

SS

The  
Journal of  
Curriculum  
Theorizing

RECEIVED  
PERIODICALS  
APR -1 1981  
MIAMI UNIVERSITY  
LIBRARIES

3:1

**THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING** welcomes manuscripts examining issues of curriculum theory, history, and criticism. Correspondence, manuscripts and subscription requests should be directed to:

Professor William F. Pinar  
University of Rochester  
Graduate School of Education and Human Development  
Center for the Study of Curriculum and Teaching  
Rochester, New York 14627  
U.S.A.

**Subscriptions:**

Individuals: \$25 for one year \$45 for two \$65 for three  
Institutions: \$35 for one year \$65 for two \$95 for three  
Graduate students: \$18 for one year

Two issues (approximately two-hundred fifty pages each) mailed per year,  
Winter and Summer.

**THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING** appreciatively acknowledges the support of the Graduate School of Education and Human Development of the University of Rochester  
Professor Walter I. Garms, Dean.

Journal Secretary: Margaret S. Zaccone  
Cover design by Francine Shuchat Shaw  
Printed by Asymmetrical Press, Rochester

ISSN 0162-8453

Copyright 1981 by JCT.  
All rights reserved.

THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING

Volume Three, Issue One  
Winter 1981

William F. Pinar, Editor  
University of Rochester

Janet Louise Miller, Managing Editor  
Old Dominion University

Madeleine R. Grumet, Book Review Editor  
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Francine Shuchat Shaw, Associate Editor  
New York University

Shigeru Asanuma, University of Rochester  
Editorial Assistant

Board of Advising Editors

- Michael W. Apple, University of Wisconsin, Madison  
Judith Morris Ayers, Otterbein College  
Charles W. Beegle, University of Virginia  
Leonard Berk, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education  
Robert V. Bullough, Jr., University of Utah  
Russell H. Coward, Jr., Housatonic Valley Regional High School, Connecticut  
James DiGiambattista, Haleiwa, Hawaii  
George Dixon, Haleiwa, Hawaii  
Lawrence J. Dolan, University of Rochester  
William E. Doll, Jr., State University of New York at Oswego  
Barry M. Franklin, Augsburg College  
Henry A. Giroux, Boston University  
Richard Hawthorne, Kent State University  
Dorothy Huenccke, Georgia State University  
Paul R. Klohr, Ohio State University  
Florence R. Krall, University of Utah  
Craig Kridel, Ohio State University  
Eleanore E. Larson, University of Rochester  
Michael Littleford, Auburn University  
James B. Macdonald, University of North Carolina, Greensboro  
Alex Molnar, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee  
Ronald E. Padgham, Rochester Institute of Technology  
George J. Posner, Cornell University  
William A. Reid, University of Birmingham, U.K.  
Timothy Riordan, Xavier University, Cincinnati  
José Rosario, High/Scope Educational Research Foundation, Michigan  
Paul Shaker, Mount Union College  
G. W. Stansbury, Georgia State University  
Peter Maas Taubman, New York, New York  
Wayne J. Urban, Georgia State University  
Max van Manen, University of Alberta  
Sandra Wallenstein, Berkeley, California  
Philip Wexler, University of Rochester  
David C. Williams, Kansas State University  
George Willis, University of Rhode Island

913366

## Table of Contents

	Page
Editor's Note	4
<b>The Field:</b>	
How Fields Change: A Critique of the "Kuhnian" View Theodore M. Brown	5
The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: An Historical Study Margaret Ann Huber	14
The Kent State-Georgia State Proceedings Edited by Dorothy Huenecke	85
A Map of the Concept of Curriculum Theory David L. McCrory	91
Shaping the High School Curriculum: The Case of Regional Accreditation Carolyn M. Jurkowitz	103
The Problem of the Learner in Curriculum Building Mary Anne Levine	114
Assessing Ideologies A.W. Sturges	117
Aesthetics and the Curriculum Harry S. Broudy	124
Some Aspects of the Relationship Between Economic and Cultural Reproduction Michael W. Apple	130
Curriculum, Consciousness and Social Change James B. Macdonald	143
Dewey and the Herbartians: The Genesis of a Theory of Curriculum Herbert M. Kliebard	154
Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: The Reconceptualist Movement Barbara J. Benham	162
The Curriculum Field: Emergence of a Discipline Jo Anne Pagano	171
A Reconceptualist Perspective on Curriculum Evaluation George Willis	185

	Page
<b>Psychological and Political Themes:</b>	
Perspectives on Mentorship Barbara K. Iverson and Hersholt C. Waxman	193
Social Action, Self Reflection, and Curriculum Theory: Part One James R. Whitt	202
Self Reflection, Social Action, and Curriculum Theory: Part Two Michael S. Littleford	211
Zones of Potentiality Contributing to Consciousness: Thrust for Curriculum Design Virginia M. Macagnoni	222
"All the things I might not be...": Issues in Communication for Curricularists Bonnie Meath-Lang	232
Toward Curricula That Are Of, By, and Therefore for Students William H. Schubert and Ann Lynn Lopez Schubert	239
<b>Historical Criticism:</b>	
Whatever Happened to Social Control? The Muting of Coercive Authority in Curriculum Discourse Barry M. Franklin	252
<b>Autobiographical Voice and Method:</b>	
Life History and Educational Experience: Part Two William F. Pinar	259
<b>Gender Studies:</b>	
Conception, Contradiction and Curriculum Madeleine R. Grumet	287
Gender, Values, and Curriculum James B. Macdonald and Susan Colbert Macdonald	299
<b>Comment:</b>	
Academic Publishing: Mammouth in the Morass Anthony Serafini	305
<b>Book Reviews:</b>	
Shor's CRITICAL TEACHING AND EVERDAY LIFE and Reid's THINKING ABOUT CURRICULUM Esther Zaret (Shor)	310
Kenneth Teitelbaum (Shor)	313
George Willis (Reid)	318
Alex Molnar (Reid)	321
Post Text: Author's Reply. THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION. Elliot W. Eisner	324

### Editor's Note

This issue opens with a critique of Kuhn's work by one of his former students. Theodore Brown, who is the Mercer Brugler Distinguished Professor of History at Rochester, examines also the Reconceptualization, which he is not ready to characterize as a "paradigm shift." Following Brown's intriguing paper, which incidentally he read to an appreciative audience at the Airlie House in 1979, is Dr. Huber's provocative study of the Reconceptualization. Dr. Huber completed this research -- research which, I suspect, will be controversial -- at the University of Michigan in 1979.

Next is Dorothy Huenecke's skillful editing of the proceedings of the 1977 Kent State and 1978 Georgia State conferences. These are varied and interesting papers, and among them is important work by Kliebard, Macdonald, Apple and Broudy. Also included is Barbara Benham's 1976 study of the Reconceptualization which insightfully traces its beginnings. Following the Huenecke collection is Jo Anne Pagano's informative historical study of the Schools of Education at Chicago, Columbia, and Ohio State. Pagano provides a "socio-intellectual" definition of discipline which could be useful in laying to rest the tired debate over the disciplinary status of the curriculum field. Concluding this part is George Willis' useful delineation of a reconceptualist view of evaluation.

Opening the next section is Iverson's and Waxman's interesting perspectives on mentorship, followed by Jim Whitt's and Mike Littleford's forceful account of self-reflection and social action in which they do nothing less than challenge the primacy of the intellect in the lives of academicians. Siding with Nietzsche, Vico and Norman O. Brown, they call us back to our bodies, our lived experience, and insist upon congruence of both with social action. Their papers will no doubt cause the same stir they did when read to the 1979 Airlie conference.

Next is Virginia Macagnoni's remarkable study of "zones of potentiality" and curriculum design, followed by Bonnie Meath-Lang's wise advice to researchers of deaf education and curriculum. Bill and Ann Schubert's agreeable description of curricula "of, by and therefore for students" comes next. Barry Franklin's sobering historical study of social control and the early field concludes this section. That is followed by the conclusion of my autobiographical study.

The final section in this again over-sized issue is composed of two important papers. First is Madeleine R. Grumet's brilliant explication of pre-oedipal sexuality, feminist epistemology, and gender relations; second is Jim and Susan Macdonald's persuasive and accessible critique of sexism and control.

The issue concludes with interesting reviews of William A. Reid's THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM and Ira Shor's CRITICAL TEACHING AND EVERYDAY LIFE.

W.P.

## How Fields Change: A Critique of the "Kuhnian" View

Theodore M. Brown  
University of Rochester

I have recently become aware that a debate rages in something called the "curriculum field." As an interloper from something called the "history of science," I don't pretend to understand most of what the debate is about. I can tell from reading a bit of the literature--recent pieces by Tanner and Tanner, Jackson and Pinar--that tempers are frayed, feelings are hurt, and egos are being defensively protected, which is to say that major issues seem to be at stake.<sup>1</sup> In fact, according to Pinar, nothing less than a "fundamental shift, a paradigm shift" in the definition and direction of the field is well underway.<sup>2</sup>

I won't pretend to judge the merits of rival positions in this debate; I don't have the qualifications to do so. I am, however, intrigued by Pinar's use of the phrase "paradigm shift" to describe what is happening. For the phrase comes from a book crucial to the history of science--Thomas S. Kuhn's *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS*--and associates with a number of issues central to my intellectual life. "Paradigm shift," then, will be my focus and an assessment of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of its application to the current state of the curriculum field will be my ultimate objective.

\*\*\*\*\*

To understand what a paradigm shift is supposed to be, we must first review the overall theory of scientific development of which it is a part. That theory is set out in Kuhn's brilliant book, first published in 1962.<sup>3</sup> Kuhn's goal in *STRUCTURE* (as I will refer to his book henceforth) was to challenge deeply held beliefs about the nature of scientific practice and its history. According to common understanding, scientists invent theories in the abstract realm of thought and then test them decisively against the neutral and objective data of the "real world." The history of science has been a history of the cumulative, progressive unfolding of "truth." Ever better theories have been invented to account for increasingly refined data. The march of science has been a march of objectivity, whose cutting edge sliced through superstition, error and imprecision.

Kuhn challenged all these assumptions--about the supposed strategy of scientific measurement, the presumed perceptual neutrality of observational testing, and the averred continuity in science's cumulative historical development. He outlined, instead, a pattern of intellectual process that focused attention on the interlocking set of beliefs and practices that literally controls the perceptions and behavior of scientists in given historical periods. He spoke of the scientist's "world view" that relates every feature of "reality" in a seamless structural matrix, and of systems of shared belief that control cognitions and even the visual intake of scientists. Kuhn located scientific ideas in social groups of practitioners (scientific "communities"), talked of the "disciplinary matrix" that defines a given community, and sketched a history marked by discontinuous, quantum-like jumps--the "revolutions" of the title.

Kuhn argued that for different scientific disciplines at different times activity passes from a "premature" to a "mature" state. Maturity is marked by the acquisition of a "paradigm" modeled on an "exemplar", a specific scientific achievement that provides shared problems, methods, and assumptions for the scientific community. Scientific communities that have a paradigm initiate a tradition of "normal science," and "normal science" encompasses the vast bulk of scientific activity throughout history. The goal is "puzzle-solving" according to expectation rather than the generation of novelty. The accepted paradigm is teased, stretched, and modified to meet the new empirical realities the scientific community continually confronts. After a while, certain empirical realities remain resistant; the paradigm cannot easily fit them into the established pattern of puzzle-solving expectation. Then the scientific community reluctantly acknowledges genuine "anomalies." If a sufficient number of anomalies accumulates, the community may enter "crisis."

Only in crisis does the scientific community abandon its normal, puzzle-solving rules. Some members, frequently new arrivals or intruders from nearby communities, inaugurate a deliberate scrutiny of fundamental assumptions. An innovator may come forward with a revolutionary new paradigm, fundamentally discontinuous with the old, which can yet simultaneously fit in both the comfortable old "facts" and the disturbing anomalies. The crisis moves to resolution as certain community members switch loyalties to the new paradigm.

Once adhering to the new paradigm, these community members are in a "new world," incommensurable with the old one. At first slowly, they eventually attend to increasingly divergent problems, apply novel methods, and think in new terms. Across this quantum gap, the scientific community begins to pursue a new puzzle-solving tradition of redefined normal science. Adherents to the new tradition "talk past" adherents to the old, and vice versa. They seem to babble in mutually incomprehensible languages. Often the new generation "wins out," that is, gains dominance over the field, simply and only because leaders of the old generation die out. When this occurs, the new generation follows out its new puzzles until the pattern of anomaly, crisis, and revolution recurs.

Kuhn thus proposed to provide science with a new historiographic foundation and, thereby, with a truly usable past. Rather than moving toward anything in customary "Whiggish" fashion, science could now be seen as moving away from its past-toward no goal in particular, except an ever greater precision of fit between existing paradigms and "empirical reality." But since nature remains beyond our grasp and, therefore, ultimately recalcitrant, no paradigm will ever quite fit, and the process of intellectual change will never stop. Kuhn believes he has solved the problem of explaining how so insulated an activity as abstruse, technical, modern science can continue to change. He has created, without the label, a dialectics of change for science--that cognitive activity presumably most insulated from all other forms of social, cultural, and intellectual experience.

In recent years a new generation of historians of science (a generation of which I am a member) has departed from Kuhn in one significant respect. We have argued that crises and paradigm shifts need not be determined as exclusively by the internal dynamics of intellectual development as Kuhn insists.<sup>4</sup> "External" factors--for example, new metaphysical beliefs, changed cultural values, shifting economic incentives--may in certain cases also play significant roles in precipitating crises or inaugurating new paradigm traditions. Impressive case studies have been written of episodes in sciences even as esoteric as atomic physics in which paradigm shifts seem to have occurred because of influences moving from the "outside of science, in" rather than from the "inside, out." What the older and newer generations of historians of science have in common, however, is the deep belief in the need to define first the intellectual contours and "disciplinary matrices" of the fields whose histories they write. Whether the subjects under study be chemists in eighteenth century France, naturalists in nineteenth century England or theoretical physicists in twentieth century Germany, historians of science want to specify first what puzzles these groups of scientists actually worked on and what group characteristics defined their disciplines. It is a second-order problem to decide whether specific conceptual changes in particular communities of scientists resulted primarily from "internal" or from "external" causes.

Outside of the history of science Kuhn's impact has also been enormous, and this is my central concern here. Virtually upon the publication of *STRUCTURE*, many sociologists, political scientists, and intellectual historians--among others--found fascinating and useful things in it.<sup>5</sup> Some used Kuhn's scheme to explore the current state of their disciplines. Were certain social sciences now "mature" because they seemed to possess recognizable "paradigms" or was the continuing existence of competing paradigms in other fields a sign of extended "prematurity"? Several used Kuhn to explore the history of various fields. Scholars tried to identify paradigm traditions and shifts among them over time. Let us first consider some of these general examples of the heuristic application of *STRUCTURE* before returning directly to the possible identification of "paradigms" and "revolutions" specifically in the curriculum field.

Christopher G.A. Bryant's brief but incisive article, "Kuhn, Paradigms and Sociology," in *THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY* sets the stage for our consideration of many of the applications of *STRUCTURE*.<sup>6</sup> Bryant disclaims interest in explicitly assessing "the maturity or otherwise of sociology by comparing it with natural science" but sets as his task identifying "the possible existence of paradigms in sociology." His conclusions are worth quoting at length.

...I doubt whether there are many exemplars [cf. Newton's *PRINCIPIA*] in sociology though Malinowski's analysis of the Kula ring might be thought one. Sometimes particular books, Durkheim's *SUICIDE* and Lynd's *MIDDLETOWN* are favourite examples, or particular research instruments, say the sample survey, or particular generalizations, such as "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," have been treated in an exemplificatory way



but they still tend to lack the concreteness and the imposing authority of exemplars in natural science. ...On the other hand, there seem to me a number of paradigms in the sense of disciplinary matrices extant in sociology. Structural-functionalism, conflict theory, action theory, phenomenological sociology ... to say nothing of the continuing presence of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, are only the most obvious. Each presents a distinct constellation of values, axioms, concepts, methods and basic theories which constitute the object world of sociology and indicate the work which needs to be done ... All this century sociologists have advanced elaborate sets of basic concepts either for their general use (e.g. Weber) or for general adoption (e.g. Homans). None has commanded universal assent. . . Kuhn has commented that basic terms like force, mass, element, compound and cell have changed their meaning at some time in natural science. In sociology the list of terms for which there is no agreed meaning is almost endless; rational, objective, critical, universal, conservative, liberal, socialist, democratic, organic, contradiction, conflict, constraint, consensus, structure, function, need, science, ideology, power, status, interest, etc. This diversity makes comparability of findings in sociology as a whole very difficult. Different researches use different concepts and it is hard to compare like with like. It is also hard to discriminate . . . between competing hypotheses whenever these are couched in the different terms suggested by different paradigms because there does not exist in sociology any neutral or universal observational language in which the results of tests may be expressed.<sup>7</sup>

This account by Bryant is a model of sobriety and intelligence. The analogies he draws between sociology and the natural sciences as Kuhn describes them are clear, but so too are the differences. Sociology and paradigm-dependent natural science exhibit at least occasional division into competing communities whose members share allegiance to self-contained frameworks of belief and practice. Members of one community have trouble seeing things the way members of another community do, or, indeed, even in understanding what others talk about. Just as among scientists, gaps of incommensurability and incomprehensibility among sociologists separate certain groups from others. Nevertheless, scientists and sociologists are quite different in that the latter lack of precise, quantitative data and the concrete techniques of investigation of the former. Sociology mimics certain features of science, but it is not, at least not at present, really science.

Bryant's sort of application of Kuhnian categories had been tried a few years earlier in political science by David Truman and Gabriel Almond. In successive presidential addresses at the 1965 and 1966 American Political Science Association annual meetings, Truman and Almond (the latter in greater detail) sketched the twentieth century history of their field in "paradigmatic" terms. Truman wrote as follows:

In the formative years of political science in the United States, in the decades around the turn of the century, the field did not have a paradigm, nor has it acquired one since. Unquestionably the absence of such an agreed model has influenced the pace and pattern of change in the field, for a crucial feature of a true paradigm is its precision ....I think it is accurate to argue, nevertheless, that something loosely analogous to a paradigm characterized American political science for at least the half-century running from sometime in the 1880s into the 1930s... Given the looseness and especially the lack of precision in the prevailing implicit agreement on what to do and how to proceed in the field, its weakening and gradual dissolution was bound to be followed by a confusion of competing and divergent, if not incompatible, views of the appropriate questions to be asked and the proper methods to be used. How long that state of affairs is likely to exist is anyone's guess.<sup>8</sup>

Sharing many of the same assumptions but disagreeing over important particulars, Almond revised Truman's history with an account of his own. But Almond was consistently more positive, upbeat. Most notably, he saw evidence for a new, emergent paradigm, more "scientific" than that which it replaced and popular especially in the rapidly expanding younger ranks of the profession. The new paradigm emphasized the political system and grew in popularity as it dealt with both conceptual and empirical "anomalies" turned up by the older generation. His concluding summary is as follows:

A new paradigm is surely developing in political science. Its first formulations are crude, partial, and often pretentious. But theory formulation will undoubtedly go forward with the rapid growth of the profession and with the high capabilities and research opportunities of an increasing proportion of its members. . . . These trends toward rigor and scope, systematic exploration of the consequences for politics of social and psychological variables, and the formulation of general analytical frameworks represent a significant step into the modern world of science. And the rate of growth and professionalization of political science give promise that the intellectual rate of growth will be correspondingly rapid.<sup>9</sup>

Particularly notable in Almond's application of Kuhn is his sensitivity to what he accurately terms the "sociology of political science." He is acutely aware of the development of the field in its social, institutional and professional aspects. He notes overall, accelerated growth in numbers, generational change, and the increasing popularity of quantitative methods. He observes that the field is really a distinctively American one and that its most rapid numerical growth began in the fifties. He thus prepares us to conclude that the rise of the new, "scientific" paradigm in American political science was part and parcel of a professionalizing process that occurred within American universities during the Cold War period.<sup>10</sup> Although he restricts his own observations to safer "sociology" and never quite gets around to risking questions of ideology and political economy, the evidence Almond presents makes it easy for us to connect the rise of the new paradigm with broad changes in the role of "intellectuals" in American society. The paradigm as heuristic device has here opened up important questions about the social function of a premier social science.

Let us consider one more example of the analogical application of ideas in Kuhn's *STRUCTURE* before turning to the curriculum field itself. This extended example is rather different from those we have already considered. It is J.G.A. Pocock's ambitious effort to organize major currents of political thought from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries around three crucial "Machiavellian moments" in a book recently published by Princeton University Press.<sup>11</sup> The first of these "moments" occurred in Renaissance Italy, where Machiavelli and his contemporaries grappled with the problem of explaining how a political republic could remain "morally and politically stable" in the stream of historical events. Machiavelli solved this problem in neoclassical terms by identifying those "political conditions which permit the arming of all citizens, the moral conditions in which all are willing to fight for the republic and the economic conditions. . . . which give the warrior a home and occupation outside the camp and prevent his becoming a . . . mercenary whose sword is at the command of some powerful individual." Thus, "the economic independence of the warrior and the citizen are prerequisites against corruption."

The second "Machiavellian moment" occurred in the seventeenth century, in the midst of the English Civil War. Elements of the Machiavellian "paradigm" had been present in English political thought before, but it took the frenzied emotions unleashed by the Civil War to force the breakdown of the still dominant "monarchic paradigm." James Harrington (a lesser known contemporary of Thomas Hobbes) was the principal agent of reformulation, forcing the issue against "minds clinging to the vocabularies of monarchy and common law." His own motivation derived from the unusual circumstances surrounding Oliver Cromwell's victorious army--"a body of men of diverse social origins, having in common that they had been mobilized into a military society which had just won a civil war of an unprecedented kind." The men of the army shared "a common sense that the arms they had taken up had engaged them to a common end" and declared "a political self-consciousness of a kind unheard of in England before." Harrington published his *OCEANA* in 1656 amid growing discontent in the Army. One of Harrington's major purposes, which he nonetheless managed simultaneously to transcend, was to "justify the military republic in England as the rule of a *popolo armato* [armed people]." Driven by this impulse, he produced a book that marked "a moment of paradigmatic breakthrough, a major revision of English political theory and history in the light of concepts drawn from civic humanism and Machiavellian republicanism."

The third "moment" extended from Harrington's injection of revived Machiavellian ideas into the seventeenth century to their fuller working out and reformulation in the eighteenth. *OCEANA* began a new paradigm tradition out of which grew a "neoclassical" conception of politics that gained ascendance in eighteenth-

century England and America. Societal, especially economic, evolution helped gradually transform the terms of discussion: "credit" and "commerce" increasingly assumed the role formerly occupied by "fortune" as the corrupting influence undermining civic "virtue" and political stability. But the culminating, truly "revolutionary" break with the Machiavellian paradigm came with peculiarly American experience, not with the general economic development. Americans, Pocock contends, allowed themselves to be guided by neoclassical conceptions through the Revolutionary War, so much so in fact that

In Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, there were deliberately engineered constitutional experiments aimed at identifying the natural aristocracy by applying the Aristotelian criteria of property, as in Massachusetts, of self-selection, as in the unicameral legislature which was tried in Pennsylvania. None of these experiments succeeded, and soon after the end of the War of Independence, the Revolution faced a crisis of confidence born of the realization that the naturally differentiated people, presupposed by every republican theorist from Aristotle to Montesquieu, had simply failed to appear.

To overcome this "crisis of confidence" in the Machiavellian paradigm, American political thinkers slowly fashioned "a new paradigm of democratic politics." And thus occurred the transcendence of the third and final "Machiavellian moment."

This extended example from Pocock adds an important dimension to the heuristic application of Kuhn's STRUCTURE. For unlike Bryant, Truman, or Almond, Pocock describes moments of paradigm change in terms of heightened emotions, psychological crisis, and creative transcendence. Men leaped to new conceptual gestalts when their emotions, stirred by critical circumstances, drove them to do so. Major political theorists in Pocock's account do not merely formulate rival intellectual positions as do Bryant's sociologists or Truman and Almond's political scientists. They have bold flashes of insight and interior transformations precipitated by exterior events.

In other ways, however, Pocock's example is a step back from our first three. For one thing, he is an incredibly biased anti-Marxist.<sup>12</sup> When describing the circumstances crucial to Harrington's paradigmatic breakthrough, Pocock pointedly notes the "diverse social origins" of Army men and makes sneering allusion to "bourgeois-spotting scholars" and "the older Marxism of Christopher Hill." In Pocock's analysis, there is no place for "Marxist" or "neo-Marxist" links between the social origins and identities of intellectuals and the ideas they articulate, even about political matters. Paradigm thinkers are completely insulated from external influences on their ideas, even though their psychological crises may be precipitated by social upheavals. Pocock wouldn't seem to tolerate the ideological and political-economic speculations Almond's approach readily suggests. Secondly, Pocock's "paradigms" seem remarkably ethereal and free-floating. It is often hard to know who was supposed to maintain them or in what context. Adherents to paradigms appear variously as particular political thinkers, legislators, or members of society at large. Indeed, the "Machiavellian paradigm" at times seems to be nothing more specific than a vague and diffuse ZEITGEIST. By contrast, Bryant, Truman, and Almond all tried clearly to link paradigms with identifiable practitioners of particular disciplines at specific times. Even if they didn't describe them precisely, "communities" and "fields" of various sorts were at least implicit objects of their attention, and in this they well understood Kuhn's intention.

\*\*\*\*\*

Now that we have looked at representative examples of the application of Kuhn's STRUCTURE heuristically to other disciplines, we are finally ready to come back to the curriculum field and consider its situation directly. As I noted at the outset, observers who ought to know are claiming that the field is in ferment. Philip Jackson has written:

. . . [there is a] chorus of complaints issuing from both . . . clusters and . . . individuals. . . The same note is struck by more than one person, motifs issuing from one location are picked up in another, contrapuntal harmonies emerge. . . [there is] a litany of sorts, containing the following set of verses:

- The Tyler rationale is out-of-date and we have little or nothing with which to replace it.
- Our present ways of thinking and talking about schools and schooling do not do justice to the complexity and dignity of the human condition.

- The control of the curriculum is in the hands of technologists, test-makers, textbook publishers and school administrators. . .
- The aesthetic, ethical, and spiritual dimensions of the educational experience are being ignored. . .<sup>13</sup>

Jackson has also observed:

. . . two general suggestions for change [have emanated] from the Discontents. The first has to do with a proposed shift in scholarly allegiances from one intellectual tradition to one or more others. The second has to do with a proposed change in the relationship between those who talk and write about curricular matters and those who are closer to educational practice, including especially, among the latter, classroom teachers. . . The proposed shift in scholarly allegiance is away from what is increasingly referred to as "mainstream social science". . . and toward a wide assortment of intellectual traditions that have not heretofore been drawn upon heavily by persons interested in educational and curricular topics. These comprise, in the main, existential, phenomenological, and Marxist thought but they also include, somewhat less prominently, the contributions of literary critics, psychoanalysts, and even a philosopher of science or two . . . The second proposal, that having to do with a change in the relationship between those who are closer to educational practice. . . the practitioners. . . is really split into two sub-proposals that move in opposite directions. The first calls for a closer relationship between academics and practitioners; the second for a more distant one.<sup>14</sup>

These complaints, shifts, and changes in relationship that Jackson identifies appear to be among the very things Pinar believes constitute a "paradigm shift" in the curriculum field. He elaborates as follows:

Given that the field is well into a paradigm shift, and given that the traditional paradigm is associated with many in a generation now within fifteen or fewer years of retirement, it is not inaccurate to note that the current situation of conflict and fluidity has its generational aspect.<sup>15</sup>

Elsewhere, Pinar speaks of the goal of the "reconceptualists" in the new generation as "emancipatory knowledge." Without elaborating further on what Pinar means by this, suffice to say that a dramatically new formulation of the curriculum field does appear to exist, have its advocates and adherents, and manifest itself at least partially along generational lines. It is certainly reasonable to offer as a first approximation that something like a "paradigm shift" is indeed underway.

But Pinar has his critics, and two of them--the Tanners--have turned to the very book on which he leans for legitimation to develop a sharp critique of the reconceptualists. They write as follows:

Of profound importance in any discussion of educational theory is Kuhn's view of scientific development. "Science," Kuhn points out, "is a highly cumulative enterprise." The natural scientist is concerned with the behavior of nature. Hence "a new theory is always announced together with applications to some concrete range of natural phenomena; without them it would not even be a candidate for acceptance." The point may be generalized to the curriculum field. A new curriculum theory must have applications to educational phenomena. It is clear that reconceptualism does not meet this criterion and would be unacceptable to the community of curricularists. More importantly, the term "theory" is used all too loosely in the field of curriculum. A doctrine is not a theory.<sup>16</sup>

Here, then, is a central issue, for what the Tanners are reminding us of, in effect, is that any application of Kuhn's notion of "paradigm shift" to a field other than science must be done carefully and cautiously. We must be sure that the analogy works in a reasonably precise way. We can elaborate this point further with regard to the curriculum field in light of the examples we have previously discussed.

Thus, with Bryant, we could say that curriculum theory even more than sociology is not science, and we should expect "paradigms" and other bits of Kuhnian conception to be only loosely applicable. Competing

communities or even generations may well exist among "curricularists", but since the academic activity in the field differs sharply from the practice of science, we should not be surprised to discover that changes in direction arise very differently, show divergent patterns of development, and are subject to special methods of resolution. Kuhn himself cautioned against discovering analogies between science and other fields too readily. In a splendid essay, "On the Relations of Science and Art," he disavows efforts to identify scientists too closely with artists, despite the fact that both sorts of practitioners seem to follow "exemplars" and regularly belong to something like incommensurable "paradigm" communities.<sup>17</sup> Among the important differences he notices are the following:

Whatever the term "aesthetic" may mean, the artist's goal is the production of aesthetic objects; technical puzzles are what he must resolve in order to produce such objects. For the scientist, on the other hand, the solved technical puzzle is the goal, and the aesthetic is a tool for its attainment.<sup>18</sup>

Or again,

. . . art can support, far more readily than science, a number of simultaneous incompatible traditions or schools. . . when traditions do change, the accompanying controversies are usually resolved far more rapidly in science than in art. In the latter. . . controversy over innovation is not usually settled until some new school arises to draw the fire of irate critics; even then, I presume, the end of controversy often means only the acceptance of the new tradition not the end of the old. In the sciences, on the other hand, victory or defeat is not so long postponed, and the side which loses is then banished. Its remaining adherents, if any, are considered to have left the field.<sup>19</sup>

And most pointedly,

Artists can and sometimes do voluntarily undertake dramatic changes in style on one or more occasions during their lives. Or again, most artists begin by painting in the style of their masters, only later discovering the idiom for which they are ultimately known. Similar changes occur, though far more rarely, in the career of an individual scientist, but they are not voluntary. . . Instead, they are forced upon him either by acute internal difficulties within the tradition he had at first embraced or by the particular success within his special field of an innovation produced by someone else. . . In the evolution of art. . . there is nothing quite like the internal crises which a scientific tradition encounters when the puzzles it aims to solve cease to respond as they should.<sup>20</sup>

We should clearly be cautious of attaching the "paradigm shift" label too readily just because in fields like "curriculum" disputes arise among groups and broad changes seem underway.

Relying next on Almond, we can say that in order to validate a generationally-based "paradigm shift in curriculum," we ought first specify a great deal more about the "sociology" of the curriculum field than anyone has. We ought to find out who "curricularists" are, what institutional positions they occupy, what degree of training in which disciplines they have received, and much more. We ought to look for possible institutional, generational, and disciplinary patterns of differentiation among them. What, for example, is the mean age of the "reconceptualists," have they generally been trained in the humanities and philosophy rather than the social sciences, and are they, by and large, affiliated with institutions out of the School of Education "mainstream"? I don't pretend to have answers to any of these questions, but these seem the directions for further inquiry Almond's approach suggests.

Finally, we can appeal to Pocock in a broadly suggestive way to explore still another sense in which "paradigm shift" might or might not be applied to the curriculum field. Has the field passed through an intense, emotionally charged period, that is, a "crisis," in which in some sense heightened feelings forced conceptual transcendence? Did events in society at large (I would guess events of the sixties) spawn a new generation, turn an older one inside out, or both? Was there a "reconceptualist moment"? Were there several?

These questions suggest that there is still considerable merit to the "paradigm shift" notion in the curriculum field, provided that notion is cautiously applied. Fundamental differences, gaps in understanding, generational differences, and a large amount of "talking through" divide curricularists. But, to raise a more difficult question, is there any real evidence that these are signs of paradigm succession rather than the proliferation of schools? Reconceptualists, I expect, want to see developments as paradigm succession--for obvious reasons. Paradigm succession suggests a degree of maturity in the field and eventual triumph for the new generation. Proliferation of schools, on the other hand, means prolonged prematurity and a hung jury. As an historian I don't believe events can be forced into shape artificially, nor do I prescribe behavior. Yet I wonder whether I may be allowed some concluding observations on what seem to me the available options.

One option is to cut all ties from "school people" and to work hard at developing a "pure theory" of curriculum. This option, I believe, has several difficulties. For one thing, it might be too early to develop pure theory. Newton relied on Kepler, Galileo, Hooke, and Huygens as crucial predecessors before he could crystallize a non-traditional, anti-Aristotelian theory of cosmology and mechanics. Mere wishing and straining won't make it so; the time has to be ripe for a Newton to appear. Secondly, even if something vaguely analogous to Newton's PRINCIPIA already exists in the curriculum field, very few of the older generation are likely to be persuaded until it proves capable of addressing more successfully than its competitors the ongoing problems in the field. To ignore completely the problems and methods other curricularists consider important is to invite anger and isolation; to suggest new ways of approaching or defining them is to allow the possibility of partial persuasion or even total conversion. Pinar seems to acknowledge this point when he says,

. . . a retreat to explication of philosophical texts represents an evasion of our professional responsibility. As curricularists we must address ourselves to our contemporaries in the field; to traditionalists and conceptual-empiricists.<sup>21</sup>

But how consistently has this advice been followed?

There is a danger, of course, in too seriously taking on the problems and methods defined by the older generation; they become a burden and a distraction. Here is the dilemma. By ignoring the older problems and defining one's own, one risks being ignored; on the other hand, by confronting existing problems in a field one risks being thwarted in fresh creativity. The dilemma strikes me as not unlike that faced by nineteenth-century radicals. Should they pursue the ultimate "socialist revolution" sometime in the vague and distant future, or should they enter parliamentary governments, make some compromises, and pursue reformist social democracy? Who is to say which strategy was better? To considerable degrees, both succeeded and both failed, in about equal measure.

The analogy of curricularists to nineteenth-century radicals might be a bit misleading, but perhaps no more so than "paradigm shift." Paradigms are decisively shifted in science when new paradigms are articulated to better solve the field's crisis-producing anomalies. How much would the new generation of curricularists lose of their originality if they took on the actual "anomalies" turned up by the research program of older generation curricularists? Oxygen theory replaced phlogiston theory in eighteenth-century chemistry when it was realized that phlogiston theory required negative weight to explain the heating of a metallic oxide. Are there examples of "negative weight" in traditional curriculum theory? Can their existence be demonstrated using the very techniques of the older generation? Does the newer generation have better solutions to these problems? These seem to me the salient questions.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See Daniel Tanner and Laurel N. Tanner, "Emancipation from Research: The Reconceptualist Prescription," *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, 8, (1979), pp. 8-12; Philip W. Jackson, "The Curriculum and its Discontents" [mimeo]; William F. Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978," *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, 7 (1978), pp. 5-12; and "A Reply to My Critics" [mimeo].
2. Pinar, "Reply" [Note 1], p. 3.
3. Thomas S. Kuhn, *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS* (Chicago, 1962). For a recent discussion of Kuhn's ideas, see my "Putting Paradigms into History," *MARXIST PERSPECTIVES*, No. 9 (Spring, 1980), pp. 34-63.
4. Brown, "Putting Paradigms into History" [Note 3].
5. For a general guide to this Kuhn-inspired literature, see David A. Hollinger, "T.S. Kuhn's Theory of Science and Its Implications for History," *AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, 78 (1973), pp. 370-393, esp. pp. 380-381, n. 23 and Richard J. Bernstein, *THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY* (New York, 1976), pp. 84-106, esp. 93 ff.
6. *THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, 26 (1975), pp. 354-359.
7. Bryant [Note 6], pp. 356-357.
8. David B. Truman, "Disillusion and Regeneration: The Quest for a Discipline," *THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, 59 (1965), pp. 866-869.
9. Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," *THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW*, 60 (1966), pp. 875-878.
10. *IBID.*, pp. 869-870, 875.
11. J.G.A. Pocock, *THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT* (Princeton, 1976). For quotations in this and the following paragraphs, see pp. viii-ix, 210, 336, 360, 372, 384, 391, 457-461, 516-517, 523, 525.
12. cf. Brown [Note 3], pp. 42-43, 55-56.
13. Jackson, "The Curriculum and its Discontents" [Note 1], pp. 18-19.
14. *IBID.*, pp. 20-21.
15. Pinar, "A Reply to My Critics" [Note 1], p. 8.
16. Tanner and Tanner, "Emancipation from Research" [Note 1], p. 10.
17. The essay is reprinted in Thomas S. Kuhn, *THE ESSENTIAL TENSION* (Chicago, 1977), pp. 340-351.
18. *IBID.*, p. 343.
19. *IBID.*, p. 348.
20. *IBID.*, p. 349.
21. Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978" [Note 1], p. 9.

The Renewal of Curriculum Theory in the 1970s:  
An Historical Study

Margaret Ann Huber  
La Roche College  
Preface

In this study I want to show how important it is, when studying change in education, to take into account three factors: the historical context, the social process, and the intellectual substance of scholarly debate. Some research approaches to educational change, such as those originating in the sociology of innovations, the sociology and history of science, and the sociology of education, present reform and renewal outside the historical context and neglect the effect of social and intellectual events that provide the background for interpreting change. On the other hand, some studies of curriculum change address the philosophical and epistemological questions while paying very little attention to historical context or social process. My analysis shows how ideologies underlie the creation of new ideas and the establishment of a process of interaction among researchers. It also demonstrates that neither ideas nor events are separate from the historical period in which they occur. Currently undergoing an early phase of renewal, the curriculum field provides an opportunity for studying the content, the process, and the context of change in educational thought.

An emerging group of curriculum theorists in the early 1970s attempted to place curriculum study in its historical context and examined the values that formed the basis of life in the schools in American society. In broad terms, their goal was the revitalization of educational thought, particularly as it applied to the curriculum field. James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Herbert Kliebard, and Paul Klohr had been examining ways of renewing the conceptualization of curriculum throughout the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, and in the late 1960s their students and other theorists began to show a spark of interest in their work. The group of scholars grew as it began to focus on a "reconceptualization" of curriculum. The "reconceptualists" discovered new bases for theory in curriculum: history, philosophy, literary criticism, political science, radical psychology, aesthetics and anthropology. By 1973 a second academic generation of students, scholars, and teachers affiliated with the pioneer members. These younger scholars included Michael Apple, Donald Bate-man, Alex Molnar, and William Pinar. Communication among these theorists eventually led to their first group conference in 1973 in which they shared their thoughts on the theme of "heightened consciousness, cultural revolution, and curriculum theory."

From 1973 to 1978 over sixty-five individuals associated with the group through presentations at special conferences and published articles and essays. Throughout this dissertation I refer to this group as critical curriculum theorists, a name distinguishing them from curriculum specialists and from other curriculum theorists who do not employ critical historical or literary analysis as they do.

In this work I emphasize the content and the underlying ideological and educational assumptions made by the writers who associated with this group of critical curriculum theorists. The analysis of their appearance and significance is based primarily on the writings of five leader-participants in the curriculum movement: Maxine Greene, Teachers College, Columbia University; James B. Macdonald, University of North Carolina at Greensboro; Dwayne Huebner, Teachers College, Columbia University; William Pinar, University of Rochester; and Michael Apple, University of Wisconsin at Madison.

Three criteria guided my choice of Greene, Macdonald, Huebner, Pinar, and Apple as representatives of the critical curriculum theorists. Each writer contributes a unique point of view which has influenced the movement. Each is highly visible and credible among the members of the group. And finally, each has an available body of literature which spans the period in which the group was formed and addresses a range of topics broader than curriculum studies.

The five theorists represent a diversity of approaches to education that includes existentialist, phenomenological, and neo-Marxist scholarship. The early college education of the five theorists illustrates their range of interests and includes nuclear physics, music, and literature. The selected theorists represent two generations of academic scholarship in the field of curriculum. Macdonald and Huebner have published in the field



since the early 1960s and Pinar and Apple since 1970. Maxine Greene is unique among the five since she has never thought of herself as a curriculum specialist but as an existentially oriented philosopher of education.

Leadership among curriculum theorists has developed informally. The scholars who possess the respect of their colleagues and who make themselves visible through teaching, conferences, personal conversation, research publications, and consulting have become the key individuals in the development of the group. In correspondence and conversations with over one-third of the group, I conclude that the five theorists I have selected for this study are among the most visible and respected leaders in the new curriculum theory movement.

Each of the selected theorists writes on subjects which range beyond curriculum analysis. Greene addresses esthetic education and literary criticism; Apple's interests lie in Marxism and ideology; and Macdonald is presently working on a synthesis of theology and education. Three of the five have published books on the subject of curriculum.

Chapter I introduces the theorists and traces the origins of the humanistic movement from which their group developed in the curriculum field and education in the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter II brings together the available documentation on the collective activity of the critical curriculum theorists in the context of their strong commitment to individuality. Chapter III presents an analysis of the writings of Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, William Pinar, and Michael Apple who have concerned themselves with the subject of heightened consciousness. Chapter IV connects the American intellectual tradition of antinomianism with the work of these curriculum theorists in the formation of their values and theories. Chapter V sets forth the social and educational contexts in which the curriculum revival originated and discusses the style of its participants. Chapter VI examines the role and place of the critical theorists as intellectuals in the field of education.

#### Acknowledgements

It is nearly impossible for me to acknowledge adequately those who have contributed to this work in very special ways. I am grateful to the Sisters of Divine Providence of Pittsburgh who continually have supported me in all my studies. I appreciate the time and energy of my dissertation committee, Zelda Gamson, Joseph P. Cosand, Robert T. Blackburn, and John O. King.

Correspondence from the five major theorists studied in this dissertation and from more than twenty other curriculum writers has been encouraging and helpful. B.J. Benham was especially generous in giving me time and sharing her interview transcripts.

I am grateful for the wonderful help of Jane DeVecka, the encouragement of Sister Mary Joan Coultas, and the friendship of many inspiring women studying at the University of Michigan. Most of all I want to acknowledge the energy and spark of intellectual excitement given to me by my friend and colleague, Mary Stuart. Without her questions and challenges this work would not exist.

#### Introduction

The study of curriculum is really the heart and soul of the study of education. All of man's knowledge, wisdom and skill is required to build a just educational environment. The study of curriculum can be and should be a great liberal and liberating study, for through it the specialist must come to grips with the great social and intellectual problems of today.<sup>1</sup>

As the school curriculum develops through debate among teachers, parents, students, administrators, professors of education, and representatives of various social institutions such as churches, the military, the government, it remains the heart of American education. Influenced as it is by many segments of society, the curriculum is a composite expression of American social values. As pluralism characterizes Americans' values, so pluralism characterizes the American schools' curriculum.

Scholars and university professors are particularly influential in changing the way educators view curriculum. Members of the academic disciplines develop the content and form of their curriculum in response to new knowledge and largely through their own scholarly associations. As they respond to changes in their own

research orientations and special interests, scholars often fail to examine the effects of such changes on other disciplines and on the entire education offered to the student.

The task of looking at the effects of the total educational experience on the student and on society is left to curriculum scholars. They formulate the descriptive terms, such as "liberal arts" or "career-oriented," to describe to the public the form and meaning of what is taught in the schools. These scholars exert little influence on actual disciplinary change but they do influence the way the American public and other educators view the curriculum. For critical theorists the purpose of research is to examine critically the existing curriculum systems to make explicit their implications for students and teachers as well as their probable effects on society.

From its beginning in the 1920s the curriculum field developed in response to the needs of practitioners in the schools. Scholars and professors, interested in helping practitioners who wanted theoretical approaches to designing curriculum, formulated principles of what should be learned and proposed ways of teaching and evaluating students. Following the Chicago Conference on Curriculum Theory in 1947, American curriculum writers began to examine the development of theory in the curriculum field. At the conference the term "curriculum theory" came into use and the concept was used interchangeably with "curriculum studies" or "curriculum writing." By the early 1960s, however, the social sciences increasingly influenced educational research causing some curriculum writers to shift their attention from theory as principles of practice to theory based on social science models. The shift was designed to upgrade educational research in a time when the social sciences were gaining prestige. Educational scholars began seeking acceptance from their peers in the academic community more than from those implementing the curriculum. As theory continued to become more abstract, it also became more difficult to translate into practice.

Beginning in the late 1960s a third type of curriculum writing appeared as critical curriculum writers who had been traditional theorists separated themselves from both tradition and the new social science to examine the bases of curriculum and curriculum theory. They attempted to articulate the value assumptions which supported common conceptions of knowledge and learning. Protesting the ahistorical stance of the traditionalists and the abstract approach to the social scientists, these scholars constituted only a small portion of curriculum writers.

Within the last three years two curriculum writers, William Pinar and Decker Walker, have named this newest group of curriculum theorists; neither has done so satisfactorily. Walker places this minority group of theorists within the context of what he pejoratively calls "partisan scholarship." He believes these critical theorists have attempted to persuade other scholars and educators that the school curriculum has responded inappropriately, or not at all, to social situations that need attention.<sup>2</sup> Walker calls these theorists "curricular critics," a name they never have applied to themselves.

In 1975 William Pinar de-emphasized the critical quality of the group's ideas and focused on the post critical or creative aspects by calling the critical theorists "reconceptualists."<sup>3</sup> While several individuals in the group could not accept this name, it was used for their early annual meetings. By 1976, however, the conference participants dropped the formal label of reconceptualization and subsequently writers have used the terms "curricular critics" and "reconceptualists" interchangeably.

#### Major Theses

Critical curriculum theorists distinguish themselves from other specialists by their historical and critical approach to the curriculum. They see the schools as proactive and reactive social institutions. Contrary to the continuing dominant use of social science methods to analyze curriculums they use methods derived from historical, literary, and esthetic criticism.

Critical curriculum theorists believe in the rights, uniqueness, freedom, and value of the person and conceive of themselves as scholars protesting the alienation and dehumanization of life in the school system. They consistently resist categorization of their work into any general school of thought. At the same time, in order to survive in the academic profession, they have created a forum for debate. Forsaking some of their individual autonomy, they have begun to share ideas in a formal setting and have taken on some features of a professional organization.

Although their critique of the unexamined bases of society, of knowledge, and of existing educational practice and research unifies the critical theorists, they differ from one another in almost every other way. They have taken various approaches to curricular analysis and have developed different blueprints for the future. European existential thought has influenced Maxine Greene who emphasizes the need for heightened consciousness and demystification. Marcuse and Polanyi have influenced James B. Macdonald who places great faith in the power of the schools to humanize students. Dwayne Huebner protests the unconscious acceptance of language and metaphors that stifle the use of esthetic or moral valuing in the schools. Having been influenced by Paulo Freire, William Pinar develops two emphases in his works: heightened consciousness as a central aspect of cultural revolution, and the intuitive experience of the self as a valid way of knowing. Interested in the way schooling uses knowledge to support the ideological and economic dominance of certain classes and groups in society, Michael Apple allies himself with neo-Marxist scholarship. In summary, the central common aspect of their argument is a concern for heightened consciousness.

The critical curriculum theorists fall within an American tradition of anti-intellectualism and anti-institutionalism that historically has arisen to challenge the dominant pragmatic and institutionalized values of a developing mass society. The critical theorists challenge certain American values while they seek to preserve others. In so doing, they reflect the confusion and many of the paradoxes of American intellectual and educational life in the 1960s and 1970s. They protest dehumanization, technological rationality, the submersion of human consciousness, and the fragmentation of social life. They affirm the importance of the emotions and intuition. Defining reality in terms that go beyond economic materialism to include spirituality, they criticize schools for cooperating in maintaining values which preserve the social structure at the expense of the individual.

The critical theorists express their antinomian beliefs as a movement against scientism in educational theory. Taking an anti-institutional stance, they consistently emphasize the primacy of the individual. Believing in moral choice and freedom for the individual in a pluralistic world, critical theorists oppose determinism and behaviorism in the schools and in learning theory. While critical of the existing social structure, the theorists nevertheless believe that the conversion of the individual to a new consciousness is possible if educators make an effort to renew the language of education, to value the individual, and to demystify common conceptions of reality.

Critical theorists have responded to the social change of the last two decades by unconsciously participating in a secular revival—one that has much in common with traditional religious revivals. Like religious revivalists, they have attempted to renew education without disturbing its internal structure or its position in society. As in religious revivals, their purpose has been to renew by individual conversion. The theorists have developed a revivalist style of response that includes a plain style in speaking and writing and an appreciation for the conversion experience. Their antinomian impulse contributes to their separation from the spirit of institutionalism.

Within education as a field of study, critical curriculum writers fulfill the special function of the intellectual by adopting a critical stance in order to evaluate society. They, therefore, experience the ambivalence that results from participation in the very institutions which they protest. Maintaining a unique and ambivalent relationship with their colleagues who comprised the majority of the educational research community, the critics fully participate in the organizational commitments and activities of the university and accept the status and rewards of academic life.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," in *PRECEDENTS AND PROMISE IN THE CURRICULUM FIELD*, ed. Helen F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 112.
2. Decker F. Walker, "Toward Comprehension of Curricular Realities," in *REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION*, Vol. 4, ed. Lee S. Shulman (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1976).
3. William F. Pinar, *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975).

## CHAPTER I

## The Origin and Nature of Critical Curriculum Theory

Critical curriculum theory arose within the context of two important post World War II movements in education: the rise of the behavioral sciences and behaviorist theory; and the development of theory as a sub-specialty in the curriculum field and other sub-fields of education.

The term "behavioral sciences" originated in the early 1950s with the Ford Foundation grant of several million dollars which funded a large program of research to increase knowledge of human behavior through basic scientific research.<sup>1</sup> Though funding ended in 1957, the conception of the behavioral scientific approach to research had become established in the academic community. By the 1970s behavioral science had come to dominate the field of education as evidenced in the behavioral objectives movement and the competency-based education movement.

While scientific and behaviorist approaches were becoming accepted in educational research, the concept of curriculum theory was evolving from a concern with the broad principles of curriculum design to a scientific theory based on experimental research. Critical curriculum theorists protested the movement to behaviorism and social science theory at the same time that they accepted the development of a theoretical approach to curriculum studies. They were affected by both trends and did very little to reverse either.

## Anti-behavioral Origins of the Movement

The origins and development of the critical curriculum movement as a protest against the rise of the behaviorist approach in education are discernible in the three decades following World War II.

## The 1950s

## Strengthening the Position of the Humanities

For the humanist educator, the 1950s was a time when the social changes that had occurred as a result of World War II were beginning to take form in the schools. As behaviorism, technology, and science became more important in education, humanists began to react by strengthening their position in an argument for the validity of the humanistic approach to life. During the 1950s writers who later associated with the reconceptualists--Ross Mooney, Paul Klohr, Elliot Eisner--focused on the role of the arts and humanities in education. It is evident in their works prior to 1963 that the language of protest had not become a dominant form of expression for them. They were concerned with positively emphasizing the need for creativity, humane education, personal relationships between teachers and students, and deliberation of questions of morality.

Ross Mooney discussed research in education and creativity. "Creativity in Teaching," "Nurturing the Educational Researcher as a Creative Artist," and "Cultural Blocks to Creativity," are some of the titles that exemplify his expression of the need to preserve the creative aspect of learning. One of his outstanding articles, "The Researcher Himself" was a synthesis of his thinking on the "researcher's intimate experience with himself during his research activity."<sup>2</sup>

Mooney believed that each person must actively create and value the self. "It is therefore well that we know to recognize the self, to name it, to cherish its values for the human race, to cultivate our faith in its natural powers for giving birth to man's humanity and that we learn how to work with these powers for further growth of man."<sup>3</sup> His view of the individual influenced his view of the curriculum field. He saw curriculum-building as a "creative process" in which the curriculum builder is both rational and poetic. He supported the need for new ideas and rational structures that cherished and preserved life rather than those which unconsciously supported the mechanisms of death.

Similar to Ross Mooney, Elliot Eisner and Paul Klohr were also concerned with preserving creativity and humanistic education. In the 1950s, Eisner explored the area of the arts and art education, proposing that schools create an esthetic environment. Having begun to teach at Ohio State University in 1952, Paul Klohr made many contacts over the period with his students who eventually came to support his view of humanistic education.<sup>4</sup>

## The 1960s

### Strengthening the Protest

The critical theorists' mood in the 1960s was one of outspoken protest. The great surge forward in scientific and technological education following Sputnik forced humanists to become more aggressive in their objection to the way educational institutions responded by minimizing the importance of the arts and liberal studies.

In the late 1950s the humanistic psychology movement provided an added impetus to critical curriculum theorists who challenged the dominant conceptions of the person and interpersonal relationships. Two such theorists were Dwayne Huebner and James Macdonald. Macdonald questioned the way society defined the individual in "An Image of Man: The Learner Himself," while Huebner examined how persons related to one another in "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man."

By 1964, the rhetoric of the humanists had changed. Gradually the humanist movement attracted persons who were committed to reform and who protested vehemently the positivist values that had become acceptable and even popular in education. They opposed behaviorism, the fragmentation of knowledge in science, dehumanizing technology, and an alienating institutional bureaucracy.

One of the first protests to be articulated among humanistic educators was the argument against behavioral objectives. This argument was soon joined by a critique of bureaucracy, of the disciplines, and of educational evaluation and measurement. Herbert Kliebard wrote "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory" and "Structure of the Disciplines as an Educational Slogan." John S. Mann contributed to the protest with "Student Rights Strategy," and "Alienation, Restlessness, and Violence." Bernice Wolfson joined James Macdonald to write "The Case Against Behavioral Objectives." Elliot Eisner summed up the skeptical attitude toward feeling of the group with his title, "How Can You Measure a Rainbow?"<sup>5</sup>

While the protest of the critical theorists in the 1960s was strong, it lacked the force of an organized group protest movement.

## The 1970s

### Renewal of the Curriculum

The period of curriculum protest peaked in 1973 when curriculum theorists held their first organized conference to share thinking on the "cultural revolution and heightened consciousness." But with the publication of the conference proceedings came recognition of a concern for a new direction—one of renewal beyond protest. William Pinar characterized the group's new direction as a focus on "postcritical issues." Pinar sensed the spirit of renewal and strong desire to move beyond critique to address issues of the future even if that involved dialogue with social scientists.

Critical curriculum theorists addressed renewal in many areas. Louise Berman's article "Curriculum Leadership: That All May Feel Value and Grow," indicates concern for values and inner growth of the persons in the schools. George Posner added a dimension by exploring the connection between ideology and technology in the context of curriculum. David Purpel contributed to the discussion of moral education describing it as an area "where sages fear to tread."

In a spirit of renewal, a number of theorists and curriculum writers began to express ideals about education and society in a language which spoke of love and hope. Making use of poetic metaphors and a new literary style, William Pilder published "In the Stillness Is the Dancing," and "Youth: Society's Hope for Love."

A group of critics concerned specifically with the curriculum developed a spirit of educational and social renewal. Questioning the basis on which curriculum had been built in the past, John Mann, George Willis, Alex Molnar, Elliot Eisner, and Michael Apple called upon all curriculum theorists to critically question the basic assumptions of their work.<sup>6</sup>

As compared to the 1960s, the curriculum theorists formed a more cohesive group in the 1970s. They met yearly after 1973 establishing their own journal in 1978. In the decades following World War II, the critical curriculum theorists moved from isolated pleas for humanistic education to vehement and outspoken individual protest to a supportive group renewal. Attracting attention during their period of protest, the critical theorists achieved a degree of acceptance by their peers in their efforts of renewal.

## The Development of New Theoretical Methods

Critical curriculum theorists built their analysis of curriculum and curriculum theory within their conception of the field of curriculum studies as an historical developing entity. Traditionalists and social scientists approached the field by analyzing current practices outside the context of the social and intellectual environment and rarely viewed themselves and their colleagues as part of an historical progress of ideas or as contributing to one among many views of curriculum. An examination of the traditional way of seeing the field provides an understanding of the way the critical theorists differ.

Recent curriculum literature suggests the curriculum scholars' understanding of their field of study is generally ahistorical. They rarely take time to separate themselves from their own disciplines to see how their research changes over time and in relationship to other fields. Educational scholars traditionally have seen curriculum studies in three ways: as an administrative unit within the university structure; as a cluster of related concepts developed among interdisciplinary researchers; and as a body of research literature based primarily on empirical or experimental studies.

According to Seguel, the curriculum field consists of faculty in departments of curriculum in large universities. She notes that prior to 1938 there were some common interests running like threads through the writings of seven major curriculum writers. The themes which continued in the field of curriculum into the 1960s included the nature of knowledge; the nature of knowing; a political interest in the limits of each new emerging specialization in education such as educational administration, educational psychology, or instructional improvement; and an interest in the mass production and use of new ideas through technology.<sup>7</sup> Members of the field institutionalized these interests by creating specializations within the fields of education and curriculum.

George Beauchamp takes a second approach. He describes the field of curriculum as clusters of individuals involved in related research. Beauchamp sees curriculum as an interdisciplinary specialty which is the nexus of research from various other sub-specialities in education such as "curriculum design, theory and research, foundational backgrounds, and cognitive disciplines."<sup>8</sup> The locus of the field is the university, but not necessarily in departments of curriculum. The conception of the field extended in Beauchamp's framework to include anyone in the university who addresses the problems and issues of curriculum. Beauchamp believes that the field of curriculum needs careful definition in order to differentiate itself from other areas of research in education.

Decker Walker, in his review of the research on curriculum 1969-1975, takes a third approach. According to Walker, the field of curriculum is comprised of those researchers who contribute empirical studies to curriculum literature. He divides the literature into four areas of popular interest: studies of the relation of curricular variables to school achievement; studies of curricular maintenance and change in response to social forces; studies of curriculum change processes in schools and classrooms; and studies of the field itself.<sup>9</sup> Except for the fourth area, studies of the field itself, Walker believes that "the other bodies of research seem to share a concern for discovering and interpreting the realities--with which those who create, manage, and use curricula must deal."<sup>10</sup> Walker believes that presently, students of curriculum are concentrating on research that enables educators to understand the processes, outcomes, and relationships within curriculum development.

Observing that curriculum writers have become increasingly preoccupied with their own work, Walker notes that "the past few years have seen the publication of an unprecedented number of works inquiring into the nature and fate of the curriculum itself."<sup>11</sup> He adds that nearly every writer in the field has ventured an essay on the theme. Walker observes that curriculum is one of those "unusual cases in which students of the subject have to study their own activities and ideas because they are a part of the phenomena to be understood. The curriculum writer's own prescriptions are themselves forces that must be taken into account..."<sup>12</sup> This consciousness of the entire field of curriculum precedes the development of more historical analyses that take into account the differing perspectives of the scholars themselves.

In general at the present time, critical theorists feel the necessity of developing a descriptive and historical framework of the field in which they can locate their work. Herbert Kliebard has stated the need for such a perspective and Macdonald and Pinar have proposed an analysis of the field which includes an acceptable

interpretation of the field. Their purpose is to encompass critical and postcritical theory within the historical development of curriculum studies.

Herbert Kliebard, a critical theorist, perceives an acute need for the kind of historical research which traces back to the earlier curriculum writers the issues and themes of the present. In his 1970 essay "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective,"<sup>13</sup> he chides members of the curriculum field for their ahistorical approach. By ahistorical he means that there is a lack of knowledge of the basic facts of recent curriculum history even among the most articulate spokespersons in the field. Such ignorance perpetuates certain unexamined myths in the field. He also believes there is a lack of "dialogue" between current practitioners in the field and their historical predecessors. The curriculum field in general is "characterized by an uncritical propensity for novelty and change rather than funded knowledge or a dialogue across generations."<sup>14</sup>

In his 1971 article, James Macdonald sets forth his view of curriculum theory in the field. He observes three groups of researchers in curriculum:

One group (by far the largest) sees theory as a guiding framework for applied curriculum development and research and as a tool for evaluation of curriculum development.

A second "camp" of ofttime younger (and far fewer) theorizers is committed to a more conventional concept of scientific theory. This group has attempted to identify and describe the variables and their relationships in curriculum.

The third group of individuals looks upon the task of theorizing as a creative intellectual task which they maintain should be neither used as a basis for prescription or as an empirically testable set of principles and relationships.<sup>15</sup>

For the first group, Macdonald asserts that theory is a springboard for prescribing and building practical activity in relation to the curriculum. Curriculum theory functions like philosophy in that it is not open to direct empirical validation. William Pinar, developing a view of the field that is distinct from Macdonald's named this first group "traditionalists."

Traditionalists value service to practitioners in the schools above all else, and this service is more important than the development of an integrating theory or conducting research (as the term is used by social scientists), although some traditionalists would maintain that theoretical considerations and research findings may be employed with discretion.<sup>16</sup>

Traditionalists are concerned about "principles" guiding curriculum design and implementation. Pinar, however, suggests that "principles" may have little to do with theory as viewed outside the perspective of the traditionalists.

Pinar speculates that the closeness of the relationships between the traditionalists and the schoolteachers sustains the atheoretical and ahistorical character of the traditionalists' approach. This closeness prevents curriculum theorists from attaining the intellectual distance needed to generate adequate curriculum theory. Pinar equates the "field of curriculum" in the 1960s with the traditionalists.

In Macdonald's second group, theory is conceptual in nature; it utilizes research for empirical validation of curriculum practices rather than for testing the efficiency or effectiveness of a curriculum design. Pinar names this group of social scientists "conceptual-empiricists." The conceptual-empiricists began to transform the curriculum field in the 1960s. Their basic premise is "that a scientific knowledge of human behavior (a subset of which involves curriculum) is possible."<sup>17</sup> While traditionalists' allegiance has been to practitioners and to the students who benefit from their ideas, conceptual-empiricists seem to have their eyes "more upon their colleagues in social science fields, upon creating nomological knowledge than upon practitioners, who at times, given their participation in experiments, seem a means to other ends..."<sup>18</sup>

Pinar observes that the traditionalists, as a group, have lost their vitality in the field of curriculum as the conceptual-empiricists have gained prominence. He remarks that a few years ago the "only pulse detectable was the work of conceptual-empiricists, and in the early nineteen-seventies it seemed if a curriculum field were to survive, it would be as another colony of mainstream social science."<sup>19</sup>

The third and smallest group identified by Macdonald has as its purpose to "dévelop and criticize conceptual schema in the hope that new ways of talking about curriculum, which may in the future be far more fruitful than present orientations, will be forthcoming."<sup>20</sup> Pinar identifies himself and Macdonald with this group and refers to them as "reconceptualists."<sup>21</sup> Pinar recognizes two orientations within the reconceptualists. The first group criticizes the existing field of curriculum and the second or "postcritical" group goes beyond their own criticism to create a new conception of curriculum and education.<sup>22</sup>

Like Macdonald, many critical theorists attempt to clarify their own position in the field and how their work is integrated with that of their colleagues by developing a "state of the field" position. They criticize the curriculum field and their colleagues for not engaging in the types of analyses of curriculum that would examine how curriculum affects students or how the structure of knowledge in the disciplines emphasizes values that are hidden in the rhetoric of educators. They try to take themselves out of a preoccupation with the present system and to look for historical continuity or discontinuity in curriculum development and design. In order to do this they use historical, literary, and esthetic criticism along with phenomenological methods to study curriculum. They combine their view of the field and historical research in developing a legitimate basis for a critique of curriculums and education.

### Curriculum Theory

Since the 1960s, the dominant approach to curriculum theory has been based on conceptions developed from scientific theory. Theory development as it occurred in the physical and biological sciences did not provide an adequate model for educational research, but theory in the social and behavioral sciences was generally acceptable. Considering theory development to be a relatively new activity within the study of education, George Beauchamp saw the need for a linkage with the social sciences.

Whenever scholars have lacked experience in theory development in a field of endeavor, it has been customary for them to look to the patterns set by those who have been successful and to use those patterns as paradigms for beginning efforts. . . as an applied social science, education must look to original sources in the established social science disciplines for guiding structures, processes, and rules.<sup>23</sup>

Within the context of scientific theory, a number of writers propose definitions of curriculum theory. Some, such as George Beauchamp and Glenys Unruh present curriculum theory from the scientific perspective. Curriculum theorists, however, seem to agree on a very general conception of theory as described by Macdonald.

In addition to providing a basic definition of theory, Beauchamp attempts to differentiate the various uses of the term "curriculum." He finds that in the literature, curriculum is used in three ways: as a substantive plan of intended learning outcomes or a document discussing such a plan; as a synonym for a curriculum system (that part of the organized framework of a school system within which all curriculum decisions are made), and as a synonym for an area of professional study, the field of curriculum. For his purposes he defines curriculum theory as a "set of related statements that gives meaning to a school's curriculum by pointing up the relationships among its elements and by directing its development, its use, and its evaluation."<sup>24</sup> According to Beauchamp, curriculum theory directs practice and is derived from practice. Beauchamp likely would consider most curriculum writers to be theorists.

In his study of curriculum development, Glenys Unruh holds that curriculum theory is complementary to curriculum practice. Unruh sees the professor and the practitioner as the two separate and complementary partners in the development of curriculum theory.

Theory is based on a value position and interrelated concepts, a belief system that provides criteria to guide the practitioner-in making rational choices among alternative courses of action and sources of knowledge, in making value decisions, and in predicting the consequences of various solutions to dilemmas. Theory provides a frame of reference against which the practitioner can raise questions and test hypotheses.<sup>25</sup>



Unruh sets out to define curriculum theory by stating what it is not: not a rule of thumb--a style or pattern of operation; not a brainstormed flight of fancy, thoughts tossed around in bull sessions; not an "ought to," a personal point of view or value statement; not a taxonomy; and finally, not the literature, classical works or criticism. His definition of curriculum theory, written in the language of the social sciences, is narrower than Beauchamp's in its perspective. Curriculum theory consists of

. . . a set of propositions [about curriculum] derived from data and creative thinking, from which constructs are formed to describe interactions among variables and to generate hypotheses. Theory describes, explains, goes beyond the data, predicts, and leads to new knowledge.<sup>26</sup>

Unruh proposes that theory in curriculum is a part of social theory rather than formal scientific theory. Consonant with this view, he sees the year 1954 as a critical turning point in the development of theory in education. The National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration (NCPEA) formed in 1947 to begin the study of educational administration and by 1954 several theorists of human behavior from social science fields were meeting in conference with the members of the NCPEA. That meeting marked the beginning of a concerted effort to promote the development of theory in all areas of educational studies including curriculum. Among educators, there were adverse reactions to the new "educational theory," but the behavioral sciences gained status as traditional approaches became less useful in explaining the complexity of educational activity.

Contrary to the tendency to define scientific theory very exactly, critic curriculum theorists share a broader definition as described by James Macdonald in his article, "Curriculum Theory," first published in 1971.<sup>27</sup> He believes that curriculum theory is in a formative condition since there does not seem to be any generally accepted criteria to distinguish curriculum theory from other forms of writing in education.

The present situation may be summarized by saying that curriculum theory and theorizing exists because a fair number of thoughtful and respected professional persons say they do it and that it exists. Still others refer to the work of these persons as theorizing and their efforts as theories.<sup>28</sup>

Since Macdonald views curriculum more as a "historical accident" than a planned and rational development, he believes that the purpose of curriculum theory is to advance the understanding of actual curriculums and curriculum development systems. Any scholars who contribute to this understanding are curriculum theorists. Macdonald agrees with Huebner that the meaning of curriculum theory depends on the kind of language used in the analysis: descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimizing, prescriptive, and affiliative. Theory varies with the intentions of the theorists in the way they use language.

This may appear to be unusual in relation to the history of scientific theory at first glance, but a little reflection shows that there are similar varieties of theory in many fields. . . It would appear that the variety is less troublesome than the confusion among theorists about the variety and of the intentions of other theorists.<sup>29</sup>

Macdonald suggests that members of the field need to realize the multiplicity of theoretical approaches and in facing that reality they would also find that the intentions and language of the theorist create the meaning of his or her writings.

### Summary

Humanistic educators have responded to the movements related to the behavioral sciences in the last two decades in three styles of protest.

The first humanist response was to strengthen their position and develop a case for the continuing presence of humanistic education. They addressed questions of creativity, the arts, and humane education in the disciplines. As science became increasingly dominant, however, some humanists resorted to outspoken protest--a change in approach that seemed more a negation of technology and scientism than a creative effort to maintain their former position of strength. Eventually, when the period of protest faded, the same individuals moved to a period of recreation of the conceptions of curriculum.

Several current approaches to curriculum have neglected to emphasize either the curriculum or the curriculum field within a historical context. Critical theorists, on the other hand, have felt compelled to set forth a position substantially different from the accepted "ahistorical" approach. They concentrated on analyzing the field and of curriculum that clearly stated the nature and meaning of their own work as curriculum critics. In the past, "curriculum theory" as an area of study has not had a clear and commonly accepted definition within the field. Critical theorists distinguished themselves from others in curriculum studies by their view of the theorizing process which differed from that of the social scientists who searched for ever more precise and limiting definitions of theory. For the critical theorists, theory was any scholarship that contributed to the understanding of the curriculum and curriculum development systems as they existed in education.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The Ford Foundation in 1952 was the first to use the term "behavioral sciences," to refer to the area of research it was funding.
2. Ross Mooney, "Researcher Himself," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 175.
3. Ross Mooney, "The Emerging Self," *CHILDHOOD EDUCATION* 35 (October 1958): 55.
4. See Appendix D for a list of selected works by Mooney, Eisner, and Klover.
5. See Appendix D for a list of selected works by Kliebard, Mann, Wolfson, and Eisner.
6. See Appendix D for a list of selected works by Berman, Purpel, Pilder, Willis, and Molnar.
7. Mary Louise Seguel, *THE CURRICULUM FIELD: ITS FORMATIVE YEARS* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), pp. 180-182. In this work, she examined the writings of seven individuals who contributed to the developing professional identity of curriculum specialists before 1940. They were Charles Frank McMurry, John Dewey, Franklin Bobbitt, Werrett Wallace Charters, Harold Rugg, and Hollis L. Well.
8. George A. Beauchamp, *CURRICULUM THEORY*, 3rd ed. (Wilmette, Ill.: The Kagg Press 1975), p. 1. The third edition is a revision of his 1961 and 1968 editions. Beauchamp felt that after 1968, professional interest in curriculum theory continued to grow. This growth of interest compelled the preparation of the third edition.
9. Decker F. Walker, "Toward Comprehension of Curricular Realities," in *REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN CURRICULUM EDUCATION*, vol. 4, ed. Lee S. Shulman (Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1976), pp. 270-271.
10. *IBID.*, p. 271.
11. *IBID.*, p. 299.
12. *IBID.*
13. Kliebard originally published this work in *EDUCATIONAL COMMENT* (1970): 31-41.
14. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 41.
15. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 5-6.
16. William F. Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association in Toronto, 1978, p. 2. *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, Vol. No. 8, September, 1978, pp. 5-12.
17. Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field," p. 4.
18. *IBID.*, p. 5.
19. *IBID.*, p. 6.
20. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," p. 6.
21. For the purpose of this study the term "reconceptualists" is interchangeable with "curricular critics" with "critical curriculum theorists."
22. Though Pinar found reason to divide the group, critical curriculum writers studied in this dissertation reflect both orientations.

23. Beauchamp, CURRICULUM THEORY, p. 9.
24. Beauchamp, CURRICULUM THEORY, p. 58. In his 1975 edition of CURRICULUM THEORY, Beauchamp outlines the development of theory in the curriculum field with a short but comprehensive review of the most significant publications from 1947 to 1972, pp. 68-76.
25. Glenys G. Unruh, RESPONSIVE CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 59.
26. IBID., p. 64.
27. Macdonald originally published this work in JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, 64 (January 1970): 196-200.
28. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory," p. 5.
29. IBID., pp. 6-7.

## CHAPTER II

### The Critical Curriculum Movement: The Compromise of Formalization

A search for a unifying theme in the great variety of works of the critical curriculum theorists leads to two areas of agreement. In general, they agree on their protest of existing social structures and values and they agree in their resistance to being categorized as a group. Commitment to individuality is a strong underlying theme that explains their protectiveness of their own autonomy.

As the critical theorists look at social organization, they find it to have overwhelming power over the lives of its members. The theorists write about the loss of personal autonomy, the declining value of the person in a technological age, and the loss of human rights, especially for students. In short, they hold values that are counter to the prevailing organizational trends of American life.

The critical theorists' common objections consciously and unconsciously formed a bond among them. In commenting on their unifying protest, critical theorist Alex Molnar claims that the diverse ideas of the group can only be tied together by a theme of "dissatisfaction with what is."<sup>1</sup> Maxine Greene in an interview with B.J. Benham, points out that all of the reconceptualists have a sort of "adversary" quality. "I guess there are certain themes that hold them together--you know: they're anti-traditional; anti-positivist; anti-formalist; and anti-bureaucratic."<sup>2</sup>

A brief reading of the themes in the writing of the critical theorists suggests that, at some point, individual theorists separated themselves from the dominant values of society. Without taking on a counter-cultural life style or disrupting their professional careers, they adopted a critical stance toward education and society in a loosely organized movement created to breathe new life into education and curriculum studies.

In addition to protest, critical theorists almost unanimously agree that they cannot be called a group, a movement, or an organization. Janet Miller, a student of Paul Klohr and managing editor of THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING, suggests this is true because of their diversity and warns that in viewing the critical curriculum theorists one should take note of the many perspectives represented. "I think...many are attempting to label and classify without solid knowledge of the multifaceted nature of the work done by those who have thus far participated in the movement."<sup>3</sup> Alex Molnar agrees that there are individual scholars doing very different work and do not constitute a movement. Richard Hawthorne, another critical theorist believes that the participants are too diverse to be classified as a self-conscious group.

In fact, critical curriculum theorists have never been a formal professional group. They officially have never agreed on any common goals. Some feel that the group is not intended to be goal-oriented but is formed for the sole purpose of direct and personal communication in the forms of scholarly debate and informal discussion. Alex Molnar argues that people engage in curriculum theorizing because it intrigues them and not because of any external goals they have in mind. To Molnar, the only future of the group is the interaction taking place at the annual meetings.<sup>4</sup>

There seems to be unanimous agreement on the lack of agreement within the movement. Michael Apple points out that "this has historically been the case in this field. I can't remember a time when there was

agreement about what the important questions were."<sup>5</sup> Critical theorists find themselves balancing their sense of individuality against the prevailing and increasing formalization of their group interactions.

Critical theorists find themselves in the dilemma of protesting the very structure that would permit them a voice and a hearing. To obtain a forum they have acquired membership in the university structure and have begun to organize themselves to share more systematically their thinking about subjects of common interest. The organization has begun to take on the features of a social movement. Three stages explain their development as a social movement: intellectual awakening and liberation within the individual scholar; a time of growing group consciousness; and finally, some collective activity.

### Intellectual Awakening and Liberation

At some point in their life histories the individuals studied here began to free themselves from the prevailing ideology and stepped back to examine it critically. This intellectual act of awakening and liberation has been a continuing one for many of the critical theorists. The theorists possess an openness to constant reawakening and recurring liberation from the ideas that have formed the past. Throughout their writings there are references to moments of heightened consciousness leading to a critical view of the world and a personal conversion to a new point of view.

James Macdonald described his awakening as a "utopian impulse" which led him to search in direction very different from his original preoccupation with empirical research and technical development work. At that point he began to see education as a moral enterprise rather than a set of technical problems.

Dwayne Huebner experienced a feeling of disillusionment with his own education and with the education of those around him. He began to study teaching and, while working on his dissertation, sensed that his statistical and empirical competencies far outweighed his conceptual competencies. From that time he directed himself to the study of philosophy and theology.

For some, like William Pinar, the change took place in the continuing experiences of education or graduate studies and in the experience of teaching. Others like Michael Apple express their moment of enlightenment as the rejection of illusions, even the rejection of the "comforting illusion that the types of questions that are commonly being asked by curriculum workers and other educators are fruitful."<sup>6</sup>

Maxine Greene's life was a series of awakenings--early notebooks and attempted novels awakening her to the intellectual world; therapy, politics, and Europe in the 1930s; and her experience at New York University where she became "hooked" on philosophy of education.

### Group Consciousness

In contrast to the issue-centered and doctrinaire movements of the 1960s, critical theorists formed a diffuse and open movement which allowed for internal debate among the members. They de-emphasized the cohesion and single-minded commitment of the members required by a group seeking immediate social change, and relied on scholarship and open debate.

While critical curriculum theorists constituted a new and diffuse educational movement, they did not perceive themselves as one. After 1973 several events contributed to a growing group consciousness. William Pinar popularized the name "reconceptualist"; noted curriculum writers included the group as a significant part of the curriculum field in their state of the field papers in the 1970s; prominent critical theorists began to acknowledge their affiliation with the group; and participants began to debate the possibility of group goals.

In 1975 William Pinar adopted the label "reconceptualist" from James B. Macdonald and published *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*. In effect, he had named the group and strengthened the growing self-consciousness among its participants. He saw *CURRICULUM THEORIZING* as a presentation of the works of major contemporary curriculum theorists. He considered these theorists as the avant-garde who would become increasingly significant in the field. "I see the collection as a report of a movement just under way, an example of 'work-in-progress,' the theme and function of which at first challenge and the supplant traditional curriculum writing."<sup>7</sup> Having been named, those in the movement had a label to accept or to reject. They proceeded to do both.

Several writers contributed to the self-consciousness of the group by including curricular critics in their analyses of the curriculum field. Most notable were B.J. Benham, Decker Walker, Paul Klohr, James Macdonald, and Herbert Kliebard. B.J. Benham compiled a bibliography of reconceptualist works<sup>8</sup> and conducted interviews with eight individuals.<sup>9</sup> She discovered in her interview with James Macdonald that he and Dwayne Huebner had been working in an effort to reconceptualize curriculum for twenty-five years, although they had been ignored for the first fifteen years. Macdonald noted that they never published any reconceptualist work until the idea became acceptable around 1966.

Decker Walker included critical curriculum theorists in his 1976 review of the curriculum literature. He divided the research on the field of curriculum into two groups. The first consisted of those writers who were critical of schools but sought ways to improve them through their critique. The second group urged a "critical stance towards schooling so thoroughgoing that it precludes working for all but the most radical reforms, those that would amount to abandonment or destruction of schools as we know them and substitution of some other form of education."<sup>10</sup> Walker believed that some of this second group focused on the educational system, while others were more interested in social reform and revolution. They were "deeply and vehemently critical of certain features of the societies which they believe the school helps to perpetuate."<sup>11</sup> He found that one wing of the group, including Michael Apple, objected to the class bias of schooling and to the social, cultural, and political inequalities it continued to support. Another wing objected to the violence done to the individual psyche by the society's and the schools' "emphasis on scientific-technical rationality, to the exclusion of the more personal, emotional, aesthetic, and moral qualities of experience..."<sup>12</sup> Though Walker disagreed with the critique of the critical theorists, it was significant that he recognized the movement's contribution to the field.

Personal correspondence with members of the group<sup>13</sup> has provided further information on group-consciousness. Huebner and Macdonald, two visible members of the group, are not entirely in agreement about the degree of self-consciousness in the reconceptualist movement. Macdonald feels that it is a self-conscious group "to a rather large extent for many."<sup>14</sup> But Huebner, in reference to Macdonald, Greene, Pinar and himself, states that they were "not a coherent group with a collective sense."<sup>15</sup> Yet some who have tried to describe the group as a movement stress an intangible sense of identity among the participants.

To a considerable and increasing extent conference participants are self-consciously a group, and increasingly I sense some interest in the possibility of "movement," of self-consciously attempting to make a collective impact on the character of American education. To what extent this is possible and will in fact happen isn't clear at this point.<sup>16</sup>

Small, informal groups rest on shared values and shared contacts. As opposed to large organizations, small groups tend to foster personal relations over an extended period of time, to recognize something common to their own group that differentiates it from others, and to share some genuine goals. Academic professionals tend to form themselves around goals related to their disciplines. Those goals generally include the publishing of journals, the sharing of ideas, a selective membership, and the promotion and advocacy of the profession.

Some writers observe that the critical theorists share certain implicit values, although their goals have not been clearly expressed. Hawthorne sees the goals to include the generation of "alternative paradigms or approaches, modes of thinking about curriculum."<sup>17</sup> It seems important to him that the group produce some tangible evidence of its activity. Macdonald is more direct in his assessment of the informal goals of the group stating that they are "reform and revolution."

...I wish we could revolutionize the whole education world! I'd like to see curriculum re-defined radically; I would hope that we could re-conceptualize curriculum even in its most traditional sense, of subject matter; reconceptualize the substance of educational material. Now, that's not a social or structural change; that's a conceptual change.<sup>18</sup>

Some critical theorists have tried to further describe the common elements and future expectations that unite the group. Macdonald saw their common theme as "human liberation."<sup>19</sup> Pinar added: "All are preoccupied with the idea of emancipation, in a political sense as well as psychological and religious senses."<sup>20</sup>

Whether ambivalence in the expression of goals and significant issues is important depends on the context in which it occurs. Viewed as a group trying to formulate a well-defined political and scholarly position, the critical curriculum theorists suffer from the lack of clear goals and organization. When they are viewed as intellectuals, critical theorists achieve a unity in valuing critical debate and questioning that is not overshadowed by a lack of formalized goals. Divided in affirmation of a common stance, they are united in their protest of the status quo.

### Collective Activity

The first transformation associated with the appearance of a social movement is its formalization--its embodiment in one or more movement organizations. Collective action is the visible expression of a social movement and usually comes through the movement organization.<sup>21</sup> The emergence of leadership, the formation of a network of participants, conferences, a journal, and other activities of the critical curriculum theorists are all visible expressions of a developing social movement.

The ability of a group to form and remain together depends in part upon leadership. Attracting persons of similar ideas and commitments to a movement, leadership is the focus of its visibility and the personification of its ideals.

It is difficult to pinpoint leadership in a diffuse group such as the critical theorists. Even though the group did not develop the formal interaction of a professional organization with leadership legitimated by election, leadership did emerge. The names of several individuals consistently appear in correspondence with members of the group and in the literature. James B. Macdonald, William Pinar, Dwayne Huebner, Michael Apple, Paul Klohr, and Maxine Greene seem to have attained the respect of their colleagues due to academic achievement--ideas, publications, personal interaction with conference participants and colleagues, and insight in their critiques of society and the schools. These "leaders" in the movement take on the role of participant-colleagues. Participants in conferences have often remarked on the ability of such leaders to create a spark of enthusiasm within the group for a new idea or for a new perspective.

The informal nature of the early conference presents a difficulty in listing individuals who have participated in the movement. Correspondence with participants, conference publications, prepublication lists of conference proceedings and conference programs are the source for generating a list of sixty-five persons who have written, published, or in some way participated in curriculum theorizing within the context of the critical group.<sup>22</sup> With a few exceptions, participants are from schools of education in large research universities in the eastern United States. Columbia Teachers College, Ohio State University, and the University of Rochester are three major locations of interest in critical curriculum theory.<sup>23</sup>

While the origins of a movement are specific to the history of its times, the continuation and growth of an academic movement depend on an environment that is conducive to disseminating ideas. The critical curriculum theory movement is centered in universities and develops through contact among interested scholars. University professors share ideas with graduate students who complete degrees and continue scholarship within the critical framework.

Some of the original teachers who were early "critical theorists" were Paul Klohr, Ross Mooney, Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, and Dwayne Huebner. They contacted students through classes and effectively began to develop the next academic generation of critical theorists. Almost one-half of the sixty-five participants have studied or taught at Columbia Teachers College and Ohio State University. The openness to debate and critical study in both colleges provides an atmosphere for the growth of the movement.

An academic movement needs a forum for sharing papers, ideas, and informal conversation. In sponsoring a conference, scholars not only share ideas but provide a large audience to respond to those ideas and to continue the debate in other academic settings. Publications of proceedings help in the dissemination of ideas. The critical theorists have sponsored five conferences from 1973 to 1978.<sup>24</sup> All of the conference proceedings have been or will be published.

The papers from the first conference, held at the University of Rochester in 1973 and chaired by William Pinar, have been edited and published by Pinar as *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY* in 1974.<sup>25</sup> In the preface, Pinar describes his sense of the first

conference:

I had the sense of a group of almost lonely scholars whose coming together was a time of sad celebration of mutual effort, of mutual acknowledgement that, while individual paths may differ markedly, ultimately we seek the same, and that same has something to do with what the phrase "the quality of existence" hints at, something to do with the cultivation of wisdom. This, finally, it seems to me, recalls the theme of consciousness and cultural revolution.<sup>26</sup>

Maxine Greene also responded to the first conference:

I was interested, because the conference title sounded so crazy, you know, and also because I had a chance to do the kind of thing I was interested in. What appealed to me at that first conference was that it escaped the usual convention spirit. It was because you knew that, in doing it, you weren't going to get any medals. And you had the feeling that somehow people were more genuine because of that.<sup>27</sup>

In 1974, Xavier University of Cincinnati hosted the second conference chaired by Timothy Riordan, and in 1975 the University of Virginia was the gathering place for the third conference chaired by Charles Beegle. Charles Beegle at the University of Virginia is editing the papers of these two conferences for publication in 1978. The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee hosted the fourth reconceptualist conference in 1976, chaired by Alex Molnar and John Zahorik. The papers from this conference appeared in November 1977 as CURRICULUM THEORY.<sup>28</sup> In May 1978, Ronald Padgham chaired the fifth conference at Rochester Institute of Technology. In addition to these conferences, other reconceptualist theorists delivered papers at the Geneseo Curriculum Theory Conference in 1976 and at the Kent Curriculum Theory Conference in 1977.<sup>29</sup>

The curriculum theorists plan to publish a journal to disseminate their ideas.<sup>30</sup> The journal may be an important step in identifying the critical writers as a group. Janet L. Miller, managing editor of the journal, described its purposes in the announcement for March 1978:

...the emphasis is theoretical, and focused, at least in the initial issues, on cultural, political, and psychoanalytic dimensions of curriculum. However, the journal will be open. It will print criticism of such work, and, on occasion, pertinent empirical studies. Such an emphasis makes the journal unique in the curriculum field.<sup>31</sup>

The journal board plans to sponsor a series of activities to stimulate scholarly activity in the field of curriculum. These include the annual spring conference and an occasional meeting at which six to ten participants concentrate on one formal paper. Miller also hopes to publish a small book series in curriculum theory, printing books of high scholarly quality that are important to the field but of insufficient market potential to interest commercial publishers.<sup>32</sup>

The critical curriculum writers have published primarily in scholarly education journals.<sup>33</sup> Several also have published in selected journals that relate to their individual areas of interest.<sup>34</sup>

Critical curriculum theorists developed as a group in the context of two professional organizations--the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD) and American Educational Research Association (AERA). In the mid 1960s the ASCD established a commission on curriculum theory. In addition the AERA created a Special Interest Group for the Generation and Utilization of Knowledge in Curriculum which Paul Klohr, a critical theorist, co-chaired. In his following comments Pinar discusses the distinction between these groups viewing the ASCD affiliation as the traditionalist strain in curriculum theory and the AERA development as the social science strain.

This distinction is not a simple matter of elitism, rather, it is an indication of a historical-intellectual shift in the field which parallels in some respects the rise of psychology and the social sciences generally in the university. It indicates, as well, the influence of colleagues in the so-called cognate fields, who view educationists' work according to criteria of research in their own fields.<sup>35</sup>

Critical theorists see their group as an alternative and a complement to both the ASCD and the AERA for sharing around the special issues in which they are interested. They are projecting a future for themselves as a group even though they have not agreed upon what that future will be. Molnar holds that its future is in the next conference--the next forum where ideas would be shared.<sup>36</sup> Hawthorne sees the group as a convivial one, a "group that will last as long as personal needs are being met."<sup>37</sup> The most optimistic, Macdonald, sees the group as "healthy and growing--drawing a lot of talented young folks."<sup>38</sup>

But there is another focus and question. What effect does the group expect to have on the curriculum field and on education? There have been three academic generations of critical theorists in the curriculum field and, as young faculty obtain appointments in large universities, the possibilities for influencing students grows. Most of the persons Benham interviewed were optimistic about the new life that this group could bring to the dying field of curriculum. But Benham observes that as "far as the possibility of making any significant impact on the institution of education is concerned, the reconceptualists are nearly unanimous in the opinion that this is not likely."<sup>39</sup> Michael Apple puts the point even more bluntly:

I don't think the reconceptualists are going to have a major impact on the schools, because I think the schools are doing exactly what they're supposed to be doing, what our society wants them to do.<sup>40</sup>

That is, the schools preserve and transmit the accepted values of American culture. Maxine Greene, too, expresses only modest hope: "I think, just, that individuals can make differences, in their own institutions..."<sup>41</sup> Finally, Decker Walker, a theorist not sympathetic to the critical point of view, sees a longer life for the movement and a stronger ultimate effect than the members themselves envision:

It may be that this sudden growth of popularity of curricular criticism is a temporary phenomenon, perhaps an echo of the John Holt, Paul Goodman, Jonathan Kozol, and Edgar Friedenberg critiques of a few years back or a symptom of the increasing separation of writers on curriculum from those who hold the levers of power over school programs. But my hunch is that curricular criticism will be voiced for at least several more years, long enough, in any event, to require some critical attention itself.<sup>42</sup>

In spite of protest to the contrary, critical curriculum theorists are developing into a formal organization within the field of curriculum. The formation of a journal is convincing evidence of their commitment of energy and finances to the future of the movement. Other members of the curriculum field will be forced to recognize the new orientation in research and, as Walker states, there will be a need for some critical attention to the critical theorists.

### Summary

In the 1970s critical curriculum theorists as a group entered the beginning phases of formalization as a social movement organization. They shared their respective intellectual awakenings through their scholarly presentations. They began to see themselves, however cautiously, as a group, and they engaged in common action in support of their ideas. Most of the collective activity of the participants was an attempt to reflect upon and share their ideas.

In making judgments about the curriculum, critical theorists make judgments about the social, moral, and educational aspects of American life. They have emerged as a social movement protesting the status quo in education and society. But the critical theory movement discussed here is neither a political movement nor disruptive of the structure of society and education. Directed against oppressive thought patterns in an effort to renew educational thinking, the movement is not intended to effect sweeping changes in the social, economic, and political structures of education. The critical theorists were not engaged in radical activities, and only peripherally in school reform, but they did engage in radical questioning in search of new perspectives on curriculum.



## FOOTNOTES

1. Conversation, January 1978.
2. Maxine Greene quoted from interview transcript in Benham, "Curriculum Theory in 1970s," p. 14.
3. Personal correspondence, February 1978.
4. Conversation, January 1978.
5. Michael Apple quoted from interview transcript in Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970s," p. 18.
6. Michael Apple, "On the Educator's Commitment: A Personal Statement," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 89.
7. Pinar, *CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, p. ix.
8. Benham compiled her work in "Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: The Reconceptualist Movement," a paper presented at the Kent State University Curriculum Theory Conference in Kent, Ohio, 1977.
9. Benham interviewed Janet Miller and Donald Bateman at Ohio State University; Madeleine Grumet and William Pinar at the University of Rochester; Maxine Greene at Teachers College, Columbia University; Michael Apple at the University of Wisconsin at Madison; and James Macdonald and Ira Weingarten at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
10. Walker, "Curriculum Realities," p. 300.
11. *IBID.*
12. *IBID.*
13. Correspondence or conversation with: Michael Apple, Donald Bateman, Charles Beegle, B.J. Benham, Michael Diamonti, Carl Glickman, Maxine Greene, Richard Hawthorne, Dorothy Huenecke, Dwayne Huebner, Paul Klohr, James Macdonald, Gordon Marshall, Janet Miller, Alex Molnar, Ross Mooney, Robert Osborn, Wayne Urban, Max Van Manen, and George Willis.
14. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
15. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
16. William F. Pinar, personal correspondence, December 1977.
17. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
18. James B. Macdonald, "Maxine Greene and James Macdonald: Two Views of Curriculum Reconceptualization," interview by B.J. Benham, 1976 (mimeographed), p. 13.
19. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
20. Personal correspondence, December 1977.
21. In her work, *SOCIAL MOVEMENTS*, Roberta Ash clarifies the distinction between movements and movement organizations: "Movements undergo transformations in response to both external pressures and internal processes, which in turn are often triggered by environmental conditions. Most of these transformations are vicissitudes of the movement organizations, the formal structures that tend to be the acting components of the movement." p. 23.
22. Listed in Appendix A.
23. Both Columbia University and Ohio State University have played significant roles in the history of the curriculum field. See Seguel, *THE CURRICULUM FIELD: ITS FORMATIVE YEARS*.
24. The conference locations and chairpersons are listed in Appendix B.
25. (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974).
26. *IBID.*, p. x.
27. Maxine Greene quoted from interview transcript in Benham, "Curriculum Theory in 1970s," p. 6.
28. Alex Molnar and John Zahorik, ed., *CURRICULUM THEORY* (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977).
29. For a more detailed description of the conference and participants see Janet L. Miller, "Curriculum Theory: Multiplicities, Resemblances and Integrations," a paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York, (mimeographed), 11-13, May, 1978.

30. The first issue of the JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING, edited by William Pinar, was mailed in November 1978. Selected papers read at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference comprised the first issue. The journal is published twice yearly, once in the winter and once in the summer.
31. Janet L. Miller, personal correspondence, February 1978.
32. IBID.
33. Critical theorists most frequently publish in EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, the journal of the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development; EDUCATIONAL THEORY, journal of the John Dewey Society and the Philosophy of Education Society; THEORY INTO PRACTICE, educational journal published by the College of Education, Ohio State University; TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, educational journal published by Teachers College, Columbia University, EDUCATIONAL FORUM, published by the Kappa Delta Pi Honorary Society in Education; JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, journal dedicated to the study of educational practice and settings; and CHILDHOOD EDUCATION, journal of the Association for Childhood Education International.
34. For example: Maxine Greene has published in THE HUMANIST, COLLEGE ENGLISH, and the JOURNAL OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION. James Macdonald has published in URBAN REVIEW, the JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION, and ELEMENTARY SCHOOL JOURNAL. Michael Apple has published in COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW, and Dwayne Huebner has published in ANDOVER NEWTON QUARTERLY.
35. Pinar, "Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies," pp. 4-5.
36. Personal conversation, January 1978.
37. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
38. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
39. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in 1970s," p. 20.
40. Michael Apple quoted from interview transcript in Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970s," p. 21.
41. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in 1970s," p. 21.
42. Walker, "Curricular Realities, p. 288.

## CHAPTER III

## Five Curriculum Theorists: The Argument for Heightened Consciousness

Critical curriculum writers emphasized the importance of personal knowledge and life history to the philosophical stance and research orientation of the educational scholar. Several curriculum theorists referred to Michael Polanyi who succinctly expressed their view of knowledge:

This view entails a decisive change in our idea of knowledge. The participation of the knower in shaping his knowledge, which has hitherto been tolerated only as a flaw--a shortcoming to be eliminated from perfect knowledge--is now recognized as the true guide and master of our cognitive powers.<sup>1</sup>

It is imperative to see the five critical theorists presented here as historical individuals, possessing unique ideological and philosophical commitments and personal life histories. Prior to an analysis of their writings as part of the curriculum renewal movement, they are treated individually to clarify four aspects of their contribution to curriculum scholarship: their own descriptions of themselves in relation to education and society; their biographical and educational background; their view of the schools; and their ideas about the curriculum and the curriculum field.

An examination of these five representative critical curriculum theorists provides a view of the diversity among individuals within the group while illustrating an underlying unity among them in their intellectual concerns. Maxine Greene, James B. Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, William Pinar, and Michael Apple are the individuals presented in this chapter.<sup>2</sup> From five unique perspectives these curriculum theorists focus on consciousness. They are eclectic as they borrow ideas and critical methods from the disciplines and apply them to their major concern: how curriculum in the schools affects the quality of life of the student from an individual and social perspective.

In general people have two consciousnesses of their world. One consciousness derives from being an individual, and the second from being part of a social group. Critical curriculum theorists who attempt to address the questions of life in the schools and in society emphasize one or other of these consciousnesses. Within the critical curriculum movement there appears to be a division between the two orientations. It is an artificial division. Some theorists emphasize the spiritual and ethical dimensions of education, personal knowledge, and the need for personal consciousness raising through self-study. Others stress the political analysis of life, community and social institutions, and the need for change in the social structure. But their unity lies in their concern that the student understand the existence of multiple perspectives and the need for choice. This is the heightened consciousness which they all want to bring about.

## Maxine Greene

Maxine Greene is unique among the five writers chosen for this study. She is neither a self-proclaimed "curriculum person" nor a member of the "reconceptualist" group of curriculum theorists.

I would find it almost impossible to classify myself--I don't feel like a curriculum person, so I don't feel like a "reconceptualist!" I don't even understand the first conceptualization! I'm a philosopher and I'm in the arts.<sup>3</sup>

It was not until 1973 that Greene became involved with the group of critical writers at their first conference during which she presented a paper, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum."

We had a colloquium in our department on curriculum, and each of us was asked to contribute something from our own vantage point. So, I wrote a paper called "Curriculum and Consciousness." And it was because of that, that Bill Pinar asked me to that first conference in Rochester in 1973. And I was interested, because the conference title sounded so crazy...and also because I had a chance to do the kind of thing I was interested in.<sup>4</sup>

While many of Greene's works since then have not addressed specifically the topic of curriculum, her perspective was significant in the early formulation of the issues of debate among the critical theorists.

Greene has been involved in what she considers to have been an "embarrassing multiplicity of interests--including social philosophy, history, aesthetics, phenomenology, literature, and now (or so it seems) women's studies."<sup>5</sup> But this multiplicity of interests gives Maxine Greene's writing a perspective that allows her to ask the essential question of how education and teaching maintain the traditional American value of freedom and protect the individuality of the student. She holds the William F. Russell chair at Teachers College, Columbia University, as Professor in the Foundations of Education, a chair dedicated to the study of the implications for education of the American tradition of freedom. But she does not deny her unique point of view in all of this as she describes herself as a "stubbornly loyal, hopelessly provincial New Yorker."<sup>6</sup>

Greene was born in New York City in 1917. She graduated from Barnard in 1938 with a major in history and a minor in philosophy. While quite young she married a doctor, took care of the medical office, and entered politics. She became the Legislative Director of the American Labor Party in Brooklyn. After World War II she returned to school at New York University for an M.A. which she received in 1949. From 1949 to 1954 she was an Instructor in Philosophy and History of Education at New York University. Her interest in philosophy of education led her to write an interdisciplinary dissertation, "Naturalist-Humanism in 18th Century England: An Essay in the Sociology of Knowledge." She obtained her Ph.D. in 1955. Greene continued at NYU as assistant and associate professor until 1962 when she became Associate Professor of Education at Brooklyn College. During that time she taught off-campus literature courses and wrote biographical profiles and book reviews for *SCHOOL AND SOCIETY* and *SATURDAY REVIEW*.

In the early sixties, having developed an interest in multiple ways of knowing, Greene presented several main session papers to the Philosophy of Education Society and held a number of positions which included the presidency, 1966-67. In 1965, she began a five-year editorship of the *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD* as Associate Professor of English at Teachers College. She received an appointment as Professor of English and Educational Philosophy in 1966 and since 1973 has taught at Teachers College in the Division of Philosophy, Social Sciences, and Education.<sup>7</sup>

Greene views herself primarily as a teacher. She combines a passion for understanding the act of teaching with a commitment to existential philosophy in her writings. *EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTERS FOR TEACHERS*, published in 1967, reflects her view that existential thinking was increasingly relevant for teachers and all educators in post World War II American society. She asserts that Americans generally had accepted the myth, or "mystification," that the schools embodied American ideals such as freedom, justice, and equality. However, according to Greene, the schools served to perpetuate situations that were directly opposed to these American ideals. She believes that as more and more Americans realized this, they began to question the rationality of human activity. Greene argues that, having experienced World War II, teachers increasingly became receptive to the way existential philosophers viewed the world and to the ideas that had been so irrelevant in the early twentieth century when confidence in rationality and in the schools had been at a peak.

So long as the traditional confidence prevailed, existentialism was irrelevant to the educational concern. The existential thinker, after all, was reacting to "absurdity," to domains of experience where there could be no effective controls. He was responding to felt ambiguities and silences, to a "darkness" that critical thinking could only graze. Moreover, he was rebelling against the notion of the "ready-made" individual; and the oldest American commitment was defined by an essence, by an abstract vision of a free, perfectible, rational man.<sup>8</sup>

Greene once again addresses teachers in 1973 with *TEACHER AS STRANGER*<sup>9</sup> in which she presents her existentially oriented philosophy of education. *TEACHER AS STRANGER* focuses on the problems, conflicts, and demands that force the teacher to respond to moral dilemmas. Her theme is consistently supportive of the teachers's need to choose. In his 1974 review of *TEACHER AS STRANGER*, Thomas Green observes:

Most of us really don't have moral problems all the time...if we are as aware as Maxine Greene of the turmoil and the moral conflict of the modern world and the demand that we participate in all these issues, then practically every act becomes subject of the anxiety of choice. Indeed

her treatment is so compelling, and so vivid, and so effective in creating a "heightened self-consciousness" that after reading the book I realize that I have many more problems demanding my choice than I thought existed.<sup>10</sup>

At present, Greene is writing a book on moral education based on a Horace Mann Lecture she delivered in 1973. In addition to her books, Greene has published numerous articles on teaching focused on aesthetic education and the teaching of literature, articles in which she has restated her themes of teaching as a personal encounter and personal choice.

Mystification is a second major theme in Greene's work. She defines mystification as a state of unawareness of the basic beliefs supporting one's existence in the world. Among her publications, titles such as "Against Invisibility," "Defying Determinism," "Challenging Mystification," "The Problem of Malefic Generosity," and "Countering Privatism," express her protest against common myths in society and education. Along with other existential thinkers in twentieth century America, she takes a stand against the unexamined assumptions of a society steeped in positivist thinking and social self-righteousness. She sees individuals accepting positivist thought as a universal representation of reality. And within society, oppressive social institutions perpetuate that single view of reality by discouraging consciousness.

It seems evident that the schools encourage immersion, deliberately or unthinkingly. The schools create the kind of reality that absorbs those within it and thereby serves to submerge consciousness. This, fundamentally, is the nature of the oppression they impose.<sup>11</sup>


According to Greene, the schools cannot deny their actual responsibility for perpetuating mystification.

Greene believes that the conscious individual is able to break through mystification by examining basic assumptions and by recognizing the many perspectives in which reality can be viewed. She is convinced that teachers, as individuals apart from institutions, can challenge mystification through teaching for critical thought. The teacher can create "the kinds of conditions that may make possible a critique of what is taken to be 'natural,' of the 'forms of illusion' in which persons feel so 'completely at home,' no matter how alienated they are, how repressed."<sup>12</sup>

Greene's educational position implies both simple and overwhelming consequences for curriculum. In her writings she indicates her resistance to the usual process-product orientation of curriculum. She would have the curriculum consist of experiences that present a multiplicity of views leading the student to a position of choice. In order to humanize the school, the curriculum should be presented in such a fashion that it "signifies live possibility of the student as existing person, concerned to make sense of his own life-world."<sup>13</sup> She feels that the academic disciplines can be presented as occasions for "ordering the materials of experience with the aid of cognitive forms..."<sup>14</sup> rather than as structures of socially prescribed knowledge. Her goal for curriculum, as well as for human existence, is to allow the emergence of individuals from the social forces that submerge their consciousness.

My object is to develop a conception of education oriented to the levels of learning that may enable persons to break with channeling, to affirm themselves as fully conscious, critical beings. More than that, I want to discover ways of arousing individuals from submergence in reality--not only to recover themselves as persons, but to apprehend cultural change as possible and act in concert to remake their world.<sup>15</sup>

Maxine Greene's contribution to the critical curriculum movement is her depth of insight into the meaning of education and her well-articulated philosophy. Her colleagues in education express only high regard for her and her work. One curriculum writer notes that over the years Greene has gradually moved from existentialism to radicalism in her thinking. Indeed she maintains a balance of both in her writing. Her thinking is penetrating and dynamic, not easily dismissed by those who do not share her perspective.



## James B. Macdonald

James Macdonald was born in 1925. Early in his academic career he spent some ten years engaged in empirical research and technical development work in which he claims he was enamored with taxonomics, general systems theory, and technical schemes such as the Tyler Rationale and behavioral objectives. At some point, however, an idealistic impulse--one he describes in terms of justice, equality, and fairness--pressed into his professional consciousness. Education became for him a moral enterprise in which he developed a concern for quality rather than quantity.

In a 1976 interview with B.J. Benham, Macdonald shared the history of his involvement in curriculum theory.

Dwayne Huebner and I started off together in graduate schools at Wisconsin many years ago, and there, Virgil Herrick got us started on curriculum theory--introduced us to the whole area as a possibility, and it caught our imagination. We've been working on it for twenty five years. And for fifteen years, nobody would even talk to us. There were just the two of us. And if you said "curriculum theory" people thought you were crazy. So we just simply learned not to talk about it, except when we were together. We didn't even publish curriculum theory.<sup>16</sup>

Macdonald describes his subsequent work in the field of curriculum as an attempt to combine his personal growth with a meaningful social concern for human issues. Two major themes reappear in his work over the years. One is the desire to construct "intellectually satisfying conceptual maps of the human condition" which are educationally meaningful and personally satisfying. The second is an idealistic hope that people can improve the quality of their existence through changed educational processes and broad new social policy.<sup>17</sup>

James B. Macdonald is presently Distinguished Professor of Education at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. He was formerly Professor of Education and Director of School Experimentation and Research at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee. He has published widely since 1960 in a variety of journals and texts, and has been active in educational reform movements and program development for the public schools. His current interests are in theoretical and theological perspectives in education.

Currently I am pursuing literature in extraordinary experience, mysticism and general spiritual development in human beings to take the developmental position to its full curricular implications.<sup>18</sup>

He has plans for a book entitled THEOLOGY OF EDUCATION.

The writings of Herbert Marcuse have influenced strongly Macdonald's view of society. Macdonald often refers to Marcuse's conceptions of technological rationality and one dimensional thought in his characterization of the existing milieu of American education. Marcuse described technological rationality as the "experience, transformation, and organization of nature as the mere stuff of domination."<sup>19</sup> Macdonald criticizes the mindless acceptance of this way of thinking by educators who are responsible for the everyday lives of students and other teachers in the schools. With respect to education, Macdonald believes that the important point is not the existence of educational technology, such as computers and television, but "(a) the pervading rationality which enters into the way we perceive ourselves, others, the environment, and (b) our orientation to existence."<sup>20</sup> The schools which should be responsible for raising the consciousness of citizens have fallen into a mindless perpetuation of a single mode of rationality--one they have not adequately examined.

It is a mindlessness which does not critically identify the public behaviorist values embodied in the activity of schooling. It is a mindlessness that continues to accept through its practical activity a process by which persons are alienated from one another and from their own potential as human beings.<sup>21</sup>

Macdonald believes that the schools should stand for the values of justice, liberty, and equality against the actual social conditions that reflect inequality and a lack of justice and freedom. Believing that the purpose of the schools is to initiate the young into society, Macdonald argues that this objective of schooling can be

achieved through teaching students to examine themselves and their society critically. But Macdonald charges that activities in the schools unconsciously teach children hidden social values including "...the phenomena of (a) unequal power, (b) living in groups or crowds, and (c) evaluative or judgmental qualities in relation to activity and rewards."<sup>22</sup> He believes that American schools tend to be two-faced and ridden with unspoken assumptions, "more often than not determining operational procedures, which are in conflict with the rhetoric and idealism of American school values."<sup>23</sup>

Believing that schools reflect the larger social system, Macdonald argues that if the culture becomes more humane the schools will eventually reflect that change.

If we wish to get at the root of the problem of schooling, that is, take a radical approach, it would seem to be clear that a cultural reforming is the end goal and that this culture reform must deal directly with human activity in its qualitative aspects.<sup>24</sup>

Macdonald believes that the individual person feels powerless to initiate cultural reform. Like Macdonald, educators who work with youth are distressed watching so many potentially creative individuals become a part of the cultural production and consumer mentality. Naturally, educators turn to the schools to bring about reform. According to Macdonald that same process of humanization is needed in America and schools are perhaps the "only potentially controllable agency for humanization left in society."<sup>25</sup> He contends that the schools can play a major part in buttressing the person against the massive dehumanization of the broader society.

The schools should function to protect the person from dehumanization. They should "culture" the person until he has developed a reasonable sense of integrity and self worth, a coherent set of values and personal goals with which survival in our modern age as a human being is at least possible.<sup>26</sup>

Of all the critical theorists, James Macdonald is the most willing to risk sharing his view that the goal of his work is reform and revolution. In his writing he exhorts others to risk in the same way. He possesses a broad perspective on the relationship between education and cultural crisis and a determined optimism about the ability of people and institutions to face the moral dilemmas of these times.

#### Dwayne Huebner

In 1963 Dwayne Huebner published an article entitled "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man" in which he expressed his interest in language and its use in communication, or as he called it, conversation. He was dismayed at the "compartmentalization of human thought into religious, philosophical and scientific sections, without attempting consciously to compare and evaluate the differing language and symbol categories for the same phenomena or situations..."<sup>27</sup> Huebner hoped that existentialism and linguistic analysis would prove to be two sources of new insights for reducing the barriers to conversations in academe and in the field of education. He pointed out the complementary aspects of these sources:

...the existentialist, by emphasizing the significance of man's relationship to man and the primacy of the communion, conversation, dialogue, or participation with his fellow man, makes it possible for man to value more strongly these personal encounters and provide a language to legitimize conversational acts.

Whereas the existentialist is concerned with the need for a possibility of communication in its many forms, the analyst is concerned with the use of language and assuming his task to be "to get a better understanding of the language we in fact use."<sup>28</sup>

After 1963 Huebner often focused his essays on the meaning of language in education and curriculum studies.

Dwayne Huebner is Professor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia University. Prior to his appointment at Columbia in 1957 he taught as an Assistant Professor at Northern Illinois University for three years. While at Teachers College he served as Principal at Agnes Russell School for two years, from 1963 to 1965, and as Lecturer at Union Theological Seminary from 1970 to 1975. He began publishing in 1960 and in addition



to his published articles he has delivered papers at several conferences on curriculum and teaching.

Born in 1923, Dwayne Huebner describes himself as a child of working class parents and the depression. He began his academic career in the physical sciences in high school where an inspiring chemistry and physics teacher encouraged him. He started college by majoring in chemistry and served as a lab assistant in the local junior college. Huebner entered the armed services and ended up in a program in electrical engineering at Texas A & M where he decided to combine his interests and study nuclear physics. Eventually disillusioned with his own education and the education of some of the people around him, Huebner decided to study teaching.

Huebner entered the elementary education program in the division of the social sciences at Chicago. He received his M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1951. After teaching elementary school for two years, he left feeling that he knew very little about teaching and education. While at Chicago, Huebner met Paul Eberman who invited him to continue graduate studies at Wisconsin. During the third and last year at Wisconsin Huebner spent more of his time in the library catching up on philosophy and developing conceptual skills he had neglected in his past. From that time he considered his intellectual development as subconsciously self-directing and he began to feel increasingly alienated from his colleagues in education. Huebner completed his doctoral work at Wisconsin and received his Ph.D. in 1959.

Following completion of his Ph.D., Huebner taught in a pre-service program and developed an interest in the mystics of the East and West, and in Tillich's theology. By the time he left undergraduate teaching to join the staff at Teachers College, he had stopped reading in the positivistic sciences and had begun to concentrate on existentialism--Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, Jaspers, Sartre, and others. His interest in theology led to a position as advisor in the joint program between Teachers College and Union Theological Seminary in New York.<sup>29</sup>

Huebner's criticism of schools and the field of education is a protest against the unconscious use of commonly accepted language systems that stifle the development of new metaphors for educational discourse. He criticizes the use of psychological and technical language to conceptualize the curriculum:

The invasion of the schools by technique is not symbolized by modern developments in electronic instructional technology. Technique is already firmly, although perhaps not permanently, institutionalized in the means-ends language which guides the educational process.<sup>30</sup>

Education designed on a technological model presents educational experiences as means to an end. Huebner argues that the technological model is only one way of viewing education--a view that has pervaded the schools so deeply that they seemed not to understand it as a value choice.

The educational experiences are a slice of life itself, expressions of the values of people in control. Consequently, they are the meanings that these people impose upon existence.<sup>31</sup>

Huebner argues against the use of "goals and objectives" in educational development. He finds that when educators specify their goals and objectives, ostensibly making explicit the goal of education, they assume no further responsibility except the attainment of those goals and objectives. Huebner claims that educators, in connecting the past and the future through "goals" failed to engage themselves in the present.

Ultimately, according to Huebner, education is a question of power--one that educators would not acknowledge.

If education is talked about as concern for the evolving biography of the person and the evolving history of a community or society, then the phenomenon of power can more easily be lived within. The conflict between the individual and the community becomes a fact of human existence that need not cause neurotic inaction but could create, instead, an awareness of one's freedom to participate in public life. Conflict can free a person to be political, to use power, and to struggle with others over the various manifestations of power.<sup>32</sup>

Conflict among teachers and students is not merely a school phenomenon resulting from the bureaucratic expectations and roles that have become a part of life in the school, but from the real and differing interests of people who have invested their lives in the schools, its maintenance, and its supporting ideologies.

Educators blame the tensions involved in making decisions within the schools on the problems of inefficiency, lack of order, and lack of goals and objectives. But Huebner sees this tension differently:

Today I recognize that the tension between young people and educators--whether functionaries in schools or functionaries in academia--is not a symptom of a problem. The tension between the new, manifest in the lives of the young, and the old, manifest in the already established, is a basic human tension. It exists because men, women, and children do not have a nature. They have only a past and a future which collide in the present. The consequences of that collision are limited by the way power is distributed, exercised in human relationships and controlled by custom and law.<sup>33</sup>

Huebner does believe, however, that all schools can create educational environments directed toward individual creativity and potentiality. He describes those as environments expressing concern for the temporality or historicity of individuals and society.

These environments must encourage the moment of vision, when the past and future are the horizons of the individual's present so that his own potentiality for being is grasped. Education is a manifestation of the historical process, meshing the unfolding biography of the individual with the unfolding history of his society.<sup>34</sup>

In the context of educational critique Huebner identifies five value frameworks from which writers might criticize educational theory: the technical, the political, the scientific, the esthetic, and the ethical. He asserts that the frameworks most used in educational discourse are the technical and scientific with a more unconscious use of the political. Esthetic and ethical critique are neglected by persons doing research in the curriculum field. While claiming that he is presently incapable of developing esthetic and ethical criticism to the depth that is necessary, Huebner outlines some of the possibilities of such study.

The esthetic valuing of educational activity is often completely ignored, perhaps because the educator is not "sufficiently concerned with or knowledgeable about esthetic values or perhaps because esthetic activities are not highly prized today in society.... Valued esthetically, educational activity would be viewed as having symbolic and esthetic meanings."<sup>35</sup> Huebner also believes that educational activity may be examined for its ethical values.

Here the educational activity is viewed primarily as an encounter between man and man, and as ethical categories for valuing his encounter come into being, metaphysical and perhaps religious language becomes the primary vehicle for the legitimation and thinking through of educational activity. The concern in this value category is not on the significance of the educational act for other ends, or the realization of other values, but the value of the educational act per se.<sup>36</sup>

Huebner feels that the study of curriculum is the core of the study of education because the values of the educational environment are expressed in the curriculum. Huebner believes that educators' language should make curricular and educational values explicit, and he has committed himself to the creative act of critically examining the hidden values of educational design. For Huebner, curriculum critique touches the essence of human purpose and meaning.

Educational environment and activity in the schools are symbolic of what man is today and what he wants to be tomorrow. The design of these symbols is a great art. The study of curriculum should be a preparation for this artistry.<sup>37</sup>

In his thinking, Dwayne Huebner combines philosophy, theology, and educational theory. His contribution to critical thought is his view that language frames discourse and creates the questions with which scholars wrestle. In his creative approach to new ways of seeing education he includes ethical and esthetic criticism. While not examining these areas in great depth, Huebner sketches the outline of critical questions in education for at least the next generation of scholars.

In the majority of his works, William Pinar focuses on the cultural shift taking place in American society. That shift is from a concentration on external experience to a concentration on inner experience and personal values. The counter culture of the 1960s and 1970s provides the most impressive evidence of this cultural revolution to Pinar and has strongly influenced his work. He reflects his times and his own values when he states "...I have taken a rather old-fashioned concept in the curriculum field, 'the individual,' and made of it the cohering center of my conception."<sup>38</sup> A shift from teacher-centered or material-centered curriculum to a person-centered focus or inner experience in education is a part of what Pinar considers a new conceptualization in the curriculum field. He sees his ideas following in the tradition of Greene, Macdonald, and Huebner in combining criticism and the development of new ideas in a movement he calls the "reconceptualization."

Born in 1947, Pinar did his undergraduate work at Ohio State University during the 1960s. He recalls the war, the riots on campuses and in the cities, a heightened awareness of racism, classism, and sexism, and personal events involving his family and peers as all contributing to an "extraordinary period" in his life. School was the only constant during that time. Over the first three years of undergraduate study he changed his major from music to English and chose minors in psychology and education. Paul Klohr and Donald Bateman, teachers at Ohio State University, had a profound effect on the development of his thinking.

After graduation, Pinar moved to Long Island to teach for two years in a suburban New York City high school. Paul Klohr introduced him to Dwayne Huebner with whom he did some coursework at Columbia while teaching high school English. During the summer he returned to Ohio State and completed a dissertation which as an attempt to design a psychoanalytically-based humanities curriculum.<sup>39</sup>

After completing the doctorate in 1972, Pinar became a member of the faculty at the Center for the Study of Curriculum and Teaching in the College of Education at the University of Rochester. He began to publish articles on curriculum and the field in 1974. Since then he has edited two publications which set forth the development of the reconceptualists in curriculum theory.

Pinar develops two major themes in his works: heightened consciousness as a central aspect of cultural revolution, and the inner experience of the self as a valid and necessary way of knowing. These themes suggest the nature of his critique of society and the schools. Pinar views both society and the schools as alienating and dehumanizing. He believes that the formation of the 1960s counter-culture was an event that brought to social consciousness the extent to which this was true. "...In one sense, the counter-cultural phenomenon is a response to dehumanized American culture, to the accepted social madness of emptied-out, exteriorized existence...."<sup>40</sup>

Pinar sees the 1960s as a time when a shift in society from a material-centered to a person-centered emphasis occurred. But to translate that shift to curriculum theory or educational theory requires a new approach to research and a new framework of valuing in the educational community. Pinar feels that the field of education and curriculum has no choice but to respond to this shift of values. In his article "Self and Others," he states that a shift in consciousness on the part of educational theorists is first of all a social imperative. According to Pinar, education should liberate people from the social and political oppression of society, oppression that results from the consciousness of the "old culture" and can be lessened by the consciousness that springs from the "new culture."

Political and economic oppression can be traced back to the psychic condition of those involved. In Laingian terms, it is maddened men who oppress others and who permit themselves to be oppressed. It is the self-estranged who are estranged from others, and hence who can manipulate and destroy themselves and others.<sup>41</sup>

In addition, Pinar feels it educationally imperative that the schools emphasize the individual for the sake of survival. He argues that in the academic professions the abandonment of self-study, the loss of the status of the humanities, and the rise of behaviorism all indicate the loss of the individual. Education has ceased to be the vital human institution needed by society and may die unless it renews its perspectives and recognizes the individual as a central focus.

Pinar presents his strongest critique of the schools in his work, "Sanity, Madness, and the School," published in 1975. In this essay he observes that much of the previous criticism by his colleagues has centered on the dehumanizing effect of school experience. He argues that socialization is similar to going mad. Influenced by R.D. Laing and Paulo Freire, Pinar explores how the schooling experience contributes to psychic deterioration.

In "Sanity, Madness, and the School," he lists twelve effects of schooling on the student. These included the hypertrophy or atrophy of fantasy life, the loss of the self to others via modeling, the thwarting of affiliative needs, the turning of self-direction to other-direction, and the atrophy of the capacity to perceive esthetically and sensuously.<sup>42</sup>

The cumulative effect of the schooling experience is devastating. We graduate, credentialed but crazed, erudite but fragmented shells of the human possibility.

What course of action can be recommended to correct this state? ...An intensive adherence to one's "within" forms the basis of renewal strategies.

What configuration of this loyalty to one's subjectivity must take and what such configurations mean for theorists of the process of education are not yet clear.<sup>43</sup>

In his attempt to create a new approach to curriculum, Pinar wants to move away from curriculum as the manipulation and elaboration of artifacts and activities "out there" to an examination backward, toward, and "inside" the learner. To support this new curriculum approach, Pinar uses phenomenology as his research method. He describes his attempt to reconceptualize traditional curriculum theories and practices as a return of processes to their biographic context. He calls his reconceptualized curriculum, *currere*, to indicate "a focus not just on the material contents of the course of study, but the existential experience of studying and living through the course of study."<sup>44</sup> His approach is "...a systematic attempt to reveal...individual life history and the historical moment."<sup>45</sup> Pinar views his approach as complementary to explicitly political efforts to change curriculum.

Pinar wants the curriculum field to synthesize the two opposing orientations of humanities and sciences in the conceptualization of curriculum. He sees such a synthesis as the next step in the evolution of curriculum theory with the present being the time for laying the groundwork.

What appears possible is not only a reconceived and reborn field of curriculum, but the introduction to intellectual life in the university of aspects of the new age. In a certain sense, it is the establishment of a counter-culture within academe, but one which promises to effect a synthesis with the dominant intellectual culture, a synthesis of the humanities and the sciences.<sup>46</sup>

William Pinar's work in the phenomenological method of curriculum research is promising. He takes seriously his conviction that curriculum theorists are reconceptualists-post-critical scholars who are not reacting to the past but who are searching for new syntheses of ideas. He offers to the group the perspective of youth in his profound belief that curriculum theory is the arena for discussing the important education and social questions of the future.

#### Michael Apple

Michael Apple, despite disdain for what on some occasions he calls "vulgar Marxism," allies himself with the tradition of neo-Marxist scholarship. Separating himself from the majority of curriculum researchers whom he views as merely ameliorative in their approach to change in the schools, he describes his neo-Marxist approach as critical scholarship with a "commitment to, and action for, a more just and equal set of social and economic institutions."<sup>47</sup> While remaining close to humanist goals, Apple separates himself from the existentially and humanistically inclined educators who are too concerned with the individual's search for meaning. Apple admits that "more and more I'm beginning to realize that educational problems are not educational problems; they happen to be political and economic problems."<sup>48</sup>

Michael Apple joined the faculty in the Department of Curriculum and Instruction at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1970. Before going to Wisconsin, he completed an M.A. in Curriculum/Philosophy at

Columbia University in 1968 and an Ed.D. in Curriculum in 1970. He began to publish in 1971. Many of his works were in a critical vein addressing such topics as systems management and education, valuing in educational settings, students rights, and ideology and curriculum.

Apple consistently views the schools as part of the knowledge preserving and producing sector of society, and he follows Antonio Gramsci's argument that control of such institutions is a critical element in maintaining the ideological and economic dominance of certain classes and groups in society. Apple makes the connection between knowledge as cultural control and knowledge as economic power the basis for his analysis of the schools and of all education.

Two things are central to this approach. First, it sees schools as caught up in a nexus of other institutions--political, economic, and cultural--that are basically unequal... Second, these inequalities are reinforced and reproduced by schools...<sup>49</sup>

But it is not schools alone that structurally are connected to economic power. Thought about schooling and curriculum design is linked fundamentally to the structure of the social order as Apple points out:

While I would like to avoid a vulgar Marxist interpretation of consciousness, I would take the position that the basic framework of most curriculum rationality is generally supportive and accepting of the existing economic, political and intellectual framework that apportions opportunity in American society.<sup>50</sup>

Apple's critique of the field of curriculum centers on two factors: "the ahistorical nature of most educational activity and the dominance of an ethic of amelioration through technical models in most curriculum discourse."<sup>51</sup> He points out that many recurring historically significant issues have been ignored in curriculum argumentation in the United States. He believes that any serious attempt to understand whose knowledge gets into schools must be historical. "It must begin by seeing current arguments about curriculum, pedagogy, and institutional control as outgrowths of specific historical conditions, as arguments that were and are generated by the role schools have played in our social order."<sup>52</sup>

Apple sees few areas of investigation more pressing than that which seeks to uncover the links between knowledge and control in society's cultural institutions. He asserts that the traditions in the sociology of education and in the curriculum field treat the principles, ideas, and categories that are preserved in educational institutions as relatively neutral. But an alternative tradition does exist.

An alternative tradition, one that has deep roots in the sociology of knowledge and in critical sociology, understands the forms of curricular knowledge somewhat differently. It sees them as potential mechanisms of socio-economic selection and control, and thus interprets them, at least partially through the lens of Marx's dictum.<sup>53</sup>

Apple claims that educators, and particularly curriculum scholars, are responsible for making explicit the values underlying the process and content of school knowledge and especially the values inherent in their own work. He believes that curriculum study should bring to a level of awareness the "latent dysfunctions" of its own scholarship. "Part of the answer, but only part, is to illuminate our political and conceptual orientations. It is possible that the two are considerably interwoven."<sup>54</sup>

But the curriculum field should go even further. Curriculum scholars look at those fields "whose fundamental roles are that of dealing with the provision of checks on power within and among our institutions."<sup>55</sup> This means focusing on economic forces and legal precedents that have a bearing on the schools. Apple emphasizes the need for research in power to study who controls what is thought and done in the schools.

Apple, like Huebner, is concerned about educators who borrow, out of context, the language of other disciplines. Because such educators have little insight into the continuing dialogue in the disciplines they are unable to perceive the dangers of applying them to education. Specifically, Apple criticizes the curriculum field for borrowing the language of "learning" from the field of psychology. To do so is:

apolitical and ahistorical, thus hiding the complex nexus of political and economic power and resources that lies behind a considerable amount of curriculum organization and selection. In

brief, it is not an adequate linguistic tool for dealing with what must be a prior set of curriculum questions about some of the possible ideological roots of school knowledge.<sup>56</sup>

As evident in his critique, Apple is convinced that the future of the curriculum field relies on a progressive movement away from the existing "quasi-scientific" and engineering framework guiding the field's endeavors toward a political and ethical structure.

#### Summary

Although a concern for heightened consciousness is an important element of the writings of the critical theorists, other common subjects recur in their works. Critical theorists describe themselves as individuals dedicated to education. As teachers concerned with the plight of students in the schools, critical theorists consider the attempt to educate to be of such high value that they have given a good portion of their personal time and energy to its renewal.

Although critical theorists do not share the same perspective on the schools, they all feel strongly that one should have a clear understanding of the role of the school in society. Schools may be seen as dehumanizing institutions or as an opportunity to teach love, but the theorists make the point that each way of viewing the schools is a position and a choice.

Finally, curricular critics have a common concern for language in the discourse of education. Because language may obscure the meaning of reality rather than reveal and communicate its meaning, critical theorists are particularly careful in their selection of language to discuss curriculum issues. They do not hesitate to formulate a critique of their colleagues which is based on the mindless use of borrowed language.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Michael Polanyi, *THE STUDY OF MAN* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 26-27.
2. See Appendix C for a list of their selected works and sources.
3. Maxine Greene, "Maxine Greene and James Macdonald: Two Views of Curriculum Reconceptualization," interviewed by B.J. Benham, 1976 (mimeographed), pp. 2-3.
4. *IBID.*, p. 3.
5. Biographical Sketch in *PHI DELTA KAPPAN* (September 1976): 25.
6. *IBID.*
7. Information obtained primarily from Greene's personal statement in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 295-298; and her Curriculum Vitae obtained August, 1978.
8. Maxine Greene, ed., *EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTERS FOR TEACHERS* (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 16.
9. Maxine Greene, *TEACHER AS STRANGER* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973).
10. Thomas F. Green, "An Invitation to Choose," *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 75 (February 1974): 407.
11. Maxine Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum," in *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 74.
12. Maxine Greene, "Challenging Mystifications: Educational Foundation in Dark Times," *EDUCATIONAL STUDIES*, 7 (September 1976): 10.
13. Maxine Greene, "Literature and Visibility," *NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS BULLETIN*, 56 (February 1972): 63.
14. *IBID.*
15. Maxine Greene, "Countering Privatism," *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 24 (Summer 1974): 211.
16. James B. Macdonald, "Maxine Greene and James Macdonald: Two Views of Curriculum Reconceptualization," interviewed by B.J. Benham, 1976 (mimeographed), p. 10.

17. Information obtained primarily from Macdonald's personal statement in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), pp. 3-4.
18. Personal correspondence, January 1978.
19. Herbert Marcuse, *ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. xvi.
20. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Development in Relation to Social and Intellectual Systems," in *THE CURRICULUM RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT*, ed., Robert M. McClure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 102.
21. James B. Macdonald, "Quality of Everyday Life in School," in *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, ed., James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 86.
22. *IBID.*, p. 85.
23. James B. Macdonald, "The School as Double Agent," in *FREEDOM, BUREAUCRACY AND SCHOOLING*, ed., Vernon F. Haubrich (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1972), pp. 235, 244.
24. Macdonald, "Quality of Everyday Life," p. 94.
25. James B. Macdonald, "The Person in the Curriculum," in *PRECEDENTS AND PROMISE IN THE CURRICULUM FIELD*, ed., Helen F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 51.
26. *IBID.*
27. Dwayne Huebner, "New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man," in *NEW INSIGHTS AND THE CURRICULUM*, ed., Alexander Frazier (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1963), p. 163.
28. *IBID.*, p. 162.
29. Information obtained primarily from Huebner's personal statement in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 213-215.
30. Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field of Study," in *PRECEDENTS AND PROMISE IN THE CURRICULUM FIELD*, ed., Helen F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 96.
31. Dwayne Huebner, "The Leadership Role in Curricular Change," in *STRATEGIES FOR PLANNED CURRICULAR INNOVATION*, ed., Marcella R. Lawler (New York: Teachers College Press, 1970), p. 143.
32. Dwayne Huebner, "Toward a Remaking of Curricular Language," in *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, and CURRICULUM THEORY*, ed., William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), pp. 37-38.
33. Dwayne Huebner, "The Contradiction Between the Recreative and the Established," in *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, ed., James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 31.
34. Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 246.
35. Dwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975), pp. 226-227.
36. *IBID.*
37. Huebner, "Curriculum as a Field," p. 112.
38. William Pinar, "Self and Others," in *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, by William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976), p. 16.
39. Information obtained primarily from Pinar's personal statement in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William F. Pinar (Berkeley, McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 357-358.
40. Pinar, "Self and Others," p. 14.
41. *IBID.*, p. 21.

42. William Pinar, "Sanity, Madness, and the School," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed., William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 362-381.
43. *IBID.*, p. 381-382.
44. "Political-Spiritual Dimensions," in *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, by William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1976), p. 106.
45. *IBID.*
46. Pinar, "Self and Others," p. 29.
47. Michael Apple, "Humanism and the Politics of Educational Argumentation," in *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION*, ed. Richard Weller (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), p. 330.
48. Interview with Michael Apple, University of Wisconsin by B.J. Benham, 12 July 1976.
49. Michael W. Apple and Barry M. Franklin, "Curricular History and Social Control," 1978. (Mimeographed), pp. 4-5.
50. Michael Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education," *JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, 66 (September 1972), 10.
51. Michael W. Apple, "Some Aspects of the Relationship Between Economic and Cultural Reproduction." 1978. (Mimeographed), p. 3.
52. Apple, "Curricular History, p. 6.
53. Michael Apple, "Cultural Capital and Educational Transmissions," *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 28 (Winter 1978): 34-35.
54. Apple, "Adequacy of Systems Management," p. 11.
55. Michael Apple, "Justice as a Curricular Concern," in *MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION*, ed., Carl Grant (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977), p. 15.
56. Apple, "Some Aspects of the Relationship," p. 6.

#### CHAPTER IV

##### AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL ROOTS: THE ANTINOMIAN TRADITION

When artists and young people began to perceive a latent violence in American culture and to relate it to the technological system, they did not have to invent an idiom of protest. Like the scientific ideal, like the democratic credo, antiscientism and antirationalism were present in the "great tradition." In other words: the Dionysian impulse, long suppressed by the public view, was secretly challenging the Apollonian force all the time.<sup>1</sup>

Critical theorists are part of the dual heritage of Western thought. Maxine Greene describes the first tradition as one that "emphasizes form, lucidity, intelligence," and the second tradition as one that "stresses subjectivity, sincerity, sensuality."<sup>2</sup> Greene expresses a particular sensitivity to the interplay between both traditions. Yet, the tradition of rationality and form has consistently dominated thinking in America while the tradition of subjectivity and intuition has been a minor one that exerts itself in protest.

In the way they view the world and knowledge and in their values, critical theorists are part of the minority tradition that stands in opposition to mainstream America. They celebrate individual consciousness, pluralism, transcendence, and intuition. They oppose the excesses of the dominant rationality which were evident in the prevailing materialistic, mechanistic, and amoral approach to reality.

An examination of the works of critical curriculum theorists in the framework of American intellectual heritage shows that the values embraced by critical theorists are consonant with a tradition of anti-rationalist impulse in America. Three historical periods exemplify this strain of anti-establishment thinking: the eighteenth century antinomian protests against early Puritan rationalism, the nineteenth century transcendental movement evident in the writings of Emerson, and the early twentieth century synthesis of the rational scientific and intuitive approaches to truth, particularly evident in the writings of William James. These are



only three examples of the tradition of protest and they provide only an impression of the American intellectual heritage of the critical theorists. In their writings, critical theorists express the same themes and criticism of society as the intellectuals who wrote in these three historical periods.

Critical theorists base their epistemology on the individual and his or her experience of the world; they protest rationalism by taking a stance against the effects of scientism in educational theory; and they constitute a group of intellectuals who opposed intellectualism. In these ways, they resemble the antinomian protest within colonial Puritanism.

Critical theorists are anti-institutional, proposing a radical individualism reminiscent of the transcendental movement. They engage in the study of the moral implications of education, wrestling with the contradiction between the life style of the radical individualist intellectual and the requirement of a socially acceptable vocation.

Finally, critical theorists placed a high value on moral and ethical discourse, on pluralism, and on freedom of choice. William James addressed all of these topics in his attempt to synthesize science and rational knowledge with mysticism and intuitive knowledge.

Critical theorists see subject matter in curriculum as a body of knowledge that "awakens" the student to the unexamined assumptions prevalent in contemporary society and acquaints them with the values of the American critical intellectual tradition.

### The Puritan Antinomian Heritage

The legacy of Puritan thought is a dual intellectual heritage Perry Miller described as "the heritage of the troubled spirit and the heritage of worldly caution and social conservatism."<sup>3</sup> The original notion of the organic community with which the Puritans settled in New England was soon challenged by the antinomian and heretical notion that the individual could receive direct inspiration from the spirit. This change challenged the belief that individuals received inspiration mediated through the community of believers. The community of believers in New England rejected the impulse for individualism and freethinking in their efforts to create the new "promised land," the "New Canaan."

Puritanism was an expression of two natures: "a piety, a religious passion, the sense of an inward communication and of the divine symbolism of nature...and an ideal of social conformity, of law and order, or regulation and control."<sup>4</sup>

The dissenting Puritans valued the individual and his or her experiential relationship with God. They protested the idea that God only spoke through the clerics or intellectuals and believed that God worked in each individual. Believing in equality before God, they tried to democratize the power of the clerics and intellectuals. They intended that each individual participate in the divining of God's will. Emphasizing mystical experience and spiritual realities, they formed a stance that was anti-rationalist, anti-mechanist, and anti-materialist.

### Personalism

Critical theorists are interested in understanding education as change in the personal consciousness of the individual. William Pinar articulates the importance of personal experience in his new conception of curriculum which he calls *currere*, the Latin root of "curriculum." To reconceptualize curriculum, Pinar employs the meaning of *currere* in a new sense. "...it is not the course to be run, or the artifacts employed in the running of the course; it is the running of the course."<sup>5</sup> In expressing the importance of experience in his conception of the curriculum, he differs from other scholars who use the word "experience" to refer to activity. He conceives of experience as that which "one senses, one feels, and one thinks: it is, in a word, one's living through of one's life."<sup>6</sup> Pinar believes that the study of curriculum should refer to the "private existential experience" and "lived-world" of the student. Of all the theorists studied here, Pinar is most articulate about his belief that the perceptions of the individual are the primary data for curriculum research.

Along with other theorists, Maxine Greene proposes that the purpose of curriculum is the development of individual consciousness which eventually leads to work in concert with others. The object of her work is to "develop a conception of education oriented to the kinds of learning that may enable persons to break

with channeling, to affirm ourselves as fully conscious, critical beings."<sup>7</sup> Greene asserts that it is only when individuals recover themselves as persons that they are able to see cultural change as possible and then act together to remake their world.

#### Anti-scientism

Critical theorists strongly believe that the issue of esthetic and ethical values should be addressed by curriculum scholars. The contemporary preoccupation with science precludes attention to ethical and esthetic consideration; in rebelling against this state of affairs, critical theorists have developed an anti-scientist rhetoric. Anti-scientism is most evident in their argument against the use of the behavioral sciences and the use of psychological language to describe learning. Convinced that the curriculum field reflects the situation in the totality of education and in the other disciplines, William Pinar comments:

...the curriculum field, from its inception, has been subsumed in the ethos of "scientism", a cult of efficiency and production especially fashionable among businessmen. This unreflective emphasis upon efficiency, production, improvement ("ameliorative orientation" is Kliebard's term), upon behavioral notions of psycho-social and intellectual development molded the nation's schools into, structurally speaking, mirrors of its factories.<sup>8</sup>

The cult of efficiency is not the sole issue distressing the critical theorists. Specifically, they challenge the use of psychological metaphors and language in discussing the learning process. Believing that other disciplinary languages can contribute valuable ethical and esthetic metaphors to conceptions of education, they attack the scientific psychological language of the dominant "learning" orientation in curriculum and education. Michael Apple notes that the "terminology drawn from this psychology and its allied fields is quite inadequate since it neglects or at best tends to draw attention from the basically political and moral character of social existence and human development."<sup>9</sup> Apple would prefer to see educational scholarship deal with the creation and recreation of personal meaning and with the notions of responsibility and justice in conduct with others from a more adequate perspective than learning theory. He finds that the language of "reinforcement, learning, negative feedback and so forth" is a weak tool in dealing with what he considers the continual encroachment of chaos upon order.<sup>10</sup>

After essentially the same analysis, Dwayne Huebner is convinced that the exclusive use of the behavioral and social sciences in education prevents curriculum scholars from dealing with important elements of human existence. These elements included mystery and doubt. Huebner believes that educational theory eventually becomes powerless unless educational scholars broaden the language of their discourse. He observes that "...because we lack an educational poetry which stirs the imagination and harnesses our power we are forced to push our school images, our present school materials and organization to the breaking point, without convictions or results, but with a naive faith in our past ways."<sup>11</sup> For Huebner, science simply is not adequate to deal with the complex reality of human life.

#### Anti-intellectualism

In taking a position against rationalism and scientism, critical theorists are in a sense, anti-intellectual. They attack the use of the intellect in making universal claims about reality and criticize the use of rationality alone as the final arbiter of decisions and valuing. But they never have condemned the use of reason. Leszek Kolakowski clarifies this point in his article, "Intellectuals Against Intellect."

A sharp distinction needs to be drawn between the criticism of the universal aspirations of analytical reason and the properly anti-intellectual criticism based on the idea that in questions where rational discussion and controversy are possible, final decisions depend on social, ethnic, religious, or psychological commitment, and that the object of conflicts is not truth in the current meaning but the function, value, or origin of ideas.<sup>12</sup>

Maxine Greene stresses this distinction as she describes the difference between one who is currently believed to be a rationalist and the phenomenologist as one who begins inquiry with the individual in the midst of everyday

life. Rather than emphasize the constancy of the "pure operation of reason" characteristic of the rationalist, the phenomenologist observes the uniqueness of the individual in studying biography, positing the formation of values by other than rational means. Greene herself believes that the kinds of information one receives in phenomenological inquiry present alternatives to the rationalist view that has often been equated with intellectualism.

Michael Apple describes the basic taken-for-granted view of reason as a conception of rationality based on bringing order to beliefs and concepts within the logical structures that dominate the field of curriculum. He adds that "any serious conception of rationality must be concerned not with the specific intellectual positions a professional group or individual employs at any given time, but instead with the conditions on which and the manner in which this field of study is prepared to criticize and change those accepted doctrines."<sup>13</sup> Concluding that intellectual flux, not intellectual immutability should be the expected and normal occurrence, Apple questions the validity of approaching change in conceptualization as exceptional when "stability or crystallization of the forms of thought" is the less natural occurrence.

Following in the tradition of antinomian thought, critical theorists believe in the democratization of the intellect. They hold that every individual is responsible for critically assessing his or her life situation and for making choices about action and meaning. The intellect and intuition both serve in that assessment.

### The Transcendentalist Heritage

Transcendentalism arose in the nineteenth century continuing the tradition of antinomian protest. Transcendental thought revived the anti-rationalist argument in the form of radical individualism and anti-institutionalism. A fear of the evils brought about by the mechanization of American life led the transcendentalists to propose a world view in which the individual could rise above the material world to assume control of his or her own existence. Material society was not a vehicle but a block to the enlightenment of the individual. Transcendentalists challenged mechanism, materialism, and empiricism possessing a self-consciousness that developed into a state of moral and personal dilemma. The movement was an attempt to reconcile religion with science and industrialism through the creation of a philosophy in which intuition led the mind and thought in the shaping of understanding.

### Intuition

Ralph Waldo Emerson viewed the world as moral but believed that empiricism failed to direct one to truth and morality. Rather, truth and morality were embodied in nature and its apprehension came through the individual's intuition. The process of delving into one's self led to the discovery of truths which went beyond the self. In transcending one's self the individual shared in the unity of the universal.<sup>14</sup>

While the critical theorists might argue with the extreme idealism of transcendentalism--Apple would certainly take issue at this point--they accept the importance and necessity of intuition and introspection as a means of apprehending truth and morality. Pinar speaks of the need for a method in self-understanding, "one that, like psychoanalysis, invites systematic self perusal, but like the meditative disciplines I have used, works in an experiential way to shift the ontological center from exterior to interior."<sup>15</sup> Michael Apple brings another perspective to the group with his critique of the "individualistic" reformers for a lack of political sensitivity. Apple sees consciousness rising from the individual but always in the context of the prevailing social ideology. He cautions critical theorists that political power is not to be forgotten as they look at who can make changes in society. Apple presents the tempering realism that is needed in the approach of the critical writers.

Emphasizing the intuitive approach to knowledge, Greene describes her position as an existentialist as one in which the "cool neutrality of experimental inquiry is usually alien ..as is the search for consensus and something approximating objectivity."<sup>16</sup> The intuitive approach precludes the use of science "largely because scientific thinking is concerned with objectification and excludes the intuitive awareness and the self-encounters required of philosophy."<sup>17</sup>

### Anti-institutionalism

The transcendentalists protested the incursion of technology in a world that was still pre-industrial. Emerson expressed the protest by stating that "...many facts concur to show that we must look deeper for our salvation than to steam, photographs, balloons, or astronomy. These tools have some questionable properties. They are re-agents. Machinery is aggressive. The weaver becomes a web, the machinist a machine..."<sup>18</sup>

Critical theorists, on the other hand, live in a post-industrial society. In protesting a developing technological society that threatens the lived-world of the individual, they are similar to the transcendentalists insofar as they oppose a trend already gaining strong acceptance in society. Too late to protest the movement of technology into life, critical theorists want to find ways to protect the individual until he or she is able to maintain a humane existence within a technological world.

In dealing with the existence of the schools, critical theorists are more ambivalent. They want the schools to be held up for close scrutiny to show how the language and slogans of school people "actually work in a manner that is destructive of ethical rationality and personal political and institutional power."<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, they seem to believe that the school is capable of being a place that protects the person from dehumanization that is the result of the institutionalization of life in all other sectors, a life characterized by a "partially ordered and conditioned set of regimented performances in the modern age."<sup>20</sup>

### The Search for Reconciliation

As the industrial age progressed through the nineteenth century, intellectuals found themselves confronting the increasingly complex problem of reconciling the obvious benefits of the rational approach to science resulting in a technologically improved way of life, and the intuitive approach to knowledge that was giving them a very different message. William James was a philosopher/scientist who tried not to forget the spiritual side of the person.

Finding it important to include the non-intellectual factors in his definition of truth and meaning, William James followed in the antinomian and transcendental traditions. Although committed to scientific endeavor, James distrusted science whenever it threatened to ignore the "intuitive" and experiential side of life, particularly the emotions.

James totally opposed monism, being most deeply impressed not with the unity he found in the world, but with the variety.

The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also.<sup>21</sup>

James believed not only that human freedom was more than an illusion but that determinism nullified morality. In his view free will must be accepted as a postulate in justification of the moral judgment that certain things already done might have been done better.<sup>22</sup>

The pragmatic method was probably the most noted and popularized idea of William James.

Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has every yet assumed... He [the pragmatist] turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from veiled solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power.<sup>23</sup>

James saw pragmatism as a way of making moral choices in a pluralistic world. He also believed in the process of conversion, or what he called being "twice born." He saw that there were two lives to live, the natural and the supernatural with being twice born a movement to a heightened consciousness in which "higher energies filter in."<sup>24</sup>

2000  
1999  
1998  
1997  
1996  
1995  
1994  
1993  
1992  
1991  
1990  
1989  
1988  
1987  
1986  
1985  
1984  
1983  
1982  
1981  
1980  
1979  
1978  
1977  
1976  
1975  
1974  
1973  
1972  
1971  
1970  
1969  
1968  
1967  
1966  
1965  
1964  
1963  
1962  
1961  
1960  
1959  
1958  
1957  
1956  
1955  
1954  
1953  
1952  
1951  
1950  
1949  
1948  
1947  
1946  
1945  
1944  
1943  
1942  
1941  
1940  
1939  
1938  
1937  
1936  
1935  
1934  
1933  
1932  
1931  
1930  
1929  
1928  
1927  
1926  
1925  
1924  
1923  
1922  
1921  
1920  
1919  
1918  
1917  
1916  
1915  
1914  
1913  
1912  
1911  
1910  
1909  
1908  
1907  
1906  
1905  
1904  
1903  
1902  
1901  
1900

to common aspects of reality would be of great benefit for communicating the relatedness of the disciplines to each other.<sup>33</sup>

The critical theorists' conception of multiple perspectives in approaching a subject implies a multiple view of values. Macdonald notes that the American culture contains within it nearly all human values developed throughout western civilization. "Thus, we have not only radical leftist and rightist values, but a broad spectrum of middle positions. The crucial element here is not the selection of a position within this spectrum, but the recognition of the existence of the total range of values."<sup>34</sup>

Michael Apple used this concept of a range or spectrum of values in his approach to "evaluation" in education. He notes that one can give value to an educational activity for its efficiency, for its human qualities, for its embodiment of conflict, ambiguity, and uncertainty, and for its political results. "Hence, it is not naturally predetermined that education should be valued only for its ability to reach our goals adequately and efficiently."<sup>35</sup>

Critical theorists argue that the universities and schools have perpetuated a consciousness of a multiplicity of perspectives, but only within the dominant scientific orientation. Whole new perspectives outside the realm of science are left unexamined and latent in the consciousness of young scholars. Through a lack of commitment to developing critical thinking in students, the scholars perpetuate a consciousness of a spectrum of values within a single unconscious value orientation that is materialistic and consumer-oriented. Under the guise of openness and objectivity, this form of rationality eliminates the possibility of protesting the main value orientation. While leeway or "freedom" is acceptable within the main value orientation and scholarly perspective, protest of the basic questions and world view is dismissed as irrational.<sup>36</sup>

A lack of freedom characterizes the way teachers and professors view the choices they make in taking a position on knowledge and society. A mystified conception of knowledge submerges the traditions of critique, and educators seem to see the only "real" choices to be between the tradition of technological thought and efficiency and the tradition of humanism. This fact speaks less to the importance of the choice than it does to Americans' utter inability to preserve viable alternative social and educational traditions. For example, in the United States, as Apple points out, there is a lack of understanding of the socialist humanist tradition and its possible alternative contribution to education.

There is no serious attempt in the media, in schools, in teacher-training institutions, or in society's cultural apparatus in general to document the long and valuable history of what might be called socialist humanism in the United States. Since this tradition is simply not preserved or readily available to both the populace at large or to professional educators, it is nearly impossible for committed individuals to affiliate with it. One has no choice but to choose between a concern for inputs and outputs or a vague romantic individualism. Thus, a perspective that offers a uniquely potent mode of analysis and an agenda for coordinated action in the economic, political, and educational sectors of a society, one that may enable us to see where ameliorative changes are realistically possible and where more major structural alterations in our institutions are necessary, cannot be turned to.<sup>37</sup>

Macdonald feels that scholarship in the critical vein is crucial for the curriculum field in particular because it develops, as a whole, from a variety of contributed sources. He finds that, true to the American faith in democracy, curriculums are built relying upon participation from several sectors of society, each contributing an intellectual perspective and value commitment.

Cultural pluralism in curriculum development is in many ways a truer reflection of the reality of how curriculum development takes place than are the broad-scale technical planning efforts. It does not fall into the acceptance of the myth of rational control of social and intellectual forces which influence development. Further it preserves at least on the surface a community mediation and participation which touches some of our deepest democratic value commitments.<sup>38</sup>

For curriculum theorists, a multiplicity of views requires critical scholars who bring to consciousness the hidden value assumptions of existing forms of curriculum in contemporary society.

## Anti-Behaviorism

Believing in moral choice and freedom for the individual in a plural world, the critical theorists take a strong stand against determinism and behaviorism. Along with the other theorists, Maxine Greene deplores the latent behaviorism and determinism that she finds in the literature of America as she encounters "people who feel themselves manipulated by an incomprehensible system--and who feel, at the same time, uneasy, as if somehow they could have had something to say."<sup>39</sup> Greene believes that individuals can make choices and she sees the ability to choose defying the whole conception of determinism.

To defy determinism, then, is to become fully conscious of one's freedom--with all its risks, with all its dread responsibilities. It is to break with the crowd, to know one's own inwardness, to be wide-awake with respect to the world around and its "iron laws," its limitations, its causes which need not compel.<sup>40</sup>

Greene believes that education or learning will only happen when students make the choice and put themselves in a position to learn and be committed to act upon their world.

From another perspective, Apple attacks behaviorism as it manifests itself in the notions of efficiency and control in educational thinking, particularly in the guise of behavioral objectives. He believes that one can value predetermined behavioral objectives for their supposed ability to lead to measurable outcomes, "however, the very notion that such reductive and atomistic curricular formulations are worthwhile educationally in themselves is an arguable assertion to say the least."<sup>41</sup> Apple further noted that behavioral objectives embody an "ideology of control" in placing a value on certainty above all else. Behavioral objectives are "inaccurate representations of and trivialize the process of inquiry..." and they are "psychologically and philosophically naive."<sup>42</sup>

Illuminating the thinking of critical theorists in the framework of the intellectual tradition of anti-intellectual protest in America connects the theorists to their American intellectual roots. Critical theorists have developed their thinking within the continuing American intellectual tradition that values personalism, intuition, pluralism, and freedom. Seeing such themes as important enough to be revived again and again, critical theorists manifest such a revival in the field of curriculum.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Maxine Greene, *TEACHER AS STRANGER* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1973), p. 112.
2. *IBID.*
3. Perry Miller, *ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 192.
4. See Miller's *ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS*, p. 192. In reference to religious passion, Miller further stated that one side of the Puritan nature "hungered for these excitements; certain of its appetites desired these satisfactions and therefore found delight and ecstasy in the doctrines of regeneration and providence... At the core of the theology there was an indestructible element which was mystical, and a feeling for the universe which was almost pantheistic; but there was also a social code demanding obedience to external law..."
5. William Pinar, "Self and Others," in *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, by William Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976), p. 18.
6. *IBID.*
7. Maxine Greene, "Countering Privatism," *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 24 (Summer 1974): 211.
8. William Pinar, "What is the Reconceptualization?" a paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, 11-14 May 1978, (mimeographed), p. 5.

9. Michael Apple, "Common-Sense Categories and Curriculum Thought," in *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, ed. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975).
10. *IBID.*
11. Dwayne Huebner, "Poetry and Power: The Politics of Curricular Development," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 275.
12. Leszek Kolakowski, "Intellectuals Against Intellect," in *INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION, Part II*, ed. Samuel N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 4-5.
13. Michael Apple, "Common-Sense Categories and Curriculum Thought," *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING* (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 121.
14. See Ralph W. Emerson, *SELECTED ESSAYS, LECTURES, AND POEMS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON*, ed. Robert E. Spiller (New York: Washington Square Press; Pocket Books, 1965).
15. Pinar, "Self and Others," pp. 14-15.
16. Maxine Greene, *TEACHER AS STRANGER* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1973), p. 137.
17. *IBID.*
18. Quoted from Emerson's *Works and Days* in Frederick Mayer, *AMERICAN IDEAS AND EDUCATION* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1964), p. 175.
19. Michael Apple, "Common-Sense Categories," p. 126.
20. Macdonald, "Person in Curriculum," p. 52.
21. William James, *THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE* (New York: New American Library; Mentor Books, 1958), p. 391.
22. Cynthia Eagle Russett, *DARWIN IN AMERICA* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976), p. 74.
23. William James, *PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS* (New York: Washington Square Press, Pocket Books, 1963), p. 25.
24. James, *VARIETIES*, p. 391.
25. James B. Macdonald, "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education," in *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 99.
26. Pinar, "Self and Others," p. 21.
27. Charles Beegle, Personal Correspondence, February 1978.
28. Michael Polanyi, *THE STUDY OF MAN* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 16-17. Polanyi described two kinds of knowledge: explicit knowledge, or that which is usually set out in written words, maps, or formulae; and tacit knowledge, that unformulated knowledge of the fact that one is performing an act or doing something. "The essential logical difference between the two kinds of knowledge lies in the fact that we can critically reflect on something explicitly stated, in a way in which we cannot reflect on our tacit awareness of an experience... Inarticulate intelligence can only grope its way by plunging from one view of things into another. Knowledge acquired and held in this manner may therefore be called a-critical." Polanyi asserted that the tacit personal component of knowledge dominated all human thought. He opposed the common acceptance of the perfect objectivity of knowledge.
29. *IBID.*, p. 27.
30. James Macdonald, "Language, Meaning and Motivation," in *LANGUAGE AND MEANING*, ed. with Robert R. Leeper, (Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1966), p. 4.
31. Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 314.
32. Apple, "Common-Sense Categories," p. 124.



33. James B. Macdonald, "The Person in the Curriculum," in PRECEDENTS AND PROMISE IN THE CURRICULUM FIELD, ed. Helen F. Robison (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966), p. 45.
34. James B. Macdonald, "An Evaluation of Evaluation," in URBAN REVIEW, 7 (January 1974): 4.
35. Michael Apple, "The Process and Ideology of Valuing in Educational Settings," in EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: ANALYSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY, ed. Michael Apple, Michael J. Subkomak, and Henry S. Lufler, Jr., (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 8.
36. Critical theorists, particularly Macdonald have used Herbert Marcuse's ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN to develop some of their thinking in this line.
37. Michael Apple, "Humanism and the Politics of Educational Argumentation," in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION, ed. Richard Weller (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), p. 317.
38. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Development in Relation to Social and Intellectual Systems," in THE CURRICULUM RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, ed. Robert M. McClure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 111.
39. Maxine Greene, "Defying Determinism," TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD, 74 (December 1972): 153.
40. IBID., p. 154.
41. Apple, "The Process and Ideology, p. 11.
42. IBID.

## CHAPTER V

### THE SECULAR CURRICULUM REVIVAL: A METAPHOR FOR RENEWAL

Although they were steeped in the values of American life the critical theorists nevertheless failed to find an American intellectual tradition through which to express their thoughts and ideas. As a base for renewal in educational theory and society, they turned to European traditions--existentialism and Marxism. Placed in the context of the American educational and social experience and given an American form of expression by the critical theorists--that of a revival--European existentialism and Marxism became Americanized by them.

Several critical theorists particularly are attracted to existentialism, focusing on the individual person's consciousness as the agent for change in the world. Emphasizing the human condition, they protest the alienating effect of technological rationality, positivistic values and behaviorism which rob the individual of consciousness and recognition of free choice. Pinar places the individual at the center of his theoretical conception and proposes that curriculum scholars study human consciousness through phenomenology including biography and autobiography. Greene believes curriculum should bring the individual person to consciousness or "wide-awakeness," and from there to a recognition of free choice.

A second wing of the critical curriculum theorists bases its thought on a structural approach to change rooted in Marxism. This group begins with the individual grounded in the conditions of the material world rather than in the inner experience. For these critical theorists society alienates people from their labor, from other people, and finally, from themselves. The Marxist theorists view social institutions as mechanisms for preserving class interest and assuring the status quo by socializing people and effectively reproducing the social order through successive generations. The neo-Marxist critical theorists particularly challenge the injustices inherent in educational structures and lament the ahistorical approach to educational theory which unconsciously supports those structures. These critical theorists use classic social analysis<sup>1</sup> in educational theory and the study of curriculum.

Some writers have noted a wave of humanism beginning in the 1960s as a response to a feeling of possible physical and spiritual extinction.<sup>2</sup> The remnants of this humanistic wave of the 1960s can be traced through such groups as the critical curriculum theorists in the 1970s.

The critical curriculum theorists in their humanism seek to conserve and affirm traditional American values: equality, liberty, justice, morality, individualism, community, democracy, and transcendence, and they do not hesitate to attack society and the schools for undermining these American ideals. But affirming these values

in the context of twentieth century America, a nation in which scientific philosophy and technological rationality prevail, results in what is perceived to be a radical stance.

While the critical curriculum theorists look to existentialism and Marxism for their intellectual roots, they synthesize those traditions into an American humanism. The form of expression they give to their humanistic movement is not radical but thoroughly American and rooted in the American tradition of the revival. Not only are the present conditions for the appearance of the critical curriculum movement similar to the historic conditions of American revivals, but the critical curriculum theorists are assuming the stylistic form of a revival.

On the other hand, critical theorists are not proposing a return to religion, nor are they religious in any traditional sense of the word. Holding the ideals and values traditionally esteemed by Americans, they participate in a secular revival.<sup>3</sup>

For some curriculum theorists, participation in a revival movement to renew the curriculum field is an unconscious action; for others there is an awareness of the similarity in form between the critical curriculum movement and religious fervor.<sup>4</sup> Their revival is neither a mass movement nor is it spontaneous but rather it has occurred as a response to changing conditions in society calling for a renewal beyond reform.

In his research on revivalism, William McLoughlin asserts that the key to all of America's revivals is "not in the sincerity of the personal talent of the revivalist, but in the social and theological milieu in which he works."<sup>5</sup> Critical theorists have worked in a social and educational milieu within the last two decades which resembles the milieu that typically has given rise to revival movements in the religious-theological sphere. The 1960s have provided an intellectual reorientation within education with the acceptance of behavioral objectives, performance contracting, and competency-base education. Within education there has been a conflict among scholars as to the ultimate direction that the schools should take.<sup>6</sup> Education is also in the process of balancing its credibility among certain constituencies. Yet the nation as a whole retains a faith in education to solve the social problems of the country.

Curriculum theorists have adopted a style of writing, interacting, and speaking that is characterized by some elements of revivalism. They are plain and direct in their speaking as is the style of revival sermons. Like revivalists they tend to be moralistic in their approach. Their message is one of conversion couched in the terms of heightened consciousness. Their goal for change is the curious revivalist mixture of a radical spiritual conversion combined with social reform from within existing institutions.

#### Conditions for Revival: Social and Educational Crisis

Critical curriculum theorists, together with most Americans, are confronting a reorientation in American values arising out of the social and cultural crises of the past two decades. As scholars, they search for ways of integrating the developing new conceptions of the world with the actual conditions in society. Many critical writers have sensed an unease in contemporary life--an unease in response to some inner sense which has not reached full consciousness in most people but which leads to a quest for liberation from the experiences of a modernized society. Peter Berger names the quest "de-modernization," and Maxine Greene adds her view that the quest entails a rejection of the engineering mentality, of efficiency and compartmentalization and of predefined goals.

It may signify a growing perception by young people that these things compose an alien reality, in fact a mode of oppression. I think few would disagree that there are multiple signs of a persisting malaise, even among those remaining in our institutions. There is a sense of powerlessness expressed in cynicism and privatism, a loss of trust tinged with despair.<sup>7</sup>

Curriculum theorists have examined American life within their own special context of teaching and curriculum and have concluded that American society devalues personal choice, responsibility, and human community. They see the schools as an extension of a social system out of touch with the real desires and dreams of the American people. Society and the schools have alienated people who eventually have begun to wonder why they feel separated and why they sense a contradiction between what they accept as a possibility in

American life and what they actually experience. The increasing consciousness of this contradiction fore-shadows a crisis in confidence about dominant American institutions such as the family, government, and education.

Clearly evident to Macdonald is the crisis caused by the common acceptance of the rationalist approach to life. "Essentially it is a process of objectifying all phenomena, abstracting from reality some bit of matter, event, or behavior and manipulating reality as if this objective part of it were all there were."<sup>8</sup> This approach to reality leads to an environment in which technological rationality can prevail. It is an intellectual orientation that is in fact "so pervasive an influence encountered so early that it is taken to be almost the 'natural' way of thinking about the world for many Americans and Western Europeans."<sup>9</sup>

Michael Apple views the present crisis as a time of questioning the basic ground rules with which people operate in society. In non-crisis periods individuals exercise their rights of choice within the basic social framework without ever questioning the rules.

Normally, we do not even focus on the broader constitutive rules, though this is changing today given the important process of consciousness raising among women (and, of course, men). In fact, it usually takes a crisis of some sort to bring these basic rules to a level of consciousness. This is rather important for it should be clear that a crisis has arisen in education, one which raises significant questions about the very base on which schoolmen operate.<sup>10</sup>

For Apple, student revolt is an "expression of alienation from the imposition of obligatory meaning structures. The students are often challenging constitutive rules, not preferences within them."<sup>11</sup>

Pinar, along with other critical theorists, argues that the dislocation of young students and others from ostensibly outer and public forms of experience to a search for inner or private experience is the central aspect of the post-industrial age. While Pinar emphasizes the role of studying inner experience, he does not represent the entire movement. Several members adhere to an analysis similar to that of Michael Apple in which social structures are important entities to be examined in the context of curriculum studies.

While the theorists may disagree over points of analysis, they agree that the sociologists and social reformers of the 1960s failed to respond to the physical and spiritual crises of their decade. Many Americans share in the disillusionment of the theorists. A sense of alienation is evident in a loss of credibility on the part of government both to address social problems and to act in moral ways.

In the 1950s and 1960s Americans viewed schools as the institutions which could remedy undesirable situations in society including the need for a developed technology and the need to close the gap in poverty, unemployment, and inequality. Educators and the general public possessed a deep faith in the ability of the school as a reform agency. The failure of the schools to reform society resulted in disenchantment. The purpose of education and the schools was challenged both from within and without.

Having triumphed over the traditionalists in the early 1960s, the conceptual-empiricists faced an assault from a new quarter in the 1970s--the critical theorists. In their challenge, the critical theorists assumed the role of restoring faith and credibility to society and the schools through a renewal in the curriculum field. If revived, education could once again show the way not as "a passive mirror, but an active force."<sup>12</sup> Macdonald emphasizes the need for the kind of place education provides.

The critical point, and the place where education appears to become a crucial part of the picture is the necessity for some societal arrangements whereby alternative life style options in relation to individual needs are made known; rational thinking about alternatives takes place; and value clarification, development, and selection result in personal choice.<sup>13</sup>

### The Revival Style

Critical theorists have adopted three aspects of a revivalist style which offer substantive direction for the analysis of their movement. These are preaching as the way of spreading the message of the movement; conversion of the individual to a new heart as the goal of the movement; and a spirit of social reform from within, always moralistic, and rarely radical in approach.

Curriculum theorists are not preachers in the religious sense, nor have they ever stated in their writing and teaching that they perceive their work as a missionary act of converting the masses to their point of view. Rarely addressing the issue of liberal reform versus radical restructuring in society, they consciously act out the role of scholar and intellectual both within their field and within the university.

The use of meaningful language is the essence of preaching. Critical theorists often speak of the need for language to be clear and to express the message of the writer without confusion. Yet, in their attempt to maintain a forum in their discipline and in the university, they sometimes find themselves forced to speak in the rhetoric of the social sciences or not to speak at all. B.J. Benham notes that at the May 1978 conference at RIT, the final discussion among participants centered on the need to "speak clearly" in one's own voice.

As a minority challenging the schools and their own colleagues, the critical theorists find themselves in the uncomfortable position of defending and advocating their own theories in an environment which rejects advocacy. Their colleagues in the university label the critical theorists as partisan and accuse them of attempting to convert the school people and society to their position. Caught in the dilemma of partisanship the critical theorists refuse to see themselves as reformers. Rather they prefer to view themselves as scholar-intellectuals developing curriculum theory in an objective manner. The exception to this position is Macdonald who sees himself and others as radical revolutionaries committed to reform.

Although critical theorists consciously attempt to accommodate to the university and to their colleagues, thereby maintaining their forum, they unconsciously assume the form and style of preachers and missionaries in their zeal to revive curriculum.

#### Preaching

Essential to preaching is a commitment to a message, and critical theorists possess such commitment. They believe that no intellectual position and no research is neutral. They protest the seeming neutrality of the scientific outlook. James Macdonald expresses the style of critical theorists in his strong statement for commitment to human fullness. "Curriculum theory should be committed, not neutral. It should be committed to human fullness in creation, direction, and use. All of man's rational potential should be committed to these processes and goals in curriculum theorizing."<sup>14</sup> The commitment of these theorists is most evident in the moralistic style and content of their writings. Their commitment is a willingness to choose a value stance and use it in their writing and teaching. Their message includes not only the direction in which curriculum studies should go but the style and use of language in the formulation of ideas as ways of viewing the world. The writings of the critical theorists resemble the sermons preached by revivalists in two ways: their style is similar to the plain-speaking Puritan sermon; and their content is based on a committed, moralistic stance.

The sermon, as a form of literature or aural experience, developed in early America from the plain language and sober style of Puritan preaching. Even though emotionalism was one of the trademarks of the revival, preachers relied on that which could be comprehended cognitively--the word. As revivalism developed, the tendency to speak in a language that was concrete and understandable to the common people prevailed. Aside from sometimes intensely emotional outbreaks, revivalists espoused a logical style of preaching that can be compared to a lawyer stating a case. They used variations in bringing the message of conversion to the people, affectionately exhorting them to change, preaching in the vernacular with short simple sentences, and telling vivid and concrete stories.<sup>15</sup>

Critical curriculum theorists emphasize the need of educational theorists to speak in a plain and unaffected language. They attempt to write in plain style with remarkably little use of the jargon and technical language of the disciplines. They criticize the adoption of language borrowed from one discipline to another without an acknowledgement of the original context. Some critical theorists believe that certain language usages contribute to the maintenance of oppressive social structures. William Pinar argues that recognizing one's "complicity in the maintenance of oppressive social structures is work contiguous with discovering one's own voice, one's own language and views of others, and discovering, in phenomenological terms, the 'things themselves.'"<sup>16</sup>

In the same vein, Michael Apple points out that it is important to examine what language says and what it does.

. . .the meaning of language depends on its use. Now language can be used to present evidence, to describe, and so forth. It can also be used for affiliative purposes, as a mode of linking oneself and one's audience together with a tradition... When one employs a language, hence, one is not merely saying such and such is or is not the case; one is also affiliating with those groups who generated the linguistic system in the first place. Thus, the language we use to deal with our problems is not necessarily neutral. Because of these affiliations, language may covertly support those groups and institutions that created the problem that the users are trying to solve in the first place.<sup>17</sup>

Apple believes language can be used to describe and perpetuate an affiliation among educators based on an ideological position. Language, in effect, has been used in the past to create a new rationality. He observes that during the Progressive reforms, educators acknowledged that the once accepted moral order had broken down. The meanings that had tied people together had to be laid on a new foundation. So they formulated a new way of speaking of education that brought them together. At that time, the "rationality of science and technology was an ideal device to create a new set of meanings, a new vision of the 'sacred,' if you will, that would rebuild the affiliative bonds that had become so fragile."<sup>18</sup>

Dwayne Huebner summarizes the views of critical theorists when he suggests six categories of language usage in curriculum--descriptive, explanatory, controlling, legitimating, prescriptive, and affiliative. These usages are not discrete but point to ways curricularists "speak" in a variety of situations. Huebner sees the purpose of the speaker or writer as an important part of the choice of language. Since the speaker's intention is part of the statement, the language is never value-free.

Language is never found ready-made in the world of nature. It is a man-made phenomenon, and its source is the creative efforts of people. Furthermore, it is never a complete or finished system or tool of man; it is always in the process of being recreated, which means that it is criticized and scrutinized in a variety of ways, parts of it are dropped from usage, and new usages and terminologies are introduced. It is an evolving form, and thus has a history or past that can be articulated.<sup>19</sup>

While the early ideal of Puritan preaching was to present the word of God and allow it to work in the individual, religious revivalists quickly seized the opportunity to preach on the right and wrong of human activities in ways that often turned into crusades against the moral problems of the times.

In a similar way curriculum theorists have begun a crusade for the rights of the individual, for a world where individual growth and fulfillment are as important as economic growth and social stability. Critical theorists preach their idealistic hopes to students and share their ideas among themselves. They believe it is possible to create a world in which the individual person is valued above the collectivity; where the social purpose is to protect and cherish human life; and where the interests of power and control are directed to the fulfillment of the individual.

### Conversion

In the American experience, a revival is a social movement to reawaken religious faith in the participant. It is an anti-intellectual movement based on personal experience of the individual, usually an irrational conversion. Because it deals with experience outside the realm of the intellect, revivalism as a metaphor has held little interest for educators who have searched for language to express their efforts to recreate educational goals and revitalize schools.

Critical curriculum theorists use a variety of terms to describe the experience of conversion. Greene uses "demystification" and "wide-awakeness," Huebner uses "awareness of possibilities" and Pinar uses "heightened

consciousness." Several critical theorists, without using Paulo Freire's term "consciousness-raising," nevertheless claim Freire's conception of consciousness-raising to be central to their theories. Peter Berger emphasizes that Freire's act of "consciousness-raising" is better understood as an act of conversion:

The process may be welcomed or deplored. But it is not very helpful to call it "consciousness-raising." A better term would be conversion, and a very good way of understanding anyone claiming to raise the consciousness of other people is to see him as a missionary.<sup>20</sup>

Decker Walker also finds that the critical theorists have proposed reforms requiring a change of heart which he calls conversion.

Basically, the message of these critics is the schools must be made less bureaucratic, more humane, and more equitable. Thousands of coordinated changes, major and minor, will be needed to accomplish this, but before these changes become feasible, many minds and hearts will have to be reached and changed. So the racial critic attempts the conversion of his reader by the persuasiveness of his case and eloquence of his appeal.<sup>21</sup>

Critical theorists argue that American society and the schools ignore the activity of reflective social critique--consciousness-raising. The increasing submersion of the person into an unquestioning acceptance of the unspoken assumptions of a technological society and in social myths that have no basis in fact are important evidence of the lack of critical thinking. Greene asserts that in this society, "most people are too immersed in daily life to be aware of how they constitute their world."<sup>22</sup>

Greene uses the term "mystification" to mean the acceptance of "norms we've heard for years as facts." Unexamined myths recede further from human consciousness as time passes. Eventually people stop examining actual situations and are content to believe that their ideals are being realized in the schools. This has happened to such traditionally accepted values as equality and liberty. To regain equality and liberty people must recognize their subjugation by the schools. That act of recognition is the act of conversion or what Greene calls "wide-awakeness."

To serve human beings in an educational domain is to set them free to reflect, to criticize, to come to know--most particularly their own reality. I think that the way to counteract privatism and powerlessness is to act in the name of consciousness and wide-awakeness.<sup>23</sup>

As the act of conversion is necessary to an individual as prelude to a new life or a new vision, so Michael Apple finds that the act of consciousness-raising is important as a prelude to active change in society. "It would seem important to note that not only is an understanding of existing reality a necessary condition for changing it, but it is a major (and perhaps the major) step in actually effecting this reconstruction."<sup>24</sup>

Whether they name it heightened consciousness, wide-awakeness, or demystification, the critical theorists all believe in the need for a change in the consciousness of Americans. The theorists believe a change of consciousness to be the necessary prelude to reviving human freedom, equality, and morality.

#### Reform from Within

Critical curriculum theorists hold the belief that they can be most effective in the schools and in educational theory by working within the structure of education and the university. This choice follows in the tradition of the American religious revival. Since the beginning of American revivalism, the institutional churches have accommodated revival movements without subsuming them. At the same time, revivalists have rarely been totally separatist. They prefer to remain a spiritual force within the church keeping alive the spirit of renewal.

Historically, revivalism has served to strengthen lay-persons in the church. It gave them a feeling of control over religion outside clerical circles and also gave them access to the spiritual realm. Similarly, the secular curriculum revival has within it the potential of strengthening the position of the student and the teacher. It makes teachers and students conscious of their position in the schools as well as of the values permeating

their daily lives. With that recognition, teachers and students can begin to take control of a system which has controlled them through its certainty, its incomprehensible language, and its false objectivity.

Critical curriculum theorists have remained within the university system as university professors in prestigious schools of education. They have published, formed a journal, gained status and prestige within professional organizations and have participated in professional activities. They remain in the precarious position of critic within. They never have disavowed the university structure, but continued to teach and keep alive a movement of continuous renewal.

The critical theorists did not propose radical action in the social sphere. They were conservative in the sense of preserving what they considered to be the best aspects of the schools. Their approach was to change how teachers advised in the schools, how scholars did research in curriculum and schools, how students perceived themselves, and how the public perceived power in the schools. They remained less interested in how to create a "school-less" society or a new educational structure. In this sense they were not revolutionary and barely reformist.

Though critical theorists appeared in a period of history that was conducive to revivals of many kinds, they did not search for their historical roots in the early American preachers and in the theological debates of the American churches. They borrowed from the European traditions of existentialism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and Marxism, and gave those traditions an American expression in a secularized version of a religious revival.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. C. Wright Mills defines this approach as one in which the essential feature is a concern with historical social structures and the problems of this approach are of direct relevance to urgent public issues and insistent human troubles. See his book, *THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959; paperback reprint, 1973), p. 21.

2. Erich Fromm, "Foreward," in *KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY*, ed. T.B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, trans. T.B. Bottomore (London: C.A. Watts and Co., Ltd., 1956; reprint ed., New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. xvi. This resurgent group of humanists, sympathetic to both Marxism and existentialism protested: "the threat of mankind's physical existence by nuclear war, and the threat to his spiritual existence by the increasing automatization, bureaucratization and alienation of man. Against this threat to man a new wave of humanist thought and feeling is moving. The representatives of the new humanism are still in the minority in their respective camps. Yet their voice is heard with ever-increasing clarity."

3. See Will Herberg, "America's Civil Religion: What It Is and Whence It Comes," in *AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION*, ed. Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), pp. 76-88. Herberg describes the "organic structure of ideas, values and beliefs that constitute a faith common to Americans as Americans, and is genuinely operative in their lives," as American civil religion. "It seems to me that a realistic appraisal of the values, ideas, and behavior of the American people leads to the conclusion that Americans, by and large, find this 'common religion' in the system familiarly known as the American Way of Life."

Herberg's view of civil religion affirms a "belief in a Supreme Being, in which Americans are virtually unanimous..." He mentions "idealism and moralism: For Americans, every serious national effort is a 'crusade' and every serious national position a high moral issue. Among Americans, the supreme value of the individual takes its place high in the spiritual vision of America's civil religion. Above all, there is the extraordinarily high valuation Americans place on religion. The basic ethos of America's civil religion is quite familiar: the American Way is dynamic, optimistic, pragmatic, individualistic, egalitarian, in the sense of feeling uneasy at any overtly manifested mark of the inequalities endemic in our society as in every other society; and pluralistic, in the sense of being impatient with the attempt of any movement, cause, or institution to take in "too much ground," as the familiar phrase has it. Culturally, the American Way exhibits an intense faith in education, significantly coupled with a disparagement of culture in the aesthetic sense..." (*"America's Civil Religion,"* pp. 77-79).

4. James Macdonald does appear to have made a connection between the critical curriculum thinkers and religious fervor.
5. BILLY GRAHAM: REVIVALIST IN A SECULAR AGE (New York: The Ronald Press, 1960), p. 7. McLoughlin lists four major conditions that contributed to the formation of revivals in the history of America: there was a grave theological reorientation within the churches invariably connected with a general intellectual reorientation in society at large; there was conflict among clerics associated with the reorientation in which personalities played a part; there was a particularly grave sense of social and spiritual cleavage within the institutions and between the institutions and society flowing from a welling up of dissatisfaction with the prevailing order; and there was a feeling on the part of those outside the institution that Christianity had a particular relevance to their contemporary situation both individually and corporately.
6. Within the history of education, radical revisionist approaches have been taken by Michael B. Katz, Clarence Karier, Joel Spring, Colin Greer, Walter Feinberg, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis.
7. Maxine Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum," in HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORIZING, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974), p. 70.
8. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Development in Relation to Social and Intellectual Systems," in THE CURRICULUM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, ed. Robert M. McClure (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 103.
9. IBID.
10. Michael Apple, "Scientific Interests and the Nature of Educational Institutions," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), pp. 127-128.
11. IBID., p. 128.
12. Michael W. Apple, "Some Aspects of the Relationship Between Economic and Cultural Reproduction," 1978 (Mimeographed), pp. 22-23.
13. James B. Macdonald, "Cultural Pluralism as ASCD'S Major Thrust," EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 32 (December 1974): 169.
14. James B. Macdonald, "An Example of Disciplined Curriculum Thinking," THEORY AND PRACTICE, 6 (October 1967): 169.
15. For a discussion of preaching, moralism, and conversion in the revivalist style, see: Harold P. Simonson, SELECTED WRITINGS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1970); William G. McLoughlin, ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967); William G. McLoughlin, Jr. MODERN REVIVALISM (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959); and BILLY GRAHAM: REVIVALIST IN A SECULAR AGE (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960).
16. William Pinar, "What is the Reconceptualization?" a paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, 11-14 May 1978, (mimeographed), p. 8.
17. Michael Apple, "Humanism and the Politics of Educational Argumentation," in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION, ed. Richard Weller (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), pp. 320-321.
18. Michael Apple, "Rationality as Ideology," EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 26 (Winter 1976): 126-27.
19. Dwayne Huebner, "The Tasks of the Curriculum Theorist," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 257.
20. Peter Berger, PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974); Anchor Books), p. 128.
21. Decker F. Walker, "Toward Comprehension of Curricular Realities," in REIVEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION, Vol. 4, Ed. Lee S. Shulman (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1976), p. 302.
22. Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum," p. 74.
23. Maxine Greene, "Countering Privatism," EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 24 (Summer 1974): 217.
24. Michael Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, ed. William F. Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 115.



## CHAPTER VI

## THE PLIGHT OF CRITICAL THEORISTS AS INTELLECTUALS: RESOLVING DILEMMAS

Intellect...is the critical, creative, and contemplative side of mind. Whereas intelligence seeks to grasp, manipulate, re-order, adjust, intellect examines, ponders, wonders, theorizes, criticizes, imagines. Intelligence will seize the immediate meaning in a situation and evaluate it. Intellect evaluates evaluations, and looks for the meanings of situations as a whole.<sup>1</sup>

Very few places in America provide a setting as favorable to the intellectual as the university. Lewis Coser, in his sociological study of intellectuals, suggests a number of reasons for this: regular remuneration, security of tenure, provision of time for research, and academic freedom. These reasons support the basic rationale for the attraction of university life. "It provides a milieu in which men sharing a common concern with the untrammelled pursuit of knowledge can communicate with one another and thus sharpen their minds in continuous interchange."<sup>2</sup>

Critical curriculum writers, working almost exclusively within the setting of the university and as scholars in education, engage in the role of the intellectual. Among intellectuals in education the theorists form a sub-group and share certain values, particularly a commitment to a critical approach. Lipset and Dobson describe such a group as a "critical intelligentsia." These individuals possess a broad evaluative outlook derived from their commitment to general values. "The characteristic orientation of these 'generalizing intellectuals' is a critically evaluative one, a tendency to appraise in terms of general conceptions of the desirable, ideal conceptions which are thought to be universally applicable."<sup>3</sup>

Critical curriculum theorists are not primarily practical people. They generalize situations in the schools and speak in symbolic language that is often far from the practical realities of implementing an actual curriculum system in the schools. They are critically evaluative in their approach to the curriculum.

B.J. Benham states that one of the integral parts of the curriculum theorists' stance is "the element of radical criticism, whether conceived of as radical political analysis and activity, or as radical individualism..."<sup>4</sup> As the "critical intelligentsia" in the field, critical curriculum theorists attempt to detach themselves from the inherent biases of their academic work to examine society and education. The university provides them with an environment from which to pursue such an examination.

The critical curriculum theorists, as critical intellectuals, wrestle with the ageless and complex question of reconciling their commitment to a world of ideas and "what ought" with their recognition of the world affairs and "what is." R. Jackson Wilson, in discussing the intellectual notes the difficulty in reconciliation for the intellectual.

From time to time, the intellectual's world view--his complex set of beliefs about God, man, and the nature of the universe--is disturbed when he encounters an unfamiliar idea. Or his accommodation to the world of facts is upset by a political revolution or an alteration in some institution in which he is involved. He must either alter his world-view to take account of a new set of facts or he must seek to alter the factual conditions of his life to fit a newly acquired feature of his intellectual landscape.<sup>5</sup>

Engaging in self-examination, intellectuals often are confronted with the gulf between the ideas they believe and express and the lives they lead within the university. Without retreating from their critical stance, curriculum theorists make conscious efforts to bridge that gap.

## The Critical Stance

The academic community historically has included a minority who stepped outside the prevailing framework of thought and tried to comprehend the entire landscape of education through the use of critical reasoning. Christopher Lasch sees to distinguishing characteristics of these persons. First of all, the intellectual presumes to be detached from society in order to comment upon it. And, secondly, this detachment creates

an uneasy relationship between the intellectual and society.<sup>6</sup>

The social structure of the disciplines within the university and the norms of science and scholarship contribute to the development of a critical stance in some individuals. According to Lipset and Dobson, two norms have been particularly important in strengthening a critical stance among academic scholars: the suspension of judgment until the facts are gathered, and the importance of subjecting claims of truth to pre-established impersonal criteria.

Adherence to such norms of scholarly work may engender a critical attitude toward judgments and beliefs outside of the particular field of inquiry--a doubting of the conventional verities and reigning myths.<sup>7</sup>

Within their field, critical theorists adhere to these norms and do not, in their writings, ever consider themselves exempt from the accepted criteria for good scholarship. With the exception of some of the works of William Pinar<sup>8</sup> the group has adopted a norm of scholarly critique which is exhibited in their publications and papers. Pinar believes, however, that critical theorists must submit their own work to the same process of objective critique to which they subject others or they will risk mirroring the very structure of social relations that they criticize.

The danger always for the theoretician and critic is deluding himself that identification of evils in others guarantees his freedom from them. Naming and critical comprehension do not always an exorcism make.<sup>9</sup>

While the critical theorists viewed the field of curriculum and the work of curriculum specialists as the special subjects of their criticism, they extend their critique to include the schools, education, and society. Within the field of curriculum, Pinar notes that "the present function of the reconceptualist work would appear to be, in a word, to understand, and this understanding, as it is currently conceived, is of the order aimed for and sometimes achieved in the humanities."<sup>10</sup> In reviewing the general direction of his work, Michael Apple adds that "a critical theory of society is an attempt to understand such things as individualism, uniqueness, personal meaning (or the lack of it) on a larger scale..."<sup>11</sup>

#### Dilemmas of the Intellectual

The life of the intellectual poses many unresolved dilemmas for the critical curriculum theorist. Writers such as Lasch, Hofstadter, and Lipset and Dobson agree with Coser that the intellectual is fundamentally "a person unlike all others who will always be in the society without fully being of it."<sup>12</sup> They are balanced by those such as Jill Conway and Thomas Molnar who believe that the American intellectual has no major quarrel with established authority nor that the American intellectual has any interest in revolution or violent change.<sup>13</sup> Jill Conway questions whether there is an adversary culture.

The acrimony of American intellectual life comes not from a genuine adversary culture questioning the legitimacy of both cultural and political institutions. Instead the battle rages because one style or another of approach to the promise of American society is in vogue at the seats of political power or may have greater appeal for popular culture. Those deprived of influence for the time being advance their opposing views. But they are adversaries about means and ends in realizing the American dream, not about its ultimate desirability.<sup>14</sup>

Critical curriculum theorists experience the ambivalence that results from their critical stance within their own discipline and society. Michael Apple can only conclude that the relationship between the schools and their critics is a paradoxical one:

In a way, critics of the schools (and the present author to a large extent) are caught in a bind. It is rather easy to denigrate existing "educational" structures (after all, everyone seems to do it); yet, it is not quite as easy to offer alternative structures. The individual who attempts to ameliorate some of the more debilitating conditions runs the risk of actually helping to shore up and perpetuate what may very well be an outmoded set of institutional arrangements. Yet, not to

try to better conditions in what are often small and stumbling ways is to neglect those real human beings who now inhabit the schools for most of their preadult lives. Therefore, one tries to play both sides of the battle often. One criticizes the fundamental assumptions that undergird schools as they exist today and, at the same time, paradoxically attempts to make these same institutions a bit more human, a bit more educative. It is an ambiguous position, but, after all, so is one's total situation.<sup>15</sup>

Critical theorists are faced with the dilemma caused by the dichotomy between their critical stance and the preservation of tradition in society. S.N. Eisenstadt observes that, in linking the critical attitudes of intellectuals to their role in the construction or continuation of tradition, one should be wary of the rather common assumption that intellectual attitudes are necessarily opposed to tradition and that intellectuals always perceive their role as creating a society in which traditions do not play an important part.

The critical stance is a condition of the mind which may express itself in assent to and acceptance of traditions, ideas, beliefs, and authority as well as in rejection. Moreover, there is no necessary relation between the pursuance of intellectual activities, even in relatively independent and autonomous ways, and the development of different types of broader critical attitudes. The majority of intellectuals productive in intellectual fields in various societies have been in many ways active or passive cultural and political conformists.<sup>16</sup>

The essence of the critical stance is the questioning of the status quo and not the confirmation or condemnation of it. In questioning, the critical intellectual may come to be more firmly committed to a status quo position. The intellectual may criticize the given society because he or she is committed to its most basic values which may have been lost over time.

Similarly, intellectuals may be highly critical of their society because they are intensely devoted to its main aspirations. And they will criticize its current performance in the light of these aspirations. They may attack what "is" in the name of an "ought" derived from the very value premises to which the society professes to adhere. In this sense, intellectuals may indeed be detached while they are at the same time deeply concerned.<sup>17</sup>

The dilemma of affirming tradition while questioning its root values leaves the critical theorists uncertain of their relationship to the university structure which is steeped in its own tradition. In an interview with B.J. Benham, William Pinar recognizes the risks of taking a stand outside the institution.

.....well, my guess is that the bulk of the educational establishment is too absorbed in quantification, to be able to respond to this. So in that sense it will be squelched. I don't expect it to be accepted; no. I see it much more as the tip of an iceberg and historical iceberg that people will do this kind of work, and bring in others and that there's a possibility, over the years, of creating another establishment. Not with the same political suppressing-action as now, but-it was a lot easier to do that kind of thing in the early 60s, we're in a period of economic contraction still. The Carnegie Report suggests however that things will change by the late 70s, and there will be jobs. But even then, it's not clear to what extent, for instance, graduate students from Wisconsin who work with Apple, and graduates of Rochester who work with us, will be placed. So it's very tricky, and so I've worked very hard in order not to isolate myself from the rest of the field, and make considerable effort to stay in contact with more conservative people. It seems important, at this stage of the work and primarily for instrumental reasons, rather than others, to cultivate similarities with others, and to help to claim the field because it would be very easy to be isolated and ostracized. So I think it requires very shrewd and subtle political work at this point...<sup>18</sup>

Because critical curriculum theorists are committed to a specific value position, they face the question of their own personal integrity in their role as intellectuals who strongly criticize the institution within which

they work. As a group they are convinced that they will have no major impact on education, and perhaps they will have little in their own field. But as individuals, they must decide to what extent their belief in change directs their own social and political life actions. Benham finds them to be realistic about the situation:

Reconceptualists, then, while they do oppose certain traditional procedures, are realists: they work to maintain a clear sense of themselves and of the context within which they have chosen to work; of the compromises that might be necessary, and of the matter of principle that allow no compromise.<sup>19</sup>

Michael Apple poses a further dilemma in the distinction between neutrality and objectivity. "We tend to hide our heads by saying that educators must be neutral. I don't believe neutrality is possible. One must try to be objective, certainly, but that is not neutrality."<sup>20</sup> Apple believes that intellectuals must face the difference and balance their commitments with objective analysis.

The goal of scholarship is to be "objective," to step back from the multiple view of reality and make judgments about the types of values underlying particular institutions and social actions. But being objective has little to do with being neutral. The theorists believe that no scholar or teacher is ever neutral. The difficulty for the critical theorists, as committed intellectuals, is in presenting a position or analysis in educational and academic forums where neutrality and objectivity are considered to be the same.

In accepting the subjective aspect of scholarly endeavor, the critical theorists do not need to make a great shift in approach or self-perception to fulfill the role of the critical intellectual. They believe that all intellectuals and all critics examine society from a committed ideological standpoint. Ideological commitments are based on beliefs and not facts, and critical theorists argue that even the "non-ideological" stance of the dominant scientific technological approach to knowledge is based on some fundamental beliefs--always a leap of faith to the first principle underlying rational conceptions.

Macdonald expresses his understanding that there is a value orientation underlying commonly accepted behaviors in society just as there is a value orientation underlying those behaviors which are not acceptable.

Thus, school people have mistakenly thought that in their practices, activities, and aims they are value free (or perhaps better--free of having to commit themselves to values). This misguided "centrist tendency" has actually resulted in an acceptance of broader social values which are destructive of the development of personal meaning and which are representative of a form of oppressive social meanings.<sup>21</sup>

The separation of value and fact in society make it difficult for Americans consciously to accept a position that is recognized as ideological at its base, and for this reason, Apple feels that the United States has lost the roots of the valuable analysis of society that Marxist thought can offer.

Also, the tendency in Western industrialized societies to strictly separate value from fact would make it difficult to accept a position which holds that most social and intellectual categories are themselves valuative in nature and may reflect ideological commitments...<sup>22</sup>

#### Alienation from Community

The creation of informal social circles for spontaneous exchange of ideas among scholars contributes to the formation of a critical intelligentsia. Creative intellectuals must keep abreast of current developments outside their individual fields and establish informal contacts with peers in other disciplines and in other universities. They develop a comprehensive view of their own work and its significance which tends to make them more like their colleagues in other fields and universities than like those in their own departments and schools. They become increasingly separated from their own discipline's community of scholars and its pursuits.

To the extent that scientists and scholars feel themselves to be alienated--separated from the means of effectively realizing themselves through their activity--they may be inclined to develop a critical orientation to their activity and to generalize ideological propositions. Bureaucratic social arrangements may have dialectical potentialities--at once limiting the scholars' creativity while fostering in them a critical mentality.<sup>23</sup>

The dichotomy between their degree of alienation and their inclusion in the academic community poses another dilemma for critical theorists. Participants in the curriculum movement share ideas and attempt to create among themselves a community of critical scholars. Several have noted the excitement of participating in the semi-annual meetings with others who dared to be excited about a critique of education and creative plans for renewal. The theorists value open debate in the group as long as the parties debating an issue speak clearly about their own work and are open to critical questioning. This experience, however, leads some to question the compatibility of a critical stance toward the field itself with the creation of an academic community within the field. Michael Apple seriously poses this question to the critical theorists.

How do we begin to learn from each other? How do we criticize each other's work in a way that enables us all to go further, and at the same time preserves the value of each contribution?

It is only through our commitment collectively to examine each other's work--to use and go beyond what may be no longer utile or what may be weaker than it might, and then stand on each other's shoulders--that serious progress can be made in our collective understanding of and action on institutions like schools.

Thus we should not expect that one person will answer, or even pose, all of the important questions concerning what might best be seen as the relation between power and knowledge. Rather, concrete groups affiliated with a larger social and intellectual tradition become exceptionally important.<sup>24</sup>

In the competitive arena of disciplinary research, this type of communal sharing described by Apple is becoming counter-cultural. Apple points out that there is very little in the American scholarly tradition to guide scholars in a reconceptualized communal endeavor. The traditional humanist view, with its emphasis on the individual, neglects the communal aspects of social life that are crucial for a humane existence. Apple argues that the concern for the individual in society, in education, and in the disciplines could go too far, acting as an ideological assumption that keeps individuals from establishing a genuine sense of collective commitment.

Thus, the total concern for the individual is, paradoxically, ideally suited to maintaining both a rather manipulative ethic of consumption and a lack of political and economic sensitivity. It makes it very difficult for people to see and know their real relationships with others. We need to inquire quite rigorously, I think, into the latent effects of the humanists' tendency to absolutize the individual. In fact...such absolutizing makes it difficult to develop a potent analysis of widespread social injustice and "inhumanity."<sup>25</sup>

In a sense, all of this applies to the work of critical theorists themselves. Many theorists have been involved in humanistic scholarship and have neglected to explore some of the implications of their own scholarship for the way they interact among themselves in the curriculum theory movement.

Because of their critical stance, the curriculum theorists will be forced to resolve the dilemmas that confront them. In the resolution of conflicts that are inherent in balancing community versus individualistic research, tradition versus critique, and neutrality versus objectivity, critical theorists face the possibility of alienation from their colleagues in the academic community. To varying degrees, participants in the movement have taken on the role of the critical intellectual, but only recently have become conscious of the consequence of accepting that role.

## CONCLUSION

A sensitive study of the topics addressed by critical theorists, their interaction with each other, and the historical context of their movement highlights the relationship of these three aspects of the group. Critical theorists tried to share their views in a way consonant with their belief in a humane environment for learning. In so doing, they responded to the opposite trend in society and in educational institutions.

The critical curriculum movement is a development in the field of curriculum and in the evolution of educational research. But it is not discontinuous with the past. It is in the anti-rationalist tradition of intellectual inquiry; it is in the humanist tradition in education that has had periodical resurgences; and it is an Americanized continuation of the existential and Marxist European traditions. This group adds a special dimension to educational research. Critical theorists are not the totality of educational research and they will never be dominant in the American tradition. They simply add a valuable perspective that scholars and educators should understand. They ask difficult questions about the fundamental values underlying educational activity.

A significant contribution of the group to the future of education is their view of multiplicity. They propose that education provide students with the vision to see multiplicity in reality and with the courage to make choices in their own lives.

Critical curriculum theorists have been misunderstood and mislabeled. They are often dismissed as radicals and are overlooked by unsympathetic colleagues. They are ignored because they are less visible than those in other areas of educational research. Because of their humanistic approach, they have less access to mainstream journals than the social scientists. Because of their critical approach, they are alienated from those who could help them institutionalize their ideas, and because they deal with symbolic language and theory, their importance and their impact on education cannot be evaluated in any traditional way. Their diversity prevents a simple classification of their work, but one intuitively senses their importance to the field.

Critical curriculum theorists have planned a future for their group in the journal, the conferences, and some new activities of the journal board. They are now in contact with each other and continue to share their ideas. There is a possibility that the group will eventually develop into a professional organization in education.

Critical theorists take a general theoretical approach to education that appears abstract. They have no concrete recommendations for reform in pedagogy or in curriculum design. Many of the theorists were curriculum specialists at one time and consulted with teachers in the schools. This study examines their theoretical work and does not include their activity as consultants where they would have been required to make their ideas concretely applicable. Their readers must make the leap from theory to practice. The theorists suggest a framework for that leap, but they do not prescribe its direction.

As is often the case with groups who are minorities, the theorists are not as assertive as they might be in stating their view of the world. Because they have no formulas for practical implementation of their thinking and focus their work on understanding the forces that act on curriculum, they are hesitant to risk being as revolutionary as they might in proposing the renewal of educational values.

The group has been examined by several participants in their "state of the field" papers. Very few outside the group itself have looked at their work and tried to place them in the context of the past and the future. More bibliographic research needs to be done on their writings. Interviews with members and a discussion of how they view each other's research would be a valuable contribution.

Critical theorists are an academic group who are disseminating creative and unpopular views of education. The way that this has been done through faculty-student interaction and through sharing among colleagues may point to a new understanding of how knowledge is shared and formed in the educational disciplines. But researchers should be cautious when trying to understand this group. The theorists should not be subjected to the type of research that does not respect their diversity, the goals of their work, and the ideas and values that they share. While a narrow social science analysis might provide some interesting conclusions, it probably would not provide any deepening of our understanding of these people or their style of renewal.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Richard Hofstadter, *ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 25-26.
2. *MEN OF IDEAS: A SOCIOLOGIST'S VIEW* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 280.

3. Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard B. Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union," in *INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION*, Part II, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), p. 138.
4. B.J. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970's: The Reconceptualist Movement," a paper presented at the Kent State University Curriculum Theory Conference in Kent, Ohio, 11 November 1977.
5. R. Jackson Wilson, *IN QUEST OF COMMUNITY* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 29.
6. See Christopher Lasch, *THE NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. ix.
7. Lipset and Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel," p. 160.
8. Pinar used a very different approach in his curriculum method which he named *currere*. It was based on a psychoanalytic and phenomenological approach using biography and autobiography. For his discussion of this approach see his *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM* and *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*.
9. William Pinar, "What is the Reconceptualization?," paper presented at the RIT Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York, 11-14 May 1978, p. 10.
10. William Pinar, "Self and Others," in *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, by William Pinar and Madeleine Grumet (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 25-26.
11. Michael Apple, "Humanism and the Politics of Educational Argumentation," in *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION*, ed. Richard Weller (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), p. 316.
12. *MEN OF IDEAS: A SOCIOLOGIST'S VIEW*, p. 360.
13. See Molnar's *THE DECLINE OF THE INTELLECTUAL* (New York: The World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1961), p. 266.
14. Jill Conway, "Intellectuals in America: Varieties of Accommodation and Conflict," in *INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION*, pp. 200-201.
15. Michael Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, ed. William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. 116.
16. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Intellectuals and Tradition," in *INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION*, ed. S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), pp. 10-11.
17. Lewis A Coser, *MEN OF IDEAS*, p. 360.
18. Interview with William Pinar, University of Rochester, by B.J. Benham, 25 June 1976, (Mimeographed), p. 5.
19. Benham, "Curriculum Theory in the 1970s," p. 17.
20. Michael Apple and Nancy King, "What Do Schools Teach?" in *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION*, ed. Richard Weller (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977), p. 53.
21. James B. Macdonald, "The Quality of Everyday Life in School," in *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, ed. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 86.
22. Michael Apple, "Common-Sense Categories and Curriculum Thought," in *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, ed. James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975), p. 124.
23. Lipset and Dobson, "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel," p. 161.
24. Michael Apple, "Cultural Capital and Educational Transmissions," *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 28 (Winter 1978): 36.
25. Apple, "Humanism and the Politics," p. 318.

## APPENDIX A

## INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRICULUM THEORY MOVEMENT TO 1978

- Apple, Michael W.  
University of Wisconsin-Madison
- Ayers, Judith Morris  
Ohio State University
- Baron, Daniel  
Indiana University
- Bateman, Donald R.  
Ohio State University
- Beegle, Charles W.  
University of Virginia
- Benham, Barbara J.  
Institute for Development of Educational  
Activities, Inc., Los Angeles, California
- Berk, Leonard  
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education
- Berman, Louise  
University of Maryland
- Bullough, Robert V., Jr.  
University of Utah
- Burton, William  
Guilford College
- Dennis, Michael  
University of Virginia
- Diamonti, Michael  
University of New Hampshire
- Eisner, Elliot  
Stanford University
- Kridel, Craig  
Ohio State University
- Larson, Eleanore  
University of Rochester
- Leonard, J. Timothy  
St. Xavier College
- Macdonald, James B.  
University of North Carolina
- Mann, John Steven  
University of New Mexico
- Miller, Janet L.  
Center for Improved Education, Battelle Memorial  
Institute, Columbus, Ohio
- Mitrano, Barbara  
University of Rochester
- Molnar, Alex  
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
- Franklin, Barry  
La Crosse, Wisconsin
- Glickman, Carl D.  
Ohio State University
- Gordon, Marshall  
University of North Carolina-Greensboro
- Gorman, Donald L.  
Miami, Florida
- Greene, Maxine  
Teachers College, Columbia
- Grumet, Madeleine  
University of New York at Geneseo
- Hawthorne, Richard  
Kent State University
- Huebner, Dwayne  
Teachers College, Columbia
- Huenecke, Dorothy  
Georgia State University
- Jordan, Daniel  
University of Massachusetts
- Kliebard, Herbert  
University of Wisconsin
- Klohr, Paul R.  
Ohio State University
- Krall, Florence  
The University of Utah
- Roderick, Jessie  
University of Maryland
- Rosario, Jose  
High Scope Educational Research  
Foundation
- Scheirer, Elinor  
University of North Florida
- Selden, Steven  
University of Maryland
- Shaker, Paul  
Mt. Union College, Riyad University
- Short, Edmond C.  
Pennsylvania State University
- Shuchat-Shaw, Francine  
New York University
- Starratt, Robert  
Regis College, Denver



- Mooney, Ross L.  
Ohio State University
- Murphy, William J.  
(formerly) Indiana State University
- Osborn, Robert  
University of Rochester
- Padgham, Ronald  
Rochester Institute of Technology
- Pilder, William  
New Canaan, Connecticut
- Pinar, William F.  
University of Rochester
- Purpel, David  
University of North Carolina
- Riordan, Timothy  
Xavier, University of Cincinnati
- Stone, Joan  
National Technical Institute for the Deaf
- Ubolelohde, Robert  
Earlham College
- Urban, Wayne J.  
Georgia State University
- Vana, Ray Joseph  
University of Rochester
- Vanderberg, Brian  
University of Rochester
- Van Manen, Max  
University of Alberta
- Waks, Leonard  
Temple University
- Wallenstein, Sandra  
University of California-Berkeley
- Washington, Al  
University of Pittsburgh
- Weingarten, Ira  
University of North Carolina
- Williams, David C.  
State University of New York at Albany  
AACTE Kingston, Jamaica
- Willis, George  
University of Rhode Island
- Wolfson, Bernice
- Zaret, Esther  
Virginia Commonwealth University
- Zirkin, Wayne  
Madison, Wisconsin

**APPENDIX B**  
**CURRICULUM THEORY CONFERENCES**

**Reconceptualist Conferences**

Year	Place	Chairperson
1973 - May	University of Rochester	William F. Pinar
1974 - October	Xavier University	Timothy Riordan
1975 - October	University of Virginia	Charles Beegle
1976 - November	University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee	Alex Molnar John Zahorik
1978 - May	Rochester Institute of Technology	Ronald Padgham

**Conferences With Some  
Reconceptualist Papers**

1976	State University of New York at Geneseo	
1977 - November	Kent State University	Richard Hawthorne
1978 - October	Georgia State University	Dorothy Huenecke

## APPENDIX C

## SELECTED WORKS AND SOURCES OF FIVE CURRICULUM THEORISTS

Maxine Greene

## Journals and Essays

- "Real Toads and Imaginary Gardens." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 66 (February 1965): 416-424.
- "The Teacher and the Negro Child: Invisibility in the School." In *THE DISADVANTAGED LEARNERS: KNOWING, UNDERSTANDING, EDUCATION*, 447-453. Edited by S.W. Webster. San Francisco: Chandler Pub., 1966.
- "Aesthetics, Criticism, and the Work of Literary Art." *COLLEGE ENGLISH*, 30 (October 1968): 60-66.
- "Against Invisibility." *COLLEGE ENGLISH*, 30 (March 1969): 430-436.
- "The Spectrum of Disenchantment." In *STUDENT UNREST: THREAT OR PROMISE?* pp. 12-34. Edited by Richard L. Hart and J. Galen Saylor. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1970.
- "Reich's Greening--and the Morning After." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 72 (May 1971): 505-512.
- "Curriculum and Consciousness." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, pp. 299-317. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975. Also in *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 73 (December 1971): 253-269.
- "Literature and Visibility." *NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PRINCIPALS BULLETIN*, 56 (February 1972): 63-73.
- "From Disjunction to Multiplicity." *JOURNAL OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION*, 6 (January 1972): 161-178.
- "Defying Determinism." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 74 (December 1972): 147-154.
- "Countering Privatism." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 24 (Summer 1974): 209-218.
- "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum." In *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, pp. 69-84. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "Literature, Existentialism and Education." In *EXISTENTIALISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY IN EDUCATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS*, pp. 63-86. Edited by D.E. Denton. New York: Teachers College Press, 1974.
- "Paul Goodman and Anarchistic Education." In *SOCIAL FORCES AND SCHOOLING*, pp. 313-336. Edited by Nobuo K. Shimahara and Adam Scrupski. New York: McKay, 1975.
- "Literature in Aesthetic Education." *JOURNAL OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION*, 10 (July 1976): 60-76.
- "Approach to the Constitution of Democracy." *THEORY INTO PRACTICE*, 15 (February 1976): 15-22.
- "Challenging Mystification: Education Foundations in Dark Times." *EDUCATIONAL STUDIES*, 7 (1 September 1976): 9-27.
- "Honorable Work and Delayed Awakenings: Education and American Women." *PHI DELTA KAPPAN* (September 1976): 25-30.
- "Toward Wide-awakeness: An Argument for the Arts and Humanities in Education." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 79 (September 1977): 119-125.

## Books and Monographs

- THE PUBLIC SCHOOL AND THE PRIVATE VISION: A SEARCH FOR AMERICA IN EDUCATION AND LITERATURE*. New York: Random House, 1965.
- EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTERS FOR TEACHERS* (Edited with Commentaries). New York: Random House, 1967.
- TEACHER AS STRANGER: EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY FOR THE MODERN AGE*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1973.

## Others

- "Personal Statement." In **CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS**, pp. 295-298. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "Maxine Greene and James Macdonald: Two Views of Curriculum Reconceptualists." Interview by B.J. Benham, 1976 (mimeographed): 2-7.
- Biographical Sketch. **PHI DELTA KAPPAN** (September 1976): 25.
- Personal Correspondence, January 1978, August 1978.

James Macdonald  
Journals and Essays

- "The Nature of Instruction: Needed Theory and Research." **EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP**, 21 (October 1963): 5-7.
- "An Image of Man: The Learner Himself." In **INDIVIDUALIZING INSTRUCTION**, pp. 29-49. Edited by Ronald Doll. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1964.
- "Myths about Instruction." **EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP**, 22 (May 1965): 571-576 and 609-617.
- "Moral Dilemmas of Schooling." **EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP**, 23 (October 1965): 29-32.
- "Language, Meaning and Motivation: An Introduction." In **LANGUAGE AND MEANING**. Edited by James Macdonald and Robert R. Leeper. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1966.
- "The Person in the Curriculum." In **PRECEDENTS AND PROMISE IN THE CURRICULUM FIELD**, pp. 38-52. Edited by Helen F. Robison. New York: Teachers College Press, 1966.
- "An Example of Disciplined Curriculum Thinking." **THEORY INTO PRACTICE**, 6 (October 1967): 166-171.
- "Curriculum Development in Relation to Social and Intellectual Systems." In **CURRICULUM: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT**, pp. 95-112. Edited by Robert M. McClure. (The Seventieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.
- "Curriculum Theory." **JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH**, 64 (January 1971): 196-200.
- "The School as Double Agent." In **FREEDOM, BUREAUCRACY AND SCHOOLING**, pp. 235-246. Edited by Vernon F. Haubrich. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971.
- "A Transcendental Development Ideology of Education." In **HEIGHTED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY**, pp. 85-116. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "An Evaluation of Evaluation." **URBAN REVIEW**, 7 (January 1974): 3-14.
- "Cultural Pluralism AS ASCD's Major Thrust." **EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP**, 32 (December 1974): 167-169.
- "Curriculum and Human Interests." In **CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS**, pp. 283-298. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "Quality and Everyday Life in School." In **SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING**, pp. 78-94. Edited by James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.
- "Structures in Curriculum." In **CONFERENCE ON CURRICULUM LEADERSHIP**, pp. 28-46. Edited by William C. Kahl. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction, 1967.
- "The Open School: Curriculum Concepts." In **OPEN EDUCATION**, pp. 23-38. Edited by Bernard Spodek. National Association for the Education of Young Children Monograph, 1970.
- "Responsible Curriculum Development." In **CONFRONTING CURRICULUM REFORM**, pp. 120-133. Edited by Elliot Eisner. Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1971.
- "Scene and Context: American Education Today." In **STAFF DEVELOPMENT: STAFF LIBERATION**, pp. 7-14. Edited by C. Beegle and R. Edelfelt. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.

"Living Democratically in Schools: Cultural Pluralism." In **MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION: COMMITMENTS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS**, pp. 6-13. Edited by Carl Grant. Washington D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.

"Value Bases and Issues for Curriculum." In **CURRICULUM THEORY**, pp. 10-21. Edited by Alex Molnar and John Zahorik. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.

"Curriculum, Consciousness and Social Change." Paper presented at the Kent State Conference, Kent, Ohio, 1977. (in publication, 1978).

#### Books and Monographs

and Robert R. Leeper. **THEORIES OF INSTRUCTION: PAPERS**. (Edited) Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1965.

and others. **A RESEARCH ORIENTED ELEMENTARY EDUCATION STUDENT TEACHING PROGRAM**. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin, 1965.

and Robert R. Leeper. **LANGUAGE AND MEANING**. (Edited) Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1966.

**SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON READING: SOCIAL INFLUENCES AND READING ACHIEVEMENT**. (Edited) Newark, Delaware: International Reading Association, 1973.

and Esther Zaret. **SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING**. (Edited) Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.

#### Others

"Personal Statement." In **CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS**, pp. 3-4. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

"Maxine Greene and James Macdonald: Two Views of Curriculum Reconceptualists." Interview by B.J. Benham, 1976 (mimeographed): 8-14.

Personal Correspondence, January 1978.

#### Dwayne Huebner

#### Journals and Essays

"Politics and the Curriculum." In **CURRICULUM CROSSROADS**, pp. 87-95. Edited by A.H. Passow. New York: Teachers College Press, 1962.

"New Modes of Man's Relationship to Man." In **NEW INSIGHTS AND THE CURRICULUM**, pp. 144-164. Edited by Alexander Frazier. Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1963.

"Politics and Curriculum." **EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP**, 22 (November, 1965): 115-129.

"Curriculum as a Field of Study." In **PRECEDENTS AND PROMISE IN THE CURRICULUM FIELD**, pp. 94-112. Edited by Helen F. Robison. New York: Teachers College Press, 1966.

"Today's Challenge." **CHILDHOOD EDUCATION**, 43 (January 1967): 252-258.

"The Leadership Role in Curricular Change." In **STRATEGIES FOR PLANNED CURRICULAR INNOVATION**, pp. 133-151. Edited by Marcella R. Lawler. New York: Teachers College Press, 1970.

"Toward a Remaking of Curricular Language." In **HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY**, pp. 36-53. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.

"Technology vs. What Will be the Outcome?" **EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP**, 31 (February 1974): 393-396.

"Poetry and Power: The Politics of Curricular Development." In **CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS**, pp. 271-280. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

"The Tasks of the Curriculum Theorist." In **CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS**, pp. 250-270. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

- "Curricular as Concern for Man's Temporality." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 237-249. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975. Also in THEORY INTO PRACTICE, 6 (October 1967): 172-179.
- "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 217-236. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975. Also in LANGUAGE AND MEANING, pp. 8-26. Edited by James B. Macdonald and Robert R. Leeper. Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1966.
- "The Contradiction Between the Recreative and the Established." In SCHOOLS IN SEARCH FOR MEANING, pp. 27-37. Edited by James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1975.
- "Implications of Psychological Thought for the Curriculum." In INFLUENCES IN CURRICULUM CHANGE. Edited by Glenys Unruh. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, NEA, 1968.
- "A Response to Friendenberg Status and Role Identity." In EDUCATION AS A SOCIAL POLICY: LOCAL CONTROL OF EDUCATION. Edited by Bowers, Dyke, and Housego. New York: Random House, 1970.
- "Education in the Church." ANDOVER NEWTON QUARTERLY (January 1972).
- "Language and Teaching: Reflections on Teaching in the Light of Heidegger's Writings About Language." Paper presented at Union Theological Seminary, February 1969.
- "Curriculum as the Accessibility of Knowledge." Paper presented at the Curriculum Theory Study Group, Minneapolis, 2 March 1970.
- "Curriculum.... 'With Liberty and Justice for All.'" Paper presented at the Conference on Craft, Conflict and Symbol: Their Import for Curriculum and Schooling, Tennessee Technological University, 25 April 1974.
- "Humanism and Competency--A Critical and Dialectical Interpretation." Paper presented at the Conference on Humanism/Competence, Teachers College, Columbia University, 5 October 1974.
- "The Thingness of Educational Content." Paper presented at the Conference "Reconceptualizing Curriculum Theory," Cincinnati. 18 October 1974.

#### Books and Monographs

A REASSESSMENT OF THE CURRICULUM. (Edited) New York: Teachers College Press, 1964.

#### Others

- "Personal Statement." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 213-215. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- Personal Correspondence, January 1978.

#### William F. Pinar

##### Journals and Essays

- "Working from Within." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 29 (January 1972): 339-331.
- "Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory: An Introduction." In HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY, pp. 1-15. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "Search for a Method." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 415-424. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "CURRERE: Toward Reconceptualization." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 396-414. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "The Analysis of Educational Experience." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 384-395. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "Sanity, Madness and the School." In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 359-383. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

- “Political-Spiritual Dimensions.” In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM, pp. 89-110. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- “The Method.” In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM, pp. 51-65. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- “Self and Others.” In TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM, pp. 7-30. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- “Life History and Curriculum Theorizing: A Case Study.” Paper presented at University of Wisconsin Curriculum Theory Conference, 11-14, November 1976.
- “The Concept of Class in Educational Theory: Some Comments.” REVIEW JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, 1 (undated reprint): 309-320.
- “Currere: A Case Study.” In CURRICULUM CRITICISM. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1978.
- “The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the AERA. New York City, 1977. Also in JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM STUDIES (Fall 1978), in press.
- “Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of AERA. Toronto, 1978. Also in EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER (September 1978), in press.
- “What is the Reconceptualization?” Paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference. Rochester, 11-14 May 1978. Also in THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING (November 1978), in press.
- “Currere: An Anatomy of Liberative Study.” In LIBERATION AND THE CURRICULUM. Edited by James Macdonald and Marshall Gordon. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, in press.

#### Books and Monographs

- HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY. (Ed.) Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS. (Ed.) Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- SANITY, MADNESS, AND THE SCHOOL. Meerut, India: Sadhna Prakashan Publishers, 1975.
- TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM. (with Madeleine R. Grumet). Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- LIFE HISTORY AND EDUCATIONAL PROCESS. (In process).

#### Others

- “Personal Statement.” In CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS, pp. 357-358. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- Interview with William Pinar, University of Rochester, by B.J. Benham, 25 June 1976.
- Personal Correspondence, December 1977, July 1978.

#### Michael Apple Journals and Essays

- “Relevance--Slogans and Meanings.” THE EDUCATIONAL FORUM, 35 (May 1971): 503-507.
- “Community, Knowledge, and the Structure of Disciplines.” THE EDUCATIONAL FORUM, 37 (November 1972): 75-82.
- “The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education.” JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH, 66 (September 1972): 10-18.
- “The Process and Ideology of Valuing in Educational Settings.” In EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: ANALYSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY, pp. 3-34. Edited by Michael W. Apple, Michael J. Subkoviak, and Henry R. Lufler, Jr., Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.

- "Common-Sense Categories and Curriculum Thought." In *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, pp. 116-148. Edited by James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.
- "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, pp. 95-119. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975. Also in *INTERCHANGE*, 2 (1971): 27-40.
- "Scientific Interests and the Nature of Educational Institutions." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, pp. 120-130. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "What May a 75-Year Involvement with the Language and Ideology of Business Tell Us?" *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 32 (April 1975): 452-456, with Steven Selden.
- "Ivan Illich and Deschooling Society: The Politics of Slogan Systems." In *SOCIAL FORCES AND SCHOOLING*, pp. 337-360. Edited by Nobua Shimahara and Adam Scrupski. New York: David McKay, 1975.
- "Rationality as Ideology." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 26 (Winter 1976): 121-131.
- "Curriculum as Ideological Selection." *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW*, 20 (June 1976): 209-215.
- "What Do Schools Teach?" In *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION*, pp. 29-47. Edited by Richard Weller. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977, with Nancy King.
- "Humanism and the Politics of Educational Argumentation." In *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION*, pp. 315-330. Edited by Richard Weller. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1977.
- "Justice as a Curricular Concern." In *MULTI-CULTURAL EDUCATION*, pp. 14-28. Edited by Carl Grant. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.
- "Curricular History and Social Control." In *COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION*. Edited by Carl Grant. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1978, with Barry Franklin. (Mimeographed).
- "Cultural Capital and Educational Transmissions." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 28 (Winter 1978): 34-43.
- "Some Aspects of the Relationship Between Economic and Cultural Reproduction." *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW* (October, 1978), in press (Mimeographed).
- "Ideology and Form in Curriculum Evaluation." In *QUALITATIVE EVALUATION*. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1978.

#### Books and Monographs

- with Bruce Joyce and others. *IMPLEMENTING SYSTEMS MODELS FOR TEACHER EDUCATION: STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING FEASIBILITY*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Education, 1971.
- with Michael J. Subkoviak and Henry S. Lufler, Jr. *EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: ANALYSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY* (Edited) Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- with Vernon F. Haubrich. *SCHOOLING AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN*. (Edited) Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- with James B. Macdonald and others. *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.
- IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, forthcoming.

#### Others

- "On the Educator's Commitment: A Personal Statement." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, pp. 89-93. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- Interview with Michael Apple, University of Wisconsin, by B.J. Benham, 12 July 1976.
- Personal Correspondence, February 1978.



## APPENDIX D

## SELECTED WORKS OF ADDITIONAL CURRICULUM THEORISTS

- Bateman, Donald. "The Politics of Curriculum." Paper presented at the Rochester Curriculum Conference, Rochester, New York. 3-5 May 1973.
- "Since Feeling Is First, Who Cares About the Syntax of Things..." Paper presented at the National Middle School Conference, Columbus, Ohio. March 1975.
- Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. Interview by B.J. Benham, 22 June 1976.
- Benham, B.J. Interviews with Donald Bateman, Janet Miller, James Macdonald, Maxine Greene, William Pinar, and Michael Apple. Unpublished manuscript. June-July 1976.
- "Curriculum Theory in the 1970's: The Reconceptualist Movement, Fifty Annotated Sources." *RESOURCES IN EDUCATION* (June 1977): ERIC number: ED 134-590.
- "Curriculum Theory in the 1970's: Analysis of the Reconceptualist Movement." Major invited address presented at the Kent State Curriculum Theory Conference, Kent State University. 11-13 November 1977.
- "Thoughts on the Failure of Curriculum Reform." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 35 (December 1977): 205-208.
- "Experiencing Research." Paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York. 11-13 May 1978.
- "None So Holy as the Recently Converted--Malefic Generosity and Multicultural Education." *EDUCATIONAL STUDIES*, 9 (Summer 1978).
- "Reconceptualization of the Curriculum." Paper presented at the Pepperdine University Curriculum Conference, Los Angeles, California. 21 October 1978.
- "Sociobiology..." *EDUCATIONAL STUDIES*, 9 (Fall 1978).
- "The Future on a Human Scale." *THE HUMANIST EDUCATOR*, (1978): in press.
- With Kenneth A. Tye. "The Realities of Curriculum Change: Into an Era of Uncertainty." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 36 (October 1978).
- Berman, Louise. "Teaching Love as Co-response." *THEORY INTO PRACTICE*, 8 (April 1969): 96-100.
- "Not Reacting But Transacting: One Approach to Early Childhood Education." *YOUNG CHILDREN*, 28 (June 1973): 275-82.
- "Curriculum Leadership: That All May Feel Value and Grow." In *FEELING, VALUING, AND THE ART OF GROWING: INSIGHTS INTO THE AFFECTIVE*, pp. 249-73. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.
- With Jesse A. Roderick. "The Relationship Between Curriculum Development and Research Methodology." *JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION*, 6 (Spring 1973): 3-13.
- With Jesse A. Roderick. "Future Curricular Priorities." *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY*, 1 (Winter 1977): 79-87.
- Burton, William. "Schools and Sex: A Tragedy in Two Parts." In *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, pp. 51-77. Edited by James B. Macdonald and Esther Zaret. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1975.
- Diamonti, Michael C. "Career Education and the Process of Initiation." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, (Spring 1977).
- "Yes We Have No Curriculum Theory." *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, 6 (1977).
- "Curriculum Theory and the Trivialization of Educational Problems." Paper delivered at the Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, New York. May 1978.
- Eisner, Elliot W. "School as an Aesthetic Community." *ELEMENTARY SCHOOL JOURNAL*, 60 (November 1959): 84-7.
- "How Can You Measure A Rainbow?" *ART EDUCATION*, 24 (May 1971): 36-9.
- "Emerging Models for Educational Evaluation." *SCHOOL REVIEW*, 80 (August 1972): 573-90.

- Eisner, Elliot W. "Do Behavioral Objectives and Accountability Have a Place in Art Education?" *ART EDUCATION*, 26 (May 1973): 2-5.
- "The Humane School Is the Human Relations Curriculum." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 32 (October 1974): 7-9.
- "Reading and the Creation of Meaning." *CLAREMONT READING CONFERENCE YEARBOOK*, 40 (1976): 1-15.
- "On the Uses of Educational Connoisseurship and Criticism for Evaluating Classroom Life." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 78 (February 1977): 345-58.
- Franklin, Barry M. "Technological Models and the Curriculum Field." *EDUCATIONAL FORUM*, 40 (March 1976): 303-12.
- Glickman, Carl D. "Unraveling the Hidden Curriculum." *RESEARCH IN EDUCATION* (October 1977).
- Gordon, Marshall and Weingarten, Ira. "Communique or Communication: Towards a Theory of Practice." To appear in *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, (May 1979).
- Grumet, Madeleine R. "Existential and Phenomenological Foundations." In *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, pp. 31-50. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- "Toward A Poor Curriculum." In *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, pp. 67-88. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- "Psychoanalytic Foundations." In *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, pp. 111-146. By William F. Pinar and Madeleine R. Grumet. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1976.
- Kliebard, Herbert M. "The Tyler Rationale." *SCHOOL REVIEW*, 78 (February 1970): 259-72.
- "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory." *ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK*, (1971): 74-93.
- "Metaphorical Roots of Curriculum Design." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 73 (February 1972): 403.
- "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, pp. 39-50. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "Curriculum Past and Curriculum Present." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 33 (January 1976): 245-8.
- Klohr, Paul. "Use of the Design Element in Curriculum Change." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 23 (October 1965): 25-28.
- "Problems in Curriculum Theory Development." *THEORY INTO PRACTICE*, 6 (October 1967): 200-203.
- "Curriculum Workers in a Bind." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 26 (January 1969): 323-25.
- "Seeking New Design Alternatives." In *A CURRICULUM FOR CHILDREN*. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1969.
- "Involving the Learner." *IDEAS EDUCATIONAL*, 9 (Fall 1970).
- "The Greening of Curriculum." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 28 (February 1971): 455-57.
- "Staff Development--Resource Pak for Curriculum Reform." In *STAFF DEVELOPMENT: STAFF LIBERATION*. Edited by Charles Beegle and Roy Edelfelt. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.
- "Emerging Foundations for Curriculum Theory." *EDUCATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS* (Austum, 1978)
- Mann, John Steven. "Alienation, Restlessness and Violence." *CHANGING EDUCATION*, 4 (Winter 1969): 12-14.
- "Curriculum Criticism." *THE RECORD*, 71 (September 1969): 27-40.
- "Political Power and the High School Curriculum." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 28 (October 1970): 23-6.
- "Student Rights Strategy." *THEORY INTO PRACTICE*, 10 (December 1971): 353-62.
- "A Discipline of Curriculum Theory." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* pp. 149-165. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.

- John Steven Mann. "On Contradictions in Schools." ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK (1975): 95-115.
- "In Defense of Busing." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 34 (April 1977): 501-5.
- With Alex Molnar. "On Student Rights." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 31 (May 1974): 668-71.
- With Alex Molnar. "To Serve the Interests of the Masses." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 32 (November 1974): 147.
- Miller, Janet L. Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio. Interview with B.J. Benham. 22 June 1976.
- "Curriculum Theory: Multiplicities, Resemblances and Integrations." Paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York. 11-13 May 1978.
- "Curriculum Theory: The Recent History." JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING, 1 (November 1978).
- "Working: A Self Dichotomy." IMPACT: THE JOURNAL OF NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT (March 1979).
- Molnar, Alex. "Schooling is Not a Team Sport: It's the Opposite." INSTRUCTOR, 86 (February 1977): 22.
- With John S. Mann. "On Student Rights." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 31 (May 1974): 668-71.
- With John S. Mann. "To Serve the Interests of the Masses." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 32 (November 1974): 147.
- Mooney, Ross L. "Problems in the Development of Research Men." EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH BULLETIN, 30 (September 1951): 141-50.
- "Groundwork for Creative Research." THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 9 (September 1954): 554-548.
- "Evaluating Graduate Education." HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 25 (Spring 1955): 85-94.
- "The Artist and Our Human Need." JOURNAL OF HUMAN RELATIONS (Summer 1955): 9-16.
- "Cultural Blocks and Creative Possibilities." EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, 13 (February 1956): 273-278.
- "The Researcher Himself." In RESEARCH FOR CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT, pp. 154-186. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1957.
- "Creation and Counseling." Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Educational Research and Service. The Ohio State University, 1960. (Mimeographed).
- "Creation and Communication." In CREATIVITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH, pp. 37-54. Edited by Michael F. Andrews. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1961.
- "Creation and Teaching." In CREATIVITY AND COLLEGE TEACHING, pp. 45-62. Edited by W. Paul Street. Lexington, Kentucky: The College of Education, The University of Kentucky, 1963.
- "Training for Research in Educational Administration: A Rationale." In EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: NEW PERSPECTIVES, pp. 325-340. Edited by Jack A. Culbertson and Stephen P. Hencley. Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1963.
- "The Problem of Leadership in the University." In EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: NEW PERSPECTIVES, pp. 31-48. Edited by Jack A. Culbertson and Stephen P. Hencley. Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1963.
- "Nurturing the Educational Researcher as a Creative Artist." In THE TRAINING AND NURTURE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHERS, pp. 224-253. Edited by Egon Guba and Stanley Elam. Bloomington, Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa, Inc., 1965.
- "Creative Integration." THEORY INTO PRACTICE, 5 (October 1966): 174-178.
- "Creation: Contemporary Culture and Renaissance." THE JOURNAL OF CREATIVE BEHAVIOR, 1 (Summer 1967): 259-281.
- "Perspectives on Ourselves." THEORY INTO PRACTICE, 6 (October 1967): 209-211.
- "Three Moments in a Crisis." THEORY INTO PRACTICE, 8 (December 1969): 310-311.
- Murphy, William J. and Pilder, William F. "Alternative Organizational Forms, Cultural Revolution and Education." VIEWPOINTS, 48 (May 1972): 57-76.

- Osborn, Robert L. "Why Aren't English University Students Militant?" *YOUTH AND SOCIETY* (December 1971): 159-172.
- "Paradox in the American Classroom." *ASPECTS OF EDUCATION*, 14 (1972): 16-30.
- "An All-American Small Group in Search of an Electric Kool-Aid Acid Theory of Curriculum, or, A High is Not for Home." In *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, pp. 131-137. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "Radical Inquiry and the Study of Education." *FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES*, 7 (Winter 1978): 2-19.
- Pilder, William F. "Persons, Fidelity, and Community: Values as a Process of Encounter." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 27 (February 1970): 449-551.
- "Unlearning the Idea of School." *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 28 (March 1971): 601-3.
- "In the Stillness is the Dancing." In *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, pp. 117-129. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "Youth Society's Hope for Love." *THEORY INTO PRACTICE*, 13 (December 1974): 350-3.
- With William J. Murphy. "Alternative Organizational Forms, Cultural Revolution and Education." *VIEWPOINTS*, 48 (May 1972): 57-76.
- Purpel, David and Ryan, Kevin. "Moral Education: Where Sages Fear to Tread." *PHI DELTA KAPPAN*, 56 (June 1975): 659-62.
- Roderick, Jesse A. "Describing Persons in Settings: Making the Affective Explicit." In *FEELING, VALUING, AND THE ART OF GROWING: INSIGHTS INTO THE AFFECTIVE*, pp. 203-27. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.
- With Louise Berman. "Future Curricular Priorities." *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY*, 1 (Winter 1977): 79-87.
- With Louise Berman. "The Relationship Between Curriculum Development and Research Methodology." *JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN EDUCATION*, 6 (Spring 1973): 3-13.
- Selden, Steven. "Curricular Metaphors: From Scientism to Symbolism." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 25 (Summer 1975): 243-62.
- With Michael W. Apple. "What May a 75-Year Involvement with the Language and Ideology of Business Tell Us?" *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 32 (April 1975): 452-6.
- Shuchat-Shaw, Francine. "The Listeners." In *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, pp. 156-160. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "Theory is Experience." *THE HUMANITIES JOURNAL*, 7 (Spring 1974): 6-10.
- "Paradox in Pedagogy." Presented to the Xavier Curriculum Theory Conference, Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio. October 1974.
- "Being for Oneself and Being for Others." Presented to the Rochester Institute of Technology Seminar on Effective Teaching, Rochester, New York. September 1975.
- "Congruence." In *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, p. 445. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- "Organic Dimensions: A Personal Prologue." *THE HUMANITIES JOURNAL*, 8 (Spring 1975): 21-22.
- "Beyond Deception: A Contemporary Conception of Education." Presented to the Milwaukee Curriculum Theory Conference, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 11-13 November 1976.
- "Congruence in Aesthetics Education Curricula." Presented to the Kent State University Curriculum Theory Conference, Kent, Ohio. 10-13 November 1977.
- "Visual Media Curricular Phenomena." Presented to the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York. 11-13 May 1978.
- "In Search of Congruence." In *QUALITATIVE EVALUATION: CONCEPTS AND CASES IN CURRICULUM CRITICISM*. Edited by George Willis. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1978.
- "Congruence: The Relation of Curriculum to Instruction." *IMPACT* (March 1979), in press.

- Urban, Wayne J. "Social Foundations and the Disciplines." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 71 (December 1969).
- "Social Foundations: Forward with Marx and Mills." In *FOUNDATIONS STUDIES: JUSTIFICATIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS*. Edited by Margaret Gillett and John Laska. Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1973.
- "Reconstructing Reconstruction: A Problem for Educational Historian." *HISTORY OF EDUCATION QUARTERLY*, 15 (Spring 1975).
- "The Past and the Present in Educational Innovation: Scientific Management and Competency Based Education." *FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES*, 6 (Spring-Summer 1977): 5-17.
- With Ronald Goodenow. "George S. Counts (1889-1974): A Critical Appreciation." *EDUCATIONAL FORUM*, 41 (January 1977).
- Manen, Max. "Phenomenological Disorientation in Curriculum Thinking." Presented at the Curriculum Theory Conference, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. 10-12 November 1977.
- "What Curriculum is Best Suited to Develop a More Critical Minded Public?" Presented at the CSSE Curriculum Conference, New Brunswick. June 1977.
- "A Critical Bibliography for Critical Mindedness." Presented at the CSSE Curriculum Conference, New Brunswick. June 1977.
- "Linking Ways of Knowing to Ways of Being Practical." *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, 6 (Spring 1977).
- "An Analysis of Dutch Interpretations of a Phenomenological Approach to Pedagogy." Presented at the 1978 Annual Conference of the American Educational Research Association, Toronto. March 1978.
- "Objective Study of Subjective Structures of the Life-World." Paper sent to the Rochester Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York, May 1978.
- "Languages of Deep Structure in Curriculum Inquiry." In *LANGUAGE, CULTURE, AND CURRICULUM*. Monograph published by the Centre for Curriculum Studies, Vancouver, UBC. 1978.
- "Prods for Reflection." In *CURRICULUM POLICY MAKING*. Edited by Max Van Manen and L. Stewart. University of Alberta Faculty of Education Publication, Edmonton. 1978.
- "Curriculum Policy Making: Introduction to a Curriculum Debate." In *CURRICULUM POLICY MAKING*. Edited by Max Van Manen and L. Stewart. University of Alberta Faculty of Education Publication, Edmonton. 1978.
- "Sprouting Wings and Tailfeathers: A Crow's Eye View of the Basics." In *ASSESSING CURRICULUM IN THE 1970's: WHAT ARE OUR CORE CONCERNS?* Edited by G.S. Tomkins and P.E. Moir. The Canadian Association for Curriculum Studies, Vancouver, UBC. 1978.
- "The Utrecht School: A Phenomenological Experiment in Educational Theorizing." ERIC Document Services, 1978.
- "Reconceptualization in Curriculum Inquiry." Review article of Macdonald, James B. and Esther Zaret (editors), *SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING*, 1975; Pinar, William (editor), *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*, 1974; Pinar, William (editor), *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, 1975; Pinar, William and Grumet, Madeleine, *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*, 1976. *CURRICULUM INQUIRY* (forthcoming issue).
- "A Concept of Social Criticism." *THE HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE TEACHER* (forthcoming issue).
- "The Phenomenology of Pedagogic Observation." *THE CANADIAN JOURNAL FOR STUDIES IN EDUCATION* (forthcoming issue).
- Waks, Leonard J. "Philosophy, Education and the Doomsday Threat." *REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, 39 (December 1969): 607-621.
- "Re-examining the Validity of Arguments Against Behavioral Goals." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, 23 (Spring 1973): 133-43.

- Willis, George. "Reply to Critiques by Louise Tyler and Decker Walker." *CURRICULUM THEORY NETWORK*, 6 (Winter 1970-71).
- "The Concept of Experience in Major Curriculum Literature: 1918-1970." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago. April 1972.
- "Reactions to the Conference: An Interpretation." In *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY*. Edited by William F. Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1974.
- "Researchable Problems in Curriculum: Some Directions." Presented at the Annual Meeting of American Educational Research Association, 1974.
- "Curriculum Theory and the Context of Curriculum." *CURRICULUM THEORY NETWORK*, 6 (Winter 1970-1971.)
- "Curriculum Criticism and Literary Criticism." *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM STUDIES*, 7 (May 1975).
- "A Cultural Prescription." *INSIGHTS*, 11 (May 1975).
- With W. Lynn McKinney. "Some Alternatives for Alternative Curricula." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco. April 1976.
- "Expectations and Realities in the Organization and Control of American Education." *INSIGHTS*, 14 (May 1977).
- "Curriculum Studies as Foundational Studies." Presented at the Convention of the American Educational Studies Association, Philadelphia. November 1977.
- "Phenomenological Methodologies in Curriculum." *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, 1 (1978).
- Wolfson, Bernice and Macdonald, James B. "A Case Against Behavioral Objectives." *ELEMENTARY SCHOOL JOURNAL*, 71 (December 1970): 119-28.
- Zaret, Esther. "Research for Whom?" *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, 29 (April 1972): 591-3.
- "Women/Schooling/Society." *ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT YEARBOOK*, (1975): 38-50.
- With James B. Macdonald. "Student Teaching: Benefit or Burden?" *JOURNAL OF TEACHER EDUCATION*, 22 (Spring 1971): 51-8.
- With R.V. Bennett. "Using Conceptual Frameworks to Improve Instruction." *EDUCATIONAL FORUM*, 40 (November 1975): 33-47.

#### REFERENCES

- Ash, Roberta. *SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AMERICA*. Chicago: Markam Publishing Company, 1972.
- Barrett, William. *IRRATIONAL MAN*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1958; Anchor Books Edition, 1962.
- Beauchamp, George A. *CURRICULUM THEORY*. 3rd ed. Wilmette, Illinois: The Kagg Press, 1975.
- Bellah, Robert. "Civil Religion in America." *DAEDALUS*, 96 (Winter 1967): 1-21.
- Benham, B.J. "Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: The Reconceptualist Movement." Paper presented at the Kent State University Curriculum Theory Conference in Kent, Ohio, 11 November 1977.
- Berger, Peter. *PYRAMIDS OF SACRIFICE*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974; Anchor Books, 1976.
- Conway, Jill. "Intellectuals in America: Varieties of Accommodation and Conflict." In *INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION*, Part II, pp. 199-205. Edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard. New York: Humanities Press, 1973.
- Coser, Lewis. *MEN OF IDEAS: A SOCIOLOGIST'S VIEW*. New York: The Free Press, 1965.
- Eisenstadt, S.N. "Intellectuals and Tradition." In *INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION*, Part I, pp. 1-19. Edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard. New York: Humanities Press, 1973.
- Emerson, Ralph W. *SELECTED ESSAYS, LECTURES, AND POEMS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON*. Edited by Robert E. Spiller. New York: Washington Square Press, Pocket Books, 1965.

- Fromm, Erich. "Forward." In **KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY**. Edited by T.B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel. Translated by T.B. Bottomore. London: C.A. Watts and Company, Ltd., 1956; Reprint edition New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.
- Green, Thomas F. "An Invitation to Choose." **TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD**, 75 (February 1974): 405-407.
- Herberg, Will. "America's Civil Religion: What It Is and Whence It Comes." In **AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION**, pp. 76-88. Edited by Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974.
- Hodgson, Godfrey. **AMERICA IN OUR TIME**. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1976.
- Hofstadter, Richard. **ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE**. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.
- James, William. **PRAGMATISM AND OTHER ESSAYS**. New York: Washington Square Press, Pocket Books, 1963.
- James, William. **THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE**. New York: New American Library, Mentor Books, 1958.
- Kliebard, Herbert M. "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective." In **CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS**, pp. 39-50. Edited by William Pinar. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- Kolakowski, Leszek. "Intellectuals Against Intellect." In **INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION**, Part II, pp. 1-15. Edited by Samuel N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard. New York: Humanities Press, 1973.
- Kristol, Irving and Weaver, Paul, eds. **THE AMERICANS: 1976**. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976.
- Lasch, Christopher. **THE NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA**. New York: Vintage Books, 1965.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin and Dobson, Richard B. "The Intellectual as Critic and Rebel: With Special Reference to the United States and the Soviet Union." In **INTELLECTUALS AND TRADITION**, Part II, pp. 137-198. Edited by S.N. Eisenstadt and S.R. Graubard. New York: Humanities Press, 1973.
- Marcuse, Herbert. **ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN**. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
- Mayer, Frederick. **AMERICAN IDEAS AND EDUCATION**. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1964.
- McLoughlin, William G., Jr. **MODERN REVIVALISM**. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1959.
- McLoughlin, William G., Jr. **BILLY GRAHAM: REVIVALIST IN A SECULAR AGE**. New York: The Ronald Press 1960.
- McLoughlin, William G., Jr. **ISAAC BACKUS AND THE AMERICAN PIETISTIC TRADITION**. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
- Miller, Janet L. "Curriculum Theory: Multiplicities, Resemblances and Integrations." Paper presented at the Rochester Institute of Technology Curriculum Theory Conference, Rochester, New York, (mimeographed), 11-13 May 1978.
- Miller, Perry. **ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS**. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1956.
- Mills, C. Wright. **THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959; Paperback, 1967.
- Molnar, Alex and Zahorik, John, eds. **CURRICULUM THEORY**. Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977.
- Molnar, Thomas. **THE DECLINE OF THE INTELLECTUAL**. New York: The World Publishing Co., Meridian Books, 1961.
- O'Neill, William. **COMING APART: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF AMERICA IN THE 1960s**. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.
- Polanyi, Michael. **THE STUDY OF MAN**. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.
- Russett, Cynthia Eagle. **DARWIN IN AMERICA**. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976.
- Seguel, Mary Louise. **THE CURRICULUM FIELD: ITS FORMATIVE YEARS**. New York: Teachers College Press, 1966.

- Simonson, Harold P. **SELECTED WRITINGS OF JONATHAN EDWARDS.** New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Company, 1970.
- Sweet, William Warren. **REVIVALISM IN AMERICA.** New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1944.
- Unruh, Glenys G. **RESPONSIVE CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT.** Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1975.
- Walker, Decker F. "Toward Comprehension of Curricular Realities." In **REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION**, Vol. 4, pp. 268-308. Edited by Lee S. Shulman. Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, Inc., 1976.
- Wilson R. Jackson. In **QUEST OF COMMUNITY.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Copyright Margaret Ann Huber, 1979  
All Rights Reserved.



## THE KENT STATE-GEORGIA STATE PROCEEDINGS

Edited by  
Dorothy Huenecke  
Georgia State University

Prologue  
Dorothy Huenecke

Curriculum theorizing can be marked from a number of events--from the publication of Bobbitt's *THE CURRICULUM*, or the *TWENTY-SIXTH YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY OF THE STUDY OF EDUCATION*, or even from the 1947 theory conference at the University of Chicago.<sup>1</sup> Regardless of its starting point, however, it is clear that conscious, intentional curriculum theorizing is a twentieth century phenomenon.

Until approximately the mid-1960s, curriculum theorizing could be distinguished by an emphasis on structure. Although a variety of concerns were addressed by individuals, the major thrust was the identification of curricular elements and their interrelationships. In the late 60s and the 70s, new voices were heard. Some urged that curriculum workers needed to be more conscious of their roots and urged that paths already taken be examined for insights into present practices. Others stressed the need to examine the effects of curriculum, or overall school environment, particularly with regard to its enslaving consequences. As Benham states in her article at the end of this volume, the emphasis was on liberation from either enslavement without (political liberation) or enslavement within (personal liberation).

As most readers of this journal are well aware, a curriculum conference held in Rochester in 1973 brought together a small group concerned with liberation theorizing. In the years since that conference, nine additional conferences have provided a forum for many kinds of theorizing. The papers from many of these conferences have been well chronicled. This publication presents selected papers from two of the conferences that have not been hitherto published: the Kent State University Conference in October of 1977, and the Georgia State University Conference in October of 1978.

As with the earlier conferences, the Kent State and the Georgia State conferences attracted a diversity of theorizing interests. A number of approaches for classifying these interests have been proposed, most notable among them are those by Macdonald and Pinar.

In a 1970 publication, Macdonald spoke of three groups.<sup>2</sup> The theorizing of the first group can be characterized as a springboard for presenting and guiding practical activity in relation to curriculum. The second group attempts to identify and describe the variables and their relationships in curriculum and the third criticizes conceptual schema in hope that new ways of talking about curriculum will be forthcoming. At a later date, Macdonald referred to essentially the same three divisions when he described control theories, hermeneutic theories, and critical theory.<sup>3</sup>

Pinar proposes a classification which has much in common with Macdonald's scheme.<sup>4</sup> He categorizes theorists as traditionalists, conceptual empiricists, or reconceptualists. Traditionalists value service to practitioners in the schools above all else; conceptual empiricists tend to be trained in social sciences and see the practicality of their work only after much research; and reconceptualists tend to be trained in the humanities and are mainly concerned with emancipation.

Miller was encouraging to those who see other patterns in the field when she stated:

The fact that much attention has been paid to the various "namings" of the realms within which curriculum theorists are working indicates...a positive phenomenon; the point is not that we must reach agreement or consensus about the named context of our work, but rather that we are infusing life into the curriculum field by our very careful attentiveness to the specific definitions of our various works.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, in an attempt to organize the papers in this publication, another classification is offered. Although the scheme is simpler in many aspects than the other two and, therefore, less sensitive, it does, I believe, highlight major differences in theorizing. The categories are structural, substantive, generic, and retrospective; each category is described briefly.

### Structural Theorizing

The major emphasis in curriculum theorizing from Bobbitt through Beauchamp has been structural; the chief concern has been with curriculum development. The two best known practitioners of the major strand of structural theorizing are Ralph W. Tyler and George Beauchamp.

In BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION,<sup>6</sup> Tyler identified four questions to aid the educator in making decisions about purpose, content, organization, and evaluation. He sets out a plan to be followed by those who have decided to educate, to influence, to train, or to program someone for something. Although the first question, "What should the purposes of the school (or course or program) be?" had been considered in one form or another by philosophers and other thinkers of many ages, it is only in modern times that the question was linked so closely to systematic practice. The other three questions Tyler presents are basically of the twentieth century efficiency milieu; they are technical in nature and explore the "how" of an assumably desirable course or program. Tyler's last question is in some ways the least explored of all, not only by Tyler but by others who have wrestled with the problems of education. Endless behaviors and competencies have been identified in the name of evaluation, but creative alternatives to such practices have rarely been incorporated into structural theorizing.

George Beauchamp's well-known work, CURRICULUM THEORY,<sup>7</sup> was first published in 1961. In it, Beauchamp contends that educational theory in general and curriculum theory in particular should follow the dictates of theory in the natural and social sciences. Thus, according to Beauchamp, definitions, propositions, axioms, postulates, laws, hypotheses, and generalizations should be clearly identifiable. The resulting theory may be descriptive, prescriptive, or explanatory. Beauchamp's major contribution does not lie in his own "nucleus of a curriculum theory" which appears in the third edition of CURRICULUM THEORY, but rather in his carefully constructed guidelines for theory. These guidelines are followed most consistently by those whose theorizing interests lie in the domain of structure. Modern theorists whose work falls mainly into this category include Mauritz Johnson, George Posner, and Cherry McPherson-Turner.<sup>8</sup>

Those engaged in theorizing in the Tyler and Beauchamp tradition generally consider themselves to be involved in scientific processes which allow them to be neutral. This type of theorizing is not neutral, however; no human activity is. Normative issues are at stake in both the questions addressed and in the answers offered. The latter is often seen more clearly than the former, but the questions and decision points identified are deeply embedded in views of such basic constructs as learning, education, and person-ness. Some argue that the answers to the questions are value-free because they have been arrived at scientifically. In some senses, this resembles Bobbitt's early attempts to look at what is (was) to determine what ought to be.

Through description and definition, these theorizers aim to put boundaries on the curriculum field and on curriculum processes to render them more manageable. Their definitions are usually explicit, their values often implicit.

A significant subset of structural theorizers explicitly addresses values, beliefs, and assumptions. The purpose is to make clear the importance of this dimension as identified by Goodlad<sup>9</sup> and others. These theorizers do not seek to identify new methods for making curriculum but, by focusing on the pervasiveness of beliefs, they tend to shed new light on long-established approaches. The contributions of Jurkowitz, Levine, and Sturges to this journal illustrate this type of theorizing; the earlier approach is exemplified here by the McCrory article.

### Generic Theorizing

Far removed from the concerns of those who focus on structure are the concerns of those who focus on outcomes, on the overall effects of curriculum. These theorizers tend to view curriculum as broadly conceived, as encompassing the total educational environment. They argue that since much of what is "taught" is

unrecognized (at least by those who are to "receive" the teaching) and may in fact be unintended, the revelation of assumptions, beliefs, and perceived truths underlying decisions of what to teach must receive the highest priority. New and usually implicit hypotheses are generated from insights gained from such fields as sociology, anthropology, philosophy, and political theory. These theorizers tend to look outside of education to understand better what is happening within education. They tend to be highly critical of both past and present conceptions of curriculum that have served to place limitations on all aspects of education--e.g., on content, on interactions among students and between students and teachers, and on the interrelationships between school and society. Their focus is on curriculum, schooling in general, rather than on curricula or specific programs.

In generic theorizing, value bases are usually explicit, while definitions and propositions generally remain to be inferred. Generic theorizers seek not to put boundaries on the field in order to manage it, but rather to remove as many barriers as possible in order that all persons involved in the educative process can be liberated from the entrapment of unexamined assumptions.

Leading theorists of this domain include James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Michael Apple, and William Pinar.<sup>10</sup> Contributions from Apple and Macdonald appear in the third section of this volume.

#### Substantive Theorizing:

Another class of theorizing can be identified as substantive. As used in this context, recommendations apply to content rather than to other elements of curriculum. The style tends to be precise and what is prescribed may be expounded in quite some detail. Values and assumptions are generally emphasized in providing a rationale for the curricular prescriptions. The concern is not with curriculum development nor with the identification of curricular elements, nor is it with the outcomes of current prescriptions. Emphasis is not on the negative aspects of what is being done in the name of curriculum, but rather on areas of omission in the curriculum; consideration of specific programs, curricula, is highly relevant. In contrast to those focusing on the effects of curriculum, substantive theorizers are generally positive about the role schools can play in improving the individual's quality of life. Florence Stratemeyer's *DEVELOPING A CURRICULUM FOR MODERN LIVING*<sup>11</sup> and the Smith, Stanley and Shores classic *FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT*<sup>12</sup> are examples of this type of theorizing from the near past; some of the work of Elliot Eisner and Louise Berman exemplifies current efforts.<sup>13</sup> The article by Broudy in this journal has been classified as substantive theorizing.

#### Retrospective Theorizing

This category of theorizers include those who reflect on the field itself, who take a conscious look at the work in progress. While such work involves synthesis, the resulting retrospection is generally descriptive in nature. The purpose is to help theorizers reflect on what has been done in the field and to put it in new patterns and perspectives. Herbert Kliebard and Steven Selden<sup>14</sup> are among those who have contributed to this area; Kliebard's article and B.J. Benham's retrospective piece on reconceptualists conclude this volume.

#### In This Issue...

For the reader who would appreciate a further introduction to the articles in this volume, a few brief comments are presented along with several questions stimulated by each article.

**STRUCTURAL THEORIZING.** In "A Map of the Concept of Curriculum Theory," McCrory focuses on the question, "What is curriculum theory?" by identifying referents for the terms "curriculum" and "theory". He presents definitions for curriculum which include the concepts that curriculum can be seen as the identification of what the student is "to learn" or what the student is "to do" or both. Or he states that curriculum can be viewed as equivalent in meaning to the instructional program or total environment of the school. Or it can be considered as the plans for student activities during instruction.

In describing "theory" definitions, McCrory discusses descriptive theory and prescriptive theory, the first being "theory of" and the second "theory for". He concludes: "In its most elemental meaning, the concept of curriculum theory refers to a set of statements about plans for instruction."

A question which follows logically from this discussion is "So what?" How does clarifying one's definitions of curriculum, theory, and curriculum theory help one in carrying out his/her professional responsibilities? How does such clarification help in dealing with the ethical issues of choice and influence? How can the point of view represented by McCrory respond to an earlier statement of Huebner: "...definition is a stage along the way, not necessarily a beginning point"?<sup>15</sup>

Jurkowitz applies an analytic model to the role of accrediting associations in influencing curriculum. She traces possible responses in her article to several questions, including: What role do accrediting associations play in "homogenizing" curriculum? What influence do they wield? What questions need to be raised about their involvement in defining curriculum? Additional questions come to mind: What are the assumptions behind accreditation? What points of view are likely to be enhanced through accreditation? What view of man is supportive of a strong accreditation system?

Levine's article deals with the curriculum worker's or the teacher's view of man as it influences curriculum decisions and instructional actions and reactions. She deals with four misconceptions of the learner: (1) that he/she doesn't want to learn in the first place, (2) he/she is self-centered, (3) he/she is not to be trusted, and (4) he/she is incapable of knowing what is good for him/her.

Her plea is that we should establish the curriculum process on a "rich and inspired and humane view of the learner." How does one who accepts this position answer the charge of the Back-to-Basics supporters who believe that what is needed for one is needed for all? How much knowledge about the learner affects the curriculum? Should each learner have his/her own curriculum? How do Levine's concerns relate to those of Apple?

Sturges, too, is interested in beliefs of the educator but he feels that many educators do not know what they believe. He suggests an ideological inventory to help educators assess their beliefs. Questions of commitment spring to mind. For example, is it appropriate (in a graduate class or other teaching situation) to accept any view of man? Should the purpose be to assess beliefs in order to try and change them "if necessary"? Why or why not? How can one be helped to cope with the disparity between what he/she thinks should be and reality as it appears to exist?

**SUBSTANTIVE THEORIZING.** Broudy's view of man is based, in part, on his belief that man is and in fact must be creative, beauty-producing, beauty-appreciating, and beauty-needing. He believes that what belongs in schools is only what is not taken care of adequately outside of schools. For Broudy, this clearly leaves aesthetics education on the inside! He believes that the aesthetic skills of expression and impression can both improve the quality of life. He explores the relation of images to language, images to thought, and images to feeling. His article deals with the age-old question "What should schools teach?" Other questions occur: For example: How class-related are Broudy's suggestions? Are they applicable (equally) to all persons? Can they lead to liberation?

Wood considers curriculum as including both content and process, the one inseparable from the other. His description of a particular content, "number," would in and of itself have been of interest but of only marginal value in a curriculum theory publication unless he had moved on to pedagogy, one of the major sources of the curriculum field.

To focus solely on content and exclude instructional process can create problems, as indicated by Wood's discussion of practical-mathematical thinking and logical-mathematical thinking. While what should be taught is not necessarily synonymous with how it should be taught, Wood's article clearly points to the need for curriculum theorists to include pedagogy within their purview.

Among the questions this article raises are: How might topics be explored for meaning in such other areas as the social sciences? The natural sciences? What does the teacher need to know about content before s/he can teach for meaning? What must be known about structure? What about the students? Must students be seen as complex and confounding humans, rather than one-dimensional learners, before instruction can be successful? How will this approach lead to liberation?

**GENERIC THEORIZING.** Apple continues his analysis of the effects of schooling with an examination of knowledge. In this article he identifies knowledge as capital related to and at least as important as capital

in the monetary sense. He rejects the oft-accepted point of view that knowledge is socially constructed as less than helpful because this view in itself does not address the question of how some knowledge and not others becomes school knowledge. Perhaps more frightening still is the fact that most educators could readily recognize and agree on which knowledge is school knowledge and which is not. Questions which intrigue include: Can personal liberation be obtained in a system that "predetermines" school knowledge? If so, how? Would analysis of the structure of knowledge, both in and out of school, help reveal the assumptions of those who select school knowledge?

In "Curriculum, Consciousness, and Social Change," Macdonald forcefully states, "My intention (is) to enter into the work of curriculum for the sake of human liberation, rather than shaping and controlling behavior..." To accomplish this in a context of "democratic rights, responsibilities, and practices," Macdonald offers broad outlines for becoming more conscious of such areas of living as bureaucracy, human rights, and economic structure. In reflecting on Macdonald's article, one might consider other areas that could increase sensitivity to social structures. Consideration might also be given to the type of educator capable of teaching as Macdonald suggests.

**RETROSPECTIVE THEORIZING.** In the article included here, Kliebard continues his careful analysis of Dewey which he began in "Curriculum Theory: Give Me a 'For Instance.'"<sup>16</sup> His article raises such important questions as: What can we learn about curriculum from the past? What light can be shed on present practices (viewpoints) by an examination of past practices (viewpoints)? How have the assumptions of the past dictated the givens of the present? How do unexamined givens hold us in bondage?

Benham's article will be welcomed by all students of curriculum theory who have struggled with the possible dynamics among the reconceptualists in an attempt to understand their messages. Based on a series of interviews with leaders in the field, Benham sorts, sifts, and synthesizes to suggest that, although the individual differences among the reconceptualists are indeed strong, there are several important commonalities between those who look for liberation within (existentialists) and those who look for it without (structuralists). The basic commonalities are: (1) movement away from the traditional paradigm "adversary spirit," and (2) the struggle to maintain congruence between one's life and one's work within the context of the social political economic educational institution. Benham believes that dynamism comes from interaction; the point is not to reconcile but to continue in creative conflict.

Questions to consider include: Why is there so little dynamism between reconceptualists and structuralists (traditionalists)? What would it take for these groups to have a synergistic relationship? Why is a reconceptualist point of view important if it has so little impact on practice?

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Franklin Bobbitt, *THE CURRICULUM* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1918); National Society for the Study of Education, *THE FOUNDATIONS AND TECHNIQUES OF CURRICULUM CONSTRUCTION*, Parts I and II (Bloomington, IL: Public School Publishing Co., 1926); Virgil E. Herrick and Ralph W. Tyler (editors), *TOWARD IMPROVED CURRICULUM THEORY* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).
2. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory." *JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, January, 1971. Reprinted in William F. Pinar (editor), *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* (Berkeley: CA: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975).
3. James B. Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory as Intentional Activity." Paper presented to Professors of Curriculum, Miami Beach, 1976.
4. William F. Pinar, "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978." *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, Vol. 7, No. 8 (1978), pp. 5-12.
5. Janet L. Miller, "Curriculum Theory: A Recent History." *THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (1979), p. 39.
6. Ralph W. Tyler. *BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

7. George A. Beauchamp, *CURRICULUM THEORY*, Third Edition (Wilmette, IL: The Kagg Press, 1975).
8. See, for example, Mauritz Johnson, "Definitions and Models in Curriculum Theory," *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, April, 1967. Reprinted in Edmund C. Short and George D. Marconnit (editors), *CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT ON PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM* (Dubuque, IA: William C. Brown, Co., Publishers, 1968); George J. Posner, "Curriculum Research: Domains of the Field," Paper presented at the Rochester Curriculum Theory Conference, May 1978; Cherry McPherson-Turner, "Identifying Concepts for Curriculum Theory," Paper presented at the Airlie Curriculum Theory Conference, October 1979).
9. John I. Goodlad with Maurice N. Richter, Jr., *THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM FOR DEALING WITH PROBLEMS OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION*, HEW Contract No. SAE-8024, Project No. 454 (Los Angeles: University of California and Institute for Development of Educational Activities, 1966).
10. One of the best sources for the curriculum theorizing of both Huebner and Pinar is William F. Pinar (editor), *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975).
11. Florence B. Stratemeyer, et al., *DEVELOPING A CURRICULUM FOR MODERN LIVING*, Second Edition (New York: Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1957).
12. B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores. *FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT*, Revised Edition (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1957).
13. See, for example, Elliot Eisner, *THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), and Louise M. Berman, *NEW PRIORITIES IN THE CURRICULUM* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968).
14. See, for example, Steven Selden, "Extending Rights and Responsibilities." Mauritz Johnson (editor), *TOWARD ADOLESCENCE: THE MIDDLE SCHOOL YEARS*. Seventy-ninth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
15. Dwayne Huebner, "The Tasks of the Curricular Theorist." William F. Pinar (Editor), *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975), p. 251.
16. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Curriculum Theory: Give Me a 'For Instance,'" *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1977), pp. 257-268.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

## A Map of the Concept of Curriculum Theory

David L. McCrory  
West Virginia University


The curriculum field abounds with proposals and counter-proposals regarding what is and what ought to be the nature of instructional programs in the schools. Many proposals claim to be based on certain curriculum theories, but when the claims are examined it is difficult to find precisely what are the theories (cf: Kleibard, 1977).

At the same time, the controversy continues over the concept of curriculum (cf: Derr, 1977 and Egan, 1978).

There are those in the field of curriculum studies who would have us avoid discussions about the meaning of the concepts of curriculum and curriculum theory. It is all a matter of semantics, they say. The problem of meaning will not go away, however. Indeed, an apparent "identity crisis" faced by those in curriculum studies may be traced directly to misunderstandings about the nature of curriculum theory.

This paper is a summary of a study in which selected statements of curriculum writers were examined to explicate the referents and meanings of the concept of curriculum theory (McCrory, 1974). A significant finding from the analyses was the discovery that the notion of curriculum theory is most clearly seen as a compound concept made up of two element-terms. The element term 'curriculum' and the element term 'theory' carry meanings of their own when they are joined together to form the compound concept of curriculum theory.

The two dimensional nature of the concept of curriculum theory is represented in the following diagram:




it is necessary then to consider the meaning of each of the two element-terms. Analysis of each concept in this light provides possibilities for disentangling some of the vague and ambiguous usage in the curriculum literature.

First, common uses of the term 'curriculum' will be described as a classification of meanings. The classification of uses of the term 'curriculum' will take the form of a continuum representing emphases in meaning from content on one end to curriculum as process on the other.

#### The Concept of Curriculum

To begin with, it is acknowledged that there exists a major difference in emphasis where the term 'curriculum' is used. There are some contexts where the concern is primarily upon the knowledge, skills, and attitudes intended for students to achieve as a result of schooling. There are other contexts, however, where the concern is primarily involved with the teaching-learning process. This distinction is embedded in the linguistic contrast between curriculum as plans for the student to learn so-and-so, and plans for him to do this-and-that in order


to learn so-and so. The distinction can be represented diagrammatically as follows:



#### “Curriculum” and “Course of Study”

The terms ‘curriculum’ and ‘course of study’ are often used interchangeably. Bruner’s *MAN: A COURSE OF STUDY* program, for example, is often considered to be a “curriculum.” It is common to speak of a “vocational curriculum” or a “vocational course of study.” The context here is concerned with organizational arrangement of subjects and activities for learning. It makes little difference if the writer speaks of a course of study or a curriculum. The meanings of the two concepts overlap. They are closely related.

Certain distinctions, partially concealed in the language of curriculum thinkers, indicate that there may be a principle of common usage that may be explicated. It is here hypothesized that the principle implies that the distinction between curriculum and course of study hinges on the degree of comprehensiveness inherent in the context. A “broad fields” arrangement is sometimes called a curriculum because the arrangement includes (implied) plans for what pupils are to learn, as well as how they are to learn the content. An outline for subject area is called a course of study because it includes on the what of plans for instruction. Restating the principle, it can be said that the distinction between curriculum and course of study has to do with the degree of comprehensiveness inherent in the linguistic context. When the relationship of the concept ‘curriculum’ to the concept of ‘course of study’ is illustrated following the technique of Green (1971), the result appears as follows.




#### “Course of Study” and “Learning Objectives”

The principle of usage stated above suggests that the concepts of curriculum and course of study overlap in meaning because in some contexts they are both concerned with plans for content and planned activities for learning the content. What happens, then, when the concept of course of study is aimed less at process and more at content? In that case the concept of course of study falls off gradually into the concept of learning objectives, and it becomes more difficult to apply the idea of curriculum.

The concepts are related, but not identical. The principle of distinction in usage among the two terms may be stated thusly: As the focus of the discussion moves more exclusively toward the intended content for instruction, the concept of curriculum is less clearly exemplified and the concept of learning objectives is more clearly illustrated. This finding can be illustrated as follows:






### "Curriculum" and "Instructional Program"

Another term closely related to the notion of curriculum is the concept of instructional program. Curriculum scholars use this term, along with the word 'school program' to refer to the whole of school-based activities. In this dimension, language includes talk about spatial and temporal aspects, scheduling of teachers and students, and even the "extra-curricular" activities.


When the language of curriculum writers centers on talk about the total environment of the school, there is noticeable shift from some contexts where the concept of course of study has less application than does the concept of school program. The determining criteria for ordinary usage in curriculum talk seems to be one of the emphasis. It appears that when the context is in the realm of what it is intended that students learn, the concept of course of study is applicable. As the context shifts emphasis from the "what" (content) to include the "how" (process), then the concept of instructional program comes into play. This relationship of related terms is illustrated below.



### "Instructional Program" and "Intended Learning Opportunities"

'Intended learning opportunities,' like 'school program,' is a concept closely related to the concept of curriculum. When used in this sense, the term 'curriculum' refers to plans for activities of students during the acts of instruction.

In some ways, current uses of the term 'intended learning opportunities' are concerned with intended teaching methods. The form of learning is as much or more in consideration as the function of learning. Where distinctions occur between uses of the term 'school program' and 'intended learning activities,' the difference is again one of emphasis. In contexts where curriculum is broadly perceived as the whole of that which is intended to happen in school, then the concept of instructional program is most applicable. In contexts where emphasis is on the activities planned for the learner, then the concept of intended learning opportunity has greater application. This relationship may be illustrated as follows:




### The Concept of Theory

There exists a major difference in emphasis in the concept of theory as it is used in the curriculum field of study. There are some uses of the term 'theory' where the context is concerned with guidelines for practice. There are other contexts where the primary interest is to explain or describe events. The distinction is evident in the linguistic contrast between "theory for" and "theory of." By the first of these expressions it is ordinarily meant to focus on prescriptive aspects, and by the second to focus on the descriptive nature of the subject.

The relationship between these two emphases in use of the term 'theory' is highly significant to those who labor in the field of curriculum, because of a temptation to believe that one is more fundamental than the other. Whichever viewpoint is taken, quite different ideas about theoretical statements will result.

If "theory for" is taken to be more basic, then theory may be viewed primarily as a prescriptive guide or directive to practice. If "theory of" (the descriptive sense) is understood as the more fundamental meaning, then theory may be seen primarily as a making sense of empirically derived data about practice. In short, implicit in the contrast between "theory of" and "theory for" is the difficult problem of the relationship between prescribing and describing. Rather than to attempt to solve that complex problem here, it would seem adequate to point out that the prescriptive/descriptive aspect does play an important part in adding to the vagaries and ambiguities of the term 'theory.' The contrast between the two emphases in meaning are embodied in the phrases "theory for action" and "theory of action." The contrast may be represented graphically as follows:




### "Theory" and "Design"

The terms 'theory' and 'design' are often used interchangeably in this discourse of curriculum scholars. There are some contexts where either term may be used without changing the meaning of the statement. For example, it is common for curriculum writers to speak of a "subject-centered curriculum design" or a "child-centered" design. The referent in such cases is an organized arrangement of, or approach to, schooling. The phrase could just as easily be formed to read: "subject-centered curriculum theory" or "child-centered theory." In such cases where 'theory' and 'design' are used as synonyms, the context is concerned equally with speculation about what ought to be the orientation of curriculum, and with what actually is the case in many schools. The concepts overlap in meaning.

The distinctions noted in the language of curriculum scholars indicate that when the referent is an arrangement or approach for schooling, and the context is concerned with the knowledge base and assumptions underlying the arrangement, then the term 'theory' is normally used. However, when the contextual emphasis has a programmatic or normative emphasis, then the term 'design' comes into use. The distinction hinges on the degree of subjectivity inherent in the context. An arrangement of subject matter is sometimes called a curriculum theory when the context is concerned with that arrangement as it does exist in schools. As the

emphasis switches to what ought to exist, then the concept of design comes into play. This principle is illustrated in the following diagram:




#### "Design" and "Policy"

In one sense, there is an overlap in meaning of the terms 'design' and 'policy' which distinguishes them from the concept of theory. It is common for curriculum workers to speak of implementing a curriculum design or a curriculum policy. It would be highly unusual to speak of implementing a theory. Theories, in the descriptive sense, are not implemented—policies are. The reason it is possible to talk about implementing policies and not theories, is because policies are statements for action. They are intended to be used (or implemented) in the practice of schooling.

The concepts of design and policy are related, then, but not identical. Accepting a curriculum "design," such as the broadfields approach, does not tell the practitioner what he ought to do in the curriculum arena. A design may state that by accepting that particular arrangement of content, one has also accepted certain assumptions (and perhaps certain "theories"), but otherwise, the design deals very little with descriptive statements. The intent of a policy statement is not to explain, describe, and predict. The concept of policy, as used by curriculum writers, refers to judgments about guidelines for practice, and to persuade that those judgments be accepted.

In other words, as the emphasis in curricular discourse moves more toward speculation about what ought to be the curriculum, then the concept of theory is less clearly exemplified and the concept of policy is more clearly exemplified. This phenomenon is illustrated as follows:




#### "Theory" and "Model"

In some ways the concept of model is quite similar to that of theory. In some contexts the two terms, may be used interchangeably where the focus is on systematically related statements with both programmatic and descriptive implications. Both terms function in such cases as a perspective from which to make sense of empirical data and to formulate guides for action. As such, 'theory' and 'model' operate in both the philosophical and the scientific realm.

In some contexts, however, the term 'model' is used with a stronger emphasis toward the nonnormative concerns. In these situations, the term 'theory' is less like the concept of design. Curriculum theorists sometimes speak of describing reality by using a model or paradigm. The term in these cases refers to a shorthand method of presenting relationships which help the theorist make sense out of the data he is investigating. It would not always do to use the term 'theory' to describe such representations.


There are times when the concept of theory is used in the 'design' sense, and there are times when the concept is used in the 'model' sense. The term 'design,' however, is often oriented to statements of what ought to be the case. As the context becomes more involved with descriptive data, however, the term 'model' is used with more frequency than the term 'design.' The point of this analysis is not to discredit either term as cousin-terms of the concept of theory. Rather, the purpose is to show where there are subtle distinctions among the concepts as used in the literature of curriculum theorists. The relationships among the concepts described above are illustrated below:



**"Model" and "Research"**

As is the term 'model,' the term 'research' is sometimes related to the concept of theory. The relationship is not as close, however. It was noted that 'model' is used quite similarly to 'theory' in some situations, especially where the context has to do mainly with description of what is the case regarding theoretical concerns. In the case of the term 'research,' the contextual setting is almost always one of description, as opposed to prescription.

The distinction between 'model' and 'research' is one of emphasis. Where the context is concerned with both normative and descriptive aspects of logically related statements about curriculum, then the concept of model has an application. As the context focuses more on raw, descriptive data, the concept of research has greater application. This phenomenon of linguistic usage is represented on the following diagram:




**Conclusions**


This study has found that when curriculum scholars speak of curriculum theory, the compound concept often reflects the root notions of each of the component terms. The root notion of the concept of curriculum

was found to be "plans for instruction." The root meaning of the concept of theory was noted to be "systematically related statements." In its most elemental meaning, the concept of curriculum theory refers to a set of statements about plans for instruction.

Difficulties of communication occur because discussions in the curriculum field rarely operate in clear contexts. More often than not, as has been shown by the selected references, each of the element terms carries baggage of its own into the linguistic usage. The variances of meanings of the term 'curriculum' and the term 'theory,' when joined, result in a web-like tangle of meanings. Uses of the element terms, as analyzed in this study, may be noted on a continuum. When the compound term 'curriculum theory' is used, the resulting variations of meaning may be plotted on a two-dimensional continuum as shown in the following diagram:




It should be noted that as the meaning of each element term goes outward from the center or root meaning, the meaning becomes less clearly associated with the concept as it normally occurs in the literature. In the case of the term 'curriculum,' for example, as the meaning goes outward to the left, it takes on a clearer sense of curriculum as content for instruction. This realm may be illustrated as follows:




Curriculum talk about content for instruction, as represented by curriculum materials such as texts, charts, films, and other carriers of information, serves potential content for instruction (cf: Payne, 1969).

As the meaning of 'curriculum' moves toward the right side of the continuum, the focus is more on the process of instruction. This usage can be illustrated as a system on the right side of the diagram, called the concept of instruction:




Discourse pertaining to the instruction system is normally concerned with methods and styles of teaching. References such as Mager (1962) and Banathy (1968) represent work which is primarily in this arena. It may be noted that reference to curriculum material often assumes instructional methods as given, and talk about instructional method often assumes predetermined content-bearing materials. Some curriculum discourse, however, deals with both aspects as an open question. It matters a great deal, then, which "sense location" of the concept of theory is assumed in any one piece of curriculum theory discourse.

The theory dimension of the concept of curriculum theory was found to have similar extremes of meaning. Toward one end of the continuum of meanings, theory takes on value connotations in the sense of theory as philosophy. That realm may be identified as shown on the following diagram.



The chief characteristic of curriculum theory language in value-oriented contexts is concern for what ought to be the plans for instruction. Much of the literature on how to develop curricula falls in this realm of meaning.


At the other end of the dimension of the concept of curriculum theory is the realm of theory as science. In this sense, the term 'theory' carries strong connotations of data as derived from empirical research. This extreme meaning of the concept relates to the others as indicated in the following diagram.



Examples of discourse in the contexts of research data may be found in references to analyses of curriculum planning such as that of McClure (1965) and Walker (1970).

When current meanings of the concept of curriculum theory are viewed, it becomes apparent that there are four major emphases which can be described as quadrants of meaning. One conceptual emphasis is in contexts where curriculum theory refers to systematically related statements about the content that is planned for instruction.

A second emphasis places curriculum theory as the statements about content that ought to be planned for instruction. In a third conception curriculum theory represents statements about the activities which ought to be planned. The fourth emphasis refers to curriculum theory as statements about activities which are planned for instruction. These four emphases may be illustrated in four quadrants, as in the following diagram:



The writings of curriculum scholars may be examined for placement on the map of the concept of curriculum theory.

#### Implications for Practitioners

Given the varieties of meanings of the concept of curriculum theory found in the discourse of curriculum scholars analyzed in this study, it would seem wise for those who are "on the firing line" to reconsider a particular piece of folklore. A bit of conventional wisdom has it that "theory cannot tell you what to do." Perhaps theory cannot, in the sense of research data, but it certainly can, in the sense of a philosophy. It has been pointed out repeatedly that much of the discourse which has been loosely termed 'theory' has been set in the context of a suggestion for what ought to be done in the school curriculum. There are several implications for practitioners.

First, whether philosophic theory is of more value to school practitioners than scientific theory is not to be debated here. The point remains that, in reading the literature in the curriculum field, "theoretical" statements can be taken in several ways--as suggestions for, or as descriptions of curricular matters. A survey (Comfort, et al., 1974) of articles in five leading journals of education found that: (1) most of the articles were written about administration, curriculum, and instruction; and (2) only one-fifth of the articles had anything to do with research. This would suggest that those who labor on the front lines may well be unaware of how little "scientific" curriculum theory there is. In fact, some practitioners may be unaware of the concept of scientific curriculum theory. If this is the case, then a significant portion of potentially helpful information is being overlooked by persons who are in a position to use the information directly.

Second, there are suggestions in the discourse used as reference for this study that in some cases, curriculum scholars may be, consciously or unconsciously, using the term 'curriculum theory' in a context of scientific research in order to lend prestige to their statements. When this happens, a school administrator or curriculum worker could get the impression that a curriculum program is being described when it is really being prescribed. This could have immense consequences upon the decision-making processes of the school personnel. If curricular statements are perceived as "programmatically," in Scheffler's terms (1960), then the ideas can be examined for their philosophic base to determine consistency and fit with the philosophy of the specific school. If, however, curricular statements are taken as reportive statements of fact, then practitioners might imply that the ideas worked somewhere else, and they might be more inclined to accept the ideas on face value. If this is the case, and this writer suspects it is, then there is little hope of the field of curriculum studies to rise beyond a state of conventional wisdom or shared ignorance.

Finally, practitioners in the schools might do well to look more closely at the contexts of statements purported to be "curricular" or "instructional." This study has shown that statements of curriculum theory vary from those that are primarily concerned with a knowledge base for content, to those which are mainly concerned with the process of instruction. Bruner's TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION (1966), for example, could possibly be passed up by those who thought that the book had little to say to someone selecting content for the "curriculum." On the contrary, Bruner's book deals more with the selection and structuring of content than with selection of teaching methods.

#### Implications for Student/Scholars

The onus for producing vague and ambiguous usage of the concept of curriculum theory must fall to those who labor in the area of studies loosely called the curriculum field. Those persons who are doing research in the field, those who write about it, and those who attempt to develop curricular theories, must all bear responsibility for miscommunication. There are several implications to be highlighted here.

First, curriculum scholars who would like the concept of curriculum theory to be entirely a notion of empirical research, may be limiting the meaning of the term so much as to render it useless in current discourse. If confusion among scholars is to be avoided by holding to one, and only one, root notion of the term 'curriculum theory,' then it could be that the scientific sense is not a productive usage. It is not productive because talk in the realm of "scientific" curriculum theory, in the present state of the art, must be largely talk about curriculum theory. Discourse in curriculum theory is mostly normative at this time, and it probably will be



until much more research has been done in the curriculum field.

Second, restricting the concept of curriculum theory to normative statements has its dangers also. If the term 'curriculum theory' is to be used only to refer to talk about "what ought to be," then there is little hope of any progress that would parallel some of the other areas of social science, such as learning theory. Consider a field of study that dealt only with how humans should learn.

Third, the common-sense approach would not be to suggest a "common sense" of the term 'curriculum theory,' but to recommend that curriculum scholars develop a heightened awareness that there are many meanings, in various contexts, in which the term 'curriculum theory' can be, and is, used legitimately. The problem comes, as has been stated before, when curriculum writers used the concept ambiguously in similar contexts, or even consistently in vague contexts. The result can be only claims and counter-claims, or much smoke and little fire.

Lastly, this study has indicated that there are many pieces of literature in which the author talks about (1) what curriculum theory might be, (2) what it could be, (3) what it was, and (4) what others say it is. There is a subtle but clear implication in much of the discourse of curriculum scholars that someone should be doing it. Schwab (1970), for example, stated that this "flight upwards and sideways" provides very little light on the problems at hand. Theorizing about curricular matters is dirty work. It is dirty because clear procedures have not yet been worked out, and the boundaries have yet to be established. The need remains, however, and obscure communication will certainly not help those who are striving to produce some light.

The results of this study may be summed up by the suggestion that it is not fruitful to search for the "ideal" meaning of the concept of curriculum theory. Rather, the productive questions of those who work in the curriculum field should be:

1. Which notion of curriculum is under consideration?
2. Which emphasis of the idea of theory is in use?
3. What are the implications of the author's concept of curriculum theory, given the context of his language? This major implication suggests a stronger use of analytical procedures when reading, writing, and applying ideas, concerned with curricular ideas.

#### REFERENCES

- Banathy, Bela H. *INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS*. Palo Alto, CA: Fearon, 1968.
- Bruner, Jerome S. *TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1966.
- Comfort, Ronald E., et al. "Who's Writing About What in Education's Major Journals?" *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, May, 1974, pp. 663-667.
- Derr, Richard. "Curriculum: A Concept Elucidation." *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*. Vol. 7, No. 1, 1978, pp. 65-72.
- Egan, Kieran. "What Is Curriculum?" *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, pp. 65-72.
- Green, Thomas F. *THE ACTIVITIES OF TEACHING*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
- Johnson, Mauritz, Jr. "Definitions and Models in Curriculum Theory." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, April, 1967, pp. 127-140.
- Kliebard, Herbert M. "Curriculum Theory: Give Me a 'For Instance.'" *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*. Vol 6, No. 4, 1977, pp. 257-269.
- Mager, Robert F. *PREPARING INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES*. Palo Alto, CA: Fearon, 1962.
- McClure, Robert M. "Procedures, Processes and Products in Curriculum Development." Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965.
- McCrary, David L. "The Concept of Curriculum Theory: An Analysis." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, 1974.
- Payne, Arlene. *THE STUDY OF CURRICULUM PLANS*. Washington, DC: National Educational Association, 1969.
- Scheffler, Israel. *THE LANGUAGE OF EDUCATION*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1960.

Schwab, Joseph J. **THE PRACTICAL: LANGUAGE FOR CURRICULUM.** Washington, DC: National Education Association, 1969.

Walker, Decker. "An Empirical Model of the Process of Curriculum Development." Paper presented at AERA meeting, Minneapolis, February, 1970.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

## A Map of the Concept of Curriculum Theory

David L. McCrory  
West Virginia University


The curriculum field abounds with proposals and counter-proposals regarding what is and what ought to be the nature of instructional programs in the schools. Many proposals claim to be based on certain curriculum theories, but when the claims are examined it is difficult to find precisely what are the theories (cf: Kleibard, 1977).

At the same time, the controversy continues over the concept of curriculum (cf: Derr, 1977 and Egan, 1978).

There are those in the field of curriculum studies who would have us avoid discussions about the meaning of the concepts of curriculum and curriculum theory. It is all a matter of semantics, they say. The problem of meaning will not go away, however. Indeed, an apparent "identity crisis" faced by those in curriculum studies may be traced directly to misunderstandings about the nature of curriculum theory.

This paper is a summary of a study in which selected statements of curriculum writers were examined to explicate the referents and meanings of the concept of curriculum theory (McCrory, 1974). A significant finding from the analyses was the discovery that the notion of curriculum theory is most clearly seen as a compound concept made up of two element-terms. The element term 'curriculum' and the element term 'theory' carry meanings of their own when they are joined together to form the compound concept of curriculum theory.

The two dimensional nature of the concept of curriculum theory is represented in the following diagram:




it is necessary then to consider the meaning of each of the two element-terms. Analysis of each concept in this light provides possibilities for disentangling some of the vague and ambiguous usage in the curriculum literature.

First, common uses of the term 'curriculum' will be described as a classification of meanings. The classification of uses of the term 'curriculum' will take the form of a continuum representing emphases in meaning from content on one end to curriculum as process on the other.

#### The Concept of Curriculum

To begin with, it is acknowledged that there exists a major difference in emphasis where the term 'curriculum' is used. There are some contexts where the concern is primarily upon the knowledge, skills, and attitudes intended for students to achieve as a result of schooling. There are other contexts, however, where the concern is primarily involved with the teaching-learning process. This distinction is embedded in the linguistic contrast between curriculum as plans for the student to learn so-and-so, and plans for him to do this-and-that in order






### "Curriculum" and "Instructional Program"

Another term closely related to the notion of curriculum is the concept of instructional program. Curriculum scholars use this term, along with the word 'school program' to refer to the whole of school-based activities. In this dimension, language includes talk about spatial and temporal aspects, scheduling of teachers and students, and even the "extra-curricular" activities.


When the language of curriculum writers centers on talk about the total environment of the school, there is noticeable shift from some contexts where the concept of course of study has less application than does the concept of school program. The determining criteria for ordinary usage in curriculum talk seems to be one of the emphasis. It appears that when the context is in the realm of what it is intended that students learn, the concept of course of study is applicable. As the context shifts emphasis from the "what" (content) to include the "how" (process), then the concept of instructional program comes into play. This relationship of related terms is illustrated below.



### "Instructional Program" and "Intended Learning Opportunities"

'Intended learning opportunities,' like 'school program,' is a concept closely related to the concept of curriculum. When used in this sense, the term 'curriculum' refers to plans for activities of students during the acts of instruction.

In some ways, current uses of the term 'intended learning opportunities' are concerned with intended teaching methods. The form of learning is as much or more in consideration as the function of learning. Where distinctions occur between uses of the term 'school program' and 'intended learning activities,' the difference is again one of emphasis. In contexts where curriculum is broadly perceived as the whole of that which is intended to happen in school, then the concept of instructional program is most applicable. In contexts where emphasis is on the activities planned for the learner, then the concept of intended learning opportunity has greater application. This relationship may be illustrated as follows:




### The Concept of Theory

There exists a major difference in emphasis in the concept of theory as it is used in the curriculum field of study. There are some uses of the term 'theory' where the context is concerned with guidelines for practice. There are other contexts where the primary interest is to explain or describe events. The distinction is evident in the linguistic contrast between "theory for" and "theory of." By the first of these expressions it is ordinarily meant to focus on prescriptive aspects, and by the second to focus on the descriptive nature of the subject.

The relationship between these two emphases in use of the term 'theory' is highly significant to those who labor in the field of curriculum, because of a temptation to believe that one is more fundamental than the other. Whichever viewpoint is taken, quite different ideas about theoretical statements will result.

If "theory for" is taken to be more basic, then theory may be viewed primarily as a prescriptive guide or directive to practice. If "theory of" (the descriptive sense) is understood as the more fundamental meaning, then theory may be seen primarily as a making sense of empirically derived data about practice. In short, implicit in the contrast between "theory of" and "theory for" is the difficult problem of the relationship between prescribing and describing. Rather than to attempt to solve that complex problem here, it would seem adequate to point out that the prescriptive/descriptive aspect does play an important part in adding to the vagaries and ambiguities of the term 'theory.' The contrast between the two emphases in meaning are embodied in the phrases "theory for action" and "theory of action." The contrast may be represented graphically as follows:




### "Theory" and "Design"

The terms 'theory' and 'design' are often used interchangeably in this discourse of curriculum scholars. There are some contexts where either term may be used without changing the meaning of the statement. For example, it is common for curriculum writers to speak of a "subject-centered curriculum design" or a "child-centered" design. The referent in such cases is an organized arrangement of, or approach to, schooling. The phrase could just as easily be formed to read: "subject-centered curriculum theory" or "child-centered theory." In such cases where 'theory' and 'design' are used as synonyms, the context is concerned equally with speculation about what ought to be the orientation of curriculum, and with what actually is the case in many schools. The concepts overlap in meaning.

The distinctions noted in the language of curriculum scholars indicate that when the referent is an arrangement or approach for schooling, and the context is concerned with the knowledge base and assumptions underlying the arrangement, then the term 'theory' is normally used. However, when the contextual emphasis has a programmatic or normative emphasis, then the term 'design' comes into use. The distinction hinges on the degree of subjectivity inherent in the context. An arrangement of subject matter is sometimes called a curriculum theory when the context is concerned with that arrangement as it does exist in schools. As the

emphasis switches to what ought to exist, then the concept of design comes into play. This principle is illustrated in the following diagram:




#### "Design" and "Policy"

In one sense, there is an overlap in meaning of the terms 'design' and 'policy' which distinguishes them from the concept of theory. It is common for curriculum workers to speak of implementing a curriculum design or a curriculum policy. It would be highly unusual to speak of implementing a theory. Theories, in the descriptive sense, are not implemented--policies are. The reason it is possible to talk about implementing policies and not theories, is because policies are statements for action. They are intended to be used (or implemented) in the practice of schooling.

The concepts of design and policy are related, then, but not identical. Accepting a curriculum "design," such as the broadfields approach, does not tell the practitioner what he ought to do in the curriculum arena. A design may state that by accepting that particular arrangement of content, one has also accepted certain assumptions (and perhaps certain "theories"), but otherwise, the design deals very little with descriptive statements. The intent of a policy statement is not to explain, describe, and predict. The concept of policy, as used by curriculum writers, refers to judgments about guidelines for practice, and to persuade that those judgments be accepted.

In other words, as the emphasis in curricular discourse moves more toward speculation about what ought to be the curriculum, then the concept of theory is less clearly exemplified and the concept of policy is more clearly exemplified. This phenomenon is illustrated as follows:




#### "Theory" and "Model"

In some ways the concept of model is quite similar to that of theory. In some contexts the two terms, may be used interchangeably where the focus is on systematically related statements with both programmatic and descriptive implications. Both terms function in such cases as a perspective from which to make sense of empirical data and to formulate guides for action. As such, 'theory' and 'model' operate in both the philosophical and the scientific realm.

In some contexts, however, the term 'model' is used with a stronger emphasis toward the nonnormative concerns. In these situations, the term 'theory' is less like the concept of design. Curriculum theorists sometimes speak of describing reality by using a model or paradigm. The term in these cases refers to a shorthand method of presenting relationships which help the theorist make sense out of the data he is investigating. It would not always do to use the term 'theory' to describe such representations.


There are times when the concept of theory is used in the 'design' sense, and there are times when the concept is used in the 'model' sense. The term 'design,' however, is often oriented to statements of what ought to be the case. As the context becomes more involved with descriptive data, however, the term 'model' is used with more frequency than the term 'design.' The point of this analysis is not to discredit either term as cousin-terms of the concept of theory. Rather, the purpose is to show where there are subtle distinctions among the concepts as used in the literature of curriculum theorists. The relationships among the concepts described above are illustrated below:



#### "Model" and "Research"

As is the term 'model,' the term 'research' is sometimes related to the concept of theory. The relationship is not as close, however. It was noted that 'model' is used quite similarly to 'theory' in some situations, especially where the context has to do mainly with description of what is the case regarding theoretical concerns. In the case of the term 'research,' the contextual setting is almost always one of description, as opposed to prescription.

The distinction between 'model' and 'research' is one of emphasis. Where the context is concerned with both normative and descriptive aspects of logically related statements about curriculum, then the concept of model has an application. As the context focuses more on raw, descriptive data, the concept of research has greater application. This phenomenon of linguistic usage is represented on the following diagram:




#### Conclusions

This study has found that when curriculum scholars speak of curriculum theory, the compound concept often reflects the root notions of each of the component terms. The root notion of the concept of curriculum




was found to be "plans for instruction." The root meaning of the concept of theory was noted to be "systematically related statements." In its most elemental meaning, the concept of curriculum theory refers to a set of statements about plans for instruction.

Difficulties of communication occur because discussions in the curriculum field rarely operate in clear contexts. More often than not, as has been shown by the selected references, each of the element terms carries baggage of its own into the linguistic usage. The variances of meanings of the term 'curriculum' and the term 'theory,' when joined, result in a web-like tangle of meanings. Uses of the element terms, as analyzed in this study, may be noted on a continuum. When the compound term 'curriculum theory' is used, the resulting variations of meaning may be plotted on a two-dimensional continuum as shown in the following diagram:




It should be noted that as the meaning of each element term goes outward from the center or root meaning, the meaning becomes less clearly associated with the concept as it normally occurs in the literature. In the case of the term 'curriculum,' for example, as the meaning goes outward to the left, it takes on a clearer sense of curriculum as content for instruction. This realm may be illustrated as follows:




Curriculum talk about content for instruction, as represented by curriculum materials such as texts, charts, films, and other carriers of information, serves potential content for instruction (cf: Payne, 1969).

As the meaning of 'curriculum' moves toward the right side of the continuum, the focus is more on the process of instruction. This usage can be illustrated as a system on the right side of the diagram, called the concept of instruction:




Discourse pertaining to the instruction system is normally concerned with methods and styles of teaching. References such as Mager (1962) and Banathy (1968) represent work which is primarily in this arena. It may be noted that reference to curriculum material often assumes instructional methods as given, and talk about instructional method often assumes predetermined content-bearing materials. Some curriculum discourse, however, deals with both aspects as an open question. It matters a great deal, then, which "sense location" of the concept of theory is assumed in any one piece of curriculum theory discourse.

The theory dimension of the concept of curriculum theory was found to have similar extremes of meaning. Toward one end of the continuum of meanings, theory takes on value connotations in the sense of theory as philosophy. That realm may be identified as shown on the following diagram.



The chief characteristic of curriculum theory language in value-oriented contexts is concern for what ought to be the plans for instruction. Much of the literature on how to develop curricula falls in this realm of meaning.


At the other end of the dimension of the concept of curriculum theory is the realm of theory as science. In this sense, the term 'theory' carries strong connotations of data as derived from empirical research. This extreme meaning of the concept relates to the others as indicated in the following diagram.



Examples of discourse in the contexts of research data may be found in references to analyses of curriculum planning such as that of McClure (1965) and Walker (1970).

When current meanings of the concept of curriculum theory are viewed, it becomes apparent that there are four major emphases which can be described as quadrants of meaning. One conceptual emphasis is in contexts where curriculum theory refers to systematically related statements about the content that is planned for instruction.

A second emphasis places curriculum theory as the statements about content that ought to be planned for instruction. In a third conception curriculum theory represents statements about the activities which ought to be planned. The fourth emphasis refers to curriculum theory as statements about activities which are planned for instruction. These four emphases may be illustrated in four quadrants, as in the following diagram:



The writings of curriculum scholars may be examined for placement on the map of the concept of curriculum theory.

#### Implications for Practitioners

Given the varieties of meanings of the concept of curriculum theory found in the discourse of curriculum scholars analyzed in this study, it would seem wise for those who are "on the firing line" to reconsider a particular piece of folklore. A bit of conventional wisdom has it that "theory cannot tell you what to do." Perhaps theory cannot, in the sense of research data, but it certainly can, in the sense of a philosophy. It has been pointed out repeatedly that much of the discourse which has been loosely termed 'theory' has been set in the context of a suggestion for what ought to be done in the school curriculum. There are several implications for practitioners.

First, whether philosophic theory is of more value to school practitioners than scientific theory is not to be debated here. The point remains that, in reading the literature in the curriculum field, "theoretical" statements can be taken in several ways--as suggestions for, or as descriptions of curricular matters. A survey (Comfort, et al., 1974) of articles in five leading journals of education found that: (1) most of the articles were written about administration, curriculum, and instruction; and (2) only one-fifth of the articles had anything to do with research. This would suggest that those who labor on the front lines may well be unaware of how little "scientific" curriculum theory there is. In fact, some practitioners may be unaware of the concept of scientific curriculum theory. If this is the case, then a significant portion of potentially helpful information is being overlooked by persons who are in a position to use the information directly.

Second, there are suggestions in the discourse used as reference for this study that in some cases, curriculum scholars may be, consciously or unconsciously, using the term 'curriculum theory' in a context of scientific research in order to lend prestige to their statements. When this happens, a school administrator or curriculum worker could get the impression that a curriculum program is being described when it is really being prescribed. This could have immense consequences upon the decision-making processes of the school personnel. If curricular statements are perceived as "programmatically," in Scheffler's terms (1960), then the ideas can be examined for their philosophic base to determine consistency and fit with the philosophy of the specific school. If, however, curricular statements are taken as reportive statements of fact, then practitioners might imply that the ideas worked somewhere else, and they might be more inclined to accept the ideas on face value. If this is the case, and this writer suspects it is, then there is little hope of the field of curriculum studies to rise beyond a state of conventional wisdom or shared ignorance.

Finally, practitioners in the schools might do well to look more closely at the contexts of statements purported to be "curricular" or "instructional." This study has shown that statements of curriculum theory vary from those that are primarily concerned with a knowledge base for content, to those which are mainly concerned with the process of instruction. Bruner's *TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION* (1966), for example, could possibly be passed up by those who thought that the book had little to say to someone selecting content for the "curriculum." On the contrary, Bruner's book deals more with the selection and structuring of content than with selection of teaching methods.

#### Implications for Student/Scholars

The onus for producing vague and ambiguous usage of the concept of curriculum theory must fall to those who labor in the area of studies loosely called the curriculum field. Those persons who are doing research in the field, those who write about it, and those who attempt to develop curricular theories, must all bear responsibility for miscommunication. There are several implications to be highlighted here.

First, curriculum scholars who would like the concept of curriculum theory to be entirely a notion of empirical research, may be limiting the meaning of the term so much as to render it useless in current discourse. If confusion among scholars is to be avoided by holding to one, and only one, root notion of the term 'curriculum theory,' then it could be that the scientific sense is not a productive usage. It is not productive because talk in the realm of "scientific" curriculum theory, in the present state of the art, must be largely talk about curriculum theory. Discourse in curriculum theory is mostly normative at this time, and it probably will be

until much more research has been done in the curriculum field.

Second, restricting the concept of curriculum theory to normative statements has its dangers also. If the term 'curriculum theory' is to be used only to refer to talk about "what ought to be," then there is little hope of any progress that would parallel some of the other areas of social science, such as learning theory. Consider a field of study that dealt only with how humans should learn.

Third, the common-sense approach would not be to suggest a "common sense" of the term 'curriculum theory,' but to recommend that curriculum scholars develop a heightened awareness that there are many meanings, in various contexts, in which the term 'curriculum theory' can be, and is, used legitimately. The problem comes, as has been stated before, when curriculum writers used the concept ambiguously in similar contexts, or even consistently in vague contexts. The result can be only claims and counter-claims, or much smoke and little fire.

Lastly, this study has indicated that there are many pieces of literature in which the author talks about (1) what curriculum theory might be, (2) what it could be, (3) what it was, and (4) what others say it is. There is a subtle but clear implication in much of the discourse of curriculum scholars that someone should be doing it. Schwab (1970), for example, stated that this "flight upwards and sideways" provides very little light on the problems at hand. Theorizing about curricular matters is dirty work. It is dirty because clear procedures have not yet been worked out, and the boundaries have yet to be established. The need remains, however, and obscure communication will certainly not help those who are striving to produce some light.

The results of this study may be summed up by the suggestion that it is not fruitful to search for the "ideal" meaning of the concept of curriculum theory. Rather, the productive questions of those who work in the curriculum field should be:

1. Which notion of curriculum is under consideration?
2. Which emphasis of the idea of theory is in use?
3. What are the implications of the author's concept of curriculum theory, given the context of his language? This major implication suggests a stronger use of analytical procedures when reading, writing, and applying ideas, concerned with curricular ideas.

#### REFERENCES

- Banathy, Bela H. *INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS*. Palo Alto, CA: Fearon, 1968.
- Bruner, Jerome S. *TOWARD A THEORY OF INSTRUCTION*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1966.
- Comfort, Ronald E., et al. "Who's Writing About What in Education's Major Journals?" *EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*, May, 1974, pp. 663-667.
- Derr, Richard. "Curriculum: A Concept Elucidation." *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*. Vol. 7, No. 1, 1978, pp. 65-72.
- Egan, Kieran. "What Is Curriculum?" *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*. Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, pp. 65-72.
- Green, Thomas F. *THE ACTIVITIES OF TEACHING*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971.
- Johnson, Mauritz, Jr. "Definitions and Models in Curriculum Theory." *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, April, 1967, pp. 127-140.
- Kliebard, Herbert M. "Curriculum Theory: Give Me a 'For Instance.'" *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*. Vol 6, No. 4, 1977, pp. 257-269.
- Mager, Robert F. *PREPARING INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES*. Palo Alto, CA: Fearon, 1962.
- McClure, Robert M. "Procedures, Processes and Products in Curriculum Development." Unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965.
- McCrary, David L. "The Concept of Curriculum Theory: An Analysis." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, 1974.
- Payne, Arlene. *THE STUDY OF CURRICULUM PLANS*. Washington, DC: National Educational Association, 1969.
- Scheffler, Israel. *THE LANGUAGE OF EDUCATION*. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1960.

Schwab, Joseph J. *THE PRACTICAL: LANGUAGE FOR CURRICULUM*. Washington, DC: National Education Association, 1969.

Walker, Decker. "An Empirical Model of the Process of Curriculum Development." Paper presented at AERA meeting, Minneapolis, February, 1970.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

## Shaping the High School Curriculum: The Case of Regional Accreditation

Carolyn M. Jurkowitz  
St. Benedict Academy, Fairview, Pennsylvania

### Introduction

One fruit of recent efforts to demythologize the curriculum field has been the revelation that curriculum-making is not merely a matter influenced by political pressures, it is, in itself, a political process.<sup>1</sup> In pointing out the inadequacies of a "rational-scientific" curriculum model, curriculum writers have identified a number of outside groups exercising varying degrees of control over school curricula. These groups, which include federal and state governments, foundations and other private organizations, national testing agencies, accrediting associations, textbook/software companies, professional associations, special interest groups, and colleges and universities, exert their influence primarily by "establishing minimum standards, by generating curricular alternatives, and by demanding curriculum change."<sup>2</sup>

While we have recognized the impact of such groups on curriculum, we have, however, done little to demonstrate it.<sup>3</sup> This paper takes one step in that direction by analyzing the relationship between secondary school curriculum and one particular outside force: the regional accrediting association.<sup>4</sup> This analysis is partly historical and partly theoretical.

### The Historical Dimension

#### The Certificate System

"The certification association is a peculiarly western and especially American device of social control," claim Wiley and Zald in their study of the growth and transformation of educational accrediting agencies. "It is a mechanism of self-regulation that develops in societies where hierarchical regulation is weak and where relevant professional groups believe market forces are inadequate for the maintenance of desired standards."<sup>5</sup>

The secondary schools of the late nineteenth century certainly reflected an inadequacy of desired standards, at least in the eyes of many nineteenth century educators. Lamented William Collar, headmaster of Boston's Roxbury Latin School, in 1891:

Whatever criticism we may make upon the substance, the aims, or the principles of education in European states, we must admit that abroad education is organized and that here it is not. There, even in the poorest states,...all grades of school...are brought into an organic union; here is an utter want of organization, a chaos of relations.<sup>6</sup>

There were no generally accepted curricular standards in the late nineteenth century, no common sequence of instruction extending from grade to grade, and little similarity between what was taught in one school and what might be taught in the next. The dropout rate was high; buildings were overcrowded; and teachers ill-prepared to cope with the wide variety of students and subjects which confronted them.<sup>7</sup>

The first form of school accreditation--the certificate system--began during this early period in the development of the modern high school. Having no curricular standards of their own, secondary schools of the late nineteenth century set their programs by the dictates of the colleges whom they served. In fact, high school reputations rose and fell on the success or failure of the fewer than 5 percent of their graduates who went on to college. When University of Michigan President Frieze first proposed the certificate system as a form of college admission in 1871, he aimed to improve the quality of college preparatory coursework in Michigan schools--to promote a "statewide system of public secondary education that would identify, prepare, and certify for university admission students of high academic caliber."<sup>8</sup>

Under this plan a team of university inspectors visited feeder high schools. They evaluated the school's academic program: the number and content of courses offered and the textbooks used; next, matters relating to instruction: the academic preparation of teachers, the adequacy of instructional performance, and the number and length of class periods; and third, the overall moral tone of the school. These inspectors were primarily

interested in ascertaining the ability of the school to prepare its students for college. If the school "passed inspection," its students could enter the certifying college or university without further examination.

The certificate arrangement provided high schools with a college admissions alternative. Instead of splitting every senior class into many, each preparing students for a different set of entrance requirements,<sup>9</sup> high schools enjoying the certificate privilege were able to ensure college entrance for those who sought it while focusing their curricular attention on the students who did not.

Participating colleges also benefited from the certificate plan. By facilitating admissions, the certificate system aided college recruitment. It controlled the quality of academic preparation for college through the inspection process, and it freed colleges from the necessity of operating preparatory departments of their own.<sup>10</sup>

The certificate plan represented an effort on the part of the colleges to standardize curriculum at the secondary level. As University of Michigan President Frieze explained, in describing the certificate to the college's board of regents:

We go back to the schools and aid their instructors in devising correct plans and laying solid foundations of scholarship; instead of waiting until pupils present themselves at the University, prepared under dissimilar, and perhaps erroneous systems, often imperfectly prepared, and sometimes rejected for deficiencies which could have been obviated by this previous interchange of views between the Faculty and the preparatory teachers.<sup>11</sup>

The system spread rapidly. By the early twentieth century Columbia University's Joseph Henderson, in compiling a book on the subject, could report that some form of certification was in use "to some extent and in some form in every state in the Union and in all institutions of higher learning with the exception of less than a half dozen independent colleges along the Atlantic Coast."<sup>12</sup>

So important was curricular uniformity to the certificate system's notion of educational quality that the plan's downfall came in part with the breakdown of curricular uniformity in certificated schools.<sup>13</sup> In 1893, for example, when the University of Minnesota discovered that some diploma high schools permitted students to omit "required" subjects and substitute others, it ruled that entering students had to make up any subjects required for university admissions, diploma notwithstanding. To the universities, academic quality depended upon the maintenance of specific courses of study; in many instances high schools automatically lost their certificate privilege when they underwent a change in administration or a revision of the curriculum. Because the colleges certified a great number of institutions over a vast geographical area, dropped high schools had to wait long periods for revisitation and possible recertification. It was at this point that accrediting associations stepped in to assume the certification function.

The accrediting associations were responding to a far larger movement toward standardization--a movement which affected institutions throughout the country in the general period between 1880 and 1920--when they began to develop accreditation procedures at the turn of the century. Though they too were initially concerned only with ascertaining the ability of member high schools to prepare their students to do college work, they established a far more complex and directive system of certification than the colleges had ever envisioned. This system sought to ensure the educational quality of "approved" institutions by demanding their conformance to specific curriculum standards.

#### The Regional Associations Take over Certification

The accrediting association, in its nonaccrediting form, had existed since 1885 when a group of fifty-one New England educators--about an equal number of college presidents and preparatory school principals--gathered in Boston to discuss school/college relations and other matters of mutual concern. This collegial gathering became institutionalized as the New England Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools. The Middle States Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools began in a similar fashion. Disturbed about the small number of high school students going on to collegiate work, the College Association of the Middle States and Maryland voted in 1892 to expand its membership to the high schools. The Middle States group spent



most of its formative years debating the issue of appropriate college admission requirements, and in 1899 the College Entrance Examination Board was born of this discussion. In Atlanta at the Georgia School of Technology, Chancellor James Kirkland of Vanderbilt called together the first meeting of the Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools of the Southern States in 1895. While the post-Civil War condition of most Southern schools precluded the luxury of an informal collegial gathering, members of the Southern Association officially described their tasks as delineating the functions of secondary schools and colleges, eliminating the college as a preparatory school, and establishing minimum standards for all academic institutions.

It was the North Central Association, also formed in 1895, which became the first regional agency to define itself as an accrediting body. In 1901 Inspector A.S. Whitney of the University of Michigan spoke on "The Problems of Harmonizing Inspection by Numerous Colleges so as to Avoid Duplication of Work and Secure the Greatest Efficiency."<sup>14</sup> He proposed that the NCA act as a clearinghouse for the exchange of opinions regarding the academic standings of schools in different states. With each state's university inspector responsible for visiting the schools in his state and reporting data on a uniform inspector's blank, the inspectors could then meet once or twice a year and draw up an "accredited list" of schools of the highest ranks. The association paired this proposal with a second made by S.A. Forbes of the University of Illinois at the same meeting. Forbes called for a standing committee of the association, aided by subcommittees representing each member state whose job would be:

defining and describing high school courses of study, ascribing to each its admission [to college] value and dividing the list of such courses into constants, group electives, and general electives to be accepted as such by all.<sup>15</sup>

The accreditation plan which developed from Whitney's and Forbes's proposals became the model for regional accreditation not only in the North Central Association, but eventually in each of the other associations as well. For the North Central Association, accreditation was the stamp of educational respectability; respectability which implied a uniformly appropriate program of studies. As part of its official effort toward standardizing, and thereby upgrading, high school coursework, the NCA defined a unit of study ("a course covering a school year of not less than 35 weeks, with four or five periods of at least forty-five minutes per week");<sup>16</sup> set graduation requirements (fifteen units of study); and outlined, in over twenty-seven pages, the curriculum content of acceptable units of coursework in each of the high school subjects which the association thought ought to be included for college admission.

As the high school severed its bonds with the college, accreditation standards became a means for evaluating not simply the ability of the school to prepare those going on to college, but its ability to provide secondary education for all students, college-bound or not. Accreditation standards expanded with the scope of high school activities so that by 1930 they encompassed such concerns as acceptable student/teacher ratios; proper maintenance of school buildings; requirements for teacher preparation, teacher class load, and class size; faculty salaries; supervision of instruction; library and laboratory specifications; student records; athletics; and guidance counseling.

If the emergence of the high school as an autonomous educational institution can be used as a measure of success, then the efforts of the North Central Association and the impact of other standardizing forces on secondary schooling can be judged as quite effective. Accreditation stamped the growing form of compulsory public education with a seal of legitimacy. By the late 1920s it had become America's benchmark of high school quality and an educational "must" which effectively belied its supposedly voluntary nature.

#### Accreditation and the Curriculum: Contemporary Issues

While the importance of regional accreditation as a measure of educational accountability has since declined (most recently finding a replacement in increased state regulation), over half the nation's schools still claim membership in regional accrediting associations, and the number seeking and renewing accredited status continues to rise each year. Ostensibly, accreditation serves schools as a voluntary, self-sustaining procedure for the "improvement of educational quality" (its avowed purpose) in a country where no official ministry of education exists to perform this task.

Nonetheless, accreditation also exerts a controlling force over school curricula. More than fifty percent of America's high schools use authorized evaluation manuals (the National Study for School Evaluation's **EVALUATIVE CRITERIA** or the NCA **GUIDE** or the Western Association's **PROCEDURES**)<sup>17</sup> to direct accreditation-related self studies; they undergo the scrutiny of visiting teams of outside educators who judge school quality against those criteria; they permit their faculties to participate on teams evaluating other schools in the same manner; and they submit reports and interim reports to accrediting bodies which apply association standards to school curricula in order to pass judgment upon their worth. Accreditation is an on-going process. Schools must make reapplication, submit reports, undergo visitations, and conduct evaluations on a regular basis.

The control which accreditation holds over school curricula is continual, indirect, conservative, and diffuse. Accreditation is powerful insofar as people accept the value judgments which it makes regarding curricular worth. Like the training teachers receive, the curriculum guides which sit on school shelves, the textbooks which direct instruction, and the departmental structures within which faculties operate and courses are offered, accreditation standards, criteria, and procedures help to form the mindset, the understanding which schoolpersons have of what a good high school curriculum is all about.

What do these accreditation instruments have to say about curriculum? The **EVALUATIVE CRITERIA**, now in its fifth edition, is the most widely used of all accreditation guides. It is composed primarily of checklist items by which the school is judged on a scale ranging from 5 (excellent) to 1 (missing but needed). Each major section of the **CRITERIA** also includes "evaluation items" (open-ended questions) and requests for supplemental data.

All three manuals--the **CRITERIA**, the **GUIDE**, and the **PROCEDURES**--advise schools to add, delete, or modify items so that the resulting evaluations will accurately portray school conditions. Indeed, there is no official attempt on the parts of the authors of any of these books to force a school into a particular pattern. Allegedly, the manuals are meant to simplify and organize the work of school evaluation for the sakes of the school, the visiting committee, and the accrediting commission. In fact, the National Study for School Evaluation asserts in the forward to the **CRITERIA** that the book is not a volume of standards, but rather a profile of the important characteristics of a quality secondary school.<sup>18</sup>

Despite protestations to the contrary, however, these evaluation manuals--in particular, the **EVALUATIVE CRITERIA**, by virtue of its specificity--are very much books of standards. A criterion is, by definition, a "standard of judging." The set of **EVALUATIVE CRITERIA** is, therefore, a set of standards for judging the quality of schools. By setting down things that will be considered in evaluating the school curriculum (thereby eliminating things that will not), the **CRITERIA** defines school curriculum. And, not only do the questions asked and the data called for define what curriculum is, they determine what a good curriculum is. The requirement that responses be given in the form of numerical ratings implies that the quality of an individual school's curriculum is a direct function of the extent to which the school can assign 5's to curricular attributes preselected by the **CRITERIA**.

While the **EVALUATIVE CRITERIA** would have school people believe that the following checklist items<sup>19</sup> do not constitute an imposition of standards, interpretation of these items reveals very distinct curricular and instructional assumptions. Recall that each item is to be marked on a scale of "excellent" to "missing but needed." The title of the subject area sub-section from which the item has been drawn follows it in parentheses.

1. Provision is made for employing an interdisciplinary approach to the study of art (Art)
2. Typewriting instruction is recommended for all students (Business Education)
3. Slow students are systematically identified and given appropriate individual instruction (English)
4. Ability to work in groups is evaluated (English)
5. Activities are geared to the probable future employment choices of students (Home Economics)
6. Courses at all levels include the use of a calculator as an option (Mathematics)
7. The objectives are stated in terms of student behaviors which are measurable (Social Studies)<sup>20</sup>

Interpretation of the "descriptive items" listed above reveals these assumptions:

1. Adequate study of art calls for an interdisciplinary approach
2. All students should receive instruction in typewriting
3. Students who are slow in English ought to be identified as such and given individual instruction
4. It is important to the study of English that students be able to work well in groups
5. In a good home economics program, the probable future employment choices of students are identified and activities are geared to these choices
6. Use of a calculator should be optional for students in math courses at all levels
7. Social studies objectives are best stated in terms of measurable student behaviors

Whether or not these statements constitute wise curricular and instructional principles is irrelevant to this discussion. What is relevant is the NSEE's claim that such items represent purely descriptive characteristics of schools. They do not. They may be common; they may be popular; they may be agreeable to every school which uses the CRITERIA. Nonetheless, they are prescriptive, and the possibility that a school may judge itself (or be judged by others) well or poorly on any one of these items only reaffirms their normative quality.

#### Alternative Views

The value of accreditation as a process of school evaluation depends to no small extent upon the validity of the evaluation criteria and of the curriculum standards which accreditation employs. Together these form accreditation's position on "the good high school curriculum." In order to systematically analyze that position, this paper compares the view of curriculum presented in accreditation standards and criteria with alternative views reflected in six curriculum texts: those of Smith, Stanley, and Shores; Taba; Doll, Wilson; Saylor and Alexander; and Zais.<sup>21</sup> One might well remark at this point that these works hardly represent contemporary curriculum thought. They certainly overlook most of the curriculum thinking which has characterized curriculum theory meetings during recent years. This is acknowledged. But accreditation is a conservative, tradition-based activity. A juxtaposition of the accreditation notion of curriculum with that of those seeking to redefine the field or to view curriculum from a fresh perspective could be expected to yield fairly predictable results. However, even within a traditional curriculum framework there are options, alternatives. How does the accreditation position regarding curriculum look when placed beside positions growing out of a similar framework? In the following paragraphs I will attempt to isolate and to analyze the interpretation of curriculum endorsed and promulgated through accreditation activities. This will be done by comparing and contrasting accreditation views of curriculum with those of the authors on four points:

1. The meaning assigned to "curriculum" and the way in which curriculum relates to instruction.
2. The purposes which school curriculum serves and the bases for determining curriculum purposes.
3. The nature of curriculum content and the way(s) in which curriculum is organized.
4. The way in which curriculum is developed and who participates.

The definitional question and the relationship between curriculum and instruction are two issues which have perennially characterized curriculum theory discussions. Coming from a social orientation, Smith, Stanley, and Shores define curriculum as "a sequence of potential experiences...set up in the school for the purposes of disciplining children and youth in group ways of thinking and acting."<sup>22</sup> Doll, in writing a book designed as a practitioners's guide for curriculum improvement, defines curriculum as "all the experiences which are offered to students under the auspices or direction of the school."<sup>23</sup> Concerned with maximizing access to knowledge, Wilson describes curriculum as "a planned set of human encounters thought to maximize learning."<sup>24</sup> In his discussion Wilson clearly delineates curricular and instructional matters, claiming that instruction, dominated by psychology, has relegated to the sidelines anthropological, political, and sociological considerations basic to the crucial curricular task of opening access to knowledge for all students. Taba, Saylor

and Alexander, and Zais, on the other hand, speak of curriculum and instruction as interrelated matters. Zais, for example, questions whether one can really be content with an evaluation of curriculum which looks only at a written document without judging how well it "functions" in live situations.<sup>25</sup>

It is interesting to note that while the definitional question may plague curriculum theorists, it appears to matter very little to the accrediting agencies. The associations use various terms--educational program, instructional program, program of studies (often interchangeably)--to refer to curriculum, yet they manage to collaborate on terminology in producing the EVALUATIVE CRITERIA, and then have no trouble using the CRITERIA definitions for evaluation purposes while maintaining their own definitions for accreditation purposes. Instruction is rarely mentioned; in the EVALUATIVE CRITERIA questions relating to instruction simply form an appendage to the curriculum section, leaving one with the impression that in accreditation, instruction is simply an appendage to curriculum.

Most of the textbook authors consulted for this paper follow a Tylerian approach to determining curricular purposes. According to Doll, Saylor and Alexander, Smith, Stanley, Shores, and Taba, curricular purposes are to be based on social conditions and needs, the nature of learners and learning, and the "demands" of subject matter. Zais recognizes the same foundational trinity; however, he contends that while such considerations are helpful for determining what is, they do not determine what ought to be. In the end, the justification for all curriculum purposes is a philosophical matter. Wilson bases his entire curriculum proposal on a single purpose: curriculum ought to provide people with greater access to more knowledge.

However, the primary demand on curricular purposes, according to accreditation standards and criteria, is that they be in line with the school's philosophy and objectives--a requirement for which only one guideline is provided: schools should align curriculum purposes with the needs, interests, and abilities of students. It is indeed curious that so highly complex and systematic a procedure as accreditation and one which purports to improve educational quality in schools across the country should pay such meager attention to the question of curricular purposes, and enshroud in vague generalities the little guidance it has to offer.

While the textbook authors differ in their treatments of curriculum design, all develop curricular alternatives. Doll's psychological bent prompts him to favor an "experience-centered" curriculum in which content is used (rather than mastered) to focus on the learner's activities and interests. For Smith, Stanley, and Shores, writing from the historical vantage point of the late 1950s, curriculum should be social-centered. Since the most important criterion for content selection is its potential contribution to the growth and development of a democratic society, social problems should constitute the curricular core. To Taba, selected content must be organized so that the "basic principles" of a discipline stand out. Learning is to be focused on discovering, understanding, and applying basic principles.

Saylor and Alexander do not believe that an entire school curriculum can follow one curriculum design and they hold that an appropriate pattern of organization should be selected for each curriculum domain (goal-related area). Zais wants curriculum organized so that the relationships between and among disciplines are demonstrated, and he suggests that if one has an overarching theme, this can become the curriculum's organizing center. Wilson recommends that schools try several curriculum designs simultaneously. His own model involves setting aside large content clusters composed of fact, contested truth, and open exploration. There are to be multiple entry points to this knowledge; students engage in many personalized projects, and are responsible for their own education for at least half of their scheduled time.

But accreditation standards and criteria pay almost no attention to these--or any other--curricular alternatives. The standards of the Northwest Association specify "minimum course offerings by size of school." These course offerings are listed by subject. A school with eight hundred to twelve hundred students, for example, is required to offer eight courses in language arts, seven in science, six in mathematics, five in social studies, six in fine arts, two in practical arts, three in foreign languages, two in physical education, plus special courses for accelerated students, slow learners, and handicapped pupils. States the standard: "Schools whose philosophy or size precludes a comprehensive program shall secure the approval of their State Committee if they deviate from the prescribed program."<sup>26</sup>

The standards of the North Central Association likewise prescribe minimum units of coursework by subject, although these standards do not vary by size of school (except for the four-year high school with three hundred

or fewer students). Each school with three hundred or more students must teach at least thirty-eight units of coursework; provision for exception can be made only by the NCA Commission on recommendation of the state committee and the written request of the superintendent or government board of a limited purpose high school.<sup>27</sup>

While the curriculum standards of the New England, Middle States, and Southern associations are looser than those of the Northwest Association and the North Central, accreditation in those regions is highly influenced by the EVALUATIVE CRITERIA, and over 60 percent of the CRITERIA is concerned with an evaluation of curriculum. The CRITERIA'S "Educational Program" section calls for (1) a listing of major subject fields, (2) the names of courses offered within these fields, (3) an indication as to whether or not the courses are required, (4) the grade or grades in which the courses are offered, and (5) the number of credits toward graduation assigned to each course. Eighteen separate subject subsections contain checklists for rating the organization of courses and instruction given within them as well as a checklist for assessing the quality of the offerings in each subject area.

There are certain assumptions regarding curriculum which are implicit within the standards of the Northwest and North Central associations and in the EVALUATIVE CRITERIA. Together these are:

1. That the school being accredited probably organizes its curriculum using the separate subjects design.
2. That subject area courses are probably graded.<sup>28</sup>
3. That some courses are required and others are elective.
4. That in order for a school to be of sufficient quality to merit accredited status, it offers (at minimum) a certain number of courses in specified areas.
5. That courses are assigned credit values and that graduation from high school is linked to an accumulation of a certain number and distribution of credited courses.

The curriculum model which emerges from an analysis of the standards and criteria of the accrediting associations is the subject-centered design described by Smith, Stanley and Shores, Taba, Doll, Saylor and Alexander and Zais. It is, as these and other authors have shown, the most widely followed curriculum model, but not the only model. Indeed, each of these authors has criticized the subject-centered design for its weaknesses.

If news of this has reached the regional associations, however, they have chosen to ignore it. It is true that in theory, accredited schools are permitted to design curriculum in any way which they can justify. In fact, some associations say little or nothing in their standards about curriculum content and organization, and even those that do (the Northwest and North Central associations) allow schools to apply for permission to deviate from the norm. The EVALUATIVE CRITERIA permits, and in fact, encourages alteration of its questions to fit the individual school's situation. Nonetheless, the subject-centered design is the only curriculum design presented in accreditation literature. No other possibilities are provided for, discussed, or even suggested by accreditation standards and criteria. Alternative designs are simply unacknowledged, and hence, unavailable in any formalized way for consideration by schools in assessing the quality of their curricula. It might be said that by their silence regarding curricular alternatives, accrediting associations tacitly legitimize, and hence, perpetuate a subject-centered curriculum: a curricular status quo.

Perhaps the two most central questions in curriculum development are: How will curriculum be developed and implemented? and Who has what decision-making power over the development and implementation? Doll's approach to these questions is pragmatic and political. He urges the curriculum worker to "be openminded about social influences, to exert leadership in using these influences, to understand people's feelings about the school, and to regard himself as a practical politician."<sup>29</sup> Doll's plan for curriculum involves change that is deliberative and collaborative. The school principal is a major change agent and teacher participation is to be strong.

Smith, Stanley and Shores isolate and describe three traditional approaches to curriculum change: the administrative, the grass roots, and the demonstration models. Their own plan, termed "action research,"

starts with the identification of some specific disturbing situation demanding immediate attention to which a problem-solving group addresses itself by trying out various solutions until a satisfactory one is found. Smith, Stanley, and Shores insist that educators, particularly teachers (by virtue of their expertise) lead curriculum change.

Taba's "action model" of curriculum building calls for the development of pilot units at the classroom level and then the gradual building of these into a larger pattern of curriculum change. She favors teacher involvement, but under the guidance of a curriculum specialist.

In contrast to Taba, Saylor and Alexander have administrators, teachers, pupils, parents, and the local community all involved in curriculum development through the use of curriculum councils. However, Zais calls the Saylor and Alexander policy "nonsense" and lambastes the authors for their lack of understanding regarding the teacher's position. Not only do teachers lack the time for curriculum planning, Zais maintains, they also lack the interest and the competence which are necessary for large-scale curriculum development. He offers two alternatives for teacher involvement: one at the pre-implementation stage, and the other at strategic "choice points" along the planning road.

For Wilson opening access to education means providing teachers and students with greater participatory roles in curriculum decision-making. Presently, according to Wilson, teachers and students have no real voice in curriculum planning.

If curriculum authors are most widely divergent on the issue of curriculum development, accreditation standards and criteria are the most noncommittal. The Middle States standard asks: "Are the procedures for developing improvements in the curriculum flexible and do they encourage change and innovation when appropriate?"<sup>30</sup> But the association makes no recommendation regarding who should participate in the development process. Nor do the New England or Southern associations. The Northwest Association mentions staff involvement; the Western Association, faculty, administration, and student; the North Central Association is the only agency to specifically request lay involvement. The Southern, Northwest, Western, and North Central associations require curriculum development to be study-based, but only the Western and North Central associations suggest what curriculum development actually entails. While the EVALUATIVE CRITERIA asks but a few questions relating to who participates in curriculum development, the volume reflects great concern about the variety of "ingredients" that go into the process. Schools are asked to rate the extent to which needs are analyzed, resources are utilized, consultants are used, other schools are studied, research is looked at, and experimentation is engaged in.

In sum, while accrediting agencies deem it important that curriculum change be study-based, that a variety of sources be consulted, and that numerous persons and groups participate in the development process, they fail to consider how that information is to be used or how the persons and groups identified are to participate. We know what ingredients should go into the curriculum development process, but not how the process should proceed. Is it to follow the administrative, grass-roots, or demonstration model? The action-research model? The pilot unit-to-general revision plan? Are there steps involved, and if so, what is their order? How are participants to be organized? Should there be an elaborate organizational plan to mobilize people for action (as Doll suggests), or the kind of on-going system outlined by Saylor and Alexander? Who is to have what responsibility? Is the teacher to be the real curriculum leader? The principal? The curriculum specialist? Depending upon who leads, how are the remaining roles to be differentiated?

The problem is not so much that accreditation standards and criteria, by and large, fail to take a stand on these questions, but that they fail to even raise them. By neglecting to acknowledge and deal with such issues, they relegate them to a position of unimportance--a position which if taken seriously, might well result in the kind of irregular, piecemeal, pseudo-systematic curriculum decision-making, which according to Kirst and Walker,<sup>31</sup> most often characterizes curriculum-making in our schools.

A good high school curriculum in the accreditation view is therefore a collection of separate academic subjects which serve primarily to carry out the school's philosophy. Accreditation standards and criteria reveal little concern for curriculum foundations or theory. The meanings assigned to the terms curriculum and instruction are vague and inconsistent, and little emphasis or direction is given to the designation of curricular purposes. The accreditation version of curriculum disregards curricular alternatives and overlooks some of the

most important questions involved in curriculum development. While accreditation recognizes the importance of multiple resources and varied input in curriculum change, it is unclear about the organization of the development process, the allocation of roles, and the locus of decision-making.

### Conclusion

Throughout its one hundred year history, accreditation has operated as a mechanism of curriculum control. Under the certificate system accreditation enabled certifying colleges and universities to dictate a high school curriculum which conformed to college entrance requirements. Under the accrediting association, legitimized by its aim of "improving educational quality," accreditation became an effective device for curriculum standardization.

While it may have neither the clout it wielded under the certificate system nor the prestige it carried during the formative years of high school development, accreditation remains influential in controlling high school curricula. Through its standards and criteria, and through the evaluation process and the involvement of schoolpersons as school evaluators, accreditation affects the thinking and the decision-making of those engaged in curriculum policy-making and practice.

The standards and criteria used for evaluating curricular quality in accredited high schools are conservative, as their comparison with a variety of curriculum texts indicates. Perhaps this conservatism is endemic to an assessment model which has traditionally disregarded educational outcomes, focusing solely on input, process, and context evaluations. In any case, if, as the accrediting associations claim, accreditation exists to improve educational quality, and if improvement implies change, then indeed it is no wonder that, as Sarason aptly notes, "the more things change the more they remain the same."<sup>32</sup>

### References

1. By a political process, this paper shall refer to one in which persons or groups struggle to secure authoritative support for their values. See Frederick M. Wirt and Michael W. Kirst, *POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1972), pp. 4-5.
2. Michael W. Kirst and Decker F. Walker, "An Analysis of Curriculum Policy-Making," *REVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, 41 (December 1971), p. 488.
3. A notable exception being *THE SORTING MACHINE* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1976) by Joel Spring, in which the author documents federal involvement in American schooling since World War II.
4. Regional accrediting association refers to one of the six, independent, voluntary organizations of non-profit educational institutions in the United States. At present these are: the New England Association of Schools and Colleges; Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools; Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges; Southern Association of Colleges and Schools; North Central Association of Colleges and Schools; and Western Association of Schools and Colleges. These agencies are also referred to as "regional associations." As used in this paper, accreditation refers to the practice, process and/or state of a school's being recognized by one of the six accrediting associations described above. Such recognition demonstrates that the school has met regionally approved standards.
5. Mary C. Wiley and Mayer N. Zald, "The Growth and Transformation of Educational Accrediting Agencies: An Exploratory Study in Social Control of Institutions," *SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION*, 61 (Winter 1968), p. 38.
6. William Collar, "The Action of the College Upon the Schools," *EDUCATIONAL REVIEW*, 2 (December 1891), p. 442.
7. For an account of secondary school conditions in the late nineteenth century see Theodore Sizer, *SECONDARY SCHOOLS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
8. Harold S. Wechsler, *THE QUALIFIED STUDENT* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977), p. 21.
9. The lack of uniformity in college entrance requirements created serious problems for nineteenth century educators. With each college determining its own unique set of entrance criteria, high school principals had to be certain that their programs included (1) all subjects required by each college which the school's graduates

might want to attend, and (2) course content specific to the entrance examination questions of each college. An informal study of 487 colleges done by William Collar in 1891 revealed an "exhausting" diversity of academic requirements. For an elaboration of this problem, see Edward A. Krug, *THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN HIGH SCHOOL, 1880-1920*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.).

10. In order to maintain their own supplies of incoming freshmen, many colleges operated preparatory departments. After surveying 400 institutions of higher education, James Canfield reported to the National Education Association in 1889 that only 65 were without such programs. (James Canfield, "The Opportunities of the Rural Population for Higher Education," National Education Association, *JOURNAL OF PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES, SESSION FOR THE YEAR 1889* (Topeka: Published by the Association, 1889), p. 374). By the end of the nineteenth century most colleges had phased out these departments.

11. University of Michigan, *PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE BOARD OF REGENTS FOR THE YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1871* (Ann Arbor: Published by the University, 1871, p. 20.

12. Joseph L. Henderson, *ADMISSION TO COLLEGE BY CERTIFICATE* (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1912), p. 166.

13. That the system had become so unwieldy--costly and increasingly difficult for colleges with large numbers of out-of-state applicants seeking admission--constituted another reason for its downfall. The development of state departments of education (followed by a shifting of the locus of certifying power from state universities to these departments) was another contributing factor.

14. A.S. Whitney, "The Problem of Harmonizing Inspection by Numerous Colleges so as to Avoid Duplication and Secure the Greatest Efficiency," North Central Association, *PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, 1901*, pp. 25-26.

15. S.A. Forbes, "The Desirability of so Federating the North Central Colleges and Universities so as to Secure Essentially Uniform or at Least Equivalent Entrance REquirements," North Central Association, *PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING, 1901*, p. 19.

16. North Central Association, *PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING, 1902*, Appendix, p. 8.

17. The National Study for School Evaluation is composed of representatives of all six regional associations who convene regularly to revise the *EVALUATIVE CRITERIA*--the set of evaluation criteria available for use by the associations in their accreditation activities. The North Central Association and the Western Association have also developed their own criteria as alternatives for the same purpose.

18. National Study for School Evaluation, *EVALUATIVE CRITERIA*, 5th ed., (Arlington: National Study for School Evaluation, 1978), p. v.

19. All items are taken from the individual subject subsections of the *EVALUATIVE CRITERIA*, fifth edition.

20. National Study for School Evaluation, *EVALUATIVE CRITERIA*, pp. 60, 67, 103, 112, 145, 164, 223.

21. B. Othanel Smith, William O. Stanley, and J. Harlan Shores, *FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1957); Ronald C. Doll, *CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT: DECISION-MAKING AND PROCESS* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974); L. Craig Wilson, *THE OPEN-ACCESS CURRICULUM* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971); J. Galen Saylor and William M. Alexander, *PLANNING CURRICULUM FOR SCHOOLS* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974); Hilda Taba, *CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1962); Robert S. Zais, *CURRICULUM: PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATIONS* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976).

22. Smith, Stanley, and Shores, *FUNDAMENTALS*, p. 3.

23. Doll, *CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT*, p. 22.

24. Wilson, *THE OPEN ACCESS CURRICULUM*, p. 65.

25. Zais, *CURRICULUM: PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATIONS*, p. 11.

26. Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges, *POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITATION OF HIGH SCHOOLS AND SPECIAL PURPOSE SCHOOLS* (Pendleton: The Association, 1975), pp. 20-21.



27. North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, **POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS**, 1976-77 (Boulder: The Association, 1976), p. 20.
28. The **EVALUATIVE CRITERIA** does make provision for a course to be labeled "ungraded."
29. Doll, **CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT**, p. 90.
30. Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, **HANDBOOK OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPALS/HEADMASTERS** (Philadelphia: Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, n.d.), app. D-2.
31. Kirst and Walker, "An Analysis of Curriculum Policy-Making," pp. 484-87.
32. Seymour B. Sarason, **THE CULTURE OF THE SCHOOL AND THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE** (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1971), p. 2.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

## The Problem of the Learner in Curriculum Building

Mary Ann Levine  
Kent State University

The nature of the learner, as it derives from a larger view of human nature, has long been recognized as one of the principal forces in curriculum building. Although conceptions of the nature of the learner have changed over time, historically society's view of human nature has not embraced a very expansive view of the child as a learner. Even though today profound views of the learner are espoused in academia and philosophic circles, little speculation appears to have been undertaken by practicing educators on the complex nature of the learner's personality and on the role of the learner's unique talents and interests in the learning process.

Prevalent simplistic views of the learners have taken little account of the learner's own hopes and aspirations. In the main the learner has been and continues to be seen within the narrow constraints of academic achievement. The success of the school has been little measured in terms of its meeting individual needs of learners, but rather has been conceived in terms of the learner's successfully memorizing facts and mastering pre-determined skills. Though most school-age American youngsters now have the chance to attend school, the problem of the learner as a complete and unique human being is not yet solved.

Shallow views of the learner, moreover, contribute to shallow conceptualizations of the curriculum process and of curricular phenomena. When superficial judgments about human nature and the human experience are underpinning forces in education, teaching and learning are reduced from human effort and triumph to mere dictation and absorption of facts.

Among the works of those in the curriculum field vitally concerned with the nature of the learner, Dorris M. Lee's contribution to the 1973 NSSE Yearbook stands out in its clarity for the identification of misconceptions about the learner. Lee characterized certain misconceptions about the learner in terms of a series of ideological conflicts regarding man. She found the following four to be dominant conflicts in the struggle to conceptualize the learner's nature meaningfully:

1. Man as inherently evil vs. man as inherently good.
2. Man as a puppet of circumstances vs. man as mainly self-determining.
3. Man's actions as determined by the impact of a given situation vs. man's actions as the result of seeking to meet basic needs in the situation.
4. The self-concept as of little importance vs. the self-concept as the most important aspect of the individual's progress toward achieving his maximum potential.<sup>1</sup>

There resides within each conflict outlined by Lee, a misconception which detracts from a positive, holistic view of the learner and which contributes to malpractice with learners in schools. The conflicts outlined by Lee adumbrate these major misconceptions about the learner:

1. The learner is by nature uncivilized, antisocial, and tends toward delinquency unless properly disciplined and coercively socialized by the school into prosocial behaviors.
2. The learner is not capable of decision-making, self-direction, and self-discipline. He or she is shaped by the environment and, thus, must be molded by the school in accordance with the dictates and demands of society.
3. The inner strivings and intrinsic motivations of the learner have no great role in learning; rather external conditions and externally administered rewards and punishments are, in contrast, more important.
4. The learner's intellectual capacities are largely heritable and, therefore, fixed from birth. Emotional depth is lacking and feelings about the self and others play a minimal role in the life of the learner.

Such misconceptions, it can hardly be overstated, remain engrained in our society and create barriers against optimistic visions and realistic visions of man. Each one of the four misconceptions will be discussed in this light and in terms of its negative impact upon appropriate views of the learner.

Misconception 1. The unfortunate link between misconceptions of the learner and the learner's educational experience is strong. Regarding the first stated misconception, for example, many writers have described a link between corporal punishment of learners and the obsolete Puritan notion that evil resides inherently in children and must be "beaten out." While historical vision reveals progress toward more realistic philosophic and psychological conceptualizations of learners, enlightened ideas have not been widely enough applied in educational spheres. Foshay has commented at length on this very point. He stated:

Various ... school practices find their source in these implicit theories about the nature of children. Corporal punishment is one and, although the amount of actual punishment of children has greatly diminished during the past hundred years, some form of corporal punishment still is found in many schools. A hundred years ago, one punished the excesses of the body because the body was viewed as somehow corrupting the processes of the mind. One had to 'whip the boys into shape.'<sup>2</sup>

Misconception 2. Much of the regimentation which characterizes the treatment of learners in schools seems founded in the second misconception that the learner is neither capable of making decisions nor of directing his/her own destiny. Behavioristic views cast the learner as a pawn of the environment. Thus, the teacher who controls the environment of the classroom controls the learner. In reality, however, the learner also contributes to the quality of the environment and creates his/her own personal environment within the larger environment of the school. There is neither one environment which is experienced by all learners in the same way nor one environment which exerts a similar control over all learners.

Ours is unfortunately a society totally captivated by an ethic of efficiency and productivity at the least cost per unit produced. Linked with this sense of economy is a view of learners in schools as products on an assembly line. That learners are to be in compliance with predetermined specifications at each point and to be uniformly turned out at the time of graduation are the implications of the accountability and minimum competency movements. This view of education, however, implies a degree of control which is at odds with the autonomous nature of learners. The quest for control, in many cases, results in rebellion rather than in sought after conformity and engenders frustration in students who are unable to meet rigid expectations.

Misconceptions 3 and 4. Views of the learner which minimize the importance of feelings and images of the self are misconceived. Such views create an "untenable dualism"<sup>3</sup> between cognitive and affective processes. They unrealistically separate the "interests, attitudes, appreciations, and values"<sup>4</sup> of the learner from the processes of knowing and learning.

Scientific views of man, particularly, in quest of concise conceptions of human nature, have concentrated on man's observable features and have ignored his more elusive emotional make-up. Curriculum models thus founded have depicted learning as a one-way absorption of data by the learner from the environment. These models have ignored the important integration of cognition and affect in the personality. They have ignored the role of the learner's preferences, individual tastes, and inner motivations which propel him/her into an interaction with the environment. Likewise the impact of internal struggles, arising in emotional conflict and bringing the learner into a struggle with the environment, is overlooked. A useful picture of the complex cognitive and emotional interaction between learner and environment -- moreover between the learner and the universe -- is created in Pritzkau's "authentic" reality. "The authentic may be thought of as that experience in which one has present awareness about himself in relation to his surroundings."<sup>5</sup> In all experience and resultant learning, the self-concept and emotions tied with feelings about the self are paramount and cannot be overlooked in the case of the learner.

#### The Curriculum and a Valid View of the Learner

The most meaningful curriculum for learners can be buildt only on the richest, most valid view of the learner possible. The most realistic view of the learner can be formulated only if many sources of knowledge

are drawn upon. The overuse of scientific method and knowledge obscures a view of the "real learner" by emphasizing only observable aspects of behavior and measurable facets of academic performance. In using scientific-behavioristic methods entirely, educators ignore feelings and self-perceptions in which the true self of the learner resides. As Kurt Lewin said: "A teacher will never succeed in giving proper guidance to a child if he doesn't learn to understand the psychological world in which that individual child lives."<sup>6</sup> The teacher, who makes the final decisions in the curriculum process, cannot be merely an objective observer of the learner's behavior, but must enter into an interpersonal interaction with the learner. Within such an interaction the teacher's own subjective frame of reference on the world becomes merged with the learner's subjective view of the world. How the teacher approaches the learner, the degree to which he establishes rapport with the learner will influence the way the learner feels about himself. The teacher's relationship with the learner is the important vehicle in meeting needs of individual learners and in fully understanding their nature.

The teacher crosses over a threshold of merely observing the learner and enters into a relationship with the learner when human interaction, which necessarily occurs in classrooms, is transacted. Beyond this threshold the scientific skills of the observer are enhanced by the skills of human sensitivity, intuition, artistry, and feeling. Within these human contexts, the teacher is able to judge not only the learner's academic success by quantitative measures but to judge the quality of the learner's experience. The teacher is able to sense the learner's degree of well-being and the degree of his/her acceptance of self. These are areas where quantitative methods of evaluation fail. Artistic skills are utilized. What Eisner calls educational connoisseurship, the teacher's ability to judge what is educationally significant,<sup>7</sup> comes into play and enables the teacher to gain an intimate view of the learner, to enter into a friendship with him/her, to understand his/her moods, to share in his/her triumphs and defeats, and to lend support.

Bernier has written that "chaos" and "confusion" arise in education principally because the curriculum is founded in a view of the learner which does not recognize his/her emotional depth and dynamic, purposeful nature. He stated:

The major cause of the perpetual conflict is due to the fact that philosophers have habitually focused on a single aspect of man, such as man as a symbol-using animal, a seeker of meaning, a rational being, a problem-solving animal. The sensitive, loving, dreaming, suffering and searching being we call 'man' has been defaced and dissected. Thus an atomistic view of man has spawned radically divergent and incomplete educational objectives. Confusion prevails.<sup>8</sup>

Educational objectives should address the ends of emotional well-being, individual creative expression, enjoyment, and relaxation, but rarely do. Instead a sameness is sought in the achievement of all learners at the expense of pressuring them, regimenting them, boring them, and punishing them. All this because we fail to establish the curriculum process on a rich and inspired and humane view of the learner.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Lee, Dorris M. "Views of the Child," in *THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES*. The Seventy-Second Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, 1973, pp. 138-139.
  2. Foshay, Arthur W. "Sources of School Practice," in *THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL IN THE UNITED STATES*, p. 181.
  3. Tanner, Daniel and Laurel. *CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT*. Macmillan, 1975, p. 125.
  4. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
  5. Pritzkau, Philo T. *ON EDUCATION FOR THE AUTHENTIC*. International Textbook Co., Scranton, Pennsylvania, 1970, p. 1.
  6. Zais, Robert S. *CURRICULUM: PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATIONS*. Crowell, 1976, p. 244.
  7. Eisner, Elliot. *THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION*. Macmillan, 1979, p. x.
  8. Bernier, Normand R. *THE AFFECTIVE DOMAIN IN TEACHING*. Teachers College, 1965.
- Copyright 1980 by JCT.

## Assessing Ideologies

A. W. Sturges  
University of Missouri at Columbia

A teacher's philosophy of education influences both what is taught and how and it is taught. Unfortunately, philosophy of education is an area that is either lightly covered or not covered at all at both undergraduate and graduate levels of teacher education. When it is addressed, confusion is heightened because of the nomenclature used and the complexities of the various schools of philosophy. Although some authors of curriculum textbooks integrate philosophical concepts with other topics (McNeil 1977; Hass 1977; Rubin, 1977), others devote only a chapter or two to the topic (Doll 1978; Tanner and Tanner, 1975; Zais, 1976). The integrated approach implies the importance of philosophy in curriculum decisions, but it tends to leave the reader with an inadequate understanding and restricts the application of philosophical concerns to curricular and instructional problems. Some excellent attempts to make philosophy understandable to teachers have been published (Lodge, 1947), but assistance in applying the information to curricular and instructional problems has not been available to most educators.

In order to help teachers identify their dominant ideology, the writer set out to answer a series of questions based on the work of several authors. Lucas (1976) published a book of readings that included twenty-nine authors classified into six categories on the basis of their ideological orientations: 1) educational conservatism and the liberal arts tradition; 2) neo-positivism, educational technicism and the technocratic revolution; 3) humanism and the schools; the open education movement; 4) the new vocationalism, career education; 5) social reconstructionism and educational futurism; and 6) education without schools; deschooling society.

The writer carefully reviewed the thirty-nine articles in the book concentrating on each author's possible response to seven rather specific questions. Several subsequent readings of the articles reduced the number of ideologies to five ("education without schools, deschooling society" was dropped and the responses were included in the other five ideologies).

On the following pages (118, 119, and 120) is a list of leading proponents and basic assumptions for each ideology and a summary of exemplary answers by each ideology to questions regarding: 1) philosophical assumptions; 2) main objectives; 3) view of school and society; 4) the preferred way to structure school; 5) the ideal curriculum; 6) view of human structure and development; 7) the nature of the individual; and 8) the nature of change.

Based on this comparison of ideologies, the writer developed a self-scoring inventory based on a philosophical test found in Lodge (1947, pp. 337-341). The inventory is presented below along with an "answer sheet" for identifying the ideologies in each section.

#### Ideology Attitude Inventory

For each of the six main headings, there are five possible statements. Select the statement that best reflects what you believe is correct.

#### I. Human Nature and Development

- A. Man is a "rational animal," i.e. the capacity for conceptualization and abstract thought is a distinctive (if not unique) characteristic of being full "human."
- B. The human being is a dynamic organism in interaction with an environment; human functioning (behavior) is basically a function of environmental stimuli impinging upon that organism.
- C. To be human is to be a thinking, feeling, and sensing creature, an agent ultimately responsible, in a condition of freedom, for self-development and self-determination.
- D. The individual is inextricably bound up in a social matrix, a member of a social community or society, in and through which the person becomes more fully self-actualized, largely as a result of adjusting to group norms, values, and mores.
- E. Man is a social being, whose possibilities for self-realization and development are tied largely to the survival of the collective of which the individual is a constituent element or component part.

#### II. Education: Process and Objectives

SOME COMPARISONS AMONG SIX IDEOLOGIES

SOCIAL RECON-  
STRUCION &  
FUTURISM

VOCATIONALISM &  
CAREER EDUCATION

HUMANISM (EXISTEN-  
TIALISM & PRAGMATISM)

ED. TECHNOLOGISM  
& BEHAVIORISM

LIBERAL ARTS  
TRADITION

Alvin Toffler  
George Counts  
Harold Shane  
Glen Heathers

Sidney Marland  
Keith Goldhammer  
Kenneth Hoyt  
Norman Gysbers

Abraham Maslow  
Carl Rogers  
Eric Fromm  
John Dewey

Terrence Bell  
B. F. Skinner  
Robert Mager  
John Hayman

Lindley Stiles  
Robert Hutchins  
Mark Van Doren  
Mortimer Adler

Human nature is such that once people have the knowledge about pollution, nuclear war, etc., people will be stimulated to solve these problems.

Man finds meaning in life either totally or mostly through his/her vocation. There is a stress on an economic view of man.

Little or no knowledge exists which is essential for everyone to acquire. The healthy person has the right to make significant decisions affecting the content and process and direction of learning.

Man is extrinsically motivated. Human functioning (i.e., behavior) is a function of environmental stimuli impinging on the human.

Intellectual stimulation and knowledge will make men rational. There is a particular body of knowledge which one needs to know if one is to be a civilized person.

118

The only way for preparing people for the real world is to put them in command of knowledge about how society really is and will be.

(1) Career education's goal is to prepare students for vocations by the end of high school (college entrance or saleable skill).  
(2) Career development's goal is to make students explore various careers, with less emphasis on various societal roles.

To create a human supportive learning environment marked by flexibility, individualization, and freedom of choice, in which the "whole person" assumes primary responsibility for self-actualization and personal growth.

To create teaching-learning processes which are efficient, controllable, and cost effective; to adapt to education rationalized methods of empirical observation, intervention, and assessment.

To create a thoughtful, sensitive, and reflective, and rational human being who, disciplined by knowledge, grows intellectually, morally, and aesthetically.

S T Educational institutions  
O H are to preserve and dis-  
C E cover knowledge that a  
C I society needs to be civ-  
I E ilized. Schools are to  
T Y graduate educated  
A citizens and leaders  
N needed by society. The  
D school is more than a  
placement office for  
new workers.

Schools should improve  
society by graduating  
healthy self-actuated  
individuals. Humanists  
see themselves having  
responsibility to  
society, but individual  
welfare comes first.

Schools should adjust  
children to meet  
society's needs and  
standards. Children  
are shaped to live  
within the system.  
When graduated,  
students should be  
able to join the  
country's work force.  
Schools should  
emphasize the  
humanistic desire  
to save man.

The school adjusts child-  
ren to meet society's  
needs and standards.  
Children are to be shaped  
by the school so that they  
will accommodate to the  
system. The school works  
for the society, not for  
the individual.

Schools should improve  
society by graduating  
healthy self-actuated  
individuals. Humanists  
see themselves having  
responsibility to  
society, but individual  
welfare comes first.

Schools should adjust  
children to meet  
society's needs and  
standards. Children  
are shaped to live  
within the system.  
When graduated,  
students should be  
able to join the  
country's work force.  
Schools should  
emphasize the  
humanistic desire  
to save man.

S C Traditional structure  
C in the school should  
H be maintained. Students  
O should become self-  
L actualized through  
C contact with intellectual  
T and emotional stimulating  
U knowledge. Students are  
R allowed more freedom  
E when they mature in  
becoming a mature scholar.

Schools should become more  
of a model of industry  
than now shown. Objectiv-  
es, assessment, etc. would  
rationalize school operat-  
ions.  
The school should be  
structured and adminis-  
tered so a child has  
feelings of efficacy  
and can learn democra-  
cy from on-the-job  
training. Teachers are  
counselor-helper-teach-  
er. Open classroom  
programs are supported.

The basic organization  
of schools would be  
retained. More  
counseling and more  
contact with the  
business school  
would be encouraged.  
Students should  
have more autonomy  
from the establish-  
ment. Structure  
should permit or  
encourage activist  
and reform activities  
of teachers and  
students.

C (1) Liberal arts people  
U stress the need to study  
R the Great Books; (2) Gen-  
E ral Education people  
I add the components of  
D critical thinking,  
E thinking skills, etc. to  
A include language, math;  
L (3) Classicists support  
the study of Greek and  
Roman classics. These  
groups support a  
curriculum emphasizing  
pure rather than applied  
knowledge.

The ideal curriculum is  
one that efficiently  
conditions the child to  
learn what is desired by  
the educator. Learning  
that can be stated in  
measurable objectives  
is to be taught.

The ideal curriculum  
is student centered.  
Individualization is  
emphasized. The whole  
child is taught; the  
curriculum would not  
include many require-  
ments.

Both groups agree on  
many values/skills  
taught before grade  
11. For the last 2  
years, the curriculum  
would emphasize self  
exploration and career  
awareness (career  
development) or specif-  
ic employment skills  
(career education).  
The curriculum is  
humanistic, but  
emphasizes learning  
activities to help  
students improve the  
world. Courses are  
selected by their  
"survival value".

H D By exercising reason Human development is If given freedom and Economic independence The development of  
 U E each person can come observable. It develops opportunity, an ind- makes for personal an individual can  
 M V to discern the absol- through environmental ividual can be expect- independence and can be influenced by  
 A E ute,unchanging, and influences. Controlling ed to learn from direct- result in an involved formal education.  
 N L uncertain foundations the environment develops experience. He will responsible and well-  
 O of experience. the desired outcomes. develop best when given adjusted individual.  
 M Through this comes Behavior that can be opportunities to  
 E self-fulfillment specified can be explore/learn when he  
 N and hence enjoyment produced. is interested/ready.  
 T of life.

T I Natural man exists in Natural man exists in an The individual is an The individual is  
 H N an ignorant and unsatisfactory state active,dynamic and find fulfillment as important, but not  
 E D unsatisfied state. because of his respons- curious individual who he responds to the important as society's  
 I I He is capable and es to the uncontrolled will naturally explore need for employment immediate and future  
 V desirous to move elements at work and in the environment to to survive and to needs.  
 I from ignorance to nature. He is capable control, direct, and join the work force.  
 D knowledge, from error of controlling and understand things which  
 U to truth and to creating stimuli. interests him.  
 A understanding.

C Knowledge is certain Only changes that are Needs and interests People change jobs, Change is necessary.  
 H unchanging and verifiable that are change throughout and jobs change in Individuals must change  
 A absolute. We must icant. Behavior is life. Flexible and ways that requires to be better able to  
 N be willing to use changeable through the responsive curricula provides the best additional knowledge. change the world for  
 G knowledge to foster control of stimuli. opportunity for the education to meet the better.  
 E change. personal change. the changes in society.



- A. To create a thoughtful, reflective, sensitive, and rational human being who, disciplined by knowledge, grows intellectually, morally, spiritually, and aesthetically.
- B. To create teaching-learning processes which are efficient, controllable, and cost effective; to adapt to education the methods of empirical observation, intervention, and assessment.
- C. To create a human supportive learning environment marked by flexibility, individualization, and freedom of choice, in which the "whole person" assumes primary responsibility for self-actualization and personal growth.
- D. To make students aware of, and explore various possible careers, and to prepare students for vocations by the end of high school (includes college entrance and/or saleable skills).
- E. To put students in command of knowledge about how society and the world really are and will be.

### III. The Ideal Curriculum

- A. The curriculum should include general education for the student to learn inquiry, language, mathematics, and thinking skills. The rest of the curriculum should be drawn from information that provides a basis upon which to build future learning, such as the "great books" or the "classics.."
- B. The curriculum should be confined to that content identified as essential and worthwhile, in the most efficient and systematic way possible. What is learned by the student should be measured and reported to him and to appropriate other people.
- C. The curriculum should be student-centered, allowing the student to develop at his own rate and style, through stimulating the child's interests and natural curiosity.
- D. Career awareness and self-exploration should be part of the curriculum; for students not planning to attend college, specific job skills should be included during the 11th and 12th grades.
- E. The curriculum should be humanistic, but also emphasize learning activities to prepare students to improve the world. The standard used is "survival value" and the social relevance or urgency of the curriculum.

### IV. School Structure

- A. Students become self-actualized through contact with intellectually and emotionally stimulating knowledge. Traditional structure that includes the disciplines should be maintained.
- B. School structure should be determined by those methods that develop efficient learning of appropriate knowledge and skills, recognizing the availability of systems by which achievement and cost of instruction can be motivated.
- C. School structure should enhance the individual worth of the children, and should provide a setting by which children learn democracy and the well being of themselves and others through experiencing these concerns in the school.
- D. The basic structure of existing schools is appropriate in general terms, but there should be closer ties between the business community and future employers and the school.
- E. Schools should have the freedom to organize any way appropriate to help them become reform agents for society.

### V. School and Society

- A. Educational institutions are to preserve and discover knowledge that society needs to be civilized. Schools are to graduate educated citizens and leaders for society.
- B. The school adjusts children to meet society's needs and standards. Children are to be shaped by the school so that they will accommodate to the system.
- C. Schools should improve society by graduating healthy self-actuated individuals. Schools have a responsibility to society, but the welfare of the individual is most important.
- D. The school should adjust children to meet society's needs and standards. Children should learn so they will accommodate to and not attempt to live outside the system, and to join the work force of the country.
- E. Schools have an obligation to improve society. Schools should have the freedom to assume leadership

roles in improving the welfare of individuals and of society.

#### VI. The Person in the Process

- A. Natural man exists in an ignorant and unsatisfied state. He develops through knowledge, understanding, and guidance.
- B. Uncontrolled stimuli at school and at play result in unsatisfactory personal development. By controlling the environment, appropriate stimuli for successful adult life can be obtained.
- C. The individual is an active, dynamic, and innately curious organism, who will naturally explore his environment in order to better control, direct, and understand those things that interest him.
- D. An individual can find personal fulfillment only as he successfully responds to his future role as a worker. His individual development is coupled to his satisfactory entrance into the enjoyable and productive work force.
- E. Individual development is important as it relates to society's resolution of present and future problems.

Teachers who hold one of the listed ideologies as their dominant belief in their profession would emphasize a rather specific teaching style. For example, humanists would probably emphasize individualization, technologists would emphasize efficiency, vocationalists would emphasize usefulness, and so forth. Students, of course, have similar ideologies, although it is unlikely that they verbalize their beliefs as teachers might. As a result, there is a competing force between teachers and students in what is expected as classroom outcomes. Figure 1 illustrates this competing force between teachers and students (p.123).

There is another component that is implied but not illustrated. Administrators, board members, and school patrons also have competing ideologies. The possible combinations become a labyrinth of competing forces that makes systematic planning of learning difficult.

#### Conclusion

One's ideology is directly related to one's preferences for curricular and instructional changes. By finding a way in which one's ideology can be identified, it is possible to fix the importance of this foundational area to curricular and instructional emphases that will enhance the importance of the philosophical foundations to the study of curriculum and instruction. It would certainly seem logical that agreement in this foundational area will enhance the possible success of curricular and instructional changes in a school building.

If the previous dialogue and illustration have some truth, it is possible to administer a self-scoring test that would assist teachers and administrators in identifying their ideology and its effect on the curriculum and instruction of a school. For example, those who are identified as traditionalists by the self-scoring test would have rather specific preferences for the instructional mode of the classroom; other teachers with differing ideologies would have equally distinct preferences for the instructional and curricular modes of their classrooms.


It is possible that teachers responding to the self-scoring test might be grouped by the ways in which they would respond to change. Some might be more responsive to instructional changes, others to curricular changes, and others to a change in the organizational structure of the learning environment. Pragmatically, this could assist teachers and administrators to identify curricular, instructional, or organizational changes that would be accepted by certain teachers. This approach of using a self-scoring test with an in-service dialogue would certainly assist teachers and administrators to direct their concerns for education improvement toward a sphere that would be supported by certain faculty.

#### REFERENCES

1. Doll, Ronald C. CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT: DECISION-MAKING AND PROCESS. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1978.
2. Hass, Glen. CURRICULUM PLANNING: A NEW APPROACH. 2nd edition. Allyn & Bacon, 1977.
3. Lodge, Rupert C. PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. Harper, 1947, revised edition.
4. Lucas, Christopher J. CHALLENGE AND CHOICE IN CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION. Macmillan, 76.

5. McNeil, John D. CURRICULUM: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION. Little, Brown, 1977.
6. Rubin, Louis. CURRICULUM HANDBOOK. Allyn & Bacon, 1977.
7. Tanner, Daniel and Laurel Tanner. CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT: THEORY INTO PRACTICE. Macmillan, 1975.
8. Zais, Robert S. CURRICULUM: PRINCIPLES AND FOUNDATIONS. Harper & Row, 1976.

IDEOLOGIES AND INSTRUCTIONAL EMPHASES - FIGURE I



IDENTIFICATION OF IDEOLOGIES ON IDEOLOGY ATTITUDE INVENTORY

STATEMENT	TRADITIONALISM	BEHAVIORISM & TECHNOLOGISM	MODERN HUMANISM (& EXISTENTIALISM)	VOCATIONALISM & CAREER EDUCATION	SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTIONISM AND FUTURISM
I	A	B	C	D	E
II	A	B	C	D	E
III	A	B	C	D	E
IV	A	B	C	D	E
V	A	B	C	D	E
VI	A	B	C	D	E

124

Instructions: Circle the letter after each statement that you selected as one that best reflects what you believe to be correct. The column that has the most circled letters probably suggests the ideology that you support. If there is an equal distribution among the columns, your ideology is probably eclectic.

## Aesthetics and the Curriculum

Harry S. Broudy  
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana

It has never been easy to justify spending public funds for arts education because art itself has been regarded as one of the finer things in life that ordinary people can do without and which people with means can provide for themselves. At a time when taxpayers seem to be convinced that public funds should provide only the barest necessities in the way of social services, it seems quixotic to argue for the preservation, let alone the expansion, of arts education in the public school. Yet quixotic as it may seem, even preservation may depend on the enlargement of both the concept and the program. To put it plainly, the public in general, schoolpeople, people in arts education will have to be persuaded that the aesthetic mode of human experience is not only nice but necessary. Indeed, one might hope that some day it can be generally understood that this mode of experience is always necessary even though at times it may not be nice. I use "aesthetic mode of experience" advisedly, because it is a generic activity in which all of us participate, whereas artistic activity is a species of aesthetic experience in which participation is far more selective. We all have to look at faces and buildings, but only a very few have to paint pictures of them. It is far easier to argue that all school children learn how to perceive the objects around them than that they all be able to create expressions about them.

Furthermore, to make the case for investment in arts education, it must be shown that form instruction in this field is possible, essential for all members of the school population, and that no agency other than the school can provide it. I submit that this case is not being made by the advocates of arts education with the arguments they are advancing. The public and public school authorities are being told first, that experience in the arts is delightful on its own account -- which nobody can or does deny -- and second, that art, like dessert, persuades the pupil to consume more of the basics -- reading, math, and vegetables.

How valid are these arguments? Art experience, to be sure, can be intrinsically satisfying, but the environment is drenched with art -- especially popular art. Art exhibitions, regular and special, concerts, recordings, television, radio, and Muzak keep up a constant flow of opportunities for experience with art. Why should the school, especially the public school, add more water to the flood?

As to the second and third arguments, one must examine carefully whether the facilitating powers of art experience on other phases of school work are anything more than a hope and a plausible conjecture. But granted that the claims may have some validity, it is nevertheless more evident that with the available techniques of behavior modification, electronic technology, drugs, neurosurgery, and the reduction of the curriculum to the three r's, the efficiency of instruction could be increased far more dramatically than by resort to the indirect and putative influence of arts education.

No less difficult is it to convince schoolboards that arts education is even possible. For there are many in our ranks who believe that in artistic activity, external influence should be kept at a minimum and that standards of performance and preference should not be imposed on the learner.

Samuel Johnson made the clearly sexist observation that the remarkable thing about women preachers was not that they did it well or badly, but that they did it at all. And one might make the same sort of remark about talking dogs and school children engaged in artistic creation or indeed any form of school work. However, the more open, permissive, and unstructured the program, the less does it require a place in the school. For play, hobbies, and many other such activities can be fostered outside the school. Many communities provide opportunities for young people to work in arts and crafts in summer park and playground programs. And during the school year they could be made available in community recreation centers and museums.

If, on the other hand, one argues that an arts program in the schools is needed to expose pupils to art products -- great and near great -- as part of their general sophistication, then it can be retorted that exposure is better accomplished by museums, concert halls, and the theater, not to speak of the mass media.

That children learn by exposure to the "good" things in life to become good in them or at doing them is

true only in that they don't as a rule learn without some exposure, but the converse, alas, is not true, as the wide range of school achievement demonstrates. Apparently we all come equipped with varying amounts of antibodies against infections of this kind.

In short, we need to argue that aesthetic experience is as pervasive as cognitive and practical activity, and that there are skills of aesthetic impression and expression that can, if cultivated under tuition, change the quality of that experience just as the study of science or mathematics or history changes the quality of their respective modes of untutored experience. But our task has special difficulties that other fields of study do not. Of these perhaps the most important is that the connection between the work of the imagination and that of the intellect has been ruptured.

Indeed, imagination has suffered from a bad philosophical press for centuries. It was held to be the anti-thesis of reason; its flights regarded as inimical to prudential wisdom. Some attributed its lack of order and its unpredictability to demons, at worst, and to the gods, at best; others located the cause in drugs or a bad conscience or a bad digestion. Art, which shares the suspicions engendered by imagination, accordingly has always had ambiguous status in the academy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the intimate connection between imagination and the intellect has been forgotten, overlooked, and neglected--especially in our schools.

But historically, if not theologically, in the beginning was the image, not the word; the forms of feeling, not the forms of thought. Concepts, logically and psychologically, come later than percepts, and percepts are images. We do not realize how much of thought and action are guided by images, and this is responsible for the grand misunderstanding, viz., that image making and image perceiving--the imagination--can be left to develop without tuition, and that formal instruction is to be concentrated on the skills of cognition and problem-solving.

It is this relation between the imagination and the other functions of mind that grounds the claims of arts education. Briefly, this relation can be considered in three forms: the relation of images to language, to thought, and to feeling.

### Image and Word

Language is a system of symbols, for the most part abstract and non-iconic, i.e., the sounds of the words or their appearance in print do not resemble the objects which they designate. No cat looks or sounds like c-a-t or c-h-a-t. Common nouns in the language designate classes of objects: tables, chairs, airplanes, and the classes are formed by grouping the objects according to sets of characteristics they all share. These common nouns are concepts, and so are the names of operations such as running, painting, thinking, and of relationships such as above, below, because, and therefore. There is no way of identifying a particular, individual table or chair by common nouns alone; one has to say "This chair" and point to it or "Uncle Tom's chair in the corner of the dining room." In other words, to arrive at the meaning of a concept, one needs images of particulars that have the properties common to the class. Sometimes a pseudo particular, such as a diagram or picture used in a dictionary, helps us catch on to the meaning of a term. Hence, learning to read and speak means connecting sounds or marks on paper with images of particular things and actions and relations. The images may come from actual sensory experience or by combining images in the mind--i.e., by the exercise of the imagination. From the day of birth the mind is being stocked with images--visual, auditory, tactile, kinaesthetic, olfactory--and associations with words and things. It is this imagic-conceptual store that is activated whenever we read or speak or listen to speech. We comprehend with these resources. The way in which the ingredients are stored and retrieved is a mystery, but we do know that every term--aside from the most technical and mathematical--evokes many layers and shades of meaning. Even the dictionary lists several meanings for every term. Some meanings have become lost or elaborated or transformed. Idiomatic uses of language depend on complicated combinations of images, e.g., "We worked around the clock," as does the poetic use: "This is the forest primaeval."

One could go on in this vein. One should not have to were it not that in the current mania for the basics it is almost certain to be forgotten that we read with the imagination and not merely with phonetics and the dictionary. Children with impoverished imagic stores will not read; they will simply decode mechanically messages that have been mechanically encoded. But how much of our communication can be cleansed of all

ambiguity? No matter how precisely a statute is drawn, there is always enough ambiguity to keep lawyers and judges busy and happy. To be sure, minimal literacy comes first, and the public is rightfully enraged when pupils fail to achieve it, but do we need 12 years of schooling for functional literacy sufficient only to construe utility bills and to write letters of application? We may be taking the first step backward to a time when the 3 r's were enough for the masses and anything more was reserved for the classes. Art may not be the only study that will be regarded as dispensable by indignant taxpayers.

I would not therefore urge arts education because it contributes to mastery of the mechanics of reading, writing, or computation, but rather because it enriches the store of images that makes comprehension of concepts possible and comprehensive. This is the proper contribution of aesthetic education to language mastery, and if this is not basic to education, then it is difficult to imagine what would be. Aesthetic literacy is as basic as linguistic literacy.

### Images and Thought

Consider the following statements:

The sky is threatening; let's call off the picnic.

That man has a weak chin; I wouldn't vote for him to be dog-catcher.

Nobody with a messy desk like that can think straight about anything.

I've got a piece of the rock!

Look at those dirty jeans and long hair; no wonder the streets aren't safe.

You can tell by the sign that this is an expensive place to eat.

The bank building must say, "Your money is safe here."

In each of these statements, the premise is an image or an appearance--an aesthetic clue. The conclusion is an assertion of fact or a judgment of value based on fact: that something or other is or was or will be the case, and that therefore this or that ought or ought not to be done. It is easy to overlook two characteristics of this type of inference. One is its extent. The number of judgments we make on the basis of such clues is vast. The other is that we do not test the validity of more than a tiny fraction of them.

Because we so rarely check our judgments of aesthetic clues, the image acquires enormous importance. Indeed, it has displaced the reality in many aspects of our life. The mass media manufacture these images for corporations, politicians, products and the government itself. Even the arts themselves--the preeminent producers of images--are understood not so much by what they produce as works of art, as by what the media have to say about the art world.

Through columns of criticism and reviews, through gossip about art, artists, galleries, exhibitions, prizes, grants, awards, the public is told what to see and what to believe. Without moving more muscles than it takes to hold the NEW YORK TIMES, one can learn about the goings on in the art world. There is no need to attend a concert or an exhibition or read a book. One can hold one's own pretty well at a cocktail party with no more than the images of images that are systematically built up by the press agency of the art world.

The displacement of the reality by its image was discussed at great length by Daniel J. Boorstin in his book, *THE IMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTS IN AMERICA* (New York: Atheneum, 1973). He cites a joke in which someone says to the mother of a child, "What a lovely child" to which the mother replies, "That's nothing, you should see her picture."

Pseudo-events, Boorstin noted, are created by the media, a process markedly accelerated by television but originating in what he calls Graphic Revolution. Thus celebrities become pseudo-heroes, and the images of life in America projected in motion pictures and television commercials have taken the place of American ideals--they are pseudo-ideals. Incidentally, Boorstin points out, Communist countries have the advantage over us in the battle for the loyalties of the under-developed countries because they advertise their ideals, which are general enough to commend allegiance by multitudes who have not the slightest notion of what life is like in a Communist country. But when motion pictures tell and show what life is like in America with its plenitude of material goods, then the gap between the haves and have nots cannot be concealed.

To become well-known (a celebrity), says Boorstin, takes the place of doing great deeds, and the media

determine who shall become well known and who and what shall have prestige, albeit the derivation of prestige from the etymological roots of the word prestidigitation and its associated connotation of deceitful illusion has faded from common usage and consciousness.

The popular arts are no exception to the general trend of images displacing actuality. Ratings, news about contracts, box office receipts, the personal life of the entertainers are more important than their actual performances. At least the public reacts to the images rather than to the events themselves. To paraphrase an old song: There's no business like show business, and all business is show business. VARIETY could very well be the universal organ of pseudo events, not only on the stage and screen, but in the world of art, academe, government, and business--for all spend much time and effort to create images of themselves that take the place of reality.

In a world where images displace reality, it becomes of paramount importance to know which is which. In the world of choice and action it becomes important to seek the truth. In personal life it occasions the search for authenticity.

Now there is a way of checking the factual accuracy of images; the body of ideas and facts we call science is the way. We can call the weather bureau to check on threatening skies, and we can look up the work records of men with weak chins. We should steel ourselves against voting for the image of the candidate rather than his record. Yet we check only those judgments that impinge on our immediate choices and actions, and we must assume that the image we portray of ourselves in general will be taken at "face" value. That imposes upon us the responsibility and advisability to present an image of ourselves that is true, a reliable index of our character. In passing, one might note that much of the adolescent problem of adjustment has to do with the images they project or think they project. For one thing, there is some doubt and vacillation about the "real me" who is to be imaged. For another, the image or person is more than visual appearance. The tone of voice, gesture, posture, and general demeanor make up the gestalt to which the outsider reacts--if it is noticed at all. It is in the shaping of such a total image that it is tempting, albeit misleading, to compare it to a work of art. If the analogy is not taken too literally, there is a sense in which a personality interesting to perceive will have aesthetic qualities that one finds in works of art.

#### The Image and the Human Reality (Feeling)

Authenticity, however, seems to mean somewhat more than factual correctness. The real me, the real meaning of an event, of a life connote another kind of reality--the human reality to which our access is through feeling, valuing, and willing rather than through correct descriptions of fact.

Consider the following quotations:

I know that my Redeemer liveth...

A thing of beauty is a joy forever

Give me liberty or give me death

Free at last

You took the rose and left the thorn

These woods are lovely, dark and deep

But I have promises to keep

And miles to go before I sleep

And miles to go before I sleep (Robert Frost, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening")

Syntactically, these are all statements asserting something or other to be the case. Can we go to science to verify the truth or falsity of these "assertions?" No, because they are not images of fact but of human aspiration and faith; images of human import; intimations of the infinite variety of human feeling, actual and potential.

Art creates these images according to no prespecified design; there is no fixed lexicon of human feeling. If the artist is fortunate, the beholder recognizes in the image his or her own reality; their own potentiality of feeling, for these images are, to use Susanne Langer's term, "the forms of feeling."



The verification of these images lies in our recognition in them of messages emanating from the human reality itself. Sometimes we verify these intimations by achieving them in our own experience. That "my Redeemer liveth" is verified by the believing Christian in the way he lives and not by the testimony of the Coroner. There is a sense in which the artist's rendering of a Campbell soup can is more revelatory of a human reality than the can on the grocer's shelf is; a judgment that we pass on occasion about the truthfulness of a person's portrait when compared to a photograph.

Not all images created by art or discerned in nature are of equal complexity or profundity; some images become cliches, especially in the very popular arts; some are so esoteric that they inhibit our recognition of their human import; some artists have little to express; some have much. The important matter for the cause of arts education is whether or not the school can help pupils become sensitive and selective in their transaction with imagery both in its relation to the world of fact and to the human reality.

But how can the school help if there are no prescribed criteria of scientific truth in the human reality and the images thereof? Only by developing the skills of aesthetic impression that are presupposed in the response to the artist's skills of expression. To become sensitive to the appearance of things for their own sake; to the expressive properties of color, sound, texture, movement, when organized into aesthetic objects by nature or the artist—these prepare the pupil to distinguish the original from the cliché, sincerity from fakery, insight from contrivance.

Beyond this there are the resources of the whole history of the arts, the attempts to portray the intimations of the human reality in forms of feeling. How to perceive and construe these images is as much an accomplishment of the educated human being as is clear thinking in the world of fact.

To qualify as a fourth r, (reading, writing, 'rithmetic, and 'rt) in the instrumental skill sense, the arts program need only demonstrate that there are skills that function as instruments for impression and expression in the aesthetic domain of experience with somewhat the same generality as do the symbolic skills in the cognitive domain. And one can do this with some plausibility if the metaphor of the language of the arts and artistic literacy is not taken too literally.

That there are skills of expression is witnessed by schools of music, painting, dance, theater, and creative writing. Arts programs in the schools for a very long time have concentrated on developing expressive skills, chiefly in music and the graphic arts. Unfortunately, the skills of expression, i.e., of the making of images that express human import of one sort or another, tend to become less functional for more and more people as linguistic forms are developed. Beyond the age of seven or eight, ordinary language takes the place of imagery as forms of expression for all but a tiny minority of individuals, artists.

Much has been made of the fact that persons, especially children, who have difficulty with linguistic skills often develop artistic ones as means of expression. An extreme case is that of an autistic girl who displayed an extraordinary talent in drawing at a very early age. Yet when after much difficulty the child acquired a very rudimentary ability to communicate in words, the amount and quality of the drawing dropped sharply.<sup>1</sup>

Anyone who in a foreign country has been reduced to using drawings instead of words realizes—unless one is a pretty good artist—how cumbersome a means of communications it is. Yet in the hands of a competent artist how much more immediate and expressive is the drawing than the words of any particular language! How many words, for example, would it take to convey the information expressed by one caricature?

When it is said that the arts are means of expression, it is not ordinary communication of information that is meant. Rather it is the expression of subjective experience, usually of an emotive sort, the sort that adolescents want to express in poetry and many others express to their psychiatrist or marriage counselor. For this purpose the arts are preeminently suited, and one would like to think of a citizenry that could express themselves in poetry, paint, clay, dance, and drama. The hitch is that once naive childhood, in which one's drawing or song or rhyme serves as a means of expression even if it does not meet the technical demands of adults, is gone, we are not satisfied with our art products unless we have the technique to make them really expressive rather than a gesture of expression. In plain language, unless we have some talent and a willingness to work hard and long enough to master technique, we do not use artistic skills as a means of expression. To

try to justify a more central place in the curriculum for arts education on these grounds, therefore, is neither credible nor advisable. So long as arts education programs restrict themselves to the skills of expression--image making--they will retain their status as pleasant accomplishments, but not really necessary for anyone save prospective artists.

The situation is quite different with respect to the skills of impression. In the first place, all of us are consumers of images even if most of us do not deliberately contrive them. In the second place, there is a difference between a response to serious art that creates images of human import in a very special way and our response to the images we encounter in everyday life and in the popular arts. Whether or not a formal program of arts instruction is justified in the public schools depends a good deal on this difference.

But there are other reasons for the arts to be regarded as necessary. They touch on the role of art and the artist in society. One of these is the role of art as a value marker. Whatever a society regards as of major importance it underscores by using art. Crucial episodes in its history, critical events--birth, marriage, war, death--are stylized by ritual and ceremony so that all members of the community perceive their import through a standardized image. Rituals create a powerful and reliable community of attitude. A society that cannot bind to itself the loyalty of its members with the bonds of its images is fragile and brittle--not long for this world. A society that keeps its people chained to stereotyped images may also be dying. Imagination delights in being captured, but not in remaining a captive.

Furthermore, society relies upon the images of art to define the social roles of the family, government, religion, and the status of the individuals in these institutions. The appropriate behavior of a man, a father, a husband, a worker, a soldier is made clear and vivid by the portrayals of art in the various media. Popular arts in the mass media provide the standard image; serious art creates more sophisticated and complex images for these roles. It is to the arts that we look for the model of our national heroes, military and moral, as well as of the good life. More character training was accomplished by the Horatio Alger stories than by any school program of character education. We grasp the problems of industrial England through the works of Dickens more vividly than through scholarly history. The Statue of Liberty has brought catches in the throats of more Americans than all the tracts of political science.

If we are in times of trouble, not the least reason is that art no longer offers any unifying, clarifying, redemptive images to capture our imagination. Modern woman looks vainly to science and rational justice for her liberation, but she will get it only when some artist throws out an image of the new woman that makes aesthetic sense. We shall not really understand Watergate or the assassinations of the 60s until some artist creates a plausible fiction that makes aesthetic sense; it will be the legend, not the empirical facts, that will fix the meaning of these events.

The paucity of captivating images for the good life may mean that the chaos of randomized good and evil is the only plausible image available. But a society cannot live in chaos forever or for very long, and since every triumph of science and science-based technology seems to create two problems for every one it solves, about the best we can expect from that quarter is a bureaucratized and computerized chaos.

Arts education, however eagerly pursued, will hardly redeem this state of affairs, but insofar as it sensitizes a generation to more critical and more sophisticated response to images, it may not only enlarge the volume of possibility for human life, but it may increase the probability that a redemptive image, when some artistic genius creates it, will be recognized.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Review of Lorna Selfe's *NADIA: A CASE OF EXTRAORDINARY DRAWING ABILITY IN AN AUTISTIC CHILD*. New York: Academic Press, 1978, by Nigel Dennis in *THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS*, May 4, 1978.

## Some Aspects of the Relationship Between Economic and Cultural Reproduction\*

Michael W. Apple  
The University of Wisconsin-Madison

### Introduction

Liberal educators have taken a rather optimistic posture on some aspects of the past ten to fifteen years of educational reform in the United States. This is, perhaps, most especially evident in those individuals and groups who are concerned primarily with curriculum, with the knowledge that gets into schools, and who have either witnessed or participated in the growth of discipline centered curricula throughout the country. The position often has it that schoolpeople, scholars, the business community, parents, and others, all somehow working together, have set in motion forces that have increased the stock of disciplinary knowledge that all students are to get. Supposedly, this process of increased distribution of knowledge has been enhanced by comparatively large amounts of funding on a national level for curriculum development, teacher training and retraining, and so on. Success may not have been total; after all, it almost never is. But, better management and dissemination strategies can be generated to deal with these kinds of problems.

Given this posture, we have tended to forget that, often, what is not asked about such widespread efforts at "reform" may be more important than what we commonsensically like to ask. Who benefits from such reforms? What are their latent connections to the ways inequality may be maintained? Do the very ways we tend to look at schools and especially the knowledge and culture they overtly and covertly teach (even ways generated out of a fairly radical perspective) cover some of the interests that they embody? What frameworks have been and need to be developed to generate the evidence which answers to these kinds of questions require? In what follows, I shall outline some approaches to begin to deal with these issues, approaches which incorporate some of the current economic criticisms of schooling but which also respond to the complex functioning of schools that even some of the analysts of the political economy of education may tend to gloss over.

### Cultural and Economic Reproduction

Many economists and not a few sociologists and historians of education have a peculiar way of looking at schools. They envision the institution of schooling as something like a black box. One measures input before students enter schools and then measures output along the way or when "adults" enter the labor force. What actually goes on within the black box - what is taught, the concrete experience of children and teachers - is less important in this view than the more global and macro-economic considerations of rate of return on investment, or, more radically, the reproduction of the division of labor. While these are important considerations, perhaps especially that dealing with the role of the school as a reproductive force in an unequal society, by the very nature of a vision of school as black box, they cannot demonstrate how these effects are built within schools. Therefore, these individuals are less precise than they could be in explaining part of the role of cultural institutions in the reproduction they want to describe. Yet, as I shall argue here, such cultural explanations need to be gotten at; but it requires a different but often complementary orientation than the ones these and other scholars employ.

There is a unique combination of elite and popular culture in schools. As institutions they provide exceptionally interesting, and politically and economically potent, areas for the investigation of mechanisms of cultural distribution in a society. Thinking of schools as mechanisms of cultural distribution is important since, as the late Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci noted, a critical element in enhancing the ideological dominance of certain classes is the control of the knowledge preserving and producing institutions of a particular society.<sup>1</sup> Thus, the "reality" that schools and other cultural institutions select, preserve and distribute may need to be particularized, in Mannheim's<sup>2</sup> words, so that it can be seen as a particular "social construction" which may not serve the interests of every individual and group in society.

Now it has become something of a commonplace in recent sociological and educational literature to speak of reality as a social construction. By this, these scholars, especially those of a phenomenological bent, mean

two things. 1) Becoming a person is a social act, a process of initiation in which the neophyte accepts a particular social reality as reality "tout court," as the way life "really is." 2) On a larger scale, the social meanings which sustain and organize a collectivity are created by the continuing patterns of commonsense interaction of people as they go about their lives.<sup>3</sup> Now this insertion of the social element back into what has increasingly become a psychological problem in Anglo-Western society is certainly an improvement over the view of many educators who hold that the patterns of meanings which people use to organize their lives and attempt to transmit through their cultural institutions are independent of social or ideological influences. The notion that there is a "social construction of reality" is a bit too general, however, and not as helpful as we might think in understanding the relationships that exist between cultural institutions, particularly schools, and the framework and texture of social and economic forms in general. As Whitty succinctly puts it, "The overemphasis on the notion that reality is socially constructed seems to have led to a neglect of the consideration of how and why reality comes to be constructed in particular ways and how and why particular constructions of reality seem to have the power to resist subversion."<sup>4</sup> Thus, the general principle of the social construction of reality does not explain why certain social and cultural meanings and not others are distributed through schools; nor does it explain how the control of the knowledge preserving and producing institutions may be linked to the ideological dominance of powerful groups in a social collectivity.

The opposite principle, that knowledge is not related in any significant way to the organization and control of social and economic life, is also problematic, of course, though this may be a surprise to many curriculum theorists. This is best stated by Raymond Williams in his critical analysis of the social distribution of culture.

The pattern of meanings and values through which people conduct their whole lives can be seen for a time as autonomous, and as evolving within its own terms, but it is quite unreal, ultimately, to separate this pattern from a precise political and economic system, which can extend its influence into the most unexpected regions of feeling and behavior. The common prescription of education, as the key to change, ignores the fact that the form and content of education are affected, and in some cases determined, by the actual systems of [political] decision and [economic maintenance].<sup>5</sup>

Both Whitty and Williams are raising quite difficult issues about what might be called the relationship between ideology and school knowledge, yet the context is generally British. It should not surprise us that there is a rather extensive history of dealing with issues concerning the connections between culture and control on the Continent and in England. For one thing, they have had a less hidden set of class antagonisms than the United States. That the tradition of ideological analysis is less visible in American educational and cultural scholarship speaks to two other concerns though, the ahistorical nature of most educational activity and the dominance of an ethic of amelioration through technical models in most curriculum discourse.<sup>6</sup> The ahistorical nature of the field of curriculum is rather interesting here. Anyone familiar with the intense argumentation both within and on the fringes of the Progressive Education Association during its history soon realizes that one of the major points of contention among progressive educators was the problem of indoctrination. Should schools, guided by a vision of a more just society, teach a particular set of social meanings to their students? Should they concern themselves only with progressive pedagogical techniques, rather than espouse a particular social and economic cause? Questions of this type "plagued" democratically minded educators in the past and the controversy continues, though in a different vocabulary, to this day.

In fact, as Stanwood Cobb, one of the early organizers of the Progressive Education Association, stated in a recent interview, many progressive educators throughout the early decades of this century were quite cautious about even raising the question of what actual content should be taught and evaluated in schools. They often preferred to concern themselves primarily with teaching methods, in part because the determination of curriculum was perceived as inherently a political issue which could split the movement.<sup>7</sup> Cobb's estimation of the larger structural causes behind these educators' choice of arenas in which to act may or may not be historically accurate. The fact remains though that, at least phenomenologically, many educators recognized that the

historically significant issues have not informed current curriculum argumentation in the United States as much as they have in, say, England and France. Yet, there is a growing recognition that schools in advanced industrial societies like our own may serve certain social classes rather well and other classes not well at all. Thus, I can think of few areas of investigation more pressing than that which seeks to uncover the linkages between meaning and control in our cultural institutions.

While I cannot present a fully worked out theory of culture and control at this time (though individuals such as Raymond Williams, Pierre Bourdieu, and Basil Bernstein have begun such a task),<sup>8</sup> I would like to do a number of things here. First, I will provide a discussion of the basic framework of assumptions under which the recent work on the relationship between ideology and school experience operates. This will be compared to the traditions which now predominate in curriculum research today. I will, then, take one aspect of the argument about the linkages between curriculum and ideological and economic structure and will outline some general propositions about it. These propositions should be seen more as hypotheses than as final proof, and will undoubtedly require historical, conceptual, and empirical - to say nothing of comparative - investigations to demonstrate their fruitfulness. These hypotheses will concern the relationship between what curricular knowledge is accorded high status in our society and its economic and cultural effects. I shall argue that it is difficult to think through the past and present problems of the form and content of curriculum without attempting to uncover the complex nexus linking cultural and economic reproduction together. Let us begin by briefly examining the extant traditions - as ideal types - that tend to provide the assumptive background of a good deal of current curriculum work.

#### The Achievement and Socialization Traditions

A large proportion of educational and curriculum theories and scholarship today derive their programmatic impetus and their logical warrant from the various psychologies of learning now available. While Schwab and others have demonstrated that it is a logical error to attempt to derive a theory of curriculum (or pedagogy) from a theory of learning<sup>9</sup> - something all too many curriculum theorists still do not seem to realize - there is another difficulty that is more germane to my own discussion here. The language of learning tends to be apolitical and ahistorical, thus hiding the complex nexus of political and economic power and resources that lies behind a considerable amount of curriculum organization and selection. In brief, it is not an adequate linguistic tool for dealing with what must be a prior set of curriculum questions about some of the possible ideological roots of school knowledge. In their simplest aspects, these questions can be reduced to the following issues: "What is actually taught in schools?" "What are the manifest and latent social functions of the knowledge that is taught in schools?" "How do the principles of selection and organization that are used to plan, order, and evaluate that knowledge function in the cultural and economic reproduction of class relations in an advanced industrial society like our own?"<sup>10</sup> These questions are not usually part of the language game of psychology. Let us examine the conceptual framework, the board, on which language games of this type are played just a bit further.

There seem to have been two rather distinct ways educators (and psychologists, sociologists, and economists) have investigated school knowledge. One has centered around the issue of academic achievement. The second has been less concerned with questions of achievement than with the role of schools as socialization mechanisms.<sup>11</sup>

In the academic achievement model, curricular knowledge itself is not made problematic. Rather the knowledge that finds its way into schools is usually accepted as given so that comparisons can be made among social groups, schools, children, etc. Thus, academic performance, differentiation, and stratification based on relatively unexamined presuppositions of what is to be construed as valuable knowledge are the guiding interests behind the research. The focus tends to be on determining the variables that have a major impact on an individual's or group's success or failure in school, such as the "adolescent subculture", the unequal distribution of educational resources, or say, the social background of the students. The social goal is maximizing academic productivity.

Unlike the academic achievement model, the socialization approach does not necessarily leave school knowledge unexamined. In fact, one of its primary interests is in exploring the social norms and values that are taught in school. However, because of this interest, it restricts itself to the study of what might be called

"moral knowledge." It establishes as given the set of societal values and inquires into how the school as an agent of society socializes students into its "shared" set of normative rules and dispositions. Robert Dreeben's well known little book, *ON WHAT IS LEARNED IN SCHOOLS*,<sup>12</sup> can provide an excellent example here.

These approaches are not totally wrong, of course, and have in the past contributed to our understanding of schools as cultural and social mechanisms, though perhaps not always in the way the approaches intended. In fact, one advantage of the extended accounts of, say, socialization by Dreeben and others is that they enhance our ability to illuminate what is taken-for-granted as commonsense, as given, for such an approach to actually be accepted as a cogent explanation at all.<sup>13</sup> As such, they point beyond themselves to the nature of meaning and control in schools.

What they tacitly accept and, hence, fail to question is important for, on closer inspection, each of these two research traditions is problematic in its own way. The academic achievement model, influenced more and more strongly by managerial concerns of technical control and efficiency, has begun to neglect the actual content of the knowledge itself, thus failing to take seriously the possible connection between economics and the structure of school knowledge other than to argue, say, the importance of the "production" of students with strong disciplinary affiliations if "democracy is to be kept strong," and so on. The socialization tradition, while insightful in its own way, focuses on social consensus and on the parallels that exist between the "given" values of a larger collectivity and educational institutions. It, thus, ignores to a very large extent the political and economic context in which such social values function and by which certain sets of social values become the (by whose definition?) dominant values.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, both almost totally disregard some of the latent functions of the form and content of the school curriculum. And this is exactly what the tradition of what has come to be called the "sociology of school knowledge" wants to inquire into.<sup>15</sup>

#### The Sociology and Economics of School Knowledge

A fundamental starting point in this third and more critical tradition is that articulated by Young in his argument that there is a "dialectical relationship between access to power and the opportunity to legitimize certain dominant categories, and the processes by which the availability of such categories to some groups enables them to assert power and control over others."<sup>16</sup> Thus, to put it another way, the problematic involves examining how a system of unequal power in society is maintained, and partly recreated, by means of the "transmission" of culture.<sup>17</sup> The school, as a rather significant agent of cultural and economic reproduction, (after all, every child goes to it and it has important effects as both a credentialing and socializing institution) becomes an important institution here, obviously.

Like the socialization tradition, the focus of these investigations has been on how a society stabilizes itself. What is the place of schools in maintaining the way economic and educational goods and services are controlled, produced, and distributed? However, these questions are guided by a more critical posture than, say, Dreeben. For much of these individuals' commitment to this particular kind of problem stems from an affiliation with socialist movements. They begin with something broadly like a Rawlsian theory of justice: i.e., for a society to be truly just, it must maximize the advantage of the least advantaged.<sup>18</sup> Thus, any society which increases the relative gap between, say, rich and poor in the control of and access to cultural and economic "capital" (as recent economic reports show ours does, for instance) needs to be questioned. How is this inequality made legitimate? Why is it accepted? As Gramsci would put it, how is this hegemony maintained?

For many of these researchers, this seeming social and ideological stability is seen in part "as relying upon the deep and often unconscious internalization by the individual of the principles which govern the existing social order."<sup>19</sup> However, these principles are not perceived as being neutral. They are seen as intimately interconnected with economic and political stratification.

For example, in the American, British, and French analyses currently being done by Bowles and Gintis, myself, Bernstein, Young, and Bourdieu, the individual's underlying perception of the social order of which he or she is a part provides the locus of understanding. Thus, to take one instance, in the words of a British commentator on Bowles and Gintis' interesting but too mechanistic book,<sup>20</sup> "In the work of Bowles and Gintis emphasis is given to the importance of schooling in forming the different personality types which correspond to the requirements of a system of work relations within an economic mode of production."<sup>21</sup> In this

way, for Bowles and Gintis, not only does education allocate individuals to a relatively fixed set of positions in society - an allocation of positions determined by economic and political forces - but the process of education itself, the formal and hidden curriculum, socializes people to accept as legitimate the limited roles they ultimately fill in society.<sup>22</sup>

Other similarly oriented scholars take a comparable stance in examining the effect schools may have on the formation of the consciousness of individuals. Thus, for instance, Basil Bernstein and I have argued that, to a significant extent, "through education the individual's 'mental structures' (i.e., categories of thought, language, and behavior) are formed, and that these mental structures derive from the social division of labor." In France, the investigation of the relationship between cultural reproduction and economic reproduction is being carried out in a parallel vein by Bourdieu. He analyzes the cultural rules, what he calls the *habitus*, that link economic and cultural control and distribution together.<sup>23</sup>

Bourdieu focuses on the student's ability to cope with what might be called "middle class culture." He argues that the cultural capital stored in schools acts as an effective filtering device in the reproduction of a hierarchical society. For example, schools partly recreate the social and economic hierarchies of the larger society through what is seemingly a neutral process of selection and instruction. They take the cultural capital, the *habitus*, of the middle class, as natural and employ it as if all children have had equal access to it. However, "by taking all children as equal, while implicitly favoring those who have already acquired the linguistic and social competencies to handle middle-class culture, schools take as natural what is essentially a social gift, i.e., cultural capital."<sup>24</sup> Bourdieu asks us, hence, to think of cultural capital as we would economic capital. Just as our dominant economic institutions are structured so that those who inherit or already have economic capital do better, so too does cultural capital act in the same way. Cultural capital ("good taste", certain kinds of prior knowledge, abilities and language forms) is unequally distributed throughout society and this is dependent in large part on the division of labor and power in that society. "By selecting for such properties, schools serve to reproduce the distribution of power within the society."<sup>25</sup> For Bourdieu, to completely understand what schools do, who succeeds and who fails, one must not see culture as neutral, as necessarily contributing to social progress. Rather, one sees the culture tacitly preserved in and expected by schools as contributing to inequality outside of these institutions.

Behind these points, hence, is an argument that states that we shall have to recognize that, like poverty, poor achievement is not an aberration. Both poverty and curricular problems such as low achievement are integral products of the organization of economic, cultural, and social life as we know it.<sup>26</sup> (I shall have more to say about seeing many curriculum problems, such as achievement, as "naturally produced" by our institutions shortly, when we consider the formal corpus of school knowledge further in the next section of this analysis.)

Given arguments of this type, then, what is it that this third tradition is basically saying?

The assumption underlying most of the "reproduction" theories is that education plays a mediating role between the individual's consciousness and society at large. These theorists maintain that the rules which govern social behavior, attitudes, morals and beliefs are filtered down from the macro level of economic and political structures to the individual via work experience, educational processes and family socialization. The individual acquires a particular awareness and perception of the society in which he lives. And it is this understanding and attitude towards the social order which [in large part] constitute his consciousness.<sup>27</sup>

Schools, therefore, "process" both knowledge and people. In essence, the formal and informal knowledge is used as a complex filter to process people, often by class; and, at the same time, different dispositions and values are taught to different school populations, again often by class (and sex and race). In effect, for this more critical tradition, schools latently recreate cultural and economic disparities, though this is certainly not what most school people intend at all.

Let me pause here to clarify one thing: This is not to maintain that either culture or consciousness is mechanistically determined (in the strong sense of that term) by economic structure. Rather, it seeks to both

bring to a level of awareness and make historically and empirically problematic the dialectical relationship between cultural control and distribution and economic and political stratification.<sup>28</sup> Our ordinary perceptions - ones taken from the achievement and socialization models - hence, are bracketed. The "cognitive interest" underlying the research program is to look relationally, if you will, to think about school knowledge as being generated out of ideological and economic conflicts "outside" as well as "inside" education. These conflicts and forces set limits on (not mechanistically determine) cultural responses. This requires subtlety, not appraisals which argue for a one to one correspondence between institutional life and cultural forms. Neither all curricula nor all culture are "mere products" of simple economic forces.<sup>29</sup>

In fact, I want to note a critical caveat at this point. There is an obvious danger here, one that should not go unrecognized. To make the actual "stuff" of curriculum problematic, to hold what currently counts as legitimate knowledge up to ideological scrutiny, can lead to a rather vulgar brand of relativism. That is, to see overt and hidden curricular knowledge as social and historical products ultimately tends to raise questions about the criteria of validity and truth we employ.<sup>30</sup> The epistemological issues that might be raised here are not uninteresting, to say the least. However, the point behind these investigations is not to totally relativize either our knowledge or our criteria for warranting its truth or falsity (though the Marxist tradition has a long history of just this debate as the controversy between, say, Adorno and Popper documents. We have much to learn from the epistemological and political issues raised by this debate, by the way.)<sup>31</sup> Rather, as I just mentioned, the methodological dictum is to think relationally or structurally. In clearer terms, one should look for the subtle connections between educational phenomena, such as curriculum, and the latent social and economic outcomes of the institution.

These points are obviously similar to those often associated with the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School who have argued that the context in which we perceive social facts, the general way we conceptually organize our world, may hide the fact that these seemingly commonsensical appearances serve particular interests.<sup>32</sup> But these interests cannot merely be assumed; they need to be documented. In order to lay some of the foundation of this documentation, we shall need to turn to some of the hypotheses that I mentioned earlier I would suggest. We shall need to explore how cultural distribution and economic power are intimately intertwined, not just in the teaching of "moral knowledge" as in some of the reproduction theorists, but in the formal corpus of school knowledge itself.

#### On the Problem of High Status Knowledge

The discussion in the previous sections of this analysis centered on the general political, economic, and conceptual arguments that those people interested in the problem of ideology and curriculum have focused upon. It compared this critical tradition to the current achievement and socialization models predominant in the field. I should now like to take one aspect of the relationship between cultural distribution and economic power and explore it further. I want to employ this critical framework to engage in some speculations about how certain knowledge - particularly that knowledge which is considered to be most prestigious in schools - may in fact be linked to economic reproduction. In essence, I want to begin to think through some of the issues associated with the distribution of knowledge and the creation of inequality that people like Bourdieu, Bernstein, Young, and others have sought to raise. At the forefront of our minds, I think, should be Bourdieu's point that I noted in the last section. If you want to understand how cultural and economic/political forms work in tandem, then think of both as aspects of capital.

In order to delve into the connections between these forms, I shall be using the language of cultural "transmissions," in effect treating cultural artifacts and knowledge as if they were things. However, the notion of "as if" must be understood as exactly that, as a metaphor for dealing with a much more complex process in which, say, students do not merely take in information, cultural attributes, etc., but rather they also transform (and sometimes reject) these expected dispositions, propensities, skills, and facts into biographically significant meanings.<sup>33</sup> Thus, while the act of treating knowledge as a thing makes for ease of discussion, a methodological simplification if you will, it needs to be understood as just such a simplifying act. (The fact that it is usually considered a thing in our society does of course point to its reification as a commodity in advanced industrial societies.)<sup>34</sup>



Once again, one of Michael F.D. Young's arguments is helpful as a beginning here. He states that "those in positions of power will attempt to define what is taken as knowledge, how accessible to different groups any knowledge is, and what are accepted relationships between different knowledge areas and between those who have access to them and make them available."<sup>35</sup> Though this is not always or even necessarily a conscious process of manipulation and control, and hence may be a bit overstated, it does raise the issue of the relative status of knowledge and its accessibility. For within this statement is a proposition that might entail something like the following. The possession of high status knowledge, knowledge that is considered of exceptional import and is connected to the structure of corporate economies, is related to and in fact seems to entail the non-possession by others. In essence, high status knowledge "is by definition scarce, and its scarcity is inextricably linked to its instrumentality".<sup>36</sup>

This is an exceptionally critical point and needs to be gone into a bit further. I have argued that schools do not merely "process" people but that they "process" knowledge as well. They enhance and give legitimacy to particular types of cultural resources which are related to unequal economic forms. In order to understand this, we want to think about the kinds of knowledge that schools take as the most important, that they want to maximize. I shall define this as technical knowledge, not to denigrate it, but to differentiate it from, say, aesthetics, physical grace, and so on. The conception of the maximization of technical knowledge is a useful principle. I think, to begin to unpack some of the linkages between cultural capital and economic capital.<sup>37</sup>

Our kind of economic system is organized in such a way that it can create only a certain amount of jobs and still maintain high profit levels for corporations. In essence, the economic apparatus is at its most efficient when there is a (measured) unemployment rate of approximately 4-6% (though we know that this is a notoriously inaccurate measure to which must also be added both the issues of much higher rates for blacks and high levels of underemployment). To provide useful work for these individuals would require cutting into acceptable rates of return, and would probably require at least the partial reorganization of so called "market mechanisms" which apportion jobs and resources. Because of this, it would not be a misplaced metaphor to describe our economic system as naturally generating specific levels of under and unemployment.<sup>38</sup> We can think of this model as one which is primarily concerned with the maximization of the production of profit and only secondarily concerned with the distribution of resources and employment.

Now a similar model seems to hold true when we think about knowledge in its relationship to such an economy. A corporate economy requires the production of high levels of technical knowledge to keep the economic apparatus running effectively and to become more sophisticated in the maximization of opportunities for economic expansion. Within certain limits, what is actually required is not the wide-spread distribution of this high status knowledge to the populace in general. What is needed more is to maximize its production. As long as the knowledge form is continually and efficiently produced, the school itself, at least in this major aspect of its function, is efficient. Thus, certain low levels of achievement on the part of "minority" group students, children of the poor, and so on can be tolerated. It is less consequential to the economy than is the generation of the knowledge itself. Once again, production of a particular "commodity" (here high status knowledge) is of more concern than the distribution of that particular commodity. To the extent that it does not interfere with the production of technical knowledge, then concerns about distributing it more equitably can be tolerated as well.

Thus, just as in the "economic market place" where it is more efficient to have a relatively constant level of unemployment, to actually generate it really, so do cultural institutions "naturally" generate levels of poor achievement. The distribution or scarcity of certain forms of cultural capital is of less moment in this calculus of values than the maximization of the production of the particular knowledge itself.

This, I think, goes a long way in partially explaining the economic role of the debate on standards and open enrollment at universities. It also clarifies some of the reasons schools and curricula seem to be organized toward university life in terms of the dominance of subject centered curricula and the relative prestige given to differing curricula areas. This relationship between economic structure and high status knowledge might also explain some of the large disparities we see in levels of funding for curricular innovations in technical areas and, say, the arts.

The structure of discipline movement provides an interesting example of a number of these points about

power and culture. The discipline centered approach was not a serious challenge to the traditional view of curriculum. Rather it was an argument that a particular commodity - here academic knowledge - by a particular community was not being effectively "marketed" in schools.<sup>39</sup> Even when it was accepted by most school people as the most important curricular knowledge and was given large doses of federal support to assist its adoption in schools, competing power claims were evident about what was to be high status knowledge.

For instance, substantial funding was given to mathematics and science curriculum development while less was given to the arts and humanities. This occurred then and still occurs now for two possible reasons. First is the question of economic utility. The benefits of maximizing the production of scientific and technical knowledge are easily visible and, at least at the time, seemed relatively noncontroversial. Second, high status knowledge appears to be discrete knowledge. It has a (supposedly) identifiable content and (again supposedly) stable structure<sup>40</sup> that are both teachable and, what is critically important, testable. The arts and humanities have obviously been seen to be less amenable to such criteria, supposedly because of the very nature of their subject matter. Thus, one has a two fold, nearly circular proposition working here. High status knowledge is seen as macro-economically beneficial in terms of long run benefits to the most powerful classes in society; and the socially accepted definitions of high status knowledge preclude consideration of non-technical knowledge.

It is important to note the stress on macro-economic considerations. Obviously, television repair is a subject which, if learned well, may provide economic benefits to its user. However, the economy itself will not be unduly impaired if this is not accorded prestige status. In fact, if Braverman's analysis is correct - that our economic structure requires the continual division and breaking down of complex skills into less complex and more standardized skills - economic control may be helped by the lack of prestige given to such craftsmanship. The same does not seem to hold true for technical knowledge.<sup>41</sup>

We have two levels working here again. The constitutive or underlying social and economic rules make it essential that subject centered curricula be taught, that high status be given to technical knowledge. This is in large part due to the selection function of schooling. Though this is more complex than I can go into here, it is easier to stratify individuals according to "academic criteria" when technical knowledge is used. This stratification or grouping is important because not all individuals are seen as having the ability to contribute to the generation of the required knowledge form (as well as partly because of the structural requirements of the division of labor, of course). Thus, the cultural content (legitimate or high status knowledge) is used as a device or future for economic stratification,<sup>42</sup> thereby enhancing the continued expansion of technical knowledge in an economy like ours, as well. At the same time, however, one might expect that within this constitutive framework, educators would be relatively free to respond (or not to respond) to more immediate economic pressures such as career education and so forth.

In short, one major reason that subject centered curricula dominate most schools, that integrated curricula are found in relatively few schools, is at least partly the result of the place of the school in maximizing the production of high status knowledge. This is closely interrelated with the schools' role in the selection of agents to fill economic and social positions in a relatively stratified society.

With Young, I have suggested here that some of the relations among who controls rewards and power in a society, the patterns of dominant values, and the organization of cultural capital can best be uncovered by focusing on the stratification of knowledge. It would not be illogical to claim that, based on what I have argued here, generally, any attempt to make substantive alterations in the relationship between high status and low status knowledge, by, say, making different knowledge areas equal, will tend to be resisted. This would also probably mean that attempts to use different criteria to judge the relative value of different curricular areas will be looked at as illegitimate incursions, as threats to that particular "order".<sup>43</sup>

Examples of this are not difficult to find in the area of evaluation. For instance, the usual way one evaluates the success of curricula is by employing a technical procedure, by comparing input with output. Were test scores raised? Did the students master the material? This is, of course, the achievement model I described earlier. When educators or policy analysts want to evaluate in another, less technical way, by looking at the "quality" of that curricular experience or by raising questions about the ethical nature of the relationships involved in the interaction, they can be rather easily dismissed. Scientific and technical talk in advanced

industrial societies has more legitimacy (higher status) than ethical talk. Ethical talk cannot be easily operationalized within an input/output perspective. And, finally, "scientific" criteria of evaluation give "knowledge", while ethical criteria lead to purely "subjective" considerations.

A current example might be helpful here. After massive reanalysis of studies relating schooling to mobility, Jencks, in *INEQUALITY*, concluded that it was quite difficult to generalize about the roles schools play in increasing one's chances at a better future. Thus, he notes that it might be wiser to focus less on mobility and achievement and more on the quality of a student's actual experience in classrooms, something with strangely (though pleasantly) Deweyan overtones. However, Jencks' argument that we must pay greater attention to the quality of life within our educational institutions had its roots in ethical and political considerations and was dismissed rather readily. His criteria for making that statement were perceived as being illegitimate. They had little validity within the particular set of language games of which evaluation partakes, and, hence are accorded little status.<sup>44</sup>

Notice something else about what this insistence on technical criteria does. It makes both the kinds of questions raised, and the answers given to them, the province of experts, those individuals who possess the knowledge already. In this way, the relative status of the knowledge is linked to the kinds of questions deemed acceptable, which in turn seems to be linked to its non-possession by other individuals. The form of the questions becomes an aspect of cultural reproduction since these questions can only be answered by experts who already have had the technical knowledge distributed to them. The stratification of knowledge in this case again involves the stratification of people, though less on an economic level here.

#### Hegemony and Reproduction

All of this is quite involved, obviously, and rather difficult to untangle, I know. While our understanding of these knotty relationships is still tentative, it does raise anew one of the questions I referred to before. Given the subtle connections in this process of the generation of cultural as well as economic reproduction, how and why do people accept it? Hence, the question of hegemony, of ideological stability, that is raised by the reproduction theorists emerges once more.<sup>45</sup> For it is here that the research of Bowles and Gintis, Bernstein, Bourdieu and others on the social reproduction of the values, norms, and dispositions transmitted by the cultural apparatus of a society offers part of an explanation. One form of reproduction (though "socialization" and what has been called the hidden curriculum) complements another (the formal corpus of school knowledge), each of which seems to have ties to economic inequality. It is in the interplay between curricular knowledge - the stuff we teach, the "legitimate culture" - and the social relations of classroom life that the reproduction theorists describe, that we can begin to see some of the real relations schools have to an unequal economic structure.

Again notice what I am saying, for it constitutes part of an argument against the conspiracy theories so popular in some revisionist critiques of schooling. This process of reproduction is not caused (in the strong sense of that concept) by an elite group of managers who sat or now sit around tables plotting ways to "do in" their workers at both the workplace and the school. While such an account may accurately describe some aspects of why schools do what they do,<sup>46</sup> it is not a sufficient explanation of the nexus of forces that actually seem to exist. I am arguing, instead, that given the extant economic and political forms which now provide the principles upon which so much of our everyday lives are organized, this reproductive process is a "logical necessity" for the continued maintenance of an unequal social order. The economic and cultural unbalance follows "naturally."<sup>47</sup>

This may make it hard for educators such as ourselves to deal with the problem. We may, in fact, have to take seriously the political and economic commitments that guide the reproduction theorists. Serious educational analysis may require a more coherent theory of the social and economic polity of which we are a part. While I have explored cultural mechanisms here, it is just as essential to remember Raymond Williams' points that neither culture, nor education are free floating. To forget that is to neglect a primary arena for collective action and commitment.

Some of this economic concern is summarized by Henry Levin. In a review of the effects of large scale educational interventions by the government to try to reduce economic inequality through reforms in curriculum and

teaching, he concludes that:

...Educational policies that are aimed at resolving social dilemmas that arise out of the basic malfunctioning of the economic, social and political institutions of the society are not amenable to solution through educational policy and reform. The leverage available to the most benevolent educational reformer and policy specialist is limited by the lack of a constituency for change and the overwhelming momentum of the educational process in the direction of social reproduction of the existing polity. And, there is a deleterious result in our efforts if educational attempts to change society tend to direct attention away from the locus of the problem by creating and legitimating the ideology that schools can be used to solve problems which did not originate in the educational sector.<sup>48</sup>

Yet once again, we must be cautious of this kind of approach, for it can lead us back to viewing schools as little black boxes once more. And that is what we rejected at the outset.

### Some Concluding Questions

I want to stop here, knowing full well that much more could be and needs to be said about the topics I have raised. For example, in order to go further with the relationship between high status knowledge and an "external" social order, one would have to inquire into the history of the concomitant rise of new classes of social personnel and the growth of new types of "legitimate" knowledge.<sup>49</sup> These issues obviously require much more thought to be given to the conceptual problem of the dialectical relationship between cultural control and social and economic structure. How does each affect the other? What roles does an educational system itself play in defining particular forms of knowledge as high status? What role does it play in helping to create a credentialing process based on the possession (and non-possession) of this cultural capital, a credentialing system that provides numbers of agents roughly equivalent to the needs of the division of labor in society? These questions imply something important I think, for this relationship is not a one way street. Education is both a "cause" and an "effect" here. The school is not a passive mirror, but an active force, one that also serves to give legitimacy to economic and social forms and ideologies so intimately connected to it.<sup>50</sup> And it is just this action which need to be unpacked.

Questions of this type are not usually asked in curriculum of course. However, we need to remember that these concerns are not something totally new to the discourse surrounding American education. In fact, we must not see this kind of sociologically and economically inclined curriculum scholarship as being an attempt to carry on any so called "reconceptualization" of the curriculum field, though that name has been applied to some recent analysts of power and school knowledge.<sup>51</sup> Rather, the questions which guide this work need to be seen as having rather deep roots in the curriculum field, roots we may have unfortunately forgotten given the ahistorical nature of education.

We need only recall what stimulated the early social reconstructionists in education (Counts, Smith-Stanley-Shores, Brameld, and so on) to begin to realize that one of the guiding themes in past curriculum work has been the role schools fulfill in the reproduction of an unequal society. While these individuals may have been much too optimistic in viewing schools as powerful agencies in redressing this imbalance, and while a number of them ultimately backed away from large scale structural alterations in our polity,<sup>52</sup> the principle of examining the linkages between cultural and economic institutions is a valued part of our past. It is time to make it our present and future, as well.

### REFERENCES

- \* The analysis on which this essay is based appears in expanded form in *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW* XXII (October 1978) and in Michael W. Apple, *IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
- 1. Thomas R. Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony," *JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS* XXXVI (April-June 1975), 36.

2. Karl Mannheim, *IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA* (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936).
3. This is of course best laid out by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY* (N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966). The most articulate challenge to the use of such "phenomenological" formulations in education is found in Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, *EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL: A STUDY IN PROGRESSIVE PRIMARY EDUCATION* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).
4. Geoff Whitty, "Sociology and the Problem of Radical Educational Change", *EDUCABILITY, SCHOOLS AND IDEOLOGY*, Michael Flude and John Ahier, eds. (London: Halstead Press, 1974), p. 125.
5. Raymond Williams, *THE LONG REVOLUTION* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961), pp. 119-120.
6. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Persistent Curriculum Issues in Historical Perspective." *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, William Pinar, ed. (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975), pp. 39-50.
7. Taped interview given at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The necessity for large scale educational reform movements to have this cautious penumbra of vagueness is analyzed further in B. Paul Komisar and James McClellan, "The Logic of Slogans," *LANGUAGE AND CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION*, B. Othanel Smith and Robert Ennis, eds. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1961), pp. 195-214.
8. See, e.g., Raymond Williams, *THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1973), Pierre Bourdieu and Jean Claude Passeron, *REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION: SOCIETY AND CULTURE* (London: Sage, 1977), and Basil Bernstein, *CLASS, CODES AND CONTROL, VOLUME 3: TOWARDS A THEORY OF EDUCATIONAL TRANSMISSIONS* (Second edition; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977).
9. Joseph Schwab, *THE PRACTICAL: A LANGUAGE FOR CURRICULUM* (Washington: National Education Association, 1970), and Dwayne Huebner, "Implications of Psychological Thought for the Curriculum", *INFLUENCES IN CURRICULUM CHANGE*, Glenys Unruh and Robert Leeper, ed. (Washington: ASCD, 1968, pp. 28-37.
10. I have discussed these issues further in Michael W. Apple and Nancy King, "What Do Schools Teach?", *CURRICULUM INQUIRY VI* (number 4, 1977).
11. I am drawing on the insightful exposition of these two research traditions in Philip Wexler, "Ideology and Utopia in American Sociology of Education". *EDUCATION IN A CHANGING SOCIETY*, Antonia Kloskawska and Guido Martinati (Eds.). London: Sage Publications, 1977, pp. 27-59.
12. Robert Dreeben, *ON WHAT IS LEARNED IN SCHOOLS* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1968).
13. Michael F.D. Young, "On the Politics of Educational Knowledge," *EDUCATION IN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND*, R. Bell, ed. (London: Oxford, 1973), p. 201.
14. Wexler, *OP. CIT.*, p. 21.
15. For further examination of the roots of this tradition see Michael W. Apple, "Power and School Knowledge," *THE REVIEW OF EDUCATION*, III (Jan./Feb. 1977), 26-49, and Michael W. Apple and Philip Wexler, "Cultural Capital and Educational Transmissions," *EDUCATIONAL THEORY*, XXVII (Winter 1978).
16. Michael F.D. Young, "Knowledge and Control," *KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL*, Michael F.D. Young, ed. (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1971), p. 8.
17. Bourdieu and Passeron, *OP. CIT.*, p. 5.
18. I have analyzed the conceptual and political commitments further in Apple, "Power and School Knowledge," *OP. CIT.*
19. Madeleine MacDonald, *THE CURRICULUM AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION* (Milton Keynes, England: The Open University Press, 1977), p. 60.
20. Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, *SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1975).
21. MacDonald, *OP. CIT.*, pp. 309. This piece also provides a number of interesting criticisms of Bowles and Gintis' reliance on a correspondence theory.
22. John W. Meyer, "The Effects of Education as an Institution," *AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY*, LXXXIII (July 1977), 64.
23. MacDonald, *OP. CIT.* See also, Apple and King, *OP. CIT.*

24. Roger Dale, et al., eds. *SCHOOLING AND CAPITALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL READER* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 4.
25. *IBID.*
26. R.W. Connell, *RULING CLASS, RULING CULTURE* (N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 219.
27. MacDonald, *OP. CIT.*
28. The two way nature of this relationship - how culture and economics interpenetrate and act on each other in a dynamic fashion - is best examined in Raymond Williams, "Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory," *NEW LEFT REVIEW* LXXXIII (November/December 1973).
29. *IBID.* See also the final chapter, "Aspects of the Relations between Education and Production," in Bernstein, *OP. CIT.*
30. Michael F.D. Young, "Taking Sides Against the Probable," *RATIONALITY, EDUCATION AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), pp. 86-96 and Michael W. Apple, "Curriculum as Ideological Selection," *COMPARATIVE EDUCATION REVIEW* XX (June, 1976), pp. 209-215.
31. See, for example, Albrecht Wellmer, *CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY* (N.Y.: Herder and Herder, 1971), especially Chapter I. See also the discussion of the position taken by the French Marxist philosopher of science Louis Althusser in Miriam Glucksmann, *STRUCTURALIST ANALYSIS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THOUGHT* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974). Though it may be difficult to deal with "proving" critically oriented social assertions using the positivist tradition, this does not mean that empirical documentation of aspects of the problem is inconsequential. This is nicely argued in Connell, *OP. CIT.*
32. Ian Hextall and Madan Sarup, "School Knowledge, Evaluation and Alienation," *SOCIETY, STATE AND SCHOOLING*, Michael Young and Geoff Whitty, ed. (London: The Falmer Press, 1977), pp. 151-171.
33. See the articles by Mehan and McKay in Hans Peter Dreitzel, ed. *CHILDHOOD AND SOCIALIZATION* (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1973), and Linda M. McNeil, "Economic Dimensions of Social Studies Curricula: Curriculum as Institutionalized Knowledge" (unpublished Doctoral thesis, The University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1977).
34. Whitty, *OP. CIT.*
35. Michael F.D. Young, "An Approach to the Study of Curricula as Socially Organized Knowledge," in *Young KNOWLEDGE AND CONTROL*, *OP. CIT.* There are interesting parallels here between the work of Young and Huebner in their joint focus on curricular accessibility. Compare Dwayne Huebner, "Curriculum as the Accessibility of Knowledge" (unpublished paper presented at Curriculum Theory Study Group, Minneapolis, March 2, 1970, mimeographed).
36. Bernice Fischer, "Conceptual Masks: An Essay Review of Fred Inglis, *IDEOLOGY AND THE IMAGINATION*," *THE REVIEW OF EDUCATION* I (November 1975), p. 526. See also Hextall and Sarup, *OP. CIT.*
37. The principle that schools serve to maximize the production of technical knowledge was first noted by Walter Feinberg in his provocative chapter "A Critical Analysis of the Social and Economic Limits to the Humanizing of Education," *HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: VISIONS AND REALITIES*, Richard H. Heller, ed. (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1977), pp. 249-269. My analysis here is indebted to his own.
38. Andrew Hacker, "Cutting Classes," *THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS* XXIII (May, 1976), p. 15. Hacker notes that at full employment our economy can usefully use only about 43% of the work age population. It is not profitable to employ more than that. "Some of the unnecessary 57% become housewives, college students, or retire on moderate pension. Others, however, must settle for a lifetime of poverty because the economic system offers them no alternatives."
39. Geoff Whitty and Michael F.D. Young, "The Politics of School Knowledge," *THE TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT*, September 5, 1973, p. 20.
40. This is an empirical claim, of course, and is falsifiable. There are a number of educators and scientists who would take issue with such a simplification of science and mathematics. See, e.g., Thomas Kuhn, *THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). What aspects of scientific "paradigms" are stable is being argued right now. See Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,

- CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and Stephen Toulmin, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).
41. Harry Braverman, LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
  42. The close relationship between academic curricula, the distribution of scarce resources, and the labeling and tracking of high school students is documented in James E. Rosenbaum, MAKING INEQUALITY (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1976).
  43. Young, "An Approach to the Study of Curriculum as Socially Organized Knowledge," OP. CIT., p. 34.
  44. Habermas' analysis of how purposive/rational or instrumental forms of language and action have come to dominate our consciousness is illuminating here. cf., Jurgen Habermas, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971) and Michael W. Apple, "The Process and Ideology of Valuing in Educational Settings," EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION: ANALYSIS AND RESPONSIBILITY, Michael W. Apple, et al., eds. (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974).  
We would want to trace the growth in status of purposive/rational forms of action within the concomitant growth of particular economic systems, Raymond Williams' corpus of work provides essential models for this kind of inquiry. See his THE LONG REVOLUTION (London: Chatto and Windus, 1961) and THE COUNTRY AND THE CITY, OP. CIT.
  45. Reviews of some of the relevant research on the question of hegemony can be found in David W. Livingston, "On Hegemony in Corporate Capitalist States," SOCIOLOGICAL INQUIRY XLVI (numbers 3 and 4, 1977), 235-250 and R.W. Connell, OP. CIT., especially Chapters 7-10.
  46. Barry Franklin and I have documented part of this in a recent paper that examines the historical linkages between social and economic ideologies and the dominant modes of curriculum organization and selection. See Michael W. Apple and Barry Franklin, "Curricular History and Social Control," COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION, Carl Grant, ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1979).
  47. Raymond Williams, THE LONG REVOLUTION, OP. CIT., pp. 298-299.
  48. Henry M. Levin, "A Radical Critique of Educational Policy" (Stanford, California: Occasional Paper of the Stanford University Evaluation Consortium, March, 1977), pp. 26-17. (Mimeographed).
  49. Basil Bernstein has made some intriguing inroads into this area in his "Aspects of the Relations Between Education and Production" in Bernstein, OP. CIT. See also, Nico Poulantzas, CLASSES IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM (London: New Left Books, 1975).
  50. See the interesting essay by John W. Meyer, OP. CIT. Randall Collins' attempt to articulate a theory of cultural markets, in "Some Comparative Principles of Educational Stratification," HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW XLVII (February, 1977), 1-27, is also of some assistance here. It is a bit conceptually confused, though. See my reply to him in HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REVIEW XLVII (November, 1977), 601-602.
  51. William Pinar, ed. CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975).
  52. Walter Feinberg, REASON AND RHETORIC: THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF TWENTIETH CENTURY LIBERAL EDUCATIONAL POLICY (N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, 1975).

## Curriculum, Consciousness and Social Change\*

James B. Macdonald  
University of North Carolina-Greensboro

“Three things cannot be retrieved  
The arrow once sped from the bow,  
The word spoken in haste,  
The missed opportunity.”

Islamic Proverb

It is becoming very fashionable to take a dim view about the field of curriculum and curriculum development. We are, I suspect, overly harsh on ourselves, perhaps because we have had high and unwarranted expectations. We are, I believe as the proverb suggests, missing opportunities.

It is important to note that although we have always had our own special set of complexities and problems, we also share a broader social and intellectual context that can be said to be experiencing considerable disillusionment, anxiety, and confusion.

Our alternatives seem fairly clear. We have the option of giving up the whole enterprise (negating it, if you wish); simply living through whatever resolution occurs; or continuing to try to provide better conceptualization and practice that can lead to the improvement of curriculum environments for human beings. I, personally, have not yet lost my passion for continuing the quest for improvement.

Those of us who continue on this path are faced immediately with a very difficult question. “Is there anything we can do at the level of schooling that does not necessitate prior or concomitant broad social change before it can happen in any meaningful way?” Or, perhaps stated in another way, we can modify George Count’s “Dare the Schools Change the Social Order” to “Can the Schools Change the Social Order?” If we decide we can make a difference, then we must justify the implicit “should” that rests in the very asking of it. Personally, I believe that we both can and should attempt to “change” society.

The “should” question will not be dealt with at any length here, in order that I may focus my attention on how I believe we can make a difference.

Yet, I must, at least, say that although schooling is a major social vehicle for socializing the young and conserving and transmitting our culture, there is no special reason why we ourselves must not act upon the basis of the very best values we are trying to communicate to the young.

Thus, there is little reason that I can see to propose to the young that the freeing of the human spirit, mind, and body from arbitrary social and psychological constraints--that is, the liberation of human potential in a framework of democratic rights, responsibilities, and practices--leading toward better realization of justice, equality, liberty, and fraternity--should not be reflected in our own work with schools. Thus, I think we should work toward change in the direction of human liberation.

Turning to the question of what we can do in curriculum and curriculum development in the schools, we must be clear about our expectations. At the most abstract level, it is analogous to food--do we have a synthetic, instant potato, set of expectations--or an organic set? I shall opt for the organic approach here.\*\*

What I shall attempt to do in the balance of this article is to provide an analysis of the setting for the derivation of reasonable expectations, and then proceed to suggest ways we might meet these expectations.

What do we expect

Having declared my intention to enter into the work of curriculum for the sake of human liberation, rather than shaping and controlling behavior, or understanding, per se, as end points, we need to have our expectations (as distinguished from objectives) rather clearly in mind.

What we can expect to achieve is grounded in our conceptions of the nature of human nature and the nature of change in society and culture. I shall explicate rather briefly, basically from the works of two rather disparate scholars, the position and thus setting from which my expectations come.



Historically, at least over the past 2,500 years in Western culture, we have witnessed a basic confrontation between brands of idealism and realism. Pushed to their polar extremities, this has amounted to positions which may be stated as consciousness versus materialism. At the extremes it may be argued that reality rests in our consciousness and the material objects of the world are appearances. The extreme materialist position would posit that reality is what it appears to be (what we sense), and that mental phenomena are epiphenomena of our actions in the world. This debate is a continuing one and the diversity in viewpoints about this problem are almost beyond cataloging.

I will utilize the work of Michael Polanyi<sup>1,2</sup> as a basis for illustrating the concept of human nature that I believe makes most sense in relation to this fundamental problem of consciousness and materialism, now translated into the old mind-body argument for purposes here.

Polanyi posits that all knowledge is personal knowledge. By this he does not mean that all knowledge is relative and idiosyncratic to individuals, but that all knowledge involves a person knowing (a knower). Further, knowing involves a focus for our coming to know and a tacit subsidiary ground for context is needed to form the elements of personal knowing.

Coming from a Gestalt psychology perceptual understanding, Polanyi combines this with an organismic biological orientation that posits a hierarchy of organization in organic systems whereby the higher level systems are not the sum of their parts (though dependent upon them) but provide an organizing function for lower levels.

I shall not argue the case here, but refer you to Polanyi's work for your own decision, but I would like to present what Polanyi feels are the implications of his framework in terms of the mind-body problem, or consciousness.

Polanyi states that the relation of mind to body has the same logical structure as that which exists in focal awareness and subsidiary awareness (i.e., consciousness), since we all have it.

What Polanyi concludes from his analysis is that the mind or consciousness exists as a separate entity, but dependent upon the body to which it serves as a higher principle in the organization of the organism's functions. He concludes by saying, "Though rooted in the body, the mind is, therefore, free in its actions from bodily determination--exactly as our common sense knows it to be free."

The second set of clues for our setting in projecting expectations are taken from the work of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci was an Italian Marxist theoretician whose major work ranges over the period of 1916-1937. His work was and is (to my knowledge) rather unique in Marxist theory. It has special relevance to my position here because it contributes from a Marxist orientation on social and cultural change the kind of perspective that helps us focus on reasonable expectations for curriculum and curriculum development.

Gramsci's major themes, according to Carl Boggs,<sup>3</sup> were as follows:

1. He focused upon the active, political, and voluntarist side of theory rather than the fatalistic reliance upon objective focus and scientific laws of capitalist development.
2. He focused less on historical analysis and empirical description and more upon issues of strategy and political methods necessary to destroy bourgeois society.
3. Revolution or change necessitated passionate emotional commitment, not just rational-cognitive activity, integrated through the concept of praxis.
4. Most important for our purposes here--Gramsci gave a high priority to the role of ideological struggle in the revolutionary process. He insisted that socialist revolution be conceived as an organic phenomenon, not an event; and, that transforming consciousness was an inseparable part of structural change (i.e., economic and social conditions of work and production).
5. Thus, revolutionary change must embrace all aspects of society and culture, not simply the economic.
6. Further, he rejected the elitist and authoritarian tendencies in the Community movement and strove to develop a "mass" party rooted in everyday social reality.
7. And, finally, he strove to build a theory that would be visibly relevant to the broad masses of people.

What is selectively critical for my purposes here is Gramsci's concept of ideological hegemony. Where many Marxists emphasized the dependence of politics, ideology, and culture on the economic substructure, as a reflection of the material base, Gramsci clearly felt this was not broad enough to encompass the needed analysis for change.

By positing the idea of ideological hegemony, Gramsci meant to elucidate, as Boggs<sup>4</sup> says: ... the permeation throughout civil society -- including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family -- of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it. To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of "common sense". . . For hegemony to assert itself successfully in any society, therefore, it must operate in a dualistic manner: as a general conception of life for the masses, and as a scholastic program or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of the intellectuals.

What Gramsci posits and develops through the context of his Marxist theory is the critical role of consciousness and the necessary changes in values, attitudes, morality, and beliefs that are necessary as a pre-condition in order that revolutionary change be possible.

One further point of Gramsci's theorizing should be noted for our purposes -- his conception of the role of intellectuals in the process. Assuming that curriculum thinkers are intellectuals, his points may have relevance for us.

Gramsci rejected the establishment of an elite group of theoreticians and proposed what he called an "organic intellectual" immersed in the everyday activity of the different groups of workers. New ideas would be integrated into the very fabric of the life styles, language, and traditions in those environments. As Idries Shah, the leader of the Sufis says, "Please do not start to teach the blind until you have practiced living with closed eyes."

Turning now to the problem of expectations for our own hopes for positive change in schools, the positions described by Polanyi and Gramsci, from widely separate experiences and intentions, have provided a setting which is representative of many other scholars.

The importance I wish to attach to these views may be summarized quickly. First, the existence of a separate entity called human consciousness is apparent; and next, change in human social consciousness is necessary and a precondition of later political change. And, it is precisely in the realm of changing consciousness that I believe our expectations should reside.

Thus, in Jurgen Habermas's<sup>5</sup> terms, there are two moments in the dialectic-work and communication. If we utilize the concept of a dialectical relationship over longer periods of time between consciousness and structural change, it is at the "moment" of consciousness in this dialectic whereby we may expect to have any meaningful input in the change process.

Our activities, efforts, and expectations should, in other words, be focused upon the ideas, values, attitudes, and morality of persons in school in the context of their concrete lived experiences; and our efforts should be toward changing consciousness in these settings toward more liberating and fulfilling outcomes.

Furthermore, there is no one brand of liberation. There is no predictable absolute outcome that we should expect from our efforts. On the contrary, a diversity and apparent inconsistency of comparative efforts is to be expected. Any concrete or spontaneous concern on the part of educators for repressive or oppressive structures, practices, and ideas should be treated as valid and a point of entry for changing consciousness.

William Irwin Thompson<sup>6</sup> makes a similar point when asking why our good intentions so often lead to evil outcomes. One answer to this, he feels, is simply that if the good is seen shining in the immediacy of the act itself, it should be adopted. All appeals to long-range goals, fixed outcomes, expediency and efficiency are the foci that wreck our ideals. In terms of our activity then, the good of it for liberating human beings resides in the validity of the immediate activity in concrete contexts.

Our expectations then should be focused upon the consciousness of educators, stimulated through the analysis of existing practical conditions and the introduction of new frameworks for looking at school life and by provid-

ing leadership through which new experiences with these perspectives can be internalized in a wide variety of seemingly disparate (on the surface) activities. Let us examine some of these areas and activities that can be done.

### Some of the Possibilities

The proposals and/or prescriptions I am about to present must obviously remain in the realm of possibilities. I believe we must be much more opportunistic and flexible, more adaptable to practical situations if we are to hope to foster the realization of our expectations. To attempt to be definitive at this point would obviously be inconsistent with the view presented here. Nevertheless, I think there are some areas of activity and some potential alternatives within these areas that may legitimately be suggested.

The areas that I see at this time which are more relevant to the task of changing consciousness toward a more liberating existence are the areas of (1) ideas and perspectives; (2) personal growth; (3) substance or subject matter; (4) preference rules; and (5) constitutive rules. In addressing myself to these areas, I shall refer primarily to the roles of teachers and other workers in the curriculum field.

**Perspectives:** Perhaps the most important and overriding concern is in the realm of ideas and perspectives we bring to bear on our activity. At least it has seemed to me that through my experience I have become convinced that a major prerequisite for liberating changes necessitates a rather dramatic change in the consciousness of persons in how they "see" the meaning in the activity they engage in with students and colleagues. It is not enough simply to change the structures or provide new techniques without new lenses of perception and conception.

What I propose is the attempt to shift the perspective of educators from the dominant quantitative achievement task orientation toward nebulous future goals, to a perspective which focuses directly upon the quality of the lived everyday life in our working situations.

The quality of lived experience resides in the relationships that exist in our lives. Thus, the way we relate to other people, the way we organize and administer power, the relationship of our work to our self-esteem, how we feel about what we are doing, and what meaning our lives have in concrete contexts are all ways of thinking about the quality of our experience.

As a teacher at the University, after many frustrating years, I have realized that if one wishes to influence others' ideas and perspectives, one must literally embody these ideas and perspectives.

By this, I do not mean "teaching the way you recommend others teach." This old bromide is both too simplistic and futile. Our styles are our own, rooted in biography and personality. What we must reveal is our passion, our values and our justifications. To focus simply on our behavior is near to selling our souls to the devil at the price of our own vital energy.

What we must ask of ourselves then is to really profess; to reveal and justify from our own viewpoints what we believe and value. There need be no loss in the setting forth of others' views divergent from our own in this process; but what must be risked is the loss of the posture of neutral scholarship suffused with the aridity of living an uncommitted life.

There are inherent dangers in this process. The temptation to slide from legitimating justification to propaganda and indoctrination is not always easy to resist; yet the very process of challenge and the creation of dissonance in the mind of the student embodied in the living presence of another and infused in a living relationship is often the source of the beginning of liberation. Most university teachers of my acquaintance would rather be neutral and let their readings give divergent views. I would reverse this posture if I hoped to influence students toward their own liberation and new liberating perspectives.

We are coming perilously close at this point to the concept of transcendence. We are asking persons to transcend the limitations and restrictions of their social conditioning and common sense and to venture beyond by seeing and choosing new possibilities. Thus, the human spirit becomes engaged in the direction of this transcendent activity through the guidance of the meaningfully valued goodness toward which these possibilities may lead.

Philip Phenix<sup>7</sup> has spoken insightfully about curriculum transcendence. He posits that we by our very nature are drawn toward transcending our present state via our consciousness of temporality. Thus, the impetus for

choosing and becoming in us is not something that need be externally imposed; but is rather a process of helping others see possibilities and helping them free themselves for going beyond this present state of embedded existence.

Paulo Soleri<sup>8</sup> captures this eloquently in another context which should be seen as an analogy for our purposes, when he says:

I do not bow to the death wish we exhibit cynically as a sign of existential responsibility, nor do I sympathize with the pietists sporting flowing robes, beards and sandals of the simple and the meek. I find the hard-headed technocrat utterly pulp-minded; and the politician too busy to know and be serious. I find him smothering the soul while flushing history into the past as if it were an undigestible but somehow homogeneous slut.

I see most of the equivocation, the inability to act, as the gap between the nuts and bolts fanatic and the spiritualist ... the bridge between the matter and spirit is matter becoming spirit. This flow from the indefinite-infinite into the utterly subtle is the moving arch pouring physical matter into the godliness of conscious and metaphysical energy. This is the context, the place where we must begin anew.

If the reference point is spirit, then whenever spirit is not incremented, pollution is present in its most comprehensive form: entropy. Entropy and pollution are one and the same.

What we ask of students is equally important. It should be clear by now that our goals, broadly conceived should be to: (1) develop new liberating perspectives, (2) clarify values, (3) stimulate and develop educational thinking, and (4) communicate significant knowledge and ideas in the area we are dealing with. The statement of or intent to achieve highly specific goals in curriculum courses is neither necessary nor desirable, for this process is both fruitless and antithetical to freeing students for achieving our significant goals.

In the late 1920s, W. W. Charters, through analysis of the teaching role, produced approximately 1,000 teacher competencies. No one is quite sure what happened to these necessities of good teaching, but some say their ghosts have come back to haunt us today. At any rate, in my understanding about the phenomena of ghosts, they are more to be pitied than taken seriously and their only power resides in the fear they produce in the observer.

What is at stake here is close to the distinction Rene Spitz<sup>9</sup> makes between education and learning. He sees these processes as radically different, both structurally and developmentally. Spitz illustrates this from his work with infants and toilet training. In the 1930s the Children's Bureau recommended toilet training begin at two months of age. Babies actually learned when placed on the toilet to do their duty. By the end of the first year, the training broke down. At this time, says Spitz, it came in conflict with their developing personality and it proved exceedingly difficult to right the breakdown. Toilet training based on education calls for a later age, but also an effective relationship which facilitates identification with a significant others' wishes and standards. Humanization can only occur via education, which comes through affect-charged relationships which help develop self-governance, autonomy, and independence.

In passing, I shall share one general approach that I believe is a real possibility for achieving the broad liberating goals mentioned earlier. It is a wholistic approach in that all the aforementioned goals are embedded in the same general approach.

Students and school personnel in curriculum courses or in the field can be asked to develop and share their own creative models of educational contexts that are relevant to their own work. In the process they are asked to specify the basic intention of the model, i.e., control, understanding, or liberation. Value assumptions concerning the cosmos and human nature are also identified. The model itself, once constructed, must have boundaries, variables, and specify the relationships among the variables within the model. And, finally, each may be asked to state what new insights for them or what practical implications for them the model may have. These models are then shared and critiqued by a group of peers.

This form of curriculum activity engages the person not only in an exercise of thinking, but of revealing and clarifying values, of searching for new perspectives, and engaging in moral, political, and aesthetic discourse; so much needed in education, as Huebner<sup>10</sup> has pointed out.

Let us turn now to what might loosely be called the "content" of the liberating thrust.

There are at least four fundamental emphases that we must constantly hope and attempt to recognize, analyze, and encourage deeper understanding of their meaning at the levels of values, attitudes, morals, and ideological thought processes. These emphases are: (1) Technological rationality; (2) Bureaucracy; (3) Human rights; and (4) Economic substructures. All of these are, of course, to be focused upon their meaning for the quality of lived experience in our lives.

Technological rationality refers to the dominant mind set of our culture. It is in Marcuses's<sup>11</sup> terms a one-dimensional orientation toward tasks and problems characterized by a complete commitment to an instrumental thinking which separates means from ends. Thus, in the process this empirical and socially behavioristic aura emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness of measureable achievement and divorces human activity from the source of valued meanings or qualities. Thus, an irrational rationality predominates. In social terms, this is both an ideological set and a political act of destroying the validity of possible change as concerns are narrowed to the efficiency of the domination of the status quo.

School personnel must be constantly alerted to this cultural mind-set. They must be helped to see where it enters our lives through such practices as behavioral objectives, behavioral modification, management by objectives, systems analyses, teacher competency approaches, and accountability movements. They must be constantly encouraged to shift from the "How?" to the "What?" and the "Why?"

In terms of bureaucracy we are witnessing a form of institutional organization that facilitates the rationalization and specialization necessary to carry technological rationality into social structures, work tasks, and communication networks. Thus, examination and analysis of the intentions and effects of bureaucratic practices are critical elements toward developing liberating values and procedures.

There also exists in bureaucratic structures the phenomenon of displaced goals that must be revealed and examined. Much of the policy and form of bureaucracy tends to become self-serving and related to the institution as a place of work, rather than its professional goals or purposes. This too must be noted.

A third emphasis is a concern for human rights. If we are to affect the quality of our lives in schools, we must ask if the "Bill of Rights" should be parked at the door when we enter the school, as it tends to be in most other work situations.

We have, I believe, relegated our concern for our rights to our homes as private citizens and our political system participation. This is a critical aspect of domination, since the impact on our perceptions, attitudes, values, and morals in living in institutional work settings is a pervasive factor in our mind-set or perspective.

Thus, every reasonable opportunity must be taken to raise the issue of human rights in the context of our conduct and the impact of that conduct upon the quality of living in the environments we create.

The final major substantive emphasis to be mentioned here has to do with the economic system (and especially the substructure) that we are a part of. There can be little doubt that many of the policies, practices, and procedures we utilize in schools are built upon a "factory" model or analogy. Further, the basic thrust of justification for schooling seems to be shifting more toward preparation for occupations. Also, there is the fact that education is a major "industry" itself, at least in the sense that the expenditure of monies is directly related to the private world of commerce through such acts as the purchase of books and materials.

The examination of these (and other) economic factors upon our daily lives in schools is a critical need, and we should take every opportunity to examine and raise questions about our activity in relation to these economic forces in our society if we wish to build a clearer perspective on the potential for liberating experiences.

The four perspective emphases just alluded to are not seen as topics for study, but should be utilized as liberating lenses when dealing with our curricular substance in the courses and work we do as curriculum persons.

Personal growth: The second broad area of concern beyond building new perspectives is the area of personal growth. Personal growth is not divorced from perspectives, of course, but I refer here primarily to the idea that there is little chance that persons will be concerned about liberating human potential in others unless they themselves are also involved in their own personal structures in a liberating quest and set of experiences.

The work of Gramsci (and many others) clearly suggests that liberating social change by necessity involves the breaking up of conditioned and pre-set attitudes, values, and meanings attached to present social phenomena in a manner that allows the person to sense the potential within themselves for change and growth, from powerlessness to power, and from alienation toward relationship and commitment.

I do not believe that there is any fundamental contradiction in the long run between those theorists who advocate a personal change position and those who advocate a social change orientation in terms of changing consciousness toward a liberating praxis. This assumes that the social approach does not involve a highly structured set of "new" meanings, nor the personal growth approach being restructured to a highly individualistic orientation without meaning for communal living. Neither approach need be exaggerated to the point of exclusion of the other.

There is, thus, a need for us as curriculum teachers and workers to be in the process of continuous liberating growth ourselves; and to facilitate personal growth in those we work with through our own caring for them as total persons. We should also select working processes which enhance a person's self-esteem, as well as selecting experiences which will facilitate the development of awareness of growth potential.

One relevant example comes from my year's experience as a member of the staff at the Curriculum Laboratory of Goldsmith College, University of London. Teachers and Heads (as teams from various schools) were brought on campus for twelve week workshop sessions with one day a week back in their schools. They were attending in order to work on developing curricula for an innovative program loosely labeled interdisciplinary inquiry.

I was immediately and forcefully struck, and puzzled, by the provision of about a third of the workshop time in the engagement of the participants in a wide variety of activity in the areas of arts and crafts. This came to be one of the most significant aspects of their curriculum work, for not only did they learn art and craft substance for building into Interdisciplinary studies, but far more important, it provided a rich personal experience of their own potential for seeing themselves as creative and growing persons.

Group sessions on the curriculum were organized to facilitate the kinds of issues, values, and decisions that were inherent to the task of curriculum development and design. The teams worked to develop their own plans in a full participatory manner in relation to their unique practical situations. In the broad context of attempting to innovate under the loose rubric of Interdisciplinary Inquiry toward a more liberating curriculum, the result was specific team plans which were widely varied.

The following year, I was asked to return to England to do a follow-up study of the then some two hundred persons who had experienced the Goldsmith program. One technique used was an open-ended interview with a random selection of some forty participants (ranging over five years). The most common response to their experience as its meaning to them personally, the impact upon the way they saw themselves, as persons and professionals. Their judgments about the value of the actual curriculum plans produced and subsequent implementation were much more varied.

A final note on personal growth refers to the use of such experiences as group therapy, encounter groups, and similar activities. Frankly, I am not competent to evaluate these possibilities with a fair appraisal. I should think, from what I know, that there is a great potential here for personal growth if these practices can be sensibly related to the tasks of curriculum teaching and working. A caution, gleaned from the comments of Keen's remarks in Floyd Matson's "Behaviorism versus Humanism" is in order. He suggests that some varieties of the humanistic encounter group activities may be as dehumanizing as behavioristic techniques when they result in stripping all human dignity away from the person in the process.

Substance or Subject Matter: When we approach the task of the actual content substance of the curriculum, and wish to provide liberating possibilities through this avenue, we must keep some fundamental epistemological assumptions clearly in mind. Among these epistemological assumptions are:

1. Knowledge is uncertain, not absolute.
2. Knowledge is personal.
3. Knowledge is for use, not simply storage.

And, perhaps of a slightly different order:

4. Knowledge of social arrangements is knowledge of human creatures that reflects more than anything else historical accidents within the broad organizing trends of such areas as growing technology, sciences, industry, and religion.

5. Knowledge is not disparate or segmented in a broad human sense of lived meaning, but rather unitary and only by specific highly rationalized human interests and tasks has it seemed so.

Given these epistemological assumptions (which I believe can be justified satisfactorily), we may look at the total curriculum plan for substance or at any given aspect, areas, or subject within, keeping in mind that the quality of lived experiences resides in relationships. In this case the relationships are basically: (1) Persons to subject matter; (2) Subject matter to subject matter; (3) Society to subject matter; and (4) Persons to society.

Kliebard,<sup>12</sup> at the Geneseo Conference, restates what he sees historically to be the basic questions of curriculum as "What knowledge is of most worth?"; "How is this differentiated for learning?"; "How do we teach it?"; and "How is it integrated?" He says the central question is the question of objectives.

I have little difficulty accepting the four questions as basic to curriculum but I believe he is in error from a liberating point of view in the priority he attaches to the questions of objectives. As a matter of fact, they can easily be transposed into the Tyler rationale, with the one notable exclusion being the evaluation question.

Care must be taken here to also note that this represents a "back to basics" in the curriculum field. It reflects a general trend that I see to refocus the definition of curriculum back to the subject matter to be taught. One might suppose that this is related to the frustrations suffered over the past years in dealing with the complexities of experience and/or activity models of curriculum.

Accepting these four questions as central to curriculum for purposes here, I would posit that from a liberating value base, the critical question must be the question of integration (or in terms used earlier -- relationships). The question of goals, procedures and differentiation, it would seem to me are to be answered in the dynamics of relationships. It is this network of relationships that Maxine Greene<sup>13</sup> has spoken about so eloquently.

Given these comments we may turn to a possible set of suggested design guidelines that focus upon the four relationships, (i.e. subject to subject; person to subject; society to subject; and person to society). These guidelines are not new. They not only would lead toward developing new consciousness for social change, but have also been known over the years to many persons as good, sound educational premises. What follows is an illustrative reminder.

1. Curriculum substance must be directly related to needs, interests, past experiences and capabilities of persons.
2. Substance should be so organized as to allow for maximum possible variation among persons.
3. Substance should be organized so that it reveals to the great possible extent its instrumental and interpretative relevance to the social world.
4. Substance should be organized so that its meaning for the everyday living of the persons is apparent.
5. Substance should be organized so that the cognitive and affective relationships within and between usually disparate areas are apparent.
6. Substance should be organized so that all areas of the curriculum contribute directly to the creation of meaning structures which deal with the human condition.
7. And finally, substance should be organized so that the overall concern is the development of broad meaning structures, human values, attitudes, and moral understandings.

This is by no means exhausts the possible guidelines. Designs which tend to be consistent with these liberating guidelines go under such titles at present, as: Core Curriculum, Interdisciplinary Inquiry, Open Education, Broad Fields, Emerging Needs, Affective Education, and Problems of Living.

Essentially what is needed is a continued effort to help workers in curriculum to see the meaning of these types of designs for freeing human potential and, thus, raising consciousness, but in a way that provides a creative development in relation to their everyday lives in schools. We are, as I am sure many of us can testify, in desperate need of new and better design possibilities which will facilitate this movement.

Preference Rules and Constitutive Rules: The last two elements to be discussed are the preference and constitutive rules. I shall deal with them together.

Michael Apple<sup>14</sup> has discussed the implication of these rules in relation to the hidden curriculum. Fundamentally, it amounts to recognition that there are rules which we may vary by preference, such as the rules for the use of the toilet facilities; and rules that constitute basic boundaries that cannot be varied if the system or cultural milieu is to retain its integrity and function. One such constitutive rule in most settings is the rule against cheating.

I would posit that in the cause of liberation that three things are necessary. First, that the distinction between these kinds of rules be brought into everyone's awareness; second, that constitutive rules be made cognitively accessible to all through analysis and discussion. Finally, that to the degree possible, attempts be made to move constitutive rules into the realm of preference rules.

Apple's illustration of a chess game is useful here among other reasons because it also is utilized by Polanyi in establishing the identity of consciousness. Thus, chess is played with boundary conditions such as definition of the use of the spaces, the acceptable directions and procedures for sequence of moves, etc., are the preference of the players. In Polanyi's terms one focuses consciously upon the strategy (preference rules) from the subsidiary cues (ground). It would appear then that the boundaries or constitutive rules, once internalized, become a tacit dimension, or, if you wish, a hidden curriculum.

The importance of the hidden curriculum in relation to freeing human potential cannot be overestimated. It is squarely at this juncture that many of the most pernicious practices and procedure reside. The "return to basics" referred to earlier is essentially a turning away from this critical aspect of schooling. It is probably a product or corollary of the general retrenchment to conservative stability that we are witnessing throughout our society at this time.

Curriculum teachers and workers must continuously raise the reflective consciousness questions, "What are the constitutive and preference rules?", and "Why do you have them?", and "What (if any) is their connection to the broader society and culture?" This can be done on an abstract level or through techniques, such as: observation, video-tapes, self descriptions of our own practices and procedures, and tapes and typed transcriptions of learning episodes.

One very good avenue for helping us to locate constitutive rules lies in our passions. It appears sensible to me that basic rules are those boundaries which are most apt to arouse our emotional judgements. Following the position espoused by Solomon, passions are not imposed upon us but are fundamental judgments, such as love, anger, anxiety, hate, envy, with which we have interpreted our situation and which provide a key through our reflection of our definition of the situation.

When we are pleased or disturbed by the actions of individuals or the way things are going, it would seem quite possible that we are touching basic boundaries or rules and making judgments in terms of these rules that reflect our perspectives, values, attitudes, and morals. Thus, schoolpeople can come to grips with identifying the constitutive rules in their activity via careful reflection on those very situations and actions which do arouse our passions.

This kind of reflective activity also has the merit of completing the human response to liberation by a momentary and sometimes tentative but real dissolution of the subject-object distinction so prevalent and humanly damaging in Western Civilization.

There are other two critical areas which are of special importance. These concerns are the testing and evaluation plans and procedures, and the differentiation of hidden structures that are rationalized by goals and efficiency in procedure. The structures are hidden in the sense that their full intent in relation to what constitutes their existence is not revealed in their function. Thus, to many schoolpeople and students they seem "natural" rather than arbitrary value commitments.

One dimension of this problem is the clear realization that many of the grouping, labeling, tracking procedures utilized in curriculum and instruction provide an unequal access to the common knowledge in our culture. This has the effect of replicating the social structure in terms of a meritocracy, and convincing the winners and losers



that they deserve the status they achieve. There exists a considerable lack of distributive justice in our schools or society--either materially or in terms of knowledge and consciousness.

In another sense, many of the constitutive rules, such as "Work is more important than play," "The teacher is the final authority," "Be on time," and "Don't skip school," are most probably functions of social conditioning for the work force, rather than necessary for stimulating and developing human creative potential or capabilities.

The evaluation dimension is at least as troublesome for persons concerned about human liberation. It perhaps is the epitome of domination for all persons in schools. What it essentially amounts to in practical terms is a system that can be characterized as a tyranny of knowledge and basic skills. It is interesting to note in passing that in the Business School at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, the term "evaluation" is defined as control, perhaps a more honest approach than we take.

I am reasonably sure in my own mind that the major reason that technical rationales and the use of behavioristic approaches are dominant in curriculum is that they are logically (though not necessarily empirically) the most advantageous approaches to control. Further, the concerns for specifying and managing by objectives are not essentially related to the question of "what knowledge is of most worth," or "what relationships enhance the quality of living", but, become important only in the control nexus of evaluation. Though evaluation is often made to seem a necessary adjunct to reaching goals, I am afraid that statements of objectives are much more apt to be necessary adjuncts to the system of evaluative control.

There is really no point in detailing the problems with accountability, behavioral objectives, behavioral modification, management by objectives, systems analysis, teacher competencies, and other control and evaluation-oriented procedures. Let it just be said that they are the tools of domination for the tyranny of cognitive knowledge and skills in our schools.

Neither shall I, at this point, suggest strategies or procedures for changing evaluation procedures, for I am not sure that positive alternatives within the control orientation are even possible. What I shall say is that if evaluation were truly an adjunct to the goals of human liberation, its value would reside in the provision of data from the consequences of our actions which could serve as a basis in our consciousness for our further reflection and praxis.

### Conclusion

In closing, I would like to reiterate the major points I have presented. I believe that things are not hopeless and curriculum thinking is not moribund. It is essentially a matter of our expectations, and our expectations should be focused upon the development of cultural consciousness. Further, I assume that the major meaning of education relates to the liberation of human potential and not the control of human behavior, which to me is training.

Consciousness is an essential entity of human beings, though existent in a material base. Any quest for liberating persons from arbitrary domination by others calls for a basic change in attitudes, values, morals, and perspectives, as well as change in social and economic structures. We in our roles as curriculum teachers and workers can only expect to have influence in the realm of consciousness. This is both a necessary and significant contribution.

Changing consciousness toward liberating activity can be effected by focusing upon school persons ideas and perspectives, personal growth, subject matter, and upon the preference and constitutive rules; with the intent of bringing to bear our analysis upon the quality of the living relationships that exist in our school lives.

The avenues and aspects will be manifold, but essentially, any change in consciousness or practice that moves one step closer to freeing ourselves from arbitrary domination by social structure or other persons (past or present) may be counted as a legitimate step toward liberation.

What we must do, if we are concerned about these matters, is to become somewhat more humble, but continue to work for what we believe to be right.

We must, as Erich Fromm<sup>15</sup> says, keep up our hope; which he defines as the willingness to keep working for what we believe in with the full realization that we may never see it come to fruition in our lifetime.

## REFERENCES

\*A slightly different version of this article appeared earlier in *FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES*, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1978.

\*\*In doing so, I shall immediately be accused of liberal reformism rather than radical revolution. The weight isn't too heavy to carry, but I think there is a subtle difference in the position that will be developed here, and traditional ideas of reform. In any case, what I propose seems to me the only sensible way to proceed.

1. Michael Polanyi, *PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).
2. Michael Polanyi, *THE TACIT DIMENSION* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967).
3. Carl Boggs, *GRAMSCI'S MARXISM*, Pluto Press, Unit 10 Spencer Court, 7 Chaloot Road, London, NW1 8LH, 1976.
4. *IBID.*, p. 39.
5. Jurgen Habermas, *KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTEREST* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).
6. William Irwin Thompson, *EVIL AND WORLD ORDER* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1976).
7. Phillip Phenix, "Transcendence and the Curriculum," *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 73, No. 2 (Dec., 1971), pp. 271-83.
8. Paulo Soleri, *MATTER BECOMING SPIRIT* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973), pp. 2 and 4.
9. Rene Spitz, *FUNDAMENTAL EDUCATION PLAY AND DEVELOPMENT*, edited by Maria Piers (New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton, 1977).
10. Dwayne Huebner, "Curricular Language and Classroom Meanings," *LANGUAGES AND MEANING*, A.S.C.D. Pub., The Assoc., Washington, D.C., edited by James B. Macdonald, pp. 8-26, 1966.
11. Herbert Marcuse, *ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1964).
12. Herbert Kliebard, "Curriculum Theory: Give Me a 'For Instance,'" *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1977), pp. 257-68.
13. Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness," *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 73, No. 2 (Dec. 1971), pp. 253-69.
14. Michael Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," *INTERCHANGE*, 2, No. 4 (1971), pp. 27-40.
15. Erich Fromm, *THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE* (New York, N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1968).

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

## Dewey and the Herbartians: The Genesis of a Theory of Curriculum\*

Herbert M. Kliebard  
University of Wisconsin-Madison

When at the age of twenty, John Dewey was offered a teaching position in Oil City, Pennsylvania by his cousin, the principal of the high school, he readily accepted. It is likely, however, that this decision was reflective of a young man uncertain about himself and his future rather than an early manifestation of Dewey's interest in education. During the time that he held the position in Oil City High School, between 1879 and 1881, Dewey taught Latin, science and algebra. It was in 1881 that Dewey submitted his first article to the *JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY* accompanied by a letter to the editor, William Torrey Harris, America's leading Hegelian, describing himself as "a young man in doubt as to how to employ my reading hours" and asking Harris for advice as to whether his article on metaphysics showed "ability enough of any kind to warrant my putting much of my time on that sort of subject."<sup>1</sup> After he left Oil City, Dewey taught for a time in a village school in Charlotte, Vermont near his home of Burlington.

Dewey did not mention his early experiences as a schoolteacher in his only published autobiographical account,<sup>2</sup> and it remains a relatively obscure chapter in his life. Although he appears to have been a rather successful high-school teacher, there is still no reason to believe that, at this point in his life, he seriously entertained the idea of devoting a major portion of his career to professional education. Rather, the earliest indications of Dewey's interest in education as a major scholarly pursuit seem to have had its inception in his graduate work in psychology, particularly in his latter years at Johns Hopkins University, as well as in certain opportunities that were available to him as a faculty member at the University of Michigan.

Dewey began his graduate work at Johns Hopkins in 1882 working under George Sylvester Morris, but when Morris returned to his regular academic post at the University of Michigan in 1883, Dewey concentrated his graduate study in psychology under G. Stanley Hall. Dewey's choice of a Ph.D. dissertation topic, "The Psychology of Kant," a dissertation completed early in 1884, reflected Dewey's growing identification with psychology as a major scholarly focus.\*\* Dewey is known, for example, to have delivered a paper entitled, "The New Psychology" to the Metaphysical Club at Johns Hopkins in March of 1884 which was later published in the *AND-OVER REVIEW*.<sup>3</sup> Although this article, unlike Dewey's four earlier philosophical articles, has been appropriately described as "incomprehensible"<sup>4</sup>, it does reflect a high optimism, about a euphoria, about the future of psychology.

## Dewey's Appointment at the University of Michigan

There is little doubt that George Sylvester Morris was responsible for Dewey's offer of an appointment as instructor in philosophy and psychology at the University of Michigan when he completed his Ph.D. degree in 1884. Apart from Morris's apparent recognition of Dewey's ability, he was probably concerned about the growing dissatisfaction among the students at Michigan about the preoccupation of the philosophy faculty with German idealism and the neglect of what was regarded as "the whole modern scientific school of philosophy."<sup>5</sup> Although philosophically committed to idealism himself, Dewey also possessed the "scientific" credentials that the students apparently felt were needed, and it was this feature of Dewey's scholarly interests, rather than as a Hegelian, that seems to have been his early professional identification at the University of Michigan. Morris himself taught the course in History of European Philosophy, Ethics, Aesthetics, and Real Logic, while Dewey's teaching responsibilities included Empirical Psychology, Experimental Psychology, Speculative Psychology and Special Topics in Psychology (Physiological, Comparative, and Morbid).<sup>6</sup> Dewey's work in these courses undoubtedly led to the publication of his first book, *PSYCHOLOGY*, which he began writing within a year of his arrival at Ann Arbor.

Apart from his work in psychology, Dewey participated in at least two other major activities during his tenure at the University of Michigan. His principal extracurricular activity seems to have been in the field of religion. Dewey became a trustee of the Students' Christian Association and involved himself actively in their work.

His numerous lectures on religious topics in behalf of the Association led one Ann Arbor newspaper to comment, "no one can afford to miss the privilege of hearing him."<sup>8</sup> One of these lectures, entitled, "Christianity and Democracy," drew an audience of about 400.<sup>9</sup> While these activities did not lead to an abiding interest in theological issues, one of Dewey's other university activities, his gradual and tentative involvement in education at the elementary and secondary levels, foreshadowed a lifelong commitment to philosophy of education which reached its peak in the period of the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago between 1896 and 1904.

The University of Michigan, in the late nineteenth century, offered its faculty a rare opportunity to see education beyond the university setting. In 1869-70, the University had undertaken a program of admissions based on the observations and evaluations of its faculty in secondary schools. In essence, this was an attempt to assess the preparation of applicants to the University through direct examination of the secondary schools they attended. The University of Illinois and the University of Wisconsin adopted similar plans, and, by 1895, this approach to college admission culminated in the creation of the North Central Association, a voluntary association of secondary schools and colleges designed to provide "accreditation" for the secondary schools that met their standards. In this respect, its functions were similar to other regional associations such as the Association of Colleges and Preparatory Schools of the Middle States and Maryland and the Preparatory Schools of the Southern States. In 1886, two years after Dewey's arrival at the University of Michigan, the Michigan Plan, as it was then called, evolved into the Schoolmaster's Club, and Dewey was a founding member. At its first meeting, Dewey, still reflecting his fascination with psychology, read a paper entitled, "Psychology in High Schools from the Standpoint of the College."<sup>10</sup> (His first article related to education and his only publication of the previous year was a brief commentary on a study conducted by the Association of Collegiate Alumnae on the question of the effects of college life on the health of women.)

During the remainder of his tenure at the University of Michigan, Dewey published almost nothing concerned directly with education. Although he is listed as a co-author of APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, originally published in 1889, and while it is true that book is sub-titled, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF EDUCATION, it is difficult to find in it anything that reflects Dewey's distinctive psychological interpretations or any educational ideas not directly tied to the standard psychology of the period. There is even much that is substantially different from Dewey's position. The book is a typical, even pedestrian, normal-school textbook of the period. It appears to be almost entirely the work of McLellan a director of normal schools in Ontario, Canada, rather than Dewey. In fact, Dewey was not listed as co-author in the first edition of the book but is thanked for his contribution and cited by McLellan in the preface as someone "whose work on Psychology has been so well received by students of philosophy."<sup>11</sup> It is likely, as Boydston had suggested, that Dewey's name was added as a co-author in later printings in order to take advantage of his then established position in education.<sup>12</sup>

If APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY, a popular textbook, is indeed only nominally attributable to Dewey, then it is difficult to find any concrete basis for the outstanding reputation he was unquestionably building in education.\*\*\* There is some evidence to indicate that Dewey, despite his shy manner, had a powerful effect on people with whom he came into contact, and it may have been through his personal associations with teachers' groups, professional education associations, and speaking engagements rather than through his published writings for formal teaching, that Dewey's reputation in the field of education became established in this early period.

One particular event during his tenure at the University of Michigan seems to have had a profound effect on the course of Dewey's evolving theory of education. When the National Education Association met in Saratoga Springs, New York in 1892, a prominent group of educators, including Charles DeGarmo, Frank and Charles McMurry, Elmer E. Brown, Nicholas Murray Butler, and Joseph Mayer Rice organized the Herbart Club. By becoming a charter member of the group and later involving himself actively in its affairs, Dewey aligned himself with a particularly zealous group of educational reformers who had undertaken to challenge the existing order in American education. Several of the leading Herbartians had studied pedagogy in Germany, particularly at Leipzig and Jena. By 1895, they reorganized into the National Herbart Society for the Scientific Study of Education and, in that same year, they took the occasion of the Committee of Fifteen's sub-committee report to mount an attack on the dominant figure and conservative spirit in American education, William Torrey Harris, who was the principal author of the report. The atmosphere at that meeting was so charged and the clash of ideologies so strong that thirty-eight years later, DeGarmo, at the age of 85, was moved to write his friend

Nicholas Murray Butler, "No scene recurs to me more vividly than on that immortal day in Cleveland, which marked the death of the old order and the birth of the new."<sup>13</sup> In America, the Herbartians were regarded as the major force for progressive educational ideas; and Dewey's association with them set in motion a lifelong commitment to educational reform.

### Dewey and the Herbartians

Apart from the sheer zeal they brought to the cause of reforming American education, the Herbartians came equipped with a particular set of concepts and ideas that they used to challenge "the old order." Whether these ideas were faithful to the work of the German philosopher, Johann Friedrich Herbart, who died about a half a century before, is open to serious question,<sup>14</sup> but they did present a more or less coherent system of thought with respect to education. At the very least, the Herbartians were successful in introducing a new vocabulary into the educational discourse of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Dewey became involved in the controversies surrounding the definition of their key terms and the clarification of the concepts they represented. Dewey, for example, was drawn into the fray over the Herbartian concept of interest. The concept of interest had become a focal point in the clash between Herbartian psychology and the then dominant faculty psychology. Characteristically, Dewey found fault on both sides.<sup>15</sup>

Dewey also became involved in the controversy over the meaning and utility of the central Herbartian concept in curriculum, culture epoch. His attempt to re-interpret the concept of culture epochs provides the best illustration of how his early involvement with the American Herbartians profoundly influenced his thinking in curriculum matters. The first YEARBOOK of the National Herbart Society included a long and presumably definitive article on the subject by C. C. Van Liew, a major American Herbartian theorist. Van Liew reviewed the historical development of the idea that "the individual recapitulates the experience of the 'race'" through the work of such philosophers as Kant, Goethe, and Pestalozzi with particular attention, however, to the application of the idea to curriculum by Tuiskon Ziller, a leading disciple of Herbart's.<sup>15</sup> The parallelisms that Ziller and others perceived between the historical stages in the development of the human race and the stages of development in the individual human being were seen as applicable to certain major curriculum questions. "This parallelism applied to curriculum," said Van Liew, "suggests not only a motive for the approach to the study of nature, but also the general character of the material in the various grades..."<sup>16</sup> In other words, the Herbartian concept of culture epochs provided not only a justification for teaching certain things at various levels of schooling, but the very materials from which these things would be taught. Thus, "the superstitious fear of the savage race ... finds its parallel in the fears of the child in its earliest years" and the products of this epoch in race history provide the materials for the child to study while undergoing that stage in his development. This was generally interpreted to be a "natural" order of studies in which the interest of the child could be evoked. As Van Liew put it, "the principal [sic] of succession in the curriculum must be sought in the humanistic institutional movement in culture; that material which is selected on the principal [sic] of culture epochs will be able to call forth lasting interest in the child."<sup>18</sup>

Dewey took issue with this position on at least two counts. First, Dewey argued that unless the parallel were exact (which admittedly it was not), it made a great difference, educationally speaking, if we start with race history and make inferences to child development or vice versa. To Dewey, it was obvious that the sequence of development in the child was the critical factor whether or not a parallel could be found in race history. Dewey put it this way:

We must, in all cases, discover the epoch of growth independently in the child himself, and by investigation of the child himself. All the racial side can do is to suggest questions. Since this epoch was passed through by the race, it is possible we shall find its correlate in the child. Let us, therefore, be on the look-out for it. Do we find it? But the criterion comes back in all cases to the child himself.<sup>19</sup>

Dewey also objected to the inferences the Herbartians were drawing from culture epochs regarding the amount of time devoted to the various stages. Even if we were to accept the idea that there is a stage in individual development which corresponds to the hunting epoch in human history, do we have a right, Dewey asked, to "cont"

children to a whole year of study corresponding to that epoch?

Dewey's second major objection to the culture-epochs curriculum pertained to its assumption that the products of each of the historical stages were the appropriate objects of study for the child undergoing the parallel stage in individual development. Herbartians assumed, in other words, that a child who is experiencing the "agricultural" phase in his development should study the products -- particularly the literary products -- of the parallel historical epoch. If the theory makes any sense at all, Dewey argued, "the agricultural instinct requires ... to be fed in just the same way in the child in which it was fed in the race -- by contact with earth and seed and air and sun and all the mightily flux and ebb of life in nature."<sup>20</sup> In this sense, Dewey's objection was not to the general idea of a parallelism between individual development and the historical development of the human race, but to the interpretation of this parallelism as a kind of mystical union between the individual and his ancestors through the works of those ancestors. What was implied by that parallelism according to Dewey, was direct participation in the activities that characterized the historical period.

Dewey's criticism of the central Herbartian concept of culture epochs evoked no less than three published replies. Charles McMurry, a leading Herbartian spokesman, was the first to spring into the fray. He conceded one of Dewey's major points -- that the child, not the historical epoch, is the proper "center" from which to draw curricular inferences. He denied, however, that present manifestations of a particular epoch are to be preferred over historical ones. "First find out," McMurry argued, "what present society has to offer that the child needs. If the child is the center, the argument against imposing materials on him is just as strong on one side as on the other. Present society, just as past history, has a great many things for which the child has no use at all."<sup>21</sup> McMurry's argument against Dewey's notion of substituting direct experiences for cultural products was a much weaker one. He suggested that since the child comes to school already having experienced much direct activity through his senses, the school should provide the influence from history and literature that the child presumably lacks. Naturally, these "cultural products" should be tested so as to ascertain their relationship to children's interests.

A second response to Dewey's criticism of culture epochs was wholly laudatory. The superintendent of schools of Great Bend, Kansas wrote the editor to say that the article "by Professor Dewey is worth a whole year's subscription to THE [PUBLIC SCHOOL] JOURNAL."<sup>22</sup> He went on to speculate that the "greater part of the culture epoch theory comes from the inner consciousness of the pedagogical philosopher"<sup>23</sup> rather than from the true instincts and interests of the child, a noteworthy insight. Van Liew's own response initially criticized Daum, the school superintendent, for interpreting culture-epochs doctrine in terms merely of the interest that children allegedly show in the products of historical epochs, such as myths or fairy tales. In turning to Dewey's criticism, Van Liew accused Dewey of not actually attacking the theory of culture epochs "rightly understood,"<sup>24</sup> referring rather mysteriously to a letter he received from "Dr. Dewey" in which culture epochs is "viewed in the light of [Dewey's] philosophy." According to Van Liew, Dewey's letter revealed him to be "not an opponent of the doctrine in question..."<sup>25</sup>

Van Liew's puzzlement regarding Dewey's position on this key curriculum issue is probably due to an assumption that Dewey's criticism of the master's teaching amounted to a rejection of the concept of culture epochs as the basis of curriculum organization. Dewey's writing on curriculum during the period of his direct association with the Herbartians indicates that, while he was obviously critical of certain features of the theory, he accepted the overall framework of recapitulation along with his fellow Herbartians. Acceptance of this basic frame of reference is especially significant since this was the period in Dewey's development when he was beginning to move away from the mere translation of psychological concepts into educational terms and starting to consider the curriculum principles that were later to form the basis of the program of studies at the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago.

#### Dewey's Brigham Young Lectures

Dewey's early fascination with Herbartian educational theory was also reflected in a little known series of ten lectures that Dewey delivered at Brigham Young Academy in 1901.<sup>26</sup> They were published by the Brigham Young Summer School under the title, EDUCATIONAL LECTURES BY DR. JOHN DEWEY. The lectures

reflected not only Dewey's early interest in psychology, and the application of psychology to educational affairs (which was actually the major thrust of the lectures), but also the new directions in which his interaction with Herbartian concepts was leading him.

In line with Dewey's predominantly psychological approach to education during this early period, his summer session lectures were drawn heavily from his maturing psychological theory. In his very first lecture, for example, Dewey announced that his lectures would deal with "psychological topics in their bearing upon education."<sup>27</sup> Indeed, most of the lectures deal with the conventional psychological topics of the day including "How The Mind Learns," "Imagination," and "Habit." Interestingly, Dewey's ideas on these psychological matters did not reflect direct Herbartian influence; for example, in evoking an image of the mind, he specifically rejected the idea that "the mind is like a piece of blank paper, to which it is sometimes compared, nor like a waxed tablet on which the natural world makes impressions."<sup>28</sup> Instead, Dewey invoked a digestive metaphor, declaring the child's "hunger to be an active thing, so active that it causes him to search eagerly for food."<sup>29</sup> In extending the metaphor, Dewey asserted that "The Child supplies the hunger but he does not supply the food."<sup>30</sup> Why, then, Dewey asked, do children so often find their schools studies so repulsive? The answer Dewey supplied is that, "The food is not being presented in the shape they recognize as food."<sup>31</sup> Such an active concept of mind is more reflective of Hegel than it is of Herbart.

In two of the lectures, however, (the second and the eighth) Dewey departed from the basic psychological orientation of the course. In these instances, the influence of a Herbartian frame of reference was unmistakable. In his lecture on the "Social Aspects of Education," for example, Dewey dealt with the curriculum question of how the school subjects may be interrelated. In this context, Dewey introduced the Herbartian concept of correlation, first in connection with tying the educational opportunities in the home with those in the school. Pointing out that the school is only one of the educational agencies within a community, Dewey applauded the introduction of cooking, sewing, and household management into the school's curriculum, seeing it as a way of correlating family life with the work of the school.<sup>32</sup> Here, Dewey, characteristically, took a familiar educational concept and twisted it. By correlation, the Herbartians meant, generally, the interrelationship among school subjects. Thus, a single topic could be used to "correlate" the various school subjects around a central theme; for example, if fish were the theme, a day's activity in geography, arithmetic, science, and literature would all revolve around the topic thus achieving, presumably, a unifying effect. Dewey conceived of this unity in terms of the child's overall experience rather than in traditional Herbartian terms. Of even greater significance to Dewey was that the connection between home and school afforded an opportunity for the child to understand and experience the social origins of school subjects. People did not invent arithmetic, Dewey pointed out, in an advanced abstract form. Arithmetic, like all school subjects, arose out of practical necessity. As Dewey put it, "we may trace one study after another to a period where it grew originally out of the actual necessities of social life."<sup>33</sup> Ultimately, this epistemological development from basic social activities to abstract subject matter became the core of Dewey's curriculum theory.

As soon as Dewey introduced this principle, he turned to the general notion of recapitulation, which was then already popular as a basis for curriculum -- one particularly favored by the Herbartians. Dewey described the position as holding that "just as the race goes step by step from the lower to the higher plane, so the child must go thru similar stages of evolution."<sup>34</sup> Dewey twice described this idea as "absurd" but was careful to qualify this judgment on both occasions by indicating that this opinion was confined to those who took it too literally. Obviously, the young child was not actually a savage comparable in any literal sense to the "savage" stage in human history. In fact, when Dewey returned to the question of the value of school subjects, he asserted a qualified, but unmistakable, endorsement of the theory. "So far as these branches [of study] are concerned," Dewey said, "we might accept the statement of the race development theory."<sup>35</sup> What Dewey seemed to be reaching for, but which he did not enunciate fully until later in his career, was a refinement and reinterpretation of the recapitulation metaphor as central to his curriculum theory, a metaphor which he recognized was constantly being misinterpreted as a literal statement.

When Dewey turned his attention once more to curriculum issues in his eighth lecture, his starting point was again Herbartian doctrine, this time referring to it explicitly by name. Using the terms correlation and concentration more or less interchangeably, Dewey objected particularly to the use of literature as the integrative

core around which the school subjects should be concentrated. (In later years, Dewey expressed the idea that geography as a study possessed such integrating properties.) Dewey regarded the Herbartian emphasis on literature as leading toward artificiality, pointing out that in German Schools, where the race-development theory had both a religious and secular side, German children, at one stage in the curriculum, "get their arithmetic by adding, dividing, multiplying, and subtracting the Twelve Tribes, and by dealing numerically with the various incidents of history, the number of people engaged in battle, the number of miles in Palestine from this point to that and so on."<sup>36</sup> Apart from the sheer artificiality of this organization of the curriculum, Dewey again objected to the attempt merely to correlate subjects with one another. Correlation must be achieved not only among the various school subjects, Dewey insisted, but between the school subjects as a whole and the life experiences of the child.

It is in the context of trying to explicate this idea that Dewey first used the term, "occupations," a concept that was crucial in developing the curriculum of the Laboratory School in Chicago. As Dewey introduced the concept here, occupations were to be pursued not for specific didactic purposes, but for their own sake. Children Dewey said, "cook for the fun of cooking ... not for the sake of making a scientific study of the chemistry of foods."<sup>37</sup> Occupations such as cooking, furthermore, not only "follow out the child's own end," but "recapitulate" the social world that surrounds the child. Dewey argued that if such fundamental human activities as woodwork, ironwork, cooking, and weaving "were to be made part of the curriculum they would give the child a chance to reflect from within the school and social interests and activities of the home."<sup>38</sup> As yet, Dewey did not seem to have incorporated the notion of occupations fully into his general recapitulation theory. Against the possible charge that these activities may be too utilitarian, for example, Dewey argued only that much of the activity of mankind is directed toward utilitarian pursuits and that the school may be a good place to "idealize" them. Later, he would have denied that occupations, as part of the curriculum, had any direct utilitarian purpose.

Apparently, however, Dewey did have in mind an overall plan for the curriculum based on three distinct groups of studies which would be arranged more or less sequentially. The first group, "hardly studies in the technical sense," would be those occupations which "the child must shortly follow for a livelihood,"<sup>39</sup> a characterization which Dewey would not have used in more sophisticated versions of his curriculum theory. Even here, however, Dewey argued that the basic occupations "can be made to teach a broader view of the evolution of civilization down the avenues of history."<sup>40</sup> As an example of the first group of studies, Dewey cited the making of clothing from the raw wool of sheep through the various stages required to bring it to a refined and useful state. Accounts of the activities of the Dewey School actually report this as a major activity of the youngest age groups.

The second group of studies would be directed mainly to providing the background for social life and comprised, essentially, history and geography (including nature study). Dewey deplored the emphasis in history on the "military side" arguing that its proper focus should be on "finding out how people lived, and how they came to live as they did -- I mean the common people -- the difficulties they were laboring under, the struggles they had to make, the victories they won -- not the military victories so much as the human victories -- the artistic advances, the educational movements, and the moral and religious conquests."<sup>41</sup> History, Dewey said, ought to be "a sort of moral telescope"<sup>42</sup> through which we can gain a perspective on the present. In the same vein, geography should be seen as "a study of the theatre of life" with an emphasis on human value. One of the problems here, according to Dewey, was that the specialist so influences what should be taught in fields like history and geography that technicalities begin to dominate what is taught instead of elements of our common experience. The child, Dewey argued, does not even need to know the particular names of the subjects he is studying. "The very moment you put one of those labels on the study," Dewey said, "you isolate it."<sup>43</sup>

The third and final group of studies rounding out Dewey's curriculum would be those that deal with symbols and forms. While the first group of studies, the occupations, dealt directly with social life and the second group, history and geography, provided the background for social life, the third group would be one step further removed from direct social participation. Although Dewey was vague here in actually spelling out what these studies consist of, it is clear that language, particularly language defined as social communication, as a form of social intercourse, formed the basis of this third group of studies. As Dewey expressed it, through mastery of symbols we become "initiated" into the social experience of the community. Thus, one's individual conscious-



ness becomes social by absorbing into it the thought and consciousness of the ages. The medium of the school curriculum was becoming for Dewey, a principal way in which individual and social aims were harmonized.

#### The Herbartian Influence on Dewey's Curriculum Theory

Dewey's interaction with the ideas of the American Herbartians had not only earned him a reputation as a promising educational leader and reformer, but provided him with the anvil on which he was to forge his major educational theories. Herbartian concepts such as correlation, concentration, and culture epochs represented ways by which central curriculum issues could be addressed. His early work at the University of Chicago Laboratory School gave him a chance to test these theoretical concepts in an actual school setting. Although Dewey ultimately did not accept the traditional Herbartian interpretations of these concepts, he did accept them as potent ways of considering those issues that almost inevitably arise when one undertakes to construct a curriculum.

Of particular significance was Dewey's acceptance of recapitulation as the central frame of reference for his curriculum theory. Although he rejected any kind of strict or literal notion of race recapitulation in the individual, he seems to have accepted the idea of a temporally ordered curriculum paralleling stages of individual growth. Delivered a year before Dewey's major essay on curriculum, "The Child and the Curriculum," the Brigham Young lectures indicate that Dewey was thinking in terms of individual stages in human development on one hand, and, on the other, the stages by which the human race moved from one state of knowing to a higher one. While Dewey saw no special merit in a curriculum that simply recapitulated the history of the human race, he began to see some promise in the idea that, through the curriculum, children may recapitulate the stages in which the human race acquired knowledge, from the most primitive and direct ways of knowing to the most sophisticated and abstract.

Dewey's reconstruction of the theory of culture epochs began to take shape shortly after his appointment at the University of Chicago. In particular, Dewey took the first tentative steps toward substituting a social and epistemological basis for the historical and literary one that the Herbartians favored. It seems clear that Dewey did not reject the fundamental metaphor by which an individual's growth and development are seen as paralleling an historical dimension of the human experience. It was the particular conception of the historical side of that analogy and not the recapitulation analogy itself that Dewey rejected. In fact his own theory of curriculum rests on almost the same metaphor. Instead of the naive conception of discrete stages in human history, which the Herbartians favored, Dewey took as his parallel to individual development, the growth of ever more refined ways of knowing over the course of man's social history.

\*I am indebted to the John Dewey Foundation of Carbondale, Illinois and the Research Committee of the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin for grants which supported research reported here in part.

\*\*No copy of Dewey's Ph.D. dissertation is known to exist.

\*\*\*Only Dewey's article in EDUCATIONAL REVIEW in 1893, "Teaching Ethics in High School" can be regarded as dealing with pre-collegiate education. Even that was probably an offshoot of his syllabus for a course in ethics which he published a year later.

#### References

1. John Dewey to W. T. Harris, 17 May 1881, quoted in George Dykhuizen, *THE LIFE AND MIND OF JOHN DEWEY* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), p. 23.
2. John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in George P. Adams and William P. Montague, eds., *CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY*, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 2: 13-27.
3. John Dewey, "The New Psychology," *ANDOVER REVIEW*, II (September, 1884), pp. 278-289.
4. Neil Coughlan, *YOUNG JOHN DEWEY* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 42.
5. Dykhuizen, *LIFE AND MIND OF JOHN DEWEY*, p. 45.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
7. John A. Axelson, "John Dewey," *MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL JOURNAL*, XLIII (May, 1966) p.13
8. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
9. *Ibid.*

10. John Dewey, "Psychology in High-Schools from the Standpoint of the College," Michigan Schoolmaster's Club, PAPERS (Lansing, Michigan: H. R. Pattengill, 1886.)
11. James A. McLellan, APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY (Toronto: Copp, Clark and Company, 1889), p. vi.
12. Jo Ann Boydston, "A Note on Applied Psychology," JOHN DEWEY: THE EARLY WORKS, 1882-1898 III: 1889-1892 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969), pp. xiii-xix.
13. Charles DeGarmo to N. M. Butler, 15 December 1933, Butler Papers, Columbia University, quoted in Walter H. Drost "That Immortal Day in Cleveland -- The Report of the Committee of Fifteen," EDUCATIONAL THEORY, XVII (April, 1967), p. 178.
14. Harold B. Dunkel, HERBART AND HERBARTIANSIM (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
15. C. C. Van Liew, "Culture Epochs," FIRST YEARBOOK OF THE NATIONAL HERBART SOCIETY (Bloomington, Ill.: The Society, 1895), pp. 70-123.
16. Ibid., p. 97.
17. Ibid., p. 106.
18. Ibid., p. 117.
19. John Dewey, "Interpretation of the Culture-Epoch Theory," PUBLIC SCHOOL JOURNAL, XV (January, 1896), p. 234.
20. Ibid., p. 235.
21. C. A. McMurry, "The Culture-Epochs," PUBLIC SCHOOL JOURNAL, IX (February, 1896), p.298.
22. N. F. Daum, "Culture Epoch Theory," PUBLIC SCHOOL JOURNAL, XV (May, 1896), p. 509.
23. Ibid., pp. 509-10.
24. C. C. Van Liew, "Culture Epoch Theory," PUBLIC SCHOOL JOURNAL, XV (June, 1896), p. 546.
25. Ibid.
26. John Dewey, EDUCATIONAL LECTURES (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young Academy Summer School, n.d.)
27. Ibid., p. 1.
28. Ibid., p. 3.
29. Ibid., p. 4.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
31. Ibid., p. 7.
32. Ibid., p. 38.
33. Ibid., p. 45.
34. Ibid., p. 45.
35. Ibid., p. 46.
36. Ibid., p. 175.
37. Ibid., p. 180.
38. Ibid., p. 181.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 186.
41. Ibid., p. 188.
42. Ibid., p. 189.
43. Ibid., p. 192.

## Curriculum Theory in the 1970s: The Reconceptualist Movement

Barbara J. Benham  
Oslo, Norway

Either we must give up artistic fabrication and take to political action, or we must continue modestly, knowing that the utmost we can hope to do for others is, as Dr. Johnson said, to enable them a little better to enjoy life or a little better to endure it. And whichever choice we make, let us remember that a just balance between commitment and detachment is difficult to find and more difficult to hold. The introvert, intent on improving himself, will always tend to be deaf when his neighbor cries for help; the extrovert, intent upon improving the world, will always tend to pinch his neighbor -- for his own good, of course -- until he cries for help. We are not, any of us, very nice.

W. H. Auden, from "Nowness and Permanence," in *THE LISTENER*, London, April 1966.

## Introduction

Since the fall of 1973 there have been ten curriculum theory conferences that have, increasingly, focused on what is being spoken of as the "reconceptualists" of curriculum theory.<sup>1</sup> To the extent that these conferences have involved many of the same speakers (James Macdonald, Maxine Greene, Dwayne Huebner, William Pinar, Michael Apple, and Donald Bateman, among others), and because many of the papers presented have been published in two books, edited by Pinar<sup>2</sup>, this group has come to be identified as "the reconceptualists."<sup>3</sup>

At the 1975 meeting of the American Educational Research Association in Washington, three papers were presented that identified reconceptualization as a movement within the field of curriculum theory. As we shall see, the movement is extremely complex, and a definition is difficult to provide. At this point, however, it might be briefly defined as the effort to focus curriculum thinking on personal, social and political realities.

Tangible though these conferences, books, and papers seem to be, there are nevertheless huge differences in the fundamental assumptions which various of the reconceptualists bring to curriculum theorizing. So much so, that it seems pertinent to ask: is there, really a movement? If so, what is its history? What is its underlying philosophy? And, most importantly, what impact is it likely to have on the institution of schooling in our society? It is to these three questions that this paper will address itself. In seeking the answers, the author conducted an extensive review of reconceptualist literature as of 1976 as well as in-person interviews with eight educators who have been involved in the conferences or who have published papers that support the notion of reconceptualization. The interviews were supported by a research grant from the Graduate School of Texas Tech University and were conducted with Janet Miller, then of Ohio State University, Donald Bateman, Ohio State University, Madeleine R. Grumet of the Hobart and William Smith Colleges; William Pinar of the University of Rochester; Maxine Greene of Teachers College, Columbia University; Michael Apple of the University of Wisconsin in Madison; James Macdonald and Ira Weingarten of the University of North Carolina in Greensboro. The discussion that follows will draw from the interviews as well as from the literature, in an attempt to present as complete a picture as possible of the past, the present, and the possible futures of the reconceptualist phenomenon.

## History

Although the first reconceptualist conference was held at the University of Rochester in 1973, an examination of the movement -- of the work of those associated with it and of the ideas embodied within it -- soon reveals that it is much more than eight years old. It is not, one finds, a recent phenomenon, though it has, perhaps, recently been gathering a certain momentum.

In fact, the reconceptualist movement can be viewed as an extension of a long tradition in curriculum theory

zing: "A tradition," Michael Apple pointed out in his interview, "that grows out of Counts and Rugg and Dewey; and I see myself, and Macdonald and Huebner and number of other people as working out of that tradition."

James Macdonald, when interviewed, spoke of his whole career as being involved with the effort to reconceptualize curriculum thinking: "Dwayne Huebner and I have been working on it for twenty-five years. And for fifteen years, nobody would even talk to us. And if you said 'curriculum theory' people thought you were crazy."

Macdonald suggested that in the last ten years people have started to pay some attention, that he and Huebner have begun to find a forum for their ideas. There is, too, the sense of gathering momentum in the fact of conferences, books, and articles. Also, many of the reconceptualists are acquiring a following in the form of doctoral students who, attracted to the power of Idea, are beginning to supplement the existing reconceptualist literature with doctoral theses that seek either to further clarify the theory, or to find authentic ways of applying the theory in actual classroom practice.

Why should this be happening now? Why did it begin in the 1970s, rather than as part of the intellectual ferment of the 1960s? Why not in the 1950s, when Macdonald and Huebner first began?

Donald Bateman, interviewed at Ohio State along with Janet Miller, then one of his graduate students, offered an explanation, using the radicalization of John Holt as an example: "If you tell somebody to read all of John Holt, from the point of view of observing his education as he tried to make sense of things between 1962 and 1976 -- the history of his mind is the history of our time. And insofar as that is true, one can see that the history of our time is moving from unawareness and rationalization of the status quo, to more radical positions. Notice that the same kind of movement has happened to almost all thinking people in the last decade or so. We have passed through a whole series of things. And this is another age; and the question is, who will join it?"

Certainly, the element of radical criticism, whether conceived of as radical political analysis and activity, or as radical individualism, is an integral part of the reconceptualist stance, and it is probably fair of Bateman to imply that we all had to experience the events of the 1960s before we would be ready to adopt that stance. We now see, for example, that the school is embedded in its society and that its problems are not educational problems alone but are unavoidable social, political and economic problems as well. And we see also that one cannot expect significant changes in schools unless there are significant changes in society as a whole.

It is also clear that the work of Paulo Friere, made available in the United States only in the last eight years, has had a tremendous catalyzing effect on curriculum theorists. Friere's concepts of critical consciousness and limit-situations, for example, were quickly understood: it was as if he had given words to what everyone had been thinking. Even more important is the fact that he presented a field-tested, demonstrably effective method of combining cognitive skill-building with political and personal consciousness-raising -- a synthesis that contained the essence of reconceptualist theory long before it was articulated as such by others. Thus, he had shown that theory need not always precede practice, although practice must be grounded in theory. In other words, Friere did not evolve an elaborate theory before working with Brazilian peasants; but as he worked with them, his choices of what to try had their roots, not only in the situation but in his idea of education as the creation of critical consciousness.

The example set by Friere's work provided the reconceptualists with a prototype for finding ways to link their theory to practice. Janet Miller, when interviewed, pointed out that Paul Klohr has defined this activity as "middle-range theorizing" -- that is, the attempt to find the bridges between theory and practice -- and that Klohr further maintains that this kind of activity is what is most urgently needed at the present time.

The work of Friere and the radicalizing events of the 1960s and early 1970s combined to give support and impetus to the kind of theorizing already associated with Macdonald and Huebner, and to bring together in a loose alliance the kinds of curriculum theorists who feel comfortable with the idea of searching for new ways of conceptualizing curriculum. As Macdonald put it, "I don't mind being called a Reconceptualist. I don't see it as a label. I see it as a way of saying: there are a lot of thoughtful people who, for many different reasons and from many different persuasions, feel that the field of curriculum is arid, is not fulfilling its human promise ... We must search for a new grounding for the professional curriculum field. It's the spirit, the searching, the sharing of new ground that is the Reconceptualization."

In 1973, then, the time was ripe for gathering all these people together in one place to discuss the state of the art. William Pinar's choice of a title for the first conference, "Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution,

and Curriculum Theory," was well chosen, because it attracted a wide range of curriculum thinkers, with greatly differing philosophies, temperaments, and points of view, and gave them an opportunity to begin talking -- and listening -- to each other. During her interview, Maxine Greene described the atmosphere of that first conference as being something rather extraordinary: "I was interested, because the conference title sounded too crazy, you know, and also because I had the chance to do the kind of thing I was interested in. What appealed to me at that first conference was that it escaped the usual convention spirit. It was because you knew that, in doing it, you weren't going to get any medals. And you had the feeling that somehow people were more genuine because of that."

It seems that those who attended that first conference returned to their own institutions greatly energized by the experience. Soon afterward, the papers that had been delivered there were brought together and published. The title of the book was the same as that of the conference; the term "reconceptualist" had not yet made its appearance.

By the following year, however, Pinar had started using the term,<sup>4</sup> and by 1975 it appeared in the title of a curriculum theory conference held at the University of Virginia. Whether or not it was the best choice of terms, it stuck: the burgeoning movement had a name.

But something began to happen at the Virginia conference in 1975: fundamentally different philosophical orientations began to surface and, aggravated by what several participants have identified as differences in temperament, a split in the group became evident. The appearance of a second book by Pinar, *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* in 1975 seemed to give renewed credence to the idea of a reconceptualist movement, but in fact served to further alienate some of the participants. Pinar chose to organize the book, they say, in such a way that the importance of the long history of work done in curriculum theorizing, existential philosophy, and phenomenology is minimized, when in fact that work is the firm foundation upon which all of the more recent work rests and to which the current work owes its conceptual existence.

The split is now acknowledged by all of the reconceptualists -- reluctantly by some, who see greater potential value in making continued dialogue possible; and readily by others, who simply do not feel that there is any real chance of communication between the two different orientations.

It may be that the very existence of such a split will fragment the movement and dissipate its momentum, even before it has had a chance to make any significant impact on the field of curriculum theorizing, let alone curriculum practice. This remains to be seen.

### Philosophy

James Macdonald identifies the two different reconceptualist orientations as "existential" and "structural." Donald Bateman offers the following brief distinction: "You can look inward, and see the whole business of education from the point of view of self-knowledge. Or, you can look outward, to think of what education means in a world where there's not a whole lot of freedom. And that becomes more political."<sup>5</sup>

Reconceptualization, then, aims at altering one's conceptualizations, quite literally; one's ways of looking at things at life: at oneself, which involves consciousness and leads to the existentialist position; or at the forms of social organization, which involves political action and leads to the structuralist position. Conceptual change must, then, be the result of either developed consciousness or of structural changes in society, or a combination of the two.

### The Existentialist Position

While not denying the need for acting upon the forces that would shape one's life (praxis, after all, is a central concept in existential thought), the more existentially-oriented curriculum theorists are concerned first with the individual's experience, his awareness of it, his feelings about it, and his interpretations of its meanings for him.

Viewed in this way, as Maxine Greene has explained,<sup>6</sup> students may be seen as the makers of their own curriculum, with help and guidance from teachers willing to engage in dialogue and help students pose their own problems. Macdonald, Wolfson, and Zaret have proposed a dynamic model of learning, which they call the "Humanistic-Existential-Personal Model" and which consists of a never-ending cycle of exploring, integrating, and transcending.<sup>7</sup> This conceptualization is congruent with the existentialist view of the student as the center of his own curriculum.

Sartre's *SEARCH FOR A METHOD* (1963), while overtly political, has also helped to provide the existential reconceptualists with a conceptual framework for their emphasis on self-awareness. Sartre's "method" is a dialectical movement that consists of two phases and leads to the development of critical consciousness. The first phase, called regressive, is concerned with autobiography. One's life, as revealed in autobiographical contemplation, illuminates one's work, and one's work clarifies one's life. In addition, both must be cross-referenced not only with each other, but also with the social realities of the present and the pertinent social realities of the past.

The second, or progressive phase, involves study of the work as a project chosen by the individual from a "field of possibles" to help himself transcend the conditions that would entrap him. In this way, he may create himself and make history.

William Pinar has developed what is perhaps the most specific framework for the existential approach to building critical consciousness through self-examination. He has named this method *currere*, from the Latin infinitive root of curriculum, saying "...it is not the course to be run, or the artifacts employed in the running of the course; it is the running of the course...our experience of our lives."<sup>8</sup> In school terms, this means that it is not the course of study; not the books and lectures and films, but the student's experience of these, and of all the other aspects of schooling, both latent and manifest, that constitutes the curriculum.

The method of *currere*, as one might expect, focuses on self-study.<sup>9</sup> It utilizes free association and consists of four steps, the ultimate aim of which is to help the individual to break out of his life-scripts, or limit-situations, by recognizing what they are. Pinar has further defined this method in terms of some possible activities that can be used to aid in this process: writing an autobiographical account of one's own educational experiences; keeping a journal; analysis of one's personal reading; writing a novel based on one's own life; and the study of the relationships that are revealed as these activities are carried on.

Madeleine Grumet<sup>10</sup> has perhaps done more than anyone to use these activities with students, thereby creating the bridge between theory and practice which Paul Klohr has called "middle-range theorizing"--the necessary step. In classes with theatre students, Grumet has adapted Grotowski's "poor theatre" concept (theatre which deliberately strips itself of stylistic conventions) to speak of a "poor curriculum" as one in which we "turn our focus from the artifacts themselves, the Bunsen Burner, Silas Marner, Greenwich Mean Time, nongrading...to the ways in which the individual student confronts them."<sup>11</sup> In *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM* (1976), Grumet describes specific projects and activities that she uses in high school classes, student teacher seminars, undergraduate courses, and inservice teacher workshops. Her work exemplifies the connection of existentialist-reconceptualist theorizing to practical classroom application.

### The Structuralist Position

While not denying the need for each individual to thoroughly and honestly know himself--his past as well as his present, the fact of his "being-in-the-world" the more politically-oriented reconceptualists are concerned primarily with the political acts necessary to transform social, and thus educational, reality. Translated into day-to-day school practice, this means that much effort is directed towards helping students to examine the forces that shape their lives, the myths that have passed for truths, and the unchallenged assumptions upon which schooling is based.

Fundamental to this orientation is the premise that the educational system cannot be considered as separate from the society in which it exists. This leads to the assertion that the schools in a society cannot be expected to correct that society's shortcomings, because the schools share in those shortcomings. This line of thought leads the structural reconceptualists to question the possibility of making any real dent in the schools, and some of them have concluded that the arena of significant action must be outside of the existing school system. Others continue to struggle within the system, doing what they can to lead a few students to genuine insight and understanding. As Pinar pointed out when interviewed, a reconceptualist probably wouldn't even desire to reach a mass audience: "My guess is that it would probably be mis-used--another kind of trip people lay on other people."

According to John Steven Mann, the curriculum critic plays a vital role: He is not a practitioner; rather, he stands back and observes the practitioner, with the intention of discovering meaning in the patterns of choices

made by the practitioner. He then calls these patterns to the attention of the practitioner, making his ethical judgment of them clear as he does so. The practitioner, however, is free to employ the criticism as he sees fit.<sup>12</sup>

Whether they function as critics, or as practitioners, or as some blend of both, one of the structuralists' primary themes is the de-mythologizing of the educational experience. The critics contribute by pointing out the patterns of choice that influence classroom practice. Huebner, for example, shows what happens when certain uses of language cut the child off from active participation in his own education: "The child is left with the awareness that the public world is made and that he is a misfit, rather than with the awareness that the public world is always in the process of being reworked and that he has a right to rework it. He does not perceive himself as engaged in work activity or political activity."<sup>13</sup> Maxine Greene speaks of what happens when such a child, well-schooled in passivity, decides to become a teacher, and notes that "teacher educators ought to work to combat the sense of ineffectuality and powerlessness that comes when persons feel themselves to be the victims of forces wholly beyond their control." She suggests "de-mystification" as the primary goal and purpose of courses in the Foundations of Education.<sup>14</sup>

John Steven Mann and Alex Molnar<sup>15</sup> go to the heart of this matter with their discussion of the intent-to-oppress which controls students in schools almost absolutely, and which shows itself in such culturally-entrenched policies as maintaining the myth of the value-free curriculum, and distracting students with controlled, in-school activities such as student government. Their argument that students have both the right and the responsibility to engage in progressive social action is thoroughly compatible with the structuralist-reconceptualist viewpoint.

Michael Apple has contributed much to curriculum criticism; among his many contributions is a clear examination of the basic assumptions that underlie the teaching of most science and social studies. His suggested alternative approaches would go far toward de-mystification in these two curricular-subject areas.<sup>16</sup>

Donald Bateman views the very notion of educational reform as a sort of panacea, ensuring the safety of the status quo: "Tinkering with the surface of things or treating the symptoms of deep underlying causes will not make much difference. Integration, decentralization, performance contracting, compensatory education, bi-dialectism, experimental schools, sensitivity training, remedial reading, humanistic education--none of these liberal answers will contribute much to a pedagogy of liberation."<sup>17</sup> Herbert Kliebard makes basically the same point when he shows that many of the highly-praised techniques of "individualization," such as IPI, may actually contribute to the creation of a standardized product--quite the opposite of a self-directed, autonomous learner.<sup>18</sup>

### Common Ground

In spite of the differences outlined above, there are important areas of agreement and common concern shared by both the existential and the structural reconceptualists. One of these is the opposition to what Paul Goodman called "...the present dominance of the automating spirit in schooling."<sup>19</sup> Maxine Greene, when interviewed, pointed out that all of the reconceptualists have a sort of "adversary" quality: "I guess there are certain themes that hold them together--you know: they're anti-traditional; anti-positivist; anti-formalist; and anti-bureaucratic."

James Macdonald agreed that, "although it does contain opposites, it's a movement away from the traditional paradigm." It seems reasonably safe to say that most of those who choose to associate themselves with the reconceptualist movement would agree with this statement by Michael Apple: "The roots of the technocratic perspective lie in a taken-for-granted ideology that...places efficiency, standardized technique, growth, and consensus at its very heart...Our movement should be progressively away from the 'quasi-scientific' and engineering framework that now guides most of the field's endeavors and should consistently move toward a political and ethical structure."<sup>20</sup>

One way in which this "adversary spirit" affects the actual teaching behavior of many reconceptualists can be seen in their attitude toward the problem of evaluation and grading. The competition ethic which underlies the grading system in American schools is a good example of the "automating spirit," which, in the interests of efficiency, groups children together and judges each against the others, thus ensuring that some will be judged "successful" and others "unsuccessful." Many studies have shown how this type of a system can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, particularly in the cases of children who are constantly judged as failures.

As might be expected, many of the reconceptualists argue for an evaluation system that compares each child with himself, using his own goals and his progress toward those goals as the criteria. "I evaluate all the time," said Pinar when this question came up in the interview, "according to how much an individual has moved. Not to where I have in mind for him to move, but to where, in terms of his own life history, he needs to move. And there are ways to know that. One way has to do with finding his own voice. You can sense when people begin to discover what it is they think, what their real responses are."

Pinar and others, however, are quite aware of the fact that they are still functioning within a university system that insists on traditional grading procedures.

"I like to be publicly as close to my private position as possible," Pinar adds. "But you can pay some lip service to the importance of composition, and so on; you can bitch, over coffee, like everyone else, over the lack of commas. You can do that, and then quietly go ahead and emphasize something else in the classroom...."

Donald Bateman, in working with his student teachers at Ohio State, confronts the hidden curriculum directly by telling them: "Look, you do have to give grades; you can't get out of that. It is a manipulative thing to do; it does entail certain kinds of discrimination and it is bound to have negative effects. The only thing you can do is try to minimize that. Also, you can't have a hidden agenda, as a teacher: you have to be honest about how the evaluation is going to be done. Everybody has to know, as clearly as you can tell them, how you evaluate. And then when you do it, you do it in the fairest and least dehumanizing way you can..."<sup>21</sup>

Reconceptualists, then, while they do oppose certain traditional procedures, are realistic: they work to maintain a clear sense of themselves and of the context within which they have chosen to work; of the compromises that might be necessary, and of the matters of principle that allow no compromise. This is the second large area of commonality between the existential and the structural reconceptualists: the struggle to maintain congruence between one's life and one's work, within the context of the social-political-economic educational institution. As so lucidly described by Francine Shaw,<sup>22</sup> congruence is the delicate balance between maintaining a personal harmony with one's self and one's work and yet being politically effective within an institution that is seen as being fundamentally oppressive. What works for one person, in this regard, may not be the answer for another person; but the nature of the struggle is the same.

Opposition to the "automating spirit," then, and the struggle to maintain personal congruence while at the same time being effective within the institution--these areas of common ground unite the reconceptualists. James Macdonald sees other common characteristics: "...all the reconceptualists, regardless of which side they're on, have certain general characteristics. They're intellectually curious. They have broad interests. They don't see education as simply a technical thing; they see it as life...you talk in manageable school terms, but you never kid yourself that you're talking just about schools. You won't find a reconceptualist who cares very much for psychological language, because it's too narrow, it lets too much escape. They're generalists; that's another thing. And most of them have a very, very deep concern for human welfare. It's a unique group of people, I think; the most interesting people I've met, bar none. They have a special breadth of concern, a perception of the potential meaning of exploring life through education, which just doesn't exist anywhere else."<sup>23</sup>

Actually, there are times when the "split" between the reconceptualists doesn't seem like a split at all, but like two paths to the same goal, or two sides of the same coin. Donald Bateman acknowledges: "It might not be good to be talking about either-ors; it might be that neither side would want to exclude the other. You could say that everyone ought to be sensitive to the major kinds of conflict in the world, to oppression in general. And at the same time, to be sensitive to that, you have to know how you relate to it...with all the introspection that might take." Macdonald makes much the same observation: "In a sense, they really aren't opposed. In the long run, you see, one is a cultural phenomenon and the other is a social phenomenon, and they interact. One starts with consciousness; the other starts with structures. They're never really separated: when I'm thinking about schools, I'm thinking about myself. It's integrative for me. That's why I don't see the conflict that separates the two camps. For me, it's a way of entering the structures of society, through education and my ideas, but also existentially, finding and choosing myself by my thinking and writing. It goes together as a piece."

Finally, there is unanimous agreement on the lack of agreement within the movement. Michael Apple pointed out that "this has historically been the case in this field. I can't remember a time when there was agreement about what the important questions were." Bateman, however, says that perhaps agreement, as such, isn't so



important: "...the more important thing to ask is: are they raising questions that are critical, that have the possibility of opening up new ways of thinking about all this...I do like to think of them as philosophical in the good sense of that word; critical of the times, trying to sort out the present in some way." Actually, the existence of the two different orientations--existential and structural-- can be viewed not only as healthy, but as essential to the movement. Far from splitting it apart, these two sets of viewpoints may be seen as interacting in a classic, dynamic dialectic relationship, in which one forms thesis, the other antithesis. Out of confrontation comes synthesis in the form of a temporary area of common ground; new theses are formed, new antitheses follow, and so on. In other words, it is the split itself, or, more precisely, the conceptual distance between the two camps that may keep the movement alive. What seems indispensable is the continuing dialogue which will make it possible for members of each camp to transcend their own viewpoints and thus continuously to conceptualize new syntheses. The point at which polarization prevents communication, then, is the point at which the movement will have lost its life. It is to be hoped that the lines of communication will be kept vigorously open; not so that the two views may be reconciled, but quite the opposite: so that they may continue to exist in creative conflict, each necessary to the other.

### Impact

What impact is the reconceptualist movement likely to have on the curriculum theory field and on the institution of education as a whole in the coming years?

As far as its impact on the discipline of curriculum theory is concerned, one hears tentative expressions of hope. Macdonald says, "What seems clear to me now is that the curriculum theory field is in much better shape than I had thought it was. There is indeed a definite and definable thrust and potency when viewed in terms of intentionality...Since I believe that the universe, human society, and individuals are constantly 'in process' it does not disturb me that there is no definitive certainty."<sup>24</sup>

Pinar expects that reconceptualist thinking, by that name or any other, will form the "largest minority point of view" in the curriculum theory field within the next five to ten years: "...and there are good reasons why. There is a force here; there is commitment here; and there is intellectual power. Also, there is commitment to the field and to those who hold the field down now, who live and work in this field. It's not as if it was a group of Young Turks who want to displace the older generation. And because I think the movement is, on the whole, honorable--as human movements go--I think it will be honored."<sup>25</sup>

As far as the possibility of making any significant impact on the institution of education is concerned, the reconceptualists are nearly unanimous in the opinion that this is not likely. "Hopeful?" asks Bateman, "I'm not as hopeful as I used to be. I don't see schools changing much...I don't really imagine that we're going to be able to confront the really critical political questions in American schools, the sorts of contradictions that would have to be confronted if we're going to do anything called education."<sup>26</sup>

Michael Apple puts the point even more bluntly: "I don't think the reconceptualists are going to have a major impact on the schools, because I think the schools are doing exactly what they're supposed to be doing, what our society wants them to do."<sup>27</sup>

In this context, even Pinar is pessimistic about the chances of bringing about significant changes in the society, which would be necessary if there were to be significant changes in the system of schooling. Citing Cuba as an example of a society that recently had an opportunity to make some important and genuinely liberating changes and has evidently failed to do so, he says, "I guess I'm somewhat jaded about the possibility of some kind of fundamental melioration of conditions. So I can't think that way any more, about 'really making some basic difference in American education.' What I think now is that, if the movement has import in the lives of the people who are involved with it, then it's justified."<sup>28</sup> Maxine Greene, too, claims only a modest hope: "I think, just, that individuals can make differences, in their own institutions..."<sup>29</sup>

It could be argued that if the reconceptualist philosophy does make enough of an impact on the curriculum field to become "the main minority point of view," that eventually that would also make itself felt in actual classroom practice. The activity of theorizing about curriculum does, after all, set a tone--create an atmosphere in the profession that sooner or later may "trickle down" to affect what teachers actually do.

On the other hand, if theory cannot be presented in ways that are accessible to the classroom teacher, so that

he or she can use it as a framework for practice, then what remains? Failure to provide a workable framework for "reconceptualizing experience" simply means that field workers will continue to act on the basis of personal priorities and "philosophical screens."<sup>30</sup>

Ironically, the historical problem of how to translate theory into practice may be seen as a strictly theoretical problem, to which the theorists seldom address themselves. An interesting question then becomes: what would it take, in the preparation of teachers, to help them learn how to translate theory into practice?

The problem of language presents itself here, and this is why Dwayne Huebner's work with language is so crucial: unless the field workers understand, they cannot do; and they cannot understand if the communication is as highly complex as it often is. "It is high-level abstraction," Macdonald agrees, "there are some pretty complicated and sophisticated concepts that are involved with the structuralist position, or the existentialist position, that call for a good deal of thought and effort in order to understand them."<sup>31</sup> This, it seems, is the point at which Paul Klohr's call for "middle-range theorizing" is pertinent, and it does seem important to the future of the reconceptualist movement that such an effort be made.

It would seem, too, that if the reconceptualists are to have a major impact, some kind of leadership will have to emerge and be acknowledged; but perhaps not. Maxine Greene has pointed out that reconceptualists by nature are highly independent types who do not particularly like to be followers. Pinar, who organized the first conference and the two volumes of collected papers, feels very ambivalent about his own ability and even his own desire to provide leadership. James Macdonald, in a very low-key way, does the most to provide a center, by saying, "look each side is saying important things -- let's not stop listening to each." Maybe it would be enough in the way of leadership if people on both sides continue to insist that all other sides be heard. The alternative is increasing polarization and fragmentation that would diminish the power of what is certainly an important and exciting alternative to the traditional paradigms in curriculum theory.

#### References

1. Rochester, 1973; Xavier University of Cincinnati, 1974; University of Virginia, 1975; University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, 1976; State University of New York at Geneseo and Kent State University, 1977; Rochester Institute of Technology, 1978; and the Airlie House, near Washington, D.C. 1979 and 1980.
2. William Pinar, ed., *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY* (Berkeley, California: McCutchan, 1974); *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS* (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1975).
3. Evidently James Macdonald coined this term, to mean "a new way of thinking about the role of curriculum in education," but Pinar has given it currency through its appearance in the books. At any rate, each credits the other with popularizing the term.
4. William Pinar, "Self and Others," (paper presented at the Xavier University Curriculum Theory Conference, Cincinnati, 1974), p. 15.
5. Bateman-Miller interview, June 22, 1976.
6. Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*.
7. James B. Macdonald, Bernice Wolfson, and Esther Zaret, *RESCHOOLING SOCIETY: A CONCEPTUAL MODEL* (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1973).
8. William Pinar, "Self and Others," *op.cit.*, p. 20.
9. William Pinar, "The Method of Currere," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C. 1975).
10. Madeleine R. Grumet, "Toward a Poor Curriculum: The Use of Autobiography and Theatre in the Practice of Currere," (paper presented at the Conference on the Reconceptualization of Curriculum Theory at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, October 1975.)
11. *Ibid.*, p.6
12. John Steven Mann, "Curriculum Criticism," in *CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS*, p. 133.

13. Dwayne Huebner, "Toward a Remaking of Curricular Language," in HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY.
14. Maxine Greene, "Challenging Mystification: Educational Foundations in Dark Times," EDUCATIONAL STUDIES, VII:1 (Spring 1976), pp. 9-27.
15. John Steven Mann and Alex Molnar, "On Student Rights," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS.
16. Michael Apple, "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of Conflict," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS.
17. Donald Bateman, "The Politics of Curriculum," in HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY.
18. Herbert Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in ASCD YEARBOOK 1971 (Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971), pp. 74-93.
19. Paul Goodman, COMPULSORY MISEDUCATION (New York: Vintage, 1964), p. 10.
20. Michael Apple, "Common-sense Categories and Curriculum Thought," in SCHOOLS IN SEARCH OF MEANING, ed. James Macdonald and Esther Zaret (Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1975).
21. Bateman-Miller interview, op.cit.
22. Francine Shuchat Shaw, "Congruence," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS.
23. Macdonald interview, July 15, 1976.
24. James Macdonald, "Curriculum Theory as Intentional Activity," (paper presented at the Conference on the Reconceptualization of Curriculum Theory, University of Virginia, 1975).
25. Pinar interview, June 25, 1976.
26. Bateman-Miller interview, op. cit.
27. Apple interview, July 12, 1976.
28. Pinar interview, op. cit.
29. Greene interview, July 7, 1976.
30. Herbert Kliebard, "Reappraisal: The Tyler Rationale," in CURRICULUM THEORIZING: THE RECONCEPTUALISTS.
31. Macdonald, op. cit.

## The Curriculum Field: Emergence of a Discipline

Jo Anne Pagano  
University of Rochester

Future scholars of the curriculum field may come to think of the past twenty years in the field as the era of uncertainty. The period is remarkable for the enormous volume of literature devoted to the task of legitimating a claim to disciplinary status of education and its subfield, curriculum. Typically, papers bear titles which are some variant on the questions "Is education a discipline?" and "Is curriculum theory possible?"<sup>1</sup> Also typical of the period was the 1961 symposium held at Johns Hopkins addressed solely to the issue of the disciplinary status of education.<sup>2</sup> The prevailing opinion among participants in the debate was that education was not, and logically could not be, a discipline, and that curriculum theory was, in principle, impossible.

Nearly all of the writers concerned followed similar patterns of argument. They first established general criteria for determining disciplinary status. These criteria were drawn from the natural sciences, both at the theoretical and practical levels. After establishing the unique claim of the sciences to the title of "discipline," the presentation usually proceeded to a demonstration of the dissimilarity of education to science. The inevitable conclusion was that since education was not like a natural science, it was not a discipline but something else.<sup>3</sup> That something else varied from writer to writer. More interesting than the particular conclusions reached, however, is the apparent ease and unreflectiveness with which these writers accepted science as the model for all disciplines.

A plausible explanation of the bare fact of the question's being raised at this time makes comprehensible the ready abdication of disciplinary status. We may suppose that events consequent on the Sputnik hysteria provoked an identity crisis in the field commensurate with the collective identity crisis suffered by the country at large. The selection of Jerome Bruner to chair the Woodshole conference, and the subsequent domination by psychologists and scientists on the new national curriculum projects was doubtless seen as a threat to the integrity of the curriculum field. In this context, the question of disciplinary status can be viewed as an attempt at institutional legitimation beyond anything else. But what could have been the source of legitimation? The self-reflective questioning attendant on this goal was an activity not much engaged in since the consolidation of the field as a university specialty in the thirties. Therefore, there was no ready foundation on which to build the case for legitimacy. Given the national preoccupation with science, indeed the social and intellectual domination of the scientific rational framework combined with the loss of institutional power to scientists, it is not surprising that the ideal model of a discipline should have been seen as the scientific.

Had we not been so preoccupied with science at the time, arguments might have taken a different form. It is by no means certain (or even uncontroversial) that a discipline is to be identified in terms of some sort of internal and inexorable logic and subject matter unique to it. (It is by no means uncontroversial that that is an accurate characterization of science.) At the 1961 symposium one dissenting voice was audible among the thorough. James McClellan argued:

The most visible sense of discipline is the social one. A great many persons in this world are socially identified with one or more recognized branches of study. With the typically American genius for establishing voluntary associations for worthy purposes we have organized learned societies by the score. If we want to see the discipline we attend an annual meeting of the learned society, we read its journals, and we watch the typical patterns of speech and action that distinguish its members from those in other learned societies.<sup>4</sup>

What is suggested here is a need to reconceptualize "discipline" in terms of socio-intellectual communities. This means that in order to identify and characterize a disciplinary community, we must attend not only to subject matter, theoretical propositions, and research methodology, we must be equally attentive to social networks and boundaries which are constituted by scholars in the field. Theories and methodologies do not, after all, exist independently of persons elaborating and communicating them. An investigation of the early days of the curriculum field reveals both the intellectual and sociological components required for a field's qualification

as a discipline.

The history of the curriculum field discloses another interesting aspect of disciplines as well. Not only is knowledge of the sociological features internal to a disciplinary community essential to understanding the community, but such communities are in varying degrees permeable to social and political features of the larger cultural communities within which they are situated.<sup>5</sup>

This permeability to sociopolitical influences is particularly striking when we look at education and its subfields. That there is an ineluctable bond between intellectual development and sociopolitical factors is doubtless as striking as it is in this case because of the social reform roots of American education. This historical circumstance does not require us to conclude along with Peters, however, that education and reform are identical in all respects.<sup>6</sup> A look at the intellectual developments in the 1920s, while revealing the influence of social reform concerns, also demonstrates that in terms of socio-intellectual development, education and its subfields are more similar to the sciences than they are to the Salvation Army or the A.A.

In this paper we will look at the development of the curriculum field in terms of social and institutional developments filtered through a growing communications network of theorists and researchers addressing the same issues. We will see how particular social and institutional arrangements (and we will focus on three institutions here) have crystallized in intellectual orientations which persist in the field today.

The socio-intellectual traditions which guide work in the curriculum field today can be traced to the efforts of a small group of scholars at three educational institutions established during the first two decades of this century. At this point we should note the intellectual debt which the curriculum field owes to William James and John Dewey, among others whom we will not discuss here, since their work in education represents but one aspect of their work. Our discussion will be limited to those whose sole intellectual commitment was to education.

Early activity which eventuated in the development of the curriculum field is exemplified by the work of educators at the University of Chicago, Columbia University Teachers College, and the Ohio State University. The men associated with these institutions and those primarily responsible for the emergence, first of education as a discipline and then of the curriculum field within it, are Charles H. Judd, Franklin Bobbitt, and Ralph Tyler of the University of Chicago; Boyd Bode, Harold Alberty, Burdette Buckingham, and W. W. Charters of the Ohio State University; and James Earl Russell, William F. Russell, Harold O. Rugg, Edward L. Thorndike, William Heard Kilpatrick, Jesse H. Newlon, and George S. Counts of Teachers College. These men and their work can be seen as the intellectual fathers of the major orientations which characterize curriculum study in the 1970s. Recognizing that for the present the distinctions are crude and that there is considerable overlap of categories and scholars assigned to them, we can derive some conceptual utility from characterizing the University of Chicago group as the forefathers of the logico-empirical approach to curriculum study; the Ohio State faculty as the investigators of the critical conceptual approach; and the Teachers College group as uniquely representative of a social hermeneutical approach.

Since the workers whom we have mentioned have, in some cases, remarkably similar intellectual backgrounds, many having studied with Charles Judd, an understanding of their unique and differential contributions to the development of the curriculum field requires an investigation of particular social and institutional mediations. Such an investigation reveals two things: 1) It supports the claim made earlier that curriculum scholars do constitute a disciplinary community in socio-intellectual terms. 2) It provides a framework within which to comprehend and explain the development of different intellectual perspectives.

Looking at the early academic and intellectual histories of James Earl Russell, Boyd Bode, and Charles Judd one might be tempted to conclude along with the numerous writers who have so concluded that curriculum is not in itself a proper discipline, but is rather an activity involving the practical application of the 'real' discipline. Given their historical status as pioneers, they had to have been trained someplace else. A New Yorker who moves to California does not remain forever a New Yorker.

James Earl Russell was trained as a philosopher at Cornell University. After completing his studies, he worked for a time as a headmaster at a private academy in Ithaca, New York, an experience which gave birth to a person

rebellion against what he judged to be a rigid and outmoded educational system. He was certain that there must be a better way to teach, and so he went to Germany to look for it. Germany during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was considered the mecca of those scholars interested in psychology and pedagogy. In Germany he studied psychology with Wilhelm Wundt and pedagogy with the Herbartian Wilhelm Rein.<sup>7</sup> It was in Germany that he first became aware of the intimate links between schooling and society, when he noticed that attitudes and behaviors of students in the schools mirrored the behaviors expected of German citizens. This realization marked the beginning of Russell's lifelong concern for the notion of educating for a democratic society.<sup>8</sup>

It is not surprising that the founders of Columbia Teachers College should have sought as their first dean someone with Russell's vision to give shape to the new professional school. The Teachers College is clearly the child of a collective reformist social conscience, having grown out of the 1881 Kitchen Garden Association, a philanthropic institution whose primary goal was the preparation of working-class children for life in an urban society. In 1884, the Kitchen Garden Association became the Industrial Education Association in recognition of the increasing demand for skilled manual laborers in an increasingly industrial society. The demand for more sophisticated training of children if they were to become productive members of the society led ultimately to a demand for more sophisticated training of teachers. The demand for competent teachers resulted finally in a shift from a purely philanthropic perspective to a decidedly professional educational one. By 1897, the College maintained a school for teachers and a model school for children which was to serve as a laboratory for the training of teachers.<sup>9</sup>

The absorption of the College into Columbia University and the concurrent arrival of Russell marked the beginning of the shaping of a discipline. Russell's vision of the educative concept as extending beyond the boundaries of the schools has informed the entire course of development of the field at Teachers College.

The nature and strength of Russell's commitments are clearly seen in the faculty he called to the College. His view of professional education was multidimensional and that view is reflected in the composition of the faculty. John Dewey and Edward L. Thorndike, the men often credited with establishing the framework of twentieth-century educational theory, were brought to Teachers College during Russell's early days. Dewey is responsible as everyone knows for "child-centered" or "progressive" education, and Thorndike for the invention of performance scales and the introduction of statistical methods in the study of education. Frank McMurray, an early Herbartian who is known for his application of Thorndike's principles to teaching methods, and William Heard Kilpatrick, a student of Dewey's and a schoolman also came at this time, as did Paul Monroe, a historian, sociologist and test expert. The psychologist William C. Bagley and his intellectual and ideological opponent, David Snedden, arrived at Teachers College at about the same time and as a result of their having been recruited by Russell. Snedden was a fervent proponent of tracking and testing, while Bagley argued that good teaching demands a solid background in culture and scholarship. Bagley was also a harsh critic of testing. Teachers College has maintained a conscious policy of hiring and recruitment to retain such diversity.<sup>10</sup>

In its early days, the granting of graduate degrees at Teachers College was under the control of the Department of Philosophy. By 1902 the separation of education from philosophy was complete. At this time the student body was composed primarily of young girls seeking undergraduate preparation for elementary school teaching. In 1907 only 50 graduate degrees were conferred. By the 1920s largely owing to postwar developments and the increasing momentum of the testing movement, the situation had changed. By the time of Russell's retirement in 1927 the College was primarily a graduate professional school and the student body composition had changed accordingly.<sup>11</sup>

The era of curriculum expansion which characterized Columbia Teachers College after the war was accompanied by increased activity in and reorganization of educational research. The Department of Educational Research established in 1916 became the Institute of Educational Research in 1921.<sup>12</sup> A case can be made for the claim that it was during the twenties that education and its subdivisions began to emerge as a legitimate discipline in its own right.

... the demands upon the College for large-scale educational surveys were increasing, and, without solicitation, the sale of Teachers College publications was continually mounting. ... In an interview with the New York TIMES Dean Russell explained that "the need for research in education was a

result of the new type of students coming to Teachers College, that it is experienced teachers, administrators, supervisors for whose problems the Institute is set up to investigate and to help.<sup>13</sup> At about this time Teachers College began populating more colleges and universities than it was public schools with its graduates.<sup>14</sup> The generation of the twenties is the first generation of educationists to have been specifically trained in education. They were perhaps the first recipients of a coherent and organized body of knowledge which could be termed the subject of education.

Harold O. Rugg is a good example of this new breed of professional at Teachers College. He took his undergraduate training in civil engineering at Dartmouth College in 1907. This training led him first to a position as a railroad surveyor and then to one as an instructor in civil engineering at the James Milliken University. According to Rugg, the progression from engineering instructor to Ph.D. candidacy in Education and Sociology was a logical one. He received his doctoral degree under the direction of William Bagley in 1915 while Bagley was still at the University of Illinois. There then followed a five-year period during which Rugg was associated with Charles Judd at the University of Chicago. This time was devoted to experimental and statistical studies in the social sciences. In 1918 Rugg worked for a while for the U.S. Army, and at that time he met John Coss of Columbia University. Coss started him thinking about the possibility of integrating the social sciences with the study of contemporary civilization. Because of his connection with Coss, Rugg accepted with alacrity when he was offered a position at Teachers College in 1920. He was appointed associate professor of education at the College and educational psychologist at the experimental Lincoln School. His move to New York resulted in his developing close associations with the intellectual and artistic community of Greenwich Village. These associations were crucial to his later intellectual development as were his contacts at Teachers College.<sup>15</sup>

The retirement of Dean Russell in 1927 and the subsequent appointment of his son William F. Russell in that same year marked the beginning of more changes at Teachers College. William F. Russell was a true child of Teachers College having received his early education at Horace Mann Elementary and High Schools and having received his doctorate from Teachers College. The period of the younger Russell's leadership was one of instinct with self-appraisal and "intellectual soulsearching" for the College faculty. During the first decade of his administration twenty professors retired. While none of these men had been trained in education, the newcomers in the twenties had been, for the most part, students of the original College faculty. Russell's fear was that the College was beginning to show signs of inbreeding, and he feared that this inbreeding would have a debilitating effect on the intellectual vitality of the College. To guard against such possible deleterious effects, he instituted a conscious program of recruitment from outside the ranks of Teachers College graduates.<sup>16</sup>

The new blood at the College during the early days of the new administration included George S. Counts and Jesse Newlon.<sup>17</sup> The professional biographies of these men are as dissimilar to one another and to Rugg's as the themes of their later work are similar.<sup>18</sup>

All of Counts' academic training was in education. His doctoral dissertation completed in 1915 under the direction of Judd, was on work with arithmetic scales in a survey of Cleveland public schools. Cremin tells us that "Counts early abandoned the science of education for a career of social analysis and criticism." A reason for this conversion is never given.<sup>19</sup>

Counts' educational criticism is an early statement of the themes dominating the work of the revisionists in the seventies. In *THE SELECTIVE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN SECONDARY EDUCATION* he argued that the organization of the public high school system acted so as to perpetuate pernicious class differences and hence social and political inequalities.<sup>20</sup> He called in this book and in others for a transformation of the schools and a concomitant transformation of society along progressive political lines. Counts' fundamental belief in this regard was that it was not only possible for schools to do so, but it was incumbent on them to act as agents for social change.<sup>21</sup>

Jesse Newlon was also a professionally-trained educator; however, his early career was practical rather than academic as had been Counts' and Rugg's. Newlon was brought to the attention of the academic education establishment as a consequence of a program of curriculum revision which he had instituted and directed while he was superintendent of schools in Denver. The assumptions underlying the Denver program were 1) that a vital, even a viable school program needs continual revision; 2) that this revision must be doubly grounded, first in the needs and capacities of children, and second in the goals of society for the development of children into productive adults; and 3) those people most competent to decide on curriculum revisions were the ones who had most contact with the curriculum and with children, i.e. teachers. A curriculum committee under the Denver plan

was set up so as to comprise both active classroom teachers and professional educationists from colleges and universities whose function was to be advisory. Teachers were given release time from their teaching duties, and the teachers on the committee were rotated so that all of the school system's teachers were involved in curriculum writing. The intent behind this arrangement was to keep a constant flow of fresh ideas coming to the committee. Word of the success of the program spread rapidly, and nearly as rapidly as it spread similar programs were instituted in other communities.<sup>22</sup>

In 1927 Newlon left Denver and went to Teachers College to become director of the Lincoln School. By 1934 he was chairman of the Division of Instruction at the College.<sup>23</sup> Newlon's commitments to the idea of social change and his notion of the intimate connection between schooling and society are apparent but still nascent and largely inchoate in the Denver plan. His work at Teachers College is marked by increasing articulation of these nascent ideas. EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY IN OUR TIME, published in 1939, is the culminating statement of Newlon's intellectual development. By this time he was a critic of scientific method in education, a method which the Denver plan with its emphasis on articulation of measurable objectives at least tacitly embraces.

As the social and economic crisis deepened after the World War, the more thoughtful students of social and educational affairs saw that the most difficult problems simply would not yield to quantitative and statistical methods. Statistical data do not interpret themselves. It cannot be demonstrated by these techniques that controversial social issues should be studied in schools or what issues should be studied or how. It cannot be demonstrated scientifically that the individual should be regarded as the end and not the means of government, that democracy is preferable to fascism. The hope that the problems of education could be solved solely by the application of the scientific method proved to be an illusion. The idea that the worth of a program of education for democracy can be in any sense finally evaluated by any test other than the test of time is also a dangerous illusion. It is also true that science has given us many techniques of conditioning that can be made to serve the ends of a dictatorship as well as those of a democracy.<sup>24</sup>

We may imagine that this statement reflects partly the effects of the years of interaction with scholars like Rugg and Counts and Dewey and the particular situation of Teachers College during the crisis of the Depression years.

In comparison with other colleges and universities, Teachers College was unique with respect to its financial arrangements. It operates almost solely on the tuition charged its students, and so, has never been in a position to compete with other institutions financially. Initially, the Teachers College student population came mostly from the Northeast and primarily from New York. By 1927 only 64% of the student population was represented by this geographic area. Students from other areas of the country were returning to these areas and teaching at teachers' colleges there. There was no longer any need for students to move to New York City to study with faculty comparable to those at Teachers College. Teachers College had in effect supplied its competitors.<sup>25</sup>

There was during the Depression years a concerted effort made by the faculty and administration of the College to reorganize the divisions under its jurisdiction. One might argue that the Depression acted as a catalyst, but that other factors were equally important in the changes which occurred during the thirties. Among these factors were the new dean's concern for "soul-searching" resulting before the Depression in the constitution of numerous committees charged with appraising the College's current offerings. Another important factor was the presence on the faculty of extraordinary men such as those mentioned. Their response to the crisis of the Depression was to outline and design a program which would contribute to building a society capable of avoiding the disintegration which they saw as threatening American society at that time.

In 1929 the College was organized in two main divisions: a faculty of education which included foundations, subject matter, and curriculum and methods experts, and a faculty of practical arts which taught such subjects as health, music, and industrial arts. The function of the practical arts faculty had been primarily to serve the needs of undergraduates preparing for public school teaching careers. The increased emphasis on graduate education which grew during the twenties obviated the need for such a function. By 1934 the College had been reorganized into five divisions: Foundations, Administration, Guidance, Instruction, and Measurement and Research.<sup>26</sup>



The committee which directed the reorganization was actually in the beginning an informal group meeting bi-monthly over dinner and drinks to discuss the purpose and future of American education. The group consisted of professors who eventually became the Department of Social and Political Foundations of Education among whom were Rugg, Counts, Kilpatrick, Newlon, and occasionally John Dewey. The problem which they set themselves was to "define a program which would prepare teachers for a socially conscious American school."<sup>27</sup>

A first step toward this end was to recognize that a firm grasp of the foundations of education was necessary for all educationists. The consensus opinion was that foundations could only be mastered by a multidisciplinary approach at the most basic level of study. The theme around which the multidisciplinary foundations course would be organized was school, child, and society relationships.

The formalized committee on reorganization was led first by Kilpatrick who was replaced by Newlon in 1937. Its first accomplishment was to establish a course taught by 7 professors - 4 from the foundations division and 3 from other divisions - which "attempted to draw from the various foundational disciplines certain understandings, outlooks and terminologies which would eventually be the common property of the entire education profession."<sup>28</sup> By the time the group held the last of its meetings in 1937 the entire administrative structure of the college had been reorganized, and all divisions were operated on what was characterized as a multilevel, multidisciplinary academic arrangement. The final accomplishment of the committee is noted in Dean Russell's announcement that a separate department of curriculum and teaching would be formed under the Division of Instruction. The department was headed by Hollis Caswell who was instrumental in forming the first curriculum societies and in publishing the first volumes devoted exclusively to curriculum.<sup>29</sup> Jesse Newlon was at this time transferred to the chairmanship of the Foundations Department.<sup>30</sup> These moves are doubtless significant for and emblematic of the rootedness of the curriculum perspective at Teachers College in social and philosophical foundations.

It seems safe to say that the emergence of the curriculum field as an isolable subdivision of education depended on the development and growth of a community of scholars and researchers with similar intellectual and social commitments framed in a shared vocabulary; the development of a technology of social science - the tests and statistical tools of Thorndike, the experimental quantifications of Judd; and the generalized American faith in the power and obligation of schools in the shaping of society. The threats to the integrity of American society which accompanied the Depression were perhaps more keenly felt by educationists than by any other academic groups because of the shared reformist history of American schools and American society. The making of the curriculum acquired closer conscious identification with the shaping of the American character, and so acquired a new academic importance.

The dominance of the social reconstructionist orientation at Teachers College was clearly a function then of three main factors: 1) the social and intellectual interactions of a disciplinary community; 2) the growth of both theory and technology; and 3) the unique institutional character of Teachers College. We shall see that these same three factors contributed to the differing orientations of the University of Chicago and Ohio State University groups.

The orientation to curriculum study at the University of Chicago was from its inception the exact opposite of that which characterized Teachers College. Where the Teachers College approach to curriculum was child centered, the University of Chicago's was society centered; where Teachers College stressed collective responsibility and the necessity for understanding of social structures and dynamics, the University of Chicago approached education as essentially a matter of individual ability and responsibility. Once again, an investigation of institutional historical and individual biographical factors in social context illuminate this development.

The University of Chicago is unique in many respects. From the time of conception of the idea of the University of Chicago, the founders intended that it should be an intellectually rigorous and socially conscious research and professional institution.<sup>31</sup> What this intent translated into action became was a quantitative experimentally based program emphasizing research in the social sciences. Undergraduate programs were often criticized as being haphazard and the suggestion was made more than once that the University should get rid of the undergraduate colleges and restrict its efforts to research and professional work. The rationale for retaining the colleges as stated in his "The Future of the University" speech on February 24, 1923 according to the then President Burton was

that the school of educational research required the colleges "to complete our own educational laboratory."<sup>32</sup>

William Rainey Harper, the first President of the University of Chicago (1891-1906), was a man committed to a conjoint ideal of education and research. Before his acceptance of the position at the new University, he had made an exemplary reputation for himself at Muskingum and at Yale as both a scholar and a pedagogue.<sup>33</sup> His task at Chicago was not only to run the University, but to formulate its programs and commitments as well. He became president while the University was still an idea. The following statement is excerpted from Harper's plan for the organization of the University:

It is expected by all who are interested that the university idea is to be emphasized. It is proposed to establish, not a college, but a university....A large number of the professors have been selected with the understanding that their work is to be exclusively in the Graduate Schools. The organization, as it has been perfected, would be from the college point of view entirely a mistake. It has been the desire to establish an institution which should not be a rival with the many colleges already in existence, but an institution which should help these colleges....To assist these numerous colleges, to furnish them instructors who shall be able to do work of the highest order; to accomplish this purpose, the main energies of the institution have been directed toward graduate work. ....The chief purpose of graduate work is, not to stock the student's mind with knowledge of what has already been accomplished in a given field, but rather so to train him that he himself may be able to push out along new lines of investigation. Such work is, of course, of the most expensive character. Laboratories and libraries and apparatus must be lavishly provided in order to offer the necessary opportunities. ....Here also is to be found the question of the effort to secure the best available men in the country as the heads and directors of departments. It is only the man who has made investigation who may teach others to investigate. Without this spirit in the instructor and without his example students will never be led to undertake the work. Moreover, if the instructor is loaded down with lectures he will have neither the time nor strength to pursue his investigations. Freedom from care, time for work, and liberty of thought are prime requisites in all such work. An essential element, moreover, is the opportunity of publishing results obtained in investigation. To this end it is provided that in each department there shall be published a journal or a series of separate studies which shall in each department embody the results of the work of the instructors in that department. It is expected that professors and other instructors will, at intervals, be excused entirely for a period from lecture work, in order that they may thus be able to give their entire time to the work of investigation. Promotion of younger men in the departments will depend more largely upon the results of their work as investigators than upon the efficiency of their teaching, although the latter will by no means be overlooked. In other words, it is proposed in this institution to make the work of investigation primary, the work of giving instruction secondary.<sup>34</sup>

All of the departments of the University were in fact organized according to this plan. In contradistinction to other colleges of education developed within university structures, the School of Education at the University of Chicago was from its inception research oriented. The usual pattern was normal school to undergraduate degree granting program to graduate program. The School of Education at Chicago began with the acquisition by the University in 1901 of the Chicago Institute, a normal school, along with elementary schools, a secondary and a manual training school. Once merged with the University all of these units were treated as laboratories for research.<sup>35</sup>

By 1923 the School of Education had quadrupled in size of enrollments and amount of expenditures.<sup>36</sup> At this time the University's position with regard to the relationship between education and research was firmly entrenched. In a speech entitled "The University as It Should Be in 1940" President Burton said in 1925:

The third view (of education) is that there is no fixed formula of school organization or teaching that any generation can adopt without reformulation of the practices of an earlier day...Our school of Education is an embodiment of this third view. While teaching the various subjects of the school curriculum with the cooperation of the other departments of the University and training its students in the Laboratory Schools, it devotes its chief energies to constructive studies looking toward the

improvement of methods and the enlargement of the content of teaching and at the same time looking toward more efficient organization of the school systems of the country.<sup>37</sup>

The rest of this passage enumerates the "scientific" accomplishments of Judd and others. A statement prepared for the members of the Chicago Bar in the mid-twenties proudly states:

A still broader test of scientific accomplishment is that made by James McKeen Cattell, president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, who has selected the thousand leading 'American Men of Science' on the basis of a ballot taken among authorities in twelve branches of science. Of these leading American scientists 113 are identified with the University of Chicago.<sup>38</sup>

The ideal of science in the service of society, as perhaps the exemplary service to society, is one that has persisted at the University of Chicago. The School of Education was always considered part of the social sciences and today continues its existence as a department under the Division of Social Sciences. The hiring policy first articulated by President Harper is doubtless one reason for this continued research emphasis.

The selection of Charles H. Judd as head of the Department of Education in 1909, a position which he held until 1938, represents another instance of the University's unique intellectual commitment. Judd had first distinguished himself in 1907 by translating Wundt's *OUTLINE OF PSYCHOLOGY* into English. He was at that time directing a psychological laboratory at Yale.<sup>39</sup> Harold Rugg's sketch of Judd's career probably best summarizes his approach to the study of education.

Judd believed in having a small, highly selected body of students who would work with meticulous care at the laboratory analysis of human behavior. He had returned from Leipzig imbued with with two of Wundt's lifelong interests. The first was the exact instrumental analysis of human behavior. This led him to develop the famous psychological laboratory at the School of Education, from which he and his students, from 1910 to 1930, reported a score of objective investigations. Judd, in contradistinction to Thorndike's lifelong measurement of products of education, fixed his study on the processes of education.<sup>40</sup>

He also focussed his attention on the social aspects of these processes of education.<sup>41</sup>

During his career, Judd was commissioned to make a number of surveys of public school systems in most of the large cities of the country including St. Louis, Denver, Grand Rapids and Cleveland.<sup>42</sup> One can speculate that Judd's rigorous quantitative approach to the surveys not only acted as a model for future survey work, but it may also have been responsible for the increasing popularity of the survey during this time. Professor Judd was also credited with having been instrumental in establishing the junior-senior high school since the model of this system was first instituted in the University laboratory school.<sup>43</sup>

Judd's experimental and measurement work had a tremendous effect on the developing work of his University of Chicago colleague, Franklin Bobbitt. Cremin is correct in attributing to Bobbitt the beginning of awareness of curriculum making as a specialized professional activity, but curriculum as a field of study is still nascent at this point. Bobbitt's contribution was a first attempt to define and systematize the curriculum in terms of analyzing school experiences and activities.

Bobbitt's early work in education was as an administrator setting up a school system in the newly acquired Phillipines. He went from this position to Clark University, where, as a graduate student, he was influenced by G. Stanley Hall's research on the stages by which a child repeats the developmental history of its race. This exposure consolidated a line of thought which had occurred to Bobbitt during his period in the Phillipines: that there is relationship between society and the curriculum and a primary purpose of schooling is the proper socialization of children.<sup>44</sup>

In 1909, the same year as Judd's arrival, Bobbitt joined the University of Chicago as an Instructor in Educational Administration. His contact with Judd introduced him to the new and exciting world of educational measurement, an introduction which opened the door to his later work.

Another equally important influence was the publication in 1911 of Frederick Winslow Taylor's *THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT*. Bobbitt's administrative background, his allegiance to quantitative research in education, and the ideas which he took from this book resulted in one of the persistent and dominant themes in American education today. The raw material, process, product metaphor was inspired by this combination of factors.<sup>45</sup>

Bobbitt thought that schools would be more efficient, and incidentally, that efficiency was the desideratum, if they were managed and that the tasks of management are the same whether in the context of an industry or in the context of schools. He saw the job of the schools as the production of a high-quality standard product, namely a productive adult citizen. Elaboration of the metaphor involved systematic quantitative analysis of the functions of a productive adult citizen, and the discovery of classroom goals and activities that could be guaranteed to produce citizens able to perform such functions.<sup>46</sup> This work was an early formulation of Tyler's later articulation of the curriculum-making process.

The tradition being established at the University of Chicago was fully realized in the work of one of Judd's graduate students, Ralph Tyler. Tyler's dissertation, completed in 1927, was an analysis of statistical applications in curriculum evaluation. The notion of curriculum evaluation was relatively new at this time, and Tyler has often been referred to as the father of curriculum evaluation. It is with the development of systematic evaluation procedures that we have a foundation for a technology and method for the scientific approach to curriculum work.

Tyler's impact on the development of the curriculum field, in terms of numbers of disciples and critics alike, is equaled only by that of John Dewey. The Tyler Rationale is the model for the entire behavioral objectives approach which has dominated public school curriculum making over the last forty years.

The Tyler Rationale dictates an operationalized sequence of linear steps leading from the formulation of goals and specification of outcomes, identification of classroom experiences presumed to yield desired outcomes, and precise articulation of evaluation procedures to measure achievement or nonachievement of specified goals. The specification of goals and experiences is to be derived from careful study of the nature of the "learner," the needs and purposes of the society, and a coherent philosophy of education.<sup>47</sup>

The work which culminated in the precise statement of the rationale is among the most significant studies in the evolution of the curriculum field. The Eight-Year Study which was directed by Tyler and a group of measurement experts was commissioned by a committee of the Progressive Education Association, the members of which included Harold Rugg.<sup>48</sup> According to Tyler, the Study was precipitated by a crisis in American secondary education which was directly related to the Depression.

By 1930, several features of the typical elementary school in the United States were clearly different from those of 1915. ... The high schools, however, were still very much like those of 1910, particularly in terms of curriculum content and learning activities. ...with the onset of the Great Depression of 1929, new demands for change came with such force that they could no longer be denied. Youth in large numbers, unable to find work, enrolled in high school. Most of these new students did not plan to go to college, and most of them found little meaning and interest in their high-school tasks. But still they went to school; there was no other place for them to go.<sup>49</sup>

In response to this crisis the Progressive Education Association Commission on the Relation of School and College recommended a pilot program which would allow thirty schools to develop curricula which would not be dictated by college entrance requirements and would therefore be responsive to the needs of all high school students. The study ran from 1932-1940 and included the efforts of Harold Alberty of the Ohio State University in the development of subject matter and activities which would draw upon current studies of adolescents.<sup>50</sup>

Tyler's evaluation team looked at the effectiveness of the program by studying college students' performance and achievement in 1,475 matched pairs, each pair consisting of a graduate of one of the study schools and a graduate of some other secondary school.<sup>51</sup>

Tyler lists the following significant results of the Eight-Year Study:

1. Widespread acceptance of the idea that schools could develop educational programs that would meet the needs of all students.
2. Recognition by colleges that entrance testing was a viable selection tool.
3. The development of the in-service workshop in teacher education.
4. The supersession of individual student testing as the assessment tool for program success by the concept of educational evaluation.
5. The recognition by educational practitioners of the value of defining educational objectives in

terms of the behavior patterns students are encouraged to acquire.<sup>52</sup>

Two other important results of the study should be noted: 1) the scientific approach to curriculum became a real alternative with communicable subject matter and method; and 2) Ralph Tyler became a highly visible figure in American education, a factor which led to his being made chairman of the Department of Education at the University of Chicago on Judd's retirement.<sup>53</sup>

If we now compare the emergence of the curriculum field at Teachers College with the developments coming from the University of Chicago, we can see that the development of the field in general grew out of commonalities in the general American education situation, and that the differences in the approach to the field are owing largely to differences both in institutional history and faculty composition and interaction. Most striking among the similarities are the presence of a growing technology of educational research immediately preceding the social crisis of the Depression as it was perceived by educationists. The social reconstructionist orientation which emerged at Teachers College can be seen as a function of the reformist history of the institution, and likewise the emergence of the scientific approach at Chicago must be seen as directly related to the research commitment of the University.

The development of the curriculum field at the College of Education at the Ohio State University was a function of the same sort of constellation of faculty personality, institutional structure, and increasing technological sophistication.

The College of Education at Ohio State was founded neither as a professional school nor as a philanthropic agency. It was intimately connected with the land-grant movement in that Ohio State University proper was founded as a mechanical and agricultural college under the Morrill Act of 1862. The purpose of the Morrill Act colleges was "... to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life."<sup>54</sup> The main idea was to provide education for all citizens beyond that received in the common school which children typically completed around the age of fourteen. However, in order to enter the University, pupils were required to pass an entrance examination for preparatory classes. This circumstance demanded training for common school teachers so that the quality of instruction received therein would be adequate to prepare pupils to take and pass these examinations. For a number of reasons, however, economic and political, the college was not founded until 1907. The first faculty consisted of a professor of school administration, a professor of psychology, and a professor of history and philosophy of education.<sup>55</sup>

During the first years of its life the College functioned primarily as a training facility for young girls preparing for careers in public schools. The program was a two-year course of study, admission to which required 90 hours of general college work. The course of study in the College of Education was devoted to sociology, history, and psychology of education with some study of methods and a practice teaching period.<sup>56</sup> While this preparation was quite different from normal school training, it was still largely a course of practical preparation.

The College began to develop as an institutional force in 1913 with the appointment of George Arps as chairman of the department. He was trained in philosophy and education at the University of Berlin and had studied experimentalism under Wundt. He began to select colleagues who were trained in current methods and in philosophical and psychological traditions where prior to his appointment the faculty had been largely imported from normal and secondary schools. Among Arps' major accomplishments were the hiring of Boyd Bode and Burdette Buckingham in 1921, the organization of the Educational Research Bureau, and the establishment of the Ohio State Educational Conferences.<sup>57</sup>

Buckingham organized the Educational Research Bureau under Arps' supervision and advice. Among the projects carried out by the Bureau during the twenties were the development of improved scales for the teaching of spelling and arithmetic, an investigation of the holding power of junior high schools, and an investigation into the utility of intelligence tests in classroom tracking. It was under the auspices of the Research Bureau that the Eight-Year Study was begun, and it was this Bureau that was responsible for publication in 1921 of the first journal devoted to research in education. The first issue of the EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH BULLETIN began a series of articles on "Common Sense in the Use of Tests." The particular activities of the Bureau and the general method of problem selection employed by it, namely, letters were sent to school administrators asking for statements of school problems, reflects the College's commitment to research in service to practice. This sort of commitment was necessary to the development of a curriculum field.

In 1928 W. W. Charters was made editor of the BULLETIN and head of the Bureau.<sup>59</sup> Current literature in the field presents Charters as coauthor of the scientific management movement along with Franklin Bobbitt. Actually, it seems as if the similarities are superficial. It is true that Charters was involved in the same sort of activity analysis as Bobbitt, but the focus and the intention of his analyses were very different. Charters' approach remained always faithful to Dewey's philosophy concerning child interest and child activity. He had in fact studied under Dewey while at the University of Chicago.<sup>60</sup> Charters' concern remained always with the structure of knowledge while Bobbitt was concerned to discover the components of adult functioning.

The Ohio State Educational Conferences reflected the same kinds of school concerns as did the Bureau of Educational Research. The conferences were organized around the following aims:

1. To promote professional interests of teachers and prospective teachers.
2. To aid in solving educational problems.
3. To stimulate the public interest in education and to gain the cooperation of the public in its improvement.

The speakers at the first conference in 1921 included W. W. Charters, Charles Judd, and William Bagley.<sup>61</sup> These are all men who would later be identified as the nucleus of the group of curriculum theorists and researchers.

One of the most influential members of the Ohio State faculty during the twenties expansion was Boyd H. Bode, who was brought to the University in 1921 by Dean Arps. Bode spent the first twenty years of his career as a philosopher and professor of philosophy. His move from philosopher to educationist was an outcome of his conversion from idealism to pragmatism. In this he was influenced by his reading of the work of William James, John Dewey, Josiah Royce and others. Pragmatism with its functional view of knowledge led naturally to concern for the educational processes.<sup>62</sup>

During his career as an educationist and chairman of the department of principles and practice, Bode was a frequent and outspoken critic of both the progressive and scientific education movements. Bode during his career was sympathetic to the ideals of the Progressive movement; the purpose of his criticism he said was to save the Progressive movement from its supporters. He was particularly critical of Kilpatrick's project method of teaching. In PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS Bode chastised the tendency of Progressives to neglect logically organized subject matter in favor of some nebulous romanticized vision of the nature of the child.<sup>63</sup> He maintained always that education has to do with enabling the child to search for meanings within the framework of discipline and subject matter.

In MODERN EDUCATIONAL THEORIES Bode was especially critical of what he termed "the method of instrumental or incidental learning" with its spirit of immediate practicality on which Kilpatrick's project method seemed to rely.

This is no objection to the method, unless we apply it too widely. If we do so, we find that our practicality over-reaches itself. Learning that is too limited to this method is too discontinuous, too random and haphazard, too immediate in its function, unless we supplement it with something else. Perhaps children may learn a great deal about numbers from running a play store or bank, but this alone does not give them insight into the mathematics that they need to have. They may learn a great mass of historical facts from staging a play, but this is not a substitute for a systematic study of history. Learning for immediate purposes, or incidental learning, is too much a hit-and-miss affair -- it dips in here and there, but it gives no satisfactory perspective, no firm hold on fundamental principles.<sup>64</sup>

Bode was equally critical of the scientific movement in education on the ground that it neglected the child's own role in the construction of knowledge and on the ground that scientific management could be antithetical to the interests of democracy and the common man.<sup>65</sup>

What is particularly interesting about the development of the Ohio State perspective is that this singular critical conceptual posture evolved despite the broad communications network established through the Conferences and the research interaction channeled through the Bureau. We must wonder about the unique social and institutional features of the Ohio State University which contributed to the development of this critical intellectual temperament. We know that the Eight-Year Study for example was executed as part of a cooperative effort among Teachers College, University of Chicago, and Ohio State faculty. We know that the Conferences included many of the targets of Bode's criticism. The numerous surveys carried out from the Ohio State base were also

often the product of cooperative efforts. Yet rather than developing along one of the two lines mentioned in connection with the University of Chicago and Teachers College, the Ohio State University embodied a perspective quite distinct from either of those.

Once again we must speculate about unique social and institutional arrangements. Unlike Teachers College, the Ohio State University was not situated in a rapidly overcrowding urban area beset with all of the problems attending the influx of immigrants. The student population at Ohio State was relatively homogeneous, drawn primarily from its own geographic area.<sup>66</sup> The ever-present urban poverty which must have influenced the concerns of Teachers College faculty was not so great a problem in this part of the midwest. Unlike the University of Chicago, Ohio State was not a wealthy, heavily-endowed institution created primarily for the purpose of the scientific advancement of human knowledge. Its land-grant roots must have influenced the shaping of its commitment of scholarship always in service to practice. And the commitment to practice as evidenced by the research programs and the tenor of the conferences may have surfaced in an intellectual attitude which saw itself as maintaining a balance between the perceived excesses of the foremost scholars of the day. Admittedly this conclusion requires a certain amount of fantasizing, but it is a plausible fantasy.

The emerging curriculum field can be seen to have consolidated in the thirties with the signal event of publication of two journals devoted solely to curricular matters. Prior to this time articles on curriculum were spread haphazardly among general education publications. In 1933 the Teachers College informal group began regular publication of *THE EDUCATIONAL FRONTIER* edited by William Kilpatrick. In 1937 the Society for Curriculum Study was organized and its publication of *THE CHANGING CURRICULUM* began. There were a number of other collections devoted to curriculum study which also began to appear during the thirties, and regular contributors included all of the men who have been mentioned in this paper.

If we agree to accept the socio-intellectual definition of a discipline, any argument that the history outlined above is not a picture of growth and consolidation of an academic discipline is untenable. There are clear problems belonging to the area of curriculum being raised and attacked by scholars specifically trained to deal with them. The subject matter is clearly defined in the context of school questions (at least in these early days), and there is a record of communication among workers who must be identified as curricularists and not as anything else. Certainly it is the case that the pioneers in the field were immigrants from other disciplines, but it is equally certainly the case that by the thirties there was a whole generation of scholars who had been born into the discipline of curriculum.

This socio-intellectual approach to the history of the field also suggests a way to make sense of the various orientations to the field currently existing. We can see clearly the role of institutional mediation, compellingly in the case of the University of Chicago and Teachers College. The former can be seen to have given us the hard social science research perspective and the latter the concern for moral action in the social arena which is a dominant theme in the work of some theorists today. A task for the future is the explication of the present in these terms.

#### References

1. R. S. Peters, "Must an Educator Have an Aim?" in R. S. Peters, *AUTHORITY, RESPONSIBILITY AND EDUCATION* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1959), pp. 83-95; Israel Scheffler, "Is Education a Discipline?" in John Walton and James L. Kuethe (eds.) *THE DISCIPLINE OF EDUCATION* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), pp. 47-60; Dwayne Huebner, "Implications of Psychological Thought for the Curriculum" in Arno Bellack and Herbert Kliebard (eds.) *CURRICULUM AND EVALUATION* (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1977) pp. 68-76, first appeared in Gladys Unruh and Robert Leeper (eds.), *INFLUENCES IN CURRICULUM CHANGE* (Washington, D. C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1968), pp. 28-37; Joseph J. Schwab, "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum," in Bellack and Kliebard (eds.), first appeared in *SCHOOL REVIEW* 78 (November 1969), pp. 1-23.
2. Papers collected in John Walton and James L. Kuethe (eds.) *THE DISCIPLINE OF EDUCATION* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963).
3. In particular this is the kind of argument used by Scheffler, Schwab, and Peters in the papers cited above.
4. James E. McClellan, Comments on "Is Education a Discipline?" by Israel Scheffler in Walton and Kuethe,

pp. 125-138.

5. Theodore M. Brown, "Putting Paradigms into History," Xerox copy of revised draft, 1979.
6. This is essentially Peters' argument in the paper cited above.
7. Lawrence Cremin et. al., A HISTORY OF TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (New York: Joh Wiley and Sons, 1975).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
14. Ibid.
15. Peter F. Carbone, THE SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT OF HAROLD RUGG (Durham: Duke University Press, 1977).
16. Lawrence Cremin, A HISTORY OF TEACHERS COLLEGE.
17. Lawrence Cremin, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL (New York: Vintage Books, 1964).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Cremin, A HISTORY OF TEACHERS COLLEGE.
24. Jesse H. Newlon, EDUCATION FOR DEOMOCRACY IN OUR TIME (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), pp. 11-12.
25. Cremin, A HISTORY OF TEACHERS COLLEGE.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 154.
28. Ibid., p. 151.
29. Mary Louise Seguel, THE CURRICULUM FIELD: ITS FORMATIVE YEARS (New York: Teachers College Press, 1966).
30. Cremin, A HISTORY OF TEACHERS COLLEGE.
31. Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed, THE STORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, 1890-1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925); William Edward Murphy and D. J. R. Bruckner, (eds.), THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
32. Murphy and Bruckner, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, p. 307.
33. Thomas Wakefield Goodspeed, THE STORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
34. Ibid., pp. 60, 61.
35. Ibid.
36. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO: A STATEMENT PREPARED FOR MEMBERS OF THE CHICAGO BAR (Chicago: University of Chicago, n.d.).
37. Murphy and Bruckner, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, p. 364.
38. A STATEMENT PREPARED FOR MEMBERS OF THE BAR, p. 10.
39. Seguel, THE CURRICULUM FIELD.
40. Ibid., pp. 72, 72 fn. 16.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. A STATEMENT PREPARED FOR MEMBERS OF THE BAR.
44. Seguel, THE CURRICULUM FIELD.
45. Ibid.



46. Cremin, **THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL.**
47. Ralph Tyler, **BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950).
48. Cremin, **THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL.**
49. Ralph Tyler, "Educational Benchmarks in Retrospect: Educational Change Since 1915," in Tyler, **PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN EDUCATION** (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1976), p. 38.
50. H. G. Good, **THE RISE OF THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY** (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1960).
51. Cremin, **THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL.**
52. Tyler, "Educational Benchmarks in Retrospect," pp. 40, 41.
53. John Goodlad, **INTRODUCTION** to Tyler, **PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN EDUCATION.**
54. H. G. Good, **THE RISE OF THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,**  
p. 4.
55. Good.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Seguel, **THE CURRICULUM FIELD.**
61. Good, **THE RISE OF THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.**
62. J. J. Chambliss, **BOYD H. BODE'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION** (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1963).
63. Boyd H. Bode, **PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS** (New York: Newson and Company, 1938).
64. Boyd H. Bode, **MODERN EDUCATIONAL THEORIES** (New York: Macmillan, 1927), pp. 150-151.
65. Bode, **MODERN EDUCATIONAL THEORIES,** pp. 171-191.
66. Good, **THE RISE OF THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION OF THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY.**

## A Reconceptualist Perspective on Curriculum Evaluation

George Willis  
University of Rhode Island

### Two Curricular Concerns

There is little doubt that the curriculum field is currently undergoing a process of rethinking its basic concerns. In fact, one major participant in and commentator on the field has described this process as a "reconceptualization."<sup>1</sup> While it is uncertain how much the process represents a reemphasis of several traditional concerns of the field or how much an expansion or redefinition of concerns, it is certain that many people at work in curriculum development and theory are increasingly focusing their attention on two concerns, or themes, which are clearly central to any current reconceptualization. Increasingly, such people wonder how best to think about and to put into practice concerns for: (1) how individuals personally perceive and ascribe meaning to themselves and their environments (of which the curriculum is a part) and (2) how the curriculum which in part represents to individuals the external social world, can promote social justice. Thus, the twin themes of human consciousness and political action are increasingly obtruding themselves among basic curricular concerns and, in time, may take their place with such better known themes as social adjustment, individual development, and arrangement of subject matter for efficient transmission, which have dominated thinking within the curriculum field at different times during the twentieth century.

Though far less certain, a similar process may be occurring within the related field of curriculum evaluation. At least there are indications that themes very much like human consciousness and political action are starting to reshape basic thinking in curriculum evaluation, where the dominance of assumptions from logical positivism and experimental social science was assured beginning in the 1960s by the massive influx of federal money which created the professional evaluator as a special class in curriculum apart from the traditional curriculum theorist or developer.

The basic purpose of this paper, however, is not to trace similarities and differences between the general curriculum field and curriculum evaluation during the last twenty years or more; it is to point out how the basic themes which characterize the possible reconceptualization in the curriculum field can be honored in curriculum evaluation, how in fact they may be nudging curriculum evaluation into the 1980s. The paper will do so by briefly describing the dominant form of curriculum evaluation and then contrasting it with the form consistent with reconceptualist themes.

### The Dominant Form

The dominant form of curriculum evaluation neglects both themes. This form is well known as part of the psychometric, experimental tradition in educational research, which assumes that empirically verifiable data collected under carefully controlled scientific or quasi-scientific procedures should be used to determine causal relationships. For the most part, it identifies such research with evaluation and attempts to establish quantitatively whether agreed-upon programmatic goals are met. Therefore, the dominant form tends to treat evaluation as solely the measurement of specific results of a program (or curriculum), useful because of the degree of confidence provided in asserting that results were caused by demonstrable features of the program. In it, the person who conducts such research often acts very much as part of a functional bureaucracy, seldom interacting directly with the program or making judgments about the value of purposes or program, but instead passing along descriptive data and inferences about causality to a more remote "decision maker" -- sometimes a government official -- who may or may not ultimately pass judgment. It places great emphasis on the supposedly objective or scientific methodology of "evaluation research" itself (which only incidentally is applied to curricula), as opposed to the insights of participants in curricula, and assumes that only persons who have expert training in this methodology can competently conduct such research. In so far as its prevailing interest is in the use of its methodology to determine whether specific programmatic goals are met, it clearly distances itself both from the immediate perceptions and meanings of participants in curricula and from the anticipation of social consequences of curricula. Primarily because of such distancing this dominant form of curriculum evaluation has been likened to

running alongside a train making notes through the windows.<sup>2</sup>

### The Reconceptualist Form

A second form of curriculum evaluation is not as well known, though much of it is by no means new. It is consistent with the reconceptualist themes and has been likened to boarding a train to interact with the engineer, the conductor, and the passengers.<sup>3</sup> It involves the varying perceptions and meanings of all participants in the curricular process and often attempts to account for the mutual influences between a curriculum and the socio-cultural context in which it is embedded. This form includes certain common assumptions and methods which have been subsumed under a variety of names, such as "qualitative,"<sup>4</sup> "responsive"<sup>5</sup> or "illuminative"<sup>6</sup> evaluation, "educational criticism,"<sup>7</sup> or "ethnography."<sup>8</sup> It attempts to discover what being in an educational situation is like, what it means to participants, how it has been influenced by external circumstances, and what the many consequences will be; it attempts to assess both the goodness and the significance of situation and consequences. This is largely the same kind of naturalistic, commonsensical process that most people use throughout their lives in arriving at considered opinions about the people, things, and events with which they come in contact, though the soundness of such opinions can often be enhanced by careful attention to the fullness of the process itself. Thus, the reconceptualist form of evaluation is consistent with a tradition much different from positivistic, experimental social science, with a tradition which emphasizes direct intuitive understanding through encounters with and portrayals of the experienced qualities of a situation and through linking such specifics with the external world.

In the reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation much depends on the insightfulness and skill of the evaluator, who usually carries out the process in the role of curriculum critic.<sup>9</sup> Still just as in all human lives, such insightfulness and critical skill are latent and cultivatable in all persons who are formal evaluators. All forms of naturalistic evaluation, then, begin in the perceptions and personal insights of the potential critic, but through the use of the critic's skill can end in the re-education of the audience by enhancing their own insights and skill necessary to achieve a well warranted and expanded range of meanings. Often this educative process proceeds through the critic's identifying the most pervasive or significant qualities of a classroom and relating them to the external social and political world. In this way this form of evaluation encourages personal and aesthetic responses to both the natural and the deliberately arranged configurations of educational environments or their specific qualities, but these responses include social and political insights, which lead to public consequences as part of the re-education of the critic's audience. Thus, the reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation is the highly focused and selective rendering of the critic's perceptions and experience of specific characteristics of the educational environment. By emphasizing certain qualities of experiencing that occur in response to that environment, it both illuminates the environment and discloses meaning by evoking similar responses in its audience. These evoked response, while largely influenced by the environment and by the critic's perceptions and skills, constitute personal meanings from which flow social consequences. Whether critics are participants (such as teachers and students) in or direct observers (such as supervisors and external evaluators) of the unfolding educational situation, this form of curriculum evaluation inevitably honors the twin themes of human consciousness and political action, for in it personal perceptions and the social consequences which follow from them are inextricably linked. Everyone is potentially an active critic, and as individuals work through and articulate their own perceptions and meanings, they mutually influence the perceptions, meanings, and actions of others.

In these terms, curriculum evaluation is anything but an elitist activity, for it encourages on-going participation by a wide variety of people formulating judgments through a variety of naturalistic methods and working toward consensus through an open process which fosters personal autonomy and a democratic, self-educating political community. In these terms, nonetheless, evaluation is still very much the activity of criticism; it embodies its own standards of excellence and necessarily incorporates all the basic processes of formal criticism within whatever specific methodologies it employs. Since formal criticism itself is a rendering (usually a linguistic rendering, though not always or exclusively so) of what the critic has experienced, and since its purpose is to provide new perspectives and heightened understanding to its audience and the occasion for them to act upon

these, what preserves the possibility of both universal and excellent evaluation within the reconceptualist framework is the fact that virtually any participant can develop or refine skill in applying the basic processes of criticism, which, taken together, effectively carry out its purpose. These basic processes can be considered as "observation," "description," "interpretation," and "judgment" (or "appraisal").<sup>10</sup> All are present at least implicitly in any example of the reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation.

### The Processes of Criticism

"Observation" begins in the multitude of immediate, personal perceptions of the critic within a specific situation. Clearly, no one person will perceive all the tangible characteristics of a situation, nor will any two people perceive precisely the same intangible qualities which may pervade the situation. The best any observer can hope to do is deliberately to shift perceptual fields in order to sample a wide range of characteristics and qualities and to make intelligent decisions about which of these warrant more detailed attention. Ultimately, therefore, "observation" is a disciplined and selective process of attempting to encounter the "what is going on here" of a specific situation; there are degrees of skill involved in perceiving well in the first place and then in making inferences about what is important among the many perceptions. Such skill can usually be developed through experience in similar situations. For instance, experience as a teacher may be important in developing the skills of observation necessary for accomplished educational criticism.

"Description" is an evocative recreation for the audience of what the critic has encountered. Again discipline and selectivity come into play as the critic makes choices about which of the many perceptions to portray and how most effectively to portray them to the audience. This critical skill is important because it provides the only way of conveying the critic's immediate perceptions of the situation to the audience. For members of the audience who have not been participants in the situation, these descriptions form the only basis for their own perceptions (though they should be wary about uncritically accepting such descriptions); for members who have been participants, the descriptions provide a comparative basis for expanding and heightening their perceptions. The critic has the responsibility to portray both accurately and evocatively not only the most significant tangible characteristics of a situation, but also those intangible qualities which give the situation its particular texture or atmosphere. Through well wrought portrayals the audience may for themselves experience the situation.<sup>11</sup>

"Interpretation" is the disclosure of meaning about what has been encountered. Usually this process proceeds through some kind of direct or implied comparison between the situation itself and a set of ideas or events which tend to illuminate it. For instance, the critic may attempt to disclose meaning by relating situation to external factors, such as a body of theoretical or explanatory principles or a selection of characteristics or events from the socio-economic context. Or the critic may focus on the internal configurations or patterns within the situation, perhaps by pointing out their specific social meanings to various participants, by addressing their consistency, or by comparing them to other possible configurations, real or hypothetical. The critic's skill in interpreting can be considered in terms of the explanatory power of the disclosures, particularly the power to generate meanings beyond those meanings immediately disclosed. The best interpretations are ordinarily those that create many incisive and significant insights. Again, this process is one which involves intelligent selection, for the critic must make many choices about what interpretations to make and what meanings to disclose from among the myriad of those plausible. Skill in the process may be cultivated by familiarizing the critic with a full range of interpretive possibilities, encouraging the development of new or recombined form, and providing experience in their appropriate selection.

"Judgment" (or "appraisal") is a statement of the quality and educational significance of what has been encountered. In this process of criticism, the critic's value system ordinarily is most readily apparent, for the most highly skilled critics not only provide statements about the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of specific situations but usually make clear the reasons for their judgments. Basically, the critic addresses questions concerning the goodness of what is going on. In so doing, the critic may consider which of the specifics within the unfolding situation are satisfying and which need to be improved; the critic may proceed in terms of both how intrinsically satisfying participants find the situation to be and how the situation can be judged against various extrinsic standards. Ultimately, the critic must also consider whether what is going on is worth doing in the first place. For instance, a critic might judge a situation in which several relatively trivial purposes were

consistently fulfilled as less praiseworthy than one in which a broad range of more important purposes were inconsistently fulfilled; the informed critic's judgments should consider both the internal qualities of the situation and its external significance. The process of "judgment" depends ultimately on the wisdom of the critic, and, unfortunately, there are no convenient and facile ways in which wisdom can be cultivated. Still, the reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation encourages critics to bring value systems fully into the open and to make judgments in terms of a complete range of considerations.

The reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation honors the twin themes of human consciousness and political action primarily because the good critic must be cognizant of what a complete range of considerations entails to carry out well the basic processes of "observation," "description," "interpretation," and "judgment." Therefore, in making observations and developing meanings about an educational situation, the good critic will include inferences about the perceptions and meanings of participants, the "what being there is like" in the most basic of human terms. In placing observations within a fully developed interpretive and judgmental framework, the good critic will suggest how the situation is affected by and how it affects the broad social, cultural, political, and economic context in which it is embedded. Therefore, any fully developed piece of educational criticism or curriculum evaluation necessarily includes the reconceptualist themes, for only through their inclusion can the critic build up an adequate picture of the situation and context, make fully defensible suggestions for improvement, and thus expose the basic process of valuing upon which evaluation rests. Often the dominant form of curriculum evaluation treats such matters in attenuated ways, particularly by severely delimiting the kinds of descriptive data and interpretive frameworks it considers and by eschewing the process of valuing through identifying evaluation with measurement.

#### Some Basic Differences

Aside from encouraging more complete and more fully developed evaluative studies, the reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation can be differentiated from the dominant form in three basic ways. First, they employ different methodologies and different logics of inference, the dominant being principally quantitative and the reconceptualist, qualitative. Both, of course, are empirical, for they begin with the observed characteristics of a situation, but the logic of inference in quantitative studies is one of classification and seriation resulting in numerical comparison, whereas in qualitative studies the logic of inference is one of direct comparison resulting in reclassification and new insight. The specific methodologies employed in the dominant form are largely mathematical; they attempt to determine rank order or to derive statistical correlations between characteristics and statistical probabilities that such correlations do or do not occur by chance. They are useful in dealing simultaneously with a large number of examples and in providing generalities about them. The specific methodologies employed in the reconceptualist form can be drawn from the wide variety of methods used in the hermeneutical sciences (such as art criticism) or in disciplines employing interpretive case studies (such as anthropological field methods); they attempt to provide direct understanding about particular examples by portraying observed characteristics of a situation in such a way that the qualities which permeate them, their meanings, and their significance become discernible.

The second basic way of differentiating the two forms of curriculum evaluation is in terms of the epistemological assumptions of the differing traditions from which they come. As has been noted, the dominant form is consistent with a tradition of research drawn from the natural sciences and imitated by certain social sciences. Such methods attempt to demonstrate causality, and while their intent is to interrogate and then describe the universe, they do not attempt directly to ascribe meaning to it or to evaluate it. The reconceptualist form is consistent with a tradition of research drawn from the hermeneutical and interpretive disciplines. These methods also include the search for descriptive data, but their intent includes interpretive and judgmental processes as well. The differing epistemological assumptions of these two traditions can be illustrated by considering the issues of objectivity and subjectivity and of reliability and validity.

Ernest R. House has shown how within the former tradition objectivity and reliability tend to be equated, often at the expense of validity, since the tradition rejects valid data subjectively obtained.<sup>12</sup> House points out that evaluation conducted on these epistemological assumptions will be:

ultimately defended by its objectivity and the need to make decisions. Since decisions must be made, it is better to make them on the basis of objective data than subjective information, even if the evaluation is flawed. This argument rests upon the presumed objectivity of the instruments, the sample, and the statistical procedures. It is a very special definition of objectivity.

Objectivity is often equated with agreement among observers. Agreement is accomplished by having externalized, specified procedures for observation. By the definition, objectivity is achieved by having observers agree on what they see -- replication of observation. What a number of people agree on is accepted. Anything not commonly observed is presumed to be merely subjective. This is the quantitative notion of objectivity, and it is closely identified with the objectivist epistemology of systems analysis....

In its extreme form, the quantitative notion of objectivity, called intersubjectivism, becomes operationalism: everything must be jointly seen and specified to be considered "true."<sup>13</sup>

Continuing his analysis, House cites the work of Michael Scriven,<sup>14</sup> noting that Scriven identifies this notion of objectivity as "a major philosophical error," since it confuses the method of verification with "truth."

Scriven contends there is another notion of objectivity that depends on the quality of the idea rather than on the number of people holding it. He calls this the qualitative sense of objectivity. In this sense, being objective means being free from bias and distortion.

Scriven cited the incident of an evaluator of television receivers attaching a mechanical instrument to the television to measure decibel gain, even though decibel gain is not highly correlated with picture quality. The naked eye will judge picture quality better. The technician does this because one can attain higher interjudge agreement on an instrument reading, even though naked-eye reliability is also achievable at a lower level. In other words, reliability has replaced validity. One uses more reliable instruments even though they are less valid.<sup>15</sup>

Since "truth" is determined by agreement among observers, this tradition tends to reject all but the most readily verifiable characteristics of an educational situation upon which agreement can easily be obtained. However, even if observations are free from bias and distortion, they cannot be free from personal perceptions, although they may appear so if similar perceptions are shared by those in agreement. Personal perceptions are inevitably present (though often concealed) within the decisions that go into any observations and descriptions, let alone into interpretations and judgments. For instance, many assumptions are built into the instruments (such as tests or questionnaires) from which descriptive data are obtained. These data may be objective according to the quantitative notion and appear to speak for themselves, but consideration must be given to the perceptions and assumptions which went into the creation and selection of the instruments, to the significance of the data and what they mean, and, indeed, to the many more intangible or ephemeral ("subjective," if you will) qualities of the situation which might otherwise have been described. That this tradition tends to suppress such considerations is clear indication of how it also tends to trivialize evaluation.

In contrast, the tradition consistent with Scriven's qualitative notion of objectivity does not attempt to treat as "truth" only those perceptions upon which agreement exists, for agreement is not the final test of freedom from distortion and bias. Indeed, it encourages the search for why some personal perceptions are better ways of observing and describing reality than are others, and this search for qualitative differences itself entails the processes of criticism. Truth is known at last within the final process of "judgment," and the validity found in subjective, personal perceptions and determined by qualitative comparisons is a more telling way of reaching objectivity than is the reliability found in quantitative consensus. Instead of suppressing personal perceptions and subsequent interpretations and judgments, this tradition makes them the subject of open inquiry and debate in order to free them from bias and distortion. In this sense, engaging in the processes of criticism may re-educate the perceptions of the critic as much as the perceptions of the critic's audience.

The third basic way of differentiating the two forms of curriculum evaluation follows directly from the second. The dominant form is consistent with a socially conservative ideology which suggests individuals should be subjected to direct means of control, while the reconceptualist form is consistent with an ideology of

progressive social change which suggests individuals are autonomous moral agents. The separate epistemological assumptions and practical manifestations of each form of evaluation seem to be co-joined with separate political and social theories as well.

In the dominant form, knowledge is obtained through reliable observations, which in turn are verified through consensus among observers. The process of verification provides a check on errors which might occur among single observers. In effect, truth is determined by majority vote. In effect, then, it is determined by a political process, one in which deviation from the majority (except in special, well defined circumstances) is regarded as outright error. The central question which immediately arises is: How does the social group determine consensus and how does it treat members who deviate from the consensus? The importance of the question quickly increases as the group expands from a few observers working on strictly technical problems to a full-blown political community attempting to govern itself and to work out the kind of social issues entailed in activities like curriculum development. Elevation of a principle of verification useful in technical problems to the principle used in political matters is indeed fraught with peril. And while curriculum evaluation may entail certain technical issues, it is largely a political matter as well.

In the dominant form of evaluation consensus is determined by what can be considered an elite group. Seldom are the formal evaluators themselves participants within the unfolding educational situation. In this sense the dominant form is something less than fully democratic, for the views of many people, such as teachers and students, who could contribute intelligently to a consensus are deliberately excluded. Exclusion is justified on the grounds that the descriptive data obtained are completely objective; that is, within the quantitative notion of objectivity such high reliability is achieved on data obtained through proper instrumentation that anyone would assent to it, thus obviating any necessity for actually conducting a vote or for considering data obtained directly from human consciousness. A vote which must be cast one way is a vote which need not be cast at all. The elite groups of evaluators itself, however, determines how votes must be cast in determining what data to look for and what constitutes proper instrumentation. Still, this group usually sees its task primarily as obtaining objective data; in providing data for a still more lofty "decision maker" the group can defer to the decision maker's judgments. Since these judgments clearly affect all members of the social group, the political actions of the group, as determined from the top down, are also less than fully democratic. Those who must live with the consequences of the decisions are effectively excluded from participating in their formulation, and the process itself tends to suppress diversity and to narrow the basis for decisions and actions to only those few data upon which nearly unanimous agreement is likely. Dissenting groups may be tolerated in the social policies set by this kind of decision making, but the substance of their dissent cannot be tolerated in the decisions. In point of fact, scholars such as Herbert Kliebard<sup>16</sup> and Michael Apple<sup>17</sup> have shown how in practice the use of supposedly objective data about curricula in setting educational policies has almost invariably served a high conservative, even reactionary, social orientation, one far more likely to preserve rather than to improve existing social and political arrangements.

In contrast, the reconceptualist form of evaluation does not value consensus for its own sake. The potentially diverse opinions of all participants in or direct observers of the unfolding situation are valuable in themselves as a means of fostering open debate about the goodness and significance of the situation. Such debate is what forms the group into a political community, one which educates itself about how to interpret, value and act upon the situation. Since within the qualitative notion of objectivity consensus cannot be expected prior to debate, and since diverse opinions enrich debate in ways which tend to free all participants from bias and distortion, the substance of dissenting views must be honored in the decisions of the community about social policies, and the policies in turn will tend to be tolerant of those who dissent. Each individual's opinion is potentially the single opinion most nearly free from bias and distortion, and each individual, therefore, has a moral obligation to participate in the process by which the community educates itself.

This kind of community does not altogether give up the search for consensus, but the search is postponed and is of a far different kind than it is within the dominant form of evaluation. Whereas in a group operating under the quantitative notion of objectivity the search is an immediate one for accurate data confirmed through consensus and then used to construct and confirm social decisions, in a group operating under the qualitative notion of objectivity the search is primarily part of the political process itself, one of attempting to educate and of

being educated about which points of view lead to the most beneficial consequences. Since from the latter perspective freedom from bias and distortion is not demonstrated through consensus on the facts of the matter themselves, it must be demonstrated through a political consensus about social consequences. Since the unfolding situation within which the evaluation takes place inevitably changes, so, too, will the emerging consensus and the evolving decisions about social consequences. In this way the reconceptualist form of curriculum evaluation links human consciousness and political action within a democratic search for progressive social change.

### Conclusions

This paper has attempted to embody the processes of criticism in briefly describing, interpreting, and judging both the dominant and the reconceptualist forms of curriculum evaluation. While in some ways these forms can be seen as complementary, each with its own advantages, the paper has judged the reconceptualist form as superior primarily because it broadens the scope of inquiry and gets at things which the dominant form cannot; because it can be couched in a wide variety of specific naturalistic forms, particularly the case study; and because it encourages active and intelligent political engagement by many concerned individuals. Seen in these terms the reconceptualist form has the following advantages:

- 1) It permits insight into particular cases (rather than providing generalizations about many cases). Thus, it may provide direct knowledge of why specific practices work or are appropriate within specific contexts.
- 2) It does not depend on preconceived research constructs or hypotheses and thus permits investigation of the "hidden" curriculum, of the dynamics of any educational situation as they exist (as opposed to how they are presupposed to exist). In this sense it provides a more flexible evaluative format and the opportunity for appropriately matching specific format with the changing realities of specific cases.
- 3) It incorporates its findings in forms which can be especially vivid, personal, and understandable.
- 4) It depends upon naturalistic insights and skills of evaluation (for instance, the often unarticulated insights of teachers) which all people use in their lives and which can be refined and developed through proper training.
- 5) It encourages the broadening of the interpretation of evaluative data and the deepening of the significance of evaluative judgments. In short, the meaning of the data can be ascribed only as directly connected with educational and social contexts.
- 6) It permits more direct connection between the findings of evaluative studies and the setting of social policy, particularly by encouraging that such decisions be made within a democratic, self-educating political community.

Seen only in terms of their differing methodologies and logics of inference, the two forms of evaluation can be seen as complementaries, useful in answering different kinds of questions and curricula. However, in terms of their differing epistemologies and differing ideologies, the reconceptualist is superior, expressly because it includes consideration of both human consciousness and political action and thus can answer moral and social questions about curricula which the dominant form cannot. It encourages individuals to be intelligent, autonomous agents taking responsibility for their own actions and encouraging the intelligent, autonomous actions of others within a mutually interdependent and evolving social situation.



## FOOTNOTES

1. William F. Pinar, "The Reconceptualization of Curriculum Studies," *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM STUDIES* 10:3, 1978, pp. 205-14; "Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978," *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER* 7:8 (September), 1978, pp. 5-11.
2. Lee Ross and Lee J. Cronbach, "Handbook of Evaluation Research: Essay Review," *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER* 5:10 (November), 1976, pp. 9-19.
3. *IBID.*
4. George Willis (ed.) *QUALITATIVE EVALUATION: CONCEPTS AND CASES IN CURRICULUM CRITICISM*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1978.
5. Robert Stake, *EVALUATING THE ARTS IN EDUCATION*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1975.
6. Malcolm Parlett and David Hamilton, *EVALUATION AS ILLUMINATION: A NEW APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS*. Center for Research in Educational Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Occasional Paper 9, 1972.
7. Elliot W. Eisner, "On the Uses of Educational Connoisseurship and Criticism for Evaluating Classroom Life," *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD* 78: 3 (February), 1977; "Educational Connoisseurship and Educational Criticism: Their Forms and Functions in Educational Evaluation," *JOURNAL OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION*, Bicentennial Issue, 1977.
8. Frederick Erickson, "Some Approaches to Inquiry in School Community Ethnography," *ANTHROPOLOGY AND EDUCATION QUARTERLY* VIII: 2 (May), 1977, pp. 58-69.
9. This role was first identified and described by John S. Mann. See: Mann, "Curriculum Criticism," *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD* 71: 1 (September), 1969, p. 27-40.
10. Some of this terminology is borrowed from Gail McCutcheon, who originated a similar three-part breakdown of the processes of educational criticism. See: McCutcheon, "Of Solar Systems, Responsibilities and Basics: An Educational Criticism of Mr. Clement's Fourth Grade," in Willis, *OP. CIT.*, pp. 186-205; "Educational Criticism: Methods and Application," *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING* 1:2 (Summer), 1979, pp. 5-25.
11. For an extended commentary on the art and the users of such portrayals, see: Elizabeth Vallence, *AESTHETIC CRITICISM AND CURRICULUM DESCRIPTION*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1975.
12. Ernest R. House, "The Objectivity, Fairness, and Justice of Federal Evaluation Policy as Reflected in the Follow Through Evaluation," *EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS* 1:1 (January-February), 1979, pp. 28-42.
13. *IBID.*, p. 37.
14. Michael Scriven, "Objectivity and Subjectivity in Educational Research," in Lawrence G. Thomas (ed.) *REDIRECTING EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, NSSE Yearbook, Part I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972, pp. 94-115.
15. House, *OP. CIT.*
16. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in Vernon Haubrich (ed.) *FREEDOM, BUREAUCRACY, AND SCHOOLING*. Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1971.
17. Michael W. Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education," in Ralph A. Smith (ed.), *REGAINING EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP*. New York: Wiley, 1975.

### Perspectives on Mentorship

Barbara K. Iverson  
 Hersholt C. Waxman  
 University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

I think the reverence that we feel for men and women who have been true teachers, and the way that love can change our lives, our vision, our perception of all things we know, and open up new areas of freedom and imagination we have never felt, after certain periods of loneliness that we have never undergone—that this is, in the long run, what education is and nothing else but this.  
 (Kozol, 1975, p. 195)

...little attention has been given to the processes by which students become scholars and scientists  
 (Hartnett, 1977)

When Odysseus returned from his travails seeking to claim his domain, his adviser and faithful friend Mentor stood by his side. As a graduate student seeks to claim a domain, what role does a mentor play? This paper examines this question from several perspectives. First, a brief review on the literature on faculty-student interactions is presented, followed by a discussion contrasting the empirical and phenomenological dimensions of these interactions. A classification scheme of faculty-student relationships (referred to as patron relationships) is then presented, with a section focusing on the particular relationship of mentor and protege. The inquiry shifts perspectives from an empirical to a phenomenological to an existential view of mentorship, presenting a personal perspective of the currere of mentorship in the last section.

At the core of most critiques of American higher education is the assertion that effective education requires close working relationships between faculty and students. Indeed, whether implicitly or explicitly, many recent indictments of higher education have been made from a philosophical vantage point that posits the importance of close faculty-student interaction. This interaction is seen not only as a means by which the transmission of knowledge and student intellectual growth is best facilitated, but as an educational goal in and of itself. If these critics are right, of equal importance to faculty teaching styles and practices within the classroom may well be the formal and informal teaching activities that take place outside the classroom. (Wilson, et. al., 1975, p. 30).

Research syntheses of studies on faculty-student interactions reveal that in most institutions, out-of-class interaction between faculty and students is fairly infrequent and superficial (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969; Pascarella, in press). Others have similarly found that in most academic institutions intensive informal contact with faculty is only experienced by a minority of students (Chickering, 1969b, Del Pizzo, 1917; Dilly, 1965; Fenske, 1979; Gaff, 1965; Gardner, 1969; King, 1967; Mattuck, 1969; Theilens, 1966; Wood and Wilson, 1972). "The evidence suggests that student-faculty contact in most colleges and universities is largely restricted to formalized, somewhat structured situations such as the lecture, laboratory or discussion section" (Pascarella, 1979, p. 4).

The Feldman and Newcomb (1969) review acknowledged as well that faculty may have their most significant impact on students in the areas of intellectual and career development. A review of academic sponsorship in the sciences suggested that the productivity of the sponsor or mentor was correlated with a protege's productivity not only immediately after the Ph.D. degree, but ten years later as well. The mentor's prominence affected the protege's productivity in terms of publications, as well (Reskin, 1979). Several other prominent educators and researchers have similarly emphasized the importance of student-faculty interactions and the fact that faculty members do make a difference in the lives of students (Chickering, 1969a; Katz, et. al., 1968; Sanford, 1967; Clar, 1968; Jacob, 1957; Feldman and Newcomb, 1969; Wilson, et. al., 1975; Bolton and Kammeyer, 1967; Smith, 1976; Eddy, 1959; Thistlewaite, 1962). Furthermore, research on the frequency of informal relationships between faculty and students has shown significant positive associations with academic performance and

intellectual development (Pascarella and Terenzini, 1976; Pascarella and Terenzini, 1978; Wilson, et. al., 1974; Wilson, et. a., 1975). Another result of frequent personal interaction with faculty is that students further develop their interest in and commitment to intellectual concerns (Wilson, et. al., 1975).

Rewards of student-faculty interaction are not always unidirectional. Faculty may similarly benefit from contact with students. Out-of-class interactions with students may increase the knowledge faculty members have about their students' strengths and weaknesses, their interest, problems and perspectives (Wilson, et. al., 1975). Faculty members may enjoy personal relationships as well.


This brief look at what empirical studies have suggested about faculty-student interactions presents evidence in one dimension. It attempts to describe the external, generalizable features of the interactions and relationships between faculty and students. However, in the empirical dimension with its tradition of an instrumental and technological orientation, a "...common notion is that when one measures, one sees the same thing but sees it in amounts" (Stake, 1978). This implies that measuring mentorship and student-faculty relationships describes the experience of these relationships. However, the act of measurement is a transformation of experience to representation; a shift in mind-set where "...these changes bring change in power and strength" (Stake, 1978). Therefore, the quantification of mentorship following the empirical research tradition, based on the instrumental criteria of efficiency, effectiveness and productivity, will determine what will be examined; its rules will "appear compelling" (Van Manen, 1977). The rules will determine what is evidence and knowledge where there is a "...denial that 'true' knowledge can be got at by interpreting phenomena ...in terms of 'purpose' " (Monad, 1972).

The phenomenological tradition on the other hand, is reflexive. Its truths are "...truths we acknowledge not only with our minds but with our lives as well..." (Smith, 1979). Phenomenological inquiry involves setting aside accustomed mental sets through insight and a process, bracketing. Insight can dissolve the pressures and barriers which "...hold the mind in rigid grooves and fixed compartments in which fundamental challenges are avoided" (Bohm, 1979). Bracketing is the act of setting aside a perceptual set whether by accident, through art or by deliberate, conscious decision in order to see anew; "...to set aside everydayness, to open new possibilities for perception, judgement and interpretation" (Denton, 1979). A death in the family, a cathartic experience at a play or considering a novel approach to what are normally 'givens,' all typify bracketing.

At the intersection of these spaces (the empirical and the phenomenological), lie ways of knowing apart from those procribed by a strictly instrumental orientation to social science research (Van Manen, 1977). Graduate education and the role of mentorship in that process are not fully described without reference to purpose; to the "whys" of these processes and to the contextual setting of graduate education. Final causes and questions of purpose are excluded from the empirical domain. Both dimensions will be explored in the following sections of the paper.

This section of the paper will present and explain a range of relationships which exist between individuals in graduate school. At one extreme of this range is the mentor, at the other, the peer "pal." The classification scheme presented in this section allows for analysis of mentorship in an empirical dimension; the next section suggests analysis in a phenomenological dimension.

The description and taxonomy of mentors and mentorship referred to, is drawn from investigations of success mechanisms that function in business (Shapiro, 1978). Figure 1 presents this taxonomy, based on continuum of roles individuals might occupy in a helping or "patron" relationship. A model applies to graduate education insofar as "patron systems" exist in graduate schools as agents of intellectual and personal socialization.



A Model of Patron Relationship

The continuum represents the degree the rigidity or "paternalism" in a relationship. At the peer "pal" end of the continuum the relations described are democratic, egalitarian non-exclusionary and nonrestrictive. Peer "pals" alternate roles, between dominant and nondominant according to the situation, in promoting their individual and mutual interests. The benefits resulting from such a relationship tend to be incremental rather than massive (Shapiro, 1978).

At the opposite pole is the mentor. The mentor-protege relationship is characterized as "emotionally charged" and being a "paternal dynamic structure" (Shapiro, 1978). "Paternal" in this usage, means tending toward excessive supervision, because women can be mentors and proteges, as well as men. The mentor-protege relationship is hierarchical, restrictive and exclusionary. The mentor is always the authority, and often "dictates" to the protege. The graduate student who enters a mentor-protege relationship "owes" the mentor; it is a fiduciary relationship.

Most relationships vary over time, and the guide and sponsor are intermediary roles, between peer and mentor. The guide's role is to familiarize the protege with the pitfalls and short-cuts of a given system. Advanced graduate students serve in this role in relation to entering students, for example, in providing factual information, program particulars and phenomenological information (contextual features of the experiences of graduate school).

A sponsor in graduate school is likely to be a major adviser. Once a student is oriented to the school and is observing the etiquette of being a student, as well as the conventions of the discipline, the need for a sponsor arises. As the student prepares and writes a dissertation, this need intensifies. The difference between a sponsor and a mentor is one of degree and intensity though both can alternately be referred to as benefactor, protector or champion.

Using the taxonomy, several interesting empirical research opportunities present themselves. For example, a study of successful and ABD (all but dissertation) candidates in terms of the patron variable could further explicate the relationships sketched out here. The research on mentors in business suggests that mentors tend to choose proteges who are "like themselves" (Shapiro, 1978). The degree to which this phenomena operates in graduate education and the effect of this choice factor on women and minorities (given that existing mentor candidates are largely nonminority males) are other research areas open to empirical approaches. These would further explore the outward aspects of mentorship.

The chief wonder of education is that it does not ruin everybody concerned, teachers and taught.  
(Henry Adams)

This section of the paper explores the phenomenological perspective of mentorship. Phenomenological evidence bears on the issue of the purpose of the graduate student's education and what socio-emotional influence the mentor can exercise. It is a question of ends, and the perceptual sets associated with empiricist and phenomenological tradition. The importance of the phenomenological dimension of social science research arises as, "...in a modern world thinking becomes increasingly existential and depends on credibility more than on objective truth (Broudy, 1979). This section attempts to look at mentorship from such a perspective.

How we get somewhere can influence where we end up. Currere, the running and seeking, is separable from the course traversed. Much passes between teacher and student which does not fall into more traditional views of the curriculum. Course descriptions, college brochures, and even knowledgeable peers and faculty may overlook the key experiences or influences that transform the student into an "ideal" graduate student or nascent academic. Neither the "currerist" nor the course can be adequately described in isolation, without reference to each other. As Eisner (1978) says, "To understand an event or situation one must perceive it as an aspect of a larger pattern..." The experience of mentorship is more than a description of its purposes, whether stated or implied. Describing an "open classroom" to students in an open class is a different phenomena for participants and observers, than describing the same concept to students in a regimented classroom setting. Clearly, "...all knowing entails a context that is at the focus our comprehension" (Broudy, 1979). A reflexive attitude toward mentorship is necessary in order to know about it.

What characterizes a reflexive description of mentor-protege encounter? Questions of intensity and purpose involved in description of the experiences of mentor-protege relationships enter into this "self-conscious" look at the phenomena of mentorship. The intensity which separates mentor from sponsor is central to this

description and a key to its purpose. This intensity appears to fluctuate; "...when the mentor is involved psychologically with the information..." the intensity level is highest (Pinar and Grumet, 1976). The degree of acceptance and receptivity of the protege figures in this energy exchange as well. As the individuals vary over time, the relationship moves between sponsorship and mentorship, and back again.

The purpose of a given encounter affects the intensity of the phenomena as well, for "...when the exclusive aim is learnedness in the sense of amassing information, the process is primarily technical, and may not involve a transmission of energy in the same sense that occurs when the aim is intellectual development..." (Pinar and Grumet, 1976). A lecturer with a class of thirty or forty is involved in a technical process of dissemination of facts, what Pinar and Grumet (1976) term "factology." A teacher acting as a sponsor or mentor, may be involved in a higher energy transmission than the lecturer, as his/her aim is intellectual and humanistic, not technical. In describing a technologist scholar the teacher don Juan, jokes that "...after arranging the world in a most beautiful and enlightened manner, the scholar goes home at 5 o'clock in order to forget his beautiful arrangement" (Castaneda, 1977). An adviser acting in such an alienated manner is closer to being a sponsor, than a mentor. The "world arrangement" presented to the protege will be of an ordinary non-intense energy level emphasizing facts and the acquisition of facts as easily measurable evidence of learning. The purpose of the relationship in such a case, is shaped by instrumental criteria; efficiency, effectiveness and productivity. A danger in this type of relationship lies in "...the delicate balance between...the professor's desire to propagate a view and the student's groping toward his or her own" (Hartnett, 1977). The question of how much knowledge is "enough" becomes problematic—a function of unacknowledged phenomenological evidence from which the mentor acts (perhaps unconsciously based on biases, unexamined prejudices and quirks). Furthermore, a reliance on a rational stance where objective truth as discovered and enunciated by experts is the focus of one's studies, can lead to a sense of alienation for a graduate student, as distancing from immediate and personal experience occurs.

Lane (1977) accuses graduate schools of being stress-filled, dehumanizing and ignoring the needs of students who are attracted to a world of ideas. Other educators cite similar weaknesses (Cottle, 1977; Halleck, 1976; Hartnett and Katz, 1977; Seidman, 1977; Snyder, 1970). Cottle (1977) asserts that "the psychological well-being of students generally has been ignored and often assiduously avoided by faculties as attested to by the information and life histories collected by student health services" (p. 31). Halleck (1976) cites "loneliness, severe anxiety, role confusion, and alienation as common maladies among graduate students." Hartnett and Katz (1977) add that faculty are often contributors to these students' problems. Fortunately, these indictments against graduate schools are not generalizable to all students or all institutions. Nevertheless, the learning environment of graduate school is very important. The setting should be an open one; a dialogue between teacher and student. Friere (1970) describes "dialogue" as an encounter between men, mediated by the world in order to name the world. "Naming the world" is an act of creation and recreation that is infused with "love." Friere believes that only through this process of dialogue are we capable of generating critical thinking and communication. Snyder (1970) concurs that "the context and content of the formal curriculum, as well as the hidden curriculum, must be the subject of a searching dialogue if higher education is to have any relevance at all in the coming decades" (p. 200). This sharing and communicating between faculty and student is the mode of transaction that should be occurring in our ideal curriculum.

In the intense mentor-protege relationship, the "world arrangement" presented includes encounters where the mentor's involvement in a particular topic will be higher than in other topics. The transmission of this energy is characterized as "...the giving of elan vital from one to the other" (Pinar and Grumet, 1976). Such an encounter can enable the protege to shift to another level of understanding "to see what his teacher sees in such a case, and not just mirror his teacher's language..." (Pinar and Grumet, 1976). Castaneda's description of don Juan's use of "power plants" to give a boost to the apprentice's own personal power, or energy, appears to be based on this idea of the transfer of elan vital. Castaneda experiences knowledge when don Juan is present, only to be unsure of it later when he leaves don Juan's presence. This phenomena is a baffling but common one, where "...one may see and afterward lose sight of understanding" as though the "transfusion of elan vital" contained the message itself. The intensity factor seems to be a critical factor in differentiating mentor from sponsor and in defining the mentor-protege relationship.

Beyond this intensity factor in the faculty-student relationship, other aspects of mentorship in graduate education are in need of identification. Pinar and Grumet (1976) describe the mentor acting in "...complex ways we do not even claim to understand (where) one distills one's force and expresses it through thought and action in chosen areas." Yet a mentor transmits a knowledge of this process to the protege. Henry Adams describes the "only valuable" part of his education as the opportunity he had to read privately in the study of James Russell Lowell where he "...used to read a little and talk a great deal, for the contact pleased and flattered him, as that of older men ought to flatter and please the young even when they altogether exaggerate its value." This contact between the mentor and protege is critical. "A teacher must not leave anything to chance," says don Juan (Castaneda, 1975). However, its real importance lies in its subjective not objective content. To don Juan, "...the concern of every teacher is not to let his apprentice do anything that would plunge him into aberration and morbidity..." and to bolster the apprentice in "temperance and strength" (Castaneda, 1975). These then are the criteria which determine the content of the mentor-protege relationship, rather than instrumental values. In graduate education today, "loneliness, severe anxiety, role confusion and alienation are common maladies among graduate students" while the "social utility of knowledge is understressed" leading to technologists who have mastered methodology but fear to look at large important questions (Hartnett, 1979). Further study of the phenomenological aspect of mentorship may point the way toward a praxis of mentorship, beneficial to scholars and society.

The final section of the paper examines mentorship in existential terms. This moves us beyond a perspective where the possibility of producing a system of personal "essential" knowledge similar to the nomological tradition exists, into a sphere where the uniqueness of experience precludes generalization (Pinar, 1979, personal communication). The text alternates between phenomenological statements and reflexive comments which are personal and existential in nature.

What is missing is the study of the student's point of view from the student's point of view. What is missing is the portrayal of the self from the point of view of the self (Pinar and Grumet, 1976, p. 17).

Our accounts are highly personal and it is doubtful that our feelings and beliefs are similar to other students. As Bowers (1974) states it, "Because a phenomenology of the student involves an account of his subjective experiences, it is hard to generalize that all students are experiencing the same thing" (p. 20). However, our experiences and feelings are real, and they represent valid accounts of our lives.

Just as I began to write this paper, I stopped to ask myself, "Why am I writing about mentorship?" Then I started to think about events that occurred in my past that I feel have shaped my life. Next, I thought about where I wanted to be ten years from now. After that, I tried to analyze where I'm at now. Finally, I began to synthesize these thoughts and I constructed an image of myself presenting this paper to a large group of influential and prominent scholars. I realized that I would probably be frightened, nervous, and my voice and actions would also indicate that state of shock to everyone present in the audience. Yet as I pondered for a while, I realized that nearly everyone at the conference will know and understand what I would be talking about. They would be able to empathize with me because they would know and understand how it felt to present a paper for the first time. They would also know and understand what it was like to have a mentor and how difficult it was to speak or write about the relationship. I also began to think about one of my mentors who would probably be at the conference and about some of my other mentors who would be back at home at our university. It seems to me that they would know and understand what I'm talking about too. On the other hand, I began to think that many of my fellow doctoral students back at the university would not understand what I'm going to be talking about because it is too far removed from their own personal experiences. Finally, I began to reminisce about several friends that I had gotten to know at the university. Unfortunately, those thoughts made me sad because they were victims of the fatal attrition numbers that plague most doctoral programs. Most of them would probably not know what it is like to have a mentor at a university either. This paper must be written therefore, for those students who have failed to learn the importance of mentorship in

the graduate school curriculum. Similarly, it is written for those professors who have forgotten the significance of it too.

Mentorship is important for advancement in the formal curriculum, but it is essential for survival in the informal or hidden curriculum that persists in the university. These are some of the points that we hope to have gotten across in our paper. The practice of *currere* is a technique that we incorporate here. As Pinar and Grumet (1976) state, "We have gone just about as far as we can to in understanding the nature of education by focusing on the externals." They suggest that we begin a "lengthy, systematic search of our inner experience" and this is what we attempt here in this section of our paper.

The mentor has another function, and this is developmentally the most crucial one: to support and facilitate the realization of the dream. (Levinson, 1978, p. 98).

My dream has been constantly revitalized by my mentors. It has often seemed that I would never proceed along to complete my degree. I often felt that I would never be able to make a lasting contribution to mankind. My mentors helped me through these confusing times and I can always remember feeling better after I'd talked to them.

I would often dread to walk into Professor Alindo's office for fear that I would be chastised or blamed for some shortcomings in my character or my work. Yet this was never the case. I guess I've always had a guilty conscience, so I've always expected the worst in our encounters. Yet all I received was the best. Praise, reassurance, constructive criticism, encouragement, and hope came out of our meetings. Even as time wore on, and Professor Alindo became Dean of the College of Education, I still feared making an appointment and seeing him, though he still continued to revitalize my dream and continually made me feel better after I talked to him.

When Professor Alindo became Dean of our College of Education, he immediately became a target for student and faculty criticism. I am amazed that I can sit down next to several colleagues during a faculty meeting and afterwards all of us can have different perspectives about the way Dean Alindo conducted the meeting. Naturally, I always try to defend my mentor, and if something is extremely controversial, I try to rationalize it from his perspective. Many of my colleagues don't and they see him being authoritarian, dogmatic, and an uncaring human being. I've been somewhat disillusioned of my mentor by their criticisms, but I still disagree with most of my colleagues complaints about him. I think to myself, "If they only knew him the way I do."

It's hard to speak about a man whom I respect and pay homage to constantly, but the thing I'll always admire and remember about Professor Alindo is the fact that I have always felt better after talking to him. I think that is a remarkable accomplishment that very few of us can say about other people. In recent years we've drifted apart on some ideological perspectives. Yet none of this alters the fact that I'm pursuing my doctoral degree because of his interest and concern for me or that he still continues to make me feel good whenever we interact. Our interactions are less frequent now than in the past. He has settled down to become Dean and I have settled down and accepted a job in his old evaluation department.

Professor Javits is a very distinguished, famous educator at our university who has become one of my mentors. He has allowed me to publish several articles with him and he has spoken to me confidentially about several intricacies in the world of academia. He has also gone out of his way to introduce me to several other influential educators, and he too has been revitalizing my dream. However, I still seem somewhat fearful of our relationship. I suppose I ask myself the questions that Cottle (1977) poses in his book about the rewards and betrayals of college, that is: "How can I speak to a professor so much smarter than I am, so much more experienced about life than I am? How could so great a person possibly be interested in my life?" (p. 86).

To Castaneda, don Juan was a beloved teacher; don Genaro an awesome, frightening figure, a teacher whose knowledge is necessary but not easy to gain. Professor Javits reminds me of don Genaro. He lives in a world of power. He ignores the rituals of office life and has many secrets. He talks of the side of academic life which is often characterized as political. His advice is to seek out power figures and meet them. He reveals the ways of power as well as techniques of research. Many students are drawn to him because of these "tales of power" but I've found out that Professor Javits is also concerned about students as individuals. He has taken time to talk to me about my goals and aspirations and he helped me realize some of my strengths and weaknesses. The times I've spent with him have often been the most enjoyable and profitable times I've had in graduate school.

Mentor-student relationships and the institution of doctoral study presumably have an important impact on students, their method of inquiry, and the direction of their subsequent scholarship (Posner and Schubert, 1979, p. 2).

As Cottle (1977) so abruptly puts it, "enhancing young people's psychological development is not in line with the stated careers or scholarly concerns of most faculty members. ...While personal involvement with students is viewed as kindly, it is also seen as unproductive in terms of academic advancement and achievement" (pp. 31-32). Nevertheless, all faculty should have influence on the direction of students' learning. Unfortunately, this isn't always the case either.

At our university it is made quite clear to both faculty and students that promotions and tenure for professors are based on one thing, research. Fortunately, I've found that most productive professors are also the ones who are involved and concerned about their students. Teaching and research are of equal importance to them. The more effective professors share their current research, writings and thoughts with their classes, and they are open for criticism and feedback. Their doors also remain open most of the time, a symbolic indicator that they are available to talk, chat, or socialize with students. In contrast, the least effective professors are those who never seem to be around the university, especially when someone needs to speak to them.

Professor Padura usually has her door open. She is always around, always available, and always eager and interested to hear about what you have to say. She is constantly involved in many different projects, yet she always takes time out from her busy day to speak to any student who comes by. She is the exemplary college professor, concerned with research, teaching, students, the affairs of the University, and the role of education in society. All universities should have more professors like her, and I am grateful that she has taken an interest in my life.

I've been fortunate to have several mentors who have made significant contributions to different facets of my life. I shuttered when I wrote the word "significant," because in recent years it has only meant something which can be statistically calculated or determined from the values on a T or F table. Yet in recalling the last four or five years of my life, I consistently realize that it has been these individuals who have altered or enlightened my life. Professor Alindo has helped me throughout my enduring journey to reach my dream. Professor Javits has shown me some shortcuts and paths that will get me there quicker. Professor Padura has been the ideal role model which I've tried to pattern my career after. Professor Staigers crossed my path and showed me how to express my feelings and how to care for others. I've also encountered Professor Hansen along the way, and though he took me off course for a while by introducing some new points of view, I later found that this too helped me through me journey.

My journey is not complete yet, and now I find myself in the hands of other mentors too. As I get closer to completing my journey, receiving my degree, and leaving this university "home," I sense



that I will draw away from my mentors. As my sense of independence grows, so does my sense of wonder at the complex, intricate and profound influence which my mentors have exerted over me. As a potential, nascent academic, I wonder at the process and mechanism of mentorship.

This concludes our exploration of the outer and inner aspects of mentorship and faculty-student interactions. The scope of this paper is broad; its aim is ambitious. The subject under consideration is complex and important. Hopefully, the paper has helped organize the empirical and phenomenological features of mentorship in a way that can lead to further fruitful investigations of both the descriptive and the reflexive dimensions of this relationship.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adams, H. *THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1927.
- Bohm, D. "On insight and its significance for science, education and values." *TEACHERS COLLEGE BOARD*, 1979, 80(3).
- Bolton, C.D. & Kammeyer, K. *THE UNIVERSITY STUDENT: A STUDY IN STUDENT BEHAVIOR AND VALUES*. New Haven, Conn.: College and University Press, 1967.
- Bowers, C.A. *CULTURAL LITERACY FOR FREEDOM*. Eugene, Oregon: Elan Publishers, Inc., 1974.
- Broudy, H.S. "Tacit knowledge as a rationale for liberal education." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 1979, 80(3).
- Castaneda, Carlos. *TALES OF POWER*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974.
- Chickering, A. *EDUCATION AND IDENTITY*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1969.
- Chickering, A. "Student-faculty relationships: Bedrock for college governance." *FIFTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATION*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1966.
- Clark, B.R. "The College as determinant." In K. Yamamoto (Ed.) *THE COLLEGE STUDENT AND HIS CULTURE: AN ANALYSIS*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969, pp. 255-270.
- Cottle, T.J. *COLLEGE: REWARD AND BETRAYAL*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- Del Pizzo, V. *A STUDY OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF STUDENTS AND FACULTY ON STANDING CAMPUS COMMITTEES CONCERNING STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA AFFAIRS*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Missouri, 1971.
- Denton, D. *CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH*. Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, April 1979.
- Dilley, J. "Student-faculty non-communication." *JOURNAL OF COLLEGE STUDENT PERSONNEL*, 1965, 8, 315-317.
- Eddy, E. *THE COLLEGE INFLUENCE ON STUDENT CHARACTER*. Washington, D.C., American Council on Education, 1959.
- Eisner, E. "Humanistic trends and the curriculum field." *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM STUDIES*, 1978, 10(3).
- Feldman, K.A. & Newcomb, T.M. *THE IMPACT OF COLLEGE ON STUDENTS*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969.
- Fenskie, R. *SOURCES OF STUDENT SATISFACTION IN THE COLLEGE EXPERIENCE*. Paper presented at the Association for Institutional Research Annual Forum, New Orleans: June, 1970.
- Friere, P. *PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED*. New York: The Seabury Press, 1970.
- Gaff, J. *DANFORTH STUDY OF THE CAMPUS MINISTRY: A REPORT TO THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY*. University of the Pacific, Raymond College, 1965.
- Gardner, D. "Students' perceptions of certain university aspects." *IMPROVING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TEACHING*, 1969, 7, 196-198.
- Halleck, S.L. "Emotional problems of graduate students." In J. Katz & R.T. Hartnett (Eds.), *SCHOLARS IN THE MAKING*. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976.

- Harnett, R. T. & Katz, J. "The Education of graduate students." *JOURNAL OF HIGHER EDUCATION*, 1977, 48, 646-664.
- Heiss, A. M. *CHALLENGES TO GRADUATE SCHOOLS*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1970.
- Jacob, P.E. *CHANGING VALUES IN COLLEGES: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF IMPACT OF COLLEGE TEACHING*. New York: Harper, 1957.
- Katz, Jr. and Associates. *NO TIME FOR YOUTH: GROWTH AND CONSTRAINT IN COLLEGE STUDENTS*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1966.
- Kozol, J. *THE NIGHT IS DARK AND I AM FAR FROM HOME*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1975.
- King, S. *PERSONALITY STABILITY: EARLY FINDS OF THE HARVARD STUDENT STUDY*. Paper presented at the American College Personnel Association Conference, 1967.
- Lane, F. S. "Graduate student versus graduate student?" *IMPROVING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TEACHING*, 1976, 24, 186-187.
- Levinson, D. J. et al. *THE SEASONS OF A MAN'S LIFE*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
- Mattuck, R. *THE STUDENT AND HIS FACULTY*. Paper presented at the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, 1969.
- Monad, J. *CHANCE AND NECESSITY*. New York: Random House, 1972, p. 21.
- Pascarella, E. T. & Terenzini, P. T. "Informal interactions with faculty and freshman ratings of the academic and non-academic experience of college." *JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, 1976, 70, 35-41.
- Pascarella, E. T. & Terenzini, P. T. "Student-faculty informal relationships and freshman year outcomes." *JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, 1978, 71, 183-189.
- Pinar, W. and Grumet, M. *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1976.
- Posner, G. J. and Schubert, W. H. "Toward a geneology of curriculum scholars." Paper presented at American Educational Research Association meeting, San Francisco, 1979.
- Reskin, B. F. "Academic sponsorship and scientists careers." *SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION*, 1979, 52, 129-146.
- Sanford, N. *WHERE COLLEGES FAIL*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1977.
- Shapiro, E. C., F. P. Haseltine, & M. P. Rowe. "Moving up: role models, mentors and the patron systems." *SLOAN'S MANAGEMENT REVIEW*, 1978, 19, 51-58.
- Smith, H. "Excluded knowledge: a critique of the modern mind set." *TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD*, 1979, 80(3).
- Smith, P. C. "Faculty-student interaction and student learning." *IMPROVING COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY TEACHING*, 1976, 24, 27-30.
- Snyder, B. R. *THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
- Stake, R. "On seeing and measuring." *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM STUDIES*, 1978, 10, p. 265.
- Thielers, W. *THE STRUCTURE OF FAMILY INFLUENCE: A CASE STUDY OF THE INSTRUCTOR'S ROLE IN THREE KINDS OF CHANGE AMONG COLUMBIA COLLEGE STUDENTS*. New York: Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1966.
- Thistelthwaite, D. "Fields of study and development of motivation to seek advanced training." *JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY*, 1962, 53, 53-64.
- Van Manen, M. "Linking ways of knowing and being practical." *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, 1977, 6(3).
- Wilson, R., Wood L., & Goff, J. "Social-psychological accessibility and faculty-student interactions beyond the classroom." *SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION*, 1974, 47, 74-92.
- Wilson, R. C. et al. *COLLEGE PROFESSORS AND THEIR IMPACT ON STUDENTS*. New York: Wiley, 1976.
- Wood, L. & Wilson, R. "Teachers with impact." *THE RESEARCH REPORTER*, 1972, 7, 1-4.

## Social Action, Self Reflection, and Curriculum Theory: Part One

James R. Whitt  
Georgia State University

## I

Who are we?  
And why do we gather ... here?  
Within these walls  
Enclosed! ... Within!  
Into what cave have we crept?  
and what be our business?

Here!  
We gather!  
And peer into each others eyes,  
Listen to each others words,  
Contemplate each others thoughts,  
What demand brings us hence?

Do we desire that we may be fulfilled some lacking necessity?  
Are we incomplete?  
Do we gather that we may protect ourselves from some notion we do not comprehend?  
Do we cower from the thunder of some unknown?  
Or do we perhaps seek providence, the origin of all being which might free us from our self chosen cave?  
Do we seek the origin of our own nature?  
Do we seek enlightenment?

And as we gather ... here  
Within these walls ... within this cave,  
Do we look onward in the celebration of life?  
Or do we merely pick the bones of the dead and arrange them into a pattern that gives us the pretense of life  
and temporarily soothes the pain of some thunderous canker which rages within.

“Have I been heard?” Have I been heard?”

## II

The preceding is a poetic rendering of questions we might ask ourselves as we approach the topic of “self-reflection, social action, and curriculum theory.” The final line is a question that Friedrich Nietzsche asks his readers many times in various forms throughout his writing. ECCE HOMO: HOW ONE BECOMES WHAT ONE IS, is Nietzsche’s personal interpretation of his intellectual development, his works and their significance. It ends with the burning question which seems to haunt his soul: “Have I been understood?” “And above all,” he says elsewhere, “do not mistake me for someone I am not!” It is as though Nietzsche anticipates the storm which would follow his word; and it was a storm indeed, for who of Western man has had the courage to issue a more profound world than his famous “God is dead.” “I am the first immoralist,” he says. “Man is something that must be overcome.” The impact of these and other of his utterances have reverberated thunderously through the soul of Western man ever since. Nietzsche is thunder, and his Western brethren seem to have a relationship with thunder which they have tried, mostly in vain, to transcend. It is difficult, for it is a task (to quote the subtitle of Nietzsche’s THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA), “for all and none.”

## III

The eighteenth-century Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico, gives the following account of the origin of civilization. From *THE NEW SCIENCE* we read:

...for a long period of time the impious races of the three children of Noah, having lapsed into a state of bestiality, were wandering like wild beasts until they were scattered and dispersed through the great forest of the earth, and that with their bestial education giants had sprung up and existed among them at the times when the heavens thundered for the first time after the flood.<sup>1</sup> Thereupon a few giants, who must have been the most robust, and who were dispersed through the forest on the mountain heights where the strongest beasts have their dens, were frightened and astonished by the great effect whose cause they did not know, and raised their eyes and became aware of the sky. And because in such a case the nature of the human mind leads it to attribute its own nature to the effect, and because in that state their nature was that of men all robust bodily strength, who expressed their very violent passions by shouting and grumbling, they pictured the sky to themselves as a great animated body, which in that aspect they called Jove, the first god of the so-called greater gentes, who meant to tell them something by the hiss of his bolts and the clap of this thunder. And thus they began to exercise that natural curiosity which is the daughter of ignorance and the mother of knowledge, and which, opening the mind of man, gives birth to wonder.<sup>2</sup>

Thus it was fear which created gods in the world; not fear awakened in men by other men, but fear awakened in men by themselves.<sup>3</sup>

And hence came Jove's title of stayer or establisher. With this impulse the virtue of the spirit began likewise to show itself among them, restraining their bestial lust from finding its satisfaction in the sight of heaven, of which they had a mortal terror. So it came about that each of them would drag one woman into his cave and would keep her there in perpetual company for the duration of their lives.<sup>4</sup>

Norman O. Brown comments on the account of this genesis: "The origin of civilization, thunder; the origin of civilization, madness."<sup>5</sup>

## IV

What?

Am I born in fear and madness?

Am I but the product of some cowardly beast who runs into the dank darkness of his cave and quivers there as the thunder roars through the heavens?

Am I born in fear of that which is not known...

And is this unknown my own self?

Is this god which I see before me but the projection of my own fear?

Is this wonder which drives me incessantly onward but a flight from my own nature?

Am I but the offspring of ignorance?

Is not this knowledge which I sire that which is True?

Fear you say? Fear of myself?

Nay, I say and, nay, I repeat for I yield TRUTH.

I am the Father!

"Vico is thunder."<sup>6</sup> If we are to begin to understand the significance Vico holds for modern man we must see the meaning of his genesis of civilization in relation to the tradition of Western thought prior to his exegesis. Isaiah Berlin, in pointing to the origins of Vico's thought, tells us that there existed in Vico's time "the ancient metaphysical (and mystical) doctrine .. that in the beginning subject and object, man and nature, sensation and thought were one; then a great catastrophe divided them."<sup>7</sup> In the terms of Western religion we could say man lived in harmony with nature, himself, and his fellow man and then at some point was cast from the "garden" in which he lived. It is Plato's *SYMPOSIUM* which contains probably the earliest and most memorable version of this notion. Plato was then as today the most significant figure in the origins of modern Western thought.

Indeed Plato's entire philosophy and subsequently the Western intellectual tradition is established on this division.

For Plato the division of man's nature was between the rational and sensual aspects of his total psyche with the rational given the higher status. This superior rational aspect (that of the mind) is associated with the masculine while the lesser or subordinate nature, the sensual (that of the body) is aligned with the feminine.<sup>8</sup> This is congruent with Vico's account of the origin of the domination of woman by Man in the modern Western world.

Thus for Plato and the Western world, the rational aspect of the human psyche, that which is ascribed to mind is the dominant mode by which man views his world. The sensual aspect, that which is ascribed to the body, is of lesser importance and serves only the common man, women, and youth. In this respect the rational is viewed as possessing a regal nature and must be associated with soul, while the sensual is of a common nature and must be subordinated to the rational. The rational when properly exercised will yield eternal truths and promote the healing or integration of man's nature which the great catastrophe divided. For Plato it is only a few who are capable of this rational exercise and only these few (the philosophers) who are capable of leadership.

Returning now to Vico's interpretation of the origin of civilization, the thunder of which he speaks resounds with a deeper tone and meaning. The origin of civilization is also the origin of a schism in man which finds expression in Plato's division of the rational and sensual aspects of the human psyche. They served as complementary functions in the celebration of life.<sup>9</sup> This activity of life or the ongoing everyday existence was the primary concern of the early bestial creatures. The idea of an ideal life form as the result of intellectual exercise had not occurred to them. They were immersed in the ideal life. This immersion was similar to the immersion of fish in water. Fish become aware of water only when they are taken from it much the way man conceived of the ideal once he fell from harmony with his nature.

The great catastrophe! The lightning split the solitude of the forest and the thunder roared through the heavens. Man became afraid, uncertain, and wonder overtook him. In this state, like a small puppy who scares himself with his own bark, some of these bestial men cowered in the protection of their cave, hidden from the effect whose cause they did not know.

Thunder - fear - the origin of civilization, the origin of god, the origin of the family, the origin of the slavery of woman, the origin of the dominating intellect, the denial of the sensual. Man with his intellect as god becomes superior to woman. He demands her submission to his truth. The rational is superior to the sensual. Man is split. He is cast from the garden. No longer does he live unified in his nature for he has divorced his rational from his sensual. He is the divided soul, the incomplete man.

The origin of civilization, thunder. Vico is thunder. The origin of civilization, madness. Brown is thunder.

## VI

I am Incomplete?

I a divided being?

... and divided within myself?

How dare you say, for I yield truth.

I am the Father.

It is I the father, the eternally masculine which alone yields truth.

Enough of this sensuousness, the petty feminine character which serves only the lower man.

It is I alone which is capable of such great task as the ideal.

I am the Father!

## VII

The thunder of which Vico speaks splits the nature of most men. Upon hearing the reverberations from the unknown, they cower in their caves, fall upon their faces, and worship the pagan god of the intellect - Truth - that which is to calm the storm! In fear they remain in their caves behind the mask of civilization and live totally within the boundaries of that which is known. Each experiences the thunder as an act of death from which he runs - his own death! He subsequently calls it God, and thereupon creates an ideal image with his power of reason, which he substitutes for life. Yet, there are the few who upon hearing the thunder through their souls remain steadfast and listen to the message it brings. With courage, they stand face to face with this unknown.

In doing so each transcends the boundaries of the known and celebrates life with the thunder through his soul. He thereupon experiences the thunder as an act of creation and through this experience creates life forms which transcend those of the fear-driven many. He chooses life. He is life. The others choose death. They are death.

## VIII

Life? Death? What do you know if either?

You simple sensuous Bastards who do not even conceive of the ideal.

It is only the ideal which yields life for the true is life.

Enough of this feminine folly.

Enough of this laughter and petty surrendering to the sensuous. Can you not resist the temptation to fall into bestiality?

You will only achieve life by obedience to the ideal. God alone gives life.

You who cannot even conceive of the true the ideal. How do you even speak of life? And by what power of reason do you even utter the possibility that I live in death?

Truth is life I say. And only those capable of its quest may say they live.

I am the Father.

## IX

It is with Plato that Western thought places its origins; and with Plato's philosophy the division between the rational and the sensual is stamped enduringly onto the soul of Western man. He cannot easily escape this division because the split character of his psyche is but one aspect of a total reality which includes all of the social institutions by which he relates to the world. These institutions are both a product and a cause of an over-rational nature. They demand that one live through ideal images rather than relating to the world with one's whole being. In a sense this interrelated psychic and institutional nature is cancerous, yet this goes unnoticed. In fact, it is so obscured that the schism is expected to be healed or reintegrated by the very structure which initially produced the severed condition. Absurd as it may seem, Western man continually attempts to emancipate himself by using the very chains that bind him. He continues to place greater relevance on the intellect as an emancipatory agent and in the process manages to create ever wider and deeper dualities.

At some point a cancerous growth destroys the very body it inhabits and in doing so consumes its own being. This is also the case of Western thought and thus Western man. The philosophy of Hegel provided the thunderous blow which finally undermined the intellectual tradition initiated by Plato: what reality is ultimately rational and that knowledge of this rational nature yields truth. Hegel's philosophy is "considered to mark the highest point yet reached by the ancient intellectual endeavor to comprehend the world in rational terms."<sup>10</sup> Yet at this zenith Hegel was led to the conclusion that the quest for Truth yields untruth. The golden cult of rationality collapses in an ash heap of contradiction. The rational mind in Hegel's terms is "unhappy consciousness."<sup>11</sup> Rationality, the fig leaf behind which Western man had hidden, was stripped from him. He stood naked against the storm and once again was confronted with a thunderbolt. This time, however, he could not cower in the cave of rationality for it had failed him. More seriously, the sensual which he had so long ago forsaken, had left him. He truly stood naked and alone before the world. He was once again face to face with the thunder -- and God was dead.

## X

Dead? How can this be?

Truth was my salvation!

How can I face this thunder?

How do I live with this ghost within that haunts my soul?

My God! My God!

Why hast thou forsaken me?

## XI

Perhaps it will come as no surprise to hear that the author of the portions I have just read, shortly after having

written it, slipped over the edge and collapsed into a state of total insanity. For several days he raged screaming of such insane figures as hidden ghost, satyrs that consumed his soul from within, and she devils that flogged him mercilessly. Spiders, he claimed, crawled through his ears, in one side and out the other as there was no longer anything to block their passage. When he looked at other people they suddenly broke in two, split down the middle. He found his only comfort in the park near his residence where he roamed talking to the trees. He shared his meals with the pigeons which inhabit the park, and the stray dogs that come there looking for an easy snack and a pat on the head. Neither the pigeons nor the dogs fell to pieces at his gaze.

If this were not convincing enough as to the onset of insanity, the following letter which he mailed to his major professor at a nearby university where he was a candidate for a graduate degree will leave no doubt:

Dear Dr. Somebody:

My name is everybody. I had a party last night and Jean-Paul Sartre was there. We barbequed several copies of BEING AND NOTHINGNESS. I thought it would be a delicious meal, and it seemed to be, but shortly after having eaten I felt an instant attack of nausea and regurgitated the vile mess over everyone. No one escaped the powerful gastric spray. Indeed everyone was covered head to toe with puke. It presented no particular problem, however, for it was in the form of ash, so we simply brushed it from our naked bodies and swept it into a pile in the middle of the floor. We sat around the ash heap and looked across it into each others eyes and slowly, one by one, disappeared.

Today I am well, and that being the case I no longer have need of the degree toward which I am working. Please give it to Jean-Paul, or perhaps Jurgen Habermas, or anyone else who might need it. I went to the foodstore this morning; me and Zarathustra<sup>12</sup> are leaving town.

Sincerely,  
Nobody

## XII

If there is doubt (and indeed there may be) as to the connection between this student's experience and the area of curriculum theorizing, we might well recall our initial question: Who are we? We cannot authentically inquire to individual human emancipation or democratic society unless we simultaneously ask ourselves this question. This self reflection involves a la Vico a science of origins. As our friend discovered (and probably that which resulted in his "insanity"), the examination of origins may lead one away from traditionally-accepted modes of thought. In this case, the discovery undermined the rational structures by which the psyche is in-the-world. The result is doubt and intellectual despair. This is the case of Western man.

The Western intellectual tradition beginning with Plato and culminating with Hegel is a history of divisions within the psyche each of which is a diminution of the total possibilities open to man. It is the incapacity of the rational to achieve re-integration of the variously severed psyche which results in Hegel's unhappy consciousness. To seek ultimate Being through the intellect and rational forms is futile and leads to illusion. This is because that which we seek lies beyond the comprehension of the rational and is thus not subject to intellectual demands. The call from this state of being is more than the words of rational language. Hence, this call lies hidden in our words awaiting the ears which will hear it. Paul Ricoeur refers to this call as the mytho-poetic function of language. "What carries this mytho-poetic function," he tells us, "is another power of language, a power that is no longer the demand of desire, demand for protection, demand for providence, but a call in which I leave off all demands and listen."<sup>13</sup> The continued reliance on the rational can but muffle and distort this other power which is the call of integration. It was in the light of this understanding that the project of Nietzsche became to re-unite the rational with the poetic or sensual through self-reflection.<sup>14</sup>

Nietzsche's work is a major foundation of modern existentialism. Nearly all of the existentialists pay their respects to him. Franz Kafka, Albert Camus, and Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, all develop characters in their writing which portray and further expose the existential despair of Western man which was earlier disclosed by Nietzsche. Joseph K. of THE TRIAL,<sup>15</sup> the unnamed protagonist of THE STRANGER,<sup>16</sup> and Mathieu Delarue of THE AGE OF REASON<sup>17</sup> are all overrational with virtually no component of a sensual nature. They direct their life projects by the intellect alone. They are spectre-like characters which represent a form of death rather than of life.

Fortunately, this was not the case for our friend. He was not consumed by total rationality as are the characters in the previously-mentioned works. The poetic or sensual element of his psyche was still somewhat intact as evidenced by the haunting screams of his poetry at the death of the intellect - the rational Father of Western man. His condition was more akin to that portrayed by Hermann Hesse's STEPPENWOLF,<sup>18</sup> the man so caught between the rational and sensual aspects of his psyche that he can but vacillate between the two, totally comfortable in neither and unable to achieve integration. There are lines in a current Neil Diamond song which express the condition well: "Not hearing the lie, not seeing the true, Not knowing what is and denying what seems, And there he will sleep, the man in between."<sup>19</sup>

Hesse's Harry Haller is in a more positive position for liberation than are the characters of Kafka, Camus, or Sartre as he possesses obvious components of a sensual nature which indicate that integration is possible. He had not been so conditioned by an over-rational social order as to totally destroy the sensual base or "body" of his being. The Steppenwolf managed to survive the holocaust which is the destruction of the rational thought structures, but this was not possible without a total re-evaluation and reconstruction of values, another of Nietzsche's projects.

STEPPENWOLF was banned in Nazi Germany. Within twenty years of its publication the entire continent of Europe lay in ashes. Perhaps we could say that what occurred on a large public scale was but a collective private condition.<sup>20</sup> From my perspective, it is the struggle with and the transcendence of this "in-between" which should be the focus of curriculum theorizing and other related social and educational movements which profess human emancipation as their major thrust. The struggle with is the self-reflective. The transcendence of and the new life forms which result from human interaction beyond this transcendence is social action. It is only a dialectic of the two that will allow the emergence of a theory and practice of curriculum that is truly liberating and that leads toward the development of democratic life forms.

### XIII

I visited with my friend recently. He has moved from the city to a place in the country where he is growing all his own food. "I cut out the grocery store," he said, "they're boring places and besides corporate food is terrible." He seemed quite well. He had a settled look in his eye. It was deep, as though it disappeared into his soul somewhere. He said he still had an occasional battle when some strange new devil would sneak up from the unknown and attack him from the rear. "It is a difficult struggle," he said, "but then it's better to live in struggle than not live at all, and beside if one never struggles - one never frees oneself." From the look in his eye I could tell he knew what he was talking about.

We talked of what we were into. I told him I was preparing a paper to read at a conference sponsored by THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING. He asked me what curriculum theorizing was and I tried for at least thirty minutes to explain the focus of the group. When I finally finished, it somehow felt awfully inadequate. I felt a little confused about it until I sat in on the Editorial Board meeting. I found I was not alone.

The prime activity in his life right now is keeping watch over several marijuana plants he has been nursing since spring. It was near harvest time and like any other crop knowing exactly when to take the yield is of prime importance. I asked him how he would know when it was ready and his reply was that it was just something you had to feel. "I'm striking a blow against the mafia," he said, "I'm growing my own." They say you can grow better smoke than the stuff they smuggle in." We snipped a few buds, dried them in the oven, and sampled them. He was right. "It's near time," he said, "I'll watch them close."

I still had work to do on my paper so I took my leave. He walked with me out onto the front lawn. A late evening thunder storm was sounding somewhere off in the distance. He suddenly stopped. "Habermas never made it," he said. "What?" I asked. "Habermas never got free. He talked of emancipation but hasn't made it yet. He's still afraid." "What are you saying?" I asked. "Well, he has the map - and a good one indeed - but he hasn't made the journey," he replied. "How do you know?" I asked again almost fearing his reply. "He misinterpreted Nietzsche,"<sup>21</sup> he said flatly. "Nietzsche made the journey but the result scared Habermas - and Nietzsche got lost somewhere along the road. He went crazy in the end, hugging a horse in the street. If he had really gotten free he would have had a healthier life and lived to a ripe old age. He was right about the poets though - they are the real creators. Emancipation lies in the poetry of a life well lived. We each have to



sing our own song.”

These words were a little unsettling. We spoke our good-byes and as I walked on down the path the thunder sounded again in the distance. I knew I was going to have trouble writing the paper. Somehow I got the feeling that perhaps it was he who should be going to the conference and I should be watching the marijuana plants.

#### Notes

1. Giambattista Vico. *THE NEW SCIENCE*, translated by Max H. Fisch and Thomas Bergin (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), 1960, p. 195.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 382.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 504.
5. Norman O. Brown. *CLOSING TIME* (New York: Random House), 1974, p. 71.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
7. Isaiah Berlin. *VICO AND HERDER* (New York: Random House), 1977, p. 71.
8. Plato. *SYMPOSIUM*, from *THE WORKS OF PLATO*, ed. Irwin Edman (New York: Random House), 1928, p. 344. The dialogue concerns two types of love, heavenly and common love, and it is quite clear where each is assigned. “The Love who is the offspring of the common Aphrodite is essentially common, and has no discrimination, being such as the meaner sort of men feel, and is apt to be of women as well as youths, and is of the body rather than the soul - But the offspring of the heavenly Aphrodite is derived from a mother in whose birth the female has no part, - She is from the male only; Those who are inspired by this love turn to the male, and delight in him who is the more valiant and intelligent nature.”
9. We might say that man lived in a state of “Love.” In religious terms, to be at peace with one’s self and with nature is to experience a state of God or Love. Returning to the *SYMPOSIUM* we find the dialogue which inspired the divided nature of love alluded to before. Phaedrus here speaks of one love. He quotes Hesiod: “First Chaos came, and then broad-bosomed earth, The everlasting seat of all that is, and Love.” *Ibid.*, p.341. Phaedrus then speaks of this Love: “For the principle which ought to be the guide of men who would live nobly live - that principle, I say, neither kindred, nor honour, nor wealth, nor any other motive is able to implant so well as love ... And if there were only some way of contriving that a State or any army should be made up of lovers and their loves, they would be the very best governors of their own city, ... And when fighting at each other’s side, although a mere handful, they would overcome the world - love alone; and women as well as men.” *Ibid.*, pp. 341-342.  
The love of which Phaedrus speaks is quite different from the division which follows between “heavenly” masculine love and “common” feminine love. It is unfortunate that it is this latter “split” love upon which the foundations of Western man rest.
10. Georg Hegel. *THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND* (New York: Harper and Row), 1967, p. xv.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
12. Zarathustra is the name Nietzsche gives to the mythical character of his most famous work. It is Zarathustra who provides the model for his “overman” - the man who overcomes himself. We can trace Nietzsche’s intellectual development through the works leading to the conception of Zarathustra. From Nietzsche, *ECCE HOMO* translated by Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House), 1969, we can read Nietzsche’s own words concerning his works: “Human, All-Too-Human is the monument of a crisis. ‘A book for Free Spirits’: here I liberated myself from what in my nature did not belong to me.”  
“Idealism, for example; ... where you see ideal things, I see what is - human, alas, all-too-human!”  
“The term ‘free spirit’ here is not to be understood in any other sense; it means a spirit that has become free, that has again taken possession of itself.” p.283  
These lines suggest a struggle (a dark night of the soul) to free oneself from social authority. Of his next work *DAWN: Thoughts About Morality as a Prejudice* (even the title suggests something new) Nietzsche says: “When seriousness is deflected from the self-preservation and the enhancement of the strength of the

strength of the body - that is, of life - when anemia is construed as an ideal, and contempt for the body as 'salvation of the soul' - what else is this if not a recipe for decadence? The loss of the center of gravity, resistance to the natural instincts - in one word, 'selflessness' - that is what was hitherto called morality. -With the DAWN I first took up the fight against the morality that would unself man." p. 292

"The DAWN was a Yes-Saying book, deep but bright and gracious. The same is true also and in the highest degree of the GRAY SCIENCE; in almost every sentence profundity and high spirits go tenderly hand in hand.

with a flaming spear you parted  
All its ice until my soul  
Hurries roaring toward the ocean  
Of its highest hope and goal: ...

What is here called "highest hope" - who could have any doubt about that when he sees the diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra ... Or when ... he reads the granite words in which a destiny finds for the first time a formula for itself, for all time? p. 293.

Of THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, Nietzsche says: "Perhaps the whole of Zarathustra may be reckoned as music; ... the idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable. p. 295. -Zarathustra has mastered the great nausea over man too: man is for him an un-form, a material an ugly stone that needs a sculptor. p.309 O men, in the stone an image is sleeping, the image of images! Alas, that it has to sleep in the hardest, ugliest stone! Now my hammer rages cruelly against its prison. Pieces of rock rain from the stone: What is that to me? I want to perfect it; for a shadow came to me - the stillest and lightest of all things once came to me. The beauty of the overman came to me as a shadow. O my brothers, what are gods to me now? 'Zarathustra II' On the Blissful Islands." It is Zarathustra who lives beyond the models of man provided by what Nietzsche saw as a decaying social order.

13. Paul Ricoeur. FREUD AND PHILOSOPHY: AN ESSAY ON INTERPRETATION, (New Haven: Yale University Press), 1970, p. 551.
14. Jurgen Habermas makes this point. In KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS, (Boston: Beacon Press), 1971, he says: "Nietzsche is one of the few contemporaries who combines a sense for the import of methodological investigations with the ability to move light-footedly in the dimension of self-reflection." p. 189. Nietzsche's own words reflect this; again from ECCE HOMO: "I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of something tremendous - a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of conscience ... Revaluation of all values: that is my formula for an act of supreme self-examination on the part of humanity, become flesh and genius in me." p. 326. Concerning self-reflection, Freud said of Nietzsche: "He had a more penetrating knowledge of himself than any other man who ever lived or was ever likely to live." Ernest Jones, THE LIFE AND WORK OF SIGMUND FREUD, Volume I (New York: Basic Books, 1953), p. 344, quoted by Walter Kaufmann, Editor's Introduction, ECCE HOMO, p. 203.
15. Franz Kafka. THE TRIAL (New York: Random House), 1969. Here the character Joseph K. is arrested, convicted, and executed on charges of which he is never made aware. "The only thing for me to go on doing" he says as the executioners lead him to his destiny, "is to keep my intelligence calm and analytical to the end." p. 282.
16. Albert Camus. THE STRANGER (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), 1946. Camus' novel portrays a man who confronts several life situations (i.e., the death of his mother, a proposal of marriage by his girlfriend, the act of murder for which he is arrested, tried, and convicted) in purely rational terms. He speaks here of the priest "Father" who had come to be with him before his execution. He might well have been speaking to himself. "He seemed so cocksure, you see. And yet none of his certainties was worth one strand of a woman's hair. Living as he did, like a corpse, he couldn't even be sure of being alive." p. 151.
17. Jean-Paul Sartre. THE AGE OF REASON (London: Hamish Hamilton), 1947. Sartre's portrayal of an over-rational nature is excellent. The main character is a college professor who by his power of reason tries to maintain his "freedom" throughout a series of life situations. His final thought: "I remain alone.

Alone but not freer than before ... No one has interfered with my freedom; my life has drained it dry. A lot of fuss for nothing. ... For nothing: This life had been given him for nothing, he was nothing and yet he would not change: he was as he was made. . . It's true, it's absolutely true: I have attained the age of reason." pp. 359-360.

18. Hermann Hesse. STEPPENWOLF (New York: Bantam Books), 1969. Harry Haller is Hesse's portrayal of the condition of Western Man. It is, however, not as negative and despairing a situation as presented by some other writers. Hesse tells us in the introduction ... "that the story of the Steppenwolf pictures a disease and a crisis -- but not one leading to death and destruction, on the contrary: to healing." p.viii. In some of his other works Hesse creates characters and conditions which lead toward a transcendence or healing of this dual nature. See for example DEMIAN (New York: Bantam Books), 1965, and SID-DARTHA (New York: Bantam Books), 1951.
19. Neil Diamond. "Lady Magdelene," from the album SERENADE (New York: Columbia Records), 1974. The music of Neil Diamond is a contemporary expression of what we could call a self-reflective journey through the mythical and thus poetic archetypes of individual being. It is a journey through music to the origins of personal consciousness and reflects the experiences of the writer as he makes his journey. In this sense it is akin to the trials and encounters of Zarathustra. There are other contemporary expression of this experience. See, for example, the poetry and music of Leonard Cohen. In literary form see Robert M. Persig. ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE (New York: William Morrow and Co.), 1974. The works of Tom Robbins: ANOTHER ROADSIDE ATTRACTION (New York: Ballantine Books), 1971, and EVEN COWGIRLS GET THE BLUES (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 1976, are of this nature. Robbins, however, goes beyond the totally reflective mode of Persig's book. His characters portray life styles which transcend many of the dualism and boundaries of the current overrational masculine social order. In this sense his work is viewed as feminist literature.
20. When man becomes split, confusion abounds. The confusion is the result of a dualizing consciousness in which what one knows is contradictory to what one feels. As we have shown, this is the condition of the Western intellectual tradition. In this confused state man will cling to most any idea which seems to reduce the confusion. In this way the German people clung to the idea of a supreme nature while in fact they had already been reduced to cultural nothingness by their fear. Nietzsche witnessed the development of this condition and was perhaps one of the first who was able to articulate it. From ECCE HOMO: "The Germans are incapable of any notion of greatness." p. 245. "We who were children in the swamp air of the fifties are of necessity pessimists concerning the concept 'German;' we simply cannot be anything but revolutionaries -- we shall not come to terms with any state of affairs in which the bigot is at the top." p. 247. "As far as Germany extends, she corrupts culture." p. 248. One of Nietzsche's best statements of this is from ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (New York: Random House), 1969. "For this is how things are: the diminution and leveling of European man constitutes our greatest danger, for the sight of him makes us weary. --We can see nothing today that wants to grow greater, we suspect that things will continue to go down, down, to become thinner, more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent, more Chinese, more Christian -- There is no doubt that man is getting 'better' all the time. Here precisely is what has become a fatality for Europe -- together with the fear of man we have also lost our love of him, our reverence for him, our hopes for him, even our will to him. The sight of man now makes us weary -- what is nihilism today if it is not that? -- We are weary of man." p. 44. In this sense Nietzsche's words were "thunder" to the "herd" of Germany. In fear they ran from the mirror held before them and gathered around Hitler and the myth of Aryan supremacy in a collective denial of their true nature -- that of fearful men. They sang the same song, no doubt, that Vico's earlier man sang as he ran into the cave. It is this condition of which Nietzsche speaks that is the struggle of the Steppen wolf. His effort is to transcend the dual psychic condition which is the heritage of Western man.
21. For further elaboration of this point see Walter Kaufman, NIETZSCHE (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1974, p. 452. It is interesting to note that Habermas in KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS makes almost total use of Nietzsche's THE WILL TO POWER. This work was posthumously edited by the author's sister who married an anti-semitic. It is primarily this work from which the Nazi movement drew their parallels with Nietzsche.

## Self Reflection, Social Action, and Curriculum Theory: Part Two

Michael S. Littleford  
Auburn University

Recently in the movement of social and educational thought there has been some increasing recognition for the need of a concept of self reflection to be included within our paradigms of inquiry and learning. In the area of curriculum theorizing the work of William Pinar and a few others expresses this trend of thought.<sup>1</sup> As yet, however, the trend is not only relatively weak, but wherever it has emerged it has been the recipient of considerable criticism. The attacks have labeled the proposed emphasis upon self knowledge variously as escapist, narcissistic, socially irresponsible, and even inauthentic.<sup>2</sup>

Such criticism, if it is not merely an apology for the status quo, implicitly or explicitly, posits a duality between social action -- the creation, maintenance, and reconstruction of culture -- and the psycho-social growth of the individual. The ideas developed in this paper are meant to challenge such criticism. I begin with the notion that social action and self reflection are two sides of the same reality. Their connection may be compared with the Kantian relationship of concepts and percepts in knowing: social actions without self reflections are blind and irresponsible; self reflections without corresponding and congruent social actions are meaningless and alienating. Man is a being who makes himself or creates his own nature as he makes his human world. There is no true understanding of the social world (i.e. no critical social science) without self reflection, and vice versa.<sup>3</sup>

If the notion of self reflection is not to die an untimely death succumbing to the attacks of defensive persons, or to become another water downed fad or slogan in the educational enterprise, the full implications of its complementary relationship to social action must be made explicit. This task includes bringing to light the current cultural conditions in which we do our reflection-action and the nature, risks, and meaning of a commitment to self knowledge within these particular conditions.

The necessity of this task can be clearly seen when one considers that "self knowledge" is much valued by Platonic philosophy and related trends of thought; yet the form of this knowledge is and has been degenerate due to the failure to recognize the thoroughly arrested cultural conditions in which such reflection has occurred and to identify and face the risks necessary to carry the movement of thought and action beyond these conditions. Habermas is right to the point when he links the power of self reflection to the movement of humans toward autonomy and responsibility, but also recognizes that the social conditions working against this movement have been mystified and ignored. An adequately emancipated society has been taken for granted:

The ontological illusion of pure theory behind which knowledge-constitutive interests become invisible promotes the illusion that Socratic dialogue is possible everywhere and at any time. From the beginning philosophy has presumed that the autonomy and responsibility posited within the structure of language are not only anticipated but real. It is pure theory wanting to derive everything from itself that succumbs to unacknowledged external conditions and becomes ideological.<sup>4</sup>

Hence, there is a grave danger that word consciousness will substitute for true consciousness -- that we may arrive at splendid verbal synthesis, write books, and give speeches concerning the virtues of self reflection but fail to contribute to human autonomy, responsibility, and I add, wholeness -- fail to contribute to healing the splits within ourselves and our cultural milieu. Habermas suggests a means to get beyond mere word consciousness when he asserts that:

Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical course of history the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently close off the path of unconstrained communication does it further the process whose suspension it otherwise legitimates: mankind's evolution toward autonomy and responsibility. My fifth thesis is thus that the unity of knowledge and interest proves itself in a dialectic that takes the historical traces of suppressed dialogue and reconstructs what has been suppressed.<sup>5</sup>

What Habermas is suggesting for philosophy is an activity we might designate as "cultural psychoanalysis." This process requires a perspective that transcends and incorporates every specific discipline and every form of

human thought, and parallels the movement of self reflection on the part of the individual. It seems to me that something like this consciously incorporated within the activity of curriculum theorizing would be a first and major step in establishing a clear understanding of the relationship between self reflection and social action. I am talking about an examination of the movement of human thought in the most inclusive sense -- at the level of symbolic form, world view, prevailing metaphors, collective habit, and corresponding institutional structure and activity -- one which both explains the current barbaric and arrested state of human culture and which extends and develops the vision of healthy, autonomous, and whole human beings and community which runs as a minority strain throughout much of human history.<sup>6</sup>

Since the activities of cultural psychoanalysis and self reflection are complementary processes, the former must begin with the origins of the human social world just as the latter must begin with the origins of the individual world, and trace the movement of thought, the underlife of our everyday usually taken for granted human world, to the present. What follows is a brief illustration of the suggested activity.

Our analysis begins when man emerged or when beings began to think humanly; that is, when the creative symbolic powers began to be expressed or when the first metaphors were produced. The initial focus is upon the interaction of the poetic, pre-reflective, imaginative powers of the human psyche with the world -- that which has collectively and individually been suppressed by reason.

The most inclusive treatment of origins of which I am aware is *THE NEW SCIENCE* written by Giambattista Vico in the eighteenth century. For Vico humanity and the human world began with an act of the corporal imagination which produced the first metaphors -- poetic characters or imaginative universals in the form of gods.<sup>7</sup> Vico's interpretation of this process of creation suggests (and he is supported in this by several more contemporary thinkers, e.g., Freud, Nietzsche, Norman O. Brown<sup>8</sup>) that the human world, culture as we know it, originated in fear and trauma. The occasions for the poetic creations were natural events such as a powerful thunderstorm, which engendered great fear in man. Early men ... "pictured the sky to themselves as a great animated body, which in that respect they called Jove, and the first god of the greater gentes, who meant to tell them something by the hiss of his bolts and the clap of his thunder."<sup>9</sup> And the message was restrain yourselves, inhibit yourselves, split yourselves: "That frightful thought of some divinity which imposed form and measure on the bestial passions of those first men and thus transformed them into human passions."<sup>10</sup> ... Thus, it was fear which created gods in the world."<sup>11</sup>

Moreover, the "inner" split was accompanied by an "outer" split between self and others for access to Jove's auspices were claimed by a few and used as the justification to subdue, dominate, and exploit the labor of others: "The heroes or masters by a certain nature of theirs which they believed to be of divine origin, were led to say that the gods belonged to them, and consequently that the auspices of the gods were theirs also. By means of the auspices they kept within their own orders all the public and private institutions of the heroic cities."<sup>12</sup>

Vico's position and that of the other thinkers mentioned suggest further that: 1) not only did culture originate in fear, but that it has been primarily sustained by fear ever since; 2) this fear has been accompanied by an ever widening and deepening sequence of splits or dualism within and among men; and 3) this duality has expressed itself in diverse ways in the social world especially in forms, categories, and structures which suppressed and denied human autonomy, health, and wholeness and sanctified dominance-submission relations.

As suggested, the emergence of civilization brought a more serious duality. Man's fear was less projected into and acted out through nature and increasingly more denied and repressed. With the birth of Euclidean geometry and Platonic - Aristotelian thought, human existence was separated into the realms of being and becoming with the latter subordinate in every way to the former. That which is ultimately real and important is spiritual, abstract, unchanging, and assessable only through pure reason or contemplation -- a realm of invisible, but eternal and ideal forms or which phenomena in the lower realm, our world of lived bodily experiences, the concrete, the sensuous, are inferior and temporary copies.

Hence, Western civilization in the so-called advanced form originated in a psycho-social condition in which the dominant strain was suppression and degradation of the body, the organic and earthy qualities of life. Learning and knowing were defined as processes which elevate spirit over matter. Hence, the first requirement for a "liberal education" was and is: restrain and control yourself, split yourself and become schizoid, lie to yourself about yourself and your real desires. Moreover, this mode of thought justified and continues to underly justifi-

cations of the exploitation of the many by the few.

With the Copernican-Newtonian revolution and the emergence of modern science, the duality is once more widened and deepened. Mind, which in Greek thought, includes speculative and ethical reasoning as well as calculative, analytical thought, and is intrinsically related to the cosmos as microcosm to macrocosm, is now defined as a separate and independent realm excluding all but the calculating intellect. Nature, the other realm, is a gigantic machine which includes our bodies. The message this time is: the poetic, non-rational, imaginative, sensuous parts of ourselves that early man projected into nature and the Platonists attempted to tame and transcend, no longer exist. Hence, we have complete denial, the ultimate in the degradation and reduction of the sensuous and organic aspects of our being. Now the natural order, including our bodies, is something to be aggressively used and controlled for any purpose. This is diminished consciousness and duality in the extreme -- Black's "single vision and Newton's sleep."<sup>13</sup>

This then is the primary "stuff" from which both our major social institutions and our psyches have been formed. Each is riddled by a deep and profound split between the non-rational, pre-reflective, and immediate aspects of our experiences and those dimensions which are rational, cognitive, and mediated. If anything close to this analysis is accepted, a near universal neurosis and state of arrest among humans and their social practices must be posited. A commitment to self reflection and social action is a necessity for anyone who cares about freeing human growth and life.<sup>14</sup> Our curriculum theorizing activities thus need to recognize this condition and to make explicit the nature and meaning of such a commitment for educators.

First and obviously this commitment means that we must be willing to take new perspectives concerning oppression. For example, we must see the social structures which shrink and oppress the human spirit in ourselves as well as in others and in social institutions. When one pursues self reflection and cultural psychoanalysis to the point where he actually encounters and experiences the splits and structures in himself, he also experiences the truth of Hegel's analysis,<sup>15</sup> extended and concretized by Friere,<sup>16</sup> that oppressed and oppressor, master and slave are two sides of the same reality or two aspects of the same consciousness. If you allow yourself to be oppressed by others, you will oppress others given certain conditions, and vice versa.

This perspective makes oppression a more complex issue. True emancipation requires a movement of consciousness which transcends both poles and negative reaction formations. This idea will be more fully elaborated further on. Moreover, this means also that to eliminate the more obvious forms of oppression, such as those based on categorical groups,<sup>17</sup> e.g., socio-economic class, race, sex, sexual orientation, does not necessarily bring a democratic and humane community. It may simply mean that all previously distinguished categories have an equal right to engage in oppressive relations. In particular, technocratic-bureaucratic rationality is increasingly indifferent to all categorical groupings and enlists a variety of dull-minded people (men and women, black and white, gay and straight) to aid in the newer forms of oppression.<sup>18</sup>

The social order is constantly created by all of us all of the time, not just in a political demonstration, working for a particular liberation movement, or doing a Marxian analysis for a journal or conference. Whether or not we repeat arrested and reified patterns or act upon and transform these reifications depends upon who we are in our totality not merely who we claim to be at the level of verbal, intellectual analysis. That is, it depends upon how we live in our bodies and express our totality in body language, the immediate and pre-cognitive ways that we relate to the world and that account for the nature of our presence in the world. It is this level of our existence that is touched by the activities of self reflection and cultural psychoanalysis; and it is at this level that the transformation required for true emancipation must occur. To touch and transform the pre-cognitive means to live ... to be present in a different way. It means to transcend the habitual and conditioned patterns in our own daily living.

If this type of transformation is not the basis of an educator's social action, he merely creates confusion. If socio-political criticism is not accompanied by expanding consciousness and actual transcendence of conditioning, there is a split between our verbalizing and our action, our theory and our practice. Our presence denies our words. Regardless of conscious intent we communicate who we are.<sup>19</sup> In such cases our criticism may be literally true yet ring false. It is all projection. We criticize the university, for example, for dishonest and/or oppressive and controlling practices, yet in our own way relate in a similar fashion to our child, lover, or spouse.

This brings us back once more to the fallaciousness of those dualistic analyses that postulate wholesale changes in "social structure" as prior to and causative of changes in psychic structure. Let us now examine one such analysis from the standpoint of a commitment to self reflection and social action. My example comes from S. Firestone's, *DIALECTICS OF SEX: THE CASE FOR A FEMINIST REVOLUTION*. In many respects this is a fine piece of feminist literature, yet it is flawed by the tragic split. To quote Firestone:

It is unrealistic to impose theories of what ought to be on a psyche already organized around specific emotional needs. And that is why individual attempts to eliminate sexual possessiveness are now always unauthentic. We would do better to concentrate on overthrowing the social structures that have produced this psychical organization, allowing for the eventual -- if not in our lifetime -- fundamental restructuring (or should I say de-structuring) of our psychosexuality.<sup>20</sup>

The overall effect of social criticism like Firestone's is to perpetuate our failure to face and transcend our fears of ourself, to postpone a much-needed transformation that could possibly be now, and to encourage social actions that are partially unconscious. She is saying for all of us that we cannot heal the splits, that we must continue to fail to free ourselves from oppressive consciousness, and hence, continue to fail to live. Her dual stance thoroughly denies the efficacy of self reflection and leaves it quite unclear as to how we can effectively attack and loosen social structures without at the same time loosening psychic structures.

Once more my position is that a separation of the two is illusory. Both occur together or not at all. Taking Firestone's example from a non-dualistic perspective, eliminating sexual possessiveness is one of the first things one must do to even begin the emancipation process. The inability to confront sexual or any form of interpersonal possessiveness is a good indication that one is still seriously split and capable of oppression. A person who fails to transcend interpersonal possessiveness and clings to institutional patterns (e.g., legalistic-monogamous marriage) which protects her or him from authentically confronting her or his fears has little business participating in socio-political movements designed to transcend the current cultural scenes. It is this that is really inauthentic. First, he or she is foolishly tinkering with his or her own sanity; second, he or she creates confusion with others -- what does one really care if the parent, lover, or friend who attempts to possess and control one is a Marxist, feminist, or avid proponent of gay rights? Third, to the extent that sexual or any form of possessive consciousness controls her or his being, to that extent she or he weakens and contributes to the partial reform of a still basically oppressive and inhumane world.

We are in dire need of social criticism and commentary which transcend the said duality and contribute toward developing the vision of whole and autonomous humans capable of creating and participating in a non-pathological, non-authoritarian human community. If we return to our cultural psychoanalysis we discover that we have a surprising variety of materials to work with. Along side the mainstream of human thought, there have been in the minority stream several such visions and some actual instances of human wholeness and health. The first to grasp this and those most frequently capable of living it have been religious mystics and artists, but it is implicit in other forms of human knowledge and life as well. The listing of a few examples should suffice at this point: 1) the religious writings of Jacob Boehme<sup>21</sup> 2) the poetry of William Blake<sup>22</sup> 3) the poetry and prose of Walt Whitman<sup>23</sup> 4) Shakespeare's sonnets<sup>24</sup> 5) the life style and creative works of the Bloomsbury group<sup>25</sup> 6) some of modern social and economic thought -- Nietzsche, Whitehead, Dewey, Ruskin, et.al.<sup>26</sup> 7) some developments in psychoanalytic thought<sup>27</sup> 8) some of the current work in general semantics<sup>28</sup> 9) some of the current work in natural science and philosophy especially that concerning the relationships of subatomic physics, mysticism, and the movement of philosophical thought.<sup>29</sup>

All of this is to say that the materials for a genuine transformation of consciousness and a genuine cultural revolution are around if we know what to look for; and finally if we do not hedge from the knowledge that this path involves very real and concrete risks: death, insanity, isolation. Hegel's famous quotation is right to the point: "And it is solely by risking life that freedom is obtained; ... The individual who has not staked his life, may, no doubt, be recognized as a person; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness."<sup>30</sup>

In order to attain the necessary transformation -- to heal the splits and attain congruence between words and action, intellect and presence -- one must, in the process of self reflection and cultural psychoanalysis, confront and deal with his basic fear of separation, loss, isolation, of death and insanity. The fear -- which Friere

calls the "fear of freedom"<sup>31</sup> and Norman O. Brown characterizes as the fear of "living-and-dying"<sup>32</sup> -- is the same fear that inspired Vico's early men to shrink in terror from the thunderstorm and to create Jove and his rules. This fear makes us see "ghosts" and to perceive those who are not driven by that fear as anarchic and chaotic. It also makes it easy to accept analyses like Firestone's which enables us to criticize social practice without criticizing ourselves, another of the many forms of taking refuge in an attempt to achieve security rather than taking the risks of freedom.

Nevertheless, our cultural psychoanalysis can put our fears, the risks, and the sense of personal courage needed to sustain us in perspective. The minority strain which contains the germs of our vision goes a long way back and gives us a basic message: the journey into self has no known end, but once you have been faithful to it for a while you are sustained in your efforts at social action by your whole being which refuses to shrink to fit the mechanical structures of rundown and senile institutions. This refusal is no longer a negation but a joyful affirmation; a "Here I stand and can do no other." Then social action, the creation of culture, is no longer intellectual analysis and preaching. It is the language of our total body, a new poetic wisdom emerging out of a continuous integration of rational and non-rational rather than a projection coming out of fear.

#### Footnotes

1. See, for example, William Pinar, ed. *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND CURRICULUM THEORY* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Company), 1974.
2. See, for example, Daniel Tanner and Laurel Tanner, "Emancipation from Research: the Reconceptualist Prescription." *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, Vol. 8, No. 6, June 1979, pp. 8-12.

3. The necessity of self reflection as a component in human studies and vice versa, while not as yet a dominant trend in social and educational theory, does have considerable support in past and contemporary thought. It is, for example, a leading principle of *THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO*, translated by Max H. Fisch and Thomas Bergin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1960.

The idea is also inherent in Dewey's philosophy. See especially John Dewey, *EXPERIENCE AND NATURE*, 2nd edition (New York: Dover Publications), 1958. In this work Dewey emphasizes the primacy of the pre-reflective, non-cognitive elements of human experience -- the "underlife" of reflection-- and the need for social scientists and philosophers to focus their attention upon these aspects of the human mind. Dewey's theory concerning the genesis and organization of pre-reflective experience is stated most clearly in those parts of his writings which develop the notion of "habit." This notion refers, among other things, to the attitudes, assumptions, meanings, disposition to act, and so forth which are prior to conscious reflection or make up the background of reflection. See also, John Dewey, *HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY* (New York: Modern Library), 1930.

Lewis Mumford's book, *THE PENTAGON OF POWER* (Vol. II of *THE MYTH OF THE MACHINE*) (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), 1970, pps. 414-435, also supports this thesis. In the "Epilogue," for example, Mumford discusses the processes of social and cultural change. These processes, for Mumford, have their origins in the preconscious and intuitive aspects of the human psyche.

Charles Hampden-Turner's *RADICAL MAN: THE PROCESS OF PSYCHO-SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc.), 1970, supports similar ideas through the development of a model of psycho-social growth. His model assumes a dialectical relationship of mutual determination between individual growth and action and the understanding and creation of healthy and humane social forms. He considers his individual growth model simultaneously to be a model for the communal enterprise of social science.

4. Jurgen Habermas. *KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS* (Boston: Beacon Press), 1971, p. 314.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 315.

6. The authors listed in footnote three provide a basis in their writings for such activity. In fact, one contemporary scholar, Giorgio Tagliacozzo, has constructed a Vichian "Tree of Knowledge" intended, among other things, as a curriculum model. The organizing principle of the tree is the notion of "world view "



rather than separate disciplines. See, Giorgio Tagliacozzo, "General Education as a Unity of Knowledge: A Theory Based upon Vichian Principles." *SOCIAL RESEARCH*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Winter, 1976), pp. 768-796.

7. *THE NEW SCIENCE*, pp. 69-79.
8. See, for example, Norman O. Brown. *CLOSING TIME* (New York: Random House), 1974 and *LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL MEANING OF HISTORY* (Middletown, Connecticut), 1959. In the latter work, Brown makes extensive use of both Nietzsche and Freud to ground his arguments. The idea is implicit in Freud's works, while in Nietzsche it is more overt. See especially, Friedrich Nietzsche. *THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS*. Translated by Horace B. Samuel. (New York: The Modern Library), 1939. This work is an attempt to grasp man's history as the expression of an ever increasing neurosis involving guilt and repression as two aspects of the same phenomenon. In *CLOSING TIME*, Brown uses Vico and James Joyce to establish his points in this respect.
9. *THE NEW SCIENCE*, p. 76.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
13. Richard Wilbur, ed. *BLAKE*. (New York: Dell Publishing), 1963, p. 156.
14. Nietzsche in *THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY*, translated by Adrian Collins and with an Introduction by Julius Kraft (New York: Bobbs-Merrill), 1957 speaks of this universal neurosis as being characterized by a "dull, owlsh seriousness" (p. 59) and an "excess of history" (p. 50) over life. Our education starts with a "knowledge of culture, not even a knowledge of life, still less with life and the living of it." (p.67). Prophetically he states, "man must learn to live above all, and only use history in the service of the life and the living of it" (p. 65); and to move toward this end, modern man must engage in rigorous self reflection: "he must organize the chaos in himself by 'thinking himself back to his true needs. He will want all his honesty, all the sturdiness and sincerity in his character to help him revolt against secondhand thought, secondhand learning, secondhand action. And he will begin to understand that culture can be something more than a 'decoration of life' -- a concealment and disfiguring of it, ..." He will discover "the idea of a culture as a new and finer nature without distinction of inner and outer, without convention or disguise, as a unity of thought and will, life and appearance." (pp. 72-73).
15. Georg Hegel. *THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND* (New York: Harper and Row), 1967.
16. Paulo Freire. *PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED* (New York: Seabury), pp. 29-56.
17. Categorical refers to groups based upon one or more common traits possessed by their members. Categorical groups are in contrast to relational groups which emerge and are based upon the actual interactions the members have with one another. These terms are borrowed from anthropology. See, for example, Conrad Arensberg and Solton T. Kimball. *CULTURE AND COMMUNITY* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World), 1965, pp. 135-136.
18. Tom Robbins expresses this insight nicely in *EVEN COWGIRLS GET THE BLUES* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 1976, through a female character, Delores de Ruby, who prior to a recent transformation had been very anti-male in her attitude: "I was mistaken. The enemy of women is not men. No, and the enemy of the black is not the white. The enemy of capitalist is not communist, the enemy of homosexual is not heterosexual, the enemy of Jew is not Arab, the enemy of youth is not the old, the enemy of hip is not redneck, the enemy of Chicano is not gringo and the enemy of women is not men. We all have the same enemy. The enemy is the tyranny of the dull mind. There are authoritative blacks with dull minds, and they are the enemy. The leaders of capitalism and the leaders of communism are the same people, and they are the enemy. There are dullminded women who try to repress the human spirit, and they are the enemy just as much as the dullminded men. The enemy is every expert who practices technocratic manipulation, the enemy is every proponent of standardization and the enemy is every victim who is so dull and lazy and weak as to allow him to be manipulated and standardized." (p.342).
19. Walt Whitman captures his idea in poetic form when he says:  
 I and mine do not convince by arguments, similes, rhymes,  
 We convince by our presence.

Walt Whitman. *COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE*. James Miller, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), p. 112.

Lewis Mumford. *Op.cit.*, pp. 422-23, speaks of "body language" or the emergence of new personality types (new presences) as being a first stage in cultural transformation. Mumford states: "Even before an idea can be transmitted into speech it becomes, if one may use the classic New Testament description, incarnate in the flesh and makes itself known by appropriate bodily changes... Proverbially it is by living the life that one knows the doctrine: by first taking bodily shape the idea begins to spread throughout the community by bodily imitation before it can effectively be defined by word of mouth or in intellectual formulation.

20. Shulamuth Firestone. *THE DIALECTICS OF SEX: THE CASE FOR A FEMINIST REVOLUTION*. New York: Bantam Books) 1971, p. 241.
21. Boehme was a Christian mystic who took the notion of resurrection as meaning a transformation occurring in this world rather than in some future life. For more detailed information on Boehme's life and work, see H. H. Brinton. *THE MYSTIC WILL* (New York: Macmillan, 1930); Franz Hartman. *THE LIFE AND DOCTRINE OF JACOB BOEHME* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Tribner & Co.) 1891; and Richard Bucke. *COSMIC CONSCIOUSNESS: A CLASSIC INVESTIGATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAN'S MYSTIC RELATION TO THE INFINITE* (New York: E. P. Dutton), 1923. N. Beryaev, a twentieth-century religious writer, was heavily influenced by Boehme. See his *THE DESTINY OF MAN* (London: G. Bes), 3rd edition, 1948.
22. Blake was inspired in all his works by visions of an unrepressed human life and psychically whole, androgynous persons. The integration and transcendence of duality is a dominant theme in his work. An especially good example of this is his "Marriage of Heaven and Hell." The following excerpt from this work is illustrative:

All Bibles or sacred codes have been the causes of the following Errors:

1. That Man has two real existing principles: viz: a Body and a Soul.
2. That Energy, call'd Evil, is alone from the Body; & that Reason, Call'd Good, is alone from the Soul.
3. That God will torment Man in Eternity for following his Energies.

But the following Contraries to these are True:

1. Man has no Body distinct from his Soul; for that call'd Body is a portion of Soul discern'd by the five senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age.
2. Energy is the only life, and is from the Body; and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of Energy.
3. Energy is Eternal Delight.

Geoffrey Keynes, ed. *BLAKE: COMPLETE WRITINGS* (London: Oxford University Press) 1972, p.149.

Blake also developed a mythical-poetic system which both portrayed the negative consequences for psychic growth and wholeness of the industrial conditions of western civilization and the path to psychic integration. He called his system a "fourfold vision" in contrast to what he termed the "single vision" of Newtonian-mechanistic science. Theodore Roszak in *WHERE THE WASTELAND ENDS: POLITICS AND TRANSCENDENCE IN POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY* (Garden City: Doubleday), 1972, pp. 272-290, presents an explanation of Blake's fourfold vision in the context of the problems of twentieth century man. For a more thorough treatment of Blake's fourfold system see Northrop Frye. *FEARFUL SYMMETRY: A STUDY OF WILLIAM BLAKE* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1969.

23. Whitman's poetry and prose celebrate the autonomy, exuberance, and beauty of whole and healthy human beings and are filled with images of democratic community composed of integrated and developed human beings. "Democratic Vistas" in Whitman. *Op.cit.*, pp. 455-501 is a good example of the prose. In this work Whitman fully acknowledges that an authentic democracy or emancipated society is anticipated and not real. He refers to it at present as in "embryo condition" and states, "We have frequently printed the word Democracy. Yet I cannot too often repeat that it is a word the real gist of which still sleeps, quite unawaken'd, notwithstanding the resonance and the many angry tempests out of which its syllables have come, from pen or tongue. It is a great word, whose history, I suppose, remains unwritten, because that

history has yet to be enacted." (p.477). Whitman also develops his vision of a democratic culture and the kinds of individuals who would be its members. Among other things, he addresses himself to the necessity of the equality of the sexes: "Democracy, in silence, biding its time, ponders its own ideals not of literature and art only -- not of men only, but of women. The idea of the women of America (extricated from this daze, this fossil and unhealthy air which hangs about the word lady) develop'd, raised to become the robust equals, workers, and, it may be, even practical and political deciders with men -- greater than man, we may admit, through their divine maternity, always their towering, emblematical attribute -- but great, at any rate, as man, in all departments; or, rather, capable of being so, soon as they realize it, and bring themselves to give up toys and fictions and launch forth as men do, amid real, independent, stormy life." (p.474). He also stresses the need for a solid body of literary works which are expressive of an authentic democratic spirit. This literature, Whitman tells us: "needs tally and express Nature, and the spirit of Nature, and to know and obey the standards. I say the question of Nature, largely considered, involves the questions of the aesthetic, the emotional, and the religious -- and involves happiness. A fitly born and bred race, growing up in right conditions of outdoor as much as indoor harmony, activity and development, would probably, from and in those conditions, find it enough merely to live -- and would, in their relations to the sky, air, water, trees, etc., and to the countless common shows, and in the fact of life itself, discover and achieve happiness -- with Being suffused night and day by wholesome extasy, surpassing all pleasures that wealth, amusement, and even gratified intellect, erudition, or the sense of art, can give (p.494).

The following titles and sample lines are illustrative of Whitman's poetic expressions of the same and related ideas.

1. "Song of Myself" (pp. 25-68)

I am the poet of the Body and I am the poet of the Soul,  
 The pleasures of heaven are with me and the pains of hell are with me,  
 The first I graft and increase upon myself, the latter I translate into a new tongue.  
 I am the poet of the woman the same as the man,  
 And I say it is as great to be a woman as to be a man, (p.39)

I have said that the soul is not more than the body,  
 And I have said that the body is not more than the soul,  
 And nothing, not God, is greater to one than oneself is, (p.66)

No friend of mine takes his ease in my chair,  
 I have no chair, no church, no philosophy,  
 I lead no man to a dinner-table, library, exchange  
 But to each man and each woman of you I lead upon a knoll,  
 My left hand hooking you round the waist,  
 My right hand pointing to landscapes of continents and the public road.  
 Not I, not any one else can travel that road for you  
 You must travel it for yourself.

2. "A Woman Waits for Me" (pp. 76-77)

Now I will dismiss myself from impassive women,  
 I will go stay with her who waits for me, and with those women  
 that are warm-blooded and sufficient for me,  
 I see that they understand me and do not deny me.  
 I see that they are worthy of me, I will be the robust husband of those women.

They are not one jot less than I am,  
 They are tann'd in the face by shining suns and blowing winds,  
 Their flesh has the old divine suppleness and strength,  
 They know how to swim, row, ride, wrestle, shoot, run, strike; retreat, advance,

resist, defend themselves,

They are ultimate in their own right -- they are calm, clear, well possessed of themselves.

3) "Song of the Open Road" (pp. 108-115)

Allons! with power, liberty, the earth, the elements,

Health, defiance, gayety, self-esteem, curiosity;

Allons! from all formules!

From your formules, O bat-eyed and materialistic priests.

The stale cadaver blocks up the passage -- the burial waits no longer.

4) "Song of the Broad-Axe" (pp. 135-142)

Where the men and women think light of the laws,

Where the slave ceases, and the master of the slave ceases,

Where the populace rise at once against the never ending audacity of elected persons,

Where the citizen is always the head and idea, and President,

Mayor, Governor and what not, are agents for pay,

Where children are taught to be laws to themselves and to depend on themselves,

Where equanimity is illustrated in affairs,

Where speculations on the soul are encouraged,

Where women walk in public processions in the streets the same as the men,

Where they enter the public assembly and take places the same as the men.

There the great city stands.

How beggarly appear arguments before a defiant deed! (pp. 138-139)

6) "By Blue Ontario's Shore" (pp. 241-152)

All is eligible to all,

All is for individuals, all is for you,

No condition is prohibited, not God's or any,

All comes by the body, only health puts you rapport with the universe.

Produce great Persons, the rest follows.

Piety and conformity to them that like,

Peace, obesity, allegiance, to them that like,

I am he who tauntingly compels men, women, nations,

Crying, Leap from your seats and contend for your lives. (pp. 241-242)

To hold men together by paper and seal or by compulsion is no account,

That only holds men together which aggregates all in a living principle,

as the hold of the limbs of the body or the fibres of plants.

For the great Idea, the idea of perfect and free individuals,

For that, the bard walks in advance, leader of leaders,

The attitude of him cheers up slaves and horrifies foreign despots. (p. 246).

Underneath all, individuals,

I swear nothing is good to me now that ignores individuals,

The American compact is altogether with individuals,

The only government is that which makes minute of individuals,  
The whole theory of the universe is directed unerringly to one single individual -- namely to You. (p.249)

I am for those that have never been master'd,  
For men and women whose tempers have never been master'd  
For those whom laws, theories, conventions, can never master. (p.250)

24. For an intriguing analysis of the "Sonnets," see Richard M. Bucke, *op.cit.*, pp. 153-180. According to Bucke, the sonnets reflect the "cosmic sense" in the same spirit and attitude as the writings of Boehme, Blake, and Whitman.

25. Norman O. Brown in a brief reference (*LIFE AGAINST DEATH*, p.36) suggests that this group and their works are instances of unrepressed life and living beyond duality. Carolyn G. Heilbrun in *TOWARDS A RECOGNITION OF ANDROGYNY* (New York: Harper & Row), 1973, pp. 115-167, provides an extensive description of both the lives and works of this group of artists and provides confirmation of Brown's suggestion of their transcendence of duality. She begins her commentary with: "I write of Bloomsbury not as the apotheosis of the androgynous spirit, but as the first actual example of such a way life in practice" (p.115). Commenting on their sense of wholeness, she further states, "these friends were the first to live their lives as though reason and passion might be equal ideas; hitherto (so far, hereafter) reason always demanded the moderation of the passions, as sexuality and outspokenness took for granted the denigration of reason." (118)

26. Nietzsche's earlier works are more characterized by criticism than vision. It is thus his later works that are relevant here. Two especially good examples are, *THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR EVERY-ONE AND NO ONE*, translated and with an introduction by R. J. Hollingsdale (Baltimore: Penquin Books), 1969, and *ECCE HOMO* translated by Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House), 1967.

Whitehead's criticism of scientific abstraction reveals close parallels between his thought and the poetry of Blake and the other romantics. His overall thrust is to call for a science based upon an erotic sense of reality rather than an aggressive, controlling, and power-oriented attitude. See especially, A. N. Whitehead, *SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1927.

The major emphasis in Dewey's work is an attack upon dualism of all kinds and an attempt to envision and describe the nature of education, work, politics, and life in general in a context in which dualities (e.g., mind-body, work-leisure, subject-object) have been transcended. Among several other works Dewey's *DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION* (New York: Free Press), 1916, is illustrative of these points.

John Ruskin's work in economic theory was for the most part ignored until Lewis Mumford in *THE CULTURE OF CITIES* (New York: Harcourt, Brace), 1938, p. 542, described him as the "fundamental economist of the biotechnic order." Ruskin is also used by Brown in *LIFE AGAINST DEATH* to establish some of his arguments. Ruskin assumes fundamental connections between man's drive to create a superfluous economic surplus, his desire to dominate and have power over others, and diminished, dualized consciousness. He also describes economic theory and practice which transcends this neurotic (dualized) human situation. Ruskin's economic writings are prolific. See *WORKS OF JOHN RUSKIN*, ed. by E.T. Cook and A. Wedderburn, 39 volumes (London: G. Allen & Unwin), 1903-1912.

27. Norman O. Brown's work is a good example of these developments in contemporary thought. In addition to the two works cited earlier see Brown's *LOVE'S BODY* (New York: Random House), 1966.

28. The writings of J. Samuel Bois, who began his work with a thorough study of Alfred Korzybski, the founder of the General Semantics, are illustrative. In his book, *BREEDS OF MEN* (New York: Harper & Row), 1970, Bois explicates a semantic-developmental model in which the highest level is termed the "participant" stage. Bois describes this stage as a form of transknowing, and "as an art that blends together thinking and feeling at a transcendent level of experience" (pp. 112-114). In another work, *THE ART OF AWARENESS*, 2nd ed. (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown), 1973, he calls this level the "unifying stage, the stage where we are aware of being one with the cosmic process (p. 171), and describes it as the sources and origin of all creative work, artistic and scientific. In particular, he stresses that at this stage one engages in a form of knowing that transcends structural knowledge (mental models) (pp.163-172).

29. See, for example, Fritjof Capra. **THE TAO OF PHYSICS: AN EXPLORATION OF THE PARALLELS BETWEEN MODERN PHYSICS AND EASTERN MYSTICISM** (Berkeley: Shambala Press), 1975.
30. Hegel, *op.cit.*, p.233.
31. Freire, *op.cit.*, p.20.
32. Brown. **LIFE AGAINST DEATH**, p. 166.

Copyright 1981 by JCT

## Zones of Potentiality Contributing to Consciousness: Thrust for Curriculum Design

Virginia M. Macagnoni  
University of Georgia

## Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore my assumptions about four zones of potentiality as contributing to the further development of human consciousness through curriculum design as a vehicle. Attention is given to the tentative formulation of basis for curriculum design. Basic assumptions are:

1. Present curriculum designs which are intended to give a sense of direction to schooling seldom attend consciousness of the reality of the world as thrust.
2. Part of our educational folklore which persists is that quality of consciousness is built into the genes. That heightened consciousness is teachable is not generally acknowledged.
3. One of the reasons that we shy away from attaching importance to consciousness or fundamental structures of the world as thrust in curriculum design is the evasive quality of both, the lack of precision in present-day knowledge. There is no way that we can be more precise at this time in our history, which is acknowledged by enlightened scientists. However, we do know more than we try to implement, even as hypothesis.
4. Because some of us as educators are more concerned at this time with qualitative rather than quantitative questions regarding both consciousness and nature of reality, does not mean that we do not endorse fully scholarly pursuit of collaborative investigations.
5. A reason for our shying away from including consciousness as thrust in curriculum design is the ascendance and present domination of the curriculum field by scholars from a variety of fields who represent behavioristic, empirical, technological orientations to the exclusion of other viewpoints. The ideas of these scholars are accepted readily by politicians and practitioners who are currently reflecting concerns for accountability, experience, utility and practicality, and elitism which is seldom acknowledged. The same is true for our shying away from serious attention of the nature of reality through basic structures other than the disciplines.
6. We must convince ourselves, as well as the general public, that consciousness and nature of reality are "teachable" and that such intentionality can be incorporated into curriculum design.
7. It is possible to speak of a moral imperative that can connect all perspectives and energize both learning and the curriculum.

This paper addresses (1) consciousness and four zones of potentiality as structures for perceiving the world, (2) a moral imperative, (3) what consciousness is, (4) justification and extrapolation from Husserl, (5) design, curriculum design, and the curricularist as prime designers.

There has been the potentiality for consciousness since the beginning of the universe, that is, the potentiality for the individual to participate in the making of the world as form. The potentiality for consciousness is the potentiality for mind as energy to direct the making. The evolution of consciousness has become evident in four interacting zones of potentiality (1) zone of the physical environment, the non man-made world and cosmic forces--climate, gravity, atomic structure, (2) zone of animal life, all forms of life other than vegetable and excluding uniquely human, (3) zone of uniquely human life, and (4) zone of the cultural environment, languages, cultures, and technology. These zones are worlds in the continuous process of becoming.<sup>1</sup> A world has been trying to be born and has not yet reached its essence. Zones are characterized by qualities or priorities which enable them to be set off, to a degree, as suggested.

Zones are interacting, interpenetrating fields of energy comprising both inner and outer space. One must bring multidimensionality and simultaneity of perspective to the prospect of perceiving these zones. The

individual, attempting to perceive a personal world must tune in on the make-up of these four basic fields. Such tuning-in enables the person to relate all forms of life as well as physical configurations and forces in the universe. Such tuning-in has to be done if the person desires to make a world.<sup>2</sup>

The four zones of potentiality are conceptualized in a context of temporality. We as humankind share a history of the interpenetrations of the four zones which, in a way, is the story of the emergence of consciousness. Pre-history, history, cultural artifacts, and the condition of the physical environment itself (open to more vigorous examination because of newer technologies in the human sciences) are documentation of human effort to raise the level of human consciousness. Such efforts have been experienced as both success and failure in the overall effort to make a world as aesthetic form. There is an autobiography of the human race which can be perceived through (1) the great problems and challenges, (2) the great accomplishments--forms in art and science, and (3) the great disasters in the effort to extend the consciousness of all human beings.

The construct of the four zones is a way of getting at a meaning of wholeness that is basic and comprehensive. Such constructs are almost non-existent in forms that can illuminate the work of curricularists as generalists who recognize the need (1) to select curriculum content from a universe of content, (2) to use a concept of mind that is adequate to perceiving the four zones as structures of the world, and (3) to use curriculum design as a conceptual tool.

#### The Four Zones, the Ground of Being and the Moral Imperative

The four zones visualized as overlapping, interpenetrating zones, enable us to form an image of intersections which suggests a kind of energy in movement. The point of maximum intensity suggests ground of being or God or unity or power of creation, however this maximization of energy is interpreted in eastern or western philosophies and whether the particular viewpoint be other-worldly, universe-centered, or person-centered.<sup>3</sup> The force is a spiritual or a creative force. It gains its power from unity, even though there are endless manifestations of seeming chaos and disunity. Consciousness, whatever it is -- we do not know precisely what it is -- radiates from this center.

The moral imperative for the uniquely human is that each person become what one is potentially in community with others, in spite of the pervading condition of separation. Separation is from the self, from others, from nature, and from the ground of being. In addition, separation from the self is separation from zones of consciousness within the self.<sup>4</sup> The moral imperative as I see it is to make a world.

To address such an imperative each person must regain unity or "reconciliation" which is only temporary. Reconciliation is regained through access to the innermost depths of one's being and openness to the ground of being. Each communication is individualized. Individuation is a reality in all nature. No two persons are precisely alike, either in the inner most depths of being or in their communicating with the ground of being. The perceptions of all are needed in the making of a world.

No one can force access to either depth of personal being or ground of being. However, one can be "open" to such access for the communication to occur. One has to permit energies to come into contact as encounter and even confrontation.

It is in confrontation that separation is reconciled. Becoming what one is potentially is the continuous process of resolving contradictions and arriving at personal synthesis or meaning of one's world. Much depends upon what the person perceives as question or problem. The parameters can range from a very personal, intimate concern to a more universal one. The larger connections begin with the smaller ones.

Attending existential questions enable the person as learner to attend the moral imperative. Questions are variations of the following:

Who am I? What does it mean to be me in this particular environment? What does it mean that I am born in these particular circumstances at this moment in time? How do we make a world where each of us can become what each potentially is, in relation to the larger connections?<sup>5</sup>

Other questions are:

How do we deal with problems such as: separation, fear, anxiety, meaningless, poverty, hunger, pestilence, pollution, the avoidance of war and the seeking of peace, social systems? How do we deal with the mystery, the wonder and the awesomeness of existence?



The questions and the problems run the gamut of the life span, birth through the various stages of life through death. They require attention ontologically, epistemologically, and axiologically, which suggests that the disciplines of knowledge and human experience have potential energies which can be used in the searching. (Such attention and related concerns are matters to be addressed by those who design curriculum and bring coherency to factors that are involved in curriculum).

#### What Consciousness Is

Consciousness in its simplest explanation is awareness. It is mind, and yet it is greater than all that constitutes mind. Consciousness can be experienced physically, emotionally, socially, intellectually, aesthetically, and spiritually. Consciousness as spiritual process subsumes all. If mind is its own greatest mystery and consciousness is "the enigma behind the mind"<sup>6</sup>, we cannot expect a more explicit answer to what consciousness is. Yet regardless of the question one raises in whatever discipline, at whatever level of schooling, or from whatever walk of life, one must be ultimately concerned with consciousness because it is "the fundamental ground of all experience. It is the means whereby we know what we know and do what we can do."<sup>7</sup> Consciousness is inner and outer space and thereby the meeting ground between inner and outer reality. Consciousness is chaotic energy diffused throughout the individual, with the possibility of being incorporated into intentionality.

Intentionality as focused consciousness is what makes the person uniquely human. It is the power to gain focality in a subsidiary world, to link with the ground of being, to have access to many of the levels of and the states of consciousness possible for the human being.

Consciousness can be viewed as interaction and interpenetration of at least nine components of the mind, even though we do not know precisely what mind is or how it works.<sup>8</sup> These components are:

1. Sensors (eyes, ears, thermoceptors, proprioceptors) as mind reporting effects of the environment,
2. Information-making as mind encoding, creating symbolic representation of events, and decoding, creating meanings from symbolic representations.
3. Memory as mind storing events.
4. Logic as mind checking the internal consistency of events.
5. Imagination as mind generating events independent of the sensors.
6. Body as effectors (muscle, bone, connective tissue) generating events.
7. Will as mind choosing.
8. Mind as will affecting (a) imagination and (b) effector generation of consistent and complete subsets of events.
9. Connectors as mind propagating information between the sensors, memory, imagination, logic, and will.<sup>9</sup>

The evolution of the mind is the evolution of awareness, which moves toward a focusing of intentionality to gain more power toward making a world as form. Awareness moves from (1) proto-awareness which is chaotic energy to (2) awareness of self which is matter to (3) awareness to non-self which is life to (4) awareness of awareness which is ethical behavior to (5) awareness of ethics which is morality. Awareness of morality as a relatively recent development in the use of mind, is the highest form of ethics known. Garcia adds that persons cannot be moral unless they perceive, at the conscious or the unconscious level, their own evolution.<sup>10</sup>

#### The Uniquely Human and Consciousness

Macagnon offers six potentials as constituting the human potentiality of the person,<sup>11</sup> later conceptualizing these as "zones" of potentiality. This current paper places the physical, the emotional, the social, the intellectual, the aesthetic, and the spiritual potentialities as sub-zones of the uniquely human zone. Consciousness is diffused throughout these zones. The uniquely human zone, as earlier conceptualized, has to be recast in its relationships to the zones of the physical environment, animal life, and the cultural environment, to be a holistic construct. In addition, intentionality had to be perceived clearly as the power to focus consciousness (including the many levels of and states of personal consciousness).

It is now clearly perceived that consciousness can be primarily physical, emotional, social, intellectual, aesthetic, or spiritual. Whichever the focus, intentionality joins all.<sup>12</sup> Physical consciousness is awareness of the person as body. Leonard captures a dramatic portrayal of body as "ultimate athlete" which is within the reach of everyone.

...body is spirit, that its every cell re-enacts the dance of love and death, that in the relationships of these cells we may trace the anatomy of all relationship. There is no single ultimate athlete; there are millions--each of us may get in shape or even set new records. But the body of the Ultimate Athlete--fat or thin, short or tall--summons us beyond these things toward the birth of the self, and, in time, the unfolding of a new world.<sup>13</sup>

Jewett and Mullan present a curriculum design based upon man as master of the self, moving in space and in a social world. Fitness, performance, and transcendence are important thrusts.<sup>14</sup>

Emotional consciousness is overall awareness of the variety of and texture of one's emotions "...ranging from fear to liberating hope, to ecstasy. To be human is to experience the emotions of joy and tragedy, and to acknowledge that experiencing both gives deeper meaning to life."<sup>15</sup>

Social consciousness is overall awareness of the self as a social being, "that personhood is developed in interaction with others." Social consciousness is concerned with (1) gregariousness, (2) empathy, (3) altruism, and (4) collaboration.<sup>16</sup>

Intellectual consciousness is overall awareness of the nature of mind and of mind as force for integrating the zones of human potentiality. Intellectual consciousness is awareness of the nine components of the mind as identified earlier.

Aesthetic consciousness is awareness of form as a "quality beyond common cognizance." It is quality which is life enhancing. "Form is that radiance from within, to which a shape attains when in a given situation it realizes itself complete."<sup>17</sup> Aesthetic consciousness is awareness of: (1) form, (2) human techniques and environmental forces that produce form; (3) sensuous responses as the appeal of form to the senses; (4) expressive responses as the personal meaning of encounter with form.<sup>18</sup>

Spiritual consciousness is awareness of the moral imperative. It is overall awareness of the self as aesthetic form or unity extended to other beings and other forms of life in the universe. Spiritual consciousness, the highest state of all, is concerned with (1) questions of life, birth, and death; (2) organism as the coming together of separates to form a complete; (3) individuation, (4) cosmogenesis, (5) creativity, (6) reverence for life. Subsumed under reverence for life is celebration as exalted expression experienced in community with others and forgiveness as an essential attribute for imperfect creatures.<sup>19</sup> The ultimate spiritual motivation is the desire to participate in making a world.

#### The Uniquely Human and Temporality

Temporality is our "owning" of consciousness in time. It is our believing that we can continue to raise the level of consciousness. Temporality is "lived reality" over time. The concept enables us to relate past, present, and future as unity, realizing that these must be united in the making of a world. Perceiving temporality makes it easier for us to overcome separation.

#### Justification for Consciousness and the Four Zones of Potentiality as Extrapolated from Husserl

Husserl as translated by Lauer<sup>20</sup> is helpful in clarifying and justifying the constructs of consciousness and the four zones of potentiality in relation to curriculum design. For Husserl intentionality and consciousness are inextricably interwoven.

Husserl held that "an intention is some sort of immanent term of the mind's operation when the mind is related in one way or another to some object."<sup>21</sup> Intention describes the relationship between the subject and the object in the act of perceiving. In comparison with earlier Kantian views Husserl conceives of a much more dynamic role of the mind. The acts of consciousness are the intentional acts of imagining, judging, and willing. Through these acts the world is discovered. Through such experiencing the world is known. To say that the world is known is to say that objects or configurations are known or experienced. (The four zones of

potentiality as fields are configurations that can be known or experienced. Schooling can provide such experience. The curriculum design can illuminate the way).

Mind intends through acts of consciousness. Phenomenology as a science of meanings examines phenomena which exhibit themselves to the experient. Each phenomenon contains essences which the mind can perceive. For Husserl, "the world of physical configuration is the world of fact, whereas the world of meanings is the world of consciousness" or intentions.<sup>22</sup> Writing or speaking a word is a physical operation. However, only by an act of consciousness can one give meaning to the word. Husserl connects meaning, sense, and essence through intentionality as a common bond. Through the senses one perceives the world. Through intuition one synthesizes sensory data about the particular phenomenon in the world. Each phenomenon is composed of essences that connote meaning. The mind through intentionality perceives these essences.<sup>23</sup>

Essences are self-givenness which exist independent of the object itself as correlates of consciousness. An object to be fully known must be perceived in its unity. There are qualitative states of unity that are beyond our ordinary reach. Perceiving such unity is perceiving essences. Optimal states of essence are signified as individual instances in time.<sup>24</sup> In answer to the question what is essence, Lauer cites the example of a cube of six planes regardless of the number of planes the eye can see. The example is to enable us to comprehend not only the simple essence of cube, but also the essences of all the complexities of which the mind is capable of understanding, "logical concepts, scientific theories, moral or religious values, social or political structures, all of those things of which men speak without knowing thoroughly of what they speak."<sup>25</sup> Lauer adds:

One can look at a cube and have a perfectly valid intention of cubes but such an intention would not be valid if the subject...had no intuition of any kind regarding those sides of the cube which cannot be seen in a single perception. It is not necessary that the other sides of the cube be actually perceived by the person, but it is necessary that he have 'an intuition of cube as that which has other sides.' In such an intuition, one sees the essence of cubes whether there be a cube at all.<sup>26</sup>

We develop meanings through consciousness, but meanings are not necessarily true. For a meaning to be true, it must be more than merely an intention of the mind. "It must be an intention which is verified, validated, and justified."<sup>27</sup> The difference between a mere intention and an intention of signification is that a mere intention is an empty intention. It becomes a "filled" intention when it is verified, validated, or justified.<sup>28</sup>

Lauer regards the analysis of meaning as presented for the cube as superficial but nevertheless as an example which leads to the very heart of Husserl's logical analysis, the return to the phenomenon in its setting which is the ultimate source of meaning. The most elaborate theory conceivable is "nothing but a mumbo-jumbo of arbitrary constructions"<sup>29</sup> unless there is return to the ultimate intuitions wherein the elements of a theory are given and not merely signified in the theorist's mind.

Another example furnished by Lauer to illustrate that an intention is filled when it rests in experience rather than only that which the mind signifies in thought, is the "white house with green shutters on the south-east corner of Main Street and Fourth Avenue."<sup>30</sup> One can hear another speak of such a house, but the meaning conveyed is only an empty meaning if the hearer does not have an intuition, whether through perception or the imagination, of all the elements of the description of the house.

Now let us connect essences and the four zones of potentiality. The person as a holistic being in the continuous process of becoming with six "sub-zones" of human potentiality, as defined earlier, becomes in unity with the three other interacting, interpenetrating zones of potentiality as identified in the beginning of the paper. Even though there are many ways of grouping these basic fields, no scheme is entirely satisfactory because of the dynamic nature of the matter, life, consciousness, and movement constituting the zones. My classification of the zones, rough though it may be, is intended to clarify my thinking of the universe as source for the curriculum. If as curricularists we choose to address the moral imperative as defined in this paper, we have to find ways to perceive complex wholes while we raise the existential questions as defined earlier. Hence, in leaning toward an attitude to wholeness, one of my propositions is that there are at least four interpenetrating zones of potentiality that furnish a kind of energy to the curriculum as "nutrient," that which can energize

the becoming of the person. The curriculum can be a link with continuity in the emergence of human potentiality.

Obviously, the construct of the four zones of potentiality in a framework of interconnections with priority on the intentionality of the individual is the parallel to the cube with six planes or the white house with the green shutters. Equally obvious is the argument for a curriculum providing the context for the development of full as opposed to empty intentions.

We develop meanings of the four zones of potentiality, we connect them through consciousness or intentionality, in the real world, as we confront the persistent existential questions and human problems. Meanings must be verified, validated, or justified, which leads us to the importance of schooling and to a curriculum which fosters such processes. Logical analysts of the human condition is indeed important. The learner in fulfilling the moral imperative returns to the ultimate source of meaning: the person as holistic being becoming with others in a physical universe side-by-side with other forms of life, in spite of the condition of separation. In returning to the ground of being, guided by an existential question or problem, the learner returns to a source of energy.

We must return to two additional sources of "ultimate" intuitions wherein the elements of the theory about consciousness and the four zones are given and not merely signified in the head of this writer. One source is the empirical reality of particular persons living their meanings in particular cultural environments. The second source is technology--what is known of human, cultural, and physical evolution. We must explore both sources for their potential energy to compel the learner to participate in the "patterning" of a world, an idea which will be developed in the next section.

#### Design, Curriculum Design, and the Curricularist as a Prime Designer

There are important ideas about design, including the aesthetic ideas already identified in this paper, that remain largely unexamined outside of the arts. Ideas about design can illuminate curriculum design. Such ideas as insights from a number of fields of study are potentially useful. In this section I respond to Fuller's construct of prime design,<sup>31</sup> incorporating its "essence" into this paper.

1. Nature's forms and forming processes reveal "exquisite economy and effectiveness,"<sup>32</sup> seemingly in keeping with purposefulness. This purposefulness can be interpreted as intentionality or design toward universal evolution or toward environments for learning.

Questions: How do we design a curriculum that fosters such forming processes in the direction of the learner as aesthetic product?

How do we use the four zones of potentiality to enable curricularists as prime designers to value exquisite economy and effectiveness in keeping with purposefulness?

How do we communicate the moral imperative as energizing force?

2. It has been said that for all times humans have subconsciously coordinated evolution.<sup>33</sup> I believe that this intentionality can be used more consciously to design learning environments which "open up" many more levels of and states of consciousness for the learner.

Question: How do we convince the general public that consciousness is not built into the genes as a final quality,...that opening up our concept of consciousness may enable us to create intelligence, which was intended as a prospect "from the beginning?" (See page one).

3. In such coordination, the artist's intuitive awareness of mathematical principles in nature are as important as the scientific instruments and formulas which have projected us into the future.<sup>34</sup>

Questions: How do we pattern a curriculum design that makes visible and coherent, strands that incorporate both art and science?

Would it be appropriate to begin with "general education," attempting to visualize a continuity, from the education of young children extended to other levels of education?

How do we make connections with (a) the Engle and Longstreet<sup>35</sup> formulation of four strands, the technological, the symbolic systems, the present realities, and the values strands as part of a projection of an open curriculum adequate to creating the future; (b) the curriculum design which can be translated from the work of Berman and Roderick,<sup>36</sup> which is a compelling form

addressing curriculum as teaching the what, how, and why of living, offering unique possibilities for combining art and science; and (c) Zais<sup>37</sup> formulation of a synoptic view of the person, the concept of encapsulation, and projections for design?

4. Nature has "a sublimely comprehensible conceptual patterning" which can be modeled.<sup>38</sup> This patterning appears in the four zones of potentiality. This patterning acts on us, and we return the action, with or without awareness. In nature we are dealing with "a complex integrity of complementary patterning transformations...."<sup>39</sup>

Questions: In formulating curriculum designs and in projecting the designing of learning environments, how do we make a unity of (a) the moral imperative and the four zones of potentiality, (b) the learner, (c) the content, and (d) the teacher?

Is the patterning facilitated by viewing these as complex complementary transformations? ...as potential unity?

5. In nature as a personal complex of integrity each of us influences the ultimate patterning of our world. Each of us must seize and assume the responsibility of the prime design.<sup>40</sup>

Question: Can the curricularist seize this opportunity?

6. The critical intervention in the learning context is the intervention which somehow makes possible "flitting aesthetic moments."<sup>41</sup> These are those instants when the person becomes "one" and experiences the full awareness of oneness. "Personhood is perceived as form, as a work of art, ceasing to be ordinary. When one recovers, it is as if he/she has been initiated into illuminating, exalting, formative mysteries."<sup>42</sup>

Question: How do we weave the possibility for such interventions into the curriculum design?

7. Prime design as a basic human act demonstrates concern for qualities such as form, balance, and movement in relation to human purpose and function.

8. The design process, incorporating both art and science, results in a "life-enhancing aesthetic process."<sup>43</sup>

9. Form is "radiance from within to which a shape attains when in a given situation it realizes itself complete."<sup>44</sup> Such form can be the self or the world or both.

The environment which affords the learner experience is the context wherein everything is brought together (the perspective as delineated in this paper). Some very important things have to be screened in as priorities, and a lot of the inconsequential needs to be screened out. In fact, we may need some drastic surgery to remove the clutter in our heads as well as in curricula in schools. Processes of validation, verification, and justification in terms of match between the intentionality of the learner and of the curriculum have to take place.

As curricularists are we up to the seizure of prime design as a tool? To quote Fuller:

Only the free-wheeling artist-explorer, non-academic, scientist-philosopher, mechanic, economist-poet, who has never waited for patron-starting and accrediting of his coordinate capabilities holds the prime initiative today. If man is to continue as a successful pattern-complex function in universal evolution, it will be because the next decades will have witnessed the artist-scientist's spontaneous seizure of the prime design responsibility and his successful conversion of the total capability of tool-augmented man from killingry to advanced livingry--adequate for all humanity.<sup>45</sup>

### Curriculum Design

A curriculum supported by a curriculum design, bringing new relationships into sharp focus, can illuminate the work of teachers as they shape environments for learning and making priority curriculum decisions.

Persons who are interested in the perspective as presented in this paper may use the ideas in a heuristic way. They would have to personalize a rationale that would incorporate meanings presented in this perspective. The particular concrete setting is needed to furnish the limits for the activity. The personalized rationale enables "prime designers" to raise and to deliberate basic questions. The connective tissue which they make in their deliberations furnishes the pattern.

The questions are:

- A. How do we shape environments within which:
1. Learners can become more aware of the nature of the mind, of consciousness, and of intentionality?
  2. Learners can experience modes of consciousness that are primarily physical?...emotional?...social?...intellectual?...aesthetic?...spiritual?
  3. Learners can experience mind as sensors, memory, logic, will, connectors, imagination?
  4. Learners can experience the four zones of potentiality as basic fields of the world?
  5. Learners can experience the existential questions?
  6. Learners can become more aware of the persistent human problems?
  7. Learners can become more aware of the value of limits?
  8. Learners can become more aware of the value of encounter in unsettling and resettling a world?
  9. Learners can become more aware that there are essences to be perceived?
  10. Learners can become more aware that there are optimal essences to be perceived in terms of their own human potentialities, in their natural environment as physical world and in their cultural world?
- B. How do we shape environments that energize the consciousness of  
(1) learner, (2) the teacher, and (3) the curriculum?
- C. Do we recognize that entire environments can be de-energized or debilitated? (See Figure 3).
- D. What are our provisions for revitalizing debilitated environments?

The pattern fabricated by the prime designers in attending questions such as these is the rationale, without which action in classrooms or specific learning settings could be frenzied, hit-and-miss, or piece-meal.

At some point, because the prime designers decide to work through their values and subsequent priorities about the overall perspective and the operational decisions of the teaching-learning situation, a curriculum pattern emerges. No one, not even the prime designers can say beforehand precisely what this pattern will look like. Only the particular reality affords the energizing power to generate a pattern that is right for that situation. This pattern provides a consistent framework or structure which has focus and organic unity. The dimensions and the domains of the overall perspective and the operational decisions of the teaching-learning situation become identifiable, coherent, and compelling.

The design and its attendant rationale developed by the prime designers will be capable of:

1. Accounting for all of the factors that are involved in curriculum, e.g. intentionality as aims and directional objectives, kinds of content and ways of generating and organizing content, and the character of (a) environments for learning, (b) encounter, (c) artifacts and media, and (d) evaluation.
2. Defining the coherency of the above factors through deliberating their relationships and points where decisions have to be made.
3. Developing modes of analysis for purposes of evaluation in relation to the decision points as we address the moral imperative for the learner.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Concept of becoming as developed by Alfred N. Whitehead. *PROCESS AS REALITY*. New York: Macmillan, 1929 and Gordon W. Allport. *BECOMING*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.

Concept of potentiality and the becoming of the universe influenced by Laura Zirbes 1957-1967, including *SPURS TO CREATIVE TEACHING*. New York: Putnam's, 1959 and Ross L. Mooney. *PERCEPTION AND CREATION*, a talk prepared for a creative engineering seminar, Massachusetts Columbus, Ohio: Bureau of Educational Research and Service, February 14, 1963; and "The Researcher Himself." In *RESEARCH FOR CURRICULUM IMPROVEMENT*, Yearbook. Arthur W. Foshay, editor. Washington, D.C.: The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1957.

2. Concept of making a world influenced by: James B. Macdonald. "A Transcendental Developmental Ideology of Education." In William Pinar, editor. *HEIGHTENED CONSCIOUSNESS, CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND CURRICULUM THEORY*. Berkeley: McCutchan, 1974, "Values Bases and Issues for Curriculum." In Alex Molnar and John A. Zahorik, editors. *CURRICULUM THEORY*. Washington, D.C.: The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1977; and earlier works of this same author.

3. Categorization as used by Robert S. Zais, *CURRICULUM*. New York: Crowell, 1976.

4. Construct about the moral imperative influenced primarily by Paul Tillich and Teilhard de Chardin. For Tillich, from *THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS*. New York: Scribner, 1955, to *MORALITY AND BEYOND*, New York: Harper and Row, 1963. For de Chardin, *PHENOMENON OF MAN* 1959 and *THE FUTURE OF MAN*, 1964. New York: Harper and Row. Later, this concept was influenced in the writings and presentations of James B. Macdonald.

5. See questions in Virginia M. Macagnoni. *SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE SELF AS AN OPEN SYSTEM: A CURRICULUM DESIGN*. Research Bulletin of the Florida Research and Development Council, Vol. 5, Summer 1969, No. 2. Gainesville, Florida. The University of Florida, pp. 16-21.

6. John White, editor. *FRONTIERS OF CONSCIOUSNESS*. New York: Julian Press, 1974, p. 1.

7. *IBID*.

8. John D. Garcia. *THE MORAL SOCIETY*. New York: Julian Press, 1971, pp. 50-51.

9. Revision of earlier interpretation by Macagnoni. "Coming to Terms with Curriculum as a Human Agenda." In *LIFELONG LEARNING-CURRICULUM AS A HUMAN AGENDA*, Yearbook. Norman Overly, editor. Washington, D.C. The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1979, pp. 140-151.

10. Garcia, *OP. CIT.*, p. 58.

11. Macagnoni, *OP. CIT.*, 1979.

(See Arthur W. Foshay. "Toward a Humane Curriculum," in *ESSAYS ON CURRICULUM*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1975. pp. 151-171, for another description of six aspects of humanness).

12. Virginia M. Macagnoni. In "Zones of Potential and the Curriculum as a Human Agenda." In *PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CURRICULUM THEORY IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION*. Athens, Georgia: The Department of Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, October 1979.

Jonas Salk uses "zones" for referring to human potentiality. *SURVIVAL OF THE WISEST*. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

13. George Leonard. *THE ULTIMATE ATHLETE*. New York: Avon, 1975, p. 290.

14. Ann E. Jewett and Marie M. Mullan. *CURRICULUM DESIGN: PURPOSE AND PROCESSES IN PHYSICAL EDUCATION TEACHING-LEARNING*. Washington, D.C.: American Alliance for Health, Physical Education, and Recreation, 1977.

15. Macagnoni, *OP. CIT.*, October 1979, p. 145.

16. See Macagnoni, *OP. CIT.*, 1969; 1979; October 1979 for fuller treatment.

17. Bernard Berensen. *AESTHETICS AND HISTORY*. New York: Doubleday, 1948, p. 93.

18. Harry Broudy's four categories for aesthetic experience in Foshay, *OP. CIT.*, pp. 163-164.

19. See Macagnoni, *OP. CIT.*, 1979 and October 1979 for fuller treatment.

20. J. Quentin Lauer, S.J. **THE TRIUMPH OF SUBJECTIVITY**. New York: Fordham University Press, 1972.
21. **IBID.**, p. 30.
22. **IBID.**, p. 31.
23. **IBID.**
24. **IBID.**, p. 33.
25. **IBID.**
26. **IBID.**, p. 32.
27. **IBID.**, p. 31.
28. **IBID.**
29. **IBID.**
30. **IBID.**
31. R. Buckminster Fuller, "Prime Design." In Richard Kostelanetz, editor. **BEYOND LEFT AND RIGHT: RADICAL THOUGHT FOR OUR TIMES**. New York: Morrow, 1969, pp. 359-364.
32. **IBID.**, p. 359.
33. **IBID.**
34. **IBID.**
35. Shirley H. Engle and Wilma S. Longstreet. "Education for a Changing Society." In James John Jelinek, editor. **IMPROVING THE HUMAN CONDITION**, Yearbook. Washington, D.C.: The Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1978, pp. 239-259.
36. Louise M. Berman and Jessie A. Roderick. **CURRICULUM, TEACHING THE WHAT, HOW, AND WHY OF LIVING**. Columbus: Merrill, 1977.
37. Zais, **OP. CIT.**, Chapter 10, pp. 218-243.
38. Fuller, **OP. CIT.**, p. 360.
39. **IBID.**
40. **IBID.**, p. 363-364.
41. Berenson, **OP. CIT.**, 1979.
42. Macagnoni, **OP. CIT.**, October 1979, p. 21.
43. **IBID.**
44. Berenson, **OP. CIT.**, p. 72.
45. Fuller, **OP. CIT.**, p. 364.



ZONES OF POTENTIALITY




Figure 1






Figure 2



INTERACTION AND INTERPENETRATION OF ZONES

Figure 3



THE CURRICULUM AS A HUMAN AGENDA

Figure 4

“All the things I might not be...”:  
Issues in Communication for Curricularists

Bonnie Meath-Lang  
National Technical Institute for the Deaf

### Introduction

Until a few years ago, a number of prominent scientific journals in the areas of acoustics, speech, language and related fields had the policy of accepting no study conducted on a “disordered population.” It was argued by the editorial boards of these journals that neither solid empirical conclusions nor generalizable theory could be derived from those variable-laden human mysteries who are deaf, learning disabled, aphasic, autistic, retarded, or otherwise classified by our limited descriptors. Since that time, most of these policies have changed, but the methodologies of the majority of studies found in these journals have not. Thus the aforementioned populations are treated gingerly and tentatively, and the focus of research becomes increasingly narrow as authors try to limit and discard confounding factors. As a result, the body of knowledge on handicapping conditions<sup>1</sup> has swollen in breadth but has not grown in depth. Knowledge claims appear to be more comfortably derived, for the most part, by statistical manipulation as opposed to observational acuity. The reader experiences the brightness of the methodologist but not the wisdom of the researcher.

In a previous paper,<sup>2</sup> I argued for a consideration of existential issues and phenomenological methods in the conduct of research in the specific area of deafness. While this concern may be perceived by those in the larger field of educational curriculum as somewhat provincial, it is my hope that the questions, controversies and confusions which have been dramatically underscored by the existential confrontation with deafness will illuminate the analysis of interactions with other learners by instructors, researchers, and curriculum theorists. As Susan Sontag (1977) would passionately assert that illness is not a metaphor but a reality which our society refuses to acknowledge, so I would propose that deafness must be accepted on its own terms, not on what we would have it mean. The majority of literary and media-related treatments of deaf and other handicapped persons have conceptualized an image of either stoic heroism or suffering martyrdom. Fortunately, there are choices to be exercised between the two extremes, although the freedom to choose may be inhibited by a lack of realistic models in the life of the handicapped child. Given a thoughtful basic understanding of deafness as an educational condition, however, educators may see metaphoric possibilities and analogies in the need to examine one's own communication in the light of a student's or subject's experiences. The goal of this paper, then, is to uncover some of the confusions that have manifested themselves in the instruction and examination of persons with a communication-related disability and to establish some principles in interacting with students and subjects in more general educational situations.

### Critical Confusions, General Interpretations, and Possible Solutions

The first confusion, and the most serious one, is the inability or reluctance on the part of the hearing researcher, instructor or curricularist (and, quite frankly, some deaf professionals as well) to address the fundamental meaning of prelingual deafness.<sup>3</sup> The fragmentary approach to discrete variables employed by some researchers make this avoidance not only possible, but probable. Moreover, the relegation of communication to thin descriptions of manipulable behavioral manifestations proposed most forcefully by Skinner (1957) has led to assumptions based largely on surface structures.

Donald Moores, one of the leading researchers in the area of deafness, makes a highly personal revelation in his definitive book, *EDUCATING THE DEAF: PSYCHOLOGY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES* (1978):

When the author was in a training program to become a teacher of the deaf, he was taught that the major problem of the deaf was poor speech. A few years later the consensus changed to the position that the biggest problem was language, a position the author could not accept fully because of his belief that while most deaf individuals may have difficulty with standard English

usage, they obviously possess language skills. While the indictment might sound overharsh, the author's view has evolved to the extent that he believes the major obstacle facing deaf people is well-meaning but misinformed hearing individuals...The problem lies in the misuse of power exerted by so many professionals over the lives of deaf individuals from time of diagnosis through adulthood. (pp. 151-152)

Don Moores' sensitivity to his own experiences allowed him to look beyond the surface behavior of speech to the deeper issue of the construction of meaning, and beyond that concept to the basic question of whether or not the deaf person can become an active agent in the formulation of his/her world-view given the constraints externally imposed on the handicapped population by professionals who perceive themselves as superior. Unfortunately, the openness of an eclectic researcher like Moores must be contrasted with approaches to deaf persons which have firmly placed them in the role of the alienated other. A passage from a book rather euphorically entitled *A WORLD OF LANGUAGE FOR DEAF CHILDREN* may serve as an example - and a warning:

For some difficult children it is necessary to make them imitate--During the whole process of language acquisition imitation plays an important part. Deaf children must be set to imitate speech. The following example indicated that there was something wrong in the education: A boy said to me: 'Long here?' I said: 'Say how long will you stay here?' But the boy did not follow me. He insisted asking: 'Long here?' and was almost angry that I did not answer him soon enough! This revealed a wrong attitude in the boy. Deaf children must keep an attitude of trial and check, a feeling of wanting to be corrected..." (Van Uden, 1970, 78-79)

The punitive tone of this passage is striking. The facts -- that van Uden does not make an effort to respond to the child's question through expansion or conversational modeling, that no attention is given to what the child says as opposed to how he phrases it, and that one would rarely see such a transaction occurring between an adult and a normally-hearing child speaking telegraphically - pale in the wake of an underlying judgment of moral culpability. The condition of deafness leads this person - and others - to focus only on the deficiency, allowing the humanity of the student-subject to be conveniently bypassed and solidifying the power of the hearing teacher-researcher through absolute control over the utterance and interaction.<sup>4</sup> While the acquisition of standard English (or any other spoken/orthographic language) is, as was mentioned above, perceived as the primary educational problem related to deafness, it is not only in the language research that we see an inability on the part of researchers to look at the reality of the deaf-person-in-the-world. There is an entire body of literature that defines the deaf person as intellectually inferior and psychologically unstable.<sup>5</sup> Yet in examining the methodology, we find that the communication skills of the researchers were questionable--few, for example, were skilled in manual communication themselves, only a few even permitted or understood the use of manual communication by their subjects (Moores, 1978).

How can these sad circumstances be examined for positive purposes? And how does work with a group possessing special cognitive, affective and linguistic needs, a turbulent educational and social history and an esoteric communication system translate to the general education process?

First, let us address that initial confusion in a broader sense. It is not enough to look at deafness as a congenital or adventitious anomaly (the etiology of the handicap), a degree of disability (the number of decibels hearing loss) or a linguistic deficiency (a level on a standardized test). We must look at the deaf person functioning in the world to know his/her abilities and problems intimately. For example, a deaf child's ability to use his/her residual hearing and nonverbal communication skills with familiar persons may make him/her a more effective communicator than articulation and hearing tests might indicate. Likewise, the educator who works with minority group students, speakers of other languages, adult learners or any so-called "typical" youngster has an obligation to familiarize himself/herself with their world of meanings as much as is realistically possible. Other fields have recognized and made efforts to deal with this issue. The field of linguistics, for example, has concerned itself more recently with the subfields of psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, largely in reaction to the famous statement on linguistic theory by Noam Chomsky (1965):

Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in apply his (sic) knowledge of the language in actual performance. (p. 3)

It became apparent to linguists that the gap between research and theory would be insurmountable if all attention was to be focused on a hypothetical population that was at best limited and at worst nonexistent. Dell Hymes (1972), a sociolinguist, was moved in fact to declare that "Studying language in the classroom is not really 'applied' linguistics, it is really basic research" (xviii). Without an understanding of such areas as linguistic pragmatics, defined by Bates (1976) as "the study of indexical rules for relating linguistic form to a given context" (3) - the "given context" being a real situation - form takes primacy over content and investigation becomes arid.

The researcher, instructor or curricularist must constantly make an effort to approach pedagogical questions and research hypotheses from the viewpoint of the student-subject. In Gail McCutcheon's (1979) recent treatment of educational criticism, she suggests a strategy for observational analysis which puts the observer in a different intellectual framework. For example, the observer might approach the situation from a Piagetian or Marxian or mathematician's perspective. This strategy may be adapted to a student's framework through a sort of mental role-playing on the part of the educator as he/she analyzes the interaction, especially where discourse has been in some way interrupted or expectations have been proven inaccurate. Such a procedure presupposes some experience on the part of the researcher or instructor (although there may be good reason for bringing in inexperienced observers to create a more objectified critique at times) and communicative competence for the situation, whether that competence is defined as skill in American Sign Language or sign systems, Spanish, dialects, technical language or child language.

A somewhat simple example of the adoption of a student's perspective might serve to clarify this technique. An English teacher of postsecondary-level deaf students was puzzled by a high number of poor scores on a reading comprehension task that was apparently understood if the classroom discussion behavior was any indicator. The teacher tried to analyze the article from the students' viewpoint, with the students' assistance. First of all, the article was an historical one, and it had become evident to the teacher through experience that history was not a high educational priority in the schooling of many deaf youngsters, at least not in comparison to language and speech skills. With this bit of knowledge, the teacher began to read through her deaf students' eyes: "In the eighteenth century..." ("Century...100 years...oh yes, the 1800's...as a deaf person I would not have casually picked up phrases such as 'we in the twentieth century'"). When the teacher asked her students what years comprised the nineteenth century, they replied: "The 1900's." The teacher was then able to correct while affirming the logic of her students' reasoning, as she would have come to the same conclusion. But this same teacher had been told to attribute those test scores to "carelessness"

It is important at this point to make clear that knee-jerk empathy is not sufficient to either praxis or the process of education. If the English teacher of deaf students is so guilt-ridden as to feel compromised in, for example, defining the numerical progression of centuries or the properties of English verb forms, it is time for that teacher to seek some career counseling. Pedagogical intervention is necessary. But it does not need to violate the learner - rather, the attitude of the teacher/researcher can and should stimulate the person's desire to learn while affirming the capabilities and unique contributions of that person to the world and the classroom. And this is done, admittedly with no great ease, through communicative practice and the mental experiencing recommended above.

The second confusion and issue which has presented itself rather forcefully in the field of education of the deaf is the role and responsibility of the researcher. Deaf education is a field which has been torn apart by controversies over teaching methods. Beginning in the nineteenth century, a rift developed over whether deaf children were best taught by an oral-only method (thought to encourage the production of speech and speech-reading skills) or a combined method using some form of manual communication (thought to increase efficiency in the transfer of information, be psychologically healthier, and, with some systems, given a more accurate

visual representation of spoken language). The rift created open hostility, with rival camps claiming success. Researchers, most of whom were employed by the schools, found results that invariably supported the method in which they had a vested interest. And the battle is not over. There is a more recent controversy over whether or not American Sign Language (ASL), which has different grammatical structures than standard English, or manual English sign systems which try to visually represent English should be used in the classroom. Both viewpoints have sound reasoning. Proponents of both claim vindication through research.

As a result, many thoughtful researchers in the area of deafness have chosen to place their faith solely in numerical results, scores and graphs. Many of the researchers with whom I come in contact have an attitude that "philosophy is what destroyed deaf education, so let's not philosophize," when it was not "philosophy" but naive politicization of pedagogical concerns and personality conflicts (such as the well-documented disputes between Edward Miner Gallaudet and Alexander Graham Bell) which impeded the greater understanding of the deaf people who were lost in the struggles. As a result, researchers are guarding their objectivity like some sort of intellectual virginity. Doubtless, this has had some positive effects. But there is a real question as to whether or not, in education anyway, the "detached observer" can really observe. Obviously, the researcher who does not understand small children, deaf experience and "baby sign" will not know what is going on in the preschool classroom where he/she is conducting an experiment, although incidental bits of information may be gleaned. But "incidental bits of information" are less systematic than some of the non-experimental and phenomenological methods more analytically-oriented researchers have avoided. The uses of analytic social inquiry, new ethnography, thick description and constitutive phenomenology (vanManen, 1978) are alternatives. But these approaches require the researcher to examine and admit his/her own prejudices, beliefs and preconceptions. In a field as torn apart by bias as deafness, this is not easy. The researcher must understand, however, that the aforementioned methodologies go far beyond mere intuition in the conduct of descriptive research. Through investigating and elucidating perceptions, motivations and attitudes as revealed through observational and life-experience material, the researcher is using a solid data base. A price is exacted, however. The researcher, through a tacit commitment contracted by the seeking out of background material, the development (for work with some populations) of certain linguistic, paralinguistic and technical skills, and the selection of specific groups to study and/or instruct, has invested something of the self in his/her research and must now constantly guard against what Freire (1970) calls "banking"--when the investment becomes compartmentalized, predictable and routinized. This investment, and the consciousness it evokes, are painful. Frank Caccamise (1974), a sign language researcher and deaf educator, has constructed a list of what hearing people who work with deaf people must realize and act upon. Among the items he lists are included an awareness of the teacher's/researcher's/friends's own limitations in the act of communication with a deaf person, the self-determination and autonomy of deaf people in their educational process and their daily lives, and the need for the hearing person to modify communication behaviors, rules and codes. Caccamise's list of "Musts' for Hearing People" has significant implications for the educational researcher. It is the right of the student to assume responsibility and to construct certain rules for performance and interaction in the educational setting. Gumperz and Hernandez-Chavez (1972) in a study of bilingual classrooms have noted that an elaborate code-switching among language and dialects occurred with Chicano children and adults - but only when all participants were Chicano and, for the most part, when conversation revolved around personal experience.

In such situations, all that the instructor or investigator is NOT becomes poignantly apparent. The researcher must be integrated and self-realized enough to face this reality and make a contribution within the limits of the educational and societal norms and values in which he/she has chosen to participate. In this way, the research coming out of such an attitude will be more accurate and descriptive.

The third and final issue is a methodological one. We must find as many ways and means possible for our subjects and students to articulate their experiences, in order to maintain a focus on the persons in whom we are interested. In deaf education, this has been a recurring concern. Standardized tests normed on hearing persons have obviously not contributed much to the knowledge of what deaf people truly know. When possible, schools have invested in videotape equipment only to have children and adults freeze before the profusion of wires and lenses. A fear of the writing sample, based on students' problems with standard English, has led

to the avoidance of that vehicle. As a result, not much of the direct perception by the deaf person of his/her experience has been recorded.

The capacity for videotaping is a genuine technological marvel and can be used when the researcher/teacher and subject/student have good rapport. Videotape machinery may also be used when the material being elicited is of a more cerebral nature, such as investigating language or nonverbal communication cues. Another relatively unexplored area is the application of theatre experiences and techniques in asking students to describe their life experiences, although some initial work has been done in this area at the University of Rochester (Pinar & Gumet, 1976) and described theoretically in TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM.

In my work at the National Technical Institute for the Deaf examining college-age deaf students' perceptions of their communication experiences, I will be relying heavily on writing samples, despite the already-identified problem area of learning written language with a hearing-impairment. There are several reasons for this. First, I am working with an adult deaf population who, as Moores (1978) pointed out in the above quote, possess some language skills. After eight years of teaching this population, I believe in their ability to carry out the task-perhaps not grammatically, but for the most part intelligibly. Second, writing is a "cool" medium with which I can guarantee the student anonymity. Previous samples and interviews conducted by the author suggest an anxiety on the part of the student "to say the right thing." Some sort of psychological distance may eliminate some of the facade. Third, the medium - cold hard print - will become the message by virtue of what the student says and does not say about his/her educational experience. No lapse of real time or evaporation of gesture or word into space will erase what is on the page.

Of course, there are communicative requirements in the formulation of the questions the researcher asks for in print as well as in face-to-face interactions. First, there will be a personal interaction with the students prior to the spontaneous writing to allay any concerns that the student might have and to give the students a face to attach to the project. Students who have been subjects for research balk understandably at impersonality in treatment of themselves. The researcher could identify himself/herself and explain some of his/her interests casually without telling the students what to write. I may, for example, talk about my interest in a new kind of curriculum and my need to know about students' previous educational experiences. In this way, students have a feeling for me as a person interested in improving their educational experiences without knowing "what I want." Second, the written question must communicate to the student. This means that attention should be paid in writing the question using linguistic structure, vocabulary and idioms with which students are familiar. Common sense and the intuitions born of experience with various students and groups of students are helpful here. So are sensitive teachers and conversation with other students about whether or not the task is clear, understandable and appropriate. Students are frequently one's best consultants. But if one or two students become constant consultants (a not-very-desirable but sometimes unavoidable circumstance), they should not be misused, but rewarded appropriately. For older students, this mean remuneration for what becomes a job.

### Conclusion and Summary

In summary, the conduct of research and the conceptualization and design of curriculum require a basic understanding of one's clientele, a self-examination of one's role and responsibility as a curricularist, and communication abilities appropriate to the population involved.

On the basis of experience with one group of learners, the author recommends the following general principles in the interactions that take place during the conduct of descriptive research:

1. The researcher must read previous research done on specific populations critically. Literature written by members of that population should be particularly studied.
2. The researcher should attend to his/her own progression in thinking about the persons he/she is interacting with and studying, and should record this evolution journalistically.
3. The researcher must possess and use a wide range of communication skills for the group with which he/she works.
4. The researcher should examine the functional person in a world of meanings--not only the child of the clinic or History 101B.

5. The researcher should try to approximate the mental states of members of his/her population through role-playing, interaction with subjects and imaginative meditation.
6. The researcher should examine his/her own preconceptions in the light of some descriptive and phenomenological techniques in order to more objectively probe the underlying structures of his/her research questions.
7. Because of the preconceived limitations of certain strategies for eliciting information, the researcher should not give up on them, but develop skill in analyzing the given material with honesty toward the questions raised by the method.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. There is currently some controversy over the word "handicapped." It is argued that the application of the word to a person suggests some inadequacy on the part of the individual or individuals thus described. I do not interpret the state of being handicapped as necessarily some internal malfunction, but rather a condition imposed by the larger society's reaction when its norms and expectations are violated by the presence of some disability.
2. Bonnie Meath-Lang, "Phenomenological and Existential Considerations in the Conduct of Research on Deafness." In press, 1979.
3. This paper will, for the most part, address issues relating to the education of the prelingually or pre-linguistically deaf person, that is, the person who is either born deaf or deafened before the age when most spontaneous language acquisition has taken place (about three to four years of age).
4. The interaction was also linguistically unsound. The role of imitation in language development is not clear. See, for example, U. Bellugi and R. Brown (Eds.), *THE ACQUISITION OF LANGUAGE*. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1964; S. Ervin, "Imitation and Structural Change in Children's Language." In E.H. Lenneberg (Ed.), *NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
5. To cite a complete list of these references would distract from the overall presentation. An excellent review of the literatures in intellectual functioning and mental health of deaf persons can be found in Donald F. Moores, *EDUCATING THE DEAF: PSYCHOLOGY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, 129-138; 140-152.

#### REFERENCES


- Bates, Elizabeth. *LANGUAGE AND CONTEXT: THE ACQUISITION OF PRAGMATICS*. New York: Academic Press, 1976.
- Caccamise, Frank C. " 'Must ' for Hearing People." *AMERICAN ANNALS OF THE DEAF*. 1974, 119, pp. 296-297.
- Chomsky, Noam. *ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1965.
- Freire, Paulo. *THE PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED*. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.
- Hymes, Dell. "Introduction," in Courtney Cazden, Vera John and Dell Hymes (Eds.), *FUNCTIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE CLASSROOM*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1972.
- McCutcheon, Gail. "Educational Criticism: Methods and Application." *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, 1979, pp. 5-25.
- Moores, Donald F. *EDUCATING THE DEAF: PSYCHOLOGY, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978.
- Pinar, William and Gruemt, Madeleine R. *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*. Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt, 1976.
- Skinner, B.F. *VERBAL BEHAVIOR*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957.
- Sontag, Susan. *ILLNESS AS METAPHOR*. New York: Farrar Strauss Giroux, 1978.



van Manen, Max. "Objective Inquiry into Structures of Subjectivity." *JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, 1978, 1:1, pp. 44-64.

Van Uden, A. *A WORLD OF LANGUAGE FOR DEAF CHILDREN*. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1970.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.



## Curriculum Perspectives

is a new Australian journal on curriculum which should be of interest to lecturers, advisory teachers, consultants, administrators and teachers.

Two issues of the journal will be provided each year and topics will cover short, practical case study examples of curriculum in action, as well as longer, theoretical articles. It will be a very relevant forum for the sharing of ideas about school-based curriculum.

### Editors

Dr. Colin Marsh, Murdoch University, South St., MURDOCH, W.A. 6153.  
Dr. Geoff Beeson, Rusden State College, 662 Blackburn Rd., CLAYTON, VIC 3168.  
Mr. Ron Morgan, University of New England, ARMIDALE, NSW 2351

### Editorial Board

ACT	Mr Phillip Hughes	Canberra College of Advanced Education
ACT	Dr Malcolm Skilbeck	Curriculum Development Centre
NSW	Dr David Cohen	Education Department of NSW
NSW	Prof Jack Walton	University of New England
NT	Mr Geoff Spring	Curriculum and Research Branch, Darwin
QLD	Prof Glen Evans	University of Queensland
SA	Prof Colin Power	Flinders University
SA	Dr Jill Maling-Keepes	Adelaide College of the Arts and Education
TAS	Mr Hugh Campbell	Dept. of Education, Hobart
VIC	Prof Peter Fensham	Monash University
VIC	Dr Graham Whitehead	Education Department of Victoria
VIC	Prof W.G. Walker	Staff College, Victoria

To ensure your copy of this new curriculum journal complete the tear-off slip below. Subscriptions are based on a financial year of July-June and for the 1980/81 subscription, you will receive two issues of *CURRICULUM PERSPECTIVES* (October and May) and two newsletters.

NAME: \_\_\_\_\_ AFFILIATION: \_\_\_\_\_

ADDRESS: \_\_\_\_\_ CITY: \_\_\_\_\_

COUNTRY: \_\_\_\_\_ POSTCODE: \_\_\_\_\_

I enclose \$10 Australian (individual) \$12 Australian (institution) as my subscription for 1980-81. Add \$4 for subscriptions outside of Australia for postage and handling.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Note: Make cheques payable to:

**CURRICULUM INTEREST GROUP**  
C/- Dr. Murray Print, C.I.G. Business Manager  
Mt. Lawley College of Advanced Education  
Bradford Street  
MT. LAWLEY, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 6050.

## Toward Curricula That Are Of, By, and Therefore for Students

William H. Schubert and  
Ann Lynn Lopez Schubert  
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

"...a government of, by, and for the people..."

It is our central purpose to argue that schools should create curricula that are of, by, and for the students they serve. We also wish to argue that most students experience curricula that are not of, by, and for them. Their curricular experience is admittedly intended for them, but it cannot be for in the sense that it is personally meaningful to them, unless it is first of and by the experience that life has wrought within them.

#### Hesse's Hans and Others 'Beneath the Wheel'

The life of Hans Giebenrath illustrates this distinction. Hans, the principal character in Hermann Hesse's novel *BENEATH THE WHEEL*, is an adolescent living in a small German town in the late 19th century. The town is relatively untouched by the outside world except in the case of major events and extraordinary achievements. Hans' performance in school became one such extraordinary achievement. Ministers, school masters, and the like were quick to realize that Hans had special gifts of intellect. They were equally quick to offer, even impose, their assistance to Hans. They unquestioningly accepted their roles as determiners and bestowers of intellectual gifts that would be good for Hans. The acquisition of these gifts became, for awhile, Hans' single-minded pursuit. His steadfast study brought honor, recognition, high scores on the state examination, and acceptance to the prestigious Maulbronn Theological Academy.

The glory that he thought he gained became an apparition of the personal meaning he lost during sacrifice to studies. At the academy, he befriended Heilner, a rebellious lad who valued his own poetic expression more than the time-honored curriculum designed especially for the benefit of gifted youth who were deemed worthy of receiving it. Through Heilner, Hans saw a glimmer of the possibility that he was more than the composite expectations that others had for him.

Reviewer Donald Heiney (1968) criticized Hesse for character portrayal that resembled puppetry, reminiscent of Thurber-like drawings that portray what T.S. Eliot called the hollow men. Heiney further said that Hans was soul and spirit (German Geist) while Heilner was flesh and creativity (German Natur). We, instead, regard the hollowness of character as very much intended by Hesse, not a fault of his portrayal. Hans and Heilner felt a tinge of what it might be if they were to become more than a role, a functionary, even one granted honors. As Heilner intuited, "there's something higher than the Hebrew alphabet." (Hesse, 1968, p. 84)

Their personal quests for this "something" that provides meaning ran counter to the success routes at the academy again and again. First Heilner and later Hans was forced to choose exile from the academy. In the final portion of *BENEATH THE WHEEL* Hesse continues to paint the sordid lifescape of Hans' decline. Hans returns to his hometown to be ostracized as both an intellectual failure and a community misfit by those who initially designed his role, course of study, as a budding scholar. The fact that Hans was cajoled and coerced in the above manner effectually transformed his life from a potentially self-directive person to that of a role. Thus, still in adolescence, Hans possessed barely more than a spark of a once burning fire of potential to investigate and nurture a sense of meaning to guide his life. Hesse leads the reader to conclude that either Hans caught a glimpse of an impenetrable constraint on his becoming, or that he moved into a state of utter confusion. Whether one or a combination of these was Hesse's intent, the story of Hans ended tragically. More far reaching than the singularity of Hans' untimely death is the widespread tragedy of transforming a person's search for meaning into a role. The theme is well portrayed in Kafka's *THE TRIAL*. William Pinar (1977) spoke directly to this point in a presentation wherein he discussed priorities in curriculum scholarship. He described the plight of Joseph "K.", Kafka's main character, as one of profound metaphysical, psychological and political significance. K. was almost entirely a role. He was a banker, a quite competent one. Yet, he

lacked a personal life. The little meaning that he had in life derived from his work. The work was quite mundane and almost entirely limited to linear thought patterns. K. had little opportunity to reflect, to see his past as part of his present, to look at his present through multiple lenses, to imaginatively project alternative futures. He had not experienced the expansion that viewing a synthesis of these perspectives on oneself can bring. He had not experienced the further syntheses that can evolve when such perspectives are intimately shared with others. Thus, when he was arrested he had no contexts from which to understand his predicament. He was, in short, baffled and immobilized. To overcome and/or prevent such plights should be a great priority of curriculum scholars.

K. was, perhaps, a Hans who even more tragically reached adulthood having had the spark of quest for meaning extinguished so thoroughly that he ceased to feel anything was absent. K. can be interpreted to represent the product of a life curriculum that is intended for, without being of or by the recipient of it. Admittedly, this tragic state cannot solely be attributed to schooling alone. It is surely due to a holistic cultural impact. No one institution or coterie of individuals can be accused of responsibility for such a phenomenon. Moreover, it is a quixotic overgeneralization to cast the blame toward technocratic society at large. Responsibility will not be generated by escalation or diminution of technological equipment. The latter is mere acouterment. The problem lies in the quality of transactions among persons.

#### The Role of Schooling vis a vis the Wheel

We hold that transactions among persons in schools have a significant role to play in this process. The power of schooling to influence activity that is more humane than the society that provides the context for that schooling is always a point that elicits hearty debate. Dare the schools build a new social order? (Counts, 1932) is invariably invoked. So, too, is the position of those who see schools as mere reflections of the social order of yesteryear. One such debate comes to mind. It took place at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the John Dewey Society in Chicago. The discussion followed a presentation and critique of *THE ANTI-MAN CULTURE* by Charles Tesconi and Van Cleve Morris (1972). After the debate raged on for half an hour or so, the clarion and seasoned voice of William O. Stanley made clear his stance. It was moving to hear him, in Deweyan character, move beyond partisan rhetoric to argue compellingly that while schools cannot change the social order, they have some weight to throw around. If they had no such leverage, he continued, there would be little reason to want to be an educator. An educator must be able to embrace the hope that he/she can lead others to something better or more meaningful. We contend the transactions that occur between teacher and taught can make a profound difference in the perspective that a person has on life. It is clearly possible for a teacher who has a steadfast commitment to grow in self-understanding or to derive meaning from an intellectual interest to share his or her experience with students. Students may grow to reflect such a teacher far more thoroughly than they reflect mainstream societal values. The view that schools generically reflect society, we suggest, is symptomatic of the conceptual empiricist propensity to seek educational laws. To look, instead, through the lenses of practical science one does not first see schooling generically; rather, one perceives hosts of situationally specific educative transactions. Among these experiences it is fully possible for some to be emancipatory while others, indeed, do push students beneath the wheel. It is only the average effect that mirrors the social order, and the average rarely exists in the lives of individuals.

Surely, many students today are pushed "beneath the wheel" as was Hesse's Hans. Many adults, thus become more role than person as did Kafka's K. Yet, whenever a teacher engages students in meaningful dialogue, the students can edge toward freedom from the wheel and thereby counteract the transformation from person to role.

The portrayals by both Hesse and Kafka caused us to repeatedly conure a macabre image. We envisioned a pit from which students were continuously prodded to climb, only to have the pit's rim surrounded by cohorts of the prodders whose job was to step on the fingers of hands that teached the top. The pit's image was strangely reminiscent of Plato's cave. In this light (or should it be darkness?) we could not help reflecting on many of our own students. We found many, even in grammar school, to be like Hans, making their last pathetic attempts to grasp for meaning when the capacity to do so was already diminishing with great rapidity. Whether we reflect on our teaching in grammar school or college, the dominant mode of curriculum and

instruction can be epitomized by Paulo Freire's banking analogy. This orientation, castigated by Freire, portrays teachers as storehouses and purveyors of knowledge. Teachers are thinkers, talkers, disciplinarians, selectors, enforcers. Students are recipients, listeners, receivers, disciplined, compliers, adapters. In short, teachers are active subjects while students are passive objects (1970, p. 59). This pervasive orientation to education must be overcome if students are to engage in productive dialogue with their environments, dialogue that acknowledges their essential worth at the onset and enables them to create their own freedom and carve out their own sources of meaning. This, too, we have been privileged to experience, sometimes as an actively involved agent. Nevertheless, as anyone even remotely connected with schooling knows, the latter is a far rarer phenomenon than the banking approach. Though rarer, the dialogic relationship does exist, giving credence to the notion that it could exist more fully.

#### Toward Curricula that Bring Personal Meaning to Students

Let us attempt to provide a rationale for our emphasis on the importance of personal meaning as an end of curriculum theorizing. From conception to grave, perhaps further on both ends, human beings combine their physiological and genetic composition with the substance of their experience to form personal "theories" that guide subsequent experience. These theories, albeit rudimentary and often laden with contradiction, are continuously reformed, refined, and revised (Schubert, 1978). They constitute the orientations that we use to make meaning within the continual flow of dilemmas and delights that living provides. This experiential flow is our curriculum in the broadest sense.

The theories within us are often reconstructed by helpful transactions with perceptive others, other persons who get to know us well enough to step within our reference frames and suggest alterations. Through their help we come to see some aspect of our situation more clearly. Their imaginative perception and sensitive action reflects a mode of research that is quite different from that usually accepted within the cloistered halls of academia today. Their mode is largely practical and productive. It begins in sensing an imbalance, a problem. It inquires through interaction and takes specific actual conditions as its subject matter. Its end is restoration of balance that enhance decision and action. This is science not foreign to that outlined by Dewey (1929) and Schwab (1978). It occurs within the context of action and, thus, pertains to curricula, curriculum theorizing, reconceptualizing. We begin to feel with Buckminster Fuller (1970) that we are, in fact, verbs. Curriculum theorizing is inquiry in the course of action. Thelen (1960, p. 208-209) describes action and inquiry as central to the human quest. Schubert (1977, p. 560-52) describes their union as essential to curriculum decision making. This is not the kind of inquiry practiced by the social scientist who carefully delineates research questions from a single extant theory, as worthwhile as such inquiry may be. It is not activity that is guided by preordained goals. Such goals are "tackings on," inadequate substitutes for sound philosophies, the kind of intellectual rhetoric that Goodlad (1978) criticizes as serving primarily to rationalize whatever it is that occurs. Both preordained goals and theoretic research contribute more fully to the writings of findings and to the finding of publishable knowledge than they contribute to decision and action.

In a recent critique of the reconceptualist position Tanner and Tanner (1979) claim that reconceptualization is a striving for freedom from research. This point can be conceded if reference is given to theoretic research, but not to practical inquiry. Practical inquiry can lead to the creation of new experiences for individuals in specific situations, experiences that educate because they bolster, refine, and augment the evolving theories or orientations within persons as they face the conditions of their living. Surely this is a worthwhile end of practical curriculum inquiry. The ongoing reconceptualization of curriculum between teacher and student is in essence the carving out of a journey that overcomes the mass production of what T.S. Eliot starkly portrays as hollow men:

We are the hollow men  
 We are the stuffed men  
 Learning together  
 Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!  
 Our dried voices, when  
 We whisper together

Are quiet and meaningless  
 As wind in dry grass  
 Or rats' feet over broken glass  
 In our dry cellar

Shape without form, shade without colour,  
 Paralyzed force, gesture without motion;

It is precisely this condition that we, who attempt to continuously reconceptualize curriculum, must prevent. We must intercept what Eliot calls "the Shadow" before it intercepts the possibility of personal meaning:

Between the idea  
 And the reality  
 Between the notion  
 And the act  
 Falls the Shadow

Between the conception  
 And the creation  
 Between the emotion  
 And the response  
 Falls the Shadow

Between the desire  
 And the spasm  
 Between the potency  
 And the existence  
 Between the essence  
 And the descent  
 Falls the Shadow

Surely, "the Shadow" here can be interpreted as death. However, we choose to view it as the deadening of potential for seeking meaning in one's life. Life without meaning, purpose, and a sense of urgency is a kind of living death. Those who promote curricula in schools or elsewhere, that are primarily designed to convey skills and prepare persons for roles, do little that directly combats the shadow. They perhaps unwittingly, promote curricula that have little chance of synthesis with the personal "theory" that gives them purpose and direction.

#### A Curriculum That Is Of, By, and For Students

Lest readers get the impression that we call for radical or subversive alteration of values implicit in American education, we wish to argue that our emphasis is quite thoroughly in harmony with American democratic ideals. Witness, the "Declaration of Independence;" few would dispute its status as an emancipatory document. Moreover, we contend that curriculum developers who are satisfied to simply convey skills and provide for roles promote anti-democratic ideals. They do not provide for public emancipation, except of a cursory kind.

Let us return for a moment to our initial emphasis. In the first paragraph we called for reflection on the oft-quoted "...government of, by, and for the people." Quite simply, if education is indeed in the public interest, if it is to truly serve the public, it must not merely be devised for them. This notion of for presumes that someone (teachers, curriculum designers, etc.) can determine what are beneficial educational experiences for others (students), i.e., what is in their best interest, without knowing sources of meaning in their lives.

This presumption has too long neglected the educative correlates of the democratic pronouncement that gives it context. Creation of curricula that are beneficial for others must, we argue, be nurtured in cooperation with students. Such curricula must be of and by students and, therefore, for them. Perhaps more intent than meets the eye lies behind the sequence in "of, by, and for the people." Or and by always precede for. Our interpretation is that in education as well as in government, if something is to be truly for others it must first be of and by them. A curriculum that is for students must stem from interaction with them. Its purpose should be to improve the evolving personal "theory" that gives them meaning; hence, it must be of them. It must evolve through interactive dialogue (as in Freire, 1970) with them; hence, it must be by them. Only through the prerequisites of and by can curricula be created that are for students. To purport a curriculum that is for students, but not of or by them, is to mask elitism and to debase democracy.

It is, perhaps, in the continuous cycle of reconstructing or reconceptualizing curriculum that is of, by, and for students that curriculum theorizing takes its most concrete and penetrating form. In the changing flow of situational needs this process is never made but always in the process of being made. It is, we re-emphasize, a practical form of research, not foreign to Dewey (1929, 1938), Schwab (1978), Habermas (McCarthy, 1978), Pinar (1978), and others. It is, however, sufficiently a line to the dominant social science or conceptual empiricist notion of research that the temptation to refuse to recognize it as research (e.g., Tanner and Tanner, 1979) is understandable.

This confusion is, in fact, epitomized in the essential difference in root between curriculum and currere. It is the difference between noun and verb, content and process, static and active. The active orientation also helps to refute the often crisp critique leveled at neo-Marxist academics; namely, as Lewis Cole (THE WILSON QUARTERLY, 1979) observes, such writers tend to promote theories without movements. Doing curriculum, however, can be a different case. It is rooted in action. It is integral to education which Dewey often (e.g., 1916, pp. 338-321) called the testing ground of philosophy. Thus, a case can be made that the neo-Marxist undercurrent implicit in the act of reconceptualizing curriculum theory, in fact, has a movement. It is in the subtly powerful interaction of some teachers and curriculum-makers with their students. It is in the daily striving of teachers who try to understand their students' sources of meaning, their out-of-school curricula, their personal "theories" or sense-making constructs. It exists in attempts made by such teachers to determine how their experience and knowledge can bolster their students' quest for meaning.

Attempts to reconceptualize curriculum have admittedly been prevalent in the actions of good teachers throughout history. Such teachers seek to know their students' experiences and to value them. Such teachers seek to identify basic principles (normative and quasi-factual) that guide their students' decisions and actions. They seek to enable students to know these principles that guide their lives, to know the sources of those principles, and to evaluate and revise them in view of alternative principles in light of consequences of decision and action. It must be admitted, however, that teachers who have done these things have been clearly in the minority. It is, we suggest a responsibility of curriculum scholars to enable teachers to continuously reconceptualize curricular experiences that are of, by, and therefore, for students. In complement, teachers who do these things will reap similar benefits. Their one experience with students will likewise provide educative experiences that are of, by, and for them. It is through this process that both students and teachers can be emancipated from constraint and empowered to discover and create meaning. Using Eliot's metaphor, they can intercept the Shadow that deadens meaning. Using Hesse's metaphor, they can create their own curriculum and not be crushed beneath the wheels of curricular that are derived by others.

### Applications

During the past three years experiential information has accumulated to make us increasingly convinced that school activities are devoid of meaning for students if they do not: (1) build upon students' pasts; (2) enable them to imaginatively project futures to which they can aspire; (3) magnify the bewildering swarm that is their present; and (4) help students create a synthesis of these three great episodes of living. The interpretations of our experience which follow are not intended to be ultimate solutions, but they represent steps that we have taken with two quite different groups of students, to create curricula. The first setting is a grammar school in a Chicago barrio. The students there ranged from six to sixteen years of age. The second is a small

group of graduate students in a curriculum theory course. In each case our purpose was to learn about students' viewpoints; the accumulating personal "theory" that helps them interpret experience, make decisions, and act. In each case we attempted to reconceptualize curriculum to fit what we learned. In both cases, however, curricular expectations and mandates provided limitations. It is difficult to say whether these limitations were largely positive, innocuous, or negative. Hopefully, our awareness of these constrictions moved us to a freedom of special creativity because of them; as Ilse Aichinger's bound man (1974), who discovered that by remaining entirely within the constraints of his rope he was free from it. In any event, the grammar school experience was limited by the mandate to teach English as a second language and the graduate school experience was limited by the mandate to teach about curriculum theory.

Our primary intent was to create curricular experiences that were: (1) of students' experiences and perspectives, (2) by student as well as teacher design, and (3) for students because they improved their perspectives about matters that held meaning for them. Our choice of method differed with the two groups. It was quite direct with grammar school students. In brief, Hugh Munby's advice epitomizes the approach: that "...when we wish to learn what children think of their classroom experiences, we ought to ask them." (Munby, 1979, 248). This, we assume could be applied to a desire to learn about non-classroom experiences of students as well. The method used with graduate students involved the less direct use of analogy.

First we will consider the grammar school experience, then the graduate school one. Each section begins with a "stage setting" of the tendencies for students to move beneath the wheel or to be intercepted by the shadow. Teaching and learning strategies follow these descriptions.

#### CASE I: Attempts to Build Curricula That are Of, By, and For Students in a Chicago Barrio (Reflections of Ann Lynn Lopez Schubert)

The existence of curricula that are designed for but are neither of nor by students is vividly amplified in barrio schools where daily life experiences of children and youth are virtually unknown by those who design curriculum. I thought that I had a head start. The school I taught in was the school that I had attended as a child, and my father had attended before me. I had lived within two city blocks of the school my entire life. I had imagined that my Spanish heritage, my interest and studies with regard to the Hispanic people, and my personal relationship with the school and the barrio (neighborhood) would provide me with special ways in which to share meaningfully with students. I was surprised.

I met my students and tried to exchange superficial information relative to who we each were (names, ages, places of residence, birth dates, and the like). I discovered many of them did not know these things. I further discovered that what these children did know, personally, and vividly, was a conception of reality influenced by an environment of violence, poverty, fear, destruction, and chaos. What I sensed they wanted to do was to articulate the experiences of their environments which were helping them to name the world, helping them to name themselves. What I wanted to do was to help them in their attempts to reconstruct these experiences. We wanted to talk about who we each really were, who we are now, and who we hope to become. The special way in which I had been prepared to share meaningfully with the students had been and continues to become the way that I develop as a person generally; specifically: my commitment to become more fully aware of those environments which have shared in transforming my theory of reality and which I have transformed.

I wondered...Who are these people, my students? Can I hope to know who they are when I am continuously in the process of discovering and defining who I am? Can I make a genuine attempt at making meaning with these persons if we do not know who we are...or is it the process of this search, this continual reconstructing of our experiences, this critical awareness of forces shaping and being shaped by us, this vital dialogue of being and becoming that is the essence of making meaning? The experiences we shared indicated it is, indeed.

\*\*\*\*\*

Some students I came to know...

Cesar was eight years old. His mother was "out" most of the time with her friends. Cesar's nine year old sister took care of him. The highlights of the children's relationship with their mother came during

her frequent suicide attempts. Her repertoire including jumping out of the third floor window and breaking both legs, taking drug overdoses, and slashing her wrists. Her grand scale attempts usually came near Christmas.

Carmen came from a calm home; mother, father, six sisters and two brothers. Her parents took good care of her and always called her to come in before the nightly shooting began on her corner. She lived down the street from the territorial wall of the ruling street gang. Guards protected the wall from being defaced, with their lives.

Eduardo brought his soap and wash cloth to school each day. The water pipes in his building had frozen and broken from the cold. The landlord had no intention of fixing them - ever. His family lived without running water. I showed him how to call the City Board of Health. They said they would look into it, but too many other people were in the same boat.

Miguel was seven years old. His father left when he was two. His mother dumped him with his eighty year old grandmother when he was three. He fended for himself. He and I came to care about each other. The grandmother decided she didn't want him around and sent him to live in another state.

Luz saw her mother and father try many times to kill one another. When she lacked the physical reality, the knives, the blood, the hatred, she filled her dreams - while sleeping and while awake. Luz thought she was having heart attacks. She was nine.

Blanca saw her uncle beat his wife and child until the year old child "went to sleep." Then he just threw its toys at it. They took the baby to a private physician who would be certain to forget to report the incident to the authorities...it had a concussion, broken pelvis, broken ribs, and perhaps would live. The aunt and her husband are together.

Jose didn't speak to me for a long time. He was sixteen, a gang leader. Spending hours with him his only response was a low key laugh. When he did speak I learned...he had murdered, been arrested for selling drugs, and fathered two children by different women. His mother was afraid of him.

Raul enjoyed making animal noises. His seven sisters enjoyed playing with him. One of their favorite games was to smash his teeth on rocks. It also amused them to hold a scissors to his heart and pretend to kill him - once this game led him to the hospital for stitches. The sisters also control his mother, who is twelve years old than the eldest sister. She knows just how far she can go before they "crack her down."

Abraham's apartment building had a massive fire. Arson is a sport that many of the children in the area have become aces at. He told me that everything was ruined, two walls had been demolished, smoke had damaged the remainder. They had no insurance. They continued to live in the apartment.

Carlos asked me what would happen to him if he killed his father. He showed me a knife he had in his tempera paint box. His father had beaten him so severely and frequently that he had decided that next time would be the last.

Ana and Moises told us about their aunt whose head was beaten open, by her husband, in their apartment. The blood was all over the wall. They said that they painted over it, but it still shows through.

Rosa was eleven years old. She spent her evenings going on double dates with her mother. One date in particular impressed her - a navy man who took her to a Chinese restaurant. She thought she might continue to see him on her own.

Seven year old Maria liked to stay up late at night watching television. If her mother tried to convince her to go to bed she would "smack" the mother. The mother stopped trying to make the child go to bed. The child slept a good deal of the time in school. Her talents came to use when a man tried to molest her on the way to school. She kicked and smacked him enough to leave a deep gash on his face and gain her freedom.

Javier had a hard time reading. He couldn't see clearly. He told us about a boy who had thrown rocks in his eyes repeatedly. The boy was a hallguard down the corridor. Javier was twelve. No one had asked if his vision was impaired. We set up an appointment to have his eyes examined by a physician. It was discovered that Javier also had diabetes.

Ivelisse brought a mouse to school. She caught it in her bed. It wasn't hard to do - she sleeps with four other people. The mouse had a difficult time trying to get through the mass.

Zenaida saw her next door neighbor get his guts blown out by a sawed off shot gun. He then eeked his way up the stairs to his building, leaving a trail of blood and guts, as he tried to reach for help. He never made it.



Pedro's father used to be involved in drugs. He had to leave the family because of his involvements. One night a man broke into Pedro's house and held a gun to his mother's head and told the children that if they didn't show where the stuff was hidden he would blow their mother's head off. He also told them that he had already done this to their father.

Emelyn was nine. Someone had ransacked her apartment the week of Thanksgiving. All their food and furniture - gone. The only meals the children were having were the ones that they got free at school. The mother begged lunch at the neighbors, for herself. When the welfare check came it would be better. They couldn't call the police.

Nine year old Ana lived as a squatter...in a condemned building. There was no water, no heat, nowhere else to go. Her mother hired a gang member to bring young girls to her. The mother enjoyed beating and sexually molesting young girls in front of the children. Ana developed a physical ailment from a diseased cat she slept with, in her unwashed clothes, each night.

\*\*\*\*\*

How do we name reality?

\*\*\*\*\*

Some strategies employed...

#### Listening

More often than not a person will have an experience that he/she urgently wishes to share with others. Perhaps the experience is a reflection on the past, perhaps it is a current one. In any case, it is important to provide the opportunity for the person to articulate his/her experience. Through the articulation the individual brings the experience to the focus of his/her own examination. He/she also allows others to examine the experience from their own perspectives, and offer these interpretations for further examination. By providing an environment that encourages persons to speak freely, listen intently, and reflect critically, the process of meaning-making is enhanced.

I discovered that starting from the experiences offered by students (and sometimes by myself) an intense dialogue could ensue. On occasion our conversations would be sparked through a story, a magazine or newspaper article, an artifact, a piece of music, or an incidental happening in our immediate shared environment. Most often, especially as we grew to know and feel comfort in one another, the sharing would start from our own theory of being.

#### Playing

Though the process of "being someone else" or acting in a role foreign to us, we are able to bring to focus much of what we view as real. Through interchange with others who are also playing a role we can examine and test some of these assumptions. Through play we are able to act on some of our conceptions and test them out. An added advantage of play is that the consequences of experimenting are not quite so serious as in "real" life yet the learning can be very intense.

Some of the things we found to be useful were: role playing, in which a situation was given, parts or roles were assigned, an initial line of dialogue may or may not be given depending upon the student's desire, and perhaps props would be used...students would then engage in play dialogue in regard to the situation; doll playing, in which students were allowed to choose a doll or "pet" and join with the others in the process of daily life using the miniature furniture, carpeting, and whatever else could be created; enterprise playing, in which we would strive to create a "real" environment for work such as a restaurant or a shopping center...we would begin by defining and creating the physical environment, then the roles, finally engaging in the functioning of the environment; and playing for an audience, in which we explored a situation, created a physical environment for the situation, then invited an audience to watch as we interpreted the human environment.

#### Creating

Drawing, painting, printing, and collage played an important part in our naming of reality. The artwork always served the purpose of helping us better articulate our concerns, our experiences, our ways of making sense of the world. Some ways in which we made meaning through the visual arts follow:

### Dictated drawing-

Students would tell me what to draw, describing things in great detail, refining their descriptions until the scene was as they had intended it to be. Often times I would encourage them to incorporate themselves in the drawing.

### Drawing/Painting on a theme-

We would each compose a visual representation of a situation or an event that we shared in our experiences. Some examples might be: our families, yesterday, ourselves at age three, a circumstance for joy, ourselves at play...

### Printmaking -

We made various symbols as well as free form designs from vegetables and made individual representations of our own choosing. We also collaborated in group printmaking naming and renaming our creation as it took form.

### Murals-

We collaborated on many murals. The impetus for such projects was the incredible sharing that was necessary in a community venture to create a visual image of the reality we each knew. The medium used for the murals varied--sometimes we worked in chalk, sometimes paint, most often we used cut out figures to create a collage.

We approached the creations slowly, with deliberation, reflection, and much communication...What do we need? Where does it go? What is its purpose? What are we creating? What is its significance? How real is it? What does it portray of us?...

### Portraits -

Using charcoal, we drew our conceptions of one another. We took our time and examined how we saw one another visually. We also drew ourselves in various ways: from memory, by looking in a mirror, by looking into our past, by looking into our future.

The guidelines imposed upon me by the school were simply to teach English as a second language. My own guidelines were to come to know these persons I was to work with, have them come to know me, and as a combined effort become better empowered to critically examine, refine, and take responsibility for who we are and what we are becoming. Working within, and strengthened by these guidelines, we had dialogue, we shared in experience, we transacted, we became more fully aware. We moved, through our efforts, toward life. We initiated the struggle Eugenio Florit's butterfly will never have the opportunity to engage in...

A la mariposa muerta  
 Tu jubilo, en el vuelo;  
 tu inquietud, en el aire;  
 tu vida, al sol, al aire, al vuelo.

Que pequena tu muerte  
 bajo la luz de fuego vivo.  
 Que serena la gracia de tus alas  
 ya para siempre abiertas en el libro.

Y en ti, tan suave, en tu morir callado,  
 en tu sueno sin suenos,  
 cuanta ilusion perdida al aire,  
 cuanto desesperado pensamiento.

[To the Dead Butterfly - Your jubilation, in flight; your restlessness, in the air; your life, in the sunshine, in the air, in flight. - How tiny your death, under the light of living fire. How serene the grace of your wings, now (pressed) open forever in the book. -And in you, so gentle, in your dreamless dreams, how many illusions lost in the air, how many despairing thoughts.]

Case II: Attempts to Build Curricula That are Of, By, and For Students in a Graduate Level Curriculum Theory Class at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle  
(Reflections by William H. Schubert)

Each summer for the past four years I have taught a course entitled Education 431: Curriculum Theory and Applications. It is required for one Masters Degree program, recommended by advisors in others, and elected by some of our doctoral students. I will briefly relate ways in which I tried to enable students to connect course content with personal meaning in their lives. Primary focus will be given to the summer of 1979.

It should be noted at the outset that teachers are quick to go beneath the wheel when it comes to curriculum courses; they expect dry bones listings such as those they usually find in curriculum guides. They generally don't see curriculum as anything remotely resembling the life-blood of the educative process. Instead, they see the curriculum as something handed to them by "the central office." It is to be avoided if possible, because it is not of, by, and therefore for them or their students. Given this orientation it is easy to see why most teachers are not interested in whatever theory might lie behind these documents. It, therefore, takes several class sessions to encourage teachers to see curriculum in another perspective. I try to help them see the student as a personal "theory" builder. The student experiences many curricula (home, peers, youth organizations, media, work, etc.) as well as that of schools. These curricula help forge the student's theory or perspective of the world. They provide sources of meaning; some are healthy, some detrimental, some innocuous. The teacher's job is to reconceptualize curriculum to help students reconstruct their theories, their internal sources of meaning and action.

In the summer of 1976, I engaged students in reflection on assumptions that undergrid their philosophy of life. They used modifications that I made on a model by William Frankena, Ronald Szoke, and others (Schubert, 1975). Students tried to describe how knowledge acquired in the course helped them reconstruct aspects of their personal philosophy that pertained to their professional endeavors. They portrayed their efforts in writing and in an individual conference. Although their response to the activity was favorable (derived both from commentary and written, informal as well as formal "objective," course evaluations), I sought other means to help increase meaning by more fully making the course of, by, and for students.

I introduced types of literature that students found meaningful to their lives in the summer of 1977. In addition to curriculum literature students read their favorite fiction and nonfiction to study its curricular implications and its curricular impact on them. Again evaluations were favorable.

The next year's class, in the summer of 1978, brought quite a varied group. I asked them to keep a daily journal in which they reflected on the ideas presented about curriculum theory. They were to reflect both on ways in which the ideas modified their own perspective on living, and on the relevance of these ideas to teaching endeavors. Again results were illuminating and students expressed benefit in the experience.

To this point my attempts had been quite direct. In the summer of 1979 I selected a more indirect approach. First, I exposed students to a wide variety of literature, some explicitly curricular and some not. The latter is exemplified by Hermann Hesse's "Iris" (1972), Kurt Vonnegut's "Harrison Bergeron" (1974), Woody Allen's movie "Manhattan," several newspaper selections, and several philosophical pieces. Again the point was to enable students to perceive an integral relation between life's dilemmas and curriculum.

A new breakthrough occurred when our administrators strongly urged that we give final examinations. I had given final papers and conferences in earlier versions of the course, but not examinations. Therefore, I pondered the kind of examination that might be appropriate. How could an examination be used to further curricular experiences that are of, by, and for students? As I thought, I dipped deeply into my own experiential storehouse. I enjoyed activities in which I rate or categorize persons or things. (What if I provided some categories and...no!...that wouldn't work. Then it comes from me, not the students.) So the thoughts ran until I decided that students should make categorization schemes from their own experiences. Students were asked to categorize the theorists, authors, artists to whom they had been exposed. They were asked to do this relative to something that they knew well. A biology teacher devised a scheme based on biological taxonomies. A doctoral student who had much experience with sailing selected a scheme based on types of sailing

vessels. A teacher classified the theorists according to the kinds of cars he met during a particularly dense rush hour. A music teacher saw the curriculum perspectives from the categories of Mazorsky's "Pictures at an Exhibition."

Students were then asked to select their favorite contributor from each group, and enter him/her into a "curricular enlightenment tournament." The idea was to progressively establish which contributors made the most impact on the students. One teacher, a wrestling coach, described the tournament as if it were a series of wrestling matches, complete with the hold that one theorist would most likely use to make another submit. Less competitive students were given the option of devising a progressive synthesis among their favorite ideas from each theorist entered in the tournament.

The aspect of this testing experience that I found most illuminating was that subject matter that I wanted to convey could be coupled with dominant student interests. There is a sense in which we tend to view the world through lenses of our dominant interests. A band director in the class, for example, viewed curriculum through the anthropomorphized perspective of his clarinet. A person who has had vast experience in painting, dance, cooking, or basketball may begin to view new domains through categories used in those dominant interests. Although my evidence is primarily with one class, it is with that group in considerable depth. The experience sufficiently motivates me to seek more ways to help students find meaning in new subject matter by making analogies between that subject matter and the concerns and interests that dominant their lives. This, I feel, is a step toward reconceptualizing curriculum to make it of, by, and for students.

#### Suggested Directions

Our explorations and those of others who seek to build curriculum that is of, by, and for students are embryonic indeed. The end of such curriculum must, however, probe still deeper and broader than the relationship among students and teachers. The continuous reconception of curriculum theorizing, its adaptation to the flow of events in teacher and student lives, occurs in a larger context that must not be ignored. John Bremer (1979) has recently made strides in this direction in his treatment of community as the proper subject matter for curriculum for education. By community he refers to both the locality in which we live and the ideal society to which we aspire. He describes the interplay of local conditions and societal aspirations and their synthesis as the educational process. Thus, he argues that the growth of community and of education is mutually perpetuating. Finally, Bremer concludes: "The ultimate justification of any institution, program or relationship would then be found in the extent to which it contributes to the learning of its members." (1979, p. 52) This indeed requires continuous reconceptualization of curriculum, not only as a scholarly movement but as an interactive educational process. In our judgment it requires, among other things, the following:

1. The continuous and careful study of multiple curricular forces that shape the perspectives of students both in and out of school.
2. The discovery and utilization of techniques for entering the orientation of students to learn about principles or theoretical tenets that guide their decision and action.
3. The development of educators who are able to create curricula that are of and by students and, therefore, for them.
4. The generation of the kind of public and professional seriousness about curriculum that gives the above a chance to evolve.
5. The opportunity and knowledge that enables individuals and communities to be their own curriculum theorists and developers.

We must come to know how students view their worlds if we want to teach them. To take one's orientation to curriculum construction seriously requires that one know students well. If it is, for example, one's hope to develop a curriculum based on preconceived needs of students, it is necessary to learn how those students view the world. How can one help improve another's outlook with no knowledge of what that outlook is like in the first place? If the curriculum developer wishes, instead, to enable students to direct their own curriculum, it is likewise imperative to know as much as possible about their orientation to the world. In short, educators

at all phases of the curriculum process must come to know students better. We must seriously search for the evolving "theories" that give direction and meaning to their lives. We must seek to discover the sources of those theories. Without such knowledge it is impossible to build curriculum that is of students. We must develop ways to form curricula with students so that learning activities come from within them as well as from without. The absence of such knowledge prevents curriculum that is by students. Finally, it is through this process of generating curricula that are of and by students that we begin to find curricula that are genuinely for them.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aichinger, I. *The Bound Man*. (In: *FICTION 100: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SHORT STORIES*, Editor James H. Pickering. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1974), pp. 1-8.
- Bremer, J. *EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY*. Melbourne, Australia: The International Association of Community Educators, 1979.
- Counts, G.S. *DARE THE SCHOOL BUILD A NEW SOCIAL ORDER?* New York: John Day, 1932.
- Dewey, J. *THE SOURCES OF A SCIENCE OF EDUCATION*. New York: H. Liveright, 1929.
- Dewey, J. *LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY*. New York: Henry Holt, 1938.
- Dewey, J. *DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION*. New York: The Free Press, 1944.
- Eliot, T.S. *The Hollow Men*. (In: *GREAT MODERN READING*, Editor W. Somerset Maugham. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1943), pp. 330-333.
- Florit, E. *A la Mariposa Muerta*. (In: *THE PENGUIN BOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN VERSE*, Editor E. Caracciolo-Trejo. Baltimore: Penguin, 1971), pp. 204-205.
- Freire, P. *PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED*. New York: Seabury Press, 1970.
- Goodlad, J.I. *ACCOUNTABILITY: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE*. The Society for Professors of Education delivered at the Society's Third Annual DeGarmo Lecture, Chicago, 1978.
- Fuller, R.B., et al. *I SEEM TO BE A VERB*. New York: Bantam, 1970.
- Heiney, D. Review of Hesse's *BENEATH THE WHEEL*. *CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*. October 15, 1968, p. 9.
- Hesse, H. *BENEATH THE WHEEL*. New York: Bantam, 1968.
- Hesse, H. *Iris*. (In: *STRANGE NEWS FROM ANOTHER STAR* by Hesse. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1972), pp. 123-145.
- Kafka, F. *THE TRIAL*. New York: Knopf, 1937.
- McCarthy, T. *THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JURGEN HABERMAS*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1978.
- Munby, H. *Philosophy for Children: An Example of Curriculum Review and Criticism*. *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, 9 (3) Fall, 1979, pp. 229-249.
- Pinar, W.F. *The reconceptualization of curriculum studies*. Presentation and commentary at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, New York (Symposium entitled *Priorities in Curriculum Scholarship*, W.H. Schubert, organizer and chairperson), 1977.
- Pinar, W.F. & Grumet, M.R. *TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM*. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 1976.
- Pinar, W.F. *Notes on the Curriculum Field 1978*. *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, 1978, 7, (8), pp. 5-12.
- Schubert, W.H. *Imaginative Projection: A Method of Curriculum Invention*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Urbana, Illinois, 1975.
- Schubert, W.H. *Grouping: Practices, Controversies, and Beyond* (In: *CURRICULUM HANDBOOK: THE DISCIPLINES, CURRENT MOVEMENTS, AND INSTRUCTIONAL METHODOLOGY*, Editor, L.J. Rubin. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1977) pp. 544-555.
- Schubert, W.H. *Educational Knowledge and Student Knowledge*. *INSIGHTS*, December 1978, 15, (2), pp. 3-4.
- Schwab, J.J. *SCIENCE, CURRICULUM, AND LIBERAL EDUCATION: SELECTED ESSAYS* (Edited by I. Westbury and N.J. Wilkof). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

- Tanner, D. and Tanner, L. Emancipation from Research: The Reconceptualist Prescription. *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCHER*, June 1979, 8(7), pp. 9-12.
- Tesconi, C.A. and Morris, V.C. *THE ANTI-MAN CULTURE*. Urbana, Illinois: The University of Illinois Press, 1972.
- Thelen, H.A. *EDUCATION AND THE HUMAN QUEST*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960.
- Vonnegut, K. Harrison Bergeron. (In: *WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE* by Vonnegut. New York: Dell, 1974), pp. 7-13.
- THE WILSON QUARTERLY*. (Review of journals on the left: Making it as Marxists by Lewis Cole, from *CHANGE*, March 1979), 3(3), Summer, 1979, p. 45.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

\*\*\*\*\*

## PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL THEORY

A journal of Marxian-influenced theory in psychology.

The journal seeks to publish theoretical articles which integrate problems in psychology with critical social analysis. The first issue will be available at the end of February, 1981.

Contents: Wallisch-Prinz, "Critical Reason or Rational Criticism: The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology"; Parker, "Neopositivism and Dialectics"; Jones, "Technocratic and Critical Analysis"; Krueger and Silvert, "Critique of Ideology and Psychological Models of Student Protest"; Lichtman, "The Demystification of Freudian Theory"; Wexler, "Toward a Critical Social Psychology." Published semi-annually. Subscriptions: \$5 individual; \$10 institutions and libraries. Single issues: \$2.50; \$5.00.

The journal invites contributions of theoretical articles and reviews of books which deal with the following sorts of topics: 1. Social problem oriented work--the problems of feminism, racism, deviance, testing, the degradation of work, the family, the "culture industry." We seek work which is neither narrowly empirical nor which reduces these issues to general economics. 2. Critique of dominant theorists in psychology and social theory. Here, we want not "intellectual history," but articles which trace the problematics of various theorists and show how they fail to reorient psychology; and 3. Fundamental issues of Marxist thought--the treatment of theoretical, methodological, and regulative concepts which clarify the nature of a Marxian approach; the reconstruction and critique of Marxian and Marxian-influenced theorists who have dealt with problems relevant to psychology.

Plans are also in the works for a summer conference.

Address subscriptions, submit articles (two copies, please), and direct inquiries to: Psychology and Social Theory, 504 S. Cayuga Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Phone: 607-272-5123. The editors are Laurence Parker and Edward Jones.

Whatever Happened to Social Control?: The Muting  
of Coercive Authority in Curriculum Discourse

Barry M. Franklin  
Augsburg College

One of the most pervasive themes in the writing of the formative theorists of the curriculum field is that of social control. Writing in the years between the end of World War I and the beginning of the Great Depression, these early curriculum theorists called on the schools to socialize the nation's growing post-war immigrant population of Catholics and Jews from Eastern and Southern Europe into what they thought to be a homogeneous American culture rooted in the values of a native middle class, Protestant in religion and Anglo-Saxon in heritage. These theorists believed, no doubt reflecting their own middle class origins, that the native middle class was the visible embodiment of American democracy. Cultural homogeneity was not only necessary for the continued political and social hegemony which they believed that the native middle class had historically enjoyed over the affairs of the nation, it was necessary for the very survival of American democracy itself (Franklin, 1974).<sup>1</sup>

The school curriculum was to be their instrument of social control for maintaining cultural homogeneity. These theorists argued that the curriculum should embody the values, attitudes, and standards of behavior of the middle class and that the schools should impose this curriculum and the viewpoint it embodied on the immigrant lower classes.<sup>2</sup> Ross L. Finney, an early curriculum theorist, made this point most succinctly:

A far wiser propaganda for the workers is one that will ally and amalgamate them with the middle class. And such an alliance and amalgamation should be forced upon the lower classes, whether their agitators like it or not, by compulsory attendance laws that make high school graduation practically universal (1922, p. 180).

The notion of social control adhered to by these formative theorists embodied two distinctive features. First, the goal of social control was cultural homogeneity which in turn would assure the continued political and social dominance of the middle class over the nation's life. Second, the method of social control was coercion. As Finney argued, "Compulsion is an outstanding phenomena in social life, which must be acknowledged and utilized if social calamity is to be averted" (1918, pp. 101-102).

Several contemporary curriculum theorists have argued that this commitment to using the curriculum to achieve cultural uniformity is as much a part of the contemporary curriculum field as it was a part of the field during its formative days (Apple, 1979, Chap. 6; Kliebard, 1971, p. 74-93; Seldon, 1977). As support for their contention they point to the continued dominance within contemporary curriculum discourse of the same technological approach to curriculum design that prevailed during the formative days of the field. Just as a reliance on the principles of scientific management and on behaviorism allowed early curriculum theorists to use the curriculum as an instrument of social control, they believe that the similar reliance of contemporary curriculum theorists on systems theory and behaviorism allows them to use the curriculum for the same end (Franklin, 1976b). This linkage is, however, difficult to establish. Contemporary curriculum theorists just do not talk about the need for cultural homogeneity nor do they advocate the use of coercive forms of social control. In contemporary curriculum discourse the process of inculcating belief is typically described as a process of give and take between the various segments of society. Social values are typically described as reflecting the shared agreement of all members of society. If the commitment to using the curriculum as an instrument of social control is still an interest of contemporary curriculum theorists, the obvious question is whatever happened to the concept. Why, if curriculum theorists remain committed to this goal, do they not continue to advocate the hegemony of the middle class and the use of coercion. It is to this issue that we will turn in this paper.

Our focus will be the period from the mid-1930's through the early 1940's, It was during these years that curriculum theorists began to talk about social control in a different way than they had in the previous decade. Instead of talking about homogeneity and middle class dominance, they talked about persuasion and democratic cooperation. And instead of advocating the use of coercion as a means of social control, they advocated

voluntarism. These theorists obviously changed the language of social control. But did they change its purpose? We will argue that they did not. Talking about social control in terms of cooperation and voluntarism is, we believe, deceptive. It masks what is essentially a coercive process dedicated to cultural uniformity behind the language of democracy.

### Social Control Reformulated

By the mid-1930's there were indications that curriculum theorists were beginning to reformulate their notion of social control. Theorists such as Hollis Caswell and John Norton suggested that coercion was no longer appropriate as a method of social control in a democratic society (Caswell and Campbell, 1935, pp. 106-107; Norton and Norton, 1936, p. 19). In fact, at least as early as 1929, L. Thomas Hopkins questioned the goal of cultural homogeneity in an urban, industrial society. He believed that social stability required a minimal degree of like-mindedness among the population. But the ever changing nature of urban, industrial life created new, unpredictable problems for which existing cultural traditions had no solution. What was required was a citizenry that was capable of the creative and independent thinking necessary to respond to these problems (1929, pp. 9-11).

What seems to have occurred was that curriculum theorists were beginning to change their attitudes toward urbanization and industrialization. From the earliest days of the field, curriculum theorists had recognized that under corporate capitalism the skilled craftsman had been replaced by the specialized industrial worker (Bobbitt, 1918, Chapt. 9; Hopkins, 1929, pp. 17-18; Rugg, 1939, pp. 34-35, 56-57). The formative theorists of the field saw this change as well as industrialization and urbanization in general as threats to the existing set of social and political arrangements. They chose to confront one aspect of that supposed threat, the immigrants who provided the expanded labor supply to support this emerging industrial capitalism. Their commitment to an hierarchical social order with the middle class in a position of leadership and the immigrant working class in a position of followership represented an attempt to retain their view, albeit it was probably an idealized one, of the status quo (Finney, 1922, p. 43; Franklin, 1976a).

In the years after 1935 curriculum theorists appeared to accept the corporate capitalism which their predecessors had feared. Their concern, unlike the formative theorists of the field was not the supposed destabilizing effect of immigration. The immigration restriction legislation of the 1920's had evidently responded to their fears on that score (Graham, 1976, p. 2). Their concern was the destabilizing effect of the Great Depression on corporate capitalism and the potential threat which such economic instability held for the political system. They believed, just as their predecessors, that the curriculum could be used as an instrument of social control. They would use it, as we shall see, not to preserve middle class hegemony but to preserve corporate capitalism. What was needed was a new conception of social control, one to respond not to the problem of cultural diversity but to the needs of the existing but unstable corporate economy. These curriculum theorists as well as the formative theorists of the field saw the social control function of the curriculum as that of defending the status quo. What changed in their discourse after 1935 was not their view of the function of the curriculum only their conception of the status quo.

We do, however, see a change in the period from the mid-1930's to the early 1940's in the way curriculum theorists described the process of social control. These later theorists appear to have abandoned the notion that social control was a process of imposition. For them, social control was, in Harold Rugg's term, a process of "give and take" between individuals and their social group. The group attempted to influence individuals and individuals, in turn, by resisting and modifying the nature of this social pressure attempted to influence the group. It was, in Rugg's words, "the culture of the group making the man," and the man in turn "contributing his bit to the remaking of the culture" (Rugg, 1936, pp. 283-285). This was quite different than the notion held by curriculum theorists of the previous decade that social control was the conditioning of passive individuals with predefined attitudes and values (Charters, 1928, pp. 27-28, 212-222; Finney, 1928, pp. 58, 60; Peters, 1924, p. 163). Whereas these earlier curriculum theorists saw social control as something requiring the "acquiescence" of individuals, these later theorists saw the process as demanding "intelligent consent" (Rugg, 1936, p. 265). What accounts for this different viewpoint was that curriculum theorists after 1935 turned from a behavioral explanation of the process of social control to an interactionist explanation (Rugg, 1939),



pp. 232-237, 348-358). It was their interactionist psychological orientation that enabled these later theorists to conceptualize individuals as active, creative organisms that played a role in defining the nature of the social control to which they were subjected.

The most complete statement of this reformulated notion of social control was made in 1943 by Bruce Raup and his associates in the Twenty-Eighth Yearbook of the National Society of College Teachers of Education, entitled *THE DISCIPLINE OF PRACTICAL JUDGMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY* (Raup, Axteffe, Benne & Smith, 1943). They argued that the principal social problem of the day was the absence in American society of any commonality in beliefs and attitudes. The specialization of work which a division of labor had made a part of a corporate capitalist economy had replaced the common beliefs, attitudes, and understanding that once had existed in American society with a "multiplicity of perspectives." In such a situation individuals not only had difficulty joining together to resolve existing social difficulties, they had difficulty in defining what in fact these social difficulties were (Raup, et. al., 1943, pp. 8-10). Where this lack of commonality existed, there was the danger, according to Raup and his associates, that one segment of society would attempt to force its will on the remainder of society. Social control would become a matter of force and manipulation (pp. 17-27, 205-206). To counter this tendency in contemporary society, what was called for was a method of social control, according to the authors of the Yearbook, which sought to develop common social understanding, common goals, and common social action that reflected the "valid insights and values of all parties" involved. The goal was to be "intelligent and uncoerced consensus concerning what should be done" (p. 29).

Raup and his associates located this type of social control in the social planning agencies of the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations.<sup>3</sup> It was in the work of these agencies that these theorists found a method for securing the kind of consensus they sought:

The crucial problems of planning at this state of its history will be found in the first phase of judgement; that is the determination of desirable goals. This is true, because the social situation in which we find ourselves is marked by genuine and often deep-lying differences in point of view concerning what is socially desirable and necessary. New and more inclusive normative orientations must be built before wholehearted common action can be released...The methods of collecting and coordinating facts have been rigorously developed and applied. This has helped to insure wide recognition of the second phase of judgment, since that phase is devoted to the quest for facts. Similarly, the arts and understandings appropriate to administration and administrative organization have been honored and developed in our society, though not always in the spirit of democracy. These arts and understanding contribute directly to the third phase of judgment where the primary concern is with the formulation and execution of programs of action (p. 204).

What Raup and his associates were describing was a process of making judgments through "deliberation." Social policy would be developed through discussion, analysis of factual evidence, argumentation, and the construction of commonly agreed to courses of action (pp. 82-86). They believed that through this process the regulation of the existing corporate economy could be brought under a democratic means of social control (pp. 189-190).

The school curriculum should be used, according to Raup and his co-authors, to involve children in this process of "deliberation." By providing children with the opportunity in the classroom to learn how to reach agreements about social policy, the authors of the Yearbook seemed to suggest that these children would be prepared as adults to join with their fellow citizens to reach the kind of common understanding and to construct the kind of common courses of action that embodied democratic social control. The Yearbook authors were less specific, however, about the kind of curriculum content that would secure this outcome. They thought that the existing discipline centered on fixed subject curriculum tended to compartmentalize knowledge in such a way that it could not be used to resolve social problems. But they also felt that the emerging alternative approach of the day to the organization of the curriculum, the activities curriculum, tended to ignore societal problems in favor of a singular concern with the interests of the individual. What they sought was a new discipline constructed out of the principles which individuals historically had relied on in making

moral judgments. This new discipline would be used by children in the classroom in the practice of understanding and resolving the kind of social problems that existed in the society at large (pp. 239-247).<sup>4</sup>

### The Muting of Coercive Authority

Social control for Raup and his associates was a process in which all segments of society attempted to formulate commonly agreed on policies that took into account their varying and conflicting interests:

...the task of deliberation is to provide for continued communication in the conflict, to maintain attitudes of mutual sensitivity at all times in the process to the values of which each is trying to persuade the others, and finally to effect a synthesis of competing values--a novel formulation which will unite all parties in the conflict, overlapping in normative generalizations which are partly opposed (p. 147).

This resolution was to be achieved through "persuasion", which these theorists saw as the opposite of coercion. "It does not for us carry the meaning of exploitation. It does not mean the urging of one's own purposes upon others with no time or opportunity or ability on their part to withstand the influence. It assumes absence of coercion" (p. 73). Notwithstanding the apparent absence of coercion, the authors of the Yearbook were just as committed to like-mindedness and homogeneity as were the formative theorists of the curriculum field. They argued, just as had their predecessors during the previous decade, that the continued existence of democracy depended on a commonality of belief and conduct within society (pp. 204-205). These theorists made a distinction between like-mindedness that was obtained by coercion, which they associated with authoritarianism, and a like-mindedness obtained democratically through "persuasion." The latter kind of uniformity did not for Raup and his co-authors represent the kind of imposition and manipulation we have identified with the idea of social control held by the curriculum field's formative theorists. The question of course is how accurate in fact was this distinction.

We believe that this distinction is more illusory than real. Persuasion, according to the sociologist Robert LaPiere, is different from coercion in that it relies on the manipulation of symbols through argumentation and suggestion rather than on force or threat. But it can and often does share with coercion the intent of getting individuals to do something which is wanted of them but which on the face of it they are unwilling to do. It accomplishes this by giving individuals the false impression that in doing what is wanted of them, they are doing what they themselves wish (LaPiere, 1954, pp. 416-417). The difference then between persuasion and coercion is, according to LaPiere, a difference primarily in perception. The end of bringing individuals under the direction of others is the same in both cases. But when individuals believe, albeit mistakenly, that they are acting voluntarily, the method of control is said to be persuasion rather than coercion. Persuasion thus seems to be in effect a masking of the coercive process which social control embodies by virtue of its very nature. The opposite of coercive social control is not democratic social control. It is instead for LaPiere the absence of social control itself:

The so-called "permissive" technique of control that is so strongly advocated by many child psychologists and the progressive educators is a contradiction in terms that reflects a confusion of understandings. To let people do as they will, even to aid and abet them in doing so, is not to control them. Even in the crudest of definitions, control is the provision of direction to the action of others. Control that is effected by democratic means is...disguised; but it is not permissive. It provides direction to those subject to it, and the fact that they imagine that they are being aided to do what they want to do attests only to its success (p. 418).

Raup and his co-authors were just as concerned as were the curriculum field's formative theorists in obtaining a uniformity in belief and conduct. When they talked about a method of social control that used persuasion to obtain this like-mindedness, they were not really describing a process that was different from coercing individuals to believe and act in similar ways. They were merely describing a process in which this compulsion was hidden.

Part of the reason why this reformulated theory of social control appears to be non-coercive is that its

political and social commitments are not obvious. The formative theorists of the curriculum field were blatantly obvious about the class interests they represented. Theorists such as Raup and his co-authors were less clear about their class allegiances. To uncover these allegiances we need to look more closely at the examples they employed to describe how social control took place. It is these examples that most clearly reveal the social and political orientation of these theorists, which in turn exposes the coercive intent of their notion of social control.

The model of social control for Raup and his associates was, as we previously stated, the process of social planning as exemplified in President Hoover's Committee on Recent Social Trends and the New Deal's National Resources Planning Board and the Tennessee Valley Authority (pp. 204-206). In describing the function of the NRPB they paid particular attention to commitment to maintain a capitalist economy. "Free enterprise," they stated, "is a conception that is so integrally a part of our social orientation that any suggestion that appears to run counter to it is beyond the limits of tolerance of most of us" (p. 208). As an instrument of social control, the purpose of this agency, according to the Yearbook authors, was to preserve capitalism from the threat of revolution:

If revolution is to be avoided, the new elements of the normative outlook must be recognized as continuous with the old, must express the character of person involved together with the traditions in ways that are appropriate to present conditions (p. 209).

What Raup and his associates were concerned about was the threat which economic instability posed for the existence of corporate capitalism. They were particularly concerned lest economic instability would eventually threaten political democracy. Ross Finney, writing in 1922, argued that cultural diversity threatened to expose Americans to foreign and dangerous ideas, specifically "Bolshevik ideas" These ideas, he believed, if allowed to influence the post-World War I immigrant population could lead eventually to a Russian style revolution in the United States (pp. 84-85, 167-170). The authors of the Yearbook, writing 21 years later, argued that a lack of like-mindedness in the population, in the context of a depressed economy, would heighten the popular appeal of Fascist and Communist ideologies. What was needed was a method of social control that would insure a uniformity of opinion about the nature of and solution for the nation's social problems, particularly its economic difficulties (Raup, et. al., 1943, pp. 204-205). This sought after commonality was one, we believe, that supported and attempted to preserve the existing system of corporate capitalism.

The commitment of the Yearbook authors to corporate capitalism was most evident in the explanation one of them gave of the function of one social planning agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, in stabilizing the depressed American economy. It would, he argued, improve the economic conditions of Blacks and poor whites of the region. He then made the point that "the money Negroes and poor whites had to spend rang just as loudly in the cash registers of merchants, manufacturers, and tax officers as any other money, and the more they spent the more business there would be for the whole community." He concluded by imploring this individual to abandon any racial prejudices he might have had in order to help build a "new consciousness of the interdependence of the various elements of the region" (p. 211). For these theorists then it appears that the purpose of social control, was exemplified in the social planning process, was to maintain the kind of functional interdependence between workers and more importantly between working and owning classes which the division of labor and specialization brought to corporate capitalism. More generally, the above quotation suggests the kind of commonality which Raup and his associated wanted was one that would support the existing set of economic arrangements. Just as the formative theorists of the curriculum field called for cultural homogeneity to defend the dominance of the native middle class, these later theorists called for a common popular commitment to policies that would preserve the dominance of a corporate owning class.

## Conclusions

In 1941 Franklin Bobbitt published his last curriculum text. In the name of social efficiency he called, just as he had in his 1918 text, for the existence among the citizenry of a like-mindedness in attitudes, beliefs and modes of thought (p. 271). During the formative years of the field, we have argued that Bobbitt defended

cultural homogeneity on the grounds of preserving the dominance of the native middle class (Apple & Franklin, 1979, pp. 186-189). But in 1941, he defended cultural homogeneity on the grounds that it was a necessary prerequisite for the democratic social control that corporate capitalism required (pp. 355-375).

It is this continuity in Bobbitt's thinking that most clearly reveals whatever happened to social control. Nothing happened. Although in the period after 1935 its coercive intent in curriculum discourse was muted, curriculum theorists continued to view the curriculum as an instrument of insuring cultural homogeneity to preserve what they thought were the existing set of political and economic arrangements. Those contemporary curriculum theorists who maintain that the field's commitment to cultural homogeneity is as strong today as it was half a century ago may be correct. Our examination of curriculum thought in the years from 1935 to 1943 seems to support their claim. But only further research on events after 1943 will tell us with any certainty whatever happened to social control.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The formative theorists of the curriculum field defined their effort at social control as a defense of middle class interests. Paul Boyer (1978, parts 3 & 4), argues that the late nineteenth and twentieth century efforts at the social control of America's urban immigrant population was led by the native middle class and later by an upper class, business and commercial elite. Because we are examining the viewpoint of curriculum theorists we have chosen, however, to describe events as they perceived them.
2. We can see how the curriculum was used in this way by looking at Franklin Bobbitt's suggestions for the objectives of the civics curriculum. Using activity analysis, he examined the important newspapers and magazines of his day and interviewed "leading citizens" in all walks of life in order to determine what the "leaders of current thought" in American society believed were the characteristics of good citizenship. His analysis yielded curriculum objectives that not only reflected a middle class conception of citizenship, but objectives that supported the existing set of social and economic arrangements. They included support and obedience to constituted authority, support for immigration restriction, maintenance by labor unions of industrial output, support for the public schools, and opposition to corrupt government (1926, Chaps. 7-11).
3. For an examination of the use of social planning to defend corporate capitalism from the 1920's through the 1940's see Williams (1966, pp. 413-469) and Graham (1976, Chap. 1).
4. What they are describing seems to be similar to the public controversy/social action approach to the social studies curriculum developed by Fred Newmann and Donald Oliver.

#### REFERENCES

- Apple, M.W. IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.
- Apple, M.W. & Franklin, B.M. Curricular history and social control. In C. Grant (Ed.), COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN EDUCATION. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1979.
- Bobbitt, F. THE CURRICULUM. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918.
- Bobbitt, F. CURRICULUM INVESTIGATIONS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926.
- Bobbitt, F. THE CURRICULUM OF MODERN EDUCATION. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941.
- Boyer, P. URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Caswell, H.L. & Campbell, D.S. CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT. New York: American Book Company, 1935.
- Charters, W.W. THE TEACHING OF IDEALS. New York: Macmillan, 1928.
- Finney, R.L. Sociological principles fundamental to pedagogical method. EDUCATIONAL REVIEW, 1918, 55, 91-110.
- Finney, R.L. CAUSES AND CURES FOR THE SOCIAL UNREST: AN APPEAL TO THE MIDDLE CLASS. New York: Macmillan, 1922.
- Finney, R.L. A SOCIOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION. New York: Macmillan, 1928.

- Franklin, B.M. AMERICAN CURRICULUM THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL, 1918-1938. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Educational Association, Chicago, April, 1974.
- Franklin, B.M. Curriculum thought and social meaning: Edward L. Thorndike and the curriculum field. EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1976, 26, 298-209. (a)
- Franklin, B.M. Technological models and the curriculum field. THE EDUCATIONAL FORUM, 1976, 60, 303-312. (b)
- Graham, O.L., Jr. TOWARD A PLANNED SOCIETY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976.
- Hopkins, L.T. CURRICULUM PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES. New York: Benjamin H. Johnson & Co., 1929.
- Kliebard, H.M. Bureaucracy and curriculum theory. In V. Haubrich (Ed.), FREEDOM, BUREAUCRACY, AND SCHOOLING. Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971.
- LaPiere, R. A THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954.
- Norton, J.K. & Norton, M.A. FOUNDATIONS OF CURRICULUM BUILDING. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1936.
- Peters, C.C. FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY. New York: Macmillan, 1924.
- Raup, R.B., Benne, K.D., Axtelle, G.E., and Smith, B.O. THE DISCIPLINE OF PRACTICAL JUDGMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY. The Twenty-Eighth Yearbook of the National Society of College Teachers of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943.
- Rugg, H. AMERICAN LIFE AND THE SCHOOL CURRICULUM. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1936.
- Rugg, H. DEMOCRACY AND THE CURRICULUM. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1939.
- Seldon, S. Conservative ideology and curriculum. EDUCATIONAL THEORY, 1977, 17, 205-222.
- Williams, W.A. THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1966.

## Life History and Educational Experience: Part Two

William F. Pinar  
University of Rochester

(Note: In the interest of space, days twenty-four through thirty-eight of the regressive work are deleted. The days of analytic work which correspond to this deleted section, i.e. days fifty-seven through sixty-nine, are also deleted.)

## Prologue to Part Two

To protect, preserve, and where possible, extend the limited and ephemeral freedom of the individual in the face of the growing threat to it is far more urgent a task than to issue abstract denunciations of it or to endanger it by actions that have no hope of success.<sup>1</sup>

Max Horkeimer

To scrutinize the problem of the individual, the individual who is not insulated from the social world but in fact permeated by it, hardly represents an "eclipse" of the issue of social control, as Professor Franklin suggests.<sup>2</sup> Such scrutiny situates the abstraction "social control" in the everyday lives of those who suffer it. Only in the lived experience of suffering and control can a concrete, not merely abstract, resistance develop to that control. Left abstract, not situated in the individual, "social control" risks becoming only another "concept in the literature." Concepts become real as they are bonded to percepts. Abstractions become real, and hence open to resistance and possible transformation, as they become concrete, that is, when they are experienced in one's specific situation. The individual and the collective must not be dissociated; the latter achieves actuality in the former, and the former is indelibly constituted by the latter. As Marx noted: "The state is an abstraction; the people alone is the concrete."<sup>3</sup> ... above all, we must avoid postulating 'Society' ... as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual."<sup>4</sup> It is the Marxists, not Marx, who bifurcate reality, and in ways which dissociate the concrete from the abstract, the individual from the collective. One effect is to render the individual passive, as Professor Franklin observes in the case of Professor Apple's writing.<sup>5</sup>

For Marx, social and political theory originates in the individual. "One has to start from the real subject and examine its objectification."<sup>6</sup> It is true that Marx, during the final phase of his career, focused upon the objectification of the subject almost to the exclusion of the subject. James Miller notes:

[Marx] bequeathed to his heirs a legacy charged with ambiguity. Although he himself had insisted on individual emancipation as a cardinal goal of socialism, and valued highly the creative potential of human practice, the understanding he originally elaborated came to be interpreted as a scientific world view of ironclad objective laws. In practice, the goal of individual emancipation faded from view, while in theory, subjectivity and consciousness became epiphenomena of objective material conditions. In Marxism after Marx, the sense of subjectivity was transformed.<sup>7</sup>

That transformation is tantamount to deletion. Subjectivity and agency evaporate in the Marxism which followed Marx in a mechanistic view of history and politics which, among its other functions, helped rationalize the atrocities of the Stalin regime.

G. V. Plekhanov and Antonio Labriola exemplify Marxists who forgot the individual in their remembrance of class struggle, a struggle which meant an increasingly uncritical embrace of the Party and the State. Their work was prominent during the Second International, between 1890 and 1914.<sup>8</sup> Labriola states this deterministic view succinctly. "There is no fact of history which is not preceded, accompanied and followed by determined forms of consciousness, whether it be superstitious or experimental, ingenuous or reflective, impulsive or self-controlled, fantastic or reasoning."<sup>9</sup>

Of course, there have been theoreticians influenced by Marx who have not succumbed to determinism.

Miller tells us:

Unlike Plekhanov, Rosa Luxemburg viewed Marx's theory primarily as supplying a "method of investigation," rather than a system of unimpeachable categories .... For her, as for Marx and Engels, history did not comprise an entity independent of consciousness and practice, but instead the field of subjective intervention through action.... [She] asserted that "only the working class, through its own activity, can make the word flesh."<sup>10</sup>

Today making the word "flesh" means politics, but politics broadly understood. Conventional political action is necessary. But so is what we might term "cultural politics." Such a politics acknowledges that political life hardly occurs in a cultural vacuum. The people must understand the historical situation as well as attempt politically to reinvent it. Further, our politics must not remain apart from our lives, discrete from our daily interactions with others. Interpersonally we must challenge prejudices and other limitations as we encounter them. While microscopic from a global standpoint, such individual action is not negligible. Conventional politics depends upon cultural politics. A people cannot become politically free while they are culturally and psychologically enslaved.

The political question becomes, in part, a question of consciousness, or perhaps more accurately, a diminution of consciousness which makes possible exploitation. Luxemburg suggests this formulation when she notes: "In this manner the problem faced by scientific investigation becomes defined as the lack of human consciousness in the economic life of society."<sup>11</sup> How is it, she asks, that an economic system could develop so contrary to genuine human needs? How is it that so many can remain unconscious of this fact?

The diminution of consciousness, the thinning of experience, helps allow this system to continue. Resistance is possible. The cultivation of experience is possible. Particularly at this time when human life is socially controlled more completely than we can remember is it appropriate to focus upon our capacity to resist, to refuse to succumb to the dominant historical tendencies of our time. We must assert our responsibility for our present situation, the general character of which Sartre describes adroitly.

For us, man is defined first of all as being "in a situation." That means that he forms a synthetic whole with his situation -- biological, economic, political, cultural, etc. He cannot be distinguished from his situation, for it forms him and decides his possibilities; but inversely, it is he who gives it meaning by making his choices within it and by it. To be in a situation, as we see it, is to choose oneself in a situation, and men differ from one another in their situation and also in the choices they themselves make of themselves. What men have in common is not a "nature," but a condition, that is, an ensemble of limits and restrictions: the inevitability of death, the necessity of working for a living, of living in a world inhabited by other men.<sup>12</sup>

These are general, even metaphysical limits of human life. One task of an emancipatory curriculum theory is to specify the restrictions of educational situations. Both autobiographical and political and economically oriented curriculum scholarship have accomplished this task. It is not enough. Depictions of "the ensemble of limits and restrictions" must not function to solidify them. Rather, they must make explicit the choices embedded in educational situations, thus making evident their contingency, and their possible transformation. Working concretely means portraying one's own situation, and through reflexive analysis of its sources and its directions, understanding the ways one chooses what seems only determined. Situation seems frozen and final only when we cannot see past it, when we cannot contextualize it in the past and the future, initiating its dissolution as we intuit its transcendence. Describing the situation of the worker, Sartre notes:

[If the worker] ... discovers the relation between cause and effect, it is not by submitting to it, but in the very act which transcends the material state ... toward a certain end which illuminates and defines this state from within the future.<sup>13</sup>

To contextualize the present situation in the future is to distance oneself from it, and this distance means not coinciding with it, not succumbing to it. To coincide with situation renders it static, makes it leaden and less malleable. To avoid collapse onto the present, with the defeat of the human spirit it implies, the loss of political vision it ensures, is to never forget that I am more than what I do, how I labor, how I am treated. I am possibility, and firm adherence to individual and social possibility creates the pressures which perforate the present. This individual dialectic -- resistance to those aspects of oneself which coincide with one's material

The distance between performers and audience is as little as I've known.

I remember rolling a year ago. Confirming what I experienced again this week: the emotional past is preserved in the musculature of the body. Body work can release caught emotion, and the sense of psychological release is immediate. The mind, the intellect, must be affected, and I am preconscious of it being receptive and ... let's say "dynamically interactive." Its thoughts are concrete, relatively infrequent. Peace of mind. Waiting, receptive, wed to the concrete reality I observe outside.

The dance concert last night (held on a lawn, the audience moved with the dancers as they moved from area to area), it is the audience that interests me now. Young, students at the College I suppose. Many in dance, at least they move so loosely, their bodies, many parts in motion, yet unified. Their emotional release spontaneous, or so it seemed in contrast to my quiet.

Upstairs apartment, unkept, inhabited momentarily. Walking along city streets in the morning, taking coffee on the sidewalk. The early sun bright but not yet hot. Companions, and our bodies creak with morning stiffness. In a park afterward, moving in the grass, stretching into this position, then that one, the snapping of crystals in the neck. Loosen. Let go. Fluidity. Living in the body.

Later, near dusk, an upstairs apartment (this one mine, and established), at the writing table. The sun through the window, in front of me; I pause with it. Thoughts return, eyes back down, my hand moving. A glance at the clock; my friends come in forty minutes to go to dinner.

\* \* \*

Another writing table, in an upstairs room, in an old farmhouse. Children laughing downstairs. Their mother, my wife, laughing too. Smiling to myself, looking out the window onto the sun setting through the trees. It will be cool tonight.

\* \* \*

Balance. How to move all. In balance. To make more deep, more complete their connections. To breathe more life into my body, cleansing the emotions, sharpening the mind, its thoughts more accurate, more helpful to self and others.

Others. I want them around. Companions. Lovers. Wife and mother of our children.

It must wait. Of course it exists already, but I must wait before I turn my focus onto it. It's because, partly because to do so for many years meant a loss of self to others. My attention leaves me, enters them, enters the social consciousness extant among us, and I am no longer aware of what I think and feel, only of I-mixed-with-others. It's taken years and hard, persistent work to retrieve that attention, and now that I have it, I want it on, in, over me. I want to see who this is I live with, what is this life I am living. He is a familiar stranger.

There is always a layer deeper. I think I know him, and then, when I turn to him again, he is odd and inexplicable.

July 11, 1975 day forty-one

Again, it's night on the beach, the moon full, lighting the seas as it waves onto the beach. I walk slowly at the edge of the water.

Sitting in a theater, theater-in-the-round. The play. I get out of my seat and enter it. There is anger, and I feel power.

Alone in a large house. Wandering down the corridors with a candle, opening doors to bedrooms, they are vacant. Dark velvet drapes at the end of the hall, and I turn right down the stairs.

I'm not alone. People are dancing, a band is playing in the living room, but I can't hear them. A couple greets me as I reach the stair's end, smiling, but I can barely make out what they're saying.

"What a wonderful party this is!" she's saying.

"Yes old man you've really done it this time. Absolutely super."

With effort I smile and thank them. I don't remember that I've arranged this party; just now I realize it is my house.

To the kitchen, then the porch to its side, where I drink coffee, and look out onto the shadowed back lawn. I turn my attention to the caged dove to my right.



Soon it's dawn. I make breakfast, read the paper, as the guests leave.

\* \* \*

Driving along a tree-lined parkway, in Connecticut, in a convertible. Sunny, warm but not hot. Someone is with me but I can't see who it is. We're smoking cigarettes, and he's drinking ... whiskey I think it is, from the bottle. I feel happy.

\* \* \*

It's beginning to become light now, and we're standing facing each other. Sarah and Kenny and I. In the dark we listen to each other's breathing. Now, very slowly, the light of day makes visible human form, then the eyes, a reflection of light in the center of the eyes, now faces. Noses and mouths. We watch each other carefully, and when the light is day-bright we smile together.

Outside the cottage, walking along a rocky beach. Huge stones, too large to walk over. Making my way slowly; the wind is strong; I wear a sweater.

I reach a glass enclosure, a writing table inside. I enter and begin. I remember I'm in a film, that I'm acting, I am playing ... Paul. Sarah and Kenny are names of characters the others play. The sun inside the glass makes me hot and I leave. Returning to the cottage, I see it is time to shoot.

July 12, 1975 day forty-two

Listening to a woman reading a paper on some aspect of Habermas' work. I am excited; parts become accessible; now I understand. I applaud vigorously when she finishes. Later, drinks in hand, we talk, and she is accessible also, although tired. I feel freed of something, and make mental notes to proceed with the book I'm writing.

On a beach, stony, alone. Late afternoon, a stiff wind, it's a little cool. The spray comes over me. I am thinking where do I go from here. The movie is finished, the book is finished, the affair is finished. I mustn't give in to this fatigue; I must remain stalwart. Walking, looking out onto the sea absent-mindedly, not noticing the spray. My coat is soaked; the water runs cool onto my skin. Conscious of my belly, wet now, moving in and out with breathing. I look up again, the clouds are billowy, shades of gray, moving fast. The wind is stronger now, and I begin walking back.

In the cottage my friends are cheerful and drinking. Letting go of myself, I slide into their high, sipping the guinness handed me. Soon I'm laughing also.

Lying naked on the back lawn in mid-afternoon sun, the wind, moving the trees and the shadows, takes my sweat. The sun renews me; in a bodily way I feel completed, and now, rested.

July 13, 1975 day forty-three

Early morning, the light still blue. I'm at the writing table in front of the window. Writing, now looking up, as the sun rises.

I'm in a city, maybe it's Rochester, and there isn't enough food. I can't tell what has happened, but everything's fallen apart. There's no looting or rioting. Maybe due to deep depression, so deep it inhabits all activity.

We have money, but it isn't worth much. Sitting with my wife, and our two housemates, drinking nearly the last of our coffee, discussing, again, leaving the city.

"I know it's a risk."

"If we try to stay here through the winter, I don't know. Think of that risk."

Silence. We're fighting the same hopelessness that makes people thoughtless and careless.

"We've got to leave. The question is when."

On a train, no room to sit, even in the aisles. We stand between cars, it's chilly, thank god the trains moves slowly. "Not too bad," I repeat to myself. Sarah is wrapped up, sitting on luggage, frightened.

\* \* \*

Everything will be slower and larger. I will walk slower, eat slower, make love slower, write slower. What I see, feel, touch will be larger, and I will experience it as larger, more there, more here, and I will experience being present more completely. More present to myself, to others. I will see others more completely, be

with them more spontaneously, less ritualistically. Taking more responsibility for my behavior, releasing it, allowing it to express a broader range of emotion, thought, physical motion.

Sitting in my body more restfully, with more intense satisfaction. The satisfaction of having a body. Less subservient to its demands.

Open to others, receptive to what can occur.

Sitting naked and full lotus in a field overlooking a bay. The sun hot and loud and sweat all over me. Following my breathing with pleasure.

Standing at a cocktail party with government officials discussing the future of university education in this country. Amused and serious and contented.

\* \* \*

In front of me: a mirror and my lined faced. I remember what it looked like when I was younger, and I'm awed. Lines. Gray hair. My body decomposes slowly and quickly in front of me. There, in the mirror.

The eyes. I am in those eyes, behind them. I am in here, looking out there onto myself.

The eyes will have changed too. I hope to see little or no sadness. I hope to see a glint of adolescent mischief, a desire to do something. The experience of a lifetime in the eyes: they are deeper than before, and more beautiful.

I am growing old.

July 14, 1975 day forty-four

The future.

I don't understand.

I do understand that I can project into the future. I can work for this, to be that. I create it.

I do understand that the future forms itself independently of me, and I needn't struggle to create it. I can relax, lay back, watching its direction, steering this way or that as it makes sense to.

My present understanding is that both occur. I do have plans, ambitions which I actively strive to realize. And I do rest and observe, trying to discern what occurs.

What I don't understand is: how much to do one, how much to trust in the other, and what is the nature of their relation?

\* \* \*

I want to relax more. Now I am enough tense that I'm distracted and unable to work as single-mindedly as I want.

At least I'm slowly returning to a schedule more conducive to working. Much of this summer I began dancing and drinking around midnight, awakening the next day about noon. The weather being what it is, I would walk after breakfast, then lie in the sun. Working came late in the afternoon.

Dancing has been a loosening from controls I impose on myself during the academic year. Controls to ensure efficiency and constancy of performance. It takes a couple of months of drinking, dancing and walking to loosen up, and in July I did feel loose. It didn't last long. Around the twenty-fifth I felt school coming in a month, felt it like a window pressed against my nose and lips.

It's mid-August, and while I still let go, more often I'm in bed at eleven, up at seven, and I can feel how tired my body is from late-night partying.

July 15, 1975 day forty-five

Yesterday a note from Charles Scribner III asking to see what I've done thus far with the novel. I was pleased, told Deborah, in fact read to her what I've written. I was reading, and at the point a minor character modeled after Marjorie comes, in comes Marjorie. I keep reading and after several sentences she says: "I'm not sure I like you anymore." Jokingly and seriously. I kept reading. She didn't seem to mind afterward; it is a fair characterization.

We ate dinner together: Marjorie, Roy and I. And drank. In good spirits all evening. Until they go upstairs. I feel a touch of jealousy and sadness. Jealous? I want neither one. Sad? I don't have someone. I could. I don't want to. "Why don't you take a walk before sleeping?" advises Deborah, now home from work. I do, the sadness won't go. Troubled sleep. A little hungover this morning.

(After writing today I feel finished with the progressive.)

Analytic

December 9, 1975 day forty-six

For the first six years of school memories are sparse: five and one-half double-spaced typewritten pages. Only one item do I recall for each year -- the school building. Next in frequency are memories of teachers. Each year when I had one teacher I remembered her name, what she looked like, and excluding the first-year teacher, a few of her personality attributes. The fourth year I had different teachers for different subjects, and these I've forgotten, except for the writing teacher. Writing is the first specific subject I recall, then geography. The only other subject-related memory from the first six years is doing geography homework, and of this I write that I discover "the satisfaction of giving myself to a task."

This seems significant. An issue I face now is "whole-heartedness" in working. From time to time I glimpse that I am, from an absolute point of view, dissociated from my experience, from my work, and that feels as if it functions to protect myself, in regard to work, from failure. To protect myself I don't invest myself completely in what I do. This "holding back" makes more likely, of course, the failure I seek to avoid. And accompanying it is dissatisfaction. I should like to learn again "the satisfaction of giving myself to a task."

An item I would rank in importance with the satisfaction of giving oneself to work is the remembrance in the fourth year of being instructed by the writing teacher. "I was pleased and embarrassed simultaneously, pleased at being rated ready to move to the next level, and unhappy because I wasn't doing it correctly." This is, as I think on it now, a characteristic response to instruction and to biographic movement generally. I would identify with the instructor's new stance and judge the prior one insubstantiated by the new one. New living space, particularly during the late-adolescent period, would be accompanied by some degree of emotional often intellectual repudiation of old space. This feels like an extension of the force designated as "superego" in psychoanalytical theory: a basic tendency to undercut that which one is no longer identified with. Today I don't experience disconfirmation as I leave to enter new space, but regularly I do experience a faint anxiety, especially when movement seems rapid, inexplicable and emotionally uncomfortable. This anxiety is a remnant of the past process of repudiation, which I remember surfacing in the fourth year of school while being shown the next step in the improvement of penmanship.

December 10, 1975 day forty-seven

The mid-year geography exam incident I describe in detail. I had an extreme reaction, having to do with my identification with the teacher's reality. When I misjudged him, it is as if reality had eluded me. This is related to my parents' establishment of social reality, and the contingency of their love upon my acceptance of their versions. This issue becomes acute six or seven years later when I'm compelled to probe my own realities. The shock of the geography mid-year exam is indicative of an emotional pattern I acquired or inherited and which would make my explorations of autonomy and accompanying creations of subjective and social realities painful. This due to my identification with realities created by certain significant others.

Nancy Moran. Again (fifth year also) I characterize myself as too friendly, wanting "everyone's affection and approval." Nancy tells me her friends don't like me. Shock at living in a false reality (I thought everyone liked me). Social withdrawal said to begin here. This makes sense. The shocks provided by others (Mr. Mansfield, Nancy) would not be absorbed without attendant adjustment. I became quiet, unobtrusive, watching to see what reality was. In the name of self-protection I became split. Of course such a state deprives the developing self of nourishment as well as insulating it from poison. In a more favorable light, such a condition enables one to become more sensitive to the processes of reality construction, and to the relationships between social and subjective realities. If one becomes conscious and accepting of his "false self-system," he may become skillful at altering it; i.e. he may become an actor in social life.

April 20, day four, I dreamed the night before of people I knew during that period but didn't recall. My department chairman in this dream is the "superego" I believe, and I meet these long-forgotten occupants of my social world in the hotel where I'm staying (my present personality and social world), in an academic context (writing a book). This represents a conscious integration of the forgotten (unconscious) with the remembered (conscious), and with the ostensible censor of the unconscious, whose apparent inactivity allows the integration.

December 15, 1975 day forty-eight

Eighth year. The first memory is a concrete one (the hall way). Then the genital thing. Interesting that it's the third thing I recalled about eighth year. The first was the hallway, the second that I am no longer the youngest in the building, the third that we jabbed each others's genitals.

Then, in reference to Mr. Molnar and his math class, I report I was "guilty I hadn't done my best for him." This remains something of an issue. The guilt is part of a constellation of oppressive feeling I (a little reluctantly) refer to as "superego," which typically surfaces in me as anxiety. Presently it is anxiety over the quality of my writing. Anxiety functions to decrease the serious attention I can give, making more likely the inferior quality presumably it hopes to avoid. So this internalized demand for quality is dysfunctional; it lessens attention. It is negative; it wants to avoid this or that. My conscious, ego-originating desire, say, for quality is distinguishable from the "desire" of the super-ego in that the former brings with it no anxiety. In itself, in fact, it is affect-less. It is positive; it seeks something, in contrast to a vague anxiety and fear bringing only desire for avoidance. I hadn't seen this problem of anxiety over my writing in quite this light before.

Mrs. Pickeringham. I took her seriously; I feel it as I read and recall her. I think my difficulty in adequately expressing her presence reflects her own difficulty. Her expressive flow was blocked, bringing with it the cynicism and condescension I detected.

Eighth year was less academically successful than seventh. Nothing precise I can link it to. Then the size of the school suggested in the next sentence. Anonymity. I think of Hampden-Turner, that groups over twelve in number are dehumanizing. Typically we live in small groups: family, friends, work associates. Yet experiencing anonymity is a developmental as well as social fact. It is possible to evolve to a developmental place where one feels intimately connected with people on the street, and with people one never sees, who live on an opposite side of the globe.

I think now of "internal time" and how my "less happy" period might have to do with living internal time. Buddhists invoke the concept of Karma; I think notions of genetic inheritance or acquired behaviors are roughly equivalent. One lives out sequences of experience that seem more given than chosen. It sometimes seem as if one's development is in part a function of living through these determined sequences, being willing to live through them, and not get stuck, arrested, in a period of pleasure or fear. By avoiding "attachment" to any particular period of one's life or any particular aspect, one maintains a willingness to live through all of one's inheritance. So that eighth year was, and this feels accurate today, more a function of internal time and sequence than of fortuitous environmental press, although the two may not be mutually exclusive.

December 29, 1975 day forty-nine

Day six, three-eighths through: "We stood together like that in the mornings to fortify our sense of social grounding." When "outer-directed," one is necessarily vulnerable to others. To defend myself, I find company that supports me. But the bondage of being-for-others continues, with its fear of solitude and of unknown others. It's been important for me to loosen these bonds, to concentrate on solidity in myself, on being inner-directed. Because I was so reliant upon others as a child and as an adolescent, I now have no doubt as to the importance of continuing deepening self-reliance.

"I was frightened, but it had to be done; there was no escape." This characterizes many situations in my life to present. I think of the first semester I taught at Schreiber High School. I was in shock, over the move to Long Island and subsequent changes in friendships, living arrangements, habits, and over school. I was extremely frightened. Yet flight never seemed to occur to me. Tension accumulated so that, by December, I was suffering muscular seizures while dressing for school in the morning. I don't see this as a character trait, i.e. the quality of persistence. Rather I experience it as an enduring biographical situation, one which holds considerable significance. My sense is that in complex and unconscious ways I choose this situation, the structure of it, meaning choosing a difficult, even unnerving situation and forgetting to contemplate withdrawal. I do this because I am then forced to stay my ground, to face without escape, in the Schreiber instance, my responsibility for other (students and colleagues) and for myself (creating a life in a social context where I am unknown). By forcing myself to live through this fear I shed some distorting layers of conditioned personality; I experience the process as sinking deeper into personality toward Self. I experience it as moving biographically.

The two seniors I sat near in study hall: the status system (or was it my timidity) kept me from breaking through my distancing admiration to reach their humanity, their connection with me. I watched them like television.

Day eight: "interesting that these non-musical motives would evolve into musical ones, and my interest in being in the band would change into a rather serious interest in music." I question that. From where I stand now, my interest was never strictly musical. I suppose compared to the character of the motive in the ninth grade, the motive in the conservatory at Capital was primarily musical. Today (now I take voice lessons, and listen to music daily) I would characterize my interest in music as more psychological than musical, in that I study and listen to it for its contribution to my development, rather than for its own sake.

Day eight, midway: names of teachers come to mind. I am struck again by the importance of individuals in contrast to programs and curriculum. School existed and exists for me concretely, as individuals, not abstractly as objectives and programs.

I think I've dwelled on Mrs. Galt more than on any other teacher. She, an old-fashioned word comes to mind, inspired me, and when I visualize her now, I feel again that inspiration. It's her own brand of encouragement, hopefulness, and confidence.

"... the basis [of the course] was Mrs. Galt and her lectures." It occurs to me that teachers I've admired most were pedagogically conventional. Mrs. Galt, Professor Grant (existentialism), Professor Stone (American history). So was Dan Bansom, although he encouraged us to talk, when he remembered. The "discussion method" seems quite simple-minded to me now, and only six years ago its superiority over others was transparent.

Day nine. Doing grammar exercises in the summer following the tenth year with Mr. Amble. I disliked grammar; what moved me was in part "my own vague desire to get closer to a teacher." I think there's a desire to incorporate authority here, symbolized by the recurrence of attempts to become closer to teachers, and primarily older male teachers. Of course, becoming a teacher represents such incorporation. The attraction to authority doesn't exhaustively account for my attraction to Mr. Amble. I am in touch with the satisfaction a friendship with an older man can give me, and this has much to do with the pleasure and intimacy of my early relationship to my father.

December 30, 1975 day fifty

Describing Mr. Casey, day ten. I am struck again by the absorption with individuals. Academic disciplines are clearly secondary in importance. Perhaps in my experience of school is the origin of the current preoccupation with individual life, and the role of academic disciplines in individual life.

The memory of Mrs. Farthing does arouse considerable emotion. In that sense of loyalty to her, that feeling of needing to support her and comfort her, is distilled much of my response to my mother and to women I've loved since. A sort of "outer-directedness," an ignoring of myself, a sense of being emotionally distended, thus a compulsive aspect to the affection for her. "Often it was as if not to care about Spanish meant not to care about her." This mixing of individual and academic discipline would occur again (I think of my French teacher at Capital for instance). I'm wondering to what extent one can every distinguish between attraction to a teacher and attraction to her or his discipline.

My freshman year at Capital I changed my major from music to French, thus precipitating the loss of the music scholarship, and the transfer to Otterbein and to Ohio State. My interest in French waned that summer at Otterbein, and extinguished nearly totally first quarter at Ohio State when I disliked the teacher. With French, it seems reasonably clear, the interest was in the teacher and only secondarily in the subject.

And my entrance into the education field, the curriculum and English education fields, seems to have everything to do with Dan and Marc, and nearly nothing to do with the field. I disliked many of the education courses I'd had previous to Dan's seminar.

What of the other reasons I've given myself to justify my place in a College of Education. The "conceptual looseness" of the field, hence the space to attempt to make a substantial and, relatively speaking, original contribution? This makes sense to me now, but I realize as I write that at the time I had little if any awareness of it, or of the interpersonal basis for the route I was taking. I wonder if in ten years hence I'll speak similarly of the present route.



the emotional; and it dwelled underneath all the social forms that filled our lives in the school building. Reading this hits hard this morning. Perhaps it's partly the first day of the new year, a time of looking for- ward and back, a time of a broader view. Thinking now of Sartre's interview at age seventy in the NEW YORK

REVIEW OF BOOKS, about laying one's cards on the table, that as history moves we will find ourselves dis- closing more and more of the hand we've been dealt, increasingly candid of the life going underneath the habitual forms of card-playing.

Then, my twelfth year of public schooling, I had no conscious sense of this. And my defense of cheating - that the social wasn't quite real and so neither was the assignment, that one could just as legitimately submit a copied paper as an original one: this sounds like rationalization this morning.

Yes, I've just found what I'm after here: my ambivalence over current social - especially school-related - forms. At once I feel disdain toward them, call them illusionary, call them historical phantoms, and respect- fully feel a sober acknowledgement of what schoolteachers do, the life Mr. Pervis leads. I feel both disdain and respect for the choice he made, however unaware, to maintain the pose, to muffle the smiles, the spontaneity, choking them with his button-tie shirts and tight sportcoat. I don't feel a middle ground between these two poles, between acceptance and repudiation. I can think one, but I don't feel it, yet.

The division between social reality and reality, and especially the contingency of the former and the ob- fuscation of the latter, feels as if it dates from chemistry class, no doubt earlier, but the beginning awareness of the fabricated quality of school life, of the world the teachers made for us - this dates to Mr. Pervis. Today I conceive of this matter thusly: Social reality is construction; it is at the heart of what being-in-the- world entails - constructing forms. Yet for me, for many, present forms lose their meaningful relation to inner and to historical reality, and so they have a super-imposed, political quality to them. Rather than re-

flect experienced reality they obfuscate it, like Mr. Pervis' posture did his internal life. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the historical present is one of inner confusion. This is tellingly evident in much social and school criticism. It hangs tightly to its target. However choking schooling is experienced, it is at least a form, a structure, and when inner conditions are unclear and confused, as they are, then many attach themselves to whatever structures are available, however detested. (The right wing adheres admirably to the extent of imagined structures, e.g. the right-wing reaction of the seventies, epitomized perhaps in the pseudo-Christian "crusade" of Anita Bryant against homosexuality, for family, God and country.) Unconscious, the critic becomes attached not to the structure (which is abhorred) but to the criticism. A critical attitude becomes laudable in itself. Not a reflective one, not a questioning one, a compulsively critical one, as use-

To make even first steps toward clarification\* of inner\* conditions and historical time, one must adopt (if one doesn't "naturally" experience) an affirmative, psychologically uncritical posture toward self and others. Not political agreement with others, not political acquiescence to others. Affirmation is not equivalent to blind acceptance or collusion; it is, rather, conscious acceptance, a willingness to psychologically support the other. From this support one is able to more clearly see what exists. I find that it is only with psycho- logical support that I am able to move biographically, that others are able to move. (Biographical move- ment has been subsumed within it political, intellectual and psychological movement.) Withdraw support and I tend to freeze, as do others. (This freezing takes varied forms: countercriticism, withdrawal, etc.)

is being stuck, arrested, out of synchronization with historical and internal time. Politically it has the effect of strengthening the anachronistic. Psychologically supported, the other is more able to consider that which is dissident with his own view. It is not only in this sense of strategy, however, do I tend to respect many present academic forms. The respect comes from a deeper sense, from a sensitivity to the lives of others. It comes from a biographic perspective, and a certain compassion that accompanies it. But compassion is not sentimentality and psycho- logical support while politically in counterpoint becomes complex, so much so that I am not clean with it. As I reflect on this I see that I am in what I term a biographic perspective, more of the time, more deeply, than I am in a political perspective. The political perspective seems but a fragment of a more complete one. To stay with it long seems to blur reality, which is multidimensional. It is intellectual, psychological, aesthetic, ethical as well as political; it is all these aspects at once. To think politically solely or even primarily involves a flattening out of reality, a parochialization of perspective. I see Mr. Pervis primarily as another being, with

a life given him, to be lived out according to its preconditions and his visions of it, and this fundamental fact we share. His political attitudes I may dislike; in fact, in extreme his political attitudes may lead him to fight me, to take my job away, to constrain my political freedom, even to take my life away. All this could be so, but the primacy of his being, a fellow being incarnate in this time, with a life to be lived and to be made the best of, this biographic view remains. It is underneath all the others. He remains my brother.

\* \* \*

Mrs. Cameron and Latin I. This has the feel of scholarship to it, an entrance into precise, patient attention to books. It has solitude to it, a focused quality, a safe "at home" feeling. More than any other subject that twelfth year, Mrs. Cameron's Latin class was about that for me.

January 2, 1976 day fifty-three

Day sixteen. Reading that freshman year of college I am reminded how easily I position myself as a student. Such a position could be problematic, when it becomes inalterable, compulsive, and coupled with a passivity, a refusal to take individual responsibility. That danger acknowledged, and hopefully exorcised, I can dwell on its favorable aspects. The fundamental one is that one can only learn, in a broad sense, when one is a student. I don't mean "enrolled in a school" of course. It is the attitude, the posture. As student I am open to experience, willing to listen seriously to what the other says, ready to let go of ideas and feelings no longer congruent with new information.

That's what has worried me about being a teacher. A solidification of position, due to the posture of leading students somewhere, seems inevitable. As a result, I work to remain student. It makes teaching somewhat problematic. But it makes learning possible.

\* \* \*

To my mind I'm curiously silent while I read the remembrance on day sixteen. That year was significant for me. The silence is akin to holding one's breath in anticipation, or in awe. The biographic transition, symbolized in the transition from high school to college, is a fundamental one.

"I went with ... from a conservative though largely happy Presbyterian family." I'm amused as I read this, as if I thought conservatism (theological or cultural) and happiness were rarely found together.

Day seventeen. "I remember her being passive, polite, co-operative, and soft. And smart." Listing intelligence last suggests my sex-role conditioning, what is, I suppose, my sexism.

The end of day seventeen. The awkward meeting with Becky two years later after our relationship at Capital. I then chronically angry, long-haired, compared with him whom she had known, uncontrolled. "We exchanged courtesies quickly, and I departed, shocked at the distance between us." This is an enduring image in my life. I can be close to another, share worlds, then move apart, so much so that, in a few year's time, we barely recognize each other. It seems people come together at the proper time, not "proper" in the sense of harmonious necessarily, but during the times when it is possible for each, when the distance between them can be traversed and tolerated. That pre-condition met, when they have some "business" to transact with each other. It may be to love the other; it may be to collaborate professionally; it may be to dislike each other, to thwart each other's movement. But in some way the meeting is meaningful biographically, or else it does not occur; I no longer experience "chance" meetings.

Day eighteen. "... detest for him, and away flowed my interest in history." Again, documentation for the view that, in my life at least, interest in academic disciplines is indissolubly linked to interest in the professor.

January 3, 1976

Norman Vincent Peale. My interest in his writing illustrates a point that interests me now. That is, one can be quite intrigued by subjects which, in retrospect, seem curious at best. Yet, entering the past, bringing it present, I see how legitimate this interest was at that time. The phrase comes to mind "biographic function of knowledge" to indicate that the role certain books and subjects play in a life is not fortuitous, but meaningfully related to the individual's biographic situation.

Pedagogically, I'm tempted to say this means that the educator respect his student's interests, for example mine in Peale, though perhaps asking the student to examine its biographic function. But it is true that his disdain for that interest shocked me out of it, forcing me into areas, though perhaps fulfilling similar bio-



graphic functions, that were intellectually new. The third thought that comes is that what transpired between the religion professor and me was, as a Buddhist might say, karmic; it was the continuation of our relationship from past incarnations.

That brief paragraph: "Sitting in the library, looking out the window. Autumn I think. So this is my life." I remember this vividly, more vividly than nearly any other time in the year. What does the vividness mean? I think of Maslow's notion of "peak experience." I suppose so. A longer view. A sense of living as one must. Doing what one must to bring satisfaction. Today I consciously work to extend this intuitive sense of which way to move.

Near the end of day eighteen. Recalling the first day of that first year, my parents helping me move into the dormitory. "None of us realizing it was our last day together, as parent and child. I left them psychologically, or began the departure that day." I'm thinking how prototypical that is; how one only semi-consciously makes a decision, makes some movement, and then months, perhaps years later one wakes up, in entirely different space, the people once the center of one's world distant in a world that seems to belong to television. We couldn't have been conscious that day of that day's significance, that, in a sense, we were never to see each other again, not as we had. I feel grief, deep in my stomach and on my face, as I write that, as I experience again the loss of them, the loss of home. Just now, ten years later, with my wife and our baby inside her, tentatively, gradually building our version of that archetype, home.

Then, in the next paragraph, "loss of innocence." CATCHER IN THE RYE. Such a knowing choice on Kurowski's part, it must have been what the year was about for many. Yet we lost our innocence asleep. Had we been awake, had we known, we would have screamed loud and long.

Day twenty. The interest in language. Symbolically, my need-fate to speak in different tongues to different people: schoolteachers, university colleagues, gay people, Zen Buddhists, Ohio farmers.

\* \* \*

I'm conscious of what feels like an effect of focusing on the past. It is a sharper sense, a bodily sense, of my life history, of my life. I feel as if I can identify more completely who this is that has lived thus, and lives thusly. Not that I can or want to articulate this identification. It is multi-dimensional. Now I'm most aware of this bodily presence, of its continuity, and of emotional presence, and its continuity also. My concrete environment presents itself more discernibly, as if it were louder, unmistakable, the Mahler on the phonograph, the empty coffee cup, the wooden table and the yellow writing tablet. The ink deposited on the page before me, the pen in my hand, my arms, my shoulders rising a little in tension, and now I relax them. Whatever segment of the kaleidoscope I focus on, it is now more present, more readily and completely perceived, and this is so, isn't it, because the life force, awareness, is more present. The process in this way performs the same function as sitting zazen, as most forms of spiritual practice: the increase of attention and presence. The eradication of blocks, and this seems to occur by focusing on the past which turns into focus on the present. Like the Rorschach in this respect: what I say I see there, in the past, is what I'm seeing in the present. Not consciously perhaps, and the "not consciously" is the blocks, due to the blocks. I must examine myself, albeit through the world, through my life history, my life in schools, and by examination cleanse myself, and thus enabled to see more clearly the empty coffee cup before me, hear the Mahler more distinctly, see you and your actions with more understanding.

January 4, 1976

Day twenty continued. Meeting with Professor Stone in December, and I'm frightened. Characteristic emotion for me. Frightened of teachers, especially of college teachers.

"She spoke seriously, even respectfully (as if I were capable of understanding her as a peer), and I remember being moved, a part of me that is serious and highminded is the word I think of here, and I felt committed to it, which is to say, to history." Interesting to me that the commitment is to the seriousness, to the "high-mindedness" that found expression through Professor Stone and through history. As if through the academic discipline one can achieve certain states of being. And one is drawn to these states, through, in this case, the medium of history, "called" by certain teachers. Academic disciplines as spiritual disciplines or practices. College teachers as callers to practice, for those who can hear.

French class. Here also the teacher influences my interest in the subject. This seems to be a consistent finding, that intellectual interests, in contrast to the autonomous status often ascribed to them, are often subordinate to interpersonal interests. With Mrs. S. I am fascinated with French; with the Ohio State instructor I am bored.

And yet, in the next paragraph, the philosophy of Sartre intrigues me in spite of Professor Casen's dullness. No hard-and-fast rule possible regarding this point.

Writing of the Pomerene refectory, of being lonely and not very conscious of it. The next paragraph begins "that reminds me" and has to do with sitting in a steam room in one of the men's gymnasiums. "Sitting in the steam, surrounded by other bodies, alone." I see this image clearly now: the steam thick, making vision vague, and the room crowded, people close to each other but distant, often looking into each other's eyes and at each other's bodies but sealed off from each other by some thin film of sober formality. Interesting to me, the contiguity of images: the separateness of sitting with coffee in the refectory and the separateness of the steam room.

The next paragraph, the associative chain unbroken, begins: "I met Jack that autumn quarter." My first intimate friendship. "If I were the head, he was the body." The first expression in these notes, albeit oblique, of the current attraction to body work. Leading to hatha yoga postures and to daily swimming.

Day twenty-two, the paragraph on Health Education 301. I say in it that I enrolled in the College of Education as a hedged bet, in case I didn't make graduate school. This isn't the reason I ordinarily have remembered over the years. What I recall is being in Professor Grant's Existentialism class, his lectures on Sartre's sense of being-in-the-world, of immersion in a project, of engage. Graduate school and a professorship seemed a suitable setting for work in the world. Odd that my memory during the regression differs.

Day twenty-three, reading NAUSEA. As I begin reading, I think of that Friday night near the end of my last year in high school, and sense a connection between the two. Departure from everyday life, from places I usually live, into startlingly new space, and it feels like a shedding of veils, seeing what I hadn't seen before. I think of Laing's PSYCHIATRY AND ANTI-PSYCHIATRY, the utility of LSD and of non-drug induced "breakdowns." Crystallization shatters, a new ontological order establishes itself, one more firmly rooted in the Self.

I'm not sure I'm as open to this sort of descent now. I wonder if I'm becoming too comfortable, too stable. Have I ceased moving? When I write that last question I know the doubt isn't founded. I am moving. What I work on now is moving with minimal discomfort. One needn't break down. I feel now an affirmation of how I'm living at present. Probably an occasional "breakdown" is helpful, but I no longer feel driven to them, driven by distrust of everyday life, driven by fear of the present.

Day twenty-four, remembering Grant's lectures on THE TRIAL. "The intellect may not be the medium through which understanding of our case, our trial, can come."

January 5, 1976

That seems so to me today. The intellect seems an extra-ordinarily powerful and useful tool, but a tool, used in the hands of one who has chosen a task, who knows what he wishes. If it becomes too powerful, that is, if I identify completely with my thoughts I lack grounding, and find great difficulty in choosing, choosing this thought to respect, that one to let go, that one to keep in abeyance until later. I suppose I must say "intuition" in order to have a concept to refer to the means through which I come to choice, to movement. The intellect assists in bringing to awareness what that choice is, but only assists. I could do without it, though I wouldn't want to. I can put my attention on, say, a reluctance to enter graduate school, and by dwelling on it, letting it be present, the constellation of constituent emotional elements becomes discernible. I can then identify the origin of this one; it is simple fear of the unknown. That one is based in doubt of my competence to perform adequately. Yet my academic record proves my adequacy, and my fear of what I don't know? I wouldn't have gone to first grade or left home for college had I respected it. But this part of the reluctance, a sense that now isn't time for me to go on, that other issues are more urgent, like giving attention to my body, its exercise and nutrition, like slowing the pace of my daily life, allowing more time to wander, to spontaneously explore my feeling life, to explore others. This sense of reluctance, a sense that now isn't time for me to go, that other issues are more urgent, this sense isn't regressive. It feels clean, to be respected. This

decision isn't reached strictly conceptually; reason assists but it is intuition that makes the situation clear.

March 14, 1976 day seventy

It's one in the morning. Denah and I read to each other from TO THE LIGHTHOUSE. She then fell asleep; I couldn't. Up, finished reading the regressive, progressive and analytic sections.

My mood is skeptical. Pouring orange juice downstairs a moment ago, asking what have I now, as a result of this? What can I take from this effort? Someone already too self-conscious made more so? If there are benefits, are they effable?

That mood is so material.

Where am I now?

Thinking over what I read. The deep link between interpersonal relationships and intellectual interests. How intellectual interests and academic work are grounded in life history, grounded in complicated ways I hope to sketch in the next section. The lived coherence among conceptually disparate interests. The complex interplay between the chosen and the given in biographic situation. The biographic function of intellectual interests. Biographic issues comprising a meaningful present. The establishment of biographic identity, based in name, body, personality.

Where am I now?

Still skeptical.

There are definite issues I know I moved into.

The body. Continuing attention to the body. Increasingly convinced that further intellectual development is contingent upon development of emotion and body.

Today Denah finds us a summer place. With a pond to swim in and lie by. Woods to walk in.

Suddenly I'm tired.

March 17, 1976 day seventy-one

A stream, with smaller ones leading away from its sides. Moving with a stream, watching the narrow outlets. Tempted to follow one.

I've followed them before. Soon they run dry. Always returning to the main stream.

The past few days have been away from the stream. This morning, away. Strained. Aching.

It's cool in the study. Snowstorm yesterday. Silent cold this morning.

Sitting at the desk in my cool study, strained.

The present.

Short holiday to Washington, D.C. tomorrow, if the snow is cleared. Warmth.

Yesterday, Ph.D. admissions committee with, more than ever before, my colleagues. A freeing sense, a letting go of restriction. More can be said, expressed, understood.

The Wisconsin conference on the Reconceptualization: the announcement arrived yesterday. On schedule.

We found a place for the summer. An apartment over a garage, near an old farmhouse remote in the country, in Kissing Bridge, New York. A pond to swim naked in. Sun to turn brown in. Pines to breathe in.

An apartment to write in.

The present.

Last night reading TO THE LIGHTHOUSE to each other. We feel a bit like Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay. The family, the guests, the summer place by the sea.

What's Tansley writing his dissertation on? "The influence of somebody on something," replies Mrs. Ramsay.

Thinking of this writing, of the academic disciplines as spiritual discipline. Who said it? In a meeting a week or so back, someone said something about someone's credentials that clearly indicated that the significance of his study was not "its contribution to the body of knowledge" but its certification of him as an intellectually evolved person.

I use the dissertation, the comprehensive exam -- all of it -- to coalesce myself, to penetrate through to my-

self, allow myself to flow out.

Stomach filled by a too-early breakfast, I sit slightly dulled at my desk, in cool air, the window ahead of me showing white and silent cold. It's March 17, a Wednesday morning, and I have to stop by the bank, see my therapist, then the back doctor at four, and sometime tonight stop by the office to finish pagination of the manuscript TOWARD A POOR CURRICULUM, which I think of as an introduction to this study.

Stephen's leaving for Stanford; Fussell will be gone too. Madeleine in town but not teaching the undergraduates in the fall. Sandy is coming maybe. Ron will be present.

The future, the past. They hang here in me, in the present, sitting at my desk, stomach overfull, Virginia influencing my prose, always influencing my prose. Filled with the other, spreading her out with ink and words, deposits of all the pasts and all of the futures, residues of each day lived, each to be lived, crystallized in these marks on yellow tablet.

April 1, 1976 day seventy-two

I am filled, over-reading to write. What I take from this work isn't being captured in this section, maybe in the concluding section. Why is that.

Theoretical language. Before I've suspected it was a defense -- abstraction as a shield. Also before I've viewed it as a communicative medium, a language thinned (from its subjective viscosity) into public space. This morning it feels my chosen medium to express what I conclude from my study, chosen: it comes from deeper layers. It permits me to express what I see underneath the details of a life in schools.

To move to the next section. That's what I've thought each day I've pondered this synthetical stage. To the question what have I gained, an emptiness, then the thought: begin the theoretical again. So this is what I've taken, and what I write next.

## Five

### Biographic Function

It is as if the final perspective (before entering non-conceptual space) is that of individual life. Her life history. His life story. With Kierkegaard, against Hegel, what exists historically exists concretely, and what exists concretely are individuals and their artifacts.

True, it feels as if there is a culture, a society, independent of us. We feel oppressed by it. But where is this society? Who is it? It is my colleagues at the university, my neighbor across the street, those appearing on the television set, the fact of universities and television sets: these are society. They exist concretely, discrete from by body, but the vibration of their thought, their feeling, and their bodies influence me, as mine do them. Together we comprise culture; of course, this is a commonplace. The error happens next. Culture remains; the individual drops out. It's an event few theoreticians discern. They live in abstraction, and so abstractions seems to exist concretely, the concrete does not. The concrete becomes abstract, and so he who enters my office is first a manifestation of a category (student, woman, bourgeois) and remotely (if at all) an individual being, whose name, face, and feel (of her voice, her eyes glancing now at the plant on the desk) call my own. We form a collective, but this derivative. If we remember ourselves, retain our locus inside, seated gently firmly in our bodies, then the fact of individuality is preserved.

Sartre manages to embrace social categories (like class) and not let go of individuals. The tension thus created he designates dialectical, and its examination is his developmental scheme. That is how we move, collectively (which is to say historically) and individually: in ruthless examination of our classness, our historical roles.

This view lends much credence to the shadows that are social categories, treats them too seriously. Now we must let go of them, and seem to treat them lightly. In so doing we minimize their stranglehold on us, leaving us more autonomous, more awake, to ourselves and others, and to these shadows.

Because finally they are only categories, marks on a page. Constructions superimposed upon concrete beings. Inevitably one is seduced to sacrifice concrete beings for the sake of the abstraction, to wit Stalin. This topsy-turvy madness is precisely what we humans strain so to heal ourselves of.

The paramount reality of the individual, its precedence over other realities (social, historical) is an incapable lesson of the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic exercise.

The teacher, surveying his class of youngsters scrawling in notebooks, leans backward in satisfaction. Yes, this is a good class today. The professor reading a Masters thesis. Yes, this work reflects breath and depth of scholarship. Schoolboard officials moaning over reading scores, defending their system against charges that their "educational products" can neither read nor write. Shouldn't the high-school diploma indicate a certain proficiency in the basic skills? At least reading at the eighth or ninth-grade level? We must return to the basics; we are creating a society of illiterates.

These are the thoughts of social captives. They believe they lord over society; they know what society we strive for, and what we must do to achieve it. They know what constitutes a contribution to the body of knowledge. What makes a good class and what doesn't.

Only thoughts in heads.

I think of my years in schools, of all the ideas teachers had of what they were doing, what its educational significance was. Who among them, reading this writing, would recognize my experience? Would Mrs. Galt? But your experience wasn't what school was about. You've focused only on your experience, ignored the curriculum, ignored the skills you acquired. You've evaded the role of schools in society.

The role of who in what? What I have recalled is exactly and finally what school has been for me. Those memories, the intellectual, emotional, physical residue of all those years -- they constitute the curriculum. They constitute the role of school in my life, the only role school can have: in the lives of existing individuals. For what finally exists is individual lives. "School" is a construct; "society" is a construct. You, holding this journal in your hands, are not.

\* \* \*

Who is this "you?" For all the possible lives which exist for the individual, she lives but one. One can seek this woman or that one, that man, that boy to become friends with, to sleep with, to mate with. One can try this job, then another one. Go for a walk now, no later; I'll eat now. There is choice.

Viewed exclusively, that can seem to be all that is. I am my freedom.

But what happens when I look backward? There is a string of choices made, of different orders, in different areas, but they make a string. There is discernible a certain order, a certain movement. In a certain sense the order and the movement are created; they are consequences of my choices. As well there is a certain sense in which they are given.

What is given is myself. A definite body with its genetic inheritance. A definite set of parents, and a childhood singular in quality and influence. A definite conditioning in school as well as home, and when I begin to awaken to my freedom, I so awaken in the context of this life already being lived, this body-personality that bears my name, my name. I am this body, this being.

Yet I am not. I can distance (and dissociate) myself from this being that I am; I can observe him. I can recall his past, trace the origins of his present personality. I can see patterns in this life, in this biography, how that led to this. Looking ahead, I can see what is possible, what is likely. Here I experience choice. In the context of much that is given, there is, nonetheless, choice. I am free to make of him what I wish, determining to a significant degree what he becomes.

Determining what is given and choosing what is not is my primary responsibility in the world. One fulfills -- or does not -- this responsibility in the world, among and with others.

\* \* \*

In this section I want to examine aspects of this perspective. There are terms which permit a more precise discussion of these aspects. The problem I face is that many of these aspects are discussed, casually if not unconsciously, by many in the vernacular. Often these words become weak and vague in their overuse. In order to avoid the ambiguity inherent in overused words, and to make more likely clear comprehension of what I wish to discuss, I will identify a vocabulary. In order to avoid the obfuscation likely in specialized language, I intend that its number be few.

When referring to one's life story, which has a subtly debasing whisper in it, I will use the word biography. Even when referring to my own, I will use biography, instead of autobiography, which has a ring of seventh-

grade English assignment to it. Nor did it seem to me I could use the word "life." Somehow life and life story are not equivalent; the latter is subsumed in the former. What I wish to focus on is experience, and experience and life are not identical, the former also subsumed in the latter. To examine my experience of living, as the structure of the phrase suggests, is to examine an aspect overlapping living, but not its equivalent. Biography is the history of my life; it is my life story, that is its events of note, as well as my experience of these events. A biographic perspective, in contrast to a social or an educational one, is not disembodied. It announces its groundedness in a singular embodied being, incarnate during a certain historical period. In a biographic point of view, the individual is not viewed as to his relation to the historical period in which he has life, certainly not to his role in it. Rather, we examine the historical period in the context of his biography. It assumes significance in relation to his biography. Its meaning lies in his experience of it. So we say the fact of a slight economic recovery in the United States in 1976 achieves, possibly, a certain biographic significance. There is an economic recovery but it attains life only as it expresses itself in the lives of individuals. For central planners to act in the name of the economy -- they claim of course that they act in the best interests of individuals -- is to become lost in abstractions when then serve as disguises for the best interests of politically powerful groups: corporate, governmental, and labor groups. While such social collectives as corporations and labor unions are historically necessary at present, their fundamental fictive nature must nonetheless must be systematically exposed, with an eye toward their actual dissolution. Too easily they form pockets of political allegiance and psychological identity into which the individual's energy is blindly poured, weakening and eventually severing his bond to himself as an individual being with a certain life to be lived, certain biographic issues to be faced. And, inevitably, so also is cut his bond to others as similarly endowed beings. Thus the difficulty with social collectives and social theorizing and, subsuming these, the reality of the social in itself is its illusionary nature, a nature which individuals construct to lead themselves away from their lives and the lives of others. They come to live in fictive realities. Living in the abstract, endowing it with life, these people become dissociated from the concrete, which becomes materiel for abstraction construction. Thus the sacrifice of concrete entities -- trees, mountains, air, cattle, and human beings -- becomes plausible and in fact reasonable for the sake of abstractions: the economy, world peace, educational achievement.

\* \* \*

Biographic significance. To discuss it a related term is helpful: biographic issues.

My experience has been, underscored as it was in the use of the method, that I face certain biographic issues always. They comprise the biographic present, and determine the biographic function of others. For instance, hurt or injury, in its emotional sense, is a perennial issue. Often I find myself attracted to those with whom I experience hurt. During earlier years, before I began a study of it, I would project my hurt onto the other, claiming that she was insensitive (or another appropriately perjorative term). As time passed, I came to see my complicity in these transactions. In one instance, I see I choose someone who is in fact insensitive to my expectations of her, and given my timidity, understandably she cannot grasp what it is I want from her (and what I want to give to her), and so I come to feel injured, which she finds disconcerting (although we have said little of it yet). Now I watch her slip into confusion (why does he look hurt?), and in her eyes and shoulders I see anger forming, and now she speaks, attacking me for being insensitive to her. We are like pieces in a puzzle, as I reel from her attack, injured. Our shapes are different (I asking for hurt, she for anger) yet intertwining, our visions (what we portray and what we see) differ as well, and yet -- a perfect match. My issue of being hurt fits hers of feeling anger and expressing it indiscriminately (hence failing to recognize it as her emotion, her issue). Just as I chose her to precipitate my injury, she chose me to precipitate her anger. The pieces differ but the fit is flawless. The way we fit, how we function in the life of the other, is our biographic significance for the other.

I think of Kubrick's film "Barry Lyndon," which has achieved some attention at the time of this writing. Nearly every review decried the lack of action as it praised the color, costume and music. On the gross level of social events the film was boring (save for a war, but given the American public's capacity for viewing violence, several minutes of musket warfare would hardly satisfy). On the more subtle level of biographic events the film was moving. Early on we see the fundamental biographic issues Barry Lyndon must face.

They are based in his unconscious egocentricity, which allows him to expect to obtain what he wishes, regardless the significance of what he wants for others. Inevitably disappointed and hurt, he converts hurt to anger, seeking a kind of revenge by insensitively and hostilely pursuing his desires, or pseudo-desires, for they only serve to force a repetition of the same issue.

Early in the film we observe his affection for his cousin. When she agrees to marry the older Englishman, Barry becomes hurt, then angry. The anger indicates he has misjudged the intensity of her affection for him, her willingness to express it in marital commitment. His hurt now anger, he challenges her suitor to a duel, a duel he is fooled into believing he has won. He leaves his homeland and his mother, and continues, in various forms, to act out this same story, these same issues. Finally he takes revenge on the woman he eventually marries, by being insensitive to her, by sexing with other women, by squandering her fortune, and mistreating her son. His excesses, and their aggressive undercurrent, engender opposition, again in the form of a male who challenges his relationship to the woman (a repetition of the opening scene). It is the woman's son who expresses openly the anger with which Lyndon himself unconsciously seethes. The son provokes a duel, and this time Lyndon loses.

Praise belongs at least as much to Kubrick who I presume chose O'Neal to portray Lyndon as it does to O'Neal himself. Brilliantly he wears the emotional configuration of hurt and anger on his face, in his musculature. The viewer watches stunned as he fails, over and over, to become conscious of what drives him.

Nor do the other characters. His wife's issues involve assertiveness, being responsible to herself, and to her wishes. When we first see her she is married to a man much older than she, and one so blindly egocentric that he wears her as an adornment. She feeds his consuming self-absorption (perhaps his central biographic issue) and in turn, he treats her as an object, cementing more firmly her sense of herself as objectified and determinate. She says little; she poses. The gradual deterioration of her spirit is mirrored in the decline of her estate. Even at the end, with Lyndon exorcised, she sits erect and silent, signing bills, her son her new master.

The two face quite different issues, and yet the match is perfect; it forces these issues to the others. The tragic sense that film expresses is the tragedy of beings who fail to transcend their biographic situations, fail to resolve their biographic issues. These characters are static and this condition can be termed biographic stasis or arrest. Its counterpoint is biographic movement.

\* \* \*

Joseph K. is biographically arrested. The outer form of his life so indicates: the bank is a preoccupation, around which his personal life revolves. If we can use the phrase "personal life" faithfully in this case: he has a room where he sleeps; evenings he passes in bars. Periodically he visits a prostitute; she is his "lover." There is no indication of variation; the crust of his life is rigid. Internally he seems to have little life of his own. His thoughts are in response to his literal arrest; they are thoughts of one as unimaginative as he is indignant. His absorption is his worry of the cases's effect upon his standing in the bank. The seriousness with which he regards the proceedings is one born of fear, hence myopic and unconscious. The understanding of what transpires which he seeks is in the service of escaping that which transpires. Thus his thinking has a staccato quality to it, and lacks the dispassionate reflection of one not afraid of what he faces. It has as well a blinding utilitarian focus which precludes his seeing his situation, let alone understanding it. K. is guilty, and that which he is guilty of is stasis. In the midst of life, of his own bodily life, he is dead. He is only a response, and a myopically cognitive one at that, to what occurs in the social world. He has failed to take seriously a fundamental metaphysical charge: to take himself seriously. In becoming a phantom he abandoned life years ago, and his execution at the novel's end is only the reflection in the social world of the murder he himself has committed within.

Of course the matter is rarely a case of either/or. K. seems reassuringly distant. Examining the past reveals movement. One moves through grade levels in school and through friends as one moves through clothing become too small for the quickly-developing body. Development accurately characterizes the young life. Yet, in the twenties, the body's development becomes more subtle, and if mistreated, development becomes deterioration. This danger, this truth for many, is mirrored intellectually and psycho-socially. Sometimes due to the rapidity and intensity of movement in childhood and in adolescence, one often works to still movement, to achieve stability. The excessive response is to check it altogether. One comes to mouth platitudes, and by

securing these tight in the mind, seemingly escapes from the transience of thought and feeling characteristic of the biographically moving. One's outer routine becomes sacrosanct, the structure upon which one hangs the now limp, atrophying internal self. One becomes a banker, a professor, a husband and a mother. I lose myself to the outer form of myself, and achieve the stability I demanded, until, of course, the body begins to follow the self's course, and atrophies. The mind's rigidity is mirrored in the musculature of the body; blood circulation diminishes, degenerative diseases develop. The physical death in many cases is only the echo on the physical level of what has already occurred intellectually and psycho-socially.

\* \* \*

Biographic movement is co-extensive with intellectual, psycho-social and physical movement. Emphasis on one dimension, for instance the intellectual, and disregard for the body, or for the psychological function of one's intellectual preoccupations, makes likely biographic arrest. There can be movement in my life only as I achieve some semblance of balance in these four interdependent realms.

Early in our lives we are sensitive to this. The "jock" who excels in organized sports but is effectively inarticulate and insensitive is prototypical of an idolater of the body. The socialite, superficially skillful during social intercourse but clumsy in solitude, incapable of serious intellectual encounter, illustrates an exaggerated predilection toward social reality. The overly sensitive introspective young man, painfully shy with others, his body wilting from excessive time spent in his mind, illustrates an extreme form of psychological preoccupation. And of course the intellectual, gifted at conceptualization of seemingly irretrievably complex issues, is remunerated less than his contribution deserves, due in part to his socio-political artlessness. Worse, his conceptualization, often born in an ignored if not disdained body, lacks the erotic, and is often ignorant of its own psychological functions and limitations.

As became evident through use of the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic method, body had nearly dropped out of my life. I dwelled in the mental and the psychological. The present sense of stasis is born of this absence, and I find myself hungry for sunlight on the face and chest, for warm air around my limbs, awakening me to forgotten hands and calves.

This is the synthesis I couldn't write. Not until this distance, provided by writing the preceding, existed. Now, this I can see, its simplicity, its abstractedness and its profundity for me. My biographic stasis is due to atrophy, most severely, of the body, and secondarily, of the social. Accompanying the atrophy is pain, and this sense of injury I have sought to heal solely in the psychological realm. The pain doesn't solely originate there, but in the body, a body dying due to neglect and disdain. It hangs below (say I, peering through eyes in the head where I dwell), disgusting, white, fleshy, unused. I resent its presence, that it aches after a day's work, demands without negotiation its rest, a rest I don't enjoy, involved in dreams entering this house, locked, keyless in my car in an empty parking lot, four in the morning, coatless, watching snow fall that will, in a few hours, freeze me. The body sleeps; I freeze.

So are the thoughts of bodily neglect. Both cause and consequence of neglect. To attend to the body, to accept it, to claim and integrate it. I am this hand writing, these feet trembling slightly under the desk, this stomach hanging over my belt. Give the body time. Walking, running, being outside where moving through unformed physical space reminds continually that one is also an object among objects, a body among bodies. To stretch it, awaken it, rest it, as a parent laying a child down to sleep; to embrace it erotically. To make love to oneself. To accept I am a being in a body. Then, I feel it in my groin, the pain diminishes, and I feel movement.

\* \* \*

Because most are gifted in one area and not another, we focus where we are competent and often ignore where we are not. My successes, such as they were, came academically, and for a time, socially. My body was in comparison clumsy, too tall, and for a while, chubby. It was an embarrassment to me.

Even those with bodily competence in adolescence often lose it in college when the intellectual and psycho-social become preoccupations. Seated in chairs, in classes, studying, talking with others, easily the body becomes a chair to sink in, and so used it begins to wilt. So regarded, we eat according to mood, according to circumstance, not according to bodily need. Premature death due to heart disease and cancer is not the only point. It is one made by Wilhelm Reich and psychotherapists working in his tradition. Psychological constriction is reflected in the musculature, and vice versa.

With the development of psychological armour comes physical armour. Muscular movement becomes con-



\* \* \*

The paramount reality of the individual, its precedence over other realities (social, historical) is an incapable lesson of the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic exercise.

The teacher, surveying his class of youngsters scrawling in notebooks, leans backward in satisfaction. Yes, this is a good class today. The professor reading a Masters thesis. Yes, this work reflects breath and depth of scholarship. Schoolboard officials moaning over reading scores, defending their system against charges that their "educational products" can neither read nor write. Shouldn't the high-school diploma indicate a certain proficiency in the basic skills? At least reading at the eighth or ninth-grade level? We must return to the basics; we are creating a society of illiterates.

These are the thoughts of social captives. They believe they lord over society; they know what society we strive for, and what we must do to achieve it. They know what constitutes a contribution to the body of knowledge. What makes a good class and what doesn't.

Only thoughts in heads.

I think of my years in schools, of all the ideas teachers had of what they were doing, what its educational significance was. Who among them, reading this writing, would recognize my experience? Would Mrs. Galt? But your experience wasn't what school was about. You've focused only on your experience, ignored the curriculum, ignored the skills you acquired. You've evaded the role of schools in society.

The role of who in what? What I have recalled is exactly and finally what school has been for me. Those memories, the intellectual, emotional, physical residue of all those years -- they constitute the curriculum. They constitute the role of school in my life, the only role school can have: in the lives of existing individuals. For what finally exists is individual lives. "School" is a construct; "society" is a construct. You, holding this journal in your hands, are not.

\* \* \*

Who is this "you?" For all the possible lives which exist for the individual, she lives but one. One can seek this woman or that one, that man, that boy to become friends with, to sleep with, to mate with. One can try this job, then another one. Go for a walk now, no later; I'll eat now. There is choice.

Viewed exclusively, that can seem to be all that is. I am my freedom.

But what happens when I look backward? There is a string of choices made, of different orders, in different areas, but they make a string. There is discernible a certain order, a certain movement. In a certain sense the order and the movement are created; they are consequences of my choices. As well there is a certain sense in which they are given.

What is given is myself. A definite body with its genetic inheritance. A definite set of parents, and a childhood singular in quality and influence. A definite conditioning in school as well as home, and when I begin to awaken to my freedom, I so awaken in the context of this life already being lived, this body-personality that bears my name, my name. I am this body, this being.

Yet I am not. I can distance (and dissociate) myself from this being that I am; I can observe him. I can recall his past, trace the origins of his present personality. I can see patterns in this life, in this biography, how that led to this. Looking ahead, I can see what is possible, what is likely. Here I experience choice. In the context of much that is given, there is, nonetheless, choice. I am free to make of him what I wish, determining to a significant degree what he becomes.

Determining what is given and choosing what is not is my primary responsibility in the world. One fulfills -- or does not -- this responsibility in the world, among and with others.

\* \* \*

In this section I want to examine aspects of this perspective. There are terms which permit a more precise discussion of these aspects. The problem I face is that many of these aspects are discussed, casually if not unconsciously, by many in the vernacular. Often these words become weak and vague in their overuse. In order to avoid the ambiguity inherent in overused words, and to make more likely clear comprehension of what I wish to discuss, I will identify a vocabulary. In order to avoid the obfuscation likely in specialized language, I intend that its number be few.

When referring to one's life story, which has a subtly debasing whisper in it, I will use the word biography. Even when referring to my own, I will use biography, instead of autobiography, which has a ring of seventh-

grade English assignment to it. Nor did it seem to me I could use the word "life." Somehow life and life story are not equivalent; the latter is subsumed in the former. What I wish to focus on is experience, and experience and life are not identical, the former also subsumed in the latter. To examine my experience of living, as the structure of the phrase suggests, is to examine an aspect overlapping living, but not its equivalent. Biography is the history of my life; it is my life story, that is its events of note, as well as my experience of these events. A biographic perspective, in contrast to a social or an educational one, is not disembodied. It announces its groundedness in a singular embodied being, incarnate during a certain historical period. In a biographic point of view, the individual is not viewed as to his relation to the historical period in which he has life, certainly not to his role in it. Rather, we examine the historical period in the context of his biography. It assumes significance in relation to his biography. Its meaning lies in his experience of it. So we say the fact of a slight economic recovery in the United States in 1976 achieves, possibly, a certain biographic significance. There is an economic recovery but it attains life only as it expresses itself in the lives of individuals. For central planners to act in the name of the economy -- they claim of course that they act in the best interests of individuals -- is to become lost in abstractions when then serve as disguises for the best interests of politically powerful groups: corporate, governmental, and labor groups. While such social collectives as corporations and labor unions are historically necessary at present, their fundamental fictive nature must nonetheless must be systematically exposed, with an eye toward their actual dissolution. Too easily they form pockets of political allegiance and psychological identity into which the individual's energy is blindly poured, weakening and eventually severing his bond to himself as an individual being with a certain life to be lived, certain biographic issues to be faced. And, inevitably, so also is cut his bond to others as similarly endowed beings. Thus the difficulty with social collectives and social theorizing and, subsuming these, the reality of the social in itself is its illusionary nature, a nature which individuals construct to lead themselves away from their lives and the lives of others. They come to live in fictive realities. Living in the abstract, endowing it with life, these people become dissociated from the concrete, which becomes materiel for abstraction construction. Thus the sacrifice of concrete entities -- trees, mountains, air, cattle, and human beings -- becomes plausible and in fact reasonable for the sake of abstractions: the economy, world peace, educational achievement.

\* \* \*

Biographic significance. To discuss it a related term is helpful: biographic issues.

My experience has been, underscored as it was in the use of the method, that I face certain biographic issues always. They comprise the biographic present, and determine the biographic function of others. For instance, hurt or injury, in its emotional sense, is a perennial issue. Often I find myself attracted to those with whom I experience hurt. During earlier years, before I began a study of it, I would project my hurt onto the other, claiming that she was insensitive (or another appropriately perjorative term). As time passed, I came to see my complicity in these transactions. In one instance, I see I choose someone who is in fact insensitive to my expectations of her, and given my timidity, understandably she cannot grasp what it is I want from her (and what I want to give to her), and so I come to feel injured, which she finds disconcerting (although we have said little of it yet). Now I watch her slip into confusion (why does he look hurt?), and in her eyes and shoulders I see anger forming, and now she speaks, attacking me for being insensitive to her. We are like pieces in a puzzle, as I reel from her attack, injured. Our shapes are different (I asking for hurt, she for anger) yet intertwining, our visions (what we portray and what we see) differ as well, and yet -- a perfect match. My issue of being hurt fits hers of feeling anger and expressing it indiscriminately (hence failing to recognize it as her emotion, her issue). Just as I chose her to precipitate my injury, she chose me to precipitate her anger. The pieces differ but the fit is flawless. The way we fit, how we function in the life of the other, is our biographic significance for the other.

I think of Kubrick's film "Barry Lyndon," which has achieved some attention at the time of this writing. Nearly every review decried the lack of action as it praised the color, costume and music. On the gross level of social events the film was boring (save for a war, but given the American public's capacity for viewing violence, several minutes of musket warfare would hardly satisfy). On the more subtle level of biographic events the film was moving. Early on we see the fundamental biographic issues Barry Lyndon must face.

They are based in his unconscious egocentricity, which allows him to expect to obtain what he wishes, regardless the significance of what he wants for others. Inevitably disappointed and hurt, he converts hurt to anger, seeking a kind of revenge by insensitively and hostilely pursuing his desires, or pseudo-desires, for they only serve to force a repetition of the same issue.

Early in the film we observe his affection for his cousin. When she agrees to marry the older Englishman, Barry becomes hurt, then angry. The anger indicates he has misjudged the intensity of her affection for him, her willingness to express it in marital commitment. His hurt now anger, he challenges her suitor to a duel, a duel he is fooled into believing he has won. He leaves his homeland and his mother, and continues, in various forms, to act out this same story, these same issues. Finally he takes revenge on the woman he eventually marries, by being insensitive to her, by sexing with other women, by squandering her fortune, and mistreating her son. His excesses, and their aggressive undercurrent, engender opposition, again in the form of a male who challenges his relationship to the woman (a repetition of the opening scene). It is the woman's son who expresses openly the anger with which Lyndon himself unconsciously seethes. The son provokes a duel, and this time Lyndon loses.

Praise belongs at least as much to Kubrick who I presume chose O'Neal to portray Lyndon as it does to O'Neal himself. Brilliantly he wears the emotional configuration of hurt and anger on his face, in his musculature. The viewer watches stunned as he fails, over and over, to become conscious of what drives him.

Nor do the other characters. His wife's issues involve assertiveness, being responsible to herself, and to her wishes. When we first see her she is married to a man much older than she, and one so blindly egocentric that he wears her as an adornment. She feeds his consuming self-absorption (perhaps his central biographic issue) and in turn, he treats her as an object, cementing more firmly her sense of herself as objectified and determinate. She says little; she poses. The gradual deterioration of her spirit is mirrored in the decline of her estate. Even at the end, with Lyndon exorcised, she sits erect and silent, signing bills, her son her new master.

The two face quite different issues, and yet the match is perfect; it forces these issues to the others. The tragic sense that film expresses is the tragedy of beings who fail to transcend their biographic situations, fail to resolve their biographic issues. These characters are static and this condition can be termed biographic stasis or arrest. Its counterpoint is biographic movement.

\* \* \*

Joseph K. is biographically arrested. The outer form of his life so indicates: the bank is a preoccupation, around which his personal life revolves. If we can use the phrase "personal life" faithfully in this case: he has a room where he sleeps; evenings he passes in bars. Periodically he visits a prostitute; she is his "lover." There is no indication of variation; the crust of his life is rigid. Internally he seems to have little life of his own. His thoughts are in response to his literal arrest; they are thoughts of one as unimaginative as he is indignant. His absorption is his worry of the cases's effect upon his standing in the bank. The seriousness with which he regards the proceedings is one born of fear, hence myopic and unconscious. The understanding of what transpires which he seeks is in the service of escaping that which transpires. Thus his thinking has a staccato quality to it, and lacks the dispassionate reflection of one not afraid of what he faces. It has as well a blinding utilitarian focus which precludes his seeing his situation, let alone understanding it. K. is guilty, and that which he is guilty of is stasis. In the midst of life, of his own bodily life, he is dead. He is only a response, and a myopically cognitive one at that, to what occurs in the social world. He has failed to take seriously a fundamental metaphysical charge: to take himself seriously. In becoming a phantom he abandoned life years ago, and his execution at the novel's end is only the reflection in the social world of the murder he himself has committed within.

Of course the matter is rarely a case of either/or. K. seems reassuringly distant. Examining the past reveals movement. One moves through grade levels in school and through friends as one moves through clothing become too small for the quickly-developing body. Development accurately characterizes the young life. Yet, in the twenties, the body's development becomes more subtle, and if mistreated, development becomes deterioration. This danger, this truth for many, is mirrored intellectually and psycho-socially. Sometimes due to the rapidity and intensity of movement in childhood and in adolescence, one often works to still movement, to achieve stability. The excessive response is to check it altogether. One comes to mouth platitudes, and by

securing these tight in the mind, seemingly escapes from the transience of thought and feeling characteristic of the biographically moving. One's outer routine becomes sacrosanct, the structure upon which one hangs the now limp, atrophying internal self. One becomes a banker, a professor, a husband and a mother. I lose myself to the outer form of myself, and achieve the stability I demanded, until, of course, the body begins to follow the self's course, and atrophies. The mind's rigidity is mirrored in the musculature of the body; blood circulation diminishes, degenerative diseases develop. The physical death in many cases is only the echo on the physical level of what has already occurred intellectually and psycho-socially.

\* \* \*

Biographic movement is co-extensive with intellectual, psycho-social and physical movement. Emphasis on one dimension, for instance the intellectual, and disregard for the body, or for the psychological function of one's intellectual preoccupations, makes likely biographic arrest. There can be movement in my life only as I achieve some semblance of balance in these four interdependent realms.

Early in our lives we are sensitive to this. The "jock" who excels in organized sports but is effectively inarticulate and insensitive is prototypical of an idolater of the body. The socialite, superficially skillful during social intercourse but clumsy in solitude, incapable of serious intellectual encounter, illustrates an exaggerated predilection toward social reality. The overly sensitive introspective young man, painfully shy with others, his body wilting from excessive time spent in his mind, illustrates an extreme form of psychological preoccupation. And of course the intellectual, gifted at conceptualization of seemingly irretrievably complex issues, is remunerated less than his contribution deserves, due in part to his socio-political artlessness. Worse, his conceptualization, often born in an ignored if not disdained body, lacks the erotic, and is often ignorant of its own psychological functions and limitations.

As became evident through use of the regressive-progressive-analytic-synthetic method, body had nearly dropped out of my life. I dwelled in the mental and the psychological. The present sense of stasis is born of this absence, and I find myself hungry for sunlight on the face and chest, for warm air around my limbs, awakening me to forgotten hands and calves.

This is the synthesis I couldn't write. Not until this distance, provided by writing the preceding, existed. Now, this I can see, its simplicity, its abstractedness and its profundity for me. My biographic stasis is due to atrophy, most severely, of the body, and secondarily, of the social. Accompanying the atrophy is pain, and this sense of injury I have sought to heal solely in the psychological realm. The pain doesn't solely originate there, but in the body, a body dying due to neglect and disdain. It hangs below (say I, peering through eyes in the head where I dwell), disgusting, white, fleshy, unused. I resent its presence, that it aches after a day's work, demands without negotiation its rest, a rest I don't enjoy, involved in dreams entering this house, locked, keyless in my car in an empty parking lot, four in the morning, coatless, watching snow fall that will, in a few hours, freeze me. The body sleeps; I freeze.

So are the thoughts of bodily neglect. Both cause and consequence of neglect. To attend to the body, to accept it, to claim and integrate it. I am this hand writing, these feet trembling slightly under the desk, this stomach hanging over my belt. Give the body time. Walking, running, being outside where moving through unformed physical space reminds continually that one is also an object among objects, a body among bodies. To stretch it, awaken it, rest it, as a parent laying a child down to sleep; to embrace it erotically. To make love to oneself. To accept I am a being in a body. Then, I feel it in my groin, the pain diminishes, and I feel movement.

\* \* \*

Because most are gifted in one area and not another, we focus where we are competent and often ignore where we are not. My successes, such as they were, came academically, and for a time, socially. My body was in comparison clumsy, too tall, and for a while, chubby. It was an embarrassment to me.

Even those with bodily competence in adolescence often lose it in college when the intellectual and psycho-social become preoccupations. Seated in chairs, in classes, studying, talking with others, easily the body becomes a chair to sink in, and so used it begins to wilt. So regarded, we eat according to mood, according to circumstance, not according to bodily need. Premature death due to heart disease and cancer is not the only point. It is one made by Wilhelm Reich and psychotherapists working in his tradition. Psychological constriction is reflected in the musculature, and vice versa.

With the development of psychological armour comes physical armour. Muscular movement becomes con-

strained, graceless, jagged in quality. Breathing is shallow, located primarily in the upper chest rather than in the hara, the center below the stomach. Tension is recorded in the face, lines etching permanently one's characteristic moods, often moods unrecognized and unfaced. Virginia Woolf writes that a child, examining the faces of those in middle and late age, must wonder: what twists their faces into those frightening, indecipherable expressions, makes them so irascible, so inaccessible? What is so painful, so extraordinary that they must see that I can't?

The intellectual's absorption in the intellect and neglect of his body results eventually in deterioration of the intellect. Not equivalent to the brain but nonetheless residing there, dependent upon it, the intellect must suffer as capillaries become narrow and rigid, as the condition of organic tissue declines due to lack of exercise and attention, proper rest and diet. His thinking becomes less fluid, less imaginative, and like the blood in his brain, flows swiftly in narrow and pre-ordained cavities. His writing becomes repetitive in theme, graceless in style, intolerant of theoretical positions that are not customary. As the life of the body departs, so does the life of the mind, and intellectual activity becomes moribund.

Similarly, as the psycho-social life goes unexamined, so too suffers intellectual life. Sociologist Alvin Gouldner has written of the impending crisis in his discipline (although not limited to it) due in part to social theorists' and researchers' dissociation from the domain assumption which undergird their intellectual activity. When socio-economic and psychological origins of intellectual work are unknown or repressed, more likely it is that such work acts in the service of its origins, much as an unstudied relationship with one's parents more easily is transferred to present relationships. One is blinded partially sometimes totally to the reality of one's colleague, or of one's lover, veiled by lens formed in the past but still present. In the psychological realm the past always seems to remain unless consciously exorcised. Unlike the intellectual realm, where past experience is presumed to heighten present experience, past psychological experience seems to dim the present. Because the psychological and the intellectual are intertwined, the psychological past dims the intellectual present.

As the still-present past with my parents shields my psychological present from me, in fact denies it to me (the past now constituting the present), so intellectually I am veiled. Held by my past I see the present scholarly project in terms of past projects. The intellectual project is analogous to the interpersonal one. With you, to whom I transfer aspects of my conflict with my father, I act combatively, insisting on viewing your activity in my terms not yours. I do so because I cannot see you; whom I see (without seeing, my sight unconscious) is my father. We become stuck in it; it lives still, in my present, and now in yours as well. You decided I am uncooperative, arrogant, and depart, to hold indefinitely a bad opinion of me. My conflict with my father remains, and like Barry Lyndon, I will find unending opportunities to experience the scene again.

So the social theorist falls prey to his own socialization, making him a captive of his class. He projects ambitions which originate in his class onto the lives of others in different classes. Automatically he feels chagrin at the way the welfare mother lives. Visiting her in her unkept, odorous apartment, television blaring and unwatched, two children crying unattended, another fascinated with broken glass, I am sickened. Perhaps I feel compassion for this woman and her children. I feel anger at the economic system which makes her situation possible. I suspect she cheats the welfare department, but what do I care, it deserves to be cheated. We in our suits and cheerful apartments, with careers ahead of us, we deserve to be cheated. Besides, what else does this woman have, besides an active sex life (or so I imagine, but of course there is never a man around). Let her have the money, and damn the system that makes this demeaning meeting necessary.

There he comes again, with his oily face; I'm glad I don't sleep with him. Look at him looking at the place. Yes the TV's on, I'm sick of that program, the one I want will be on in a couple of minutes. No I won't go to them (he looks into the room where they cry), they have to learn I won't come every time. That's how I learned. You can't count on people. He's here, I'm carrying his child, then he's gone. Where is he dammit. And now this oily-faced one! Who could sleep with him! No one, and he has the gall to look at me, at my place, with a sneer. Get out of here.

The social worker, the social theorist, cannot see her; he projects onto her his own preoccupations, the preoccupations of the bourgeoisie. His domain assumptions blur his view; they constitute his view. They emanate from his interior like secretions on the skin.

However pedestrian and stereotypical the content of the theorists's observations read, the structure of observation is neither. The fact of domain assumptions create such structure, then superimposed upon that which is observed. Elaborate mathematical analyses of data cannot correct the distortion due to these super-

impositions captured in the research hypotheses.

Domain assumptions, as useful as Gouldner's phrase is, do not take us deep enough. What lies underneath these assumptions about self and the world? Where do they originate?

"They don't come from the air," comes one reply. Yes, in a sense, that is exactly where they come from.

I see at this point three primary sources of the complex intellectual-psycho-social gestalt we refer to as "point of view."

One is indeed the air, that is, the influence of one's contemporaries. Given a sense of insulation commonplace in the present, one can forget that those with whom he works, those who share his neighborhood, his apartment building, contribute to his state of being. The literature of acculturation is immense, but much of it focuses on those chronologically younger than the writers of it. The effects of the subcultures in which adults live are more subtle. A homely example may assist in making this point. It is common experience being affected by the moods of those with whom we live. Regardless one's determination, one cannot read unaffected the paper while a wife seethes silently preparing dinner. The mood need not be so dramatic. With careful observation one immediately concludes that the state of one's emotional being is vulnerable to the emotional states of those physically close.

Further observation yields the conclusion that my reading suffers while a part of me senses her condition. This is obvious. What may not be so obvious is the influence of those with whom one shares an office, or a corridor, or an institution. I am not insulated from them. True, separate offices, separate houses help to insulate me, but I know, as I sit by the fire in the study, through the hallway, the living room, the dining room, in the kitchen at the other end of the house, I feel her silent anger. I feel my response. I am touched: the walls do not protect me.

I am not encapsulated. Part of who I am is the collective state of being, the vibration of those who share physical and historical space with me. Those more physically distant may influence me less than those close. Nonetheless I am touched; the pain of the starving makes my emotion dense and unsatisfying. I can travel only so far, intellectually, culturally, vibrationally, from where the mass of my contemporaries live.

A second source of these domain assumptions is childhood, adolescence, early adulthood. The complicated process of being molded by those to whom we are born, those with whom we share sandboxes and baseball team, schools and first jobs, does account in large part for where I look now, and how I see what I see. The social theorist illustrates.

My sense is that the influence of peers, of teachers, is closer to the surface of personality than the influence of parents and siblings. After an initial period of self-reflection these outer layers peel; I see how my current perspective is born in the school I attended, filled with ambitions for economic and social mobility. As that is shed, I begin to re-enter the early years, and I see that these layers are the sedimentations of my relationships with my parents. Here I see the psychogenesis of the present project. I see it in their seduction of me. Their love promised more, if only ... if only I would smile, coo, now crawl, that's good, crawl, speak, walk. If only I hug you now, not that way that's right, and wrestle with him, tickle him, allow him to touch me. If only I would be curious, ask about them, about their lives before my birth. If only I would ask about myself (what was I like as an infant?), ask about what you call "life," what is it, what is important. ("Whatever you get, " he said, "get understanding.") In my anger, in my need of them, in my fear of cradle and crawling, in these layers lie the origins of the present. The strength to attempt it, the fear of failing, the fear of succeeding, the resolution to continue, mixed as it is with anger and revenge: all of it seared me as they held me, showed me to their friends, told stories about me, insisted I tell stories about me, and refused to comfort me as I screamed late into the night.

\* \* \*

The third source is the collective past, the sense of having lived before. This is the sensation of recognizing people presumably met before. It is the tendency to characterize contemporary times in terms of past ones. For instance, the U.S. has been compared in recent years with Rome before its collapse. Literal parallels can be identified, but these quickly become sketchy. What persists is the sense that we live in a decadent time, that the culture has degenerated. This recognition of the present can be ascribed to our reality as historical beings, beings who have at times the sense of having lived in other decadent times. Jung terms this the "collective unconscious." In his researches he found these layers of historical memory lying underneath

layers of strictly personal memory, what he termed the "personal unconscious." (Historical memories are not disembodied; they remain individual. The personal unconscious is comprised of psychological material from this lifetime.) Jung's term reflects more accurately the reality of this source of one's conscious point of view than does a phrase such as "accumulated wisdom of the race." What accumulates is hardly only wisdom. Destructive impulses abound in these realms, as they do in the other two (i.e. personal unconscious and conscious). Only a cautious, wary consciousness of these layers, as well as a commitment to their release and transformation, can assist in their life-affirming social expression.

In my studies I experienced such impulses, and they do seem to bear a quality of "historical fragment," of something I cannot recall or imagine from this lifetime, from this childhood, these parents, nor from this culture; they feel they come from this abyss of endless memory. Dreams often bear unintelligible imagery, unknown people, and convey a sense of social destruction, at other times familial tranquility and stability that do not belong to this incarnation.

\* \* \*

While distinguishable under intensive scrutiny, these three sources intertwine at levels of everyday consciousness. In effect, they are as if inseparable in their composition of point of view. They do not, in law-like fashion, determine perspective. One chooses, within developmental limits, how to respond to personal and collective pasts, and to contemporary culture. Such choice is rooted in the imagination and in aspiration.

I do not take this impulse toward amelioration, in individual and social terms, to be due only to internalization of values. Internalization occurs without doubt, but accounts for the deeply embedded desire for reformation on superficial levels only.

As Charlotte Buhler found in her psychological studies of the human life cycle, individuals display a need to "live for something," a phenomenon she called "intentionality." This "for something" can be nearly anything: enlightenment, wealth, political power, career, family. This "need" is in the service of a deeper instinct, and that is the instinct toward self-transformation, i.e. biographic movement. To live for something indicates ignorance of the meaning of one's endeavors, which concerns their biographic function. To live "for something," as the phrase literally suggests, is a form of idolatry. One easily forgets the function of one's career, and remembers only its momentary social and financial gratifications.

From a biographic perspective I see that I live in a meaningful present, characterized by certain decipherable issues, destined to a series of possible futures. I can opt for one future rather than another, or create one not present by excavating the present, comprehending its biographic significance. This self-reflective work transforms the situation it seeks to understand. It becomes praxis.

\* \* \*

Whatever preoccupies an individual is his present. Whatever absorbs him becomes his lens through which he views his family, his colleagues, his country. At first this seems an obvious point. What makes it mandatory to acknowledge it, and in fact makes it an obscure point, is the tendency to ignore one's preoccupations. What is common is a refusal to take seriously one's present. Instead, one has ideas of what should comprise the present: this paper on Dewey, my wife's pregnancy, this bill overdue. True enough, these comprise the present, but not exhaustively. There is as well a semi-conscious layer of thought, attention to which makes more complete the present. Without such attention, something of oneself hangs back, absorbed in thought and feeling unrelated to the project at hand. The project at hand may be likened to a curriculum in a school; one's thought and feeling are one's internal experience. The latter shrouded the former, and rightly so. One's internal preoccupation comprises an internal curriculum. To dismiss forcefully this curriculum is suppression, creating internal pressure, hidden from view, which acts subtly and effectively to blur one's lens. On this there is, finally, no choice. The proverbial sooner or later one must attend to one's own curriculum, one's biographic past and present. If one does not, then the inner life dies, and with it, the body.

In schools and in many families one is trained to ignore oneself and to attend to public programming. One-self becomes forgotten, painfully so given that, in however complicated a way, one learned that acceptance by others, love from others, was contingent upon fulfilling in some measure others' expectations, on developing what Laing has termed a "false self system." To search for one's own program, to attend to it, adhere to it, is necessarily frightening and painful. It is the pain of losing the internalized love of parents and the affection of friends. These scenes must be relived in order to be fully lived through. Pain cannot be avoided. To insist on avoiding pain is to mute and eventually kill the emotional life. One cannot edit pain from experience,

and live through pleasure only. Deleting the pain means deleting the pleasure also; one feels only fragments of full emotion. One may become unduly cerebral, retreating into the head, away from the viscera. One's emotional condition, veiled from awareness, is deep depression, consciously a sense of loss, of vacuum, of things not quite right. Living in order not to feel pain, Kafka notes, brings us the only pain we might have avoided. The deep dull pain of emotional death.

A companion process occurs in the intellect. The injunction is not "avoid pain," but "avoid errors." The worst one can do is make refutable statements, statements that aren't so in every imaginable context. What underlies this? Not merely an interest in intellectual rigor and a disdain for sloppiness. If that were the only reason intellectuals, especially academicians, fear incompleteness, inexactitude and error, the tone of identifying these, as well as the fear of being guilty of them, would be considerably milder than it is. The issue would have a more rational sense to it. Instead, the fear is deep, and one witnesses colleagues and students attacking each other, indefatigably searching for the other's intellectual jugular vein. The effects are disagreeable: an intellectual timidity that becomes chronic. One becomes silent and unimaginative; or, for the victorious ones, comes an arrogance that makes them not only offensive but pedantic as well.

Neither intellectual error nor emotional pain can be profitably avoided. Granted, they hardly need encouragement. But given the powerful, usually unconscious injunction against both at present, their encouragement may not be a foolish strategy. Somehow intellectual and emotional possibility must be expanded; risks supported. The contemporary trend toward only pleasure and only intellectual triumph (however small) can only mean deepening deterioration of the culture. The life of the mind, like the life of the heart, can prosper only when adventures are sanctioned.

Awareness of these matters, in the context of an individual life, constitutes, in part, a biographic perspective.

\* \* \*

There is always the present. As well as conceiving of time in a linear way (Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday), let us view it in depth. As I attend to what absorbs me now, distance myself from it, bathe it in acceptance, allow it to dissolve, my attention may turn outside. On this new layer descended to there are sedimentations to be recognized, honored, and dissolved. One must rest from this work, and turn outside; there is a balance necessary, to avoid travelling too far too fast without others, with madness a result. But the layer exists, issues exist; when you are ready they wait for you.

Of course the only function of the world is not to provide respite from self work. It is, one recognizes immediately, its own work. Successfully (in one's biographic rather than its terms) negotiating its complex waters can bring strength and distance that assist one in self-reflection. As well the world offers endless shocks to our sleep, shocks to awaken us to the layer we're resting (or toiling) on but probably cannot yet see. The duels in the film "Barry Lyndon," the loss of his cousin's love, of his wife's estate, all these serve as shocks to Lyndon, screaming his failure to recognize and claim the undercurrents of his conscious action.

The function of shocks depends upon the biographic context. At a conference where I speak someone attacks me, emotionally more than intellectually, the conceptual point in the service of the emotional one. I am shocked by the hatred in his voice. What is indicated? In the context of my life history, what is indicated is to enter the duel; to become angry. I conclude this because the characteristic pattern is to withdraw, to freeze in a fear that I somehow warrant the abuse. To loosen myself from this crystallized pattern, to become more fluid, I am "offered" this opportunity (and of course others) to press into the fear, to press against the withdrawal, convert the fear to anger and defend myself.

The scene, outwardly, can be the same, its function different. If my life history had been characterized instead by continuous and unconscious loss of temper, then the biographic meaning of that situation would have been different. It would have been an opportunity to control the temper, to strengthen the will, the ego's control, and treat the attacker as dispassionately as possible.

In both instances the judgement is based on resisting automatic, conditioned behavior, and deliberately acting in ways which heighten awareness of characteristic patterns, melting said patterns, expanding the range of options. I can become more deliberate, more conscious, more capable of choosing my response to events in the public world, and to events in the private and internal world. So the public world is both rest and work, but its fundamental function is its role in individual biographic movement.



It is possible to resist one's response regardless its quality. A kind of self-conflict that affirms arrest ensues. It is self-conflict that is automatic, and this quality identifies it as developmentally regressive. It is the conditioned that one deliberately challenges.

Entering new lived space is ordinarily experienced as work. A central fact of our condition is attachment in a Buddhist sense. We hold on to what we have, who we are, at deeper levels frightened, even terrified by what is unknown. Some are lured by it, but this attraction often functions only to overrule the fear. Erich Fromm has written of the psychological tendency to define oneself in terms of material possessions: one's house, one's academic degrees, clothing, travels. It is as if our core of nothingness, in the Sartrean sense, our spirit, which is not material, frightens us, and we clamp tight to wife, husband, children, students. Their presence is deep reassurance against the hollow core inside.

Similarly one is reluctant to release one's emotion and ideas. One prizes the stability and security of repetition, the illusion of certainty. Slowly some allow their thoughts to evolve into new ones, but this happens rarely without conscious choice and support of it. More often the brilliant first book is followed by variations on the same theme; it is difficult to leave the triumph of the first book and enter what one doesn't know, where one isn't respected, and a serious response from one's readers is not guaranteed.

Intellectual movement, biographic movement, can be chosen, although not in the same sense that one chooses a university to work in, or a house to live in, a part of the world to travel in. It does not involve an insertion of self into empty space; it does not have this quality of acting, of moving my hand through air to shake yours. In the realm of physical movement, one acts. In other realms, i.e. the intellectual and biographic, one tends to block movement by attempting to assert it. Instead, one must hold back from acting in a physical way. One focuses upon one's present. One's bodily present, one's breathing in and out, one's thighs, one's emotion. One must listen for it, as it lies just underneath the threshold of consciousness.

I have found focusing on what I think, taking seriously what preoccupies me, is what is required. I can begin to achieve this attitude by recording what I think, in a free associative form, as well as recording what I experience bodily and emotionally. During this one must not hold back; judgements ("this is trivial what I'm thinking") must be taken from body onto paper. It is a kind of emptying of self onto paper, and thus lightened, one moves. It seems nearly lawlike that speaking and writing of my present, including my repudiations of it, release me from it. The more I can let go of, the more I can put down onto paper and not leave up in my head, or in my heart, the more immediate the release, the more swift the movement. Of course what constitutes the present is the past and future, and so the regressive-progressive method provides a form malleable and simple, to focus in a systematic way, on this past, this future, which releases me into a present underneath both.

Movement is multi-dimensional. It is not only linear, although it is often experienced as a progression, or as a regression. It is also vertical, and in the vernacular we say "I'm up today." Or, "you look down today." Movement is up and down, forward and backward, and in-between. I experience expansion, like a balloon expanding, like a leaf spreading from bud out into space. Intellectually it often is conceived of in vertical terms, especially among some of Piaget's followers. The more abstract the higher the intellectual development. On the whole this is so, except the intellectually developed is not attached to abstract. He must be willing to speak concretely and simply. My other qualification is that abstraction be grounded, however long and seemingly tentative the bond, in the concrete. The abstract must be in the service of the concrete, lest we become dissociated from it, from our bodies, emotion, and the bodies and emotion of others.

Let us focus on one dimension of movement, a horizontal-vertical one. To discuss it let us employ the term "level." The commonness of this sense of different levels is indicated by its frequency of usage. True, one can be assured that the term is used differently among different groups; nonetheless there remains a common experience of differentiation, and this experience would seem to be differentiation among planes and accompanying points of view. It is as if those on higher levels are able to see not only what those on lower ones can see, but more as well. I think of Berman's reply to an interviewer's question regarding growing old. "Crowing old," he answered, "growing old is climbing a mountain. The further up one goes the more winded one becomes. But ah the view! It becomes more and more immense."

This image portrays accurately a sense of levels. From this ledge where I stand now I describe to you what I see. You who stand slightly below and to my left, and you who stand just above: what we see overlaps and

yet each is distinctive. It is distinctive not only because where I stand, what level I am on is distinctive, but because I am different from you, and my history is different. I spent time with different climbers than have you; given my physical-psychological inheritance I travel at a different rate than do you, with different aims. (I remain fixed at the valley below; you are absorbed in the wild flowers; she above keeps her eyes on her fellow travelers.) Even with differences our visions mix, and I imagine I can see what you see, although I remind myself my experience of that view is finally my own.

The fact of being intellectually, or more completely, ontologically "above" others legitimates nothing. That is, how I shall treat my fellow climbers remains an ethical question, and their position vis-a-vis me, gives me no answer. Even the treatment I receive from others does not answer it. If I prize kindness, courtesy, honesty, then your rudeness and dishonesty do not diminish my commitment. They are your weaknesses, and while I am not untouched by them, my responsibility is still to myself and my ideals.

\* \* \*

For convenience imagine that five hundred feet equal a level. A certain atmospheric pressure, air this thin, characteristic vegetation, other climbers: imagine these at each level. Of course at the end of five hundred feet the level does not change abruptly; imperceptibly one fades into the next.

While other climbers are occupied with matters unrelated to what interests you, your co-inhabitation of the same level makes you fellow-travellers for a time. Vonnegut speaks of korass; I think of circles of people who remain affiliated over time, who have biographic significance for each other. Think of the Pernerstorfer circle in late nineteenth-century Austria, the Bloomsbury group in England, Freud and his followers. Think of those whom you know now, those who make up your world. Reflect how one has sets of friends during different eras in one's life; often friendships drop away as the era changes. Each of these circles can be likened to one's fellow-travellers at a given level. One is with them because one's biographic present calls for them; we have some biographic function to perform for each other.

Certainly one need not move geographically to move biographically. Remaining in one location one tends to move from set of friends to set of friends, reflecting internal movement. And it is imaginable to remain with the same tribe while moving biographically, although my experience has been that unless one works consciously and arduously, such interpersonal stability quickly becomes biographic rigidity and arrest.

This occurs intellectually. I think of my absorption six years ago in Laing and Cooper, the dissertation on "Sanity, Madness, and the School," then moving into Jung into a more serious way than before, Doris Lessing, Sartre again, then Gouldner. Of course one reads many books during any give time, but if one follows one's whims, follow where one is attracted, certain interests become apparent. This interest, once attended to and exhausted, leads to another. Viewed apart from other dimensions, intellectual interests appear to have an autonomy of their own. But this autonomy is relative. These interests are aspects of biographic interests, and their profound expression, and release into new interests, depends (to some degree I am unable to quantify) upon awareness of their biographic functions.

Movement occurs as we focus on it, not in super-ego ways that freeze it by repudiating it, but as we attend to it (including the repudiations) with fondness. What is required, then, is faith: faith in the rightness of one's movement, and in the wisdom of what occurs. Rather than objecting to what occurs, criticizing the (usually unwitting) provocateurs of one's biographic issues, one must work, again and again, to examine his experience of the event, attempting to decipher its biographic significance. Perhaps it is to fight back if attacked; perhaps it is to withdraw. Behaviorally it is not possible to predict. Nor should one be terribly interested in prediction. What is such an aim in the psychological service of? One's stability and smoothness, social and individual. As well, prediction has to do with the will to power, not in a true Nietzschean sense, but in a more primitive, less laudatory way. It has to do as well with mundane political power. To control others, to control oneself in any deep way is to strangle spontaneity, strangle the flow of blood throughout the body. I control and predict because I dislike what is there. Some control is necessary of course. There is evil, and it takes the form of the abandoned, the undisciplined, as well as the form of domination and control. But to devote a science to the prediction of behavior is ignorant (grounded in a false view of what is human) and pernicious (in its political import.)

To focus on what is static, autonomic and predictable is to enlarge same. To focus upon what is transient,

to attend to motion enlarges and deepens movement. Wilhelm Reich regarded structure as frozen motion. Interesting, isn't it, that the social sciences (although not exclusively) make frequent use of the concept "structure?" (It is like being preoccupied with photographs and never studying films.)

\* \* \*

My academic work is a symbolic form through which my intellectual (and finally biographic) movement is mediated to myself and others. Ordinarily one sees only the surface form -- scholarly work for instance -- and its bonds to personality, to physical and psychic structure and movement remain hidden. My hypothesis is that to the extent these bonds are shrouded from view is the extent to which they are rigid, and arrest movement. Conversely, to the extent one can view, in non-repudiating in fact accepting ways, these bonds, and excavate, gently but persistently, their roots through deeper and deeper psychic layers, then the more intellectual movement the individual will experience. This movement will be multi-dimensional, vertical as well as horizontal. The intellectual work, as it becomes more consciously consonant with biographic work, becomes more succinct, more profound, more useful. I am convinced that intellectual development is as much a function of becoming conscious of biographic self as it is of strictly intellectual work. Strictly intellectual work in fact can only take one so far, then one must, in literal or symbolic form, address the question of the relation of one's intellectual work to one's psycho-social and physical life, the function of the intellect in one's life.

This complicated process, which admittedly I have come to understand in only an inchoate way, is the educative process, is educational experience (in contrast to training, or schooling). It is not something I do to others. It is not a technique of instruction. It is not an approach to curriculum, or a suggestion as to curriculum content. My experience of artifacts, of lectures, and its recreation in intellectual form is my curriculum, and laying it bare to myself is the educational process. Unconscious of the character of my involvement in academic work I am only one trained not educated, and all that can be said of my work with others is that I train them, that I prepare them for academic careers. The process of education commences only as I take the disembodied curriculum and mate it with mine. Only as I comprehend the relations among my life history, my biographic present and my intellectual works, am I engaged in educational work.

Appendix: Procedural Notes available upon request from the journal.

Copyright 1981 by JCT

## Conception, Contradiction and Curriculum

Madeleine R. Grumet  
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

I suspect that I am about to present a feminist argument and that's not easy. A feminist argument is unavoidably convoluted:

It is the argument of whoever is fed up with being a 'dead woman' - Jewish mother, Christian virgin, Beatrice beautiful because defunct, voice without body, body without voice, silent anguish choking on the rhythms of words, the tones of sounds, without images; outside time, outside knowledge - cut off forever from the rhythms, colorful, violent changes that streak sleep, skin, viscerals: socialized, even revolutionary but at the cost of the body; body crying, infatuating but at the cost of time; cut-off swallowed up; on the one hand the aphasic pleasure of childbirth that imagines itself a participant in the cosmic cycle, on the other, sexuality under the symbolic weight of law, (paternal, familial, social, divine) of which she is the sacrificed support, bursting with glory on the condition that she submit to the denial of nature, to the murder of the body.  
(Kristeva, 1977, p. 15)

This is a secret that everybody knows. It is body knowledge, like the knowledge that drives the car, plays the piano, navigates around the apartment without having to sketch a floorplan and chart a route in order to get from the bedroom to the bathroom. It is knowledge in the womb. Eve knew it, but she let on and was exiled for the indiscretion. We, her daughters, have kept silent for so long that now there are no words for what we know, and we must make them up. It is an argument drawn from the experience in my own life that is most personal and at the same time most fundamental to my species and my sex. The final irony is that the argument takes off from a commitment in my life for which I accept responsibility with no doubts, hesitations or second thoughts - parenting, and lands in a field of utter confusion - curriculum. What I hope to show is that the relation between this certain beginning and doubtful end is not accidental but inevitable, the end determining the beginning and the beginning the end.

The reproduction of society, its class structure, cultural variations, institutions, is currently a dominant theme in the sociology of education. Gramsci's (1971) concept of hegemony has caught our interest, for it articulates what the experience of our daily lives has led us to suspect, that the forms of our social and individual existences are not merely imposed upon us but sustained by us with our tacit if not explicit consent. Marcuse (1964) reminds us that these dominant assumptions about our lives, about the nature of work, of play, of loyalty, of change, are no longer the proud colors of one particular class imperialistically draped over another. He maintains that mass culture has obliterated our perception and experience of differences, co-opting our resistance, our negation and our alternatives. I want to take this term, the reproduction of society, literally.

Now it is not a new idea that schooling transmits knowledge, or that education reproduces culture. But like so much of our language, this phrase has traveled so far from home that we can't even tell what part of the country it's from. Curriculum is a safe shelter for these linguistic orphans. While I am not advocating that we withhold our hospitality from them, I am suggesting that it is within their interest and ours that we connect these phrases to their roots and in so doing take their figurative function literally. Metaphor matters. If our understanding of education rests on our understanding of the reproduction of society, then the reproduction of society itself rests upon our understanding of reproduction, a project that shapes our lives, dominating our sexual, familial, economic, political, and finally, educational experience.

I want to argue that what is most fundamental to our lives as men and women sharing a moment on this planet is the process and experience of reproducing ourselves.

There are two phrases contained within this proposition that I wish to situate within my own understanding. They mark the intersections of action and reflection in my own experience that have generated the themes of this paper. The first is this word fundamental. I confess to being constantly drawn to the lure of this word.

When I was in graduate school, Husserl's call "back to the things themselves" was compelling, drawing me into his phenomenological texts and rigorous, if elusive method. The method promised clarity, a way of cutting through the thick, binding undergrowth that covers the ground of daily life, to reveal a clear path. In '72 when I went back to school, my children were three, seven and eight years old, and clear paths were well hidden by the debris of sneakers, play dough and cinnamon toast, and interrupted by endless detours to nursery schools, grocery stores and pediatricians. In those years, when there was a high probability that at any given moment one of the children was either incubating or recuperating from an ear infection, I found Husserl's stance of the disinterested observer, bracketing the natural attitude, a posture to be practiced and mastered. I am suggesting that the relation between our personal and domestic experience of raising children and our public, communal attempt as manifested in curriculum is dialectical. It is important to maintain our sense of this dialectic wherein each milieu, the academic and the domestic, influences the character of the other, and not permit the relation to slide into a simplistic one-side causality. The presence of the children was just one expression of my situation at that time, coinciding with other themes of my early thirties. It coincided with being the age of my own parents as they appear to me in memories of my own childhood. It coincided with my husband's professional development and our sense of economic security, which offered the family a brief respite from the pursuit of social mobility and class status until the children would be required to derive their sustenance from their own labor rather than ours. It coincided with what was for me a much more difficult bracketing of the natural attitude, the choice not to have more children.

While any and all of these biographic issues may be probed to understand their relation to this search for the fundamental that kept me riveted to the chair by the dining room table, digging through the dense, often impenetrable passages of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, they are not the explicit content of this paper. The dining room table became the locus for this research not because its design was conducive to meditations on eidetic form, but because of its proximity to the life world being carried on in the adjoining kitchen. I summon these scenes here because although I may not directly address them again, they will reverberate through this text, as currents that run through the argument linking the metaphors of epistemology and curriculum to the motives that choose and organize them. I present the passage through these rooms as an alternate route for the argument of this paper, and as a reminder of the many levels of experience that constitute the conceptual order that we employ here to inform, confront and mystify each other. This paper too, continues this search for the fundamental. The children, the work, the mother, the student are seven years older, and the detours are different. The frequent trips to the grocery store have fallen into one "humungous" (as the kids say) trip a week, but the frequency has been retained by daily trips to Geneva, where I got to teach. The path is not any clearer for the passage of time, and every route is a detour. "Back to the things themselves" no longer provides an adequate slogan for the project. The cadence of the command falls too decisively on the things, themselves, encouraging an idealism fascinated with essential forms.

The search for origins has capitulated to the pursuit of mediations. The world "as given" is never received as such. The world we have is constituted in the dialectical interplay of our freedom and facticity. What the stripping away of phenomenological reductions reveals most clearly is not the things themselves, but the conditions, relations, perspectives through which their objectivity evolves.

Stephen Strasser's concept of dialogic phenomenology more closely approximates the notion of the fundamental that this text addresses (1969). For Strasser, what is fundamental is the interpersonal basis for human experience and so the primary question is no longer how one comes to constitute a world, but how a world evolves for us. The very possibility of my thought, of consciousness, rests upon the presence of a "you" for whom I exist. My thought is a moment suspended between two primordial presences, the "you" who thinks me, and the "you" whom I think.

...My affirmation of the "you" must transcend all doubt for me; it must be characterized as the "primordial faith" upon which all my further cogitos rest. For the nearness of the "you" is a primordial presence, one that makes me believe that relations with other beings also are meaningful. My turning-to a "you" is the most elementary turning-to, one that causes my intentionality to awaken. In short, only the "you" makes me be an "I". That is why, we repeat, the "you"

is always older than the "I".

This principle holds for every aspect and all levels of human life. Husserl speaks of primordial faith in connection with the "being given" of the things that are experienced. It is precisely through the mediation of a "you" that I know at all that there are things worth touching, tasting, looking at, listening to. A "you" teaches me also that there exists reality which can be manipulated, "utensils" destined for particular use (Heidegger), matter which I must modify in my work (Marx). Without the active-receptive interplay with a "you" I would not know that my existence has a social dimension. (Merleau-Ponty)

...My "thinking" - no matter what one may mean by it - is never a sovereign act. I cannot think without attuning the mode of my thinking to that which must be thought. But because the "you" is the "first thinkable" I must in the first place attune my thinking to the being of the "you". We may even say that generally speaking, my thinking comes about because there is a "you" that thinks and invites me to a thinking "response." It is the "you" that makes it clear to me for the first time that thinking is possible and meaningful. This also shows the finite, social, and historical character of my cogito.

(Strasser, 1969, pp. 61-63)

Strasser asserts here that it is not only the original intentional object, but intentionality itself that is generated through human relationships, that the very ground of knowledge is love. Our word "concept" is derived from the Latin, notably *concipere semina*, meaning, to take to oneself, to take together, or to gather the male seed. Both the child and the idea are generated in the dialectic of male and female, of the one and the many, of love. What is most fundamental to our lives as men and women sharing a moment on this planet is the process of reproducing ourselves. It is this final phrase, reproducing ourselves, that contains multiple meanings for me. First there is the obvious content that refers to the biological reproduction of the species. Then there is the reproduction of culture, the linking of generations, each conceived, both and raised by another, parenting as it was parented. Finally, reproducing ourselves bring a critical dimension of the biological and cultural levels of meaning by suggesting the reflexive capacity of parents to reconceive their own childhoods and education as well as their own situations as adults and to choose another way for themselves expressed in the nurturance of their progeny. It is this last, critical interpretation of the phrase that I wish to address in this essay because I see curriculum as expressing this third intention. Curriculum becomes our way of contradicting biology and culture. The relationship between parent and child is, I suggest, the primordial subject/object relationship. Because those initial relationships are different for men and women, distinct masculine and feminine epistemologies evolve. Although the initial stages of the parent child relationship are to a great degree biologically determined, the epistemologies that evolve do more than merely mirror the biological bonds; they intertwine them with subjective aims representing the power of the human species to negate biology with culture. Hence, these male and female epistemologies and the curricula that extend them into our daily lives stand in a dialectical relation to the original terms of the parent child bond.

Subjectivity, objectivity, epistemology. Abstraction falls from these terms like a veil, blurring their relation to the men and women who create them, believe them and use them. We forget that they are lifted from our loins and lungs, from our labor and our love and our libido. And we forget that they in turn pervade our breath, lust, fears, joy and dreams. The very word epistemology is drawn from the Greek word for understanding, *episteme*, and is extended into the word *epistles*, or letters that Paul sent to the apostles. In contrast to *gnosis*, a Greek word denoting the immediate knowledge of spiritual truth, epistemology refers to knowledge that is intersubjective, developed through social relations and negotiations. I am interested in understanding the ways in which epistemological categories or subject and object and their implied relations are rooted in the psycho-social dynamics of early object relations as they are experienced by both children and parents. The three interpretations of reproduction, the biological, the cultural and the critical, never exist independently of one another, and although my discussion of them will be organized in the order just spoken, there will be frequent attempts to have all three voices speak simultaneously.

It is within the infant's social relationships that the terms subject, object first evolve. Derived from psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology object relations theory investigates the genesis of personality in the interplay of the aggressive and libidinal drives seeking satisfaction and the social relationships which surround the infant and in which it participates. Eschewing both instinctual and cultural determinism, object relations theory understands these social relationships as influencing and manipulating the ways in which the infant experiences these drives, and understands the drives as influencing the ways in which the infant transforms the relationships in which he participates into psychic structure through the processes of fantasy, introjection, projection, ambivalence, conflict, substitution, reversal, distortion, splitting, association, compromise, denial and repression. (Chodorow, 1978, p. 47) The relationship of curriculum to the experience of the birth and nurturance of children will not proceed, you will be glad to learn, with my psychosexual history, nor yours. There would be no point in making reference to our own situations, for it is obvious that there are no remote, authoritarian fathers, no binding, seductive mothers in this audience of distinguished and enlightened scholars. The analysis is structural and thematic, and, as such, abuses the specificity of each of us even as it respects our privacy and defenses.

Yet there is one moment I would remember, the day following the birth of my daughter, my first child, when my skin, suffused with the hormones that supported pregnancy, labor and delivery felt and smelled like hers, when I reached for a mirror and was startled by my own reflection, for it was hers that I had expected to see there. We are both still struggling to transcend the structure of that moment.

This child is mine. This child is me. The woman who bears a child first experiences its existence through the transformations of time and space in her own body. The suspension of the menstrual cycle subordinates her body's time to another, contained and growing within her. The pressure of labor and the wrenching expulsion of the infant (the term delivery must have been created by those who receive the child, not those who release it) physically recapitulate the terrors of coming apart, of losing a part of oneself. The symbiosis continues past parturition, as the sucking infant drains the swollen breasts of milk, reasserting the dominance of the child's time over the mother's as lactation and sleep as well, respond to the duration and strength of the child's hunger and vigor.

In contrast, paternity is uncertain and inferential. Supported and reinforced by the intimacy and empathy of the conjugal relationship, the experience of paternity is transitive, whereas maternity is direct. Paternity, always mediated through the woman, originates in ambiguity. Subject-object relations as experienced on the biological level of the reproduction of the species are concrete and symbiotic for mothers, abstract and transitive for fathers. If the "other" to which the biological individual is most closely related is the child, then the definition of subjectivity as that which is identical with myself and of objectivity as that which is other than myself originates in an experience of reproduction that differs for men and women. So long as it is women who bear children and not test-tubes, conception, pregnancy, parturition and lactation constitute an initial relation of women to their children that is symbiotic, one in which subject and object are mutually constituting.

It is important to acknowledge at this point that I am not asserting that all women experience the identification, that all men experience the ambiguity that I have associated with the anatomical and biological conditions for reproduction. The response to these conditions will vary for different cultures and specific individuals according to the interaction of these conditions with the physical environment, division of labor, organization of families, ritual and legal customs, etc. In order to investigate the interaction of biology and culture in our milieu I will turn to the analysis of Nancy Chodorow, whose book, *THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING* (1978), investigates the patterns of parenting that are dominant in our culture.

At the outset of her argument, Chodorow suggests that even as the biological components of mothering have lessened as birth control and bottle feeding have become established, biological mothers have come to have ever increasing responsibilities for child care. Her observation is reinforced by Bernard Wisby's (1968) historical study of child nurture in American culture, which indicates that as urban industrialization drew fathers away from home and the household ceased to be the primary economic unit, the responsibility for moral, social and emotional development of children devolved upon the women who stayed home to care for them. Our own time has accentuated this process. Patterns of geographic mobility have isolated child nurture

from extended kin, isolating mothers and their children from the aunts, uncles, grandparents who may formerly have shared the tasks and pleasures of nurturance. Furthermore, in Marcuse's critique of contemporary society, *ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN* (1964), we find the argument that mass culture, media, schools, teams, etc. have undermined the role of the father as an authority, vitiating the oedipal struggle and the autonomy that is the reward for the child who survives it.

These social and economic developments support Chodorow's thesis that the infants of both sexes, though polymorphous and bisexual at birth, as in Freud's view, are immediately introduced into a social field in which they become predominantly matri-sexual. Gender identity, which has evolved by the age of three, becomes a pre-condition for the oedipal crises, and it is the pre-oedipal relationships of the boy or girl child that, Chodorow argues, are most significant in influencing ego structure, gender, and ultimately, patterns of parenting in succeeding generations. The preoedipal attachment to their mothers precedes the infants' attachment to their fathers and influences it profoundly. Peaking during the first half year, the infant's symbiotic relation with its mother is upset by the asymmetry in their relation. For the infant there is only the mother; whereas, for the mother there are others, husband, other children, the world. The infant first experiences its own subjectivity as distinct as it suffers the interruptions in the mother's presence. She is the first object, the "you" in Strasser's dialogic cogito, and it is within the tension produced by her intermittent presence and absence that the infant evolves as a subject. It is at this developmental juncture that Chodorow distinguishes the mother's response to her sons and from her response to her daughters. Acknowledging the sexual gratification that the mother experiences suckling and tending to children of both sexes, she notes that the mother identifies with the daughter, but perceiving the son as sexually other, more closely monitors her contact with her male child:

Correspondingly, girls tend to remain part of the dyadic primary mother-child relation itself. This means that a girl continues to experience herself as involved in issues of merging and separation, and in an attachment characterized by primary identification and object choice...A boy has engaged and been required to engage in a more emphatic individuation and a more defensive firming of ego boundaries...from very early then, because they are parented by a person of the same gender, girls come to experience themselves as less differentiated than boys, as more continuous with and related to the external object world and as differently oriented to their inner object world as well. (Chodorow, 1978, pp. 166,167)

The achievement of masculine gender requires the male child to repress those elements of his own subjectivity that are identified with his mother. What is male is "that which is not feminine and/or connected with women" (p. 174). This is another way in which boys repress relation and connection in the process of growing up. Girls, on the other hand, need not repress the identification with their mothers. Whereas the dyadic structure of pre-oedipal parent-child relations is extended into the male oedipal period, with the male child transferring his identification from mother to father and repressing the internal pre-oedipal identifications, the female oedipal crisis is less precipitous and decisive. The dyadic relationship with her mother is sustained rather than repressed, and the father is introduced as a third element creating what Chodorow calls a relational triangle. For both boys and girls, the father, who is more immersed in the public world, represents an external, reality principle. Identification with the father presents the girl with a means of dealing with the ambivalence she experiences as the intense, identification with her mother threatens to subsume her own autonomy. Nevertheless, because that ambivalence, also shared by the male child, is not accompanied by the dramatic repression that accompanies the incest taboo in the male oedipal crisis, the female child sustains the intuitive, emotional and physical connectedness that the male represses, and for her, external objectivity becomes an alternative post-oedipal object relation rather than a substitute for the powerful and emotional experiences of early childhood, which she retains as well. The reciprocity and mutual dependency of a concrete subjectivity; here bonded to the child, and a concrete objectivity, the pre-oedipal other, who is mother, is sustained for the post-oedipal girl and a more abstract objectivity associated with the external world and father becomes a third term that mediates the mother/daughter, subject/object relationship. The triangular configuration resembles the epistemological triad presented in constructivism, where the symbolic status of the world is acknowledged as the construct that evolves from the interacting and mutually constituting



reciprocity of subject and object. Underneath every curriculum, which expresses the relation of the knower to the known as it is realized within a specific social and historical moment, is an epistemological assumption concerning the relation of subject and object. In an attempt to understand how we come to have and share a world, the various epistemologies relegate differing weights to consciousness and facticity. Each epistemology offers a negotiated peace between these two competing terms to account for this intersubjective construct, this ground of all our cognitions, "this world." Materialist epistemologies favor facticity; idealist epistemologies favor consciousness or mind. Whereas both materialist and idealist epistemologies permit the third term to collapse into one or the other poles of the dyad, the constructivist epistemology of Piaget retains the third term as constituted simultaneously by the interaction of the two and as constituting them in turn. Whereas constructivism mirrors the configurations of the symbiosis of the mother/child bond, and the extension of that continuity beyond the oedipal crisis in the mother/daughter relationship, the tenuous father/child bond and harsher repression of mother/son pre-oedipal bond reflects the dyadic structure of materialist and idealist epistemologies. Masculine epistemologies are compensations for the inferential nature of paternity as they reduce pre-oedipal subject/object mutuality to post-oedipal cause and effect, employing idealistic or materialistic rationales to compensate as well for the repressed identification that the boy has experienced with his primary object, his mother. The male child who must repress his preoedipal identification with his mother, negates it, banishing this primary object from his own conscious ego identity. As mother is not him, so too objective reality becomes not him, and his own gender, more tentative than that of the female, is constituted by the symbolic enculturation of his culture's sense of masculinity, a conceptual overlay that reinforces his own sense that his subjectivity (that pre-oedipal maternal identification) and objectivity (that primary object, mother) are alien. Chodorow's point is that masculine identification processes stress differentiation from others, the denial of affective relations, and categorical, universalistic components of the masculine role, denying relation where female identification processes acknowledge it. Both as infants and as adults, males exist in a sharply differentiated dyadic structure, females in a more continuous and interdependent, triadic one.

While Chodorow acknowledges the contributions of biology to the infant's matrisexual experience and subsequent maternal symbiosis, she maintains that the oedipal crisis is culturally specific. She demands that we acknowledge culture, the organization of families, of labor, as responsible for the oedipal crisis, which in Freudian theory is attributed to a biological determinism of shifting zones of libidinal expression. For Chodorow the oedipal crisis is a response to culture and not to biology. It is not a species characteristic but evolves as a response to the repressions demanded by those social relations that prevail in a particular era and milieu. Although Chodorow presents her study as a sociology of gender and directs our attention to the culturally specific conditions which mediate these relations, it is a structural design that dominates her text and not the texture of a particular historical moment. Chodorow does argue that the object relations that she describes are sustained by a highly rationalized economic system of capitalism that draws men away from parenting and into institutions that require behavioral obedience and an orientation to external authority, thus reinforcing the repressions of the pre-oedipal experience. Nevertheless, the influence of culture is more sharply focused in a study such as Julia Kristeva's which examines the cataclysmic changes in Chinese culture and their impact on the lives of Chinese women (1977). Perhaps the distinction between the two works is more a result of my perception, finding the one that deals with my own culture too general because I am so familiar with its complexities. Kristeva describes an era in Chinese history that parallels the pre-oedipal period of psychological development in the West. Her analysis is interesting because it suggests that despite the 8,000 year old repression of a matrilinear and matrilocal culture, contemporary Chinese women may be able to draw upon the deep streams that have run through their history linking them to a cultural and historical epoch in which pre-oedipal symbiosis and continuity of internal and external structures were political realities rather than psychological repressions.

While our culture lacks the history that might reveal its protean possibilities and the perspectives to reassure us that all is not lost and we have a past ready to reclaim, within us resides the power to imagine, if not remember, the negations of the conditions of our existence. I think we attempt to accomplish this negation in the worlds we construct for our children. The contradiction is not merely altruistic, designed for them for it also extends the projects of our own development as adults trying to extricate ourselves from our own

childhoods and our own children. Unlike other organisms, perhaps more fortunate than we, we do not spawn and die. We not only survive the birth of our children but from the moment of their conception their time and ours intermingle, each defining the other. Biology and culture influence our contemporary categories of gender and attitudes toward parenting as well as our epistemologies and curricula. This assertion seriously undermines the assumption that curriculum design is a rational activity resting on needs assessments, systems analyses or values clarification. The degree to which our support for open-schooling, back to basics, moral education, minimum competency testing is lodged in the relationships of our infantile psychosexual milieu is the degree to which our choices are overdetermined and our praxis vitiated. It would be simple if the relationships were direct, if schooling were just one great funnel into which we poured the entire social, emotional, political contents of our lives. Instead, rather than merely replicating the society from which they spring, schools contradict many of the dominant social and familial themes in our society. The history of education in this country provides countless instances of institutional, curricular and epistemological configurations that emerge to contradict a particular condition in the culture. The famous Olde Deluder Satan laws did not merely reflect the colonists' religious fervor and commitment to the Bible. They also revealed the decline of the colonists' religious fervor and commitment to the Bible. They were compensatory. The very notion of childhood, itself, argue both Aries (1965) and Wishy (1968) is also compensatory, for it endowed youth with the innocence and protection that adults, adjusting to pluralistic urban centers lacked in their own daily experience. We don't have to turn back to 14th Century Europe or the Massachusetts Bay Colony to discover contradictions. The ethos of American schooling, (equality of opportunity, and class status reflecting achieved rather than ascribed characteristics.) belies the actual commitments of the upper and middle classes to retain their class status and the function of the schools in support of that privilege. Racial integration and busing contradict racial distrust and antagonism.<sup>1</sup>

Because schools are ritual centers cut off from the real living places where we love and labor, we burden them with all the ornate aspirations our love and labor are too meager and narrow to bear. Contradicting the inferential nature of paternity, the paternal project of curriculum is to claim the child, to teach him or her to master the language, the rules, the games and the names of the fathers.

Nevertheless when negation is collapsed into a simple antithesis, a polar contradiction of one extreme by another, the alternative is as restricting as the condition it strives to repudiate. Just as the mother may succumb to the wordless ecstasy or despair of sensuality or the shallow comfort of individualism, the father is also menaced by the contradictions he employs to negate conditions of paternity. As a parent the father contradicts the inferential and uncertain character of his paternity by transforming the abstraction that has been felt as deficiency into a virtue, into virtue itself. Co-opting the word, the transforming it into the law, the fathers dominate communal activity. Tying procreation and kinship to the exchange of capital the fathers master the pernicious alchemy of turning people into gold, substituting the objectification of persons for the abstraction paternity implies and technology and capitalism amplify. The project to be the cause, to see the relation of self and other as concrete is expressed in monologic epistemologies of cause and effect, either/or constructions of truth, and of social science that denigrates the ambiguity and dialectical nature of human action to honor the predictability and control of physical and mechanistic phenomena. Who are these fathers? They are our sons. They are the children the incest taboo estranges from their mothers, repressing their symbiotic experience of connection and identification with the other, the mother, the first object and the conditions of their own sense of self. They are the ones for whom gender identification requires a radical negation that violates the mutual dependency of child and parent, of subject and object. Split off from identification with his mother, his primary object, the boy's later identification with his father is supported by his growing capacity to symbolize, to associate signs with experience, genitals with gender, words with power. As a man he will seek to reestablish the connectedness of infancy through work and culture and family, and if he can escape the depersonalizing, bureaucratic alienation of work and the positivistic, objectivizing dehumanization of the culture which combine to estrange him from his family, he may succeed. Masculine epistemology reflects this search for influence and control. It is oriented toward a subject-object dyad in which subject and object are not mutually constituting but ordered in terms of cause and effect, activity and passivity.

Masculine curricula reflect this epistemology, contradicting the ambiguity of paternity, but the forms it

takes are differentiated by class interests. Though more closely identified with class status than women, men of all classes engage in work that will be acknowledged as productive. They seek to be acknowledged as agents, who can claim the crop, the engine, the legal code, the party, the cure, the peace as theirs. For those engaged in manual labor the product if not fragmented beyond recognition by the assembly line or trick shift is concrete and tangible. For white collar workers it becomes more abstract, the plan or the report, or the paycheck. For others it becomes an investment portfolio, an office with a window, a two year improvement in reading scores. The product, material or symbolic is public, external and can be traced, if not to a particular individual than to the group to which he lends his name. In our field competency testing, back to basics, accountability are the results of this process/product paradigm.<sup>2</sup> They accompany the historical development of increasing bureaucracy and rationalization of the means of production and in particular the repudiation of the educational initiatives of the "sixties", rife with sensuality, ambiguity, rebellion against the paternal order. For all the simplistic, positivism of these programs, there is a courage in their paternalism that I celebrate. There is courage in their assertions and in those who designed them. There is courage in their willingness to address the future and bear responsibility for its character. They are political.

In contrast, the curriculum of open classroom mirrors the characteristics that Chodorow (p. 179) identifies as characteristic of women's work rather than men's. Whereas men's work in the office or the factory is contractual, delimited in time, organized around a defined progression toward a finite product, women's work is non-bounded and contingent on others.<sup>3</sup> This focus is reflected in Paul Willis' analysis of British working class youths and their attitudes toward work, family and schooling.

"The nature of masculinity in work becomes a style of teleology, completion, feminity is associated with a fixed state. Its labor power is considered as an ontological state of being, not a teleological process of becoming. Cooking, washing and cleaning reproduce what was there before. Certainly in a sense housework is never completed - but neither is it difficult or productive as masculine work is seen to be. Female domestic work is simply subsumed under being 'mum' or 'housewife'. 'Mum' will always do it, and she should always be expected to do it. It is a part of the definition of what she is, as the wage packet and the production world of work is what Dad is." (Willis, 1977, p. 157)

Ironically the child-centered philosophy of the open school reinforces this static ontological focus. Sharp and Greene (1975) argue that the ethos that supports the individuation of the child is the expectation that left to his developmental agenda the child will express his inner nature, realizing what she or he is. Just as the ontological assumptions about 'Mum' are transparent, revealing the ancient confusions of nature and culture, Sharp and Greene argue that the infant schools employ an ontological rather than teleologic view of the child that ultimately serves to sustain class differences, masking the teleological agenda that functions even more efficiently than it had in the traditional setting because its assumptions are no longer explicitly articulated.

The degree to which schooling as a social institution imitates the spatial, temporal and ritual order of industry and bureaucracy indicates the complicity of both men and women in support of paternal authority. That pattern becomes even more obvious in the social arrangement of faculty within schools, where male administrators, and department chairmen dominate female teaching staffs, who, secretive and competitive with each other vie for their fathers' approval while at the same time disregarding the rational schemes and programs that emanate from the central office in favor of a more contextual idiosyncratic curriculum of their own. Docile, self-effacing, they hand in their lesson plans, replete with objectives and echoes of the current rationale, and then safe behind the doors of their self-enclosed classrooms, subvert those schemes, secure in their atheoretical wisdom, intuitive rather than logical, responsive rather than initiating, nameless yet pervasive. The programs stay on paper, the administrators' theory barred from practice, the teacher's practice barred from theory by the impenetrable barriers of resistance sustained by sexual politics.

Dinnerstein (1976) argues that so long as primary parenting remains within the exclusive domain of women, both men and women will seek and support the paternal order as a refuge from the domination of mother. She maintains that from the early years in which mother is the source of all satisfaction as well as its denial, the audience for our humiliations as well as our triumphs, the supporting, inhibiting, protecting, abandoning

agent through whom, and despite whom, we discover the world, we retain a rage at our own dependency and disappointment. The sons and the daughters turn to the fathers for relief, they who seem free of her dominion, substituting paternal authority for the maternal order. The female elementary school teacher becomes the adult charged with the responsibility to lead the child from the concrete to the abstract, from the fluid time of the domestic day to the segmented schedule of the school day, from the physical work, comfort and sensuality of home, to the mentalistic, passive, sedentary, pretended asexuality of the school - in short, from the woman's world to the man's. She is a traitor, and the low status of the teaching profession may be derived from the contempt her betrayal draws from both sexes. Mothers relinquish their children to her, and she hands them over to men who respect the gift but not the giver. Because mothers bear so much of the weight of parenting as Dinnerstein has pointed out, they are terrifyingly powerful figures for their children. Whereas the sharper repression of the symbiotic tie permits her son to feel safe from her, the stronger identification of the daughter increases her vulnerability, and she turns to her father to escape the maternal presence that threatens to subsume her. Dinnerstein maintains that "both men and women use the unresolved early threat of female dominion to justify keeping the infantilism in themselves alive under male dominion." (1976, p. 191) The infant's rage, projected onto the mother is reinforced by the disappointments and denials encountered in adult life whereas its aspirations for autonomy along with the enduring desire for dependency are transferred to the father. Identification with paternal authority becomes a spurious symbol of autonomy, while the acquiescence it requires satisfies the unresolved desire to be managed and deny responsibility.

The symbiotic, concrete, polymorphic pre-oedipal attachment of mother and child binds them to one another. As the woman creates the child, the child completes the woman. Particularly in western culture, where female sexuality is acknowledged and tolerated only in its capacity for procreation, motherhood bonds sexuality and gender. It legitimizes desire. It permits the woman to reclaim her body and her breasts from their status as erotic objects hitherto perceived only in their capacity to attract and seduce man. It dissolves the stigma of menstruation, inherited from the Old Testament in the glory of creation. It releases the woman from the guilt of her secret sexuality as it repudiates the myth of the Virgin impregnated by the word. As the child realizes its form within the woman, the woman realizes her form through the child. They constitute each other, subject and object dependent upon each other for both their essence and existence. Chodorow goes even further suggesting that whereas the male experiences the pre-oedipal intimacy with his mother through coitus with the woman, the woman ultimately re-experiences that bond not through the sexual relation to the male, but in the intimacy she experiences with the child. This dialectical interdependence obtains not only in the early months of the child's life but throughout its development, for the mother is able to differentiate from the child only in so far as the child is able to differentiate from her. The facticity and freedom of both mother and child are contingent upon their relationship. It is only in the mother's absence that the child begins to perceive its own selfhood so that their intermittent separation is the basis for the first identification of self. Yet the converse is also true. For the willingness and capacity for separation rests upon the satisfaction of the child's needs for intimacy, dependence and nurturance. The developmental needs of both mother and child simultaneously sustain and contradict the concrete, symbiotic origins of their relationship. A feminist epistemology reflects this dialectical dependence of subject and object.

Developmental theory also confirms the temporal order of feminine experience as it acknowledges the degree to which cognitive and emotional growth are contingent upon the biological maturation of the developing child. The hand that has rocked many cradles remembers well that one resists a child's developmental demands in vain and is attuned to those demands and the adaptations necessary to transcend them. We see these aspects of developmental theory extended into the multi-age, and non-graded classrooms of the infant schools and open classrooms. The open-school, open-class movement in many ways provides a setting for the curricular manifestations of feminine epistemology.<sup>4</sup> The organization of its space provides opportunities for movement, for the manipulation of objects, aesthetic curricula.

Although these features of the open classroom appear to support the penetration of our social institutions with a feminine epistemology, the movement appears to be collapsing, its foundations eaten away by technological methods that subvert it as well as by a commitment to individualism that drains it of its social and political power to make a permanent change in the school as a social institution or in the conceptions of

knowledge that it perpetuates. The project of independence is translated into a laissez-faire individualism which surrenders a vision of the world we might share, of the adult the child might become, to a project of individual development that repudiates intersubjectivity, and interdependence. Bonded, interminably, it would seem, to her mother, and then to her child, the woman who survives the demands of these relationships to work in the world as a curriculum theorist, school administrator or teacher is often engaged in the project of her own, belated individuation. It is at this third level of the schema that I introduced at the beginning of this paper that the contradictions between the woman's own childhood and mothering and the curricula she supports appear. Bonded to the other in a nurturant but inhibiting symbiosis on the species and cultural level, feminine curricula reverse the patterns of species and socio-cultural relations emphasizing an asocial and apolitical individuation. It is this monologic intentionality that Kristeva fears will vitiate the hidden, pre-symbolic power that resides within feminine experience. She fears that we sell out, either by escaping the binding pre- and post-oedipal identification with our mothers by identifying with our fathers, striving for access to the word and to time, by sliding into an Amazonian homosexuality, that repudiates the dialectic of sexuality, obliterating the other in a fascistic and totalitarian mimicry of power, or we sink into a wordless ecstasy, back into the pre-oedipal maternal identification, mystical melancholic, sullen and suicidal, Virginia walking into the river, Kristeva's warning:

To refuse both extremes. To know that an ostensibly masculine, paternal (because supportive of time and symbol) identification is necessary in order to have some voice in the record of politics and history. To achieve this identification in order to escape a smug polymorphism where it is so easy and comfortable for a woman here to remain. (Kristeva, 1977, p. 37)

Bearing epistemologies and curricular projects that contradict both our psycho-social development as sons and daughters and our procreative experience as fathers and mothers, we find ourselves as trapped in the activity that we claim as conscious intentionality as we have been in the overdetermined, repressed experience of our early years. This compensatory and simplistic pattern of opposition demeans the dialectic, a title it hardly deserves. And yet it is a dialectic that strives not to obliterate differences in a shallow, totalitarian image of equality but struggles to sustain them and work for their integration.

Feminist social theory directs us to reorganize our patterns of infant nurturance, permitting fathers to assume significant nurturant activities and an intimacy with their children which will preclude the harsh, deforming, repression of the rich and powerful pre-oedipal experience. The felt presence of both mothers and fathers in the infant's world may diminish the crippling dichotomy of the internal and external, dream and reality, body and thought, poetry and science, ambiguity and certainty. These domestic arrangements clearly remain fantasy unless supported by the economic, religious and legal systems in which we live. The task when viewed in the structural complexity of our social, political, economic situation appears herculean. Only when we suspend the despair that isolates us from our history and our future can our reproductive capacity reclaim the procreative promise of our species, not merely to conceive, but to reconceive, another generation. I, for one, take this title of reconceptualist willingly, gratefully. Its shelter does not provide a catalogue of new forms, blueprints for the family, the factory or the school. Its shelter provides this moment, and for, particular projects and relationships with others that support work that struggles to penetrate the categories of feeling and thought that insulate us from each other. The forms that will emerge from the dialogue that will share in the months and, hopefully, years to come cannot be anticipated, and I resist the comfort that their precipitous anticipation would provide.

This essay represents my first venture in what may be called feminist social theory. It is not coincidental that its writing follows the completion of graduate work and my appointment to an academic job. It is not coincidental that its writing has been interrupted by driving the kids to the pool and to soccer practice, by the laundering of sweaty sports socks and mildewed beach towels, by the heat of the summer sun and the soft summons of the night air. As I end it, I am tempted to celebrate both it and myself. But I am chastened by Kristeva's warning:

To be wary from the first of the premium on narcissism that such integration may carry with it: to reject the validity of the homologous woman, finally virile; and to act, on the socio-political,

historical stage, as her negative: that is, to act first with all those who 'swim against the tide,' all those who refuse--all the rebels against the existing relations of production and reproduction. But neither to take the role of revolutionary (male or female) to refuse all roles, in order on the contrary, to summon this timeless 'truth'--formless, neither true or false, echo of our jouissance, of our madness, of our pregnancies--unto the order of speech and social symbolism. But how? By listening, by recognizing the unspoken in speech, even revolutionary speech; by calling attention at all times to whatever remains unsatisfied, repressed, new, eccentric, incomprehensible, disturbing to the status quo.

A constant alternation between time and its 'truth,' identity and its loss, history and the timeless, signless, extra-phenomenal things that produce it. An impossible dialectic; a permanent alteration; never the one without the other. It is not certain that anyone here and now is capable of it. An analyst conscious of history and politics? A politician tuned to the unconscious? A woman perhaps...

(Kristeva, 1977, p. 115)

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Although the contradictions as stated here appear to contain a simple opposition of thesis and antithesis, that simple polarity may mask other intervening terms. The polarization of racism and mandated integration masks the issue of economic class. "Back to Basics" provides another example of an apparent opposition that masks a third term. The slogan responds to the alienating technology of our culture, to the specialized curricula of the 50's and the expressive curricula of the 60's, and to the perceived deficiencies of the high school graduates of the 70's. The compensatory thrust of "Back to Basics" addresses itself to the failure of the school curriculum to provide adequate instruction in reading, writing and mathematics and focuses on the profound inadequacies of these high school graduates. The revelation of these inadequacies justifies the failure of the economy to provide meaningful work for these graduates while it distracts our attention from the concrete conditions that reduce their learning, schooling and literacy to empty gestures.
2. Walter Doyle presents the process/product paradigm (which I am associating with the curricula associated with masculine epistemology) in contrast to the mediating process and classroom ecology paradigms in teacher effectiveness research. (1978) The mediating process paradigm acknowledges the interdependency of teacher and student behaviors. It mirrors the emphasis on context and process noted in the mother child pre-oedipal relation and the subject object reciprocity noted in constructivism. The classroom ecology paradigm is field centered like object relations theory itself as it attempts to ascertain those skills that continuous experience with classroom demands engenders in the students.
3. Chodorow cites Rosaldo's observation that men's work brings them into a social group of peers, dominated by a single generation that cuts across lines of kinship and is defined by universal categories where women's work is kin related and cross generational, tied to the nurturance of both her children, and later on, her parents. (Chodorow, 1978, p. 181).
4. The space and flexible scheduling of the open classroom as hospitable to dance, theatre and the visual arts. Regrettably, this acknowledgement of the body and its movement as the ground for cognition diminishes as the symbolic capacity of the older child expands and curricula designed for the post-oedipal child remains almost exclusively linguistic and rationalistic. The repressed content of the pre-oedipal, pre-linguistic period finds some expression in aesthetic curricula, where primary process, ideation, imagistic and organized according to a personal rather than a public logic, dominates expression. Again this conception of art is tolerated only at the early level of childhood education, replaced in the later primary grades and secondary grades with a formalistic and technical emphasis on method and/or historical and cultural criteria of beauty and value.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aries, Phillipe. *CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD*. R. Baldick. (Trans.) New York: Vintage Books, 1965.
- Chodorow, Nancy. *THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
- Dinnerstein, Dorothy. *THE MERMAID AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND HUMAN MALAISE*. New York: Harper and Row, 1976.
- Doyle, W. "Paradigms for research on teacher effectiveness." In *REVIEW OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION*, 5, L. Shulman (Ed.), Itasca, Ill.: F.E. Peacock, 1978.
- Gramsci, Antonio. *SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS*. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (Trans. and Eds.) New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- Kristeva, Julia. *ABOUT CHINESE WOMEN*. A. Burrows (Trans.) London: Marion Boyars, 1977.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
- Sharp, R. and A. Green. *EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975.
- Strasser, Stephen. *THE IDEA OF A DIALOGIC PHENOMENOLOGY*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969.
- Willis, Paul. *LEARNING TO LABOUR*. Westmead, England: Saxon House, Teakfield Limited, 1977.
- Wishy, Bernard. *THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC*. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

James B. Macdonald

Susan Colberg Macdonald

University of North Carolina at Greensboro

Sexism totally permeates our present culture: It can be identified in all social classes, within all major religions, among all age groups, and within all ethnic and social minorities. Institutionalized sexism permeates the structure of all our major institutions: the family, education, politics, occupations, church, and state. Beyond this, sexism relates directly to the values, attitudes, feelings, and self images of human beings -- how they relate to themselves, to others, and to the world.

Sexism is both the "common sense" of our culture and the emotional and perceptual base upon which this sense stands. As such, sexism in America meets all the criteria of Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony as explained by Boggs,<sup>1</sup> when he spoke of "... the permeation throughout civil society ... including a whole range of structures and activities like trade unions, schools, the churches, and the family ... of an entire system of values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or another supportive of the established order and the class interests that dominate it. To the extent this prevailing consciousness is internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of common sense. ... For hegemony to assert itself successfully in any society, therefore, it must operate in a dualistic manner: as a general conception of life for the masses, and as a scholastic program or set of principles which is advanced by a sector of the intellectuals."

The family relationship, for example, is a critical situation in the learning of sex roles and images of self. It is both the beginning and the end of the social attitude spectrum where sex roles are learned, and the means whereby human beings are harnessed to the broader system through role stereotyping. The family is both the perpetrator and the social victim in this circumstance. Moreover, the fact remains that to the very young the parents are the culture, whereas in schools and other institutions in later life the young are taught the culture.

This critical family relationship has been described by Philip Slater<sup>2</sup> as a social system with two castes -- male and female, -- and two classes -- adult and child. Thus, the basis for a caste and class system is developed very early in the meanings, perceptions and feelings of the young through their everyday life with parents. The caste system, however, is more deeply detrimental, inasmuch as youngsters eventually come to perceive the ability to change their class status by growing up, whereas the caste system is reinforced and magnified as a permanent identity through life.

A male culture and a female culture as learned in the home poses a critical problem for changing sex roles, since our earliest encounter provides deep attitudinal "sets" which seem to be natural for us at the time we first encounter them. This cultural naivete is the bedrock of much negative emotional reaction on the part of both sexes to changing sex roles.

No less critical than the family, however, are the schools. It is here that the child encounters the attitudes and values of the broader culture, where the rational reinforcement of what have been essentially pre-rational understandings takes place. To the child this is the real world, and what this real world teaches and sanctions, IS. There can be no question that our schools sanction sexism. It is there in doll corners, the readers, the counselors' offices, the gyms, -- all the surface reflections of the expectations, reactions, and interactions of the institution and the significant adults of this world. It is here in these reflections that the battle against sexism is being fought and where, in many cases, it appears to be won. This appearance however may be essentially illusory.

Blatant examples of discrimination and stereotyping cannot of course be tolerated by any educator worth his or her salt. These must, in all decency, be dealt with. They are, and should be seen as, intolerable. But there is another dimension to sexism in American culture that must be acknowledged and examined. It may be far the most crucial.

When we look at the constellations of feelings, behaviors, thought patterns, actions and reactions that are part of being male or female in this culture, it is possible in David Bakan's<sup>3</sup> terms to characterize the male pattern as agentic or agency oriented and the female pattern as communal or integration oriented.

Bakan uses the terms agency and communion to characterize two fundamental modalities in the existence of living forms; agency for existence as an individual and communion for participation of the individual in some



larger relationship. Agency in this sense manifests itself in self-protection, self-assertion, and self-expansion; mastery and competition by separateness, isolation, alienation, aloneness; and the repression of feeling, impulse, and intuitive or creative thought. Communion is manifested by a sense of being at one with other organisms; by contact, openness, and union; by non-contractual cooperation; and the lack and removal of repression. The very split between agency and communion in human existence arises from the agency feature itself with its qualities of separation and objectification.

When we look at the socialization pattern of males and females, it is clear that by and large the agency orientation is allotted to the male role and the communal orientation to the female role. Although the necessity of both agency and communal qualities is important for human survival; the arbitrary assignment of specific orientation to the sexes is detrimental to human well being and fulfillment. Beyond this, the most disastrous aspect of this stereotyping, and what is at the very root of sexism, per se, is that agency orientation is preferred, considered superior, rewarded, and given the dominant place in our society. Communal orientations are considered adjunctive and secondary; and thus, girls are taught a constellation of thoughts, feelings and behaviors that are considered inferior.

American society, emerging from Protestant individualism, the scientific revolution and laissez faire capitalism, is today the most obvious and extreme example of a society committed to agency orientation in modern history. This is easily observed in terms of our extremes of competition, mastery and achievement orientation, exploitation of others and the environment, power pre-occupation, and economic and military domination of other, less agentic cultures.

Undoubtedly the greatest threats to human survival today are the possibilities of nuclear war and environmental destruction. We have predominantly looked at our relations with other nations in terms of power and self interest. We live continually on the brink of a threat of nuclear war. We have also abstracted ourselves from our natural world and exploited that world through our technology to the point where we are rapidly creating an uninhabitable environment. Both these critical situations are directly connected to those dominant agentic qualities of human behavior. The final outcome of the agentic, the final mastery, would appear to be total destruction of our world. The importance of those very qualities of communion, allotted primarily to women, are denied as a viable alternative toward the solution of our problems. The qualities of community, of being at one with others and the world, of unity and cooperation, are the very qualities needed for the survival of humanity.

Sexism, thus is one of the most critical issues of our times. It is so because the development of individual human potential, and perhaps the very survival of all humans, demands drastic changes in our sex stereotypes and the reunification of both agentic and communal qualities as parts of total human potential. It also promises to be the most viable way by which the priorities in human existence may come to be realigned. Woman's Liberation is far more important to humanity than simply allowing women equal access to agency in social roles. Of course, equal access to all social and political roles is a human right not to be denied women, but what we are focusing upon here is the disastrous splitting of the human potential which literally can mean the psychological or physical death of humanity.

The basic point underlying what we are talking about is that the concern for males or female roles in society, or the effects of changing roles on either of the sexes, must be viewed from total human perspective. By this we mean that what we and others should be concerned about is the meaning of changing sex roles on the definition of human "being" or existence.

Human existence in contrast to brute survival involves ethical and moral judgments about what is the good life. Human life is experienced in the way we live our every day lives, our relationships to ourselves and others, our sense of personal belonging in society and the cosmos. We believe this demands a human condition characterized by freedom, justice, equality and love.

Freedom, justice, equality and love are not separate ideas, but are unique avenues for approaching the definition of a good life. The just society is both a loving society and one which respects the quality and freedom of human beings. The loving society is perhaps captured best by Erich Fromm's<sup>4</sup> definition of love; as "care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. Whereas, the equalitarian society is predicated on the inherent

worth and dignity of each human being and the moral imperative to love, to treat others as persons, not things. The denial of equality to women is unjust and unloving. To deny humanness to half the human race is the most blatant and widespread example of man's inhumanity to humans. It is also by far the most destructive, not only in terms of the vast numbers of those persons who are oppressed through inequality, but in the tremendous psychic toll on all human beings, males as well as females.

The psychological exploitation inherent in sexism is well illustrated, for example by Margaret Adams's<sup>5</sup> concept of the "Compassion Trap." Moreover, it has dual meaning for humanity, not only confining women to certain helping roles but defining men out of these roles. For when women become by role and myth the only truly protecting, nurturant, tender and compassionate ones, men are denied the opportunity of growth through loving. And when women within this role myth are also the inferior ones the whole society is denied growth and love.

We are not suggesting that women are truly loving and men not. Rather, we are suggesting that both sexes are denied avenues for developing the full potential of love. Within the narrow confines of womans' role, treated as inferior and allotted nurturant functions, a tremendous resentment arises which decreases the possibility of love. Whereas for males, the designated superiority of non-loving capacities makes full loving almost impossible as part of their repertoire. This is obviously destructive of human beings, if, as Erich Fromm<sup>6</sup> says, "The affirmation of one's own life, happiness, growth and freedom is rooted in one's capacity to love."

The point has been made by many persons that total human potential is in a very limited state of development in our society today. Jean Houston,<sup>7</sup> Director of the Foundation for Mind Research, for example, has commented at length about the effect of the dominant agentic worker orientation on the self images we develop. This narrowing of vision disassociates ourselves from our bodies, from others and from nature. We live to manipulate, and look outside ourselves, at the object world, for the fulfillment of our needs. In so doing we cut ourselves off from our capacities for growth through relations with others and the world, as well as from the enriching realm of inner experiences.

The limited state of the development of human potential is clearly related to the oppression and denial of equality to women. When men deny true equality through tradition, self interest, or fear, to that female half with whom the most intimate and emotional attachments are formed - the mother-nurturer, lover-friend, daughter-future - they repress that part of themselves. To deny equality to those closest to the core of humanness, the core of life, love, sexuality and childhood, is to deny that within ourselves which embodies this. It is to fear life and human existence.

### Reflections on the Curriculum

If the above analysis is reasonable, and we believe that it is, we as educators are left with a very difficult question. Is there anything that can be done in the curriculum and organization of the school that will address itself to the dominant agency orientation. Given the hegemonic nature of the problem, will changing school practices make any difference?

This is a familiar paradox. When one uses broad structural analysis one often ends up with only broad structural perspectives. This can leave us in a depression, with a defeatist attitude, overwhelmed by the immensity of the problem we oppose.

Josef Schwab,<sup>8</sup> a few years back proposed the realm of the practical as the realm of curriculum. To the degree that Schwab's orientation reflected the thinking of William James,<sup>9</sup> we would agree. In essence what this thinking asks us to entertain is a shift in the realm of concern from the theoretical to the practical. In other words, can we, at a practical level in curriculum act in such ways that we may address the critical concern we find in sexism and the dominant agency orientation? The answer is yes. The practical acts of address have a partial self-fulfilling capacity of their own. Thus given the will to change, the very effort of practical action will set up a direction of improvement.

The curriculum, in its explicit content, its "hidden" socialization practice, as well as its organization structures, should reflect directly our concern for human potentiality, our commitments to freedom, justice, equality, and love. To the extent they reflect these qualities is the degree of human concern and maturity that we carry in our society.

Even a cursory glance at the curriculum and organization of the school clearly highlights the agentic character and commitment which is present in almost all major values and practices. In David Baken's terms, the school is not a place which reflects communal values. This, of course, does not mean that the curriculum does not reflect the values of communities -- it may or may not. What it does mean is that the communal values of human existence are rarely apparent in school forms or practices.

Sexism in the organization of the school is clear to any who look. A hierarchy of male elders and elders-in-training run the system. Papa is in charge of the school; Mama takes care of the children. All within the organization are perfectly aware of whose job is more preferred, prestigious, and powerful. If children remain largely ignorant of the upper reaches of male dominance in the system, they are certainly immersed in a training ground for its acceptance. Women are, of course, making some inroads into the almost exclusively male presence of school decision-makers, but as Ortiz<sup>10</sup> points out in her study of school organizations and the female administrator, some problems remain.

Essentially what this case study found was that the female administrator was able to use the hierarchical structures of the organization to bring resources to her school, to serve on system committees, etc., but she was unable to break into the informal essentially male society of administrators, and she could not cross the functional boundary of promotion to a higher responsibility in the organization.

Perhaps even more interesting are comments made by the teachers of the women principal. They viewed her as ambitious and demanding. Some thought the job made her "hard and unsympathetic." Another said, "She is a task-oriented person" and "she's on top of everything." These responses of teachers suggest that the woman principal is seen to possess those very agentic behaviors and values usually assigned to the dominant male role. Although the woman principal could not cross functional or inclusion boundaries, she still performed in a 'manly' way to her hierarchical role.

Agentic values continue to dominate school administration as token women are allowed into carefully prescribed behaviors and positions. The continuing trend toward centralization of decision-making within hierarchical structures, the increasing view of children as products, and teachers as line workers, all speak strongly of separation from others as fellow human beings.

The explicit aspects of curriculum also reflect the dominant agency pattern. This may be seen in the character of curriculum decisions that are made in most schools. Decisions about what shall be required and what shall be elective suggest that subjects of high agency value, such as science and mathematics, take precedence over artistic expression and activity. A heavy emphasis upon specific goals and objectives focuses educational thinking and activity on control, achievement, and competition. Within the disciplines, the dominance of agency prevails. The study of history, for example, is the study of elite groups and wars with little if any sense of the diversity and experience of being alive in different periods and eras. It is another example of selective emphasis on the political and governmental agency functions of society, with little or no concern for the communal aspects of human existence.

The "hidden" curriculum also reveals many evidences of the dominant value orientation. These may be seen in the rules and policies, the management techniques in classrooms, and the building of attitudes through the activities and relationships of the school.

Apple and King,<sup>11</sup> for example, have studied and discussed the socialization of kindergarten children to the idea of work, and to the value of agentic qualities of life. Essentially what Apple and King show is that in the first six weeks of Kindergarten, 5 year olds are taught the distinction between work and play, are taught that work requires priority, and that work is directed. These attitudes and tacit understandings lead children into the basic task-oriented socialization for school and work that is characteristic of a competitive and agency oriented society.

Management by objectives is an ideal paradigmatic conceptualization of agency oriented organization of curriculum. Everything is seen as linear, rational, and goal oriented. Within this orientation the social hierarchy of power is structured in an essentially authoritarian manner, facilitating the agentic value orientation of curriculum. It provides a fundamental training ground in purposes, procedures and human relationships for the very male dominant agentic society that creates the critical problem of sexism and human survival.

Curriculum theory or curriculum development talk by professionals in the field is a perfect parallel for the agency orientation of school system. Here whole sets of concepts of great popularity reflect agency. Beginning with accountability, working through behavior objectives, behavior modification, competency analysis, instructional systems, etc.; there are a series of patterned relational concepts that foster the agency oriented value orientations.

The language of curriculum talk was clearly analyzed some 15 years ago by Huebner.<sup>12</sup> That analysis is even more important today than it was then, because it clearly reveals that the language we use is value laden. The dominant language of curriculum is a technical-scientific (or "realistic") one, which we now can see as clearly related to the language of technique or agency. It reflects the very attitudes and values which destroy the communal aspects of our lives, and may well threaten to destroy our humaneness, if not our species.

Curriculum language is essentially individualistic and control oriented. Concepts such as behavior modification, learning motivation, objectives, etc. build into the linguistic meaning structure a heavy emphasis on controlling which fits nicely with the agentic values of the culture. Even the dominant psychological talk in curriculum is a positivist language in contrast to a more holistic language such as that of Gestalt psychology.

What appears necessary is to establish, or reestablish, school as a unique institution. We must in practical terms break the sexist connection between home, school, and work. This does not mean failure to respond to the community at large or ignoring the demands of future performance in the curriculum. These pressures as abstract connectors would remain. What it does mean is the recognition of school as a practical place for everyday living which has unique qualities of its own.

We can, for example, establish our own (schools) practical definition of sociability. Jacques Donzelot in *THE POLICY OF FAMILIES* discusses the idea that our culture's model of sociability has been the nuclear family; a model which has been historically unique to our modern world and one which has probably always been quite inappropriate for institutional settings. Healthy social relations at work, in school, and in the community are seen as echoing those of the family, tying us into an authoritarian - paternalistic concept of sociability with its built-in acceptance of the social validity of caste and class. During the Renaissance, sociability was thought of in terms of citizenship and collaboration. Some such definition of sociability in school contexts is needed to establish the school environment as a functionally unique communal setting.

The curriculum has been the training ground for our technical-industrial-urban society, with a value nexus focused upon self protection (survival), self-expression, self-assertion, mastering, and competition by separateness, isolation, aloneness, etc. It is little wonder that it uses gender stereotyping to help label, slot, train, and produce technically competent cogs for the machine.

The antidote for the problems of sexism and agency in the schools is to reemphasize and embody the communal aspects of human potential - to assert a sense of commonality and connection among all organisms, of openness and vision, of non-contractual cooperation, and removal of constraints on freedom. The critical concept is communal, the school as a community whereby central curriculum questions becomes "how shall we live together?" "How shall we survive?" "How can we foster freedom, justice, equality, and love?"

Change is difficult, but if any area of restriction clearly illustrates the need for change, it is the area of sexism. Sexism is not a problem "out there", but is a condition all persons share which is both subjective and objective in nature. Change, in other words, will necessitate personal as well as public acts and reflections. It will necessitate change in human consciousness as well as change in instructional structures and operating principles. This is fundamentally the challenge of our times, the recognition that change cannot simply be "engineered." The limits and illusions of technique must be transcended through personal value reflection and action.

By focusing upon the practical activities in curriculum, upon the political, ethical, and aesthetic qualities of everyday life - of how we relate to each other and the world - we may expect to begin the journey of enlarging and balancing human possibilities and potentiality. To slowly eradicate the virulent over-emphasis on control and agency.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Boggs, Carl. **GRAMSCI'S MARXISM**. South Hampton: Camelot Press Limited, 1976.
2. Slater, Phillip. **EARTHWALK**. New York: Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1974.
3. Bakan, David. **THE DUALITY OF HUMAN EXISTENCE**. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.
4. Fromm, Erich. **THE ART OF LOVING**. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956.
5. Adams, Margaret. "The Compassion Trap" in **WOMEN IN SEXIST SOCIETY**, Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran (Eds.). New York: New American Library, 1972.
6. Fromm, Erich. **OP. CIT.**
7. Houston, Jean. **SATURDAY REVIEW**, February 1975.
8. Schwab, Josef. "The Practical 3: Translation into Curriculum." **SCHOOL REVIEW**, 81, 4 (August, 1973) 501-22.
9. James, William. **THE DILEMMA OF DETERMINISM**.
10. Ortiz, Flora Ida. "Selling the Hierarchical System in School Administration: A Case Study of a Female Administrator." **URBAN REVIEW**, Volume 11, No. 3, Fall 1979.
11. Apple, Michael and King, Nancy. "What Schools Teach". Ed. Molnar and Zahorik, **Curriculum Theory**, A.S.C.D., Washington, D.C. 1977.
12. Huebner, Dwayne. "Classroom Languages and Curriculum" in **LANGUAGE AND MEANING**. Macdonald and Laeper (Eds.), A.S.C.D., Washington, D.C. 1966.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

## Academic Publishing: Mammoth in the Morass

Anthony Serafini  
Boston State College

In the late fourteenth century a philosopher by the name of William of Ockham issued his now famous "Ockham's razor"; *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*. (Very) loosely translated this means "college professors talk too much." A good point and virtually the last worthwhile one ever made in academic discussion. Ockham's statement was really a warning to scholastics not to populate the universe with all sorts of entities of no explanatory value, though my translation has things to be said for it. The "razor" is cutting far less today than it did then. There are far too many academic journals in the world. In a universe where journals seem to begit journals, I am fearful of leaving PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW and MIND in the same room overnight. Yet more are added everyday. My view, as one who has published both in academic journals and in general-interest magazines, is that anything worth saying in a journal could and should be said in a good popular magazine. Except for what Galbraith calls an "illusion of priestly superiority" among academicians, there is no reason why a discussion of Aquinas' cosmological arguments cannot be carried in the pages of PLAYBOY as well as the pages of MIND. The principal reason this does not happen rests upon a dogmatic insistence by college professors that they, like the Cabots and the Lodges, must talk only to each other.

Although I am talking about my own field of Philosophy, my colleagues in other areas of the humanities assure me that the same comments apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to their disciplines. I would add that little of what I say applies to the so-called "hard" sciences -- physics, medicine, biology and chemistry. There is a simple reason for this. In the hard sciences, what is done either has or potentially has an immediate bearing on practical matters. Medicine is the most dramatic example. It would be nonsensical to try to determine from the outset what the limits of medical research should be. It is often impossible to tell what the bearing of some particular piece of research might have on practice. If two thousand years of research results in one new antibiotic, then it was worth it.

In fact this points to a major problem. Scholars in the humanities are going to have to stop imitating the hard sciences -- at least so far as mode of expression is concerned. The humanities are not science. More and more philosophers are decorating their manuscripts with equations, formulas, symbols -- all the accouterments of the hard sciences. I read, for example, in a recent journal article: (Ex) ((x wrote WAVERLY) • (y)(y wrote WAVERLY) • (x was a genius)).

Well, o.k., but how about just: The author of WAVERLY was a genius.

Philosophy does have something to say -- but it does not need the help of the symbolization of science and mathematics. Science deals with new phenomena and this calls for new labels. Philosophy seeks to understand that which has been before us all the time, so we need no new ways to express it. As Wittgenstein put it: "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. -- Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us."

Still, philosophers are not the only ones guilty of trying to cloak their discipline in "scientific respectability." In the first chapter of BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY Skinner correctly indicates that physics progressed by eliminating psychological terminology from their working vocabulary: "Careless references to purpose are still to be found in both physics and biology, but good practice has no place for them; yet almost everyone attributes human behavior to intentions, purposes, aims and goals." But he further concludes that: "We (the psychologists) can follow the path taken by physics and biology by turning directly to the relation between behavior and the environment and neglecting supposed mediating states of mind." This does not follow. Psychological terminology could be eliminated in physics since psychological phenomena are not dealt within physics. For psychology to do the same would be equivalent to Bobby Fischer's saying he's going

to tell you about chess, but he's not going to talk about rooks, pawns and checkmates.

Since I am of the opinion that the proliferation of academic journals is at best the greatest nuisance facing humanity (second only to the proliferation of "take-offs" on CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF THE THIRD KIND), I am obliged to elaborate. In fairness to modern academicians, the problem did not originate with them. Perhaps the only good that Plato ever did for the world was to insist that philosophers become kings. Since there are relatively few kings around, and since philosophers generally seem to display a decided lack of ability to apply their craft to other areas, they exist today only within the cloistered walls of academe. Thus Plato forever shielded the world at large from the inanities of professional philosophy. (What would a world be like with "philosopher-lawyers?")

Lawyer: Tell me; why do you think the parking meter is running eleven seconds fast every hour?

Witness: Well, I timed it.

Lawyer: Aha, but are you an expert with stopwatches?

Witness: Well no, I don't believe I am exactly ...

Lawyer: Hm-m-m, you say you're not an expert exactly, but do you know you're not an expert, or do you merely believe it?

Witness: You see ... what I meant was ...

Lawyer: Oh you "meant"! But are you aware of the meaning of "meant"? Do you know that that issue was discussed in the brilliant paper "The meaning of meaning of meaning" by Professor Shlump?

Witness: Gosh, I guess I didn't think of that ...

Lawyer: Of course you didn't. That's why you thoroughly discredit your expertise as a witness concerning the inaccuracy of the parking meter. You're clearly unfamiliar with the ongoing discussions of "meaning," "belief," and other absolutely central epistemological concepts. What do you have to say to that?

Witness: I was going to say that I am familiar with other timing devices. I'm the chief engineer for a firm that's engaged in designing and testing the timing devices for our surface-to-air missiles. We use the atomic chronometer which measures time against the natural vibrations and oscillations of the ammonia molecule. It has an accuracy to one ten-trillionth of a second per century.

Lawyer: oh.

Happily, such conversations occur today only among well-read academicians, and not in courts of law. But that doesn't stop their own juices from flowing freely. At last count, philosophers were issuing forth their chatter to the tune of over one hundred fifty journals, and the number is growing fast. The trend Plato began continued with his descendants. Thomas Aquinas wrote a vast number of tomes and constructed imposing metaphysical castles out of words. Unfortunately the only speculations of any possible merit today are his arguments for the existence of God in the first few pages of the hundreds of otherwise pointless pages of the SUMMA THEOLOGICA. What little good modern analytical philosophers have done consists in large part of demolishing the pretentious speculations of Aquinas. Yet mankind will be none the worse if we can worship God without the necrosed axioms of a long-dead metaphysics. (This would also remove a host of useless journals on the topic -- not to mention saving some paper.)

The latest piece of insanity in philosophy has been the creation of a "journal" that is published entirely on microfilm. This allows the publication of unlimited numbers of articles. Oh yes -- you have to pay \$30.00 to have your piece considered. Manifestly, the service is intended not for the dissemination of truth or for additions to the sum total of human knowledge. In the editor's own words: "But when you consider the value of making your work publicly available, not to mention your vita or the tenure committee, the cost is not great." Of course it never appears anywhere where you might be likely to buy a copy. What you end up doing is finding a library with one of those microfilm reading contraptions, painfully threading the film into the reels and twiddling the knobs until you find something you're looking for on the viewer. Hopefully it will be legible. (For myself, it is more worthwhile to hike down to the nearest amusement center and attempt to annihilate the spaceships that cross the screen.) This guarantees that your latest article will possibly be "read" by someone else in about the twenty-fourth century when mutated anthropoids uncover the ruins of the inevitable neutron war.

The causes of the proliferation of journals are not easy to sort out. No doubt, the "publish or perish" syn-

drome is a major factor. With promotions and academic tenure depending virtually entirely on publication, often at the expense of good teaching, professors are driven to publishing anything that they can get by an editorial board (never mind the applicability of their thoughts to anything mankind might ever find useful.) Consider the following lamentable exercise by the late J. L. Austin: "In (6) I do better than you. We both imitate the owl, you perhaps rather better in voice than I in silhouette: but you stop short of pretending to be an owl, because you fail to attempt to disguise the fact that you are not one... However it is not easy to be certain that there is in fact any systematic difference between pretending-to and pretending-that, let alone that just suggested." Austin, you see, is telling us about the differences between pretending to be an owl, imitating an owl, and most importantly pretending that you're an owl. Judging from the importance Austin seems to place on such distinctions, one would guess that civilizations have fallen for failure to distinguish "pretending to be an owl" from "pretending that you're an owl."

A re-thinking of academic policy on promotional criteria and tenure is clearly in order. One dangerous alternative that has surfaced is the suggestion that we virtually eliminate the concept of "publication" altogether, in favor of "good teaching." I think this would merely substitute one mania for another. "Good teaching" is certainly as difficult to evaluate as the quality and quantity of publications. What is a "good teacher" -- someone who talks clearly, knows the material and comes to class on time? Suppose he makes all the students comatose in the process? Some have argued that being a good teacher is consistent with failing in the above categories, but succeeding in stimulating a lifelong interest in the subject matter. I recall a poetry professor at Cornell who was hardly a good teacher by any of the usual criteria, but had a way of making the horrors of the *INFERNO* come alive. I cannot begin to describe what exactly he had -- suffice to say that he unquestionably had it. Even if we could decide what a good teacher is, there is nothing to prevent a bureaucratic mess that would easily rival the journal saturation problem. Already at my college the idea of student evaluation has been instantiated. We have student committees on evaluation, committees to evaluate the committees, and administrators to evaluate them. And we have paper coming out of our ears. This kind of overreaction will not do. Good teaching is important -- it is very important. Yet a good teacher reaches at most, a few hundred students a year. One publication in a solid general-interest magazine can reach thousands -- an obvious point, but one that is rarely noticed. An evenhanded approach to both good teaching and publication is necessary.

What is needed is a shift in publication policies. It is eminently reasonable to suggest that if academicians have something to say, they should say it to everybody. Eliminating a vast number of bloated journals in favor of general-interest magazines would have a number of advantages. For one thing, this would automatically halt the spiraling increase in the numbers of journals. Magazines, because they serve the general public and do not cater exclusively to the interests of academicians, will not be tempted to clone themselves in a frantic effort to satisfy tenure and promotional needs. This fact alone would be sufficient reasons for academic policy makers and university administrators to radically alter their conception of the form academic publishing should take. And there need be no lowering of standards. On the contrary, my suggestions would very likely lead to a tremendous rise in standards. Is there any political argument *NATIONAL REVIEW* or *THE NEW REPUBLIC* cannot evaluate, or any piece of literary criticism *ATLANTIC MONTHLY* could not judge? With fewer publications available, only the most important, well-thought out, clear and relevant thoughts from the academy would appear in print. At present the situation is inflationary -- too many journals chasing too few ideas. There are too many professors with too little to say and too much pressure on them to say it. There is a professor of my acquaintance who has nothing to say, yet persists in demanding a promotion year after year. His principal argument is that he writes many letters to the editor of the college newspaper and is, therefore, "published." Soon the academicians will start listing the phone book as a publication.

Fewer publications would also discourage the rampant clannishness found among scholars. It is very often true that only other specialists can understand the intellectual gymnastics of academicians. But is this a necessary consequence of the "depth" of the concepts expressed, or merely a result of unclear thinking and bad writing? For untold millenia philosophers have written gibberish in the name of academic erudition. Such a one is Hegel. Consider the following remarks from Hegel's *PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART*: "The modern



moralistic view starts from the fixed antithesis of the will in its spiritual universality to its sensuous natural particularity and consists not in the completed reconciliation of these contrasted sides, but in their conflict with one another, which involves the requirement that the impulses that conflict with duty ought to yield to it." I leave the passage to the reader as an exercise.

Yet there is a rebellion afoot. John Kenneth Galbraith in a recent issue of the ATLANTIC says: "Complexity and obscurity have professional value ... They are the academic equivalents of apprenticeship rules in the building trades. ... The man who makes things clear is a scab... Additionally, and especially in the social sciences, much unclear writing is based on unclear or incomplete thought..." Galbraith speaks directly to Hegel. Hegel is not "difficult" because he is profound. He is difficult because he's unclear. I wonder what Hegel's position in the history of philosophy would have been had he submitted his papers to SATURDAY REVIEW? With the increase in knowledge and continuing academic specialization, philosophers stopped talking to the man on the street and started talking only to each other. The same thing happened with psychology, physics, history, etc. In the old days, when everybody was a philosopher (about the time Socrates took the hemlock -- perhaps he realized he had nothing more to say) people at least listened. Now analytic philosophers won't talk to existentialists, behaviorists will not talk to Freudians, and the "new" literary critics won't talk to the "old" literary critics. Come to think of it, can they even communicate within their own sub-specialties? The following statement was made by the editor of a prominent educational journal: "While many organization and personal resources in education support the creation, dissemination, and purchases of printed knowledge, there is a curious empirical failure to understand the actors managing the publishing process, individuals whose objectives and operating assumptions influence the choices of messages which form the organic bases of fields of study and action." This is one sentence. I have no idea what it means -- nor, I suspect, does the editor. This would never wash in a general interest magazine, where both substance and clarity are important.

On the other hand, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that all academic writing has been forbidding, understandable by other academicians only, or unintelligible altogether. There are many examples to the contrary; examples which show that philosophy can be both clear and interesting to everyone. And if this can be true of philosophy, traditionally the most "obscure" academic field, I see no reason why the same could not apply to all areas of the humanities. A good example is the work of Professor Norman Malcolm of Cornell. His writings could easily be understood by an intelligent college graduate: "Carnap thought that my statement 'I am excited' obtains its 'rational support' from observations ... expressed by the sentences 'I see my hands trembling,' 'I hear my voice quavering,' and so on ... . But I do not undertake to convince myself that I am excited by such an observation ... Nor do I say I am angry because I see that my face is flushed or my fists are clenched, or because I hear myself shouting." Clear and correct. Malcolm is refuting a central idea of behaviorism. He is pointing to the absurdity of trying to analyze one's own psychological states in terms of outward behavior. We know our own state of mind immediately. How could it be otherwise? Then why does behaviorism continue to live and breathe? Because it grows in dark obscurity. It molds in dark, hidden places.

What is to be done? The razor needs a new blade. (The old one might do -- it hasn't been used in years.) In the ATLANTIC MONTHLY Mary-Claire van Leunen flirts with the idea of stopping subsidies for all academic journals: "As a serious proposal, the idea would be misguided. Cutting off your nose to beautify your face is madness. But it is a tempting madness isn't it? Especially when the nose in question is so enormous, so distended and cartilaginous, so warty -- but it's the only nose we have, or the only excuse for scholarship, as the case may be." But is this the only nose we have? The REPUBLIC told philosophers to be kings. Perhaps this isn't bad advice; we can be the intellectual leaders of the people. We can restore some measure of truth to Plato's nostrils. There are signs of change; academicians are slowly crawling out of Plato's cave and into the sunlight. In a recent issue of CHANGE Robert Chernow's comments on the economist Lekachman are a case in point: "His numerous books and magazine articles aren't crowded with charts, graphs, tables and the other paraphernalia of professional respectability. Rather, his tomes are composed with a new-classical wit and elegance that betray his early desire to be a writer... . He is much more likely to crop up in the

SATURDAY REVIEW or the NEW REPUBLIC than in any of the economics journals. Like Galbraith, he has despaired of converting his colleagues and has decided to carry his case directly to the public." There are other examples. Carl Sagan, the distinguished astronomer, has been bringing the conundrums of astronomy successfully to the people lately, as has his colleague Robert Jastrow. The distinguished philosopher Peter Singer brought the arguments for animal liberation directly to the people without sacrifice of substance. Yet these are still a devastatingly small minority. The responsibility for change does not rest entirely with academicians. Magazines of general interest should invite more scholarly contributions. The day is long gone when the humanities can be argued to be too "technical" for an intelligent public. Both the magazines, the professors and educational policy makers would do well to ignore convention and shed the idea that academic prestige and journal publication are inseparable notions. There is every reason to suppose that academic publication in popular magazines would increase the prestige of the academy. It is axiomatic that fear of a given phenomenon diminishes as our understanding of it increases. My experiences and those of my colleagues indicate that students come to the academy in a vacuum as far as the humanities are concerned. If students could pick up a good, readable discussion of Free Will and Determinism in a magazine, they would be half-way toward understanding it in college (and maybe even liking it). If we can all read about Descartes in the barber shop, can Ockham's razor be far?

Copyright 1981 by JCT

PRETEXT: Essay review of CRITICAL TEACHING AND EVERYDAY LIFE. Ira Shor. Boston: South End Press, 1980, 270 p.

## Moving Us Toward A Radical Pedagogy

Esther Zaret

Virginia Commonwealth University

It's a long way from Chodorkov, a pre-revolutionary shtetl in the Russian Ukraine, to Staten Island Community College of the City University of New York. And my father, who was from Chodorkov, never knew of Staten Island Community College, nor, I am reasonably certain, did Ira Short ever hear of either Chodorkov or my father. The improbable connections between them may be solely in my consciousness, but the links are timeless and relevant to this review.

The immediate parallels in the two lives were readily evident to me: each man lived through a profoundly transforming experience in liberatory learning and teaching; each man was convinced that the compelling lessons of one's life should be shared, toward informing and shaping the larger social consciousness. What has been more difficult for me to pin down is my sense of meanings and contradictions beyond those similarities as they relate to Freire's work and efforts of Western educators to create a radical pedagogy. To illustrate the issues I see, I am including here an extract from my father's autobiography in juxtaposition to my summary of Ira Shor's work.

My father wrote eloquently of his working class origins and battles. He was a full-time worker from the age of eight years to sixty-five, when he retired and undertook the prodigious task of writing his life story for his children, and their children. Although his formal schooling, such as it was, ended at eight years, he did have some later "schooling" when he was about seventeen. It was brief; it was intensive; and it changed the direction of his life.

As a member of a pre-revolutionary Socialist-Bund that organized in his village, he met with other Jewish youth, secretly, in the woods, "to commit the great crime of learning to read and write." As the cultural content of their learning, these students studied the conditions of their lives. They were, at the same time, taught "the ABC's of the Bund." My father describes one of the early sessions:

Boris, the teacher, explained to us about our terrible condition, how our bosses [neighboring Jews] exploited us by making us work sixteen to eighteen hours a day. To our amazement, three girls who came from well-to-do homes appeared at the meeting to teach us. There was Nady K., our beloved doctor's daughter, Sonia G., who was the musician's only daughter, and Anna B., whose mother was a widow. These three wonderful girls were students, studying at the Zhitomir University.

They also spoke to us and explained how urgent it was to learn the cause of our condition and to organize ourselves. . .<sup>1</sup>

Very soon after that introductory session my father and his friends demonstrated their new skills in reading, writing, and collective action by planning and carrying out a small but successful strike against the bosses.

Those episodes took place in 1902; within a year my father had emigrated to America to escape serving in the Czar's army. Although there were some serious contradictions in the way he lived out the American Dream, his passion for learning and his commitment to the working class remained constant.

In retrospect, my father's pre-Freirian emancipation through cultural literacy exemplifies the basic principles of Freire's work: it was achieved through praxis, the dynamic dialectic of a group's reflection on the objective conditions of their lives and an awareness of their capacity to transform those realities through cooperative action. It was a politicizing education; the students acquired a literacy of collective political action as an inseparable component of their new skills in reading and writing. And finally, their emancipating learning and their action were fueled by a shared vision, in that time the vision of a better world under socialism.

It is this consciousness of my father's history and this interpretation of Freire's pedagogy that shape my re-

sponse to Ira Shor's CRITICAL TEACHING.

What Shor attempts in his book is a holistic record of his emergence as a liberatory educator. He grounds the account of his professional-personal growth in a neo-Marxian class analysis of the phenomena and events of the 70's that transformed his teaching and his life. Both the method of his reconstruction of the period and the working theory of liberatory education that he extracts from his teaching experiments are profoundly influenced by the work of Paulo Freire:

The shape of memory and knowledge in this book -- a joint social history and pedagogy -- reflects the Freirian tradition in teaching. As a dialogic educator, I do with myself what I do with my students. I organize for critical study what I learn from my students in a disorganized and critical way. In this book I've presented systematically and critically what I've learned unpredictably. (Shor, p. 269)

The catalyst for Shor's transformation from "literary scholar" to dialogic educator was his teaching experience with working class students at Staten Island Community College of the City University of New York (CUNY), during the time of the rise and fall of the Open Admissions Policy at CUNY. This first teaching job became for him "a return to the people," the working-class people of his birth from whom he had been alienated by an elitist schooling.

The disruptive presence of a large group of working class students created a permanent rift among the faculty. Established CUNY faculty members, who were alienated by race and class from the new students, resisted both the students and the junior faculty, including Shor, who had been hired for the open admissions experiment. When the faculty finally split into two factions, parallel colleges were created within the single institutional framework. It was thus possible for Shor and other junior faculty to develop new classes and programs for the new CUNY.

The seven years Shor spent in adapting his teaching to the lives of working class students admitted under the Open Admissions Policy was a time of institutional chaos and bitter professional conflicts, marked, ultimately, by the defeat of the Open Admissions Policy. But in that "highly charged conflict zone" Shor and his teaching approach were utterly transformed.

In the first part of his book, Shor analyzes the social phenomena that formed his changing social consciousness. He cites the social-political contradictions of the Open Admissions Policy of CUNY; he analyzes the broader social contradictions of the community college movement in this country; and he addresses the social the pervasive nature of the anti-critical forces that mold the false consciousness of our daily lives ("the mass denial of reason"). Shor's interpretation of these phenomena blends neo-Marxian class analysis with a personal self-consciousness as he reinterprets his lived reality from his new awareness as a liberatory educator.

In the second part of his book Shor presents his general theory of a liberating pedagogy, vividly documented by concrete examples of his students' learning processes in the classroom. It was his evolving understanding of the social contradictions in higher education for working class students that led Shor to consider his students' lives and language as themes for critical study. What he finally invented with his students is an ingenious system of abstraction for isolating features of everyday life as study themes.

The pedagogical schema that Shor developed "synthesizes Freirian and progressive learning ideas" into a single working theory. The crux of his theory is the development of critical consciousness, for students and teachers, through an egalitarian, experience-based dialogue initiated by the teacher. The teacher's initial responsibility for identifying, abstracting and problematizing the important themes of the students' experiences is eventually taken over by the students who become their own systematizers, organizers and cultural analysts. Shor sees one goal of liberatory learning as "the withering away of the teacher"; ultimately, in his model, the teacher becomes expendable.

In his inventive teaching experiments and his "extracted" theory of critical teaching, Shor has made a strong contribution toward the development of a radical pedagogy. I see his work, however, as related more clearly to educational experiments growing out of the radical politics of the 60's and 70's than to the Freirian conception of a liberating pedagogy.

Shor, together with other educators moving toward a radical pedagogy for the Western world, seems to be drawn to Freire's work either for philosophical perspective in shaping the pedagogy or for retrospective analysis, to codify and critique various aspects of the pedagogy as it emerges. Neither approach does justice to the

essential unity of Freire's conception.

The vision that shapes the Freirian educative process is political action, a cooperative and critical analysis of power, manipulation and domination.<sup>2</sup> While the form of the process is variable, to be negotiated with a population according to their realities, and the method is subordinate to the crucial egalitarian relationships that move the process, the politicization of participants is an inherent and defining aspect of Freire's pedagogy.

To borrow one or more critical dimensions of this unified process, or to "adapt" the conception to fit Western realities, violates the unity and intent of the conception. The danger is that the Freirian pedagogy will go the way of other progressive, liberalizing, humanizing educational inventions that have been reduced through overpopularization (separation of practice from philosophy) to methods, styles and good intention.

Neither Shor's working theory nor his experiments demonstrate the essential politicization of Freire's pedagogy. Consider this serious omission: Examining the contradictions in the Open Admissions Policy at CUNY, a traumatic reality for both students and teachers, would seem to be a natural priority for a liberating educational experience in Shor's (and Freire's) conceptions. Yet this potentially politicizing reality in his and his students' lives never did become a "theme" for critical study in Shor's classroom.

Perhaps it is time for radical educators in the Western world to stand back from Freire's pedagogy and pay attention to Freire's advice. He urges us to examine our own historical context (not Freire's nor my father's historical realities, but our own), so that we may better know what unique directions and forms our radical pedagogy may take:

One of the most difficult tasks we have is to know in each context, what historically can be done. It is not proper for me, for example, to tell you what you can or should do. Your task is to define your historical possibility. It is to discover the free spaces which are at your disposal for your action as educators, knowing that your action is not neutral, knowing that educators are politicians. The question is to know what politics we are following, what our choice is and to be consistent with it.<sup>3</sup>

As radical educators we may find Freire's work most useful as a perspective for uncovering our "free spaces" and reminding us that as educators we are politicians. Our collective task, then, is to define our own guiding vision so that we are clear as to what politics we are following. I propose that we begin today to sketch out, together, a new American Dream, a shared vision of where our radical pedagogy may lead us. Only then can we move toward a liberating pedagogy for our time.

#### Footnotes

1. Jacob Schwartz, *THE STORY OF MY LIFE*, translated from the Yiddish (Chicago, Illinois, 1959).
2. Paulo Freire, "Cultural Action and Conscientization," in *CULTURAL ACTION FOR FREEDOM* (New York: Penguin Books, 1972).
3. Cynthia Brown, *LITERACY IN 30 HOURS, PAULO FREIRE'S PROCESS IN NORTH EAST BRAZIL* (Chicago: Alternative Schools Network, 1978), p. 64.

PRETEXT: Essay review of CRITICAL TEACHING AND EVERYDAY LIFE. Ira Shor. Boston: South End Press.

Kenneth Teitelbaum  
University of Wisconsin-Madison

In CRITICAL TEACHING AND EVERYDAY LIFE, Ira Shor is concerned with the inability of large numbers of Americans to engage in a "systematic inquiry into the reality" of their everyday lives (p. xxiv), and specifically with what Russell Jacoby has referred to as the "class unconsciousness" of the American working class.<sup>1</sup> Involved in a particular educational arena, the working class community college, and coming from a particular theoretical framework, a critical neo-marxist perspective drawing heavily on the work of Paulo Freire, Shor describes his efforts to address this concern and to engage in the kind of "self-conscious attempt ... to unite content and process at all levels of thought and action" that Henry Giroux has urged radical educators to embrace.<sup>2</sup> Although I have some theoretical and pedagogical misgivings about Shor's analysis, it does seem to me to be an important contribution to the curriculum field.

#### I.

Without engaging in an unwarranted and functionally reproductive cynicism, radical educators need to examine the widespread rejection of socialist principles and practices by members of the working class and lower middle class despite the existence of "objective conditions" that seem favorable to such a political movement.<sup>3</sup> Clearly, the subjective conditions -- the sharpened awareness of the existence, extent and consequences of economic, cultural and ideological domination, and the desire and willingness to transform these conditions -- must also be present. Yet it is often the case that the "intellectualism" and "progressive actions" necessary to advance such a transcendence are spurned rather than welcomed.

The recent cultural analyses of Raymond Williams<sup>4</sup> and educational analyses of Michael Apple<sup>5</sup>, among others, have greatly advanced our understanding of the workings of hegemony and provide a useful vantage point from which to approach Shor's book. In an advanced capitalist nation, dominant groups have been able to maintain effective control over the production, distribution and legitimation processes of not just the material relations of society but of the cultural and ideological ones as well. Such control enables dominant interests to in large part "reproduce"<sup>6</sup> the class nature of society, while at the same time saturating our everyday lives with reciprocally confirming ideas and conditions in which domination-subordination appears as the "natural way of life," the commonsense social reality. Intellectuals, social-psychologic "helpers" the mass media, the arts, etc. in part help to legitimate the dominant practices, visions, categories and hierarchial forms, as well as the existing unequal material conditions.

The maintenance of hegemonic meanings, practices, and conditions, however, is by no means a simple and straightforward task. A comprehensive saturation of our lives by the dominant culture does take place. But our lived culture is "relatively autonomous" as well, in part because the social and psychological nature of human existence is too complex and cannot be totally enveloped within dominant social forms. As Raymond Williams writes,

No modes of production and therefore no dominant social order and therefore no dominant culture ever in reality includes or exhausts all human practice, human energy, and human intention... it is a fact about the modes of domination, that they select from and consequently exclude the full range of human practice. What they exclude may often be seen as the personal or the private, or as the natural or even the metaphysical.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time, contradictions in the logic of advanced capital (e.g. social production and individual appropriation, State intrusion into personal concerns and emphasis on privatization) are played out in virtually every aspect of social life. The "tensions" that result from these contradictory conditions provide the opportunities for the germination of alternatives to hegemonic forces. Although their sources are sometimes difficult to specify, these alternative forms develop amidst the hegemonic process itself. Some of them do constitute a real opposition or counter-hegemony to dominant forms. A dialectical relationship exists. Hegemonic forces are in constant need of regeneration and re-creation, and when oppositional tendencies coalesce into an actual oppositional form, the dominant forces modify so as to attempt to either blatantly stamp out oppositional forms or, preferably, eliminate what is oppositional within them by "incorporation." Even

though incorporation certainly plays a significant role in diffusing opposition within an advanced capitalist society, and hegemonic forces have success in limiting the emergence of oppositional tendencies to begin with, the potential (or threat) of opposition always exists and is always being realized in particular ways.

Such a theoretical perspective is helpful in analyzing school policies and school curriculum. It also needs to be translated into a pedagogy that enables many others to understand the complexities involved, people who have not the time, interest and/or money to spend years in graduate school or who do not read journals such as this one. Radical educators need to figure out ways to best help our adult students, high school students and elementary school students (and ourselves) to become more reflective and sophisticated about the nature and consequences of hegemonic influences experienced in their everyday lives. Such an agenda, although limited by his particular teaching experience, lies at the heart of Ira Shor's book.

## II.

In the first half of his book, Shor begins with an account of the Open Admissions program in New York City and his own involvement as an English instructor at Staten Island Community College from 1971 to 1977. His description of one aspect of his experience may be vaguely familiar to a few of us:

Despite my background in 60s politics, I came to class wearing a tie, and began teaching grammar. Pedagogically, I was still dominated by the elite orthodoxy which had trained me, and I did not know then of alternative models. Of course, I saw myself as a creative grammarian, jazzing up the exercises with film and photographs. I leaned on my sincerity when the teaching proved ineffective... Good intentions are surely better than bad intentions, but something had to give. Eventually, I took off my tie, and started taking some risks. (p. xxiv-xxv)

The "risks" amounted to the development of an "empowering pedagogy" that was guided by the kind of theoretical perspective outlined in the previous section of this essay and that attempted to actively involve the worker-students in their own "transcendent consciousness-change." (p. 31). This meant suggesting themes, projects, etc. that would help the students to "penetrate" the influence of dominant culture in their daily lives and to emerge "as the subjective actors in this learning process." (p. 250)

Situating the context of his own teaching, Shor explains the rise of community college during the last twenty years as in part the result of changed economic and ideological conditions. For instance, the colleges help to address the accumulation crisis of advanced capital by providing employment for construction, service and intellectual workers and, in "custodial" fashion, by keeping other potential full-time laborers off the job market for a couple of years. They also help to provide conditions (e.g. skills, attitudes) for the emergence of additional efficient and compliant workers (and consumers). Community colleges also serve a legitimating function by fostering the "need" for additional credentials and seeming to provide increased opportunities to working class and lower middle class adults for the realization of the elusive American Dream. Students are presumably given another chance to improve their economic and intellectual standing; failure to do so becomes their own fault, not the system's, and convinces them (if they weren't convinced already) that they must "settle for less." These colleges also perpetuate the separation of mental and manual labor that is inherent in the social division of labor<sup>8</sup> (and that is also furthered by high school tracking). The split between vocationalism and the liberal arts is exacerbated in these schools, with most students being channeled into occupational courses. Potentially reflective humanities courses are seen as "fluff" and possibly harmful in making oneself appear attractive ("uncritical") to potential employers.

This is not all that is going on in these schools, of course. Some students do "get ahead." And there are structural contradictions embedded within this setting, a consequences of the complex working out of the crises of accumulation and legitimation. As Shor writes, "The delayed arrival of workers into fixed jobhood can ease an economic problem only by propelling an ideological one." (p. 32) Thus, although these colleges attempt to serve the functions outlined above, many of the students who attend the schools are older (having had twelve years of previous schooling and a wealth of other experiences -- e.g. working class jobs, providing for a family -- to draw upon) and are better able than younger students to grasp the illusion of opportunity that their schools represent for members of the working class. The dehumanizing impact of being "warehoused" and coming to realize it, however vaguely and intuitively, serves to deepen distrust and frustration among many of these worker-students. As in public schools and at work,<sup>9</sup> student engage in "resistances" -- by not working as hard as their teachers would like, vandalizing, using drugs and alcohol on the premises, etc. The crisis of legitimation here intensifies, and the potential for the development of a critical conscious-

ness among members of the working class and lower middle class increases.

The contradictions embedded within the community colleges provide radical educators with the opportunity to engage in successful liberatory pedagogy. But there are larger obstacles - "interferences" - to the development of a critical consciousness among these students (and the rest of us). Radical educators need to understand these interferences because they work to impede, and can help to inform, one's practice. Shor thus sees the need to comprehensively examine what he considers to be the main culprit: the saturation of our lives by the messages and forms of an anti-critical mass culture. Although there are numerous "interferences" to critical thought - in schools, family life, advertising, the mass media, the cliches of conversation, etc. - "the machinery of thought-control is not 1984. It is not that thorough, that complete or that grotesque." (p. 49) Large numbers of students reject some of the dominant cultural messages. Despite all of the forces in its way, Shor tells us that critical thinking can and does go on among some of the students with whom he deals. What, then, can a liberatory educator do to further this potential popular emergence of critical thinking? Shor's basic approach is to help his students to "extraordinarily re-experience the ordinary," to "jointly address self-in-society and social-relations-in-self." (p. 95) This active transcendence of domination - "the reversal of everyday conditioning" (p. 104) is very similar to Freire's notion of "conscientization," what Henry Giroux has described as "learning through reflection and action to overcome the social, economic, and political contradictions of an oppressive reality."<sup>10</sup> As an English instructor, Shor is particularly concerned with literacy skills. Like Freire, his teaching of literacy is intertwined with critical inquiry and liberation. "Dialogue" - Freire's democratic model of social relations - is Shor's primary pedagogical mode, so that "the form and content of the class dialectically support each other." (p. 95) Its very nature precludes an authentic description of its development until its conclusion. The role of the teacher is transformed into a multifaceted but less dominating one. In the process, students are converted "from manipulated objects into active, critical subjects," (p. 97) guided by a critical examination of personal and social practice, and an intensive utilization of language and conceptual skills. (In fact, the former is dependent on the latter and the latter can best be achieved by tying it to the former.) This is not intended to be the rather unrigorous, therapeutic, "pop psychology" methodologies that Jean Bethke Elshain has strongly criticized. But neither is it to be the "banking education" that some radical educators, in their fervency to impart a body of knowledge, have employed.<sup>11</sup> For Shor, the attempt is to merge alternative content with alternative form. Collective work processes, peer education, inter-disciplinary approaches to study, unearthing hidden social histories, developing problem-contexts appropriate for the discouragement of racism and sexism, the workshop form, etc. - all with the students as active initiators and participants - figure prominently in Shor's classroom. Utilizing these and other untraditional pedagogical forms, Shor works to turn mass culture against itself, to examine everyday life and "the giant contradictions of an irrational social order" (p. 87) so as to foster an acceptance of its "negation" on the part of worker-students.

Shor then devotes the remaining half of his book to more specifically detailing the ways in which his political and educational perspectives have informed his practice (and vice versa). He believes that for the most part, and sometimes in unpredictable ways, he has significantly helped his students to advance in their reading, writing, speaking, thinking and creating skills, as well as in their ability to "penetrate" the myriad of hegemonic influences in their everyday lives. One chapter is devoted to explaining how and why he made the theme of "work" a focus of study in one course, and he offers a few student manuscripts as examples of his students' work. In the next chapter, he describes a course which involves systematic Utopian thinking, a problem-solving method (life description-diagnosis-reconstruction) and a concept method (name-general definition-life examples) in a critique of daily life (e.g. the chairs that students are given to sit in). Other chapters detail his utilization of language projects (e.g. developing "constitutions" for classroom relations, writing college curriculum), poetry, anti-sexist marriage contracts, and playwriting. Clearly, the key to the liberatory enterprise for the teacher is "a tolerance for anxiety and a disposition to experiment." (p. 268) What also comes across very clearly in Shor's account is that a healthy willingness to be self-critical and the adoption of a long-range perspective are also necessary ingredients for the success of his pedagogy. Finally, recognizing the need to not separate out theory from its context, Shor suggests that his ideas be



“adapted, amended, re-invented, used or discarded, depending on the requirements of the specific teaching situation...In each school or college, teachers need to assess what level of liberatory learning they can assert, given student consciousness and institutional politics.” (p. 123 and 113)

To do otherwise would be to reduce his ideas to a mechanical technique and counteract the essence of a critical pedagogy. Shor has not given us a curriculum that can be simply borrowed for use in public schools or universities, or in non-English classes. Instead, he has provided us with a model that can inform our own development of such curricula.

### III.

Despite what I hope is an obvious respect for Shor's book, I do have various reservations about aspects of his theoretical/pedagogical perspective. Because of the limited space available, I will point to a few of them and generally leave them in question form.

To what extent can Shor's ideas be adapted to public schools, where the constraints are much greater (e.g. more rigorous public scrutiny and accountability, standardized examinations and “suggested” curriculum, faculty pressure, more rigid scheduling), and still retain their “oppositional character?” To what extent is his approach adaptable to universities, where many undergraduate education majors, for example, seem to identify with dominant ideologies?

Utilizing “collective learning” and “peer education” and the like, is there a serious loss of important “information” transmitted to the students? In my own seminar with undergraduate student teachers this past semester, for instance, my students made it clear to me at its end that they had learned much more from the class sessions that I had planned and “led” than from the ones in which they (in pairs) had chosen the topics and the readings, and led the discussions. (Obviously, they are unaccustomed to such a role.) Is his conception of “action” in the curriculum curiously narrow, ignoring the possibility of students engaging in “action projects” outside of the classroom as part of the curriculum? What exactly are “liberatory values” besides the negation of hegemonic ones? Is a clear alternative vision missing from his practice, and should it be? His students' play “No Sale” (p. 258-260), and “utopian” ideas to “Have economist as manager” and “Have McDonald's take over the food service” in the school cafeteria (p. 181-182) hardly constitute a radical consciousness, although I appreciate the fact that they engaged in the production of texts and in the problem-solving technique. Shor needed to give more attention to this rather typical predicament of progressive education.

Is Shor's discussion of worker-students at times romanticized? - his description occasionally seems like it could be set to violin music. And yet at other times, he seems to minimize the vibrancy of working class life. For example, the aggressive car mystique needs to be viewed not just as “dehumanizing” but also as the insistence of members of the working class to forge their own cultural dynamic out of dominant elements.<sup>12</sup> He also needs to make clearer that not only must radical educators devise classroom practices that provide for a consistency of theory and practice, and a maximization of the existing critical potential, but that they also need to ally with other progressive groups outside of the classroom. And should we take as “given” his claim that, “By critically studying the lives they live uncritically and the culture which eclipses reason, students begin changing their powerless places in society?” (p. 48-49) There is, in fact a voice largely absent from this book - his students'. It would have helped if his account had included their views of his teaching and how his classes have influenced them.

With all of these reservations, I still found Shor's book to be an immensely informative and provocative one. His theory draws heavily from the writings of Lukacs, Gramsci, Williams, the Frankfurt School, Freire, Aronowitz, and others, and his pedagogical ideas (e.g. collaborative learning, peer education, writing marriage contracts and personal histories, problem-solving) are not particularly new. But what is illuminating and powerful about this work is the author's concrete elaboration of a critical theory of mass culture and radical educational practice, and the interrelationship of them in his teaching. When I taught high school Social Studies a few years ago, a written assignment for my Sociology class was to develop a utopian community. A class project for my Anthropology class entailed an “ethnography” of our high school. But what I failed

to do in my teaching in general was to more coherently connect the methodologies utilized with a guiding, critical theoretical framework - a perspective that included a clear understanding of the "objective conditions" of society and of our subjective reactions to them, and how this understanding related to the need for students to be more active and reflective in their learning of social and personal practice. In my teaching of undergraduates now, with a student population quite unlike Shor's, I am attempting to develop a pedagogy that is more clearly informed by my theoretical concerns. But this is no easy task, for as Antonio Gramsci said over a half-century ago: "It was right to struggle against the old school, but reforming it was not so simple as it seemed." *CRITICAL THEORY AND EVERYDAY LIFE* can be a valuable aid for all of us in this endeavor.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Jacoby's comments are contained in Stanley Aronowitz, Russell Jacoby, Paul Piccone and Trent Schroyer, "Notes and Commentary: Symposium on Class," *TELOS*, 9 (Summer 1976), pp. 145-166.
2. Henry Giroux, "Beyond the Limits of Radical Educational Reform: Toward a Critical Theory of Education," *THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM THEORIZING*, 2 (Winter 1980), p. 41.
3. The "objective conditions" I have in mind include exorbitant inflation and interest rates, high rate of unemployment and underemployment, growing fears of nuclear power and toxic waste accidents, and widely publicized political scandals. For an interesting and optimistic analysis, see Peter Dreier, "Socialism and Cynicism: An Essay on Politics, Scholarship, and Teaching," *SOCIALIST REVIEW*, 10 (September-October 1980), p. 105-131.
4. In particular, Raymond Williams, *MARXISM AND LITERATURE* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
5. Michael W. Apple, *IDEOLOGY AND CURRICULUM* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), especially Chapter I.
6. For a discussion of modes of determination, including reproduction, see Erik Olin Wright, *CLASS, CRISIS AND THE STATE* (London: New Left Books, 1978).
7. Williams, *OP. CIT.*, p. 125. Emphasis is in original.
8. Harry Braverman, *LABOR AND MONOPOLY CAPITAL* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
9. For instance, see Stanley Aronowitz, *FALSE PROMISES: THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN WORKING CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS* (New York: McGraw Hill 1973); Richard C. Edwards, *CONTESTED TERRAIN* (New York: Basic Books, 1979); Michael W. Apple, "The Other Side of the Hidden Curriculum: Correspondence Theories and the Labor Process," *THE JOURNAL OF EDUCATION*, 162 (Winter 1980), p. 47-66; and Paul Willis, *LEARNING TO LABOUR* (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1977).
10. Henry Giroux, "Paulo Freire's Approach to Radical Educational Reform," *CURRICULUM INQUIRY*, 9 (Fall 1979), pp. 257-272.
11. Jean Bethke Elshaint, "The Social Relations of the Classroom: A Moral and Political Perspective," in Theodore Mills Norton and Bertell Ollman, eds., *STUDIES IN SOCIALIST PEDAGOGY* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p. 291-313. This collection also contains essays by Antonio Gramsci, Paulo Freire, Ira Shor and others.
12. Such a perspective is given detail in Paul Willis, *PROFANE CULTURE* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

I wish to thank Michael Apple and Nancy Steinkraus for their helpful comments on a draft of this essay.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

Pretext: Essay Review of THINKING ABOUT CURRICULUM, William A. Reid. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, 132 p.

### Thinking Beyond Schwab: The Future of Curriculum Studies

George Willis  
University of Rhode Island

Most of us who work in the field which William Reid aptly calls "curriculum studies" have some sense of collectively where we have been and where we are going, however dim our perceptions of our professional evolution may sometimes be. Seldom have these collective professional perceptions been less dim than they were ten years ago, thanks primarily to the efforts of Joseph Schwab. Schwab's article "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum"<sup>1</sup> had, of course, captured the imagination of the field, and its message is still familiar to us: the curriculum field is moribund because it has overrelied on theory; it will become revitalized by focusing on what Schwab calls "the practical," solving problems by an "eclectic" approach which proceeds through "deliberation." The 1970's, at least, were to be devoted to working out Schwab, to solving practical curriculum problems by appropriately bringing to bear on them a variety of procedures and resources.

In some ways this promise has been realized, but in most ways it has not. Unfortunately, many members of the field have yet to fathom Schwab's message, others have rejected it, and still others have never heard it. Certainly, many curriculum projects of the 1970's have been conducted through deliberation, but still more have been conducted through antithetical, highly rationalized and bureaucratic procedures. The blurred boundaries of the field itself; its shifting internal configurations; the political, social, and economic pressures of the times; and the practical difficulties encountered in conducting practical deliberations have, by the 1980s's, deflected attention from tasks identified by Schwab and tended to dim again our collective professional perceptions.

Seen in even this very brief historical light, William Reid's book THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM: THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF CURRICULUM PROBLEMS is a timely and important contribution to the field of curriculum studies. If my interpretation is correct, it is timely because of its re-emphasis of Schwab and of the field's common problems and common heritage at an especially opportune moment, and it is important because it correctly suggests how to move beyond the limitations inherent in Schwab's own suggestions for the field, and thus, how to redefine curriculum studies in a way which permits both its development as an academic discipline and its contribution to the solution of practical curriculum problems. In point of fact, the book convincingly explains how disciplined, academic thought (though not the kind Schwab objected to as too theoretical) is inextricably connected with practical action. In so doing, Reid indirectly points out how Schwab springs from the same philosophic sources as Dewey,<sup>2</sup> yet how such sources can be used in curriculum studies in ways which apparently neither Schwab nor Dewey quite foresaw. With issues such as these underlying Reid's immediate analyses of a broad range of problems concerned with how practical curriculum deliberations can be carried out, the book--if it enjoys the wide audience it deserves--can clarify our collective perceptions of where the field is now and where it can be in the future.

The book begins with the assertion that emphasis on "the practical" in curriculum leads to important consequences for how public policy in education is formulated. Reid believes that the problems of curriculum studies are not basically the problems of professionals or initiates only, nor can they be treated adequately through rationalistic, technical, or managerial procedures; rather, they are problems of the community at large, and their solutions require the generation and testing of alternative courses of action within specific contexts, a process which includes empirical data and humane values. Thus, curriculum studies are concerned with how communities can best conduct deliberations about curricular means and ends and how such studies can best be conceived as inquiry that assists in the resolution of curriculum problems. For Reid, then, thinking or theorizing about the curriculum is consistent with taking practical action, and the process of deliberation in which thought and action merge is inherently educational, for possibility and actuality must be constantly re-examined. The quality of practical decisions depends on the quality of the deliberations which create them,

and, in general, the quality of deliberations can be enhanced through the creation of an appropriate critical tradition. Indeed, as Reid points out, perhaps the worst result of a technical or managerial approach to curriculum decision-making is not so much that decisions often are poor, but that the approach itself leave no real social mechanisms for dealing with practical curriculum problems.

In Reid's approach curriculum studies center on research which identifies and defines essential curriculum problems for decision, which generates alternative solutions, and which improves the quality of deliberations. Such research is oriented toward the design, implementation, and evaluation of curricula, but since curriculum problems require suggestions for procedures and for sources of data, research must provide information on desired states of affairs and descriptions of conditions under which desired states of affairs are obtainable. Since such research must aid in decision-making based on multiple criteria and must deal with specific contexts, the history of how they came about, and what they mean to people, curriculum studies are clearly normative and, in general, both conceptual and empirical, what Reid calls "naturalistic, humanistic, and interpretive." (p. 36) They lead to improved decision-making by raising the general level of understanding of curriculum problems and by contributing knowledge, insights, and values on specific occasions. Reid suggests that this approach is far more adequate to the complexity involved and far more useful to the people engaged in specific situations than is the approach based on "the objectivist/reductionist paradigm in which much educational research is cast." (p. 36)

Though this brief description of the first five chapters of the book hardly does justice to them, throughout them Reid remains in the company of both Schwab and Dewey. However, it is in the sixth and final chapter, in which he argues for the development of "a humanistic discipline of curriculum," where he makes his decidedly original contribution, I think. He suggests that since the field of curriculum studies clarifies the nature of its problems and their solutions, it is itself engaged in a deliberative search for explanation and judgment sufficient to shape its own future; that in assessing the data appropriate to it (focusing on "the practical") in ways appropriate to it (including interpreting and judging), it is clearly a non-scientific discipline with its own subject matter and methods. He thus rejects three possible futures for curriculum studies: a pure eclecticism (here parting from Schwab), a new conceptualization which is neither art nor science (perhaps here parting from Dewey), and the adoption of procedures from similar humanistic disciplines (such as art, literature, or history). In their stead, Reid suggests that the development of a strategy particular to curriculum studies will permit inquiry into how specifically curricular phenomena can be considered, particularly into questions concerning how curriculum problems are unique, how they can be solved, and how solutions can be judged. In this sense, he is suggesting the development of a discipline of curriculum studies as a way of organizing thought--particularly critical explanation, interpretation, and judgment--about the rationality of practical curriculum actions. Such a discipline would guide both curriculum thought and curriculum action.

In my opinion, the development of such a discipline is something the field needs for practical, professional, and political reasons. Schwab, with his short historical perspective and his rejection of rationalistic-objectivist theory, saw neither the antecedents for such a discipline within the field in decades before 1960 nor the possibility of conducting practical deliberations on other than an ad hoc theoretical basis. Though the general idea of a discipline of curriculum is not entirely new,<sup>3</sup> what Reid has done is quite original and quite remarkable. Writing with an insider's experience in curriculum and from an insider's perspective, he has pointed out how person-centered, "humanistic" theory compatible with Dewey's philosophic orientation and consistent with Schwab's notion of practical deliberation is appropriate to organized thinking about curricula and to the solution of curriculum problems. Practice will improve because it is guided by informed, critical thought; thinking will improve because it arises out of practical situations. (It is primarily the impossibility of providing such linkages between perceptions and actions which disqualifies rationalistic-objectivist theory as an adequate guide to the conduct of education.) Furthermore, Reid's version of a discipline of curriculum is sufficiently generous to encompass people of diverse "humanistic" persuasions and with differing agenda. For instance, though compatible with Dewey's philosophy, it can accommodate pragmatists and phenomenologists (but not positivists); though consistent with Schwab's "practical," it can accommodate emphasis on both individual situations and social contexts (but not in terms of rationalistic-objectivist research). Therefore, the development of such a discipline based on the intrinsic nature of curriculum and arising out of antecedents in the

field can also provide a common professional identity for members of the field and a mechanism for clarifying and potentially resolving differences. At the same time, this professional identity can help prevent curriculum research and practice from being further co-opted by basically external and essentially reactionary forces. Reid's humanistic discipline of curriculum moves beyond Schwab's "eclectic" by providing a stabilizing center of gravity for all these dimensions of curriculum studies.

While this review has spoken favorably and only generally of Reid's book, even the sympathetic reader will find specific points or lines of argument with which to disagree. The book is simply too rich in detail not to invite detailed response. Even the unsympathetic reader who rejects the basic thesis can, therefore, still be enlightened by Reid's analyses of curriculum problems. Very much to his credit, I think, Reid has written a book which virtually every reader familiar with curriculum will find insightful in one way or another, with insights concisely and cogently expressed.

Still, it is primarily in the role of synthesizer of the past and prophet of the future that Reid has cast himself. That is not an easy role to play. I, for one, think he has played the role well and am in agreement with his thesis. But that thesis needs to be widely debated by members of the field. Therefore, perhaps the only really unhelpful response to Reid's proposal for a humanistic discipline of curriculum is to ignore it. This can be done by members of the field who believe either that traditional modes of research will surely improve practice or that practice is its own end and will surely improve itself. Whatever the reason, such a response will perpetuate the status quo in curriculum and underestimate the capacities of the field, for perhaps the greatest value of Reid's book is that it may give curriculum studies the vision to hasten a maybe-not-so-distant future which otherwise it is only groping toward.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Schwab, Joseph J. "The Practical: A Language for Curriculum," *SCHOOL REVIEW*, 78:1 (November) 1969, pp. 1-24.
2. For a discussion of similarities between Schwab and Dewey and their mutual influence on educational research generally, see: Schubert, William H., "Recalibrating Educational Research: Toward a Focus on Practice," *EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH*, 9:1 (January) 1980, pp. 17-24, 31.
3. Willis, George. "Researchable Problems in Curriculum: Some Directions," a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, April 1974.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.

Stalking Social Analysis in the Enchanted Forest

Alex Molnar

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Why, why I asked myself, did I feel uneasy as I read THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM? The arguments set forth sound dense and scholarly. The citations are manifold and formidable. The tone restrained and measured.

As I sat through the few evenings of reading that THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM required, I felt my unease growing. However, as Hercule Poirot, I resolved to proceed, knowing that in time enough evidence would accumulate to reveal the source of my discomfort and the case would be closed.

THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM led me on a wild chase dashing here and there in pursuit of the curriculum field. During the chase it offers up characterizations of radical and reactionary analysis of curriculum and schooling which are uninformed, superficial and, in my judgment, incorrect; extols mainstream functionalist sociology; establishes the categories of rationalism and humanism in opposition to each other in a manner which appears to have little conceptual utility; and still manages, from time to time, to discuss the nature of curriculum problems with a degree of insight. So it was that I bumbled uncomfortably through THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM at times appalled, at times intrigued. . .

. . . Until I reached the next to last page.

Suddenly my unease was given form as if in a prophetic vision.

Dreamily I imagined a scene: I was an anxious fifty year old concerned for the future financial security of my family. I sought out a solid banking establishment, which was reputed to have a worthy trust department. As I entered the bank to meet with the trust department official with whom I had been given an appointment I was comforted by the muted colors, the soft murmur of voices discussing important matters and the substantial air that graced the place like the luster of the old brass fixtures and the sheen of the mahogany paneling with which it was decorated. Once in the trust department I was shown to a smallish office of the sort assigned to a promising and valued, though not yet prominent, executive. An earnest looking youngish man in a three piece tweed suit stood up behind his desk as I entered the office, extended his hand in greeting and bade me to sit in the comfortable leather chair just across the desk from him.

Throughout our conversation the young man spoke in the well modulated, assured English that carried with it the air of things eternal. While at times I could not follow his logic and many of his explanations seemed shallow and confusing the general tenor of the conversation had a soothing effect. Also, it was clear that although the young man had certain reservations about the management of the trust department (and I suspected he would have preferred more casual attire) he entertained few questions about the ultimate value of the enterprise.

So it was that despite the vague uneasiness caused by some of the man's explanations I determined to secure my family's financial future by entering into a trust agreement worked out by this young bank official. Holding my doubts in check I announced my intention to secure an agreement and another appointment was arranged to work out the details.

As I stood to leave, I was somewhat shaken by the young officer's smiling assurance that my future was now as secure as that of the British Empire. However, when he came around his desk to show me out and I saw that the man was wearing the gargantuan rubber feet of a circus clown, I fainted.

My God, I read this entire book looking for ways to precisely describe the convolutions and seams in the arguments developed only to reach the concluding paragraphs and find presented as wisdom a quote from THE GREENING OF AMERICA.

J E E E E S U U U U S! THE GREENING OF AMERICA!!!

"The political activists have had their day...Neither lawful procedures nor politics-and-power can succeed

against the Corporate State. . . the new generation, by experimenting with action at the level of consciousness, has shown the way to the one method of change that will work in today's post-industrial society."

The one method of change!?? Action at the level of consciousness!??

The "new generation" (is that like the Pepsi generation?) turns out to be upper middle class Yale undergraduates sitting around the lunch room table with Charles Reich.

The way we are shown turns out to be the way to enjoy a hip professional life style without thinking too much about the nature of the foundation which supports it.

The one method of change turns out to be internal adjustments to no change. (Um, let's see, maybe if I read the Mobil ads in TIME magazine while playing Led Zeplin backwards and chanting my mantra I could break through to consciousness IV.)

THE GREENING OF AMERICA may well be the product of too many mung beans, but it is not and should not be confused with social analysis.

Or maybe in Consciousness III it's all the same. In which case I'm looking forward to a volume with some appropriate title, perhaps EAT RIGHT FOR BETTER ANALYSIS.

Or perhaps I'm being too hard on THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM. After all it's only one quote.

How, you ask, in the review of an entire book can one quote, even one I consider breathtakingly outrageous, (no, that's not strong enough--fall over on your back, kick your feet, wave your arms, and scream outrageous) be given so much importance?

Under such circumstances I would not give one quote so much importance.

But in this case I do--for a number of reasons: 1) Because of its placement in the book the Reich quote amounts to a closing brief. 2) The content of the quote reveals a facile and flabby analysis. It makes me suspect that an affinity for this sort of thinking explains why THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM can at times present brief arguments lucidly but that its larger analysis wandered, drifted and contradicted itself. That is, I believe I can find some utility, in some of what is proposed, however in order to do so I must dismiss the framework of the book's analysis. 3) Finally, I think this quote speaks to the question of the author's interest in writing this book. It seems all diversions aside, that THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM is an apologia for a conformist social ideology.

Let us take up the analysis presented.

THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM contains six chapters: 1) Introduction: Curriculum debates and Curriculum Studies, 2) Thinking about the practical, 3) The concept of curriculum research, 4) Practical reasoning and curriculum decisions, 5) The problem of curriculum change, 6) Rationalism or humanism? The future of Curriculum Studies.

In these chapters the author identifies and addresses a number of issues. Principal among them are: the inadequacy of the contemporary policy making process, the need to develop a critical tradition capable of sustaining the thoughtful deliberation of matters of moment theoretic and practical, the utility of regarding curriculum questions as essentially "uncertain practical questions," the adequacy of a functionalist explanation of how curriculum changes, and the need to free curriculum research from the domination of the social sciences.

These are significant issues. They need to be discussed. Indeed, they have been discussed. Elsewhere.

THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM seems to hold the promise of discussing them in an important new way. Instead, it presents a grab bag of liberal assertions about the world as if they were the cutting edge of scholarly thought.

It seems the author believes that there are people called reconceptualists. These people reconceptualize. The fruits of their labor are reconceptualizations. These reconceptualizations point the way to the future.

Fortunately, the author regards logical precision as unnecessary in matters concerning "uncertain practical questions."

Maybe a little pixie dust. . . .

I should be careful with that metaphor--I mean if I don't believe does that mean a reconceptualist will die?

While THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM is uncertain about the outcomes of practical activity, it is very sure of its politics: "Reaction and revolt are opposite faces of the same thing. Both are authoritarian

attempts to solve society's problems." The book is littered with this sort of simple-minded assertion. It makes me suspicious that an unspoken ideology supports the book's contentions.

That is the rotten root of THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM.

I could take many quotes out of context and find them quite suggestive, even helpful. I suspect I might enjoy a quiet evening of conversation with the author, discussing historical method in relation to curriculum inquiry, for example.

But beware dear reader beware. If you lose yourself in the thicket of THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM'S individual arguments; you'll leave the enchanted forest having forgotten how to ask why.

The context. . . the context cannot be ignored. This sort of work functions to obscure rather than clarify, because it refuses to be critical of the reasons why some activities can be engaged in and others cannot. In fact, it dismisses such criticism as having no practical utility.

It would seem that context is not a practical concern.

Or is it?

"According to the view described (in THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM), change comes about mainly as a result of change in the factors in the environment of the school that controls the internal balance between technology, social system and theory."

Oh yes, I see, what we do is study those external "factors" so we know what they are--but we don't attempt to analyze why they are the way they are--that wouldn't be practical and there P O O F we wouldn't be doing proper curriculum thinking.

Now I understand.

But take heart. Things will improve. Evolutionary reform will overtake us.

In the future, "Deliberation will be the means by which tensions are resolved through a choice of a future system state which is attainable and which respects the aims and purposes of the participants."

How do we get from here to there? THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM is silent. Why is THINKING ABOUT THE CURRICULUM silent on such a practical matter?

Why indeed.

Copyright 1981 by JCT.



Post Text: Author's Reply. Elliot Eisner. **THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION**

A Review of Stone's and Levin's Review of **THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION**

Elliot W. Eisner  
Stanford University

In the last issue of **CURRICULUM THEORIZING** two reviews of **THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION** appeared, one by Joan Stone and the other by Malcolm Levin. Both reviews I found to be thoughtful and well written. Even more, both reviews sensitized me to areas in the book that need attention. Some things that I said apparently need to be extended and some things that needed to be said, I didn't say. In this sense both reviews were helpful.

Although I am pleased with the positive tone of much of their remarks, reviews of books, and clearly reviews of reviews are not places reserved for encomiums. There are some issues I wish to take with some of what each author has had to say. First, to Stone.

What Stone is after and why she believes I failed to provide is a way of knowing how meanings from criticism will be construed by the reader. Following Paul Ricoeur she emphasizes the fact that meanings are personal constructions, that text as intention and text as read are not the same. She quotes Ricoeur as saying that "experience as experience cannot be transferred from one individual to another." That news is nothing to write home about. To amplify her point about the autonomy of the text, she again quotes Ricoeur as saying "with written discourse the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide." Any writer of books whose books are reviewed can attest to that fact as well. But the point on the disparity between the intended and the received message can be taken too far. The fit between an author's text and the reader's meaning is never isomorphic; but it is too much to claim as Ricoeur does that the two "cease to coincide." If by the term coincide Ricoeur means that perfect overlap between the two must occur, the comment is trite. Perfect overlap never occurs. If "cease to coincide" means that no overlap occurs, then Ricoeur is wrong. If there is no overlap, there is no communication. While isomorphism between an expression and its reading is a vain hope that is impossible to attain, the claim that the text as intended and formed has no coincidence with the meaning secured, I believe to be equally false.

Stone then goes on to speak more specifically about the interpretation of educational criticism: "The role of educational criticism as a way of understanding classroom reality cannot be fully demonstrated without an understanding of the complex relation between the writer of the criticism and the reader or, in other words, the relation between the criticism as written and the criticism as read. It is this complex relation that Eisner neglects in his book. It is because he neglects it that the students in my class who attempted to write criticisms on their own were left with a feeling that such writing would have little impact on their own situations, much less on more general educational situations. It is not enough to invite us to pursue an approach which is complementary to the prevailing scientific model. That approach must be examined with the same degree of rigor and completeness that one finds in discussions of the theory of quantitative models."

I wonder how reasonable it is for Stone to expect that I provide a way of determining how an educational criticism will be interpreted by a reader. Would she have the same criterion applied to her own book review? Is there any method in critical theory generally in literature or in the fine arts that does this? If so, I have never come across it. And finally, is it a reasonable expectation for an approach as new as is educational criticism? In fact, is it ever in principle possible to work out such a scheme without reverting to a highly notational and conventionalized approach to language? I doubt it.

I have no illusions about the potential impact of educational criticism on the teaching practices of teachers or on the administrative behavior of principals. What criticism is designed to do is to raise levels of consciousness of its readers by describing, interpreting, and appraising educational practice. Changing people in

significant ways will require considerably more than what educational criticism can provide. It will require an environment that is sympathetic to change, that tolerates mistakes, and that provides for critical feedback by supportive colleagues over extended periods of time. The writing of a single criticism, whether by doctoral students or by teachers is in no way an adequate test of its utility, if the expectation is that it will change behavior patterns that have been developed over the years. Educational situations, like all human situations, are more resilient than all that.

As far as the question of rigor and completeness is concerned, I do not believe that in the arts and in approaches based on the arts, we can ever have the kind of "rigor and completeness one finds in discussions of the theory of quantitative models." This is not an apologia for sloppiness, but rather a recognition of the difference between notational systems used in the sciences and figurative systems used in the arts. Conventional and stipulative definitions and prescriptive rules abound in notational systems that are not to be found in those that are figurative, those that expressive forms are designed to represent. The need for surprise, fresh metaphor, and material whose message is conveyed through ambiguity and innuendo, will always require a level of critical intelligence that exceeds the levels needed for the decoding of rule-governed notional systems. Heaven forbid a glossary of terms and prescriptive canons of procedure in criticism or in art.

Ambiguity is inherent in artistically critical writing; its liability is that shared meanings cannot be guaranteed, its strength is that by avoiding the prescriptions of convention, fresh insights can be secured. I prefer to opt for the latter, despite the potential liability of the former.

The second review by Malcom Levin is filled with statements about which I wish to comment. Like Stone, Levin is also sympathetic to the need for developing new approaches for studying life in classrooms. He, like me, has grave reservations about the appropriateness of the R & D Model as a dominant conceptual paradigm in education. In that respect, at least, we seem to belong to the same church. But Levin is not happy because I did not specify the ways in which criticism is to relate to the process of program development that is going on in classrooms. He wants to know how to judge its validity and to know how to determine who is to judge. He also questions the appropriateness of the analogy between evaluating an educational program and writing a critical view of a concert or an art exhibit. He wonders about the number of parents interested in the character of the school or classroom, except for their own children. And he suggests that I suggest that educational criticism is not for the teachers' or the students' consumption. These are important concerns. Did I overlook so much?

First, I thought I had devoted at least some attention to the ways in which criticism can be applied to educational concerns. Was I mistaken? I consulted my book. The entire section on generalization is devoted to a discussion of how it is that knowledge of a particular can be used as a basis for anticipating the characteristics of other situations and thereby applying what one has learned in one situation to other situations. True, I did not give specific examples in that section since I was trying to make the general and more important point that random selection is not a necessary condition for generalization and that the study of individual situations could inform us in ways that apply to situations other than those studied. This apparently was not enough.

But later in the same chapter I described how one of my former students used educational criticism to disclose covert messages of a textbook in social studies. Surely here is a concrete example of utilization. I then go on to describe its application to the architecture of school buildings, school furniture, and to the illustrations found in textbooks. Clearly, not every example could be addressed and further elaboration of the examples used could have occurred. But just as clearly, not all of the techniques of applying educational criticism are well developed. What I was doing when I wrote the book was not to provide a set of procedures, but to suggest possibilities in the hope that the reader would find the models intriguing and useful.

Levin's concern about the appropriateness of art criticism to educational situations seems to center around the problem of not knowing who the audience is. He says, "We know, for example, that the audience for a critical review is the potential listener or viewer and, perhaps, the performer of artist, but who is the audience for an educational critique"? For the life of me I cannot understand why he is having such difficulty. I say throughout the chapter on educational criticism, and specifically on page 187, that "the major point I am attempting to make here is that the problem of communicating to some public--parents, school board members, students, state agencies--about what has happened in schools, the problem of making known what is strong and what is weak, what needs support and what does not, can be usefully conceived of as an artistic problem."

I take it that parents, school board members, students, and state agencies are relevant audiences. Indeed, in other sections of the book I explicitly point out that the way educational criticism is to be written should depend on who the audience is. How much clearer must that be said? Indeed, the audience for an educational criticism is likely to be far more predictable than the audience that reads a criticism of a movie or an art exhibition.

As for the interest of parents in what goes on in school is concerned, I am not ready to write them off. Unlike Levin, I think parents are, or would be, interested in knowing in much greater depth than they do now about the kinds of classrooms and schools to which their children go each day. Unless they and the wider community become interested, the likelihood of significant educational change, in my opinion, is small.

Levin goes on in his review to conclude that an artistic paradigm is "basically the wrong one." The Wrong One? Is there a right one? Apparently Levin thinks so and proceeds to offer another paradigm, one based on constitutional law. Bravo! I am all for paradigm proliferation. Yes, program development in classroom practice can be viewed from multiple perspectives. Law does have something to provide, although with the ability--dare I say the connoisseurship--to see what is happening in classrooms, laws and even constitutions will be of little use for identifying violations. One of the basic themes of the EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION is precisely the need to develop new models for inquiry and portrayal. Educational criticism in no way exhausts the possibilities--not even for me!

In his last note of concern Levin contrasts the political nature of schooling with what he apparently believes to be the apolitical character of educational criticism. This, too, surprises me. I say emphatically on page 209 that "The point of educational criticism is to improve the educational process. This cannot be done unless one has the conception of what counts in that process. Are the children being helped or hindered by the form of teaching they are experiencing? Are they acquiring habits of mind conducive to further development or are these habits likely to hamper further development? What is the relative value of direct learning to ancillary learning within the classroom? Questions such as these require the use of educational criteria." If that is not a recognition of the normative character of evaluation, I don't know what is. Furthermore, the whole of Chapter 4, titled "Five Basic Orientations to the Curriculum," is devoted to articulating five important value positions concerning educational means and ends.

Levin's use of the constitution as a metaphor for evaluation reflects his interest in the political dimensions of schooling. I suspect he thinks he knows what kind of education is best. I believe that educational virtue exists in many forms and in my books, CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF CURRICULUM and THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION I describe what some of these forms are. Not everyone must be a Cubist or an Impressionist: There are many styles in which an artist can work--even in a classroom. There is, in my view, room enough for different kinds of schools and different kinds of teaching.

Finally, Levin is concerned about elitism--the elitism that he believes comes from the authority of being a connoisseur. I have said in the book that all of us have levels of educational connoisseurship, what we want is more. At the same time I do not believe that all views of classroom life are created equal. Democracy does not require parity in opinion. There is a downright need for higher levels of educational connoisseurship than what we generally have at present. Books--even book reviews when they are effective--contribute to the raising of such levels. Both Stone and Levin have applied their own connoisseurship to my work. They have done this through analogy, by describing their own classroom experience, by applying theoretical notions for purposes of interpretation and by appraising what they take to be the strengths and weakness of THE EDUCATIONAL IMAGINATION. Their reviews have stimulated the dialogue found on the pages of this Journal. From their efforts some of my own sights have been raised. But the criticisms in these two issues of CURRICULUM THEORIZING, although not educational criticism in my terms, share enough of a family resemblance to provide a demonstration of what I am talking about: The power of criticism in general to raise levels of consciousness and thus to provide a basis for the improvement of theory and practice in education.