time. One of the very best discussions, from a feminist point of view, can be found in Leslie Roman, **Punk Femininity**, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1988. See also, Leslie G. Roman and Michael W. Apple, "Is Naturalism a Move Away From Positivism?", in Elliot Eisner and Alan Peskin, eds. **Qualitative Inquiry in Education** (New York: Teachers College Press, in press).
14. See the Discussion of the politics of authorship in Kathleen Casey, **Teacher As Author**, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1988.

The Answer is Blowin' In the Wind: A Deconstructive Reading of the School Text

Alan A. Block
Caldwell - West Caldwell School District

To live is to read texts, but to be alive is to write them. Reading is the process by which a reality is consumed; writing is the very production of that reality. Henry David Thoreau know this when he said that, "Every man is tasked to make his life, even in its details, worthy of the contemplation of his most elevated and critical hour...it is far more glorious to carve and paint the very atmosphere and medium through which we look."[1] This activity of carving and painting is the process of writing a text, and though Thoreau and Derrida and Barthes and Lacan may employ a different vocabulary, though not so different as I first imagined, it is textuality about which they all speak. To learn to read is to learn to interpret another's text; but to learn to write is to produce ones own. Now a text may be defined as a fabric composed by the weaving of either available and/or original codes. Penelope is the eponymous writer,[2] weaving her fabric daily and taking it apart at night to begin anew the following day. To write a text is to weave a conception of the world and depends on your ability to recognize, manipulate and create codes, and to produce from them a fabric which answers to our situation at the moment. It is what Henry David Thoreau learned during his life at Walden Pond. He says that, "I...had woven a kind of basket of a delicate texture, but I had not made it worth any one's while to buy them. Yet not the less, in my case, did I think it worth my while to weave them, and instead of studying how to make it worth men's while to buy my baskets, I studied how to avoid the necessity of selling them"(18). In that production he may sound Walden Pond to find its bottom, and considers that "I am thankful that this pond was made deep and pure for a symbol. While men believe in the infinite some ponds will be though to be bottomless"(191). How truly empty that pond is, and yet how

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actively Thoreau creates meaning in it, though the meaning is really not there. The pond is a code in Thoreau's text, threads of his woven baskets, and as has been often shown, not at all a fixed code, but an open and dynamic one, and entry into it can be made in many places, and hence, may become part of a new code and may be written into another's text, as it has been in mine. *Walden* is a writerly text, and I have learned to write with it—and from it!

I would like to suggest a not so radical idea—that everything comes to us as text, as a fabric woven of codes, even as Thoreau's *Walden* comes to me. But few are the texts which offer the opportunities for writing, and fewer the texts which teach writing. A text which may not be written is composed of codes which preclude the ability to write with them. Such a text may only be read, and may certainly not teach writing. Not to teach writing is to deny the opportunity for the production of worlds, to deny the opportunity to produce knowledge, to deny the experience of pleasure. Writing is, to write with Thoreau's formulation, waking "to an answered question, to Nature, and daylight," and is an activity which results in the construction of reality. Reading, on the other hand, is the activity of observing someone else's reality, and results too often in boredom, frustration, and alienation. Only if we view the world as text we must write, and therefore the product of textuality, is there the opportunity for liberatory activity, for meaningful lives, and for freedom.

I would like to suggest here that the school text is a readerly text. Its codes are irreversible and offer limited and solitary moments of access. The codes may be negotiated in a single direction only, and there is little opportunity for the weaving of new codes within it, or from it. The readerly school text offers only two alternatives to its population: either to accept or reject the text. Yet writing is an activity of freedom, and to teach writing is to teach of the possibility and the availability of choices, of offer freedom and its pleasures. The school text, as a readerly text, may teach only the opposite: enslavement, passivity, lethargy, and subservience to the authority of the signified. That signified, or as Barthes refers

to it, as the law of the Signified, demands closure and glorifies the centralization of meaning, functioning "...to arrange all the meaning of a text in a circle around the hearth of denotation (the hearth: center, guardian, refuge, light of truth)."[3] Reading is governed by the signified, and not only demands, but defines conformity. From reading, we may learn only what others tells us and our horizons only painted canvases and in-close. Possibility may exist only in writing: the way to hump a cow, e e cummings tell us, is "to multiply because and why/Dividing thens by nows/and adding and (i understand)..."[4] There is plenitude in plurality. And so it is ironic that the hue and cry of the educators' demands concentration in the teaching of writing; as it is now so constituted, and as it is so planned in the future, reading is all that is possible in the school, and all that may even happen, given the structure of the school text. And it is in this contradiction between what the school proclaims as its purpose and what it actually effects, that it denies whatever meaning it might have produced, and destroys whatever education it might ever have inspired. Indeed, for now and in the future, the teaching of writing is inimicable to the school text; even as its structures may be only read, so may it teach only reading.

Bear with me for a brief time while I establish a vocabulary which we must use to understand what is meant by 'writing a text.' The terms may be familiar, but I want to place them in a different context.

We must first acknowledge that the world, or all that we have available to produce the text of it, begins as signifiers. We may describe these signifiers as 'traces of perception.'[5] These original signifiers, which constitute for Saussure the basis of language, and for Lacan constitute the unconscious which is structured like a language, can only be know, as Saussure, Derrida, Freud and Lacan have noted, by an absence, a gap, by a discontinuity.[6] As Lacan notes, "Discontinuity...is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to us as a phenomenon-discontinuity, in which something is manifested as a vacillation."[7] This vacil-

lation places 'existence' or meaning, not at an identifiable site, but outside of that site. The site itself is known only by the movement of the constellation of presences which notes the absence. As traces of perception these signifiers, then, can be defined not by presence, but rather, as absence. A signifier has meaning only as it is not another signifier, and only as it defers its own use as a signifier in another way. This is as equally true for the letter 't' as for the production of the tongue which has come to be called a Freudian slip. Hence, a signifier can only exist as a trace for it is always 'not there,' and forever 'not that.' The defining of any certainty is, of course, not possible here, and Derrida puts knowing under erasure: it, the signifier knowing, is marked by the sign but is not held within it, the sign being the mediating concept between the signifier and the signified.[8] The beginning of all meaning lies in these 'traces of perception,' in signifiers; rather, the beginning of all meaning lies in the acknowledgment of the structure of the signifier. For the signifier is the absence which allows the denial of centrality and the fullness of space. As Barthes says of Tokyo, "...the center itself is no longer anything but a frivolous idea, subsisting there not in order to broadcast power, but to give to...[its]...urban movement the support for its empty central, obliging the traffic in a perpetual departure from the normal path." So with the signifier: in its decenteredness, it insists on diversions from the path.

Signifiers are the natural resource of the text; our signifiers come from nature. To produce text is to respect the integrity of the signifier. The plurality of meaning is an obvious result, for if the signifier merely announces an absence, then it can only be defined by its difference from all which marks the space, all of which too, exists in decentered space. This process by which the nature of the signifier is acknowledged is the work of textuality, of writing a text. For the writerly text is the field of the signifier. Terry Eagleton explains that for some Kabbalists, the scroll of the Torah used in synagogues, without vowels or punctuation, is an allusion to the original Torah as it existed in the sight of God

before the creation—no more than a heap of unorganized letters.[9] God had no need of text: God is the Signifier, or as Lacan says, ..."the true formula for atheism is God is unconscious." (Lacan, 59). When the Messiah comes, it is told, God will annul the existing Torah and compose its letters into other words: God will teach us to read it in accordance with another scriptive arrangement. In some sense, that is, the words on the page are only a temporary figuration based on a present understanding. The letters can be interminably refigured. The integrity of the signifier is here preserved, for its presence is acknowledged as absence. What seems significant here is the idea that the words, the actual signs, are actually allusions to something else: that there meaning exists not within, but without. What we perceive may have form, be a sign, but its meaning is not contained within that sign. Now what is made of the words at any one time is dependent upon the ideological positions of the interpreters who must first recognize text, which is to say, must produce a fabric from codes, and must then set about signifying that text from the particular weave of those codes. This process is writing, and it produces text which may be seen as "...material ceremonies, scriptive fields of force to be negotiated, dense dispositions of signs less to be 'read' than meditatively engaged, incanted, and ritually remade" (Eagleton, 117). Interpretation has no place in the text, for as Nietzsche has told us, all interpreting is the "will to power" and therefore, is always held within the particular consciousness of the ruling hegemony which determines the controlling center. The law of the signifier is the basis of text, and it is from that basis which must begin the understanding of writing and the production of text. Hence, we must teach the idea of text, that it might be recognized, and the means of writing it so that text is produced.

This begins only by the recognition and understanding of codes. For texts are written from the weaving of codes, and the nature of the codes will determine the nature of the text. Codes are systems of connotation, which connotations serve to provide centrality to decentered signifiers. Barthes defines

connotation as a "determination, a relation, an anaphora, a feature which has the power to relate itself to anterior, ulterior, or exterior mentions to other sites of the text (or of another text)" (*S/Z*, 8). These systems of connotation are based on the law of the signified, and act to control meaning by turning signifiers into signifieds. Codes are produced by the tentative fixing of the signifier. Open codes respect the play of the signifier, putting it under erasure, and therefore indicating that it is inhabited by another signifier which is not there. Thus, open codes may provide access to themselves at many entry points and are reversible. They are non-hierarchical: "...this speech, at once very cultural and very savage, [is] above all lexical, sporadic; it set[s] up in me, through its apparent flow, a definitive discontinuity: this *non-sentence* [is] in no way something that could not have acceded to the sentence, that might have been *before* the sentence; it [is]: what is eternally, splendidly, *outside the sentence*" (Barthes, Pleasure, 49).Closed codes are based on hierarchical order. All codes, open or closed, are necessary to facilitate communication: they classify and clarify and delimit signifiers, and provide common grounds upon which to begin communication. The formation of civilization requires that this unrestrained play of signifiers be restricted.

The symbolic process after Lacan, and the Oedipal drama, after Freud, are two descriptions of the means by which humans create and enter into the social structure. For in these processes the unrestrained play which is the very nature of the signifier is restricted, and the indeterminable signifier is transformed into a signified. A free play of signifiers existing in total promiscuity, so to speak, denies individuality and identity. but to produce civilization, that identity is essential: "In total promiscuity [total polysemy] no one could in fact be called father, son, or sister and no one would be able to situate himself or recognize others by the particular place they occupied".[10] Social existence requires the fixing of the signifier. That fixing creates the sign, which may be nothing other than a signifier-hence, Derrida's formulation that writing is at least, a signifier of a signifier. In Derrida's

formulation "The written signifier is always technical and representative. It has no constitutive meaning".[11]

Now, in constructing civilization, it has been deemed necessary to deny the nature of the signifier which rests in difference, and enter the realm of the symbolic, in which meaning is more of less determined and denied plurality. "An intermediary is necessary between man and the world, between man and man, between self and manifestation of self. The intermediary is the necessary and sufficient condition once men wish to come to an agreement with one another on general principles and wish to exchange something in common" (Lemaire, 61). Hence is created the signified, whose signification is determined by the symbolic process. To create that signified one denies the nature of the signifier by fixing meaning in a 'symbol.' For Lacan, the symbol is "either a signifier whose nature and characteristics are unrelated to the signified—in which case it is conventional and learned—or a signifier whose nature is different from that of the signified, although their characteristics do show some factual similarity, as in the case of metaphors" (Lemaire, 48). It is in the symbolic order that civilization is made possible for it is there that codes may be formed and specificity is decreed. This development, however, necessitates alienation, for as it creates identity, it denies polysemy. To create the symbol, of/for the signified, one must split the psyche and lose an immediate relation of the self to the self which only exists in the imaginary. The imaginary is the place of the signifier, and is "...everything in the human mind and its reflexive life which is in a state of flux before the fixation is effected by the symbol, a fixation which, at the very least, tempers the incessant sliding of the mutations of being and of desire" (Lemaire, 61). But in the symbolic, play is diminished as definite links are determined between signifier and signified, circumscribing a text and writer in separate fields, disallowing polysemy. The process of symbolization "...implies from the start imperfection, reduction, arbitrariness, submission to external constraints and a partial failure to recognize its own mechanisms" (Lemaire, 58). The use of the signified at

one time in a specific way denies its existence in difference and determines meaning. But at the same time, this process denies meaning, as it denies the trace which defines the structure of the signifier. By the process of signification, of meaning-making, a signifier becomes a signified, and some of its original de-centeredness is lost. This process results in codes. But the restriction of infinite play, of polysemy, the closing of codes, is only possible according to some power of authority, of law. As Derrida will state, authority condemns writing.

Authority denies writing, for its anarchic reality threatens power. Writing does away with the father, we are told, for only in speech is the father necessary to speak for the son, logos, and to answer for him. So it is the father who would assign value to writing, define it, and who would wish, as necessary, to control it by designating its social functions. As Theuth answers its inventor, writing will not give wisdom to its student: "...the pupils will have the reputation for it without proper instruction, and in consequence be thought very knowledgeable when they are for the most part quite ignorant."[12] What Theuth objects to about writing is its autonomy of the father. Without him, writing is empty notation: someone, the father, must supply the signifieds in order that information may be transferred and wisdom gained. The equation between information and wisdom is striking: and the authority of the father in this system is ensured. Socrates adds to this formulation of the myth: "The same holds true of written words; you might suppose that they understand what they are saying, but if you ask them what they mean by anything they simply return the same answer over and over again...it always needs its parent to come to its rescue; it is quite incapable of defending or helping itself"(97). Of course, what Theuth and Socrates object to in writing is its self-sufficiency, and the resultant denial of the father. "From the position of the holder of the scepter, the desire of writing is indicted, designated, and denounced as a desire for orphanhood and patricidal subversion."[13] So it is that in his condemnation of writing, authority

maintains control over the symbolic process in the service of order and meaning. The system of codes within a society, which are developed as a result of the symbolic process, and which are the substance out of which texts are woven, is then determined by the authority whose first wish is to deny writing, which process would immediately undermine that authority. And as texts are produced by the weaving of codes, the nature of those codes will determine the type of text which is produced, and will determine the processes which those texts may teach. Now, a society both inherits and creates codes, but the power of the authority legitimizes some and delegitimizes others, makes some codes available, and make others forbidden, gives credence to some and places others under suspicion. With that power, society controls the production of texts. Writing, the production of texts, is condemned, as are the open codes which make it possible, and reading remains as the sole option of the institution which is comprised of and legitimates only closed codes.

Codes are the substance of the textual fabric, and there is no limit to the numbers and types of codes which may be theoretically available. But I will suggest that codes may be classified generally into either open or closed varieties. I would like to suggest that a closed code is one which is built upon hierarchical structures, and that an open code is one not so constructed. Now by hierarchical I do not confine to meaning to constructions determined by increasing (or decreasing) levels of importance or degrees of power, though these are types of hierarchies. Rather, by hierarchy I mean here a construction in which the spatio-temporal structure is such that entry into it at any but the prescribed sites, and movement along it in any but the prescribed direction may be undertaken only at great personal risk or at jeopardy to the existence of the entire code. A closed code, based on such a hierarchy, may not exist in fragments: it would cease to exist. The closed code, then, may not respect the structure of the signifier, and must then deny the nature of polysemous meaning which is represented by the signifier. A fabric composed of closed codes is a readerly text which can be

available only to consumption; its codes admit no entry, no displacement, and no option for free movement. Barthes says that "...the readerly text is a *tonal* text (for which habit creates a reading process just as conditioned as our hearing: one might say there is a *reading eye* as there is a tonal ear, so that to unlearn the readerly would be the same as to unlearn the tonal)...(Barthes, *S/Z*, 30). And though tone might be complex, its movement is determined, for tonal unity is dependent on the sequential structuring of codes which must be permutable, irreversible, and constrained by time. This *is* the school. A writerly text, on the other hand, is one woven by open codes, and is, thus, available to be written: its codes respect the structure of the signifier, they are permutable, reversible, and unconstrained by time. This should be the school if it is to teach writing.

Derrida says that the term writing is used "...to designate not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription but also the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying face, the signified face itself...We say 'writing' for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural 'writing' (Derrida, *Grammatology*, 9).Writing, then, is all that which is inhabited by the trace, by the signifier. Writing acknowledges the 'not there' and the 'not that'. It is the production of the world, as the imaginary order is given substance in the symbolic one, and exists in a process of engagement with the signifier, which process can only be defined as flux, and, therefore, based on discontinuity. Barthes tells us that "The reader (writer) of the text may be compared to someone at a loose end (someone slackened off from any imaginary;...on the side of a valley, a *oued* flowing down below (*oued* is there to bear witness to a certain feeling of unfamiliarity); what he perceives is multiple, irreducible, coming a disconnected, heterogeneous variety of substances and perspectives: lights, colours, vegetation, heat, air, slender explosion of noises, scant cries of birds,

children's voices from over on the other side, passages, gestures, clothes of inhabitants near or far away. All these incidents are half-identifiable: they come from codes which are known but their combination is unique, founds the stroll in a difference repeatable only as difference."[14] This experience of writing depends on an openness to freedom, and is only available from a text whose codes are so open that the text is already writerly. It is from such an engagement that writing may be taught: the text both the model and the source of writing. Barthes description is of a writerly text and it is such a text which might be the school

A writerly text is "...ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular system which reduced the plurality of entrances, the opening of networks, the infinity of languages" (Barthes, *S/Z*, 5). A writerly text mobilizes codes which extend as far as the eye can reach, and are indeterminable; a writerly text is impervious to the authority of any system of meaning. Writerly texts "...encourage the critic to carve them up, to transpose them into difference discourses, produce his/her semi-arbitrary play of meaning athwart the work itself."[15] The writerly text has no determined meaning, no settled signified, but is plural and diffuse, an inexhaustible woven fabric comprised of a galaxy of signifiers, a seamless weave of codes and fragments of codes, through which the writer may cut his own path. The writerly text must be first a "non-sentence", must exist before the "sentence", must exist outside of the "sentence", and though it must always be delivered into the sentence, the sentence need not always be finished. To produce a writerly text, one must first be taught to write (and we must bear in mind at all times Derrida's formulation: writing is all that gives rise to the inscription itself, and is not confined to scriptive systems). A readerly text may not ever teach writing, for to do so would be to advocate the abandonment or rules and laws which define the readerly texts authority- and hence, its existence. "The [writerly] text is (should be) that uninhibited person who shows his behind to the *Political*

Father" (Barthes, *Text*, 53). It is the nature of text to deny authority, and yet, it is the authority who wished to condemn writing "...as a desire for orphanhood and patricidal subversion" (Derrida, *Disseminations*, 77). The school is such an authority, established as a readerly text, and therefore incapable of teaching writing, but rather, determined to teach reading.

I have said that the school text is a readerly one, that it is produced from codes that are closed and which offer severely limited and restricted access to the text which may not then be either written or teach writing. The school text denies the nature of the signifier, worships at the altar of the signified, and condemns writing by defining it as the pushing of nouns against verbs. I would like to look at the school text itself, and expose the nature of the codes from which the fabric is woven. I do not mean to offer here a description of how the school text came to be produced; this work is being done by such people as Michael Apple, Henry Giroux, and others. Rather, what I would like to observe is the very structure of the text, and show how the school text is made so readerly from the closed nature of its codes. I intend to speak of five codes: they are not necessarily inclusive, nor are they mutually exclusive, but they are whole and complete in themselves. These five codes are in large part responsible for the fabric of the school text, and determine its readerly quality. Finally, these codes are not how I read/write the school, but rather, how the school itself has been written from the codes. I refer to these codes as: the hermeneutic code, whose terms treat of enigmas, articulate ways these enigmas are presented and which structures the means of formulating or delaying an answer to those enigmas; the narrative code, by which effects may be predicted from causes and by which behavioral norms are established; the linear code, whose terms organize the conception of time; the semic code, whose terms include the school vocabulary and which is concerned with the connotations of the signifier; and the physical code, whose terms determine the physical shapes and limits of the school text.

First and foremost, the school text is a site, an idea of a location. The physical code of a school establishes and articulates this environment. The school text is, with rare exception, a social place to which one goes; that is to say, the school text exists as a definable, physical site which will serve in no other text except that of the school. This physical site also defines the limits of the text's boundaries and confines. This physical code articulates a site which is separate and apart from other sites, and hence, ensures the validity of the authority of its activities. 'Going to school' is the first independent foray away from the home. The terms of the physical code articulate it as a special location apart from the home or from business: indeed, whatever the activity of the school might be, and to the child the school's activity is often a mystery—an intentionally kept secret—it must be seen to be exclusively the province of this site which is called 'the school,' which is not home and is not the world, the latter being what one is delivered into after attendance at 'school.' Indeed, the physical code of the school acts to isolate the text from both the home and the non-school environment, allocating certain privileges to each, but protecting their separate domains. The physical code of the school articulates the nature of events and activities: there are those which occur at school or those which take place outside of school. Here the physical code determines appropriate and inappropriate actions to the school text. The school site, then, is, in a sense, designated by its physical code as a way station between the home and that world for which preparation is required, but which is definitely not the school. As George Caldwell, a teacher at Olinger High School in John Updike's *The Centaur* says, society has created "jails called schools, equipped with tortures called education. School is where you go between when your parents can't take you and industry can't take you. I am a paid keeper of Society's unusables- the lame, the halt, the insane, and the ignorant."[16] The physical code restricts the school to the idea of a location, and determines either one of two responses: to accept or reject the text, attendance, or non-attendance.

The physical code of a school also involved the shapes and forms which comprise the environment. This code sets the tone and limits of space. The geometrical shape of the classroom determines not only what a person can do, but to a large extent, determines what he can think. In "The Form of Cities," Le Corbusier avers that "Man walks straight because he has a goal; he knows where he is going. He has decided to go somewhere and he walks there directly."[17] This belief in angularity, in straight lines, in the vertical and the horizontal, seems to articulate the terms of the physical code, and results from a world view epitomized in Le Corbusier's words: the forms of nature are chaotic, and to ensure his security, the human creates "...a zone of protection which is in accord with what he is and with what he thinks... Free, man tends toward pure geometry. He makes what is called order." The vertical and the horizontal also determine the eye's direction, the extents of the mind's wanderings, and the limits of the body's perambulations. Straight lines deny meanderings. As Thoreau tells us, "Roads are made for horses and men of business. I do not travel them much, comparatively, because I am not in a hurry to get to any tavern or grocery or livery-stable or depot to which they lead."[18] These physical forms of the school text determine the play of the inhabitants who reside within, and their ability to play with the signifiers which might be arrayed around them. The horizontal and verticals with their clear and defined angles, permit sorely limited possibility for choice of directions, and end always in clearness, in finality. There is certainty in a straight line, and order in its forms. The school physical code seems posited on Le Corbusier's assertion that, "...man, functionally, practices order, that his acts and his thoughts are governed by the upright and the right angle; that to him the upright is an instinctive way and that it is, to his way of thinking, a lofty goal" (135). There is very little in a school which is not governed by geometrical forms. Within the cosmetically designed exterior are an array of boxes, in which are primarily rectangular desks arranged either in rows or large squares. In the occasional circular arrangements, there is a clear inside and outside. On each desk is a square notebook or paper or book, and the lines inscribed on them are for guiding scriptive activities. Through the walls one looks through square windows, or at square pictures placed orderly around the room- or an a rectangular bulletin board. Rectangular file cabinets sit on floors which are tiled with square tiles, or more, in square tiles in rectangular patterns. Even in those classrooms with added furniture, perhaps a couch or an arm chair, these pieces are usually placed against the wall, leaving the middle free- and square. In such rooms movement is limited, the eye is determined to move along certain directions and to proceed, as Le Corbusier stated, from angle to angle, from start to finish, from entrance to exit. The mind has little choice but to acknowledge the strength and dominance of straight lines and right angles. And the student's movement and access to movement is determined by the limited geometry of the room. The array of signifiers is sorely restricted, as is the possibility of play with them. Reading is possible in such an environment, the following of lines, but never writing. The physical code of the school determines the environment wherein the activity of the school might happen; and becomes reified into a symbol not only for the place for education, but for whatever education might be. This code is hence, irreversible, and offers the possibility of entrance at no place other than the rectangular door. The physical code of a school offers a limited play of signifiers with which to work, and produces a sameness and boredom from its rigidity.

The geometry of the physical code is mirrored in the structuring of time within the school text. Indeed, the text is severely determined by its linearly coded time, by which is meant the articulation of time in an inexorably forward motion and the acceptance of this flow as natural and inevitable. It is obvious, given this construct, how the linear code can admit of only one entrance and insist on only one continuous direction: linear time is conceived as an objective phenomenon, moving, like the tides, forward. (One is reminded here of the aphorism, "Time and tide for no man

waits.") There are beginnings and endings, and both can be exactly defined. Between the beginning and the end there is a relatively straight path, which is the mirror image of the articulation of the physical code of the text. All actions are continually and inevitable enacted under the Damoclean sword-the clock-and it is that perceived belief in the movement of that clock from which the code is constructed.

It would seem superfluous to note how the linear code, a dominant weave in the school text, functions to produce a readerly text in which only reading can be learned, but it might be worthwhile to note in passing just a few instances of its signifieds. The length of the day spent at school is externally defined and determined; whatever the school's activities, they are confined to these regularly kept hours. So too are the years allotted to attendance at the school, at which time education is declared concluded, or higher education must begin. Until the age of sixteen, every person is required to attend school, but at sixteen one may leave voluntarily. The activity is defined by the quantity of years spent in school, and not by the quality of those years. Bells separate scheduled periods which divide the day into inexorably timed segments. Lessons are organized around single periods of regular and predictable length, all governed by the clock and not by the material; an absence represents time lost, opportunity missed, and is considered as a serious interruption in continued and a continuous movement. Textbooks are read from beginning to end, in sequentially numbered chapters which, in history texts at least, are almost always structured on linearly ordered time lines. Life happens, it must be read, sequentially. One progresses through school from grade one and leaves after having completed grades 2 through 12, in that order. Tests must be made up within a certain period of time. Period 2 follows period one as regularly as Math II follows Math I. In such manner only may education be gained. The closed nature of this code is obvious.

And yet linearity is only a function of efficiency, which is a human device for ordering experience. Linearity is simply a system of classification. And as Stephen Jay Gould notes,

"...classifications both reflect and direct our thinking. The way we order represents the way we think."[19] This linear code, which prioritizes exact dependence upon regularity, and the definition of movement based upon forward directions is inimical to the writerly text. The linear code is designed to limit access and prevent play, to control movement: to practice and to teach reading. For in our internalization of these structures we determine our systems of thought, and prevent our ability to play with the limitless signifiers which are arrayed before us. The linear code maintains us in a track and a direction, and permits no carving or weaving with that code. The only possibilities open in this code are to be left back, to repeat a year, or to extend enrollment beyond the accepted and expected four year stay. Each of these options carries with it society's condemnation. And yet, without that play, we may not learn to write or write our text.

The linear code also denies the possibilities of the writing of text by restricting access to the process by which writing might take place. The research would show that "writing" happens not in linear fashion, but in endless patterns of recursive actions.[20] The linear code, in programming students along a preestablished direction governed by a determined time sequence within ordered time frames, denies the possibility of recursive action, and must deny the writing of the text by a student.

The school text is tightly woven by the linear code: the hermeneutic code, by which enigmas are revealed and their solutions posed, exacerbates the weave of the text. For it is certain that the school text is produced by the setting out of enigmas, and by the controlled and various means of formulating answers or holding those answers in suspension. The concept of prerequisites articulates the hermeneutic code and establishes hierarchies and categories which are, at best, unbreachable and isolating, but whose promise for engaging in these practices is redemptive. At the end, solutions are promised, and questions are to be resolved. Hence, this code organizes the availability of experience, and it is by this code that the school text begins to establish a theme. As

it suggests enigmas, and as it articulates various ways to the question, to the responses, and to the variety of chance events which can either formulate a question or delay its answer, the school text establishes an irreversible and impenetrable path. That there is an enigma produces the hierarchy; that the enigma has solution is evidenced from the hierarchy. There is no escape from the system, and the text which is woven brooks no play, no carving up, no restructuring. The paths are determined, even as are the ends. For as the enigma is already answered in the deep structure of the text, so must the paths to that answer be, as a result, determined. Even as it advertises learning, the hermeneutic code inhibits it by dictating the conditions of it and defining its end.

The establishment of prerequisites is an exclusionary device which prevents the development of natural curiosities and interests even as it tantalizes the learner with golden apples which are made to recede even as they are grasped at by eager minds. Each numbered course, each prerequisite, each division into classes-even buildings-are elements in the hermeneutic code which pose the enigma, and delay its answering. These classifications suggest a final answer. classify learning into time sequences, and establish clear directions of the process of educational development irregardless of the true state of the individual learner. Prerequisites deny the development of planning and individual development, discouraging challenge and risk-taking. Prerequisites protect the system even as they reproduce it, and ensure its continuance by determining what may be learned, by whom, and when.

And prerequisites are only one order of our reliance on the hermeneutic code. When one period follows another, we acknowledge that learning happens in discrete time blocks, Math following English, Social Studies succeeding Math. And that tomorrow's Math lesson will, in all probability be a continuation of today's. Each block represents a piece to a puzzle, the final picture of which is promised, though rarely offered. Each block, too, as in the daytime soap operas to

which students are so attached, offers enlightenment tomorrow. Indeed, the very phrase, higher education, suggests that the answer is continually deferrable, and made available only after to those who are chosen to continue. To those who stop along the way remains the perennial disappointment of having stopped going to school, and having ceased their education, and of having failed to acquire the answer. The hermeneutic code in not only establishing the enigma, but in articulating the ways of offering questions and of formulating and delaying answers to it, must deny the signifier in which meaning is infinite. It is from the signifier that writing must stem: writing is the signifier of the signifier.

The hermeneutic code provides, we might say, the tonal nature of the text. It organizes the harmonic patterns which are articulated by the semic code, which is responsible for the connotations of the vocabulary by which the school talks about itself. As determined symbols, this vocabulary represents the reification of meaning, epitomizes the law of the signified, and hence, determines the readerliness of the code which produces the textual fabric. The vocabulary is one which the school has devised in order to write itself, and which it chooses to use when it is engaged in discourse with those within or without the site, and which it advertises as the vocabulary which one must employ when discussing the text which has come to be called 'the school.' There are terms which are especially particular to the vocabulary code of the school text; it is these to which we must look to evaluate the openness of this particular code. This is not intended as a complete listing, but meant, rather, to indicate drift. Among other terms which are part of this vocabulary code are 'curriculum,' 'student', 'teacher', and 'administrator,' What I might like to note is how these words are both mutually exclusive, and yet paradoxically, mutually interdependent, producing a hierarchy which is intractable and impermeable. Without students, teachers are irrelevant. And because the school's activity must be organized, ensuring the proper placement and future movement of each member along the directed route, an administrative staff is necessary to oversee

that construction. The vocabulary code of the school can only produce a text which is readerly, the code of the school can only produce a text which is readerly, the code itself dependent on hierarchical structures. The total effect is a text which provides no flexibility, and no entry save at prescribed places. For no matter how the words are defined-even in the most liberal manner-they are mutually distinct categories, and movement between them is, if not prohibited, then severely restricted.

The hermeneutic code determines the connotations of the word, 'student' in the school text, for the articulation of enigmas is made expressly to them, and the variety of events which are organized to lead to an answer or to postpone an answer is meant to engage that specific body called students. And though they are to arrive, finally, at an end, that end has been already articulated and defined. Hence, student's place in the hierarchy is determined. They are, interestingly enough, the lowest rung of the hierarchical order of the school text, and it is they whose movement is most restricted within the vocabulary code. Incapacity of movement prevents writing, and encourages reading, as it denies the structure of the signifier and determines signifieds. It is also significant that by this hierarchical structure, the textuality of the students themselves must be denied, for to admit that "the 'I' which approaches a text is already a plurality of other texts, of codes which are infinite, or more precisely, lost (whose origin is lost)", (Barthes, *S/Z*, 10) would call into question not only the three codes discussed above, but the nature of the entire school text itself as it is constituted in the society.

The curriculum is the written and designed articulation of the hermeneutic code; curriculum is the name given to the sequential hierarchy of materials to be presented within the time and physical constraints of the school text as it exists in its entirety. Curriculum may also be the subject matter to be presented; but though it may change in detail, it is constrained within the text to serve the same function: a result of the text's rigidity. For whatever the subject matter, it must articulate the enigmas and the way to their solutions or

artificial deferrals. And these must be clearly set out, or disorder will result from the varying locations of students in a single room along the hermeneutic code. This disorder is inimicable to the text, and threatens to dismantle it. Hence, there is a language arts curriculum, articulated for grades kindergarten through grade 12, as well as English curriculum for Grade 12. Finally, it must be the result of curriculum to lead students to the answer; hence, the deep structure of curriculum is a world view. Be this, the end of curriculum must be interpretation and not construction. Rather, the end of curriculum is the discovery of an interpretation. Writing is the production of text: "...whether this text be Proust or the daily newspaper or the television screen: the book creates meaning, the meaning creates life" (Barthes, *Pleasure*, 36). The readerly school text denies this opportunity, and denies then, the opportunity for pleasure.

Teachers, then, is the name given to the order of those whose responsibility it is to deliver the materials ordained by the curriculum. Their role, too, is determined by their place in the hierarchy, these hierarchies the result of the codes. Teachers must be those who may present the curriculum and in that organization, lead students to a determined answers. Hence, it is posited that teachers within the school text are outside the activity which they initiate, are at best catalysts who should remain unchanged by the situation. What a teacher may actually do is determined not by himself, but by an adherence to the codes by which the school text is written and of which she is both a part and apart.

Now a writerly text calls all language into question, for its field is the signifier; if all language is called into question then all language is demanded and there can be no hierarchy, and there can be no judge, arbiter, confessor master analyst or decoder of the text, for no language system could be sufficient. Yet the school text is founded on layers of hierarchies, evidenced here in its vocabulary, each one defining by its existence the limits of the writing which is possible. These hierarchies, which exist everywhere within the text, actually deny the writerly quality of the school text even as they

prohibit the writing of text. For these hierarchies settle meaning, determine signifieds, and close off and deny access to the signifiers which are the raw materials of writing text. The vocabulary code establishes a hierarchy which announces meaning; determines access to materials for writing even as it condemns that writing.

It is easy to see how this vocabulary system demands syntax: determines deliverance into the sentence and denies the free play of the signifiers which is the nature of text. And yet, the writerly text is limitless, de-centered, and infinite: the text "...is no more than the open list of the fires of language (those living fires, intermittent lights, wandering features strewn in the text like seeds and which for us advantageously replace the 'semina aeternitatis,' the 'zopyra', the common notions, the fundamental assumptions of ancient philosophy" (Barthes, *Pleasure*, 16-17). Syntax, grammar, all hierarchy is inimicable to the writerly text, and yet the vocabulary code of the school text insists upon it, and therefore, denies writing.

The school is, finally, woven from the narrative code, which I will define here as that code which allows one to predict effects from causes. The narrative code establishes behavioral norms which are absolutely derived from the above articulated codes. It should be clear how restricted behavior may be given the natures of the linear, hermeneutic, physical, and semic codes. This narrative code seems the most constrained, and any attempt at play only serves to test the limits of the confinements which each person occupies. Causes and effects are determined from the beginning, and behaviors are organized to direct and to facilitate movement through the text. This is the process of reading, for it demands the consumption of product. This readerly text, which must be consumed, does not offer the opportunity to produce the text, to open it out, to "set it going." This text may never be written, for it offers no opportunity nor materials with which to write.

This textual fabric known as 'the school' is written by the weave of codes. These codes produce a text which is a social

site, and which is classified by the society in which it finds itself by the function which is assigned to it: to engage in education. But the text itself, determines very clearly what that means, and this readerly text can only define education as a process and a result of reading. Writing must be inimicable to this text, for writing would deny its very structure and place its existence in jeopardy. And this readerly text teaches reading.

For by the weave of these codes, education may only be the orderly process of following designated paths under the guidance of those who know not only the paths but their ends as well, to arrive finally at an image of the reality which must be either accepted...or rejected. These are the only two options in this construct. Knowledge may not be here, then, production. It can not be a process of transformation in which through human labor, materials of the sensate world-signifiers-are turned into problems, more signifiers. This would be writing, as we have earlier defined it. The activity of the school may not be a process by which these solutions to the first problems, to which we may attach the name, signifieds, become signifiers in the next and continuing transformation; this would be writing, and we recall here Derrida's statement that writing is the signifier of the signifier. Rather, knowledge can only be here an end, a body of information which is not a production, but a reproduction, or worse, simply a matter of transport. This delivery is reading, a process of consumption.

And yet, it is only to see knowledge as production, as writing, that can produce the writerly, and how writing may be learned. The knowledge premised by the school, however, offers no promise for change-the essence of work-and can not offer the possibility for changing the human's relationships to everything about her, resulting in a change in the quality of life. Without change, without production, there is no writing and no writerly text. For change is intrinsic to the nature of the writerly text as the limitless play of signifiers are transformed into signifieds which are then again transformed into signifiers. Writing is all that inhabits the trace:

there can be no trace in a defined and definable goal.

The activity of the readerly school text then, may only practice a sifting through, or engaging in, successive approximations of reality to discover or reveal a preexisting reality.[21] It is to read *Hamlet* and discover its meaning. Those approximations must come from outside, and thus places knowledge not within the student, but without him. In this readerly text, knowledge is not a matter of utilizing aspects of pre-existing orders in order to allow one to create one's own reality, one's own text. Rather, knowledge is a location to which one arrives later. And our own present locus is always an inferior version of what will happen later.

But writing does posit knowledge as the power of transformation: the ability to employ the things of this world to transform theoretical raw materials into problems which must be solved. These two rocks, which look so dissimilar, have been found in the same back yard? Why? What could that mean? Or, what interested Shakespeare about Hamlet? What interests me about Hamlet that I would read the play through? And now, having done so, who is Hamlet, and who am I now? Knowledge is a process, is the writing of text; neither activity is an end. Knowledge, textual writing, is the basis of education.

As the school text is so woven now, knowledge is a body of received facts: someone else's signifieds. A large quantity of literature exists exposing this concept of knowledge: revealing it, rather, to be a socially determined, hegemonic construct which denies the possibility of liberatory activity. The school's role in this construct is central. It would seem that this construct represents that aspect of the Lacanian process of symbolization wherein the characteristics and nature of the signified are different from that of the signifier, producing a situation where the relationship between the two is fixed and can only be learned. That learning denies the play of the signifier, creates codes which are inflexible, determines meaning, and prohibits entry into, and hence, writing of, the text. A site which advocates this system must be seen as a readerly text, for it denies the very nature of writing, which

is based on the free play of signifiers. It denies the solving of problems as well; for a meaning already determined defines the paths to it, the nature and substance of those limited number of paths. Had there been signs at the crossroads in the yellow wood, the poet's choice would have had to have been arrived at differently, and not by writing, but by reading. It is reading, the reading of signs and not the making of them which is thus taught in school: reading which is a consumption, and not writing, which is a production. Of consumption two responses only are viable: to consume or not to consume.

Knowledge in the readerly text is merely the exposition of a given text, and the objective delineations of specific disciplines: these the preestablished woven patterns which comprise the readerly text, and which serve only to inhibit entry into the school text and preclude writing. These disciplines determine signifiers into signifieds; this reading practice is not the teaching of writing, and it cannot be education.

Yet, writing is the substance of education. One does not necessarily have a *knowledge* of chemistry at the completion of a course by that name, nor can one claim *to know* Shakespeare after having successfully survived a seminar in the major plays. Rather, one can only claim to have acquired materials from which problems can be devised. One should always speak only of a new array of signifiers. Now, the nature of the signifiers is infinite, as are the problems which can be devised from them. Of course, the presented materials determine the nature of the questions which may be posed; they are, in effect, the answered question seen through a particular window upon awakening. But these materials which are really signifiers are to be played with, torn apart and reconstituted. Only in this way is writing taught. And in the teaching of writing is taught the plethora of meaning; that is the real purpose of education. For to know that meaning is infinite is to know as well that it may be always produced. That production can only occur in the process of writing: all that inhabits the trace. All else must be reading: to read these signifiers as signifieds suggests that they can be explained, explicated, but never taken apart. These materials must be

left whole, they are whole codes themselves and not signifiers which may be employed in the creation of text-in writing. Such materials may be read, may be consumed, are icons to be venerated: their value is what can be gotten from them, what one can do with them, but not what can be done to them. From such materials the observer stands apart, remains outside. Freedom, which is created in the act of writing, however, exists not in contemplation, but in action. To teach reading is to teach subjugation: As Gully Jimson, the irrepressible artist in Joyce Cary's *The Horse's Mouth*, says, "Contemplation, in fact, is ON THE OUTSIDE. It's not on the spot...And the truth is that Spinoza was always on the outside. He didn't understand freedom, and so he didn't understand anything...Freedom, to be plain, is nothing but THE INSIDE OF THE OUTSIDE...what you get on the inside...is the works-it's SOMETHING THAT GOES ON GOING ON..."[22] Writing is an activity of freedom, and to teach writing is to teach freedom: the closed code of activity with which is woven the school text teaches the opposite: teaches enslavement, teaches passivity, lethargy, and subservience to the written word. To teach writing is have no method, but to allow methods.

Education is the name of the complex system whose primary purpose is to facilitate the production of knowledge. It is the locus where the student might realize his own purposes, and give substance to the work of his imagination. It is where the writerly text teaches writing. It is by the educative process that students are encouraged to incorporate into their repertoire means by which they might produce knowledge. Students, and we are all always students, must be taught to write! Education should provide the stimulus for encouraging the students' development of original means of production. Only the constraints of ideology determine the limits of these techniques, and the acknowledgement of this limitation is the beginning of its dismantlement. One who is involved in education is engaged in the processes of knowledge production. But, knowledge is the text that one writes, and not the materials on which one works. Education should

result in the construction of determined structures, signifieds, whose forms are yet undetermined, are, in fact, originally signifiers, and which may become so once again. *Hamlet* is different materials than *Macbeth*, and this difference must figure dominantly in the particular formulation which will arise. But the exact nature of the formulations can never be known until they are produced, nor need they be made permanent. The possibilities are infinite: the text is characterized by plurality. When you ask the citizens of Thekla, in Calvino's *Invisible Cities*, where is the blueprint for their edifices, they are too busy constructing to answer until night has fallen. An when "darkness falls over the building site...The sky is filled with stars. Pointing upwards, the citizens say, 'There is the blueprint.'" The expansive universe is the only model and the sole limitation of their imaginations. Building is what they do, and not what they get. The world is a plural text from which plural texts must be written.

As the slave, Jim, sits captive in a shack at the Phelps' farm, Tom Sawyer and Huckleberry Finn plot to free him. Tom orders Huck to 'borrow' a shirt from Aunt Sally.

> "What do we want of a shirt, Tom?"
>
> "Want it for Jim to keep a journal on."
>
> "Journal your granny-Jim can't write."
>
> "S'pse he can't write-he can make marks on the shirt can't he, if we make him a pen out of an old pewter spoon or a piece of an old iron-barrelhoop."[23]

Of course, for Tom it is of little consequence that Jim can't write: Tom's text has little to do with the captive slave. Indeed, it is inimical to Tom's text that Jim be able to write: were he so able he would not be liable to such manipulation. As Huck acknowledges, "Jim he couldn't see no sense in the most of it, but he allowed we was white folks and knowed better than him; so he was satisfied, and said he would do it all just as Tom said" (Twain, 239). Nor is Tom's text very plural: the codes it mobilizes have limited access, and determine the method of reading, fixing signifieds and denying signifiers: there is a way to read this text, and Tom knows the way. Responding to Huck's complaint about the foolishness in

using case knives to dig Jim out of the shack when picks and shovels would do, Tom responds: "It don't make no difference how foolish it is, it's the *right* way-and it's the regular way. And there ain't no *other* way, that ever *I* heard of, and I've read all the books that gives any information about these things"(Twain, 234). Having learned all by reading, Tom can only produce a readerly text. Chastising Huck, who only knows how to write, for his wanting simply to free Jim in the most efficient and safest manner possible, Tom complains, "You *can* get up the infant-schooliest ways of going at a thing. Why, hain't you ever read any books at all" (231)? Tom's text is a readerly one: it makes of people objects, demands passivity and intransitiveness, insists on seriousness, and its codes limits access to the text. As a readerly text, it denies the nature of the signifiers and exalts the signified. It denies the idea of play and offers only two alternatives to the reader: to accept or reject the text. He admonishes Huck, and denies him freedom, and accuses him of "...always a-wandering off on a side issue. Why can't you stick to the main point?" (Twain 235) And if Huck wants to free Jim, and if Jim desires his freedom, then it is absolutely necessary that they accept Tom's text. The signifiers are determined as signifieds, the symbols have only to be learned. Tom's allowance that Jim can't write doesn't in the least affect Tom's pleasure: but the adherence to the code seriously restricts the acceptance of difference and the plethora of meanings available. And it does produce confusion and boredom in the other participants.

Such is the case with the school text. It is a readerly text. And it cannot produce knowledge. We must recall that all of Tom's reading couldn't free Jim, but Jim's writing saved Tom's life.

Endnotes

1. Henry David Thoreau, **Walden**, (New York: New American Library, 1960), p. 65.
2. The adjective is Barthes'. He refers to Penelope as the "eponymous speaker." I believe his intent is akin to my own.
3. Roland Barthes, **S/Z**, trans. Richard Miller, (New York: Hill & Wang, 1986), p. 7.
4. ee cummings, **50 Poems**, (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1940), 14.
5. This definition is equally true for Derrida as for Lacan, though the definition I use here comes from Lacan.
6. Freud says that "The system revealed by the sign that the single acts forming parts of it are unconscious we designate by the name "The Unconscious," for want of a better and less ambiguous term..." Sigmund Freud, **A General Selection From the Works of Sigmund Freud,** edit. John Rickman (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), p. 53.
7. Jacques Lacan, **The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis**, trans. Jacques-Alain Miller, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1981), p. 25.
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Interdisciplinary Approaches To Paulo Freire's Educational Theory

Nina Wallerstein
University of New Mexico

Brazilian educator Paulo Freire developed his educational philosophy and methodology through his highly successful literacy program for peasants and slumdwellers in the late 1950s and 1960s in Brazil. In the last three decades, his ideas have served as catalysts for literacy and community development programs throughout the third world. Less well known is his impact on educational curriculum in the developed world: on English as a Second Language,[1,2] English composition,[3,4] math education,[5] health education, [6,7,8] college teaching, [9] and on teenage schooling.[10]

The recent publication of North American applications of Freire's ideas, *Freire in the Classroom* (1987), reflects growing interest in Freirian curriculum development for basic skills and content-area teaching.[11] The very diversity of Freirian adaptations enables educators to explore some core curricular issues: how does Freirian education differ from other philosophies? How does his philosophy translate into method, ie., are there easy-to-replicate Freirian techniques? How do different institutional structures affect student outcomes and the success of Freirian projects? This article examines these questions in three applications of Freire's ideas: in English as a Second Language teaching, in worker health-and-safety education, and in community health education.

Freirian Philosophy and ESL/Literacy Education:

Applications to English as a Second Language (ESL) and basic skills teaching most directly evolve from Freire's original work in basic Portuguese literacy. For his literacy curriculum, Freire (with a team of community investigators) chose three-syllable words which contained phonetic combinations of the Portuguese language while representing the emotionally and socially charged ("generative") issues in

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students' lives. Through recombination of syllables and dialogue on the issues raised by the words, students simultaneously developed their own phrases and gained a voice in how they could improve their lives. In six weeks, people learned the literacy skills to vote and to participate in the political process.[12]

Although the phonetically-oriented literacy method is less applicable to teaching the English language, Freire's philosophy and approach to students is particularly well suited to basic education classrooms. Like the population Freire originally worked with, ESL and English literacy students in the U.S. largely come from low socio-economic backgrounds. Most have little formal education and limited access to jobs. As minorities, they often face contradictory messages from discriminatory situations or from media-stimulated expectations of equal opportunity. While many people express anger at the discrepancies between their experience and our culture's dominant myths, others blame themselves and become vulnerable and more powerless.

Freire's starting premise is that education is not neutral; the process does not occur in a vacuum. Students bring their life context into the classroom: their life pressures, their expectations of the future. About this context, Freire asks: who does education serve and for what purpose? Does education prepare people to be objects of learning and to accept their place within the status quo, or does it encourage people to realize their potential by engaging with the critical issues of the day and questioning forces that keep them passive?

To Freire, the purpose of education should be human liberation, which means people are subjects of their own learning, not empty vessels filled by teachers' knowledge. To promote the role of the learner as subject, Freire proposes a *dialogue* approach in which everyone—teacher and student, organizer and community member—participates as co-learners to construct a reality in social exchange with others. Discussing the co-learner role of a teacher, Freire writes that education:

> is a live and creative dialogue in which everyone knows some things and does not know others, in which all seek together to know more. This is why you, as the coordinator of a cultural circle, must be humble, so that you can grow with the group instead of losing your humility and claiming to direct the group, once it is animated.[13]

The goal of such group dialogue is critical thinking or posing problems in such a way as to uncover root causes of one's place in society—the socio-economic, political, cultural, and historical context of personal lives. But critical thinking continues beyond perception—towards the *actions* that people take to gain control over their lives. True knowledge evolves from the interaction of reflection and action (or *praxis*) to transform social conditions.

Freirian education therefore may be called empowerment education via problem-posing, for it starts from key problems in people's lives, and, through dialogue, empowers them to take active roles in their communities to effect personal and social change. Empowerment education involves people in a group process to identify their own problems, to critically analyze the cultural and socio-economic roots of the problems, and to develop strategies to gain control in their lives. Empowerment is not power *over* others, but power *with* others to redress social inequities. Empowerment education therefore teaches more than individual development or self-esteem. Teaching efforts become directed at individual changes, community quality of life, and structural changes for social justice.

As opposed to Freirian philosophy, much ESL and basic education curricula—wittingly or unwittingly—often leads to disempowerment. Prevailing ESL or remedial curricula, including the popular competency-based movement, often ignore students' problematic reality and self-doubts or, worse, use inappropriate or discriminatory language.

A brief critique of competency and functional curricula will help demonstrate their difference with Freirian education. First, although students of these methods may benefit

from learning to fill out employment forms, many already know how to *function* well enough to survive in their worlds; in fact, they may have much to teach us about survival. Second, teaching functional skills often means teaching students to fit into a prescribed role without questioning: for example, training students to respond to supervisor orders, but not to negotiate their rights. Third, competency approaches assume learning is an individual skill acquired through step-by-step sequences. Critical thinking, on the other hand, requires an active interaction between the individual and the group, and between learners and their social context.

Finally, education that refuses to acknowledge life pressures may be fundamentally flawed, reinforcing learning conflicts and feelings of helplessness and inadequacy. Compare the following ESL dialogues set in a doctor's office. The first is from a traditional competency unit on health:

Mrs. Garcia:	Is Doctor Smith in?
Nurse:	What is your name? Do you have an appointment?
Mrs. Garcia:	No, but I'm very sick. My name is Mrs. Garcia. My friend told me to see Dr. Smith.
Nurse:	Let me speak to the doctor. Dr. Smith will see you next.
Dr. Smith:	What is your trouble, Mrs. Garcia?
Mrs. Garcia:	I have a bad pain in my chest. I cough all the time.
Dr. Smith:	Your lungs seem clear. I'll give you a prescription. Have it filled at the drug store. You need to keep quiet and get some rest.

Although the competency skills of talking to a doctor and making an appointment are useful, the manner in which they are presented in the above example is troubling. First, the lesson assumes a situation familiar to students, thay they have their own doctor and can be squeezed into a busy

schedule without an appointment. Yet, ESL and basic literacy students more often go to clinics and wait hours to see a clinician. For non-English speakers, the dialogue doesn't explore the feelings they may have when seeing a doctor: feeling embarrassed about receiving care or about not speaking English well. Finally, this lesson assumes people can rest from work. More often, they don't have sick-leave benefits and can't afford to stay home. Although this lesson presents target vocabulary, it misreads the students' life situations and in so doing blocks learning or at least fails to facilitate it.

Unlike the previous example, a Freirian curriculum presents students' reality to generate discussion on the problematic issues in their lives. Consider the following Freirian ESL lesson also from a health unit. [14]

Receptionist:	County Clinic. May I help you?
Felicia:	My son is very sick. His head is hot.
Recep:	What? You mean he has a fever. What's his name?
Felicia:	His name is Pablo Ramirez. R-A-M-I-R-E-Z.
Recep:	We don't have a record. He needs to come in to the clinic.
Felicia:	Can you repeat that please?
Recep:	He needs to come in.
Felicia:	Can he see the doctor?
Recep:	Yes, bring him after one. The clinic opens at one.
Felicia:	Can you speak slower please.
Recep:	(loudly) After one o'clock tomorrow.
Felicia:	Oh, one. Does anyone speak Spanish there?
Recep:	No, I'm sorry.

Discussion following this lesson can address students' real difficulties in going to a clinic, having to wait in line, feeling frustrated with the lack of bilingual personnel, and feeling powerless overall to change the situation.

To generate participatory dialogue, Freire proposes a five-

step problem-posing questioning strategy that moves discussion inductively from the concrete personal stage to a social analytic and action level. These steps can easily be remembered through the acronym, SHOWeD. [15]

In step one, teachers ask: what do you "*See*" in this dialogue? What are the people doing? saying? Step two is to ask, what's really "*Happening*" here as the problem? Does anyone speak Spanish? How does Felicia feel? And the receptionist? ("Feeling" questions bring out the multiple perspectives of problems.)

In step three, teachers ask: how does this problem relate to "*Our*" lives? Do you know anyone who has experienced this? What happened? How is it the same? different? How do you feel about this problem? (It is better to ask about others and allow people to volunteer their own stories.) Step four is to ask "*Why*" there is a problem. Why are there lines? Why are there no people who speak Spanish? Why is health care often difficult to obtain? (At this point, teachers can present historical information or suggest that students conduct library and neighborhood research to find out their own answers.)

The final step five is the culmination of the problem-posing process as it takes the group into possible action. Step five asks, what can they "*Do*" to solve the problem or choose strategies for action? Should clinic staff speak Spanish? What would people want out of a neighborhood clinic? What can they do to work with local clinics to improve health care?

This initial discussion could lead to other learning activities: writing exercises, language experience stories, research, interviews, petitions to local clinics, etc. Freirian curriculum evolves depending on the interest of the class and previous dialogue. From this lesson, for example, students may become interested in access to health care, bilingualism, or improving bureaucratic relationships.

Freirian Methodology Compared to Adult Education Methods:

The above example of a problem-posing questioning strategy is one part of a Freirian methodology that empowers

people to identify their own key issues, generate dialogue, and propose actions to address their problems. Though there is no easy technique to implementing this methodology, a three-stage process can be gleaned from Freire's writings: listening (or investigating students' concerns); dialogue (or codifying these concerns into lessons for participatory problem-posing dialogue); and action (or doing something to change the problems discussed).

To listen for students' concerns, teachers can use systematic investigative techniques, similar to anthropological fieldwork. But teachers do not have to undertake this listening alone. Students can and should participate in equal partnership to uncover their key issues and learning priorities.

After identifying the issues, Freire proposes creating discussion objects called "codifications" or "codes" followed by the inductive problem-posing questions. A "code" is a concrete physical representation of an identified community issue in any form: role-plays, stories, slides, photographs, songs, or written dialogues as shown in the previous clinic example. Each code re-presents the participants' reality back to them and allows them to project their emotional and social responses in a focused fashion. An effective code shows a problematic situation that is: 1) many-sided, 2) is a daily problem familiar to students, and 3) is open-ended without solutions.

Although codes represent problems, these should not be overwhelming, so much as offer possibilities for group affirmation and small but concrete actions for change. For example, student action from dialogue about the clinic "code" should aim to change one aspect of a local clinic, rather than target all the issues raised. Students need the experience of success to overcome their feelings of powerlessness. Codes therefore become more than visual aides, for they inspire critical thinking and action about issues in people's lives.

Although codes present open-ended situations, critical thinking does not occur spontaneously. Though the teacher may be a co-learner in analyzing the problems and strategies

for action, teachers still must provide class leadership and knowledge to deepen the discussion. Freire therefore proposes the five-step problem-posing strategy demonstrated earlier in the questions based on SHOWeD that followed the clinic code.

Because of the multiple targets of change, it is deceptive to consider this process as problem-*solving*. Most often, the changes people seek in their lives do not have immediate solutions. This process is therefore called problem-*posing*, recognizing the complexity of individual and community change.

Although this inductive questioning strategy enables discussion, dialogic education is not merely a technique. The dialogue approach is founded on believing in the value of students' experience in the classroom, in their abilities to make choices, and in their possibilities for action on individual and social levels. Before dialogue can take place, certain pre-conditions are required, such as developing the trust that enables sharing of deeply-felt experiences and transforming a teacher-led classroom into an environment that values participatory learning. Each individual discussion usually jumps between the multiple levels of questioning, though it is helpful to start with the descriptive and move to the analytic steps.

In many ways, Freire's ideas parallel fundamental methods of adult education: to start from the learner's needs, to make curriculum problem-oriented and practical, to respect the life experiences of the adult student, and to use active learning methods. Beyond these similarities, Freire's approach diverges in significant ways. On the surface, Freire's philosophy of learner-as-subject appears similar to adult education's emphasis on curriculum based on individual needs. But whereas adult education assumes people should follow an individual learning sequence, Freire assumes that knowledge comes from people in a group asking their own questions as they share their experiences. The emphasis is on social knowledge and understanding the social dimensions of problems which can only emerge in group discussion.

To Freire, the educator's role is to contribute outside information once the group raises important themes for mutual reflection. His writings document a concern that educators will "invade" another culture. Instead, they should enter into "authentic dialogue" so people can emerge from their cultural silence to redefine their own reality.

In addition to promoting the group experience and understanding the societal context of problems, Freire diverges from traditional adult education in his view that true learning requires acting in the world. Unlike curricula that end in the classroom, a Freirian curriculum emphasizes action and subsequent reflection as keys to the learning process. Because the group process uncovers the personal and sociopolitical dimensions of problems, Freirian change strategies are broader. For example, rather than using a predetermined curriculum, like teaching skills of calling the doctor, a Freirian curriculum would ask students to identify and try strategies for making health care more accessible in their own communities.

Freire and Worker Health and Safety Education:

Worker health and safety education offers a different base than ESL or literacy classes to apply Freire's ideas of action outside the classroom. First, labor education has historically promoted a similar emphasis on action, teaching information and skills for immediate application back at the job site. Labor education programs also tend to use participatory case studies for problem-solving based on reality.

Second, unlike mose ESL classrooms where students come from a wide geographic area, health and safety education takes place within an institutional structure in union, management, or jointly-sponsored classes. Although the type of change actions proposed will differ depending on the sponsoring organization's objectives, action is often built in. A union-based health and sagety class for example will urge students to participate in health and safety committees or to

educate members on the shop floor. A management-sponsored seminar may focus more on safe work practices. Both however would inform workers how to identify hazards and report situations that need attention.

Freirian education however adds to the action opportunities by emphasizing problem-posing. In addition to teaching an immediate skill, problem-posing examines the underlying causes of the problem, the vested interests that maintain the status quo, longterm strategies, and students' fears about challenging the system, such as losing their jobs. Problem-posing dialogue therefore looks at power relations through possible actions, barriers, and consequences of actions—positive, negative, or unintended ones.

One example of a code from a health and safety class demonstrates confrontation with power relations: [16]

Robert: The report from the health and safety inspector is in.
Mary: What does it say?
George: It says there's no problem. The chemicals in the new paint finish are safe.
John: But we know there's a problem! We all have skin rashes on our hands!
George: The report says there's nothing wrong.
Mary: Well, we should know. We work here.

This lesson raises several issues about knowledge and power: who has a right to know about the health effects of chemicals, what knowledge workers or students have, who has access to technical knowledge, and who has power to make decisions. Through the inductive questioning approach, people can project their anxieties and legitimate fears about speaking out for their rights, can analyze sources or power over them, and can strategize how to reclaim knowledge and control in the situation.

In addition to discussing feelings and issues raised by codes, this type of content area teaching also requires teaching actual skills and information to take action. Codes therefore can be used as motivational devices to trigger

discussion, with information to address the problems given after students raise their own questions.

Although the majority of ESL teaching is less likely than worker health and safety education to have institutional support for actions, ESL programs can also encourage students to analyze power relations and promote change, particularly in community-based ESL and literacy programs with student governance procedures. There students have the opportunity to take risks in making decisions while remaining in a supportive school environment. As they gain confidence and awareness of their ability to make choices, they will be able to take actions in their own lives.

Freire and Community Health Programs:

Applications of Freire in U.S. communtiy settings are less widespread than classroom programs. Although community organizing has a long American tradition through Alinsky's work,[17] only a few community-based programs have begun to integrate a problem-posing pedagogy.[18,19,20]

One example that extends Freire's dialogic education into a community health education and organizing setting is New Mexico's Alcohol Substance Abuse Prevention Program (ASAP) for teenagers. The ASAP Program aims to reduce disease and death among junior high and high school students from high-risk, Hispanic and Indian communities throughout New Mexico. Sponsored since 1982 by the University of New Mexico School of Medicine, ASAP seeks to empower youth to make healthier choices in their own lives, and as community participants, to play an active political role in their communities and society.

ASAP brings in small groups of teenage volunteer students to interact with patients and families in the University Hospital Emergency Center, and with inmates in the county detention center who have alcohol and drug-related problems. By having the teenagers reflect on the stories told by patients and jail residents, ASAP emphasizes Freirian principles of experiential learning, dialogue, sharing their own lives, empathy, critical thinking and social actions.

In addition to interviewing patients and jail residents a total of four times, youth are trained in communication skills, decision-making, peer-teaching techniques, and analysis of media and social policies that influence consumption (such as New Mexico's drive-up liquor windows). Student actions are structured into the curriculum through training the teenagers to be peer teachers and leaders in their own schools and communities after the Emergency Center and Jail experience.

The focal point between the ASAP experience, youth empowerment and community outreach efforts are the discussion "codes" and the problem-posing questioning strategy. In the hospital, the patients and their interview responses become the codes for students to re-evaluate their own lives.

Outside the hospital when students lead peer discussion, they use two short video films developed by ASAP as codes.[21] Produced with the teenage students, the films show emotional vignettes of the students interviewing patients about alcoholism and drunk driving. As discussion catalysts, the films stimulate an exchange of common experience about the problems and prevention possibilities based on local needs.

One of the films concerns a 28-year old Indian woman who arrived at the Emergency Center drunk, having been raped. She talked with the youth for an hour about her alcoholism. The two-minute edited video movingly captures her life story of losing her mother when young and being raised by siblings who drank in front of her and paid her with beer for babysitting. She discussed her loneliness and her dependence on alcohol over everything else, including her Indian religion.

In leading discussions on this film with their peers, youth use the five-step questioning model described earlier. They ask: what do people "*see*" in the film? Can they describe what her life is like? They then ask, what's really "*happening*" here? How does she feel? How did she feel growing up? What are her life problems? How does the film make others feel? The third step is to ask about "*our*" lives? Do people know anyone like

this? How are they the same? different? For step four they ask, "*why*" is there a problem? What are the causes on an individual, family, community, or societal level? What are the reasons that people want to drink? How does advertising contribute? lack of opportunities? What does being a woman and Native American have to do with her low self-esteem?

They finally ask, what can we "*do*" about these problems? How can she get help? What would you do if your family gave you beer? What would you do if someone came to you with an alcohol problem? What can we do to improve community self-esteem? What can we do about advertising? How can we prevent problems in our community?

The last "action" questions place responsibility on the participants to commit themselves to taking action. In ASAP, these actions have included personal behavior changes, opening up dialogue in the community, teaching others, strengthening helping networks, changing social norms by establishing alternatives, and getting involved in policy change.

As people test out their analyses by acting in the real world, they begin a deeper cycle of reflection that includes information from their new experiential base. Collective actions may lead to some successes, failures, or new problems to confront, yet the reflection enables people to learn from mistakes. People become more deeply involved to surmount barriers and reach their collective visions for themselves and their communities.

Conclusion:

These examples of different educational programs using the problem-posing process demonstrate how Freire's ideas can be applied in a wide variety of settings with people who experience inequality, and lack of a personal and social voice. Problem-posing or empowerment education enables students and community members to move beyond their individual barriers to learning and to involve them actively in a group process to change their lives in the classroom and in their communities.

In sum, a Freirian curriculum would be based on the

following precepts: starting the process from people's experience in their social context as a motivator, allowing people to express their feelings about their experience, promoting group dialogue for critical thinking and shared responsibility for decision-making, suggesting actions back in the community to test out ideas for change, and inspiring deeper understanding of problems from further reflection on the actions. Once localized, the constantly evolving curriculum generates an affective, cognitive, and social model for change.

Change—personal, educational, or social—remains an ongoing and difficult process that demands time and continuing commitment. Any curriculum based on this model of change (within and without the classroom) requires teachers to be "patiently impatient" as Paulo Freire reminds us. Although change comes slowly, problem-posing can nurture the process as people explore visions and reconstruct their community together as they learn.

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

THEO van DOESBURG (1916)

The Relationship of Metatheoretical Principles in the Philosophy of Science to Metatheoretical Explorations in Curriculum

Elaine S. Atkins
Community College of Philadelphia

About ten years ago, I began working on metatheory in curriculum, culling the metatheoretical literature in both the natural and social sciences for a small set of universal principles that could guide our theory-making activities. I assumed that somewhere out there scientists or philosophers had defined the essence of theory and had derived rationally a set of criteria that could tell us how to proceed. Thinking my project difficult and perhaps a bit esoteric for most tastes, I was not very surprised when a literautre search turned up so few examples of metatheory in education. I was surprised, however, when I realized that what did exist fell into one of two incompatible camps: metatheory claiming to be "scientific" (algorithmic or empirically derived) or philosophical (usually dealing with questions of moral or ethical choice).

My search for a rationally derived set of metatheoretical principles followed a somewhat predictable path, I now see. First, I turned to traditional sources in the philosophy of science, reading Post-Enlightenment philosophers within the realist tradition. Then I discovered the relativists and abandoned a search for universal, context-free criteria to guide all theory making activity. Finally, I came upon a third perspective, one which now seems most promising and suited for curriculum theory. This perspective, as yet unnamed, is actually a synthesis of contemporary American pragmaticism and continental hermeneutics. In 1983, Richard Bernstein wrote a book entitled *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* wherein he attempted to compare and, at points, synthesize the work of pragmatists such as Dewey, Peirce and James with the work of hermeneutical thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas. It was Berstein's thesis that such

a new perspective would enable us to make explicit the continuity among science, morals and the arts. Bernstein's project offers us a powerful framework for looking at curriculum and for making good choices about what to do. By drawing from both hermeneutics and the American pragmatic tradition, he helps us understand the nature of deliverative reasoning.

What follows below is a discussion of three perspectives or traditions (realism, relativism and a synthesis of pragmatism and hermeneutics) as altervate ways of understanding rationality, and more particularly, theorizing activity. It is a historical study in the sense that it traces the Post-Enlightenment movement from objectivism to relativism, to pragmatism and hermeneutics. Yet it also reflects a distinct bias by suggesting that moving beyond objectivism (realism) and relativism will bear fruitful results in curriculum theory. This of course is a pragmatic claim; it makes no assertiona about ultimate truth or correspondence to reality, nor does it dwell on the incommensurability of opposing theories. Instead it suggests a way of proceeding that will enable us to gain a better understanding of what we are doing when we make curriculum decisions. Its ultimate purpose is to contribute to the growth of a dialogical community, in which practical discourse and judement are embodied in our educational practices.

The Realist Tradition

All realist accounts of theoretical progress, whether in the social or natural sciences, entail the concept that truth exists "out there" in the world. Hence, if two theories conflict, at least one of them is false. It follows that realists see progress in terms of ideas that are ostensibly independent of us and as a function of gathering more and more truths or moving closer and closer to truth. What holds all realist claims together is the concept of the independence of truth; it exists independently of our coming to grasp it.

Pilosophers working within the Post-Enlightenment realist tradition attempted to construct an account of human nature based on the universal and categorical character of certain rules of reason. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 52). As Alasdair MacIrtyre has pointed out, this "Enlightenment Project" was dedicated to developing valid arguments that moved from premises concerning human nature as they understood it to conclusions about the authority of moral rules and precepts. Discussing Kant's thesis that the rules of morality are rational, and therefore must be the same for all rational beings, just the way that the rules of arithmetic are, MacIntyre notes that the project of discovering a rational justification of morality was construed as the simple task of discovering a rational test that would discriminate those maxims which are genuine expressions of the moral law. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 44). His entire book, *After Virtue*, provides a rather provocative and detailed account of how Post-Enlightenment philosophers pursued a doomed quest for a set of principles that were universal, categorical and internally consistent. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 45).

Modern philosophers of science working within the realist tradition also look for universal principles that will disclose the truth. They are dedicated to articulating a set of laws that will enable them to assess the intrinsic strengths of competing theories. Realists believe that one theory more closely approximates the truth than another. The thesis of verisimilitude, the key tenet of contemporary rationalists such as Popper, Lakatos and Newton-Smith defines progress in terms of a sequence of theories which come closer and closer to objective truth. Realists support their belief in verisimilitude by pointing to the fact that theories in mature sciences (e.g. physics), provide us with better predictions about their world than their predecessors, thus enabling us to manipulate the world more effectively. (Newton-Smith, 1981).

According to Popper, the aim or ultimate goal of science is the production of true explanatory theories. If a theory is closer to the truth than another, it contains greater content, and this content is true. (Popper, 1972) The principles of comparison involved are based on corroboration; the more

corroborated theory is the better one. Similarly, if a theory passes many tests, as opposed to one which fails many, it possesses greater verisimilitude. In Popper's account, a theory is scientific if and only if it is falsifiable, that is, structured in such a way that it can be tested for falsity. Theories can be discredited (shown to be false) by appealing to the results of observation and experiment. For example, if a statement based on observation can be demonstrated to be false, then we can conclude that the universal statement to which it belongs is also false. Put differently, the falsificationist views science as a set of hypotheses that are proposed to describe or account for the real behavior of some aspect in the world. (Chalmers, 1976, p. 36).

Good theories provide information about the world "out there" partly because they have already ruled out ways in which it could possibly behave but in fact does not. (Chalmer, 1976, p. 38). Popper regards theories as genuine conjectures, highly informative guesses about the world which, although not verifiable (i.e. capable of being shown to be true,) can be submitted to severe objective tests. (Popper, 1972)

Lakatos, who has been called a sophisticated falsificationist after Popper, uses a broader lens to view theoretical progress. He enlarges Popper's unity of appraisal from the single theory to a sequence of related theories and reserves the term 'theory' for reserves the term 'theory' for a system of assertions that operate within a given research program. (Lakatos, 1968). In his account, theories are replaced by different conjectures during the history of a research program. Scientific progress occurs as theories progress within a pardigm or within a given research program. Much of Lakatos' work depends upon a search for objective criteria to distinguish progressive from degenerating research programs by determining if the program contains some excess empirical content over its predecessor. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 245).

Still other realists, such as Newton-Smith, view progress as a progression of confirmations, rather than a progression of theories that have not yet been falsified. In such accounts,

as theories move closer and closer to verisimilitude, progress occurs. Based on his belief in the steady progression of theories towards truth, Newton-Smith has abstracted a small set of universal criteria for judging individual theories. These criteria, labeled the "good-making features of theories," resemble the evaluative guiding maxims established by many other realists and appear frequently in metatheoretical literature in the physical and social sciences. For example, Newton-Smith abstracts such criteria as replication of observational success, fertility for guiding future research, track record in field, inter-theory support, smoothness, internal consistency and simplicity (Newton-Smith, 1983, pp. 226-236). All rest, of course, on the realist's assumption that the relative importance of each criterion can be agreed upon, and that there exists a common language for discussing them.

In intent and spirit, the attempts of realists in the philosophy of science are not unlike Kantian efforts in philosophy to determine universal principles of rationality. All rest on the assumption that tests can be constructed to discriminate those maxims or theories which are genuine expressions of truth from those which are false. Whether the search is for universal moral laws, or verifiable scientific theories, the ultimate goal is to capture objective reality.

Relativism

As MacIntyre claims in *After Virtue*, numerous Post-Enlightenment attempts to discover systematically a rational justification for morality have successively failed. As a result, many modern thinkers have retreated to emotivism, a theory characterized by MacIntyre as the claim that in moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for expressions of personal preference. (MacIntyre, 1983, p. 19). Emotivism holds that there are no, and can be no, valid rational justifications for any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 19).

This emotivist claim is consonant with much recent work in the philosophy of science. Relativists have been particu-

larly powerful in critiquing and descrediting the traditional view of scientific theory. To review breifly, until fairly recently (the 1950'), philosophers of science construed scientific theories as axiomatic calculi which were given a partial observational interpretation by means of correspondence rules. (Suppe, 1974, p. 1). First called the "Received View" by Putnam in 1962, this account eventually came to mean an analysis of theories in which correspondence rules constituted an interpretive system. (Suppe, 1974, p. 25). In its final version, a theory was construed as a formalized, deductively connected bundle of laws which were applicable in completely specifiable ways (via correspondence rules) to their observable manifestations. (Suppe, 1974, p. 36, 52).[1]

Critics of the Received View have attacked its assumption that theories are objective accounts of the world. Philosophers of science such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, sometimes referred to as Weltanschauungen analysts, agree that theories are about the world, but only as we see that world. Relativism entails the concept that we are the only judges of what constitutes good reasons for adopting one theory over another and that these reasons are dependent upon the way we view reality. Emotivism in moral theory, and relativism in the sciences spring from the same source: the conviction that the lens (*weltanschauung*) we use shapes the reality we see. Put simply, different people, from different cultures (or from different scientific communities) live in different worlds.

Relativists hold that there exists no absolute standard for choosing one theory over another, no rational way out there to help us choose between rival theories. In Thomas Kuhn's words, "There is no systematic decision procedure, which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision." (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 199-200). Objective criterial of rationality do not exist; what is taken to be rational is whatever is believed to be so by members of a given community.

It follows then that disagreements between members of different communities cannot be rationally resolved. In their account of scientific progress, relativists maintain that terms

used in one culture, say the term 'termperature' as used by a seventeenth-century scientist cannot be equated in meaning or reference to the way the word is now used. This thesis of incommensurability negates the ides of theory-independent standpoint from which to assess scientific theories. As the idea of a theory-independent world drops out, the history of science becomes the history of how theories replace each other, much in the way artistic or political movements succeed each other. (Wachbroit, 1984, p. 3).

Since theories are so radically different from one another, and disputes among their advocates cannot be rationally resolved, when a scientist abandons one theory and accepts a new one, this switch cannot be interpreted as the outcome of a rational proess. (Wachbroit, 1984, p. 3). Because reason is the product of a particular culture, truth and good reasons are dependent upon thje language we use and the context in which we work. In the relativist picture, truth is a function of the social perspective of the theorizer. As society changes, and new theories evolve, that which is taken to be true also changes. Kuhn and Feyerabend, two of the most influential relativists writing today, explain that the concepts of one theory simply cannot be expressed in terms of the concepts of the other theory. In Kuhn's account, proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds (Kuhn, 1970, p. 150), and in Feyerabend's, defenders of different theories constitute the facts differently; facts cannot be considered independently from the theories enveloping them. (Feyerabend, 1975, p. 23).

Values too play a significant role in creating paradigm conflicts. According to Kuhn (1970), disagreements between scientists on the merits of two theories often arise when scientists use different criteria for evaluation. Although two communities appear to be debating about which theory is closer to the truth, often they are really differing over which standards and values to embrace. Each group talks past the other, agreeing neither on common assumptions nor values.

Feyerabend, more radical than Kuhn in his defense of the incommensurability of theories, denies the existence of a

system of rules operating systematically within scientific communities. Although he agrees with Kuhn that we can often provide good reasons for choosing one theory over another, in the sense that a good reason is one with which the community agrees and can argue for, Feyerabend sees science as one tradition among many, privileged neither in terms of methods nor results. (Newton-Smith, 1983, p. 125). He speaks of progress as a function of subjective preferences, propaganda, conflucting values, etc. and points to the historical record showing that any rule, decision, procedure, method or value that is suposed to guide scientific inquiry has at one time or another been violated, not only in advancing or discovering new hypotheses but in supporting and justifying them. (Feyerabend, 1978).

To conclude, relativists working in the philosophy of science derive their strength from a close look at scientific progress, just as emotivists derive their conception of moral law from a close look at moral history. Such analyses reveal discontinuities in developmental paths; often radically different, even conflicting accounts replace the current theory in favor. The idea of progress itself thus becomes problematic; if science and philosophy do not consist of steady accumulation of facts and/or universal laws, then a serious challenge can be raised to the claim that one morality, one scientific paradigm or theory is closer to the "truth" than another.

From a pragmatist's point of view, we can understand how relativist thought has enriched the curriculum field. *Weltanschauungen* accounts have enabled us to understand the value-laden nature of all theorizing. As a field often enamored of "scientific method," we need to understand how conflicting theories multiply and flourish within one discipline. And we need to realize that using only one set of criterial for judging theory hampers rather than promotes the progress of such a young, undefined field as curriculum. If nothing else, relativist accounts provide us with the insight to realize that one true curriculum theory is not about to descend upon us.

From the relativists we also have learned about the danger of premature closure, fixed method and rigidity in theoretical activity. Feyerabend and his colleagues speak to us about spontaneity, creativity, imagination and individual freedom as qualities contributing to theoretical progress. And they speak to us as scientists, not social critics, so their ideas carry extra weight in a field concerned with gaining credibility as a "scientific," systematic discipline.

Yet at the same time that they provide us with a healthy skepticism about developing objective criteria to account for truth and progress, relativists also make us suspicious of progress as a real phenomenon and legitimate our tendencies to accept too many proposals or theories without critical analysis and argument. When Feyerabend made his famous comment, "anything goes," he said he was only joking (Bernstein, 1983, p. 72), but some scientists took him seriously. Curriculum theorists have been particularly susceptible, at their worst espousing a tolerance that borders on the careless. They have ignored the fact that no philosopher of science, including Feyerabend, has ever argued seriously that neither better nor worse arguments in support of a hypothesis or theory could be formulated.

As Richard Berstein so eloquently suggests, becoming aware of our "blind prejudices, learning that there is more to the world and to different forms of life than is captured by our own entrenched forms of life and genres, is only the beginning—not the end—of wisdon." (Bernstein, 1983, p. 106). It is to another stage of wisdom that we now turn.

A New Perspective

Although pragmatism has been a powerful force in philosophy for many years, at least in the United States, it recently has taken a most interesting turn. As described in works such as Bernstein's *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (1983) and Rorty's *Consequences of Pragmatism* (1982), philosophers of science working within the pragmatic tradition are currently developing a revivified version that bears striking resemblances to contemporary European thought,

particularly in hermeneutics. It is to this version, and its relationship to continental philosophy that the rest of the paper is devoted.

Amongst contemporary pragmatists, a new conversation about human rationality is taking place, based on an understanding that derives from an emphasis on the practical nature of human thought. Richard Rorty, for example, talks about knowledge as coping with reality, not as representing reality. (Rorty, 1982, p. 202) "It is the vocabulary of practice rather than of theory, of action rather than contemplation, in which one can say something useful about truth." (Rorty, 1982, p. 162). Whereas traditional epistemological-centered philosophy is characterized by the search for method, for principles which are definatory of the essence of knowledge, morality or rationality, pragmatic philosophy focuses on deliberation about the relative attractions of various concrete alternatives. It views the pattern of all inquiry, scientific as well as moral, as deliberation. (Rorty, 1982, pp. 164-165).

In such an account, the distinction among art, science and philosophy fades. This is nothing new, or course; Dewey spoke of philosophy as critical thought at a level of generality that differed only in degree from other sorts of inquiry. He saw the attempt to solve problems as the central concept of human rationality. Thus, he denied that moral philosophy was the formulation of general principles, regarding it instead as the application of intelligence to social problems. As Rorty notes, Dewey conceived of scientific inquiry as adapting and coping rather than copying. Truth was not accuracy of representation. Just as he didn't see the separation between truth, goodness and beauty, so he did not see the sidparity between science, morals and art. (Rorty, 1982, p. 86). James too claimed that the vocabulary of practice was uneliminable, that no distinction of kind differentiates the sciences from the crafts, from moral reflection, or from art. (Rorty, 1982, p. 163). Richard Rorthy concurs:

> If we get rid of traditional notions of objectivity, and scientific method, we shall be able to see the social sciences as continuous with literature—as interpreting other people to us, and thus enlarging and deepening our sense of community. (Rorty, 1982, p. 203).

This is not to suggest that pragmatists are not sensitive to differences between the nature of scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. Rather it is to show how their examination of the nature of this scientific knowledge, especially as it bears upon the character of rationality and matters of theory-choice, emphasizes those features that also have been characteristic of the tradition of practical philosophy. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 47). In this sense, the pragmatists agree with relativists who have held that the search for neutral algorithms for theory-choice, for systematic procedures for uncovering the truth will be futile. (Kuhn, 1970) It was, after all, Feyerabend who noted that any rule, algorithm, decision, procedure, or value that was supposed to guide scientific inquiry, such as accuracy, verification of falsification has been violated in discovering, supporting and justifying new theories. And, anything considered irrelevant to scientific inquiry, such as social context, metaphysical beliefs, or personal idiosyncrasies has been at one time or another relevant to scientific investigations. (Feyerabend, 1978). The pragmatist, however, goes much further than the pure relativist (who is hard to find, since almost any relativist, including Feyerabend, would agree with the following). Although there are no universal rules for testing and evaluating competing theories, that does not mean that we cannot construct better or worse arguments to help us make better or worse choices. The nature of these arguments is the heart of the new pragmatic tradition. Indeed, Rorty defines pragmatism as the doctrine that the only constraints on inquiry are conversational ones, rather than those derived from the nature of objects, the mind, or language. (Rorty, 1982, p. 165). He speaks about taking conversation seriously and playfully, suggesting that a dialogue is not a disguised form of inquiry about the truth, but rather activity that enables participants to make reasoned choices. Such a stance relies in part on the Socratic virtues of listening to others, talking

willingly and weighing the consequences of our actions upon other people. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 203). And it is also similar to the hermeneuticist's reliance on the Aristotelian concept of *phronesis*, to be discussed below.

In many ways, pragmatism and hermeneutics are not at all alike. On occasion, a hermeneuticist (e.g. Habermas) will sound more like a transcendentalist than a pragmatist. But both contemporary pragmatists and hermeneuticists do share a common emphasis on understanding and interpretation and it is this focus for conceptualizing rationality that provides us with a fruitful approach for curriculum theory and practice.

Hans-Georg Gadamer's work is particularly pertinent to our discussion. In his philosophic hermeneutics, the outstanding theme is the fusion of hermeneutics and praxis. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 174). Gadamer defines understanding as a form of practical reasoning and practical knowledge. He places rationality within the context of developing, living traditions that not only inform and shape what we are but are always themselves in the process of reconstitution. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 130). Interested in the ways that values are applied to concrete situations, and the role that judgment plays in all understanding, interpretation and decision making, Gadamer rejects the Enlightenment opposition between reason and tradition. His philosophical writings reflect the idea that reason is historical and situated within a cultural context. In TRUTH AND METHOD, Gadamer suggests that every act of understanding involves interpretation which in turn involves application. A key concept for him is the Aristotelian notion of *phronesis*. Originally, *phronesis*, as used by Aristotle, referred to man's most important virtue. To be a good man in the Athenian sense was inseparable from being a good citizen. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 135). Phronesis characterized a person who knew how to exercise judgment in particular cases. It was an intellectual virtue, but one necessary for the exercise of the other virtues, including those of character. (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 154).

In Gadamer's account, phronesis as a form of reasoning

is concerned with choice and involves deliberation. Because it deals with what is variable and subject of differing opinions, it involves mediation between general principles and concrete particular situations. There are no determinate technical rules to enable us to subsume the particular under the general or universal. Interpretation or mediation between universals and specifics within a particular situation is always needed. Hence, phronesis is a type of "ethic know-how in which what is universal and what is particular are co-determined." (Bernstein, 1983, p. 146). According to Aristotle, phronesis, unlike episteme which is knowledge of what is universal and invariable, always deals with what is variable, and appropriate to a particular situation.

Phronesis plays a crucial role in Gadamer's central concern (the concern of all hermeneuticists) for understanding. Indeed, he states that the chief task for philosophic hermeneutics is to illuminate what happens when we understand. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 160). As Bernstein notes, hermeneutic philosophers go beyond relativism because while they understand that different traditions or forms of life may be incommensurable, they are more concerned with how they can be rationally compared, if not evaluated. They are sensitive to the intimate connection between understanding and interpretation, and dwell on the essential role of practical judgements in making these comparisons. Philosophers such as Gadamer search for a deeper, more critical understanding of our forms of life. They seek to uncover our prejudices and create a dialectic through the study of alien phenomena. (Bernstein, 1983, pp. 107-108).

For Gadamer, every hermeneutical understanding begins and ends with the thing itself. The subject matter conditions the appropriate form of knowledge and reasoning. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 154). In aesthetics, this involves the dynamic interaction or transaction between the object and the spectator who share in it. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 123). In Gadamer's words,

> Aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics... conversely hermeneutics must be so determined as a

> whole that it does justice to the experience of art. Understanding must be conceived as a part of the process of the coming into being of meaning, in which the significance of all statements—those of art and those of everything else that has been transmitted—is formed and made complete. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 146).

Hence, the circle of understanding is 'object' oriented in that it focuses on the texts, institutions, practices, works of art, of forms of life that we are trying to understant. The whole point is the sensitive dialectial play between part and whole in the act or process of understanding. This is the hermeneutical circle. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 135). Such a circle of understanding requires the art of being responsive to works of art, texts, traditions, forms of life, etc. As Gadamer suggests, pieces of art, texts, and traditions speak to us. (Gadamer, 1980).

Hermeneutical interpretations depend upon alternative readings that are tested by seeing how they make sense or fit in with other parts of the text (situation) that we are seeking to understand. Although interpretations require background knowledge, their adequacy can be judged only be returning to the text (situation) itself. Geertz graphically captures this process by describing a continuous dialectial tacking between the most local of local detail and the most global structures, so that both are brought into view simultaneously. (Geertz, 1979, p. 239).

Opinions and prejudices play a crucial role in interpretation. Gadamer talks about how we need to designate self-consciously our opinions and prejudices and qualify them as such so that we can recognize the text as an authentically different being, whose truth can be perceived, over and against our own preconceived notions. (Gadamer, 1979). Understanding does not occur by forgetting prejudgments and prejudices but rather by using these forestructures as part of the dialectical interplay between interpreter and object. This interplay allows us to become aware of those prejudices that blind us to the meaning of what we are trying to understand, and those prejudices that enable us to understand. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 138).

Gadamer, in short, sees the movement toward consciousness of effective-history as the primary task of all philosophicalhermeneutics. And as mentioned above, he sees hermeneutic philosophy as the heir to practical philosophy. Both traditions share the task of justifying the way of practical reason by explicating phronesis, a form of reasoning and knowledge that involves a distinctive mediation or tacking between the universal and the particular. (Bernstein, 1983, p. 146). Similarly, contemporary pragmatists and hermeneutical scholars share the themes of dialogue, conversation, undistorted communication and communal judgement. And they both embrace the goal of cultivating the types of dialogical communities in which phronesis and practical discourse are concretely embodied in our ordinary practices. Gadamer, for example, suggests that what is most distinctive about our existence is that we are dialogical beings. Our understanding of human rationality depends upon an understanding of the role that historical context, choice, deliberation and judgement play in our lives. Pragmatists and hermeneuticists share a vision of practical activity as the human project.

In curriculum, we already possess a rich body of literature in the philosophy of education from a pragmatic perspective, as well as exciting new work in deliberation theory. To a field that always has been concerned with moral choice, scientific method, and aesthetic sensibility, the pragmatic-hermeneutical approach to understanding has much to offer. It can help us reframe curriculum theory in terms of practice, and practice in terms of theory. A synthesis of theory and practical activity, the mediation between the universal and concrete, and the creation of dialogical communities may well become our next major project.

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HERMAN KRUYDER (1933)

The Monster in Children's Dreams: Its Metaphoric Awe

Mary Doll
Our Lady of Holy Cross College, New Orleans

Children dream of monsters. In a recent study I collected over ninety dreams of children, four to twelve years of age, during a six month period. The dreams were recorded into tape recorders either by the children themselves or by the parents and teachers who worked with me on the project. Of the ninety dreams over half contained a monster element. The monster arrived on the dreamscene suddenly, seemingly out of nowhere, and because of size or strangeness demanded utter attention. Repeatedly and predictably, the monster was a type: part animal, part reptile; huge; often hairy male more often than female although gender was not important. What was important to the child was that the monster seemed to be the agent by which the child was transported to another world, felt as being *back* or *down* or *in*.

To take the monster literally would be to undervalue image and dreamwork. To take the monster as only what it seems—a horrible, terrible, Thing—would be to neglect its symbolic power and the child's natural connection to symbol and the roots of language meaning. Jung, who surprisingly did very little with the dreams of children, nevertheless recognized in their dreams material "fraught" with meaning. They are, he wrote, "the last vestiges of a dwindling collective psyche which dreamingly reiterates the perennial contents of the human soul" (Wickes, xxiv). It appears, then, that when dreams of children contain a monster figure, something wonderful is being shown about the unfamiliar psyche.

The monster, I suspect, is an archetype. When it arrives it turns the dream into a Big dream and into an Other, older world. True relation with this world occurs with the skills of a primal, older mind, where thinking is done not with "common" sense but with the senses. Sensible thinking

alerts eye, finger, nose, tongue—and for those who would hear—ear. And so when the archetype of the monster appears in children's dreams it is calling attention to what has been overlooked or undervalued by the ordinary, common-sense mind.

The monster is thus metaphorical through and through. It connects what is hidden; its presence links two things usually thought of as opposite; it brings two minds together. And its power is such as to endow all else in its proximity with new, charged significance. Philip Wheelwright suggests that this charged, hovering significance of *all* is the experience of metaphor's *reality* (134-5). Donald Schon's phrase "generative metaphor" suggests that metaphors are below cognition, generating it, creating it. The monster's metaphoric function in dreams should be taken seriously, accordingly, not because the monster is awful, but because it inspires awe; not because it is problematic but because it gives images to thought. And its presence leads thought down to the springs of memory and imagination.

Myths, of course, are full of monsters. The monster is the dragon, the giant, the snakey-haired woman, or the sea serpent who demands that the hero go to a different place. Sociologically, mythic monsters disrupt norms. The abnormal place the hero must go to, with its caves, dark clouds, sharp rocks, or slimy mudded waters, is the home of monstrosity. It is *there* the hero must do battle. The monster battles of myth are recounted in the tales of Beowulf and Grendel, Hercules and the Nemean lion, Theseus and the Minataur, David and Goliath, the beamish boy and the Jabberwock: all tales of monster murder. "Slaying the beast" becomes myth's metaphor for giving muscle to the hero, and murdering the monster becomes psychology's metaphor for ego control. But in the dreams of children a different encounter occurs. For in taking the child to its *place*, the monster is allowing the child to experience the primal mind and to touch base with generative metaphors. And the child's reluctance to slay the beast would seem to indicate an openness to hidden, creative powers of thought.

Consider, for example, how this dream extends an invitation to "go below":

> I was in a dark place with a sink. A big dark cloud came in. I went up on the cloud and saw nobody. Then in another hole I saw somebody sitting. It was a square hole in the cloud, small, that I walked through.

Although the four-year-old is clear about the difference between "up" and "down," the two refuse to remain as separate places. Rather, being down in the hole enables the dreamer to see better. First, up on a cloud he sees nobody, but going back down again into a hole he begins to distinguish a shade in the darkness: somebody sitting. He distinguishes other shapes when he notices that the hole is a square that can be walked through, like a door or a window. This vague, shaded moment serves to invite the dreamer to further exploration of the depths.

The impulse to explore the depths can be seen in dreams of older children as well. For these eight and ten-year-olds the dream place is ancient and very far away:

> We were walking, trying to get home, and we were lost. We found three pandas and they were following us home. There were sharp rocks...and I had to make a thing to walk down and then the whole entire world started to flow with water. It was about five hundred years ago, except that we had good clothing.

> Once I dreamt that my friends and I went down to a place where you could play games for free. And while we were down there we had to go down a slope over a haystack, back down to the hut. So when we got down there we started playing the games and we heard an interruption. They said, "Please be careful. People that—it's been a hundred years past—the people who fought in the war. They might be out in their souls. You never know. Be Ware."

Both dream examples illustrate the difficulty of arriving at the dream place: the first with images of sharp rocks, steep

pathways, and primal flooding; the second with repeated emphasis on the word "down," suggesting a tremendous depth to the unconscious and a warning to be "ware" of its exploration. In both, the dream time is old time, the time of fairytale and myth, "once upon a time," *in illo tempore*. The sense of drawing the dreamer down and back, in time and space, helps to give the dream its own location, separate from the lived events of the previous day. In such a way, the dreamer can enter the primoridal dreamworld free of dayworld thought and conscious preconception.

When the monster enters the dream, the most amazing pattern I discovered was the lack of hostile reaction by the dreamer child: In no dreams did the child kill the monster. Rather, there was the pattern of wishing to observe the monster, very carefully and fearfully. One dream, indeed, pictured the monster as a mandala, as if the child recognized it as a healer:

> I and my teacher Andy were in a tall building. We looked out and saw a huge face in a square. It was in a grass-rocky place. I came home and there was a radio and a gun. The big rock face got up.

Seeing the huge face immediately gives the child greater seeing powers, where opposites normally separated can combine. He sees both/and: both radio and gun, both grass and rocks, and the both/and image of the squared circle of the monster rock face. Although there is a considerable element of fear and terror here, the monster mandala becomes a kind of container that *holds* what is terrible, enabling one to look at the terror, dispassionately and objectively. Evil is but part of a flow of things. A natural flow is suggested by the manner in which the dreamer moves, and sees the moment move, from *up* to *out* to *in*, in ever sharper prepositional detail. This dance-like motion helps to soften what could otherwise harden feeling, and to give *place* to fear.

The monster, then, helps the child to get a purchase on her own unnameable horrors. The monster, never not-fearful and never just a jolly green giant, cannot be sentimentalized.

In our culture, we tend to allay our children's fears by protective loving or technicolor caricatures, both of which minimize or dismiss a child's shadow side. But the monster signals a reminder to the child that shadows are real and contain primal truths:

> I came to school to ask about going to school. But mommy said no I was too little so I was crying. So Mommy just left and I didn't know where she was, she just left. The school got doggies in it. The doggies were a little bit mean, with sharp teeth.

Here, the monster place is that den of social acculturation, the school. The child dreamer, age four, both knows and doesn't know of the danger of entering its doors, powerfully implied by the sudden abandonment of the Mother. Going to school is leaving the Mother and all that nourishes littleness. Going to school is also encountering the metaphorical Dog: leading a dog's life, putting on the dog, dog earing pages, getting dog tired. But seeing this little bit of meanness with its sharp teeth is another way of understanding it.

One of the etymological roots of "monster" is the French "monere," to warn, to remind. The monster reminds of what is in danger of being forgotten, or puts one in mind differently—or in a different mind. In the next example, this reminder by the monster is made very clear:

> I dreamed when we were little teeny animals and we were strong and we ran fast in the house. He said, "Now you have to stay in my house." We read his brain to tell if he was going to eat us. We always slept on the shelves so he wouldn't find us.

Staying-in-the-monster-house is the dream's metaphor for abiding with the monster, becoming more alert to its ways. One of the monster's ways, as I have noted with other dreams, is to juxtapose opposites, here as the blend between *we* and *he*, small and big, human and monster. Although *we* are tiny, we are also strong; and although *he* is big, he feeds on smallness. And, staying in the monster's house not only sharpens our wits, letting us read brains, but also enlivens

our senses. Horror is made palpable by the suggestion that we will be eaten up, entirely engulfed. But the dreamer is shown ways of dealing with this most basic fear by letting him *feel* feeling as a sleeping-on-shelves. Thus, metaphor redescribes a problem and may actually help the child cope with his monster by giving him necessary survival tactics.

The Latin roots of "monster" also imply an implicit doubleness at the heart of the word; for "monstrum" means evil omen, portent, prodigy. The meanings contra-dict, insisting that good and evil speak together, not univocally. An omen, such as the monster presents, can have prodigious importance, whose import is like that of a genius. In the next two dreams, the monster's house of meaning contains various important truths:

> All these kids were in this truck and we went to the monster house. At the back door there was a big giant castle, the stairs went up. One of the kids came down with me and he knocked down the pole and the house started to collapse. I was the first kid to get out. A lot were still in there.

The eight-year-old, like the first example of a four-year-old, shows keen awareness of Up and Down as places of differing vision. Up is where the kids go when they cannot read the signposts in the monster house, which is a deviant place accessible only by the back door in an out-of-the-way location where one must be trucked. Normally, we wish to ascend; but, here, ascension can give lofty ideas and false pride, as with the kid who thinks he can knock down the pillars of monstrosity. The dreamer, however, knows that the monster house has much to offer and its own sense of livingness, as his concluding comment indicates.

In the next dream by a ten-year-old, the monster's rumblings are omens with a first-order of significance, warning the child against literalizing dogma:

> One time I dreamed that we went to mass. And as we were listening I heard a rumbling. And I went around the corner and I noticed there was something walking, very big—some sort of dragon that had attacked our town many times. I knew there was a prince that slept in the church so I dashed in and tried to get through. But the priests and bishops tried to hold me back, so I broke in a window and I went in. There, I saw the prince laying asleep. I woke him up. He said that he would fight the beast one more time...

On one level of action, the monster alerts the dreamer to traditional, mythic heroics by forcing him out of meditative activity into the fray. But I believe the monster's function is more deeply significant, awakening the child to what slumbers in the depths. For down *there*, in a place only the child knows, sleeps the royal one who—more than the monster—is the enemy of the preachers. Although the dream in its entirety fills out the plot by having the prince do battle with and slay the monster, I am interested in the pre-battle moment, when dreamer does battle with church. It is the priests and bishops who seek to obstruct the child. It is the priests and bishops who put the prince to sleep. The dream focuses the point of opposition not between child and monster but between child and church, with the suggestion that the church's dogma lacks life. Further, what brings the child to depth of consciousness? The *monster*. The *monster* brings the child and prince together. Metaphorically we could say that the monster rumbles to re-awaken Word and to recharge Creed with the power of image. The monster's role, thus, is to mediate not only what has been forgotten, but what has been suppressed.

As we might expect, many of the places of children's dreams locate suppression specifically: in the school, the bathroom, the bedroom, the body. Civilization, as Freud knew so well, is the breeding ground for horror. Somehow, the monster—with its grotesque mockery of norms—seems most at home *there*, in the domestic places of monstrous discontent. Maurice Sendak captures this idea in his children's stories, but he forever is trying to bring *there* back home. In *Outside Over There*, for instance, Ida in her crib and Mama in her arbor are, of course, the real locations of psychic

horror. But only when a travel is taken to *there*, outside the window, well *over* and *beyond*, can what has been bottled and harbored be enlightened, put on stage, made to dance. Such a coming-to-terms is seen by the next dream example; images of body, not all perverse, are fully polymorphic:

> There was a big arm that could walk with its finger. Then a big foot came. A big eye came and another eye, arm, and head, ears, hair, and they all made a big body alive. It was nice.

Dreamer is creator; he is awake to his sensual, primal nature, feeling body part by part:head, eye, arm, hair, all bodies; foot bodied—not as Big Foot monster Sasquatch with his single large foot—but as bodied foot. How different is this sensual creating, where wholeness is feeling parts! Only when metaphors can no longer walk do ideas become fearful, monstrous!

Monster, as metaphor, is connector. Its huge presence *fills* a scene, endowing it with *big* importance. It connects what needs to be joined, what is in danger of being sundered: base feelings, root images. Clearly, its creative potential is enormous and the monster's power to energize images becomes a matter of great interest for those of us working with children. By way of concluding my remarks I would like to offer two observations about the relationship between the dream monster and children's imagination.

First, I believe that the monster transports the child to a different place: to the primal mind. In his book *The Primal Mind* Jamake Highwater explores the spirituality of American Indian culture that utilizes grotesque actions and shocking images to force people to look at things twice. Twice-seeing transforms. Twice-seeing deepens an ability to see, to think, and even to be, by initiating the viewer into another reality (176-77). But to *reach* this other reality requires a receptivity of mind that blanks out, or voids, the ego (Hillman, 112). This next dream vividly illustrates how mind is preparing itself for being transported to another place by the repeated utterance of the word No:

> And so my parents went to the party and I stayed and I played by a stream. It was a very lonely stream, plus it looked like a dark alley. Scared you a bit. Then a little girl came out. And she said, "No. Don't. No don't they'll get you. Oh NO. No. They're horrible. They'll get you, no!"...

The moment of the Great No occurs in Will's dream just prior to the monster's grisly appearance from out of the waters. The No, uttered in repeated urgency, is like a mantra that voids all preconception. The dream place is also a voiding place, separating the dreamer from all that is familiar: he is not with his parents (who are off at a party) but alone, by a lonely stream. The stream, actually a symbolic pathway, is like a fluid road to Otherness, which demands careful—even fearful—attention. The dreamer must prepare himself to meet the monster not on the ground of intellect but with full sensory awareness, where simples become multiples and concrete truths liquify. Here, the No creates space. Negation becomes the creating of a new *place*, free of preconception, such that what is hugely important may be re-cognized.

Why is negation creative? What does this have to do with the creative imagination? Partly, I think, because it calls forth deep feeling and puts the dreamer back in touch with the depth dimension. That the texture of feeling is complicated, strongly tainted with the negative, suggests a power of images to correct an overly positive, take-charge attitude of ego. The "other side" of complete positivism is repressed fear. When the monster forces its negativity upon a child, it is requesting—at the very least—that it be acknowledged as wholly Other and worthy of respect.

A sequel to this dream, perhaps its creative residue, can be found in this last example of a monster in children's dreams. This is another of Will's dreams, later in time but significantly recalling an earlier moment: as if consciousness must go back over old stuff in order to reap a kernal of truth. Here, the voided place quickly fills with images of large, monster proportions:

> ...Nothing was down at the end, except two things that were just standing there. With eyes! We immediately stopped. Then a big blaze of fire was right behind them. So we got closer. And closer. There were two more bats combining with an octopus-like. They had wings of a bat, eyes of a vulture, and arms and legs of an and octopus. We did not know what to think of it! We started getting closer and closer to it. The bat, combining with the vulture and octopus, did not even move. Then he finally did. Moved over to the side. And a big blaze of fire. And there was a roar in this pit of fire...we looked down into the fire and there was a big spider-like. A hairy thing he was. Very big. Thirty feet high, to be exact almost.

The almost-exactness of this world is, indeed, different, Other, scary. It is a dark, fiery world that is deserted as if from holocaust. The child shows that the monster realm is deep inside; but yet it is also connected by streams, caves, and paths: the grottoes of the grotesque. Not knowing "what to think" Will shows willingness to abandon a thinking-mode in favor of his wondering-fear, as if eyes and ears can tell truth better, differently.

I asked Will to draw a picture of the monster, asking if he would like to read-again the written description of his dream. It was my thought that, having dreamt the dream a while ago, he might need to refresh his memory. Not at all. He chose to plunge directly into the project of drawing his monster. To *my* amazement, it was accurate to the T of the Text. But more than that, it captured the paradox of beastial monstrosity in ways that suggested image was truly guiding insight here. Like Blake's poetic tyger, Will's monster contained "fearful symmetry." As shown by the illustration on page 99, it was constructed around the magical numbers Three and Four. Even while it had sharp, pointy, predatory features, it also had numerical harmony with *four* colors (black, brown, red, green), *four* appendages (four front legs, four back legs, two wings—to tally a magical Ten), and it had *twelve* points on one wing, thirteen on the other, with two end points, each

with balanced matching color. Threes were seen by the sets of back claws, three each, and the three boney crosspoints on the wing spans. Three and Four came together in the monster drawing with the sacred Seven triangles drawn down the monster's back: seven being a magical number of wholeness and the triangle being a magical shape of strength, unity, and perfection.

What the drawing shows, I believe, is the power of generative metaphor. A horrible event *beyond* conception (vaguely alluded to in the dream as nuclear holocaust) is metamorphosed and made metaphoric: changed, utterly. A creative manifestation of the Great No allows It to be put into other shapes, so that It may be seen anew, seen differently, handled, understood. For the child who has no power to alter world events, who is a pawn in power politics, this inner power of generative dream metaphors is wonderfully healing. Expressing the monster releases some of Its hold on rigid thinking, stereotyping, literalizing, and reductionism. Expressing the monster allows its hold on thought to become less absolute, more fluid. The point I really want to make, though, is that allowing the monster to transport consciousness is a mind-transforming act; it gives allowance for thought to touch base with image and to re-connect with collective human memory, creating thereby a *new mindfulness* of the monsters of human concern.

Creation and destruction, two poles, are two opposite sides of the monster archetype. To ignore the one is to damage the other pole. Most often in our culture we tend to see the monster as *only*, therefore, to be shunned and avoided. The research I have done with dreams of children would seem to indicate another approach; namely, that the monster's negativity (such features as its bigness, gross out-of-ordinariness) is an indicator of its importance to what the norms must hide, in order to stay normal; what dayworld logic cannot abide given the power of night's paradoxes. The monster is not what it seems, therefore, and it is more than it appears. Much more. We sleep three minutes from a nuclear midnight. We live in fear. These are hardly rational

times. Clearly, the rational approach to human experience, like dogma, has split the opposites apart to the point that we believe that the enemy is the Communist menace, outside, over there. To take comfort in such oppositional thinking is absurd and dangerous. It is time to internalize the enemy, seeing the monsters within.

Seeing imaginally, finally, is seeing within, with insight. The dream, and particularly the nightmare monster, textures inner seeing with all the dimensions of sense. When children speak their dreams they are giving texture to what is on their minds, behind their minds, lurking. As parents and teachers, we should encourage this dialogue with primal thinking. And allowing the images to take shape in drawings and paintings is but another way of objectifying fear, rather than having fear become projected by uninformed thought. For even the Terrible can be transformed, as the monsters' visits show.

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

WILL'S DREAM

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Literacy Instruction and Children Raised in Poverty: A Theoretical Discussion

David Yellin
J. Randall Koetting
Oklahoma State University

Teaching children to read and write has always been thought of as a major purpose of schooling. However, success for some groups has been considerably less than for others. Children from lower socio-economic backgrounds score significantly below middle and upper class children on standardized reading tests (Low and Clement, 1982). From the data gathered by the National Assessment of Educational Progress we know that "the lowest scores are made by Blacks and Hispanics from disadvantaged urban communities" (Applebee, 1986, p. 10). Ogbu's (1974, 1978) research argues that minority lower class children do not expect schools to make a difference in their lives and consequently, they do not expend much energy in their studies. Heath (1983) found similar attitudes among the poor white children she studied in the Piedmont Carolinas. Thus, despite over 20 years of compensatory education programs, such as *Project Headstart*, the achievement gap between the middle class and lower class still exists (Caruso & Detterman, 1981; Lerner, 1983; Plunkett, 1985). Why is this so? We believe the answer lies, at least in part, in the very nature of the school system, and specifically the type of literacy instruction it provides.

To understand the nature of literacy instruction we must look at its historical roots. Prior to the nineteenth century, the Alphabet-Spelling Approach was used to teach reading. Children were taught to memorize the letter names of the alphabet and phonogram combinations (Harris & Sipay, 1975). Not only was this a boring method for students but it was misleading because in English letter names do not automatically aid in the pronunciation of words.

In the nineteenth century synthetic phonics programs achieved prominence. The sounds of the individual letters

were introduced in isolation from words. Later the separate sounds were supposed to be blended or synthesized together to form words. Despite its drawbacks, phonics established a firm foothold in the classroom and furthered the false belief that learning to read meant oral demonstration of the reading skills. But it was not until the twentieth century that oral skill mastery really became the goal of literacy instruction. And the vehicle for this was the basal reader.

Basal readers, along with their attendant skill workbooks, teacher's manuals and supplementary materials became, in a short time, the dominant approach to teaching reading. Commercial publishing houses recognized this as a golden opportunity. Soon these companies exercised a major influence in America's classrooms. However, in the period from the 1930's to 1960's some criticisms of the approach and materials surfaced. Among them were that the story content was boring, the language was stilted, and many characters were portrayed in a stereotypic manner (Heathington, 1983). But the main criticism was that the basal series, with their emphasis on sight word knowledge, taught through the Look-Say method, were ignoring phonics. Reading authorities such as Jeanne Chall (1967) argued persuasively that the lack of early and intensive phonics instruction in basal programs was the sole cause of later reading difficulties for many children. This was the same conclusion and criticism raised by Rudolf Flesch a decade earlier in his book *Why Johnny Can't Read* (1955). And as a consequence of the popularity of Flesch's book and the influence of Chall, the phonics emphasis returned to the basal readers and the elementary classrooms in the 1960's and 1970's.

Surprisingly, the 1980's began with a familiar debate: the phonics approach versus the whole word approach. The impetus for the debate was a new book written by Rudolf Flesch, but with an old title: *Why Johnny Still Can't Read* (1981). Flesch argued, as he did in his first book, that the cause of reading problems was not enough phonics instruction. However, most reading experts rejected his simplistic analysis because most definitely phonics is taught in the

majority of classrooms today. The response to the phonics advocates came shortly with the publication of *On Learning to Read: The Child's Fascination with Meaning* (1982) by Bruno Bettleheim and Karen Zelan. Essentially, Bettleheim and Zelan renewed the tired charges against the basal reader and argued that the overemphasis placed on decoding skills in isolation from reading comprehension was the real culprit behind children's failure to learn to read. Their thesis followed the ground work laid by psycholinguists, such as Kenneth Goodman, who view reading as an active process of acquiring information rather than a passive decoding of sounds and symbols. The Bettleheim and Zelan book was predictably criticized by Jeanne Chall who still maintained that the single best way to teach beginning reading skills is through phonics. Thus, in the 1980's we have come full circle back to the arguments of the 1960's.

A brief review of writing instruction in America reveals a similar circuitous route centered upon a skills in isolation model. In the 18th century, writing was defined as penmanship and spelling. Noah Webster (1758 - 1843), a school teacher from Goshen, New York and a fiery patriot of the new America, was the foremost influence on early writing instruction. In 1789 he wrote and later revised in 1806 a dictionary, a speller, a grammar and a reader. His intention was not simply to describe the English language, but rather to delineate what he felt were the real differences between American English and the language as it was spoken in Great Britain. For nearly one hundred years, Webster's speller and reader were the dominant textbooks in America's classrooms and his rule memorization, drill and practice was the dominant teaching methods (Yellin, 1983).

The nineteenth century's emphasis on the rote memorization of spelling word lists and penmanship exercises persisted into the twentieth century. In the 1920's, for example, students were given lists of words, sometimes as many as 50 per week, taught to memorize them and regurgitate this knowledge at the end-of-the-week test. Those dolts and laggards who were not successful were "retaught" the

words with the switch or by having them write the words over and over again until their fingers ached. Pain and suffering, it was believed, instilled learning.

Grammar instruction similarly has been taught almost exclusively from a rules memorization approach. Eighteenth century grammarians, such as Joseph Priestly and Robert Lowth, recorded those rules as a series of definition for the eight basic parts of speech which every school boy and girl to this day has been taught to memorize. Twentieth century grammar books gave us exercises in parsing and the ubiquitous diagramming of sentences. And these traditional grammar skills in isolation are still taught today under the heading of writing instruction, despite nearly 30 years of research evidence that shows no positive correlation between knowledge of formal grammar and improvement in writing skills (Braddock, 1963; Graves, 1981; Green & Petty, 1975).

Donald Graves (1978), of the University of New Hampshire puts it this way:

> Writing is extolled, worried over, cited as a national priority, but seldom practiced. The problem is not poor spelling, punctuation, grammar and handwriting. The problem with writing is no writing. (p. 636)

In sum then, writing instruction also reflects a narrow parochial skills bias and ignores the holistic view of writing as a tool for the communication of ideas and feelings. Similarly, in reading instruction with its emphasis on memorization of rules and skills in isolation, the power of the printed word to evoke emotions and stimulate thought is lost. Reading and writing for pleasure, as tools for viewing and improving the human condition have been omitted from the curriculum.

This is not surprising when one understands the conceptualizations of curriculum, teaching and instruction that dominate educational thought today. The quasi-scientific, management models used in designing curricula and organizing instruction serve to place limits on the very ways we think about schooling and knowledge (Apple, 1979; Dobson, Dobson, & Koetting, 1985; Eisner, 1985; Giroux, 1983). The language and conceptualizations we have regarding effective teaching also serve to limit expansive thinking about what teaching and learning could be (Bullough, 1983; Bullough, Goldstein, & Holt, 1982; Gibboney, 1987; Hunter, 1984). The emphasis on raising test scores through more and more standardized curricula and teaching methods, the extreme specificity of performance/ behavioral outcomes help to create a simplistic picture of what teaching and learning is all about.

Skills acquisition in both reading and writing instruction fall neatly within the technical-rational manner of defining what knowledge is most worth learning. However, as Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) state, the real issue in literacy education should not be higher test scores or the mere acquisition of skills but rather the inclusion of historical and critical/ conceptual literacy. By historical and critical/conceptual literacy they mean that students need to develop the capacity to "think through what's going on in the world," and to understand the impact of political decisions on their lives. They need to understand the "relation of the United States to the rest of the world," particularly with reference to developing nations (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985, p. 64).

It is important to note that the dominant and hence seemingly legitimate conceptual models used in reading and writing curricula are inadequate and limiting for the reasons cited above, i.e. they do not have the historical and critical/ conceptual dimension that empowers students. Aronowitz and Giroux (1985) refer to this "rapid learning for whole populations" as the "ideological model" (pp. 64-65).

There are, however, viable alternative conceptual frameworks out of which we could work (cf. Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985; Eisner, 1985; Giroux, Penna, & Pinar, 1981; Grumet, 1985; Schubert, 1985; Shor & Freire, 1987). The difficulty is that these alternative conceptualizations are not within the mainstream models. The alternative models are concerned with literacy "in the context of social movements which wish to make serious social changes" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985,

p. 65). To evaluate student work within these frameworks requires methods other than numbers, rankings and comparisons. For example, Madeleine Grumet (1981) distinguishes between "curriculum as described" and "curriculum as lived" (p. 140). The described curriculum refers to what we identify on paper regarding skills to be acquired, objectives to be reached, scope and sequence, etc. The lived curriculum is autobiographical for each child, what they experience. As many children as we have in a class, that is the number of curricula at work. Depending on which curriculum we chose to focus on, we either help children have a voice, or we silence them (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1985, p. 66). It is our contention that we silence children, all children. Our concern here however, because of their disproportionately high failure rate in school, is with children from the lower economic class.

There is already a good body of evidence that suggests there are significant differences between the home life of lower class children and that of middle and upper class children which impacts upon academic achievement in traditional school settings. For example, sociologists have long known that child rearing practices differ by social class (Kohn, 1969, 1976; Sieber & Wilder, 1967; Whimbey, 1974; White, 1973). Collectively these studies argue that middle class parents reward and foster those qualities valued by the school system such as curiosity, initiative and independence which in turn leads to higher academic attainment for their children.

Beginning from a different perspective but reaching a similar conclusion, other sociologists argue that children from lower class homes acquire skills and knowledge which prepare them to cope with the life experiences they will encounter in their communities, but when measured against school standards (such as I.Q. tests), these children appear deficient and inadequate (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Hunt, 1969).

In a recent study of middle and working class homes done in the San Francisco area, sociologists LaReau and Benson (1984) found that the environment characterizing the middle

class home complemented the process of schooling whereas family and community life for poor children were independent of this process. LaReau and Benson further asserted that:

> Moreover, we found that this difference in the home/school relationship is not related to the amount of interest that parents have in their children's educational achievement. Rather it appears to stem from social and cultural differences in family life and the ways in which schools respond to these differences. (p. 402)

On the one hand, the middle and upper class child is more likely to be exposed to and experience the beauty and potency of print through books, magazines, and newspapers (Levine & Havighurst, 1984). These are not only sources of reading matter but also the catalysts for family discussions that develop the conversational routines and responsive talk valued in school (Snow, Dubber, & DeBlauw, 1982). Writing is a real act associated with personal letters, requests, applications, employment and financial matters. School too is discussed in terms of career, mobility, success and happiness.

On the other hand, the home culture of the low income child conveys either neutral or negative signals regarding schooling in general and literacy in particular (Ogbu, 1974). Reading and writing are thought of in terms of skills whose utilitarian value is questionable at best and which in any case remain the exclusive domain of the school. Television, more so than print, predominates in such homes while the uplifting potential power of the word as idea is lost.

One sadly significant result of the disparity between the culture/environment of lower versus middle and upper income homes is that poor children are denied access to the concept of literacy as an instrument for social change. Similarly, some educators (Apple, 1982; Freire, 1970; Giroux, 1985) contend that the schools too have denied the lower classes the notion of literacy as emancipation. Research has

shown that poor children are more likely to be labeled as learning disabled at an early age, placed in the lowest group or track (Shannon, 1985), and often required to do less work (Levine & Havighurst, 1984). In part this is so because the school system, which over-emphasizes the skills of literacy and omits teaching the attitudes, values and potency of literacy to improve society, has become in effect a powerful supporter of the status quo.

The notion that the school system perpetuates class distinctions and maintains the status quo is not a palatable one, yet examples do exist of school systems which serve one class at the expense of another rather than serving as a vehicle for change and personal liberation. For example, in *Letter to a Teacher* (1971), eight peasant school boys from Barbiana, a rural hill community in the province of Tuscany, Italy castigated their school for serving only the middle class and punishing the poor. Those who failed in school, they noted, were quickly expelled and denied the chance to improve their lot in life. Many of the incidents recounted by these boy authors are easily recognizable by the minority poor of America's classrooms. One thirteen-year-old boy writes:

> Examinations should be abolished. But if you do give them, at least be fair. Difficulties should be chosen in proportion to their appearance in life. If you choose them too frequently, it means you have a trap-complex. As if you were at war with the kids. (p.15)

Shannon (1985) develops a similar argument in regard to how and why lower class children in America are grouped for reading instruction.

A second example appears in the work of Paulo Freire who launched a revolutionary adult literacy campaign among the poor of Brazil that has since become a model for other such programs throughout the Third World (1968). Freire views literacy in its broadest sense; it is seen as the power to change and transform the reality of the individual's existence. Illiteracy, in contrast, he equates with the culture of silence in

which "the masses are mute, that is they are prohibited from creatively taking part in the transformations of their society and therefore prohibited from being" (1974, p. 30).

Changes in the way literacy instruction is approached, especially for the less wealthy, are taking place. In America there are individual teachers who recognize the significance of the concept of lived experience for literacy instruction and have reorganized their approach to teaching accordingly. Two of the best known of these individuals are Eliot Wigginton and Nancie Atwell.

Eliot Wigginton's development of the *Foxfire* program describes his approach to literacy with high school students in rural Georgia (1972, 1985). To teach the traditional English grammar and composition skills he has students venture out into the community to tape record interviews with local craftsmen, storytellers, etc. The tapes are then transcribed and edited. Later the students write and revise articles, based on the interviews, that are eventually published in a magazine. In the process of doing, these students are learning not only the skills of English, but the significance of literacy for their own lives and the lives of others.

In the small community of Boothbay Harbor, Maine, Nancie Atwell has gained national attention as a teacher of English in the middle school grades; *Esquire* magazine (December, 1984) included her as one of fifty young men and women who are changing America. Atwell's approach is a simple but nevertheless revolutionary one. First she shares with her students the books that have made a difference in her own life. She shares too her own writings. Then she encourages her students to choose for themselves what they will read and what they will write about; their own lives, not some standardized prepackaged curriculum, determines the content of the course. As the semester progresses, immersed in real reading and writing activities, her students want to share their excitement with each other. Empowered with choice and responsibility these adolescents discovered that their own lives were significant, their thoughts and feelings important to others.

Conclusion

The time is long overdo for our schools to begin to teach more than the skills of reading and writing. We need to expand the whole notion of literacy to include thought and discourse about the ideas generated from reading and writing. We need to stress the student's active participation in the literacy learning process. But above all we as educators have a responsibility to lead our students, especially those from the lower economic stratum, to see the reading and writing of newspapers, magazines, and books as a powerful vehicle for the enhancement of the quality of life. Literacy instruction for the future need not remain on the treadmill of the past serving the privileged few.

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POLITICAL NOTES & NOTICES

Alan A. Block, Editor
Caldwell - West Caldwell School District

MY *reading* of the most recent *Partisan Review* (sent to me by Bill Reynolds), of Mikhail Bakhtin, and a recent attendance at a screening of Tod Browning's film, *Freaks*, has led me to a consideration of a certain aphorism. As it has come to me it says: "In the land of the blind, one-eyed jacks are kings." Of course, this statement could only have been made by a sighted person, and of course, he is wrong. Firstly, blindness does not exist in "the land of the blind," for blindness requires sight for its existence. Secondly, the aphorism establishes as a central value the primacy of sight, whereas in the land of the blind, other values take precedence. Finally, the aphorism assumes that no other value could assert itself against that of sight. Whereas Browning's *Freaks* reveals the danger of such a view. In other words, the aphorism has been passed on by sighted people who are blind, and that they hold to this view precludes them from understanding the world by alternative value-systems, and as the product of alternate languages.

All this brings me to the two articles in *Partisan Review*. There, William Phillips and Sidney Hook argue from a value system which is hearing impaired, but declare themselves kings in what they call the land of the deaf. However, their own definition of hearing is premised on their own handicap, and prevents them from listening to the sounds of their own silences and the thunderings of others.

Mikhail Bakhtin describes a unitary language as a system of linguistic norms, the "generative forces of linguistic

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Mikhail Bakhtin describes a unitary language as a system of linguistic norms, the "generative forces of linguistic

life... [which serve to create] within a heteroglot national language the firm, stable, linguistic nucleus of an officially recognized literary language, or else [to defend] an already formed language from the pressure of growing heteroglossia" (271). A unitary language, thus, is always something abstractly posited, and presents itself as "forces that serve to unify and centralize the verbal-ideological world." A unitary language asserts itself as the sole legitimate world view. A unitary language must be recognized as linguistic imperialism; a unitary language functions to impose that consciousness of which it is voice as the norm; the result is the definition of reality as realized in and by the unitary language. In this way, those who insist on the monoglot nature of language actually mean to [colonize] occupy the consciousnesses of its listeners, and to deny alternate systems of reality, various world views. A unitary language is a denial of history, and it turns language into myth. It is the terrible fear of the unitary language that it will fail in preventing the centrifugal forces which fling language outwards leaving the center empty—even non-existent.

Language is, however, never unitary, but is always heteroglossic. Historical conditions, what Bakhtin calls "actual social life and historical becoming," create "a multitude of concrete worlds [within an abstractly unitary language], a multitude of bounded verbal-ideological and social belief systems' (288). These conceptual systems produce languages which are stratified in any number of ways, resulting in the heteroglossic nature of language, and making possible the dialogic possibilities inherent in this heteroglossia. "Thus at any given moment in its existence, language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a bodily form. These languages of heteroglossia intersect each other in a variety of ways, forming new socially typifying 'languages'." The heteroglot nature of language permits—or rather—demands, the presence of dialogue, a struggle among socio-linguistic points of view. "All utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve." Heteroglossia is what the unitary language struggles to deny, for the former demands dialogue for the creation of meaning while the latter makes meaning dependent on monologue.

A unitary language knows itself as a 'language of truth.' It possesses a sacrosanct and unitary medium for containing ideological thought; it is a consciousness which denies the validity of other social languages that are themselves surrounded by a single national language which exists in the midst of other national languages that are surrounded by a single culture or by a single cultural-political world. A unitary language is the consciousness of an hermetic, frightened, autocracy who maintain "a mythological feeling for the authority of language and a faith in the unmediated transformation into a seamless unity of the entire sense, the entire expressiveness inherent in that authority..." (370)

The two pieces in *Partisan Review*, one by William Phillips, the long-time editor of the *Partisan*, and the other by Sidney Hook, concern curriculum, but the conceptual systems of both writers derive from the centripetal impulses particular to unitary languages. As a result, both men address an extremely exclusive and limited audience, decry the 'deafness' of the masses, and are incapable of recognizing their own impairment. They reveal in their language the severe limits of their world view and the impotent nature of their arguments.

In his article "Further Notes Toward a Definition of Curriculum", William Phillips, having read (and disagreed with) Gerald Graff's 'partisan' book about the current debates regarding the canon and curriculum [Gerald Graff and Michael Warner, eds., *The Origin of Literary Studies in America*, Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1989], attempts to raise what he considers "some cogent problems" which curricular theorists must yet address. It is in the statement of those problems that his unitary language reveals itself.

Phillips acknowledges that the university does have an obligation to make students aware of "different schools of thought and diverse approaches to various subjects." But, Phillips goes on to say, that "objections to illegitimate positions based on factional and political interests must [also] be maintained" by the university. Several aspects of Phillip's unitary language—and its limits—are in evidence here. The manner by which he seems to advocate the presentation of different schools of thought and diverse approaches to various subjects is actually couched in a language which relegates those schools and approaches to the margins of an already centered system: "differing schools of thought and diverse approaches" may only be so named based on the recognition of an accepted standard. Difference is not the norm, but the deviation from it. Furthermore, these factional and political views, schools, and approaches must be spoken of from within a specific language which establishes these other languages as 'objectionable,' thus ensuring the naturalness of the center. Different approaches are here made possible only by acknowledging the existence of an organizing, delimiting center; factional and political views are judged by the language from which they differ: difference here is not a concept by which objects may be defined relationally to a material and inviolable center.

Furthermore, in Phillips' postulation, though it is in conformity with the function of the university to note disagreements in views, it is also requisite that certain such disagreements be designated as "illegitimate." Apparently, for Phillips, some disagreements are more legitimate than others. Phillips' ability to define what school of thought or approach to a subject is 'illegitimate,' and hence, political, and which school of thought or approach is not, is certainly admirable, but clearly specious. In that dichotomy between different and illegitimate we may note Phillips' enclosure in a unitary language which maintains abstract categories which preclude addressing words situated in the alien territory of the reader's socio-linguistic consciousness. The circuit is a closed one; the categories are self-defined and

impermeable. Phillips does not mean "to get a reading" on his words; rather, he means to implant them. All texts which are not already in the canon are factional and political; all canonical texts are classics and have been established by tradition. The underlying forces which have produced these phenomena are denied, and the result is the reification of the language and the consciousness which it forms. The dichotomy between accepted differences and approaches, and illegitimate ones can only occur in a unitary language of abstract forms which can be used to determine the nature of reality. As Bakhtin says, "A unitary language is not something given but is always in essence posited—and at every moment in its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heterglossia."

From this position it is possible for Phillips to refer to the third world, literary feminists[as if there were such a thing!] blacks, gays and left-wing groups as 'special interests and not scholarly ones.' Thus, the texts these groups have chosen may not be representative of "a consensus of the literary and intellectual community." Again, this statement stems from a unitary language which organizes such exclusive categories as 'special interests' and 'scholarly interests,' and which maintains a vocabulary which is capable of hierarchizing such categories. This naming, however, occurs in the vocabulary of the unitary language which denies heterglossia. Such a unitary language possesses categories which may be clearly defined, and as a result, relegates to the margins the vocabularies which itself names alien. Actually, in Phillip's unitary language, only white, male, first world, heterosexual and right-of-left groups are innocent of factionalism and politics; Phillips unitary language cannot examine the political nature of any of those latter categories for there is nothing in his language which would permit it. The questioning is unthinkable. Interestingly, as Phillips would formulate the legitimate organizers of such 'scholarly interests,' this group represents a minority of the world's population, and its own language, paradoxically, marginal. Finally, Phillips unitary language can only posit the consensus as firm and thus, only

permits the interrogation of the texts which do not derive from it. Heteroglossia, on the other hand, would interrogate the hegemony of the consensus.

Phillips argues that the classics—the traditional great books and the core of the liberal arts humanities curriculum—are not, as has been said, chosen by "administrative or faculty committees." Rather, the classics have been *selected* by later figures who have preserved what they found valuable in previous generations. "In essence, the formation of the tradition—or the canon—is a creative process carried on by practitioners in philosophy, fiction, poetry, art, literary criticism, social thought and so on." What is curious in this formulation is the tautological nature of the argument, a product of the unitary nature of his language. The sacrosanct canon, which is equated with tradition, is established by the figures who are in the canon. These later practioners who are responsible for the development of the canon are themselves admitted by still later practioners. But the question arises: Where are these books read, and by whom? "There has been" says Phillips, "...the current fashionable notion that the so-called canon has been chosen by white, male, Christian, Western elitists, as though they constituted some kind of self-appointed committee throughout modern history." But if the canon is composed of white, heterosexual, first world Christian males, as it clearly is so composed, then those who are responsible for its construction must be the same, since they are merely the later practitioners who discovered something valuable in the works of their predecessors.And isn't the population of academica still heavily weighted toward white, first world, heterosexual males. Or have I been reading the wrong newspapers? Since language is the stratified presence of a socio-linguistic world view, and since language is established by and establishes the canon, then it must be the language—and world views—as transmitted in the canon which attracts later practitioners: the circle is complete. The canon is reality, and all language that is not canonical is not reality. The university must educate about reality. But, the inclusion into the university curriculum of such canonical

texts must, indeed, have been made by faculty and administrative groups, for where else in the modern world are the practioners called upon to choose works for study. The unitary language in which Phillips speaks admits exactly what he means to deny. The canon is self-defining and irreproachable; it's language stands at the center of consciousness and it determines the language which may be used to discuss it. Only those employing this vocabulary are legitimately engaging in the talk. But such pontifications certainly may not be a dialogue, since Phillips employs the language which excludes dialogue.

It is interesting to reflect upon the change in words that Phillips make when he moves from chosen to selected. Disputing the claims of special interest groups who are interrogating the source of the materials from which curriculum derives, Phillips states that "The texts have been selected from the general canon. And it has always been assumed that the major works of the past—which could be identified—constituted the intellectual achievements of Western civilization." This linguistic formulation preserves the canon as self-evident and in tact: works may be selected from it, but all choices for it have already been made. The presence of other languages poses a real threat to the hegemony of what Phillips refers to as "our best historians, philosophers, and literary critics." In strident language, he decries the "assault on the works of the past... on the very idea of tradition, by academics who are promoting third-world, black, literary feminist, and deconstructionist ideologies and reinterpreting the past in terms of these ideologies." One needn't read far without perceiving some powerful fears. The assault on the canon is perceived as an assault on the whole structure of civilization as it exists in the unitary language reified in The Canon. Paradoxically, Phillips' own exclusions, and given the diversity and obvious quantity of these very excluded 'special interest groups' who are disrupting the sanctity of the canon, posit the canon-makers as a select, frightened minority of the world population. In any case, Phillips speaks in a language here which is an abstract system of ideal forms known to the

select few and dispensed out to the ignorant masses, who are ever unqualified and ungrateful.

Finally, this formulation permits Phillips to evaluate the entire movement of pluralism in education which has resulted from the entry into the universities of many who had heretofore been excluded, as the pawn of those same factional and special interest groups who so vehemently assault the canon. This populist movement in education has permitted the politicalization of the curriculum by those same factional and special interest groups who are assaulting the nature of civilization as it has voice in the canon. Again, Phillips' unitary language denies the existence of other languages, and insists on the presentation of an exclusive world view as it is contained in the language which is the canon. Hence, Phillips can say that mass education engages students who may be "less qualified students," and may not be interest in the great books, but who would "presumably relate to more current books and the more recent trends of popular culture." Taking advantage of this trend, radical educators are able to pursue a political agenda by offering popular texts and calling this liberatory education. Again, Phillips speaks in a language in which 'popular literature' does not partake, indeed, must be excluded. Popular is here opposed to classic, both terms defined by the language of the latter. Phillips' idea of a liberating education would entail the liberation of an individual from her own language and the imposition of his own as the sole legitimate and legitimating world view. Such would be the curriculum which William Phillips would advocate for the contemporary United States.

Sidney Hook, in "Curricular Politics," speaks in the same unitary language with which we have already become familiar in Phillips' arguments. For Hook, the implementation of new curricula, specifically that at Stanford University, admits of heteroglossia, the movement Hook's unitary language means to contain. Indeed, his arguments critical of the curricular changes are contained in language which means, as Bakhtin says, to "give expression to forces which are working toward making the verbal concrete and central and

unified." Complaining that under the guise of a "vague, ill-defined pluralism or diversity" the canonical syllabus for the Western Civilization course has been altered, Hook wonders if it will still be possible for the schools to provide the "unified [not uniform] common education experience that liberal arts colleges in the past have prided themselves on." The outcome of a 'liberal arts' education, as it is evidenced in this language, is the negation of heterglossia, for the end product itself, though cognizant of dialect, will authorize a single perspective, a unified view—a single language. Thus it is that Hook worries that the changes in the curriculum will alter the very "nature of educational experience itself [and will now] reflect the very differences that liberal education has sought to transcend." His entire [though hearing impaired] notion of education is contained in the unitary language in which Hook engages: education is the transmission in tact of the body of a unitary language. For these purposes, various canonical texts have been chosen as necessary medium for instruction. New texts may have been added without having to change the orientation, says Hook, as long as they were spoken of in the unitary language: "Without changing the structure of the course in Western Culture, great works by women and people of color could easily have been incorporated." The silencing of heteroglossia is clear in Hook's statements, for even the entrance of new texts is predicated on the unified view which must be the educational outcome. These books may certainly be read, but in a prescribed way.

This prescriptive manner of reading is premised on the reality of a unitary language. Obviously, Hook's immersion in this language is responsible for his limited ideas regarding the changes in the curriculum. Hook complains that the change in orientation to now emphasize race, sex and class will produce a "comprehensive, diluted course in social studies dedicated to the appreciation of the contributions and systematic oppressions of racial minorities, women, and working masses in history, past and present, in all cultures studied, especially Western culture." On the one hand, his unitary language distinguishes between 'liberal arts' and

'social studies,' the former clearly a transcendance of politics and the latter an immersion in it. Indeed, says Hook, it is the function of the liberal arts education to 'stimulate and clarify' the minds of students and not to "steer them into some sort of political action." Implicit in this language is the idea that education ought—and does—exist in the absence of politics. And yet, what, indeed, does Hook mean by 'clarify?'

On the other hand, this unitary language, in denying heteroglossia, premises learning as transmitted in a single language. Hence, according to Hook, the works in this revised curriculum are to be read specifically for evidences of contributions to culture [especially Western culture], or for the evidences of oppression. What is clearly premised here is that the unitary language will be capable of communicating only those subjects, for both words maintain Western Civilization as an organizing center. What Hook would never hear are alternative voices, voices in different languages. His language only speaks of what adheres to his concept of Western Culture—indeed, to his idea of culture in general. One thing he would clearly miss would be the means of power used by the unitary language to attempt to contain heteroglossia. Too, he could hear nothing that was not voiced in the unitary language in which he engages.

That language questions the efficacy of including Franz Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* which is to be read "as if it had an historical bearing on the diffusion of cultures or the impact of Europe on early American civilization?" What Hook's unitary can not hear are the effects of imperialism which would be evident in the language of these imperialists as they talk of themselves or the colonized, or the effects of that imperialism as the colonized speak in various languages which would be expressive of their oppressed experience. Though Hook questions the value of Fanon's text for an understanding of the impact of Europe on early American civilization, certain questions arise which his unitary language silence: who does Hook believe colonized both Africa and America, and what effects did that colonization have on both cultures? How might the experience of an imperialist be

expressed in his language. What might account for the differences in the colonial experiences of Africa and America and India, and how has those differences had impact on the course of events during the twentieth century and the development of languages in it . These issues—and more—may not be considered in Hook's curriculum, spoken as it must be in his unitary language.

The final effect of the unitary language in which both Hook and Phillips engage is to create the illusion of pure discourse. Divorced from partisan concerns, from political interests and causes, the university may be "an institution that should study with critical care and understanding *all* proposed answers to the central questions and problems of our time." But of course, it is possible for the unitary language to entertain the study of all proposed answers, for in actuality, it controls those answers in its denial of the existence of all other languages save itself with which to name the central questions and problems. The language in which those central questions and problems have been spoken is, itself, says Bakhtin, "indissolubly fused with its authority—with political power, an institution, a person..." And yet, this authority may not be discussed because the language denies the possibility of its existence by excluding those languages why which it might be known.

As I was finishing this piece this morning, our seven week-old daughter, Emma, attentive on my lap to the movements on the screen, said to me, in a phrase whose tone gurgled like mountain spring water and whose melody fell with the smoothness of the rainbow, "IRRnNaaH." And of course, she was right.



PIETER CORNELIS MONDRIAN (1917)

Pretexts

Pretext: Review of *Power and Criticism: Poststructural Investigations in Education*, by Cleo H. Cherryholmes. New York: Teachers College Press, 1988. 240 pp. ISBN 0-8077-2927-2 (cloth).

Unmasking the Politics of Educational Thought and Practice

Patti Lather
Ohio State University

In his introduction to this book, series editor Jonas Soltis defines all of the "post-" phenomena—postpositivism, postmodern, postanalytic, etc.—as suggesting "that we have gotten beyond where we were in some very fundamental way and now need to assess where we are" (viii). What Cherryholmes has done in this book is to explore what the "post-conditions" mean for education. While his is not the first book to break such ground (see, e.g., Bowers, 1987), Cherryholmes sees poststructuralism as opening up new avenues for understanding how power works in the ways we construct our world and its possibilities. Hence, *Power and Criticism* helps move educational discourse into the transdisciplinary crisis of confidence in methods and purposes that so characterizes the contemporary academy. Such movement has profound implications for educational thought and practice.

Cherryholmes writes, "To understand a text one moves from what is written to what is not written and back again, from what is present to what is absent, from statements to their historical setting" (8). Using these words as my guide, I shall touch on what seems to me to be this book's chief

points of interest and outline some of my questions and reservations. In doing so, I am well aware that I am not so much *describing* as *inscribing*, marking with words that impress my own investments of privilege and struggle onto what follows.

What is written

The postmodern focus on what makes our knowledge both possible and problematic underscores Cherryholmes' project. Placing the ideas of Foucault, Derrida, Rorty and Habermas within the context of educational discourses-practices, Cherryholmes' book is especially valuable in its effort to work at an introductory level as he demonstrates that "[m]uch of the unfamiliarity and strangeness of poststructuralism recedes when applied to everyday life" (142). Chapter one offers some basic definitions of such terms as discourse, text, speech acts, poststructural/postmodern/post-analytic. Chapters 2 and 3 provide structural and poststructural readings of three examples of educational discourse: Bloom's taxonomy, Tyler's rationale, and Schwab's "The Practical Four." In chapters 4-7, Cherryholmes deconstructs educational reform as one structural invasion after another by looking at the relationship between textbooks and the construction of meaning, standardized tests and teaching, and theory and practice, especially the relationship between empirically based theory and critical practice. Chapters 6 and 7 offer poststructural readings of construct validity and curriculum discourse, and chapter 8 addresses "critical pragmatism" and the arguments that might be directed against it.

Interrupting the nihilism and Nietzschean angst often assumed attendant upon post-foundational discourse, this is not a despairing book. Cherryholmes welcomes important changes in thinking about curriculum and education. Arguing the inescapability of structures, he uses poststructuralism to stress the fictionality and constitutive dimensions of our structuring concepts. Deconstructive strategies are offered as a way to learn to see not only what we do, but also

what it is that structures what we do. Tracing how ideological and institutional power play out in our own practices and recognizing the partiality and open-endedness of our efforts offer some hope of "getting smart" about educational change. Learning how to make power structures explicit and redistribute their effects and how to address the empty spaces in educational discourse, we can begin to examine the discourses within which we are caught.

For educators the implications are enormous. The fixed and "objective" knowledge of textbooks is displaced by a focus on the effects of power on the social construction of knowledge and meaning. The categories, metaphors, rules of logic and evidence, and underlying power relations which shape discursive practices situate pedagogy and curriculum in a Foucauldian power-knowledge nexus. Textbooks as "witness to certainty" (11), the univocality of standardized achievement tests, one-best way interpretations—all are much problematized by Derridean foregrounding of the multiplicity, dispersal and deferral of meaning. For example, to focus on the diversities of prior understandings, experiences, codes, beliefs and cultural capital that students bring to a reading is to shift away from "banking" concepts of pedagogy to a recognition that "One is always reading oneself when reading a text" (13). Canon formation and the basic categories and methods involved in the possibilities for knowledge are likewise "imploded", collapsed inward, self-consumed by the "alterity", the structuring absence, the shadow, the unsaid (and unsayable) present in every concept. And we begin moving toward a very different way of thinking about what it means to know.

What is not written

A thundering silence of *Power and Criticism* is what Newton (1988) terms "the mother roots" of postmodernism. Newton asks, "Why has feminist theory been so hard to see, especially for men and even for those in sympathy with feminist politics?" (94) Newton notes that, given the relative invisibility of feminism's theoretical labors, what happens is

that "feminist scholars and theorists read each other and male theorists, while 'they' do not by and large read 'us.' 'We' have two jobs, and 'they' have one" (106). What is lost in this exclusion of feminist work from a highly invested field of intellectual and political endeavor?

While feminism displaces the articulation of postmodernism from the site of the fathers and opens up the possibility of a heteroglot articulation premised on multiplicities and particularities, I am most interested here in feminism's interruption of theoreticism, the divorce of theory and practice. Deeply embedded in popular practice which seeks to transform the world, feminism's tendencies toward practice-based theorizing and self-criticisms have developed in response to the demands of political practice (Fraser and Nicholson, 1988). For example, the production of grand social theories, which by definition attempt to speak for *all* women, was disrupted by the political pressures put upon such theorizing by those left out of it—poor and working class women, women of color, lesbians, differently-abled women, fat women, older women (e.g., Lugones and Spelman, 1983).

Hence, feminism has for some time now been wrestling with the question of difference. Additionally, while the subject of contemporary feminism is not single, unified or static, neither is she utterly determined. Positioned as both the Other of patriarchy and the construction of feminism's internally heterogeneous discourses about identity, subjectivity and agency, she is theorized in ways that offer hope for sustained contestation and resistance (Smith, 1988). While the varied strands of feminism can be categorized in various ways, all feminisms appeal to the powers of agency and subjectivity as necessary components of socially transformative struggle. As such, feminism is the cultural site most effectively disruptive of the alleged impotence of the subject in the face of social/political forces and situations.

Finally, feminism's long-standing tendencies toward self-reflexivity provide some experience of both rendering problematic and provisional our most firmly held assumptions and, never-the-less, acting in the world, taking a stand. From this experience, poststructuralist feminism proposes a doubled strategy which both assumes and then immediately problematizes its subject positions. The material ground for such a doubled movement is women's simultaneous experiences of positions of both privilege and marginality, contradictory positions that reveal the materiality of what West terms "a reality *that one cannot not know*" if you have been positioned as the other (interview with Stephanson, 1988:p.277, original emphasis). Poststructural feminism becomes, then, not a veering between the passive, dispersed subject of deconstruction on the one hand and, on the other hand, the transcendent subject of most emancipatory discourse, but "the site of the systematic fighting-out of that instability" (Riley, 1988:p.5).

Cherryholmes' promise is "increased freedom and power" via "understanding more fully how we and others around us have become who we are" (149). Enlightenment ideals are at the core of the book's hope to enhance our ability to shape and design the social world. Such an effort toward a postmodern praxis cannot afford to ignore the one critical movement which, though full of contestatory and contradictory theories and practices, has still manged to produce solidarity and concerted action toward social change (Smith, 1988:p.155).

What is present

Cherryholmes' book is located in a territory of pragmatism where semantics, speech act theory, Habermas and critical theory, Foucault and discourse, Derrida and the text, Rorty and neo-pragmatism, reception theory and the uses of metaphor are brought together to fashion what he terms "critical pragmatism." Unlike vulgar pragmatism with its concern for "what works", "[c]ritical pragmatism results when a sense of crisis is brought to our choices, when it is accepted that our standards, beliefs, values, guiding texts, and discourses-practices themselves require evaluation and reappraisal" (151).

For anyone familiar with feminist and neo-marxist work over the last two decades, there is nothing startling here in

the revelations regarding the interpenetrations of knowledge and power. To see critical discourses as material practices which shape the search for critical practices is a useful insight from poststructuralism, but *Power and Criticism* has little to say about the theory/practice nexus. Additionally, while Cherryholmes' focus on how we regulate, police and normalize discourse about research via a deconstruction of construct validity lays the groundwork for an "antifoundational research methodology" (117), the parameters remain quite vague. I must say, however, that I enjoyed seeing Lee Cronbach and Nietzsche together in the same sentence, and I especially enjoyed the deconstruction of Academic Learning Time (ALT), a construct that has always been paradigmatic to me of the limitations of positivism. Finally, while brief, Cherryholmes' deconstruction of both the emancipation/oppression distinctions at the center of critical theory, and relativism as a structuralist obsession exemplify how rethinking education involves identifying both the privileged and silenced themes in our discourses-practices.

What is absent: From statements to their historical setting

Rorty's "polite conversations," however, make me suspicious of the capacity of any brand of pragmatism to focus on power-sensitive vs. pluralist "conversations". While Cherryholmes is well aware of this (91), the absence of feminist and minoritarian voices in his discourse underscores my suspicion of pragmatism, neo- or otherwise. Historically, pragmatism was to qualify the classical criteria of reason, to make them attainable, so that these enterprises did not delegitimate themselves by virtue of the very rigor of their standards (West, 1985). Presuming manageabilty, common interests, and a rationality suspiciously male and Eurocentric, pragmatic persuasiveness is problematized by efforts to get behind the discourse to what is not questioned, defined or even all that conscious. In Cherryholmes' movement through poststructuralism to "critical pragmatism", one must ask what are the nonproblematized assumptions of neo-pragmatism? How does "critical pragmatism" exceed,

complicate and contest the limits of pragmatism?

Cherryholmes' project is one of "control over practice" (4). It is rationalist, linear, systematic (witness his choice of poststructural over "postmodern" because the latter does "not provide a tight formulation" (16)). His project assumes both human capacity for potentially full consciousness (e.g., where is Lacan?) and progress (e.g., a "maturing social research methodology" (100). The latter, however, is proposed as *without metanarratives*, "subject to continual revision, rejection, or supplementation" (13). The text is full of "specific critical pragmatic suggestions" (15) for educational discourses-practices, suggestions premised on the lack of firm foundations and fixed standards. Contrarily, "critical pragmatism" is offered as "realistic" and "relativistic" due to its relationship "with what is in place" (185-86). As such, and not unlike all of us struggling with what it means to do critical work in a post-foundational context, Cherryholmes' book has its structural and programmatic moments, its moments of continued attachment to realisms and teleologies. As well, it has its movements toward ways of knowing that can take us beyond ourselves, movements toward what Derrida (1978) calls "the as yet unnameable which is proclaiming itself" (293).

Conclusion

Foregrounding the constant re-creation of educational practice by the actions of educators, Cherryholmes pays scant attention to the neo-marxist and feminist practices that helped to prepare the ground for the reception of the radically unsettling discourses of poststructuralism. Curiously ahistorical for a political scientist, this book, nevertheless, furthers the intent of the series to advance contemporary educational thought. Especially given its accessibility, *Power and Criticism* furthers understanding of how poststructuralism marks an important movement toward unmasking the politics of educational thought and practice.

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Reflections on an Important but Unfinished Poststructural Essay

Jim Henderson
Roosevelt University

An Important Poststructural Inquiry

There are, at least, two ways to read *Power and Criticism*. The book can be read as a thoughtful poststructural analysis of several general curriculum topics. For those readers not familiar with poststructuralism, particularly as informed by Foucault and Derrida, the book is an important and useful introduction to this type of analysis. Key poststructural concepts are discussed in chapters 1 and 2 and applied to an analysis of the Tyler rationale (Tyler, 1949), Schwab's "The Practical 4" (Schwab, 1983), and the Bloom Taxonomy (Bloom, 1956) in chapter 3. The remaining chapters of the book, chapters 4-8, provide insightful poststructural interpretations of such perennial curriculum concerns as: the linkage between text and teaching, the relation between theory and practice, construct validity in research, and the socio-political context of educational activity.

A Personal Advocacy

Power and Criticism can also be read as a personal contribution to the American pragmatic tradition, and this reading will serve as the focus of my review. In chapter 2, Cherryholmes discusses the prevalence of "binary distinctions" in educational discourse. He writes that "because language is determined by relationships or differences among words, binary distinctions or oppositions determine the content of the structure" (22). He elaborates:

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A Personal Advocacy

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> Binary distinctions abound in contemporary education: achievement/failure, theory/practice, concept/fact, accountability/lack of accountability.... In structural analysis and criticism, the word valued by the structure is stated first, the disvalued word second, and which orientation one adopts toward educational discourses-practices determines one's values and disvalues. The normative commitments of a structure, then, are high-lighted by identifying its valued and disvalued categories. (22)

Power and Criticism is structured around a binary distinction: critical pragmatism/vulgar pragmatism. The book is, in effect, an argument for the value of a particular interpretation of educational praxis. Cherryholmes introduces the argument in chapter 1 when he writes: "But in order to exert control over practice and not simply react to it, we must be explicit not only about what we do but also about what it is that structures what we do" (6). We must inquire into the discourse that structures our practice. We must engage in a *critical pragmatism* based on two inquiries: (1) How am I (and others) socially and politically positioned by a particular discourse? (2) How am I (and others) metaphysically positioned by a particular discourse?

The First Poststructural Inquiry

In order to explicate the first inquiry, Cherryholmes draws mainly on the works of Foucault and Habermas. From Foucault (1980), he takes the insight that "power is most effective and efficient when it operates as desire, because desire often makes the effects of power invisible" (35). For example, how many young black males *desire* to be Michael Jordan instead of Malcolm X or Martin Luther King? Or, for that matter, how many teachers desire to be an affluent basketball star rather than an educational leader? The former desire, which is strongly promoted by our mass media, does not challenge our current socio-political structures, whereas the latter desire would. From Habermas (1979), Cherryholmes takes the idea of an ideal speech

community. He argues that there are several necessary discursive conditions associated with the practice of *critical pragmatism* (93-94). These conditions would allow for community-based, reciprocal dialogue in the context of an open-ended, politically-aware inquiry.

Schools would have to be restructured to support this type of poststructural inquiry. For example, Sirotnik (1988) points out that despite the continuous generation of lofty educational goals throughout the twentieth century, the structure of American classroom life in 1988 is little different from what it was in 1900. Classroom conditions have not changed because support for school-based critical discourse has not materialized. Sirotnik (1988) writes:

> ...to the extent that we continue to make impossible—by action or inaction—the conditions and circumstances for critical inquiry in schools, we will never get beyond descriptive questions of "what is" and to the more crucial imperative, "This is the way it *ought* to be!" (p.66)

And this is precisely the point of Cherryholmes' advocacy for a *critical pragmatism*: to envision the way educational practice should be.

The Second Poststructural Inquiry

In order to explicate the second metaphysically-oriented inquiry, Cherryholmes draws on the work of Derrida. He first points out that, despite positivistic protestations and repressions, we can never escape from metaphysics—we can never escape the ultimate questions of life. There are no "transcendental signifieds" (Derrida, 1981)...no final stopping points in our existential travels. The *Gospel According to John* begins, "In the beginning was the Word...;" and The Derridean query is, "But whose word?" Cherryholmes points out that this rejection of transcendental signifieds "undermines a structural sense of meaning, giving rise to the term *poststructural*" (38).

Cherryholmes asks us to imagine an educational com-

munity that would operate without transcendental signifieds. Structured discourse would constantly be deconstructed in the spirit of "edification" (Rorty, 1980). This would be a community committed to a recurring critical dialogue in which the overriding concern would be that "the conversation should be kept going..."(Rorty, 1980, p.377 quoted in Cherryholmes, 1988, p. 97). This would be a community that would encourage ongoing "cycles of construction and deconstruction" (143). Cherryholmes is, in effect, envisioning an educational community committed to a continuously indeterminate, suppositional form of dialogue.

An Unfinished Poststructural Essay

Cherryholmes' synthesis of poststructuralism can be used to analyze the viability of his advocacy for a *critical pragmatism*.. That there is no such systematic analysis is an unfinished aspect of his "poststructural investigations." I would argue that *Power and Criticism* should have a chapter 9 which would be entitled: "Inquiry into *Critical Pragmatism*: Deconstructing an Interpretation of Praxis." In this proposed chapter, Cherryholmes would explore two inquiries: (1) Is the discourse on *critical pragmatism* socially and politically marginal? (2) What happens when the binary distinction—critical pragmatism/vulgar pragmatism—is deconstructed?

Consider the first question. Cherryholmes (1988) argues that the "structure of disciplines" discourse of Bruner and others was dominant in the early 1960's due to historical factors (135-141). Succinctly stated, at a certain point in time American history invented Bruner as a significant curricularist. Is history now inventing Cherryholmes? Let's go back a generation and ask a related question. Did history invent Dewey to be academically respected but institutionally marginal? Does Cherryholmes predict a similar fate for his conception of praxis? Cherryholmes offers a poststructural refinement of our pragmatic heritage but, historically speaking, so what? Are the winds of change *sufficient* in textbook writing, teacher education, research methodology,

educational policy, and curriculum theory to make *critical pragmatism* historically *necessary*? What would he say to these questions?

Consider also an inquiry into the binary distinction: critical pragmatism/vulgar pragmatism. Why is *critical pragmatism* so valuable that it need not be questioned? Bowers (1987) provides a systematic critique of the critical inquiry tradition. His analysis is also based on poststructural insights. He writes:

> The ideals of truth, justice, and progress appear to represent the interests of everybody, but this is an illusion that obscures the way language–which must always be viewed as a specific language–organizes reality according to its own epistemic grammar. (p.8)

The "epistemic grammar" that Bowers deconstructs is the "adversial, fragmenting, and relativizing nature of critical reflection" (Bowers, 1987, p.49). Simply stated, so-called "critical" awareness is not all that good, and so-called "vulgar" awareness is not all that bad. Embedded in our critical discourse is the "myth of individual autonomy" (Bowers, 1987, p.140), and embedded in our vulgar discourse is a "preliterate" wisdom of bonding and connectedness (Bowers, 1987, p.158). Our potential humanness is tied to two types of discourses-practices: the affirmation of *critical discrimination* and the celebration of *embodied centeredness*. There have been attempts to voice, to express the possible (and aesthetically powerful) synergy between these two states of awareness–to weave these two fundamentally different metaphysical orientations into a common philosophical tapestry.[1] Such discourse begins to explore the boundary between *modern* interpretations of rationality and the possibility of a more balanced and humane *post-modern* reconstruction of consciousness. What is Cherryholmes' position on such discursive efforts?

There is an underlying irony in reading Cherryholmes against Cherryholmes. Can one advocate changes in the dominant discourses-practices of a particular historical

period while admitting that whatever is advocated can be deconstructed? Riley (1988) expresses this paradox as follows: "...both a concentration on and a refusal of the identity of 'women' are essential to feminism" (p.1). *Power and Criticism* makes an important contribution to American pragmatism, but its analysis is unfinished. It needs additional inquiry to complete its poststructural investigations. It needs to deconstruct itself.

Notes

1. For example, see John Dewey, **Art as Experience**. New York: Capricorn, 1934; Martin Heidegger, **Being and Time**. New York: Harper & Row, 1962; and Julia Kristeva, **Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art.** New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

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CURRICULUM PROJECTS & REPORTS

Chip Edelsberg
Dublin City Schools, Ohio

At the recent (Fall, 1988) Bergamo conference, I had the privilege of participating on a panel in which presenters discussed the topic, "The Rumor of Reform in Education: A Survey of Critical Views."[1] In the brief time allotted to me, I bemoaned the failure of the curriculum reconceptualists and critical theorists—however they may define themselves—to influence practical curriculum work in the schools. I also noted that my fifteen years of experience in education have led me to conclude that practitioners and academicians do not have viable forums for communicating with each other. I want to repeat some of the points I made at Bergamo and elaborate on several ideas I presented for instigating this much needed dialogue between practitioners and academicians, especially as the discussion relates to current school reform curricular issues.

No one doubts by now that school reform has a momentum all its own. The reform literature is legion and still proliferating.[2] There are political treatises, empirical studies (albeit very few), and personal essays. So-called "waves" of reform appear in the literature.[3] Yet perplexing issues remain: What programs and pedagogy successfully educate at-risk students? Can we identify a core curriculum, which is to say, what constitutes a culturally literate citizen? How can we elevate teaching to bona fide professional status? What must we do to integrate technology more effectively into the educational process? What measured steps can we take to enhance school productivity (and what is productivity in the

school context)? What organizational changes are necessary to make the schools more democratic and humane? The questions are as bountiful as the reform reports themselves.

It appears that two essentially competing trends have emerged from this ongoing debate on reform. One theme receiving considerable attention is that of teacher empowerment.[4] Its current focal points include the National Teacher Certification Board and the decentralization of decision making in the movement toward school-based management.[5] A second, contradictory movement is that of legislating the profession through teacher and student competency examinations, increased coursework requirements for both teacher certification and student high school graduation, the establishment of differentiated student diplomas, state department of education selection of textbooks, etc. On the one hand, educators enact reform and are conferred greater professional autonomy; on the other hand, reform is done to professionals through standardization and bureaucratic control.

We may justifiably characterize the second major type of reform as legislated learning. State-wide standardized testing is integral to this reform effort. State-mandated testing (be it competency, proficiency, or basic skills) shapes the writing of local curricula and insidiously influences classroom teaching.[6] Legislated learning forces positivistic curriculum models on the schools and deprives educators of opportunities for innovative curriculum development at the local level. Teachers are compelled to teach to tests that are simplistic in what they assess and which distort what students know and can do. As a matter of fact, the type of tests which are created as a function of state legislation fail to measure anything that tells us very much about student learning.

There is ample research demonstrating that successful adoptions of educational innovations feature continuous involvement of the people who are expected to implement the innovation. Reform-minded policymakers can no more mandate reform than legislators can dictate morality. Top-

down reform provides neither the incentive nor the impetus for educators to change the ways they teach youth and administrate the schools.

I believe genuine reform involves at least the following:

- reconstituting school cultures;
- reconfiguring the roles professionals play in school organizations;
- reconceptualizing the teaching/learning process to make it more enabling and ennobling for our students;
- rewriting policy at local, state, and national levels to sanction qualitative, criterion-referenced assessments as meaningful measures of student academic growth and achievement.[7]

Obviously, any effort to reform schools along these lines will involve basic changes in the structure of schools, particularly at the secondary level. However, the purpose of this paper is not to identify a true reform agenda but to argue that reconceptualists and critical theorists could help practitioners shape the dialogue on school reform—yet unfortunately fail to do so.

In pursuit of this proposed dialogue, I want to digress to the practical matter of school administrators' daily work. I will use my own experience as a basis for the discussion. ...Projects that I typically manage involve helping groups to make decisions on conceptual frameworks for curriculum guides as well as coming to terms with such issues as: weighted grades; grouping students for the teaching of reading and math at the elementary school level; designing programs for gifted students; instituting honors and Advanced Placement courses at the high school; placing at-risk and special education students into appropriate support programs; creating a policy framework for high school education in the 1990s and beyond; and even eliminating programs because of lack of funding. Each of these projects contains elements of a reform agenda; and each project could

be enhanced by a broad knowledge base, *including* post-positivist and critical theorist contributions.

I am personally aware of the construct of schools as reproductive agencies. I recognize grades as cultural capital. I am sensitive to issues related to the hidden curriculum and the structured silences operating in schools. But I do not have the requisite skill to translate these concepts into practical strategies that will assist groups of professionals with whom I work to make more enlightened decisions. My Central Office colleagues, both within and outside of the district in which I work, do not possess any greater facility with these concepts than I do. Accordingly, the discussions we facilitate and the decisions we assist groups of educators to make are bereft of the emancipatory interests so central to reconceptualist and critical theorist thought.

In education, one might say, "you are what you read." I find that Central Office administrators typically subscribe to and write for such journals as *Educational Leadership, The Kappan, Executive Educator, Education Week, Curriculum Product News, Curriculum Review, Learning,* NASSP's *Bulletin,* and special subject-area journals. I have not researched indexes of these journals over the last 3-5 years. But I would speculate that few of the articles appearing in these journals have been authored by Bergamo presenters during the same 3-5 year period. Bergamo attendees and their post-positivist and critical theorist colleagues are more likely to read and publish in the *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Curriculum Inquiry,* the *Journal of Curriculum Studies, Harvard Educational Review, Teachers College Record,* the *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision.* I do not suggest that his inventory is precise. The point is that practitioners and theoreticians/researchers are not reading each others' literature and, consequently, not engaging one another in conversation about key concerns in the field.

Again, my assertion is that concepts such as ideology; dialectic; reification; reflective teaching; technical, practical, and emancipatory interests; hegemony, structured silences; and correspondence theory are not part of the thinking

practitioners apply to trying to resolve the curricular and instructional problems they confront. We need to ask why this situation exists. Is it because there are no common journals? Is it due to the lack of conferences at which reconceptualists and critical theorists and school practitioners meet to address and resolve curricular problems? Is it primarily a function of academicians' discourse which is alien to that of practitioners (and possibly vice versa)?

Perhaps there is nothing profound in these observations. But I want to argue that it is naive for Bergamo participants to believe that their conference activities and related professional writing will contribute to the (radical) restructuring of American education. Reconceptualist and critical theorist rhetoric simply does not penetrate the dialogue about school reform at the many junctures where major K-12 curriculum decisions are made, e.g., at the policy level in state legislative halls and in state departments of education and at the level of practice in school board rooms, central offices, and classrooms.

I believe there are strategies available to us which will result in fresh dialogue, new networks, and change. As a starting point, I would propose three ideas for fostering collegiality: a university professor/school administrator network established to discuss basic curriculum issues; a revamped Bergamo Conference; and a concentrated effort to write more readable curriculum scholarship.

As one example, I would point to the ASCD network on School Change, in which both school administrators and university professors participate regularly. During this last year, a small group of individuals in the Network met to review major theoretical issues related to educational change as well as to share firsthand, practical experiences on change processes in the schools. Practitioners in the group are currently authoring a book on change which will present personal accounts of practitioner's experience.[8] I would propose that creating a new network(s) to bring university curriculum professors and school curriculum administrators together to review curricular issues will foster meaning-

ful dialogue. These discussions could feature working papers which address such issues as race, gender, class, inequitable distribution of materials and resources, and school bureaucracy as they are manifest in school administration, K-12 curriculum development, and classroom instruction.

Secondly, I recommend the creation of special forums—such as a revamped Bergamo Conference—for engendering conversation between academicians/researchers and practitioners. This year at Bergamo, James Sears presented a paper in which he articulated ideas for changing the structure of the Bergamo Conference.[9] I support Dr. Sears' recommendations for conference working groups and advanced reading of papers to be presented at the conference and applaud his proposal for action research ventures. I believe that if Bergamo participants desire their work to influence public school curriculum practices, that as a starting point the conference should be shaped intentionally to involve school administrators and teachers—and certainly include those educators in the planning of the conference. Bergamo does not need to emulate ASCD or AASA's annual conferences, with thousands of educators in attendance. It can function as an alternative to these conferences *and to AERA* but not be so esoteric as to virtually exclude all but two hundred university curriculum professors, as is now the case. Of course, this is important only if reconceptualists and critical theorists hope that Bergamo provides one means for theoreticians and practitioners to establish the "art of the practical."[10]

Thirdly, we should invent fresh metaphors and seek more lucid expression of complex intellectual ideas so as to make the cultural capital of the reconceptualists and critical theorists accessible to a wider audience. This appeal is not intended to be anti-intellectual; that is, I realize that one needs to use language artfully when discussion complex content. But, the language of many curriculum academicians, and especially critical theorists, presents considerable linguistic barriers for the practitioner. Personally, I find much contemporary curriculum scholarship abstruse. All

too frequently, this discourse draws attention to itself—what Sears calls "...the frivolities of intellectual discourse abstracted from the world-as-it-is"[11]—and thereby obscures its own meaning. In this regard, I am inclined to agree with Russell Jacoby, who writes that "while professional and arcane languages can be a refuge and a necessity, they can also be an excuse and a flight."[12] Jacoby notes that the scholarship of the left in particular "...is largely technical, unreadable and ...unread."[13] Aronowitz and Giroux admit that the radical critics remain "mired in the language of critique."[14]

There are alternatives to opaque academic discourse, which like bad textbook writing makes ascertaining of textual meaning a fitfully difficult task. Some of the problems inherent in textbook writing are typical of academic curriculum writing. Both can be improved. Research into the impact of textbook discourse quality on reader comprehension is indeed an area of serious inquiry. The Council of Basic Education has commissioned Dr. Bruce Brittain from the University of Georgia to research this topic as related to freshman biology textbooks. Dr. Brittain is rewriting sections of the biology textbooks in an effort to make concepts more comprehensible to students, with the ultimate intention of creating folios to help teachers judge textbook quality.[15] A recent article in *Research into the Teaching of English*[16] details an experiment in which two college composition instructors, two text linguists, and two former Time-Life editors rewrote high school history textbook passages in an effort to improve the comprehensibility of those passages. The time-Life editors consistently produced passages that were much more readily understood by readers. Lucid writing has an obvious relationship to readability. And ideas cannot gain currency if they cannot be understood.

Perhaps a more pertinent example of the value of readable scholarship is the writing of Frank Smith, the prolific literacy researcher. Smith is able to convey technical concepts in a remarkably revealing manner. For example, his discussion of the constructive nature of reading is couched

in the notion of "reading from behind the eyeballs." This is Smith's way of explaining that readers bring as much to text in constructing meaning as they do deriving meaning from decoding text. This proposition is fundamental to a constructivist view of reading which, when understood by teachers, assists them in making dramatic changes in their reading instruction. Similarly, Smith discusses Vygotsky's complex idea of zone of proximal development by asserting that "anything children can do with help today they will be able to do unaided tomorrow."[17] Here, in simple and understandable language, Smith advises administrators and teachers to promote collaborative learning. What I believe Smith does so deftly is to take extremely complex concepts about cognition and learning and to communicate them in language that is immediately accessible to both the generalist and specialist.

Smith is one of a host of language researchers *and* classroom teachers whose work is associated with the whole-language movement. Whole-language educators advocate integrated language arts instruction based on the belief that language learning is an ongoing developmental, constructive, and interactive process. Teachers speak and write eloquently on behalf of whole-language teaching and learning.[18] Together, whole language university professors and classroom teachers have made a profound impact on language arts education. A paradigm shift is in process. In journals published by the International Reading Association, the National Council of Teachers of English, the Modern Language Association, and ASCD, as well as their own whole-language newsletters, whole-language educators have authored articles which reach hundreds of thousands of readers. They have even written for pedestrian magazines—*Parents* and *Better Homes and Gardens*—in an effort to educate the mass public on the differences between conventional, skill/basal-based language programs and whole-language curriculum. In any event, my overriding notion is that curriculum academicians might learn from the whole-language movement—its social history, networking, conference topics and arrangements, action research agenda, the politics it uses to influence policy, and its publishing strategies.[19]

Let me note that this paper is not an exercise in professor bashing. I am suggesting that we create forums which encourage theoreticians to publish articles in journals that practitioners read and vice versa.[20] I support the idea of interaction between members of the ASCD Curriculum Teachers Network and the AASA Curriculum Teachers Network. My interest is in both the intellectual *and* the practical—in attaining a viable praxis for the curriculum professional.

I believe we need the collective expertise of a vast, interconnected array of educators to realize any kind of enduring curricular reform. Practitioners who work without the benefit of theory are vulnerable to anti-intellectual practice. Academicians who write about school curricular phenomena without grounding in school contexts are open to charges of elitism and irrelevancy. "Theorizing, if defined as the articulation and critical examination of directly experienced phenomena leading to increased understanding..."[21] is fundamental activity for both university professor/researcher and school administrator/teacher. Collaborative work will bolster theory and enrich practice. Vigorous, sustained conversation will stimulate dialectical reasoning. As a community of curriculum professionals, I would encourage us to actively shape the reform debate with our own authentic voices, not necessarily expressed in unison but carefully orchestrated. Failing to do so will leave us with a legacy of rumored school curricular reform or, worse yet, new program agendas that have been dictated by the uninitiated and the misinformed.

Footnotes

The author would like to thank Charles Bruckerhoff, Professor, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio; Martin Brooks, Assistant Superintendent, Shoreham-Wading River Central School District, Shoreham, New York; and John Holton, Assistant Superintendent, Appoquinimink School

District, Odessa, Delaware; for their thoughtful review and constructive criticism of this manuscript.

[1]Panel participants included Charles Bruckerhoff, Professor of Education, Cleveland State University; Theresa Bruckerhoff, 6th Grade Teacher, Shaker Heights City Schools, Shaker Heights, Ohio; Joe Siegferth, Principal, Hudson Middle School, Hudson, Ohio; and Fran Spratley, Teacher Consultant, Columbus Instructional Model, Columbus City Schools.

[2]Among the notable studies are: **A Nation At Risk** (Washington: National Commission on Excellence in Education, April, 1983); **Time for Results** (Gov. Lamar Alexander, Chairman, National Governors' Association Center for Policy Research and Analysis, August, 1986); and **Investing in Our Children** (A Statement by the Research and Policy Committee of the Committee for Economic Development; New York: CED, 1985). Representative empirical studies are: John Goodlad's **A Place Called School** (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984); Gerald Grant's **The World We Created at Hamilton High** (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1988); and Linda McNeill's **Contradictions of Control** (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Inc., 1986). Mortimer Adler's **Paideia Proposal** (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984); William Bennett's **James Madison High School** (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education, 1988); and Theodore Sizer's **Horace's Compromise** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1984) are arguably the most visible of the personal essays on school reform. Obviously, these categories are not mutually exclusive. I have compiled a 68-item bibliography which represents a modest effort to categorize significant school reform works and which takes into consideration critical theorist literature.

[3]**A Nation At Risk**, released in April, 1983, signaled the first wave of reform. This literature attributed the country's economic malaise to the purported failure of schools to produce competent graduates. The solutions proposed call for more of everything: more homework, graduation requirements, and days in the school year for students; more college coursework for teachers' certification; more tests for everyone in education; etc. The second wave of reform clamored for restructuring of the schools. Restructuring is used so variously in the literature that it defies definition. Restructuring advocates tend to attack such time-honored elements of American education as the Carnegie unit, departmentalization, and hierarchical school organization. The Coalition of Essential Schools is commonly associated with the restructuring movement. Business leaders are promulgating the third wave of reform. Executives heralding this reform propose schools of choice—the free market—as the best solution to the problem of public education.

Business is serious about getting involved in education. A recent **Fortune** magazine cover story on saving the schools stated ..."American schools are producing an army of illiterates. Companies that cannot hire enough skilled workers now realize they must do something to save the public schools." (p. 42) (**Fortune**, November 7, 1988,pp. 42-56) In the ensuing week, and article in **Education Week** contained the following statement "There is no takeover and no leveraged buy-out, but increasingly the business of business is becoming education. Forced to compete in a world economy where technology demands a more literate work force, business finds itself with a labor pool needing training and a potential work force ill-prepared by the nation's schools. The bottom line is a human capital deficiency gap. By any yardstick, the education level of workers, not technology, is what is holding back economic growth." (p. 29) (**Education Week**, Vol. VIII, No. 11, November 16, 1988, p. 29).

[4]Stanford University professor Lee Shulman adds "enablement" to empowerment, conveying the need for enhanced teacher knowledge and competence to accompany greater authority. ("A Union of Insufficiencies: Strategies for Teacher Assessment in a Period of Education Reform," **Educational Leadership**, Vol 46, No. 3, November, 1988, pp. 36-41).

[5]Notable examples in this movement are Dade (Florida) and

Jefferson (Kentucky) County Schools and Rochester (New York) and Cincinnati (Ohio) City Schools.

[6]See **Broken Promises,** Patrick Shannon (Granby, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1989). Shannon persuasively details how legislated learning directs and even controls classroom teaching.

[7]See the Grant Wiggins article on authentic assessments: "A Test of Strength for the Strength of Tests." **Leadership News,** November, 1988, No. 36, pp. 4 & 6.

[8]In correspondence to me, Network Chair Martin Brooks writes, "Morning portions of our meetings usually are devoted to a broad discussion of educational change led by a distinguished theorist or practitioner. The afternoon portions of the meetings are focused on the development of a book on education change, a book that will hopefully present readers with a different voice—the voice of people involved in making change happen in school settings."

[9]James Sears, "The Glass Bead Game of Curriculum Theorizing: Reconceptualism and the New Orthodoxy" (Paper presented at the 10th Annual Bergamo Conference on Curriculum Theory and Practice, Dayton, Ohio, October, 1988).

[10]Sears, quoting Hilda Taba, p. 24.

[11]Sears, p. 25.

[12]Russell Jacoby, **The Last Intellectuals** (New York: Basic Books, 1987, p. 236).

[13]**The Last Intellectuals**, p. 141.

[14]Aronowitz and Giroux, **Education Under Siege** (South Hadley, MA: Bergin and Garvey, 1985, p. 5).

[15]"An Experiment in Clarity," Harriet Tyson-Bernstein, **Basic Education,** Vol. 33, No. 3, November, 1988, pp. 6-9.

[16]"Some Characteristics of Memorable Expository Writing: Effects of Revisions by Writers with Different Backgrounds," Michael F. Graves, Wayne H. Slater, Duane Roen, Teresa Redd-Boyd, Ann H. Duin, David W. Furniss, Patricia Hazeltine, **Research into the Teaching of Reading,** Vol. 22, No. 3, October, 1988, pp. 242-260.

[17]Frank Smith, **Joining the Literacy Club,** Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books, Inc., 1988, p. 134.

[18]Three fine examples of teacher-authored books are: Katie Johnson's **Doing Words** (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1987); Tom Romano's **Clearing the Way: Working With Teenage Writers** (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books, 1987); and Regie Routman's **Transitions From Literature to Literacy** (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Educational Books, 1988).

[19]My colleague John Holton suggests that the publishing of scholarly material in popular journals can result in "school reform by publicity."

[20]The new **National Forum of Applied Educational Research Journal** offers a possible model for academician/practitioner interactions.

[21]"Reflections on Stricklands' 'Toward the Extended Professional,'" Fred Burton, **Language Arts,** Volume 65, Number 8, December, 1988, p. 766.

Vacancy Announcement

EDUCATION: Assistant Professor, two tenure-track positions, University of Wisconsin-Stout. (1) Reading. ***Minimum qualifications:*** earned doctorate in reading or related discipline; three years of successful K-12 teaching experience in reading; eligibility for Wisconsin certification in reading. ***Preferred qualifications:*** excellence in teaching and research; emphasis in reading and language arts; interdisciplinary or critical approaches and interest in research methodology; evidence of successful college teaching, ***Responsibilities:*** teach undergraduate and graduate courses in reading, focusing on reading in both elementary and secondary schools; may teach coursework in research foundations; supervision of clinical experience in reading; research and scholarly activity. (2) Special Education, M.R. ***Minimum qualifications:*** earned doctorate, eligibility for Wisconsin secondary M.R. certification; at least three years successful M.R. teaching experience, including transition programming. ***Preferred qualifications:*** candidate who also possesses one of the following reading specialist certification, degree in vocational rehabilitation, or additional certifications in special education. ***Responsibilities:*** teach undergraduate and graduate special education coursework such as Curriculum and Instruction, Career Education for the Mentally Retarded Adolescent, Psychology of Exceptional Children; coordinate and supervise special education student teachers; student advisement. Review of applications will begin on March 15, 1990. Send letter of application; vita; and names, addresses, and phone numbers of three references to; Dr. William Reynolds, Chair, Search Committee, Education Department, University of Wisconsin-Stout, Menomonie, WI 54751. University of Wisconsin-Stout is an Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action Employer.

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