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

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Editor's Note

This summer-in-winter issue opens with Jacques Daignault's brilliant if difficult delineation of the tyranny of the technological, including the collapse of the political and our entrapment in what is. It is also a depiction of the disappearance of experience (into "activity" and "behavior"), a development John Dewey might have foreseen. In the first of a two-part series, Leigh Chiarelott economically describes Dewey's theory of experience for us who are often too rushed by the day's schedule to "have" experience.

Not so the main problem in Alaska, as William Parrett explains in the article following. The problems of curriculum development and coordination preoccupied the American field until ten or so years ago. Parrett's piece is not only interesting in itself, but as well it evokes a time past in the "Lower 48."

Gene Grabiner convincingly argues that the Bakke decision represents a step backward in time, not back to the American Revolution and the Constitution which accompanied it, but rather to darker days not so long gone when racial prejudice and discrimination were practiced openly, without disguise.

David Smith gives us a phenomenological version of "the practical" in his interesting essay, an order of work that is now published in a new journal entitled **Phenomenology and Pedagogy**. Max van Manen, a member of the JCT Board of Editors, is editor of this Alberta-published periodical.

Next comes an essay that is as correct as it is hard-hitting, Mike Littleford's address to her Alabama colleagues. I cannot imagine a clearer statement of the issues of censorship and academic freedom.

Following is Ron Padgham's fascinating discussion of holograms, brain hemispheres and reconceptualist curriculum theory.

Two book reviews conclude this over-sized issue. First is Dennis Carlson's lucid account of Harris' **Teachers and Classes**; second is Deutelbaum and Morris' insightful review of **The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a Literary Genre**.

W. P.

CURRICULUM AND ACTION-RESEARCH: AN ARTISTIC ACTIVITY IN A PERVERSE WAY

Jacques Daignault
University of Quebec in Rimouski

Introduction

The passing from theory to practice is indeed a delicate question which still provokes a stimulating -- to say the least -- exchange of opinions on this everlasting problem in education. For difficulties arise on numerous fronts. First, theory and practice give birth to numerous significations which necessarily create a complexity of "rapports." Then, all the possible connections between these two concepts do not unavoidably belong to the same "geographies" of thought. And if we grant credibility to the works of Foucault in the human and biological sciences or to those of Bachelard in physics and finally to those of Lyotard in the praxis of art and politics, then the general "space" of knowlege, the configurations and the way of being of the objects which hither appear, radically transform themselves according to the era or the "geography" of thought to which they belong. A passage-way between theory and practice found in a particular area of pedagogical knowledge (and mapped according to the "geography" of thought which is therefore authorized) will permit but a limited transfer of certain ideas determined by this "geography."

Within the limits of this paper we will keep only two types of "rapports" between theory and practice, types which by and large dominate present debates and which permit us to a) distinguish two different regions of peda-

gogical knowledge; b) determine the two corresponding "geographies" of thought.

Our first concern will be the "rapport" between theory as an activity describing and explaining objectively a certain portion of reality, and the diverse possible applications (previously authorized by this knowledge) which enable this reality to be transformed. Classical "rapport" of a knowledge is attained in terms of a process of fundamental research and subsequently through applied research. However, this Cartesian format will appear after a series of elaborate developments.

The second "rapport" to be equally considered is more complex. It will, in fact, imply two conceptions of theory and the problematic practice which are thus put at stake. This other "rapport" will essentially aim at the practice itself of the setting up of a relation of two opposite conceptions of theory: objective and normative aims or designs.

We would like to show that:

1) These two "rapports" belong to different areas of knowledge: namely, the technological and political "spaces" of education;

2) The passage from theory to practice does not authorize the same prescriptions, in each of these two spaces;

3) The technological space refers to a *Platonistic* "geography" and the political space, on the contrary, implies a *Nietzschean* "geography".

Because the technological space is by far the dominant space, it is useful to retrace briefly its origins. For, with it will appear successively the concepts of society as a school, school as a society, and the individual as school or society. These three parameters of the institutional universe in education will be right in the center of the debate between the respective geographies of *Plato* and *Nietzsche*. These three centers of the dominant pedagogical thinking are precisely what we would like to help shatter in order to better serve a fourth dimension which constitutes the institutional political space. This fourth dimension, which we call the "Pedagogical City" will allow us to circumscribe the perimeter of the possible effects of action-research.

Finally we will show:

1) Of what this type of research consists;
2) How its definition puts in action the corresponding political space and Nietzschean geography;
3) And how this geography invites us necessarily to consider action research as an artistic and perverse activity.

The Technological Space

The technological space of education presupposes a long series of developments which goes from Antiquity to the twentieth century. We will consider its various stages. (What follows has no pretentions to substitute itself for a thorough historical research, but is merely a possible narration of its development.)

This survey is of capital importance for it is only at the end of a long process that the two types of "rapport" between theory and practice which we want to discriminate finally appear, at last, as really two different areas of pedagogical knowledge.

Education, no matter how it is perceived, has never been, at least until recently, indifferent toward the great dreams of humankind. For Plato, education is seen as a process leading, ultimately at least, to the realization of certain ideals. The end of education is conceived as the passage of one condition (or state) to another, permitting the improvement of humankind. This same ambition applies to conceptions of education prevalent in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the century of Enlightenment, and even today, to conceptions held by some teachers. However, pedagogy (understood as a discourse on education) and also the curriculum have undergone important transformations through history. To demonstrate this, we will start with the different concepts of evil which have prevailed, because, among great pedagogical ideals, the quest for the *good* has indeed been a dominating trait. And the pursuit of this ideal is hardly explicable out of the perspective of the occurrence itself, but out of its contrary: Evil! Through a certain number of historical periods, we will pursue the analysis of this question of *evil* until we find two compulsory parameters of all curricular thinking: the type of thinking needed, and the

kind of educational institution it requires. We will in succession come upon three kinds of knowledge: knowledge, the "know-how-to-be" and the "know-how", and the three corresponding educational institutions: society, school, the individual. To each of these three moments of a dual evolution correspond three great conceptions of Evil. (4)

Evil as Ignorance, Knowledge, the Educational City

So, three great conceptions of Evil have come across history from Antiquity to the century of Enlightenment. The first is connected to the rationalist tradition as already conceptualized by certain Greeks. To understand this fully we must place ourselves in the context of the Platonistic ontology in which the "world of ideas" has the status of real existence. Among these *is* the "Good." Ontologically, *Good is* because it is part of the *Esse*; Evil, on the contrary, *is not* because it is part of the *non-ens*. From the point of view of empiric reality, however, Evil may occur and because one observes that it occurs frequently, the "Good" *must* occur. The opposition between Good and Evil would then not oppose *what is* to *what should be* but *what could be* to *what should be*. But this is true only within the limits of the world seen by our senses: the empiric reality. In the real world, the world of ideas, the *what should be* of empiric reality, constitutes in fact the only thing *that is*. So the gap between *what is* and *what should be* signifies the passage from the sensible world to the world of ideas. This passage implies only knowledge, properly speaking. For, in this thesis, the obstacle to the passage from one world to another (what often takes the shape of evil) is nothing else finally but ignorance. Socrates repeatedly says that no one can be bad voluntarily. That is because the idea itself of Subject and the possibility of a personal will does not exist.(5) Hence, if Evil occurs in humankind it is due to ignorance, and the simple fact of knowing objectively the Good assures a *knowing how to be* and a corresponding *know how*; these latter are not to be built up; they proceed directly from knowledge. This is of the utmost importance for the constitution of the technological space, for in the famous antinomy of *de facto*

and the *de jure*, this space definitely sides with the fact. One may well object that the Platonistic Universe sides with the right since it essentially poses Good as a "should be." But this would put aside that, for Plato, the real facts are Ideas and not Matter; the "should be" as seen in the Empiric Universe is a fact of the world of ideas. The passage between *what is* and *what should be* goes from the world of matter to the world of ideas. Thus the management of the Political Universe is in the hands of experts who possess knowledge, for once again, knowledge (giving access to the Idea) ensures the *know-how-to-be* and the *know-how* (in the empiric world).

Compagnon writes:

> Be the paradigm which sets, exemplarily, the Platonistic conception of political domination: the famous parable of the *Republic* which likens the state to a vessel, and politics to the pilot. [This fable] attributes to the latter the knowledge and the competence which allow the solution to any conflictual situation as a technical problem, by rational means rather than by force or persuasion.(6)

One of the main traits of the technological space and of the Platonistic geography of thought consists in setting as a strict problem of competence (here of knowledge and later of *know-how-to-be* and of *know-how*) the passage from theory to practice. "Being" always assumes that somewhere exists a passage altogether possible and desirable.

As for the "par excellence" educational institution which will permit this pedagogy of knowledge, let it be said that it should be resolutely macroscopic and allow all people to benefit from its advantages. Only society as a school responds to this dual aspiration of a permanent education and achieving its purpose through the different tasks which the individual is called upon to fulfill. G. Pineau (7) has already shown that the allegory of the cavern constitutes an excellent foundation to permanent education and to the concept of the Educational City which is closely linked to the former. Indeed, the schools (at least the gymnasiums) and the individuals exist but, during this epoch, have not as yet achieved the status of this concept in pedagogical know-

ledge; they exist only as empiric realities.

So here is the first configuration of the technological space, and the first map authorized by the Platonistic "geography."

Radical Evil, the "Know-How-To-Be" and the School

Since the Middle Ages and particularly since the rise of patristic power, the Judeo-Christian tradition has imposed a new conception of Evil. The latter is all at once contingent and fatal; contingent because it could have not occurred and fatal because the meaning of original sin is essentially to condemn all human beings to deliver themselves from evil, from now on radical for each individual. Evil is not, here or elsewhere, the essence; it participates as in the Greek theory in a perspective of *can be*, but no longer in *what could be*, but in what *could have been*. Evil having occurred will impose itself until the end of the empiric world, in the order of *what exists*. The idea of good thus implies a new urgency and with it a new conception of the educational process which leads us to it. Durkheim (8) has identified remarkably well this metamorphosis of educational thought.

> To be a Christian, it is not sufficient to have learned this or that, to be able to discern certain rites or pronounce certain formulas; to know certain traditional beliefs. Christianity consists essentially in a certain attitude of the soul and a certain *habitus* of our moral being. (9)

Evil, having become radical, requires that one convert oneself to good in order to avoid eternal punishment, but this conversion no longer passes through knowledge and the ways of science, but through the *know-how-to-be* and the roads of belief. The passage between *what exists* and *what should be* is no longer in the passage from the sensible world to the world of ideas, but in the deliverance from Evil by adopting exemplary moral behavior. For, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, the supra-sensible world is double: on the one hand is eternal Evil, on the other, eternal beatitude. This new conception of the world and of Evil no longer justifies knowledge as the guarantor of the passage from *what exists* to *what should be*. It is no longer appropriate to think of this

passage in terms that deliver us from the sensible world (the cavern) to have access to the Idea (light), but rather to think of this passage as what delivers us from evil as an eternal perspective for the benefit of eternal beatitude. No longer can one pass simply from one world to another by the mediation of knowledge, which is the sole guarantee of a change of state in the way of being. Now to pass from state of being to another, namely from a state of sin to a state of grace (through the mediation of a know-how-to-be which is the sole guarantee, by the conversion it implies), involves absolute knowledge of God in another world. Knowledge of God and of the universal laws which He implies are the sole necessary laws does not fall in the realm of science but in that of religion and morality, of belief. Divine laws now take the place of natural laws. But as the famous oppositions between *de facto* and *de jure* are based precisely on the distinction between the universal and necessary laws and the institutional laws rather relative and contingent (at least this is the state in which is found the debate between Plato and the Sophists), this new normative aim, subordinating all to the idea of God, is always regarded as a technological prejudice. For the one real problem was the passage from the City of Evil to the City of God. The ideas of grace and conversion being considered as facts, it was necessary to subdue everything to the *necessary universals* they implied. Conversion, let us not forget, guaranteed the passage from one state to another. And it is the idea of guarantee itself which constitutes the heart of the technological space: the results are foreseeable and the means of achievement are given.

If from a pedagogy of knowedge we pass to a pedagogy of *know-how-to-be,* there emerges a new educational institution – school. It was in fact necessary to create a place of distantiation in relation to the City of Men in order to facilitate the process of conversion. In *L'evolution pedagogique en France*, Durkheim (10) retraces the birth of the school as a real society in society. It appears really with the concentration of all teachings and even of the life of the student as organized by Christianity in the Middle Ages. Its emergence is this intimately linked to the pedagogy of *know-how-*

to-be.

> This notion of school [which, let us say it casually, is always ours] as an organized moral environment, has become so familiar to us that we are apt to believe that it has always existed. On the contrary, we see that its origins are rather recent.(11)

The school is no longer only an empiric place, but it is "a moral being, a moral environment, imbued with certain ideas, certain feelings, an environment that surrounds the teacher as well as the pupils."(12)

So the second configuration of the technological space was always implied by the Platonistic "geography" of thought.

Evil as an Obstacle, the Know-How and the Individual

From the Renaissance onwards, the emergence of the Subject will revolutionize all knowledge. Reason will supersede the laws of nature and those of God in determining the new imperatives of knowledge. This will influence later the conception of Evil that prevails in the Century of Enlightenment. Evil as an obstacle will replace Evil as ignorance and radical Evil. For, with the appearance of the Subject there is the possibility of an autonomous will which aggrandizes itself from the limits up to now imposed by a solely "objectivistic" perspective. The choice is now to face and combat Evil. In the general order of knowledge, the "technocentrism" succeeds to the "cosmocentrism" of the Greeks and the medieval "theocentrism." The natural sciences now impose a logic of inspection precisely in order to insure the success of the practical interventions of a technology. Reboul writes:

> The philosopher of Enlightenment is the one who frees himself of all that goes beyond his reason, and who tries to alienate his will, in this world as well as in the other. ... Evil is no longer an absolute reality, nor is it a *non-ens* but it is a stage which man has to step across.(13)

The projects of a new "natural right" or of a new "social

contract" are the results of a new hope: the capacity of the subject, of his will and his reason. This task is highly political, but far from appraising the political in itself, the century of Enlightenment will try, by all means, to subordinate it to the order of facts. Nothing is more opposed to political thinking than the idea itself of a political science. Guerin has insisted on this gap between thought and knowledge. (14) This century is thus in every way completely covered by the technological space. So it is in pedagogy. The essence of the human is to be educable, that is, indefinitely perfectible; "what is even newer," writes Reboul, "is that now we believe in an education for the educator, in a pedagogy which will permit the transformation of spirits and habits." (15) And this pedagogy has chosen the *know-how* to transform the perverted man, through his own efforts. For the first time in education the *how-to-do* is developed as such. Neither knowledge nor the *know-how-to-be* can now alone insure the passage from theory to practice. The gap between *what exists* and *what should be* no longer consists in the passage from a sensible world to an ideal world, nor in the passage from the perspective of eternal Evil to eternal beatitude in another world, but rather from one state of fact to another state of fact within the limits themselves of the possible, inscribed in our world. Good and Evil both belong to what *could* or *should* be. The gap between *what is* and *what should be* (within the limits of *what could be*) thus implies the research of the means toward the realization of possibles: a real know-how. They suppose that the suppression of the gap between *what is* (Evil) and *what should be* (Good) is henceforth possible within the limits of our own world. But the passage from one to the other implies that then it has to be built up by a real technology of pedagogical knowledge. In fact, it is only with the possibility of a technology, and thus of a know-how, that the expression of "pedagogy for teachers" really makes sense. This pedagogy requires a knowledge at least of anthropology, psychology. sociology (nascent sciences at that time), but the authentic pedagogy now consists in finding applications of these sciences in the activity itself of education, in order to attain the desired aims.

This third definition of pedagogy no longer calls for school and society, rather for the individual. The thesis of Rousseau contests school and society; it is essentially grounded in the two possibilities of the individual in the state of nature, the primitive state. This is because Rousseau presupposes a specific human nature that school and society had perverted; only the individual possesses the virtues necessary for his perfectibility. The pedagogy of the know-how presupposes an individual force which is education's role to develop and guide.

Such is the third moment of this configuration of the pedagogical knowledge developed in the technological space and authorized, as always, by the Platonistic geography of thought.

The Stakes of the Prescription

With the momentum of the educational sciences in the twentieth century, the boundaries imposed upon pedagogy by the technological space will soon be questioned. At the turn of the century the famous quarrel between normative and objective pedagogy brings about a fresh determination of the pedagogues to pursue their work in the technological space. The prospect of developing a real science of education prompted a good number of thinkers to put aside the normative aspect of their work.(16) It will then be proposed to determine the objective finalities by the objective examination of *what exists.* It has been found that the universe of the possible is contaminated by projects too idealistic which never meet the objective conditions of their realizations and thus slow down the advancement of knowledge.

It will then be recommended to abandon the normative aspects in order to insure a better passage from theory to practice. The different sciences of education (sociology, biology, psychology, etc.) are thus called upon to supply the pedagogue with an objective knowledge of man in his biological, social, psychological possibilities. Constitution, in fact, of a fundamental knowledge in Sciences of Education is decreed. Other categories of research workers (didacticians, curriculists, psychopedagogues, technologists, etc.) are then

invited to bring out the possible applications of these knowledges. Among these is found a variety of operational objectives defined as possibilities of modifications of behaviors and of transmission of knowledges. The practitioner of teaching and school administration has but to choose among these possibilities, the desired results, and thus follow through in the technological process which will insure success. In short, this is a success depending only on the practitioner's technical competence and know-how. The resorting to precriptions occurs twice in this process: the means to be taken to realize our objectives are prescribed. as well as the objectives themselves.

The first type of prescription would have procured for us great progress if the universe of possibles which surrounded it had not been so restrained. But the realizations it authorized were so meager that the project of a strictly objective pedagogy has really never ceased to be contested by different pedagogical currents. The emergence of a movement such as the "reconceptualization" in curriculum -- for example -- which regroups tendencies as ideologically apart as Existentialism and Marxism, is not an accident. The traditional curricular practice could at best permit the realization of very limited operational objectives; people eager for justice could well be frustrated. In a previous paper we have shown how tragic and incoherent it was to think education out of all the questions of values. (17)

But this return of the "normative" does not necessarily imply a desertion of the technological space. On the contrary, all pedagogical projects promote individual, social or other values, even if they do not explicitly provide the prescriptions of what has to be done to make the world according to their aims; however, they presuppose a secret and deep desire to see, one day, the limits of the possible and the "known" to be shattered. This return of the normative leads us to the heart of the second type of prescriptions: among all the possible objectives, which one should we pursue? Here, the expression "possible objectives" has to be somewhat clarified. Let us look for the passage between *what exists* and *what could be*. Are they retained as possible objectives, capable of imposing themselves as *having*

to be, only the ones which are included in the *can be?*

As we have just recalled, objectives of this kind are extremely restrictive in curriculum, so that, out of certain number of activities (i.e. program of studies), without much change in the individual, the school, and society, they merely interest the practitioners in the service of a scholar necropolis. The reason why is very simple; in the Sciences of Education there does not exist a real scientific paradigm. In other words, inside the strictly fundamental research activities, there exist many avenues, the presuppositions of which are more often than not implicit, which go in varied and diverse directions. The question of the prescription of objectives therefore, calls for a decision on political orientation. This political question which we see appearing all through the development of the technological space has very been seldom thought of in its own specificity. This means that political decisions have been treated as any other question of fact. It has always been presupposed that the prescriptions implied were of the same type as the prescriptions of means. The Platonistic geography in constantly folding down the technological space upon the political space treats the prescriptions of the *ends* as a simple prescription of *means;* there is a difference here of nature, however, and not only of degrees. Once again, we contest neither the existence nor the legitimacy of a technological space in education. We merely want to call attention to its limits and to its dangers. We readily admit that there exists a region of pedagogical knowledge where fundamental as well as applied research functions about the same way as in any other sphere where this kind of "rapport" between theory and practice dominates. To draw psychopedagogical applications from Piaget's psychogenetic theory is indeed a good example. But Piaget's theory, in the order itself of psychogenetic knowledge, offers but one trend among others (for example, Chomsky or Skinner): the choice of an orientation has to be made. And it is on the essence of this question that appears the specificity of the political space and with it the possibility of a new kind of research: action-research.

The Political Space

We have already maintained that, in the debate that opposes the world of "de facto" and the world of "de jure", the technological space sides definitely with the former.

> Plato considers that the principles and the norms which propose lines of action have the same epistemological status as the facts and statements on facts, that is, they maintain the same relation to truth and their rationality has to be identical. (18)

Against Plato, Protagoras held that "the universal which is required by persuasion is 'de jure' and not 'de facto.'" (19) The political space, at least in its origins, would have sided with "de jure" rather than with "de facto."

But Kant is the one who provides us with what is probably the best foundation for the political space: the abyss he discovers between the fields of pure reason and practical reason is of tremendous importance in understanding the difference of nature between the prescriptions of *means* and that of *ends,* for in the Kantian critique no prescription may be derived from a description. (20) The idea of Good, for instance, is absolutely inaccessible to all conceptual construction of comprehension. Further, Kant has the merit of having well established the two types of rapport, to which we have referred, between theory and practice. He has shown that what we have called the technological rapport between *what exists* and *what could be* belongs entirely to the theoretical field, while the gap, which we will call political, between *what exists* and what *should be* constitutes a real problematic gap that only a command of reflexive judgment would be apt, maybe, to fill. This distinction is so important that the extensive but brilliant passage which follows will surely please you.

> All technically practical rules (i.e. the rules of art and skill generally, or of sagacity regarded as skill in exercising an influence over men and their wills), so far as their principles rest on concepts, must be reckoned only as corollaries to theoretical philosophy. [...] The solution of the problems of pure geometry does not belong to a particular part of the science; measurement does not deserve the name of practical, in contrast to pure, geometry, as a second part of geometry in

> general; and just as little ought the mechanical or chemical art of experiment or observation to be reckoned as a practical part of the doctrine of nature. Just as little, in fine, ought housekeeping, farming, statesmanship, the art of conversation, the prescribing of diet, the universal doctrine of happiness itself, or the curbing of the inclinations and checking of the affections for the sake of happiness to be reckoned as practical philosophy or taken to constitute the second part of philosophy in general. For all these contain only rules of skill (and are consequently only technically practical) for bringing about an effect that is possible according to the natural concepts of causes and effects, which, since they belong to theoretical philosophy, are subject to those precepts as mere corollaries from it (i.e. natural science) and can therefore claim no place in a special philosophy called practical. (21)

No one could have better expressed the kind of rapport between theory and practice inherent to technological space. Kant continues:

> On the other hand, the morally practical precepts, which are altogether based on the concept of freedom, to the complete exclusion of the natural determining ground of the will, constitute a quite special class. These, like the rules which nature obeys, are called simply laws, but they do not, like them, rest on sensuous conditions but on a supersensible principle; and accordingly they require for themselves a quite different part of philosophy, called practical, corresponding to its theoretical part. [...] practical rules of this kind are not called laws (like physical laws), but only precepts, because the will does not stand merely under the natural concept, but also under the concept of freedom, in relation to which its principles are called laws. These with their consequences alone constitute the second or practical part of philosophy. (22)

Now appears a second kind of prescription which is no longer conceived simply as a corollary of theoretical philosophy or science but which directly states the question of duty and brings with it the setting up of a new field: practical

philosophy.

The question of rapport, between theory and practice, inherent to the political space, thought of in the practice itself of a double theoretical rapport, as we had said, opens up with Kant on a problematic distance between the fields of theory (pure reason) and of practice (practical reason). And the famous answer of Kant, as we have said, is that there exists between the two fields an abyss which in no way authorizes a direct passage from one to the other. Kant finally will propose a solution; however it always, ultimately, belongs to the technological space. In fact, in presupposing the final harmony of all the faculties in the exercise itself of teleological judgment, Kant folds down upon the political space (which we had however admirably freed) the most fearful mechanism of the technological space: the determination of significations.

This mechanism, by itself, caused more harm to the pedagogy born of the political space than all the other evils together.

Sense and Signification

This question of folding down upon is of prime importance in pedagogy; for the mechansims that it puts at stake show very well how we often conceal the specificity of the political space. Kant has however put us on the trail, but it is not until the perspectivism of Nietzsche that we will finally perceive a pedagogy which will no longer conceal the real difficulties of the political issue. The abyss between theory and practice discovered by Kant is an incorporal surface on which we have developed, in a previous paper(23); a paradoxical conception of the rapport between theory and practice as it is perceived in what we here call the political space of the pedagogical knowledge. Our sole geographic referent of thought was then a kind of structuralism. We will now show that this structuralism belongs to the Nietzschean geography of thought.

I here recall the main conclusions of a paradoxical conception of the rapport between theory and practice:

1. *What exists* is a "signatum" (signified) series;

2. *What should be* is a "signans" (significant) series;
3. In order for these two series to meet, without repealing each other, they have to be covered by a problematic instance which keeps both at a distance;
4. Rousseau's pedagogical utopia well shows this double reality of a same-instance being, at the same time a place without an occupant in the "signans" series and an occupant without a place in the "signatum" series;
5. All filling-up of the empty space (place without an occupant) by a "subject" of the "signatum" series is a blocking-up of the structure which the term "terrorism" adequate expresses;
6. The vertiginous flight of the place without an occupant left without an accompanying "subject" causes a lacuna and a second blocking-up of the structure: nihilism;
7. Carried along by the dynamics of the circulations of the paradoxical instance, curriculum becomes an art in the sense of a prolonged hesitation between the sense and the senses according to the sense of the definition of poetry by Valery, as being "a prolonged hesitation between sound and sense."

This conception of the paradox calls upon the notion of sense and authorizes primarily the comprehension of the paradox of sense: which is, at the same time, contrary to good sense and common sense. But this conclusion of a prolonged hesitation between sense and sense calls for another conception of the paradox: the paradox of signification, which can be defined essentially as confusion of the logical levels. It includes two figures of non-sense: "The whole which is perceived as the element, the element which divides the whole which is subjacent, the whole of all the wholes and the barber of the regiment!" (24) Thus, paradoxes of sense and paradoxes of signification both are linked to the non-sense. But non-sense does not only assume two figures it also implies two definitions which in turn authorize each two figures. The non-sense defined as an absence of sense that the two figures of the paradox of signification represent, and the non-sense defined as an excess of sense represented by the two drifts, against the good

sense and common sense, are inscribed in the heart of the paradox of sense.(25) These two definitions of non-sense put at stake two diametrically opposed functions that the paradoxes are called upon to serve or fill up. First, a function of determination of signification is based upon the definition of nonsense as absence of sense and is made possible through the laws which authorize it. The paradoxes of signification admirably serve this function in that they allow us to see the formation of the laws required by its usage: the third excluded and the principle of non-contradiction (26); second, there is a function of proliferation of sense implying the definition of nonsense as an excess of sense. The paradoxes of sense constitute the main mechanism of this second function. Let us point out, briefly, that nonsense as excess of sense confuses sense and nonsense. For sense, according to Deleuze, is the fourth dimension of the proposition. Insistence on words and extra-being on things, it is that which is incorporal at the surface of words and the things going on in the in-between of consciousness. It is produced by the anarchical circulation of pre-individual and impersonal singularities, that is, non-individuated objectively and subjectively by common sense and not foreseen by good sense.(27) The nonsense of excess is the only one that suits the sense properly called. For the sense of lack cannot lead to the development of sense per se. The nonsense of lack, through the paradoxes of signification, makes clear, indeed, the laws that reveal as possible the determinations of significations. The nonsense as absence of sense has as a stake not the sense but the signification. Then only the nonsense as excess really sends us back to sense. To facilitate the comprehension of the continuation of this expose, we will use mainly the expressions of sense and signification rather than those of nonsense of excess or lack. It is to be understood that sense necessarily calls for nonsense as excess and that signification tends to fill up the lack of sense.

Signification and Technological Space

If there be any illegitimate use of signification it is by

far the folding down of signification upon sense. Not that determinations of significations are illegitimate per se; however, legitimate determinations are rare. It is not contested that science is preoccupied by good sense and common sense: the two consequences sought by the determinations of significations. Common sense permits identification; good sense foresight. The conception of pedagogical knowledge implied by the development of technological space reveals in fact this double preoccupation. And to determine at one and the same time operational objectives and the means to achieve same presupposes that what is aimed at can, at the same time, possess an identity (the objective aimed at must remain identical to itself all through the process which leads to its achievement) and to avail itself of good sense (the objective aimed at must be foreseeable). Deleuze says:

> The systematic characters of good sense are thus: the affirmation of a sole direction; the determination of this direction as going from the most differentiated to the least differentiated, from singular to regular, from remarkable to ordinary. (29)

Further:

> Common sense identifies, recognizes, no less than good sense foresees. Subjectively, common sense subsumes faculties derived from the soul, or from differentiated organs of the body, and reports them to a unit capable of saying I [...] Objectively, common sense subsumes the given diversity and reports it to the unity of a particular form of object or an individualized form of the world [...]. (29)

The three institutions encountered in the origin of the technological space constitute totalities of that kind; this is why it was important to show the emergence of their conceptual reality and not only to indicate their empiric reality. The different contemporary currents in pedagogy, which are said to be centered on the individual, the school, and society, precisely operate determinations of significations authorized by the "totalizing" nature of the institutions concerned. And this is because it is always understood that school, society, and individual constitute "totalities" where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This is exactly

where resides the conceptual nature of these three institutions. They would then have implicated, from the moment of the constitution of a technological space in education, the role attributed to common sense in language. The corresponding "knowledges" (knowledge, know-to-be, and know-how) would have otherwise implicated good sense. These latter were insuring the passage from theory to practice, and this passage had an absolute need of good sense.

But the main question is still to know if it is legitimate to practice such determinations of significations in all regions of pedagogical knowledge. In other words, are we authorized to fold down signification upon sense and to fold down technological space upon political space? The first folding-down means that nonsense is always diagnosed as an absence of sense which has to be filled, and, the second, that the prescription is always derived according to the logic of the means. Let us recall that only the theory/practice rapport, specific to the technological space, authorizes us to follow up, step by step, the contents of the prescriptions directly linked to the quest of means.

Sense and Political Space

If the abyss between the fields of theory and practice, discovered by Kant, constitutes, by virtue of the question of "de jure," a foundation of political space, "pluralism" constitutes in virtue of the question of "de facto" another foundation. In fact, there exists no consensus, neither on the orientation to be followed by educators nor on the paradigms the research-workers in the Sciences of Education should adopt. And it is precisely on account of this political "de facto" difficulty that we are authorized to set up a hypothesis of "de jure." Since divergences are numerous in the field of pedagogical knowledge, as much from the viewpoint of the normative approach as from that of the objective approach, could it be that there exists a pedagogical specificity to be drawn from the characteristics of political space? Nietzsche's perspectivism bluntly asserts it. The famous approach of Nietzsche which pretends that illness is a perspective superior to good health opens a seductive

road. This is because perspective must be taken in its geometrical meaning. We all know that the reproduction of any tri-dimensional object, on a bi-dimensional plane, implies a "projection technique." The latter works out with the help of "vanishing points." As everyone knows, any variation of the vanishing point literally changes the perspective. It is in reference to this mechanism that Nietzsche's statement takes all its sense: illness is a continual variation which opens the way to an incalculable number of experiences, while the ideal one has of health is a determined perspective which, of course, we think of as the best. To paraphrase Nietzsche, in relation with our subject would give approximately this: paradox is a superior perspective of sense, hence appears "nomadism" of vanishing points as a high-capacity pedagogy. The Nietzschean "geography" of thought causes the intervention of the proliferation function of sense within political space itself; because the gap between *what exists* and *what should exist* signifies precisely that there is too much sense.

This proliferation of sense really brings about the reversal of Platonism. Marxism and Existentialism have, each in its own way, proclaimed it had accomplished this reversal, but rather than overturning Plato each has contributed to the enrichment of the Platonistic geography of thought and to the reinforcement of the technological space in education. We reserve for a later date the detailed analysis of this question, but it is appropriate in this paper to evoke it for the real meaning of Plato's reversal clearly shows what was particularly in this task.(30) The proliferation of sense consists, in fact, in perverting the totalizations rather than subverting one in the name of the other. This is because subversion always belongs to the function of determinations of signification. But perversion (and it is its real meaning) does not at all concede to the "whole" the quality of being greater than the sum of its parts; instead, it sets down that the "whole" is but an infinite sum of its parts. So to practice the proliferation of sense in the technological space would prohibit all science and would *in extremis* remove the possibility of language itself. For to think the "whole" as an infinite sum of parts would be equivalent to a confusion of logical levels.

The "nomadisation" of vanishing points cannot belong to science; rather, it belongs to art but in the sense of perversion of the "totalities."

The proliferation of sense would then constitute a fourth dimension of pedagogical knowledge and we will call "Pedagogical City" the fourth dimension on the institutional space implied, by the nature itself of the political space and of its specific function of proliferation of sense. The pedagogical city is, in fact, but a metaphor which expresses the idea of an "institutional whole" as an infinite sum of parts. It is, for example, the spot of the games of languages implied by a paradoxical conception of the rapport of theory/practice, as found in political space.

Action-Research: New Foundations

The emergence of action-research as a method of research appropriate for the investigation of political space rests primarily on a question of "de jure." If the process of both fundamental and applied research are restricted to the investigation of the technological space and thus authorize only prescriptions proceeding only from the logic of means and the function of the determinations of significations, the question of the prescriptions of political ends in education must cause the intervention of a new process of research. We submit the hypothesis of the concept of action-research precisely because it refers us historically to both concepts of theory and practice, and, at the same time, to the question of politics "at large," and may well be suited to the investigation of political space. One may object that the Nietzschean "geography" of thought has probably never crossed the mind of the research-workers who have tried to define action-research. But instead of being an old objection, this observation would rather tend to demonstrate that if action-research is still trampling and that no consensus has been achieved to what it signifies, it is because we press the folding-down of the technological space upon it. There exists however, with a good number of authors, a constant observation that action-research must come to terms with a paradox: (31) the practitioner-research-

er is, all at once, object and subject of his research. This paradox constitutes entirely a confusion of the logical levels, as shown, for example, by Barel (32), in connection with complex systems. This contamination of the object by the subject is, besides, to experimental research what contradiction is to logic. In the technological space, contamination of the object and logical contradiction are nonsense as absence of sense. But, insofar, as action-research sets up, on the contrary, the necessity to recognize this contamination as given, it puts a foot out the technological space. But why can we not equally recognize the paradoxical rapport of theory and practice? Then we would go a step further and cross over in the political field. The ambiguity of the nature of action-research would then be easily explained by the expression "to be neither flesh nor good red herring." The timidity of some to squarely cross over to political space and the paradox, and the very strong stubbornness of others to decontaminate the object at a given moment in the process offer but little chance to firmly set on action-research, an hypothesis with a strong discriminating capacity. Let's make the step forward, and see what scenario we will be able to write.

There exists in psychology, and this of recent date, an original approach of paradoxes within the technological space itself. The recourse to the counter-paradox would even be of a remarkable efficiency in a therapeutic enterprise concerned with a paradox of the type of confusion of logical levels. Let's take the well-known case of the insomniac. (33) The person who suffers from insomnia shuts himself up in an obsessional structure which indefinitely prevents the solution of the problem, in such a way that the absence of sleep would be in no way related to an unwillingness to sleep but to an obsessional desire to sleep. The solution, according to Watzlawick (34) would reside in the prescription of the symptom. The thing is to fill up a nonsense deemed absurd, that is to say, without signification. This problem belongs, and rightly so, to the technological space since in the gap between *what is* (absence of sleep) and *what should be*(sleep), the second term belongs, and rightly so, to the mode of *what could be* and is, moreover,

a feasible and desirable objective.

We have elsewhere (35) shown that the "education of values" and so any quest of a better evolution, constituted a paradox analogous to that of the insomniac. There is, however, an essential difference between the two paradoxes, for, not only does the paradox in education belong to the political space, but it is also a constituent part of it. It still is the obsessional will to solve the problem which constitutes it, but, this time, the problem is no longer technological, it does not consist in the blocking-up of *what should* or *what could be*. In education it is, instead, an obsessional *will* (bluntly Platonistic) to reduce a gap which is not recognized as fundamentally problematic, which leads to two great political problems which are terrorism or nihilism: to the two types of "blocking-up" of the functioning of the proliferation of sense. The prescription of the symptom will not, then, have the same effects, but will be as efficient. This efficiency, however, does not belong to the criteria of the technological space (foreseeability, feasibility, repeatability) but to the specificity of the political space: "nomadisation" of the vanishing points and thus, production of effects permitting the circulation of the places and the occupants of the pedagogical city, according to the ever unforeseeable rapports.

The type of authorized prescriptions by action-research would never be derived from the "having to be" but from the interdiction to desire it really: to never prescribe, to never proscribe and never abstain oneself. If this nonsense prompts my reader to want to determine what this means precisely, it means that this reader is ever belonging to the Platonistic geography of thought. I will then be more explicit:

First Stage

Always look for the middle of all things
For it spins fast in the middle;

Second Stage

There is a rumor to the effect that curriculists are spinning people a yarn. It even seems that some of them claim that all things being equal "it spins fast in the middle."

This rumor is unfounded because it is absolutely true.

So we now have but one thing to do against the effects of this rumor: learn over again to tell stories.

* * *

NOTES

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THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE CURRICULUM: AN ANALYSIS OF DEWEY'S THEORY OF EXPERIENCE

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To determine whether John Dewey's theory of experience still has contemporary viability for curriculum theorists, his basic assumptions concerning the nature of experience must be analyzed. It would appear that the theory can serve designers and evaluators of experience-based curricula, but does the theory provide a sufficient understanding of human experience to attend to issues raised by his critics as well as new perspectives revealed by phenomenologically oriented theorists?

Generally, criticisms of Dewey's theory of experience fall within four different categories: 1) his definition of immediate experience; 2) the role of experiential foreground and background; 3) the transaction between subject and object; and 4) his concept of the aesthetic experience. The essential evaluative purpose of the analysis of these criticisms is to determine if Dewey's naturalistic philosophy has any application to theory building. The analysis is not an either-or issue of pragmatism vs. phenomenology, but rather a quest for possible linkages between the two. Hence, the following critique should be seen in light of its attempt at conciliation and not as an effort to increase divisiveness.

Defining Immediate Experience

One of the more confusing elements in Dewey's theory concerns the role of immediate experience. Santayana, for example, criticized Dewey for supposedly saying that nothing but the immediate is real. [Santayana, 1939] He

disputed Dewey's use of the foreground and background in Nature arguing that no such arbitrary arrangement exists. Citing Dewey's statement that "experiences simply are or are had" as an ideal philosophic position, Santayana dismissed Dewey's view of the immediate. He observed that to Dewey immediacy has no temporal boundaries and that Dewey's position incorporates the subject and objective in such a way as to be specious.

Dewey countered this criticism by arguing that Santayana had misrepresented his philosophy of what is real by considering it only in terms of cognitive experiences. Non-cognitive experiences, he contended, make up the majority of "ordinary experiences." A positivist, mentalistic philosophy employed by Santayana ignored most everyday experiences, which Dewey saw as potentially educative. [Dewey, 1939] By using the foreground-background experiential framework as Dewey does, the subject is not separated from the object but is as one with it in the experience.

Robert Mack provides further clarification on the issue of immediate experience by distinguishing among three different kinds of immediate experience that he believes Dewey refers to: 1) the immediate experience *out of which* knowledge arises; 2) the immediate experience *appealed to* in at least two distinct stages in knowing; and 3) the immediate experience *to which* knowledge leads. Mack describes the three in the following way. [Mack, 1945]

Immediate experience out of which knowledge arises is, in Dewey's terms, a problematic situation. It is sometimes referred to as gross, common sense, primary, and macroscopic experience. It is never the start of knowledge but rather views knowledge as always starting. Its immediacy is related to the inquiry at hand; it is the focal point for that inquiry or mediation. As Mack says, "this first kind of non-cognitive immediate experience, then, is the setting within which thought functions to locate specific factors taken as the 'data' or more accurately the 'prehensa' for that particular inquiry." [Mack, 1945]

The second type of immediate experience is that which functions in at least two distinct stages in knowing. It occurs

in the middle of the process of reflective experience. Its first function is to identify the relevant data for reflection. Its second function is to serve as a "test" for validating the "answer" derived from the data selected above. Dewey says, "reflective experience derives its materials from primary experience and refers to it for testing." [Mack, 1945] In short, does the resolution fit the factors framed out in the original setting?

The final type of immediate experience to which knowledge leads is, in Dewey's terms, the consummatory experience. It is the "final and fulfilling" result of reflective experience; the immediate possession and enjoyment of meaning. To show how the three types would function together, Mack presents the story of a shepherd who discovers that familiar noises from his flock have ceased. He then investigates the conditions that produced this effect. Thus there exists 1) the shepherd's problematic situation; 2) an analysis of the problem to be acted upon leading to observation which tests the efficacy of the problem; and 3) the feeling of consummation that occurs when the reason for the quiet was accounted for. [Mack, 1945]

As Mack points out, when Dewey says that we start from immediate experience, that this is the datum of inquiry, he is not using data in the Lockean sense, i.e., taken as sense-impressions or simple ideas furnishing the originals for knowledge. In a passage which is important for illustrating Dewey's concept of experience, Mack says:

> He [Dewey] has said too many times to be mistaken that experience cannot be reduced to materials of direct observation, to simple ideas, impresssions or sense-data. And, on the other hand, he has insisted that a condition of any experience is an "accultured organism" with all its habits and intuitions (sic). The term "accultured organism" designates the "subjective factor" in experience, i.e., that factor which is distinguished from "physical subject-matter" and which is a singular organism, an organism that has been subjected to acculturation, and is aware of itself as a social subject and agent. [Mack, 1945]

Thus thinking becomes a continuous process of the re-organi-

zation or reconstruction within the world of experienced things. This is essentially the function of Dewey's action/reflection principle.

Experiential Foreground and Background: Uniting Subject and Object

Dewey has also been critically assailed for failing to account for the infinitude of experience particularly as applied to the use of foreground and background. The essence of this argument is that Dewey's view of experience is "local," i.e., largely based on a particular transaction between a particular person and a particular object or set of objects, in short, a very narrow view of foreground and background. In an ambitious, well-argued book that attempts to span phenomenology and pragmatism through a naturalistic phenomenology, D. C. Mathur addresses this criticism. He points out:

> No matter at what level and at what historical period experience is considered it is always a product of a "transaction" between a live organism and a changing natural and social environment. The content of experience might change according to changing social and intellectual factors but the *generic pattern and structure* (italics in original) of it show the same pervasive features which Dewey attempted to describe. And yet this social and historical determination of experience could not be used self-referentially to discredit Dewey's own notion of of experience because the generic category of "transaction" applies equally to all socio-historical periods and is a pervasive one ... He, consistently with his descriptive, empirical method, invited all to confirm the trans-actional nature of experience in their own experiences. [Mathur, 1971]

Clearly, Dewey's concept of experience was not "local" but transactionally limited, at least temporally and spatially, only by the quality and direction of prior experiences. More importantly, he sought to link undeniably the individual with the accumulated experiences of others by, to use Dewitt Parker's concept, [Reck, 1961] creating the notion

of transactions between the often unstable "focal self" and the stable background of the "matrix self," thus providing the basis for his view of foreground and background. In addition, Mathur argues that the difficulty with Husserl's view of primary experience, in contrast to Dewey's, was that Husserl was attempting to do the impossible by "bracketing" out everything including the products of socio-historical and intellectual factors from any consideration of pure experiential structures. He notes that such an attempt was bound to fail and this accounted for the subjectivistic turn in Husserl's later philosophy.[Mathur, 1971] Dewey, on the other hand, never allowed his view of experience to be separated from his conception of nature. Quoting Dewey:

> ... experience is *of* as well as *in* nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but nature -- stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways *are* experience; they are what is experienced ... Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent, it stretches. That stretch constitutes inference. [Mathur]

In supporting the principles of continuity and interaction as well as the experiential continuum in Dewey's theory of experience, Mathur notes the generic traits of primary experience in Dewey's descriptive phenomenological procedure. Among these traits are, the conception of experience as an active interplay between a living organism and a changing environment, the ongoing, transactional nature of experience, and the connection between present experience and previously developed habits and attitudes. In so doing, he repudiates the notion of experience as a passive reception of external sensations of the "subjective" something occuring "inside" a mind. The essence of experience is doing and undergoing. Something is done to the environment and in consequence something is suffered or enjoyed. [Mathur, 1971]

For Dewey, then, experience intimately joins the subject and the object. Primary experience has no boundaries or divisions. It is an "unanalyzed totality." [Mathur, 1971] Things and thoughts are products discriminated by reflection

out of primary experience. The reflective process enlarges and enriches the data received through primary experience and makes them meaningful.

The Aesthetic Experience

Besides criticism leveled at Dewey's descriptions of immediate experience, experiential foreground and background, and the transaction of subject and object, his theory of experience has also been questioned on the basis of his concept of aesthetic experience. Briefly, the criticisms center on whether Dewey limited aesthetic or consummatory experiences to an individual's interaction with artistic endeavors only.

As Mathur points out, Dewey's general perspective is that there is continuity between ordinary experiences and other experiences such as scientific, moral, aesthetic and religious. He says:

> For Dewey, every normal experience has an aesthetic phase, and the so-called "aesthetic experience" in the arts is only a conscious and deliberate development of that phase of ordinary experience. [Mathur, 1971]

The aesthetic experience provides us with a heightened sense of living. It is the feeling of intense satisfaction derived from the successful consummation of everyday endeavors. What, then, is an artistic experience? Mathur explains:

> ... there is nothing mysterious about the intuitive and imaginative nature of artistic experience. It is a well-known phenomenon that artistic experience breaks our habitual, routine, and stereotyped ways of "seeing" things. We break the bonds of dead custom, get out of ruts and experience that freshness of perception which in its quality is truly intuitive and imaginative. Whenever there is a fusion of funded meanings from past experience with a present sense-experience, there is imagination and intuition. The imaginative and intuitive processes in artistic creation appear so suddenly as to seem truly "revelatory." It is a rare quality which only a few possess. Imagination is a new way of "seeing," feeling, and experiencing things. [Mathur,

The aesthetic experience, then, is dominated by a pervasive quality related to the basic rhythm of experience. That quality is what makes life meaningful. It is not the dominion of only the trained, professional artist; it is a feeling possible to all who are capable of the Deweyan concept of experience -- primary, immediate, reflective and ultimately aesthetic. It is important to note that the aesthetic experience may also be immediate and often occurs without the benefit of reflection. As such, it may be viewed as analogous to the gestalt of insight.

Criticisms of Dewey's Theory

In general, criticisms of Dewey's theory of experience can be grouped in three different categories: 1) those that are the result of total misinterpretation/misreading of his theory causing the creation of completely erroneous conclusions, e.g., those of Hyman Rickover, Richard Hofstadter; 2) generally well-meaning criticisms usually partially appropriate but flawed and incomplete in other areas, e.g., those of George Santayana, George Kneller, Gordon Allport, R. H. Poole, and 3) those criticisms that center on important gaps in Dewey's theory, particularly in accounting for certain phenomenological factors.

Although the first category has caused innumerable problems in terms of the public's interpretation of Dewey's theory, the criticisms are so vapid as to defy serious response. The second two categories present significant problems, some of which have already been addressed. However, some do bear further study. To illustrate, Kneller, in his book *Existentialism and Education*, contends that Dewey stresses the environment's role in the process of reflective problem-solving resulting in the primary interaction of intelligence with environment. This, he holds, diminishes the importance of the affective dimension of humans -- the emotional response to problems. Due to Dewey's stress on the intellect's interaction with the environment and others' intellects, he adds, knowledge consequently becomes the creation of a social process – it is the product of social negotiations.

[Kneller, 1958] This would seem to deny one's freedom to create knowledge through the self.

Kneller's criticism coupled with phenomenologists' concern for the role of imagination in creating experience does seem to point to gaps in Dewey's theory. One might be able to dismiss Kneller's concern for the affective as philosophical hair-splitting, but the fact remains that Dewey addressed this issue only indirectly. However, Dewey would probably argue that thought and feeling cannot be separated; that the affective dimension is always present in any experience. His concept of aesthetic experience described above would seem to illustrate this.

Yet, an uneasiness remains. Clearly, there are cases of self-generated experiences – perhaps best described as an interplay of imagination and reflection. For example, when anticipating a certain experience, there is a tendency to pre-construct that experience (what psychologists would call creating a mental set). In some cases this is done to reduce anxiety over the upcoming event. Yet, in other cases, just the opposite effect occurs. The pre-construction of the experience actually results in an anxiety attack causing psychosomatic manifestations. Can the reality of that experience be denied? Can it be argued that since the environment didn't directly present us with the data of the experience, that the data didn't exist? Can there be a reflective pre-construction of experience as well as a reconstruction? At what point can the self be the environment? Certainly, these phenonemological concerns must be addressed in order to have a fully functioning theory of experience upon which to study and build curriculum.

Given these concerns, it is clear that while both Dewev's pragmatic vision and the phenomenological perspective of experience are necessary, neither is sufficient in and of itself to provide a theory of experience in curriculum. Curriculum is the experience of the self as it exists in an environment, both perceived and unperceived. That environment can be at one moment hostile and the next indifferent to the individual. It creates and is created by the self. It is, to some extent, the world of G. H. Mead, John Dewey, and William James. More important, it is the self of Edmund Husserl,

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Martin Heidegger. Taken together, pragmatism and phenomenology provide a powerful base for theory building in curriculum -- particularly in the case of a theory of experience. Their differences in perspective are not irresolvable, especially if their complementary and supplementary elements are sought.

But, is such a rapprochement possible, necessary or even desirable? Because a theory of experience must generate principles, assumptions and hypotheses that account for naturalistic and phenomenological occurrences, the answer to all three questions is yes. Analysis of Dewey's theory of experience has revealed two important factors to support this position: 1) his theory lacks a strong affective component to account for the role of imagination in experience, and 2) phenomenological perspectives would seem to provide this element as well as a more fully developed conception of the role of the individual in experience. Phenomenology expands upon concepts over the creation of knowledge.

Besides those factors, a unified theory of experience may be desirable for enhancing critical research. Most of the authors cited in this analysis noted supplementary aspects of phenomenology and pragmatism. D. C. Mathur, for example, analyzed the work of Dewey and others against the background of Husserl's phenomenology and discovered numerous points at which Dewey's pragmatism supplemented phenomenological perspectives. Rodman Webb [Webb, 1976] in comparing the phenomenological sociology of Alfred Schutz with Dewey's theory of experience, found some interesting congruencies in such areas as Dewey's concept of environment and Husserl's *Lebenswelt*, [Webb, 1976] Schutz's movement away from the concept of transcendental ego to a more Deweyan view of social science, and in both Schutz's and Dewey's definition of the problematic situation. [Webb, 1976] Sandra Rosenthal and Patrick Bourgeois [Rosenthal & Bourgeois, 1980] in their comparison of phenomenology and pragmatism, do not go quite as far as Webb in their synthesis of the two philosophies, but they do point out areas of convergence, particularly between the work of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty. They note, for example, the similarity in their points of view concerning

correlations between body and world and nature and consciousness, especially when the concept of naturalism used is Deweyan rather than Newtonian. [Rosenthal & Bourgeois, 1980] Thus, although one may not want to go so far as Kestenbaum did in labelling Dewey as a phenomenologist, [Kestenbaum, 1972] enough linkages do exist in the literature to warrant the presentation of some curricular proposals that do wed the two philosophies at least with respect to their perceptions of experience.

As Pinar has pointed out, present school experience tends to numb students to their own experience. Little, if anything, is done to assist learners in analyzing their own lived experiences, to recognize the power of the self in conjuction with others. Curriculum experiences are the experiences of others either belonging to someone else or devised by someone else. Experiential learning is conceived in the very narrow sense of "learning by doing" but without regard to what came before the doing nor to what will follow. Life in school is very much the unexamined life.

But what of the experiences the child brings with him/her into the classroom? How meaningful is reading when one must constantly read of the experiences of others? The major goal of reading is skill development, not the creation of meanings. No wonder children are bored with it. And what of the older learner? S/he is invited to read the stream-of-consciousness of Joyce and Faulkner, but are they allowed to recognize their own stream-of-consciousness? Do they engage in thoughtful play with their imaginations and free associations?

What of other life experiences? If we accept the work of Robert Coles, we must consider his argument that the child brings with him an extensive backlog of experiences in psychology, sociology, political science, economics, etc., yet these are consistently presented (when they are) in a manner so distant to the individual so as to defy appropriation. How can one accept the efficacy of the experiences of others while being denied access to the verification of his own? Hence we become the curriculum rather than the curriculum becoming us.

By the same line of reasoning, what of Pinar's use of auto-

biography? Here we clearly have the recognition of the self as history. Again, we face the issue of the individual in relation to others, the interaction of the organism and nature. Must the environment always take precedence? The phenomenologist would dispute that and, to some extent, so would Dewey. The individual is history -- one person's experience can alter the flow of the collective experiences of others irreversibly. Yet how closely do we overlay the personal biography with the cultural biography of our society and others? No wonder we suffer a loss of awareness and disintegration. What other course is open to us after we've had to repudiate and subordinate our existence totally?

We have come to accept a very narrow view of experience in our design and development of curriculum. The curriculum theorist must continue to redefine that view and ultimately the role of experience in curriculum, in spite of the present unpopularity of theory. We must alter the course of curriculum practice if we are to improve the lives of children in classrooms and attain the goals of reconceptualization. A major step is the continued analysis and criticism of theories of experience and the synthesis of both phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives.

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ALASKA'S RURAL SCHOOLS: A UNIQUE CHALLENGE FOR RESPONSIVE CURRICULAR DEVELOPMENT

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A recognized discipline, curriculum, has evolved dramatically over a relatively few number of years. However, when compared to the longevity of the rural schools of Alaska, the field of curriculum attains grandperson status. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, while scholars of the science of teaching were struggling to establish the viability of curriculum as a discipline within institutions of teacher training, the condition of public education in rural Alaska was inadequate and extremely limited. Conversely, over the past five years remarkable growth in the number of public schools in rural Alaska has occurred. Suddenly, educators have become aware that constructing these new schools has been but an initial step toward their educational efficacy. To understand this contemporary "budding" of public education in rural Alaska and to recognize the present and potential effects of curricular research and development, an awareness of the unique nature of the state of Alaska and its educational development is vital.

Alaska exists as a geographic, technological, and cultural anomaly to the contiguous Lower 48. Although the state is five times the size of California, Alaska has fewer inhabitants than Portland, Oregon (and one-half of these 400,000 resides in one municipality, Anchorage). Geographic extremes include: 39 mountain ranges, 47,300 miles of sea coast, a climate varying from rain forests to deserts, temperatures ranging from +100 to -80 (in the same location), times of the

year when the sun never appears, others when it refuses to disappear, and five time zones. The geographic phenomena of the circumpolar north are endless. Commensurate with these natural "irregularities" (from an outsider's point of view) are the technological difficulties created by a state capital 750 miles from the major population center of the state and accessible only by air or water; an extremely limited network of ground transportation and roads; and a limited availability of Lower 48 conveniences in the rural areas such as running water, electricity and telephone service. [Alaska Almanac, 1980]

Central to the unique character of rural Alaska is its native population. Aleuts, Indians and Eskimos constitute roughly twenty per cent of the state's total population; in rural Alaska they represent eighty per cent. The native Americans of rural Alaska share many economic and educational realities with the native Americans of the Lower 48: a mean income of approximately $5,000 (approximately $15,000 for non-natives); a high rate of unemployment; few are employed in skilled jobs; and life expectancy is shorter than that of the non-native. Natives as a group possess less than one-half of the formal education of Alaska's non-natives (17 per cent have none at all); they are more likely to drop out of school before completion; and they achieve little success in higher education [Hecht, 1981]

The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 exists as a most significant variable in the contemporary status of Alaska's native cultures. In 1884, the U.S. Congress promised the native peoples of Alaska "undisturbed" use of the land they claimed or inhabited. Eighty-seven years later the federal government awarded 40 million acres of land and nearly one billion dollars to thirteen regional native corporations, created and governed exclusively by natives, to administer the settlement. This Act has provided an economic base for native involvement in the technological development of their lands. Furthermore, it has called attention to the need for a better educated rural populace.

Formal Education in Alaska

Prior to the purchase of the Alaskan lands in 1867, all formal education in the territory had taken one of three formats: Russian government schools for the children of Russian settlers; company schools for the training of personnel to be employed; and a scattered network of mission schools for approximately 74,000 of Alaska's native and mixed-blood inhabitants. The schools remained in operation beyond the actual sale of the territory to the United States, and the final Russian school closed its doors in 1916. [Dafoe, 1972] The Russian schools continued their operations primarily due to the failure of the U.S. Congress to provide any form of civil government, not to mention schooling, for the initial seventeen years following the purchase. When Congress did act, passing the First Organic Act of 1884, the Secretary of the Interior was charged with "making needful and proper provision for the education of the children of school age in the territory of Alaska, without preference of race." [Getches, 1977] A few schools were established following this Act, primarily through contractual agreement with church and mission groups. This early development of schools was severely hampered by limited fiscal appropriations and a lack of federal interest. By 1900 only ten per cent of the school-age children in the state were attending school. There simply was a lack of schools to attend. [Dafoe, 1972]

In the late 1880's, rediscovery of gold brought the first significant surge of non-native Americans to the territory. The U.S. Congress became attentive to the state's educational needs. By 1905, provision had been established for locally controlled schools in incorporated towns and unincorporated rural areas for "white children and children of mixed blood who lead a civilized life." [Getches, 1977] All native education was to remain the charge of the Secretary of the Interior. Alaska received official territorial status in 1912; and the first Department of Education, formed in 1917, presided over all schools except those for native students. Economics seemingly provided the only reason for early "desegregative" efforts in rural schools. It was simply not possible for more than one school to operate in a village. Regardless of the territorial policy which insisted "the

good of both races ... seems to require separate schools for at least a few decades," by the mid 1930's over a third of the native students were being educated in territorial as opposed to federal schools. [Getches, 1977] These territorial schools were allowed the right of local control only if they were located in an organized, local government community. All decisions for rural schools continued to be made by the Department of Education. An agreement to begin the transfer of federally operated (BIA) schools to territorial supervision began in 1950. Seemingly interminable differences have prevented the complete transfer of BIA schools: more than forty continue to exist today.

Regardless of the administrative "ownership" of schools in rural Alaska, these schools have not been very effective in terms of meeting the needs of rural Alaskan natives. Concern over their ineffectiveness became increasingly voiced by natives in the 1960's. The state's response was to reorganize administrative procedure and create the Alaska state-operated schools system (ASOS). This was given agency status outside the Department of Education, and local advisory boards were established. However, ASOS retained all decision-making powers. The dual system of education which had been maintained since pre-territorial days thus became tripartite.

In 1975 the demand for local control replaced the short-lived ASOS system with Regional Educational Attendance Areas (REAAs). Alaska Senate Bill 35 established this procedure and provided rural Alaska residents with their first opportunity to elect regional school boards to govern their schools. These twenty-one REAAs, although differing in many respects from city and borough school districts, were provided equal status by the Department of Education. One hundred and nine years after Alaska became a part of the United States, all children finally were given the opportunity to attend locally-controlled public schools. However, one "minor" obstacle remained; well over one hundred rural villages had no schooling available beyond the elementary level. If students wanted to attend high school, they often had to travel as far as 1,000 miles in order to do so.

The same year the REAAs were established, a group of

rural parents from the village of Kivalina entered into litigation with the state to have a secondary school established so their children could complete twelve years of public schooling without being forced to leave their home. The state reluctantly agreed and and a school was constructed. A class action suit, filed by the residents of Emmonak, quickly followed (the Hootch Case). Later in the same year (1976) the state issued the Tobeluk consent decree which was an agreement to provide secondary education in any community which: possessed an elementary school of eight students or more; had one secondary age student; and requested to have the state construct a school. The result of this decree has been that over the past six years, 126 secondary schools have been constructed in rural Alaska at a cost of well over 130 million dollars. [Barnhardt, 1979]

Following an enormous expense and a myriad of problems in the construction of these schools (which have continued to plague the schools' operation), the REAAs have found themselves faced with the dilemma of transforming an attractive structure into an effective educational program. Never in the educational development of the state had public schools been effective in meeting the needs of rural (particularly native) students.

There now existed one hundred and twenty six glamorous multimillion-dollar facilities with gymnasiums, totally equipped vocation facilities, all the latest innovations in classroom design; yet it soon became painfully clear that the primary concern of providing effective education was still to be resolved.

Program Design for Rural Alaska

The design and implementation of education programs in rural America have been heavily influenced by the large, urban comprehensive model. Speaking out for rural education in the Lower 48, Gail Parks, Education Director of the National Rural Center, has voiced this concern regarding the efficacy of urban models for rural settings:

> The experts were wrong .... The misfit created by designing rural schools according to urban models

> is now being admitted -- more so, probably, in the last few years than at any time in the last sixty years. [Parks, 1979]

The rural schools of Alaska, which now grossly outnumber their urban counterparts, have experienced this phenomena. However, the urban school model has proven itself to be severely limited in its ability to address the special needs and circumstances of schooling in rural Alaska. Barnhardt, et.al. [1979] identified six specific characteristics of rural Alaska which specify the uniqueness of these schools:

Limited size and resources of communities
Remote settings
Varied social and cultural conditions
High teacher turnover
Rapid social and economic change in village Alaska (The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act)
The newness of the instititional framework for education in Alaska villages

These six conditions are not typical of the standard urban comprehensive high school nor can the urban model school be expected to do that which was not at any time within its operational design or capacity. Therefore the design and implementation of a model specific to the needs and conditions of the rural Alaskan environment, and capable of fitting with the newly created rural secondary schools, is needed.

Curriculum For Rural Alaska

Providing quality education in rural Alaska presents a most challenging task. Twenty-one REAAs and 126 new schools now exist and are operational. Primary attention has been devoted to the construction and physical operation of these programs. In most cases the development of curricular strategy and program planning has been the responsibility of the instructional personnel whose average tenure is two years or less. Little theoretical development has occurred in the domain of curricular planning and implementation. Most of the curricular theory and programs of study that do exist are based on the principles and prac-

tices the teachers have acquired through training and experience outside of Alaska. An excess of the teachers in rural Alaska continue to be hired from the Lower 48 and generally enter their first rural teaching assignment in Alaska with very limited knowledge of the cultural and physical environment in which they will be working.

Given the operational characteristics of these new rural schools, the personnel available to staff them, and the statewide goal of providing effective educational programs, the construction of a comprehensive theoretical basis for the development of curriculum is imperative. Responsiveness to all aspects of the local environment of the school should be considered first and foremost in this process of theory building. Responsive curriculum development, according to Unruh is:

> ... the ability to meet diverse human needs, to receive new ideas, and to adapt to new situations, new knowledge, and new uses of knowledge. It is a process of continuing renewal of the curriculum, through which new forms are created to fit new conditions of the environment. [Unruh, 1975]

Regarding process, Unruh states that "involvement by individuals and referent groups is a precondition of responsiveness in curriculum development. It is a process that requires responsibility and sharing." [Unruh, 1975] Responsiveness in curriculum development historically and presently receives articulate "lip service" from those responsible for its provision. Yet little evidence is available to demonstrate the level of participation Unruh calls for.

Unruh's remarks were not directed specifically toward the creation and needs of small schools in rural Alaska when she addressed the necessity for responsive curriculum development. However, the contextual factors she sets forth in the framework of responsibleness are most appropriate for rural Alaska. These factors include needs, diagnosis, goals and objectives, learning experiences, evaluation, knowledge, future thinking, technological support, school buildings, community resources, cultural pluralism, and student perceptions. [Unruh, 1975]

The consensus of curriculum developers indicates a

substantial level of agreement on the inclusion of several of these factors in the development of any curriculum (needs assessment, individual diagnosis, goals and objectives, learning experiences, evaluation and knowledge). Rural Alaska offers no exception to this consensus. Of particular revelance are other factors identified by Unruh:

Future Thinking: Rural Alaska is encountering rapid change and development. Technology has drastically affected transportation, communication, and many other areas. This trend is gaining momentum and providing almost daily change. Attention must be devoted by curriculum planners to the future conditions of rural Alaska and the impact they will make on educational efforts.

Technological Support: Aside from the current technological impact on instruction (improved textbooks; film, video, and audio libraries; self-instructional packages; language laboratories, etc.), rural Alaska must be particularly attentive to the statewide technological support systems available to their remote locations. Curriculum available are sophisticated programs of computer-based instruction designed specifically for rural Alaska (Apple II), audio conferencing capabilities linking any village with a telephone to an infinite number of resources, electronic knowledge and information, and a satellite television project with regular instructional programming capabilities.

School Buildings: In most cases, rural Alaska villages have completed the constructive phase of school building. Unfortunately, a substantial number of these structures, as aesthetically pleasing as they appear, were of a design more suitable to "Lower 48 suburbia" than to remote Alaskan communities. The reports of malfunction, bad design, and technological ineffectiveness are numerous, yet the buildings exist and they can be made to work. Continued efforts need to be maintained to better adapt these schools to Alaska's physical environment.

Community Resources: Even in the smallest of villages, the school must "fit" the community. Community resources, although often of a different nature and magnitude in rural villages, are abundant and should be utilized. These resources may also extend beyond the communities through-

out the state via systematic planning of travel and exchange programs (many of which currently exist). Cultural and ethnological investigations, internships, apprenticeships, community classes, and experiences with local government, REAA district offices, regional corporations, etc., offer a few of the many opportunities for village students to gain experience and knowledge outside the classroom.

Cultural Pluralism: Unruh stresses the importance of the concept of cultural pluralism. In many villages 95+ per cent of the inhabitants are native Alaskans while the instructional staff in most schools are Caucasian. Serious thought needs to be directed toward the pre- and in-service preparation of the teachers who work in these schools. Given appropriate selection, preparation, administrative support, and evaluation of rural teachers, the opportunities to foster and promote the concept of cultural pluralism are unlimited.

Student Perceptions: Unruh emphasizes that "each student makes his or her own curriculum. The past experiences that the individual brings to the situation, his or her personal thoughts, feelings and meanings, are all part of the context in which the curriculum operates." It is of utmost importance for a curriculum developer, hence a teacher, to be cognizant of these phenomena. This is often difficult enough for one to accomplish within her/his own culture, and thus it becomes one more hurdle for rural Alaskan educators to jump, given that the vast majority of them work in cross-cultural settings. Without attending to this reality, the implementation of the most expertly conceived curricula may result in minimal program success and student achievement.

Responsiveness to the needs and realities of rural Alaska must accompany the application of curricular theory and program development. Each above-mentioned factor focuses on a unique characteristic of rural Alaskan schools. The design of educational programs should include participation by those locally involved in the schooling process (students, parents, community leaders, etc.) The previously mentioned conditions specific to rural Alaska exemplify this need.

Limited Size and Resources: Due to the limited size of most of the Alaskan rural schools and their communities, a small cadre of teachers is heavily taxed to provide a total

education program. The communities could provide valuable instructional resources and assistance.

Remote Setting: A remote setting provides the opportunity for the school to become the focus of the community and vice versa. This attention could facilitate a most productive school/community relationship.

Varied Social and Cultural Conditions: In *Schooling in Isolated Communities,* Tom Gjelten strongly supports the notion of "a school to fit the place." Comprehensive high schools were not designed for small rural settings with varied social and cultural conditions. Flexibility and adaptability are two qualities of significant importance and must be incorporated into the rural school.

Teacher Turnover: Due to the high rate of attrition of rural Alaskan teachers, it makes sense to involve the community as much as possible in the operation of the school. Prospective instructional personnel should fit the school having to conform to the teachers. Program continuity needs to be developed and maintained.

Rapid Social and Economic Change in Village Alaska: The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act will continue to prompt social and economic change in the villages. The schools should provide a forum which could continually inform and educate the community regarding the implications of this Act.

The Newness of the Instititional Framework for Education in Alaska Villages: This "newness" provides an opportunity for communities to develop the types of educational programs which best fit their needs. Given the village environments of rural Alaska, a community-oriented approach appears to be the most appropriate strategy.

An initial attempt at responsive curricular development for rural Alaska has been conducted by the Center for Cross-Cultural Studies of the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. This effort involved an investigation of the operation of a number of small schools within the state. Eight months of field observation was conducted with the end result being the composition of a report which proposed a model of curricular design and numerous recommendations for its implementation. The recommendations stressed:

1) Small high schools should seek to provide students with a range of alternative educational opportunities that are functionally equivalent to those provided other high school students in the state, recognizing, however, that fundamental alterations in the structure, delivery, and design of high school programs will be necessary to accomplish the task.
2) Maximum opportunity for community participation in school operations should be provided at all levels, including the incorporation of community resources in the school program, and the training of local teachers.
3) Small high school programs should be closely tied to the contemporary social, cultural, and physical environment of the communities in which they operate, and curriculum content should be built around current issues and problems at the local and regional levels, and then expanded to encompass state, national and international perspectives.
4) The curriculum of small high schools should be organized around three broad, interdisciplinary areas of study, with one teacher for each of the three areas of communication arts, environmental studies, and cultural ecology.
5) Teachers in small high schools should pursue community-based, experientially-oriented, project-centered approaches to teaching wherever possible, so as to foster student and community participation in the structuring of learning activities, and thus assist students in integrating in-school and out-of-school experiences.
6) Small high school programs should be organized to provide teachers and students with large, uninterrupted blocks of time in which to engage in intensive, in-depth learning activities ranging anywhere from one day to nine weeks or more in duration.
7) The functions that small high schools are expected to serve should be reduced to only those directly related to the instructional program of the school, with other services, such as recreational programs, athletic activities and job-oriented training to be provided

through the native non-profit corporations or other local or regional community service organizations.

8) In addition to the instructional program offered in the local community, small high schools also should offer students access to an organized series of extended learning activities utilizing resources from outside the community, including the provision of a regional center program, an urban center program, and in-state and out-of-state travel programs.

9) School districts should make every effort to make sure that the recruitment, selection, and orientation of teachers for small high schools is aimed at obtaining strong teachers who are compatible with the communities and schools in which they will teach, and who have long-term commitments to working in the district. Districts should then make sure the teachers have the support they need to do the job for which they are hired, and seek to minimize teacher turnover and abrupt departures.

10) Extensive small high school information exchange networks should be established through newsletters, conferences, workshops, etc., to facilitate the sharing of experience across schools and districts, and to help students, teachers, administrators, and boards to develop a broader persective on the problems they encounter locally.

11) A "Small High School Program Development and Training Center" should be established immediately to develop Alaskan-oriented curriculum materials, train personnel for small high schools, and otherwise assist in and coordinate the implementation of the recommendations outlined above.

12) The State must recognize that the actions required to bring small high school programs to an adequate level of quality and performance transcend the capacities of many local communities and school districts, and can only be accomplished through a concentrated statewide cooperative effort to develop the resources, support services, and personnel necessary to accomplish the task. The State Department of Education must take

> responsibility for such an effort, in cooperation with the school districts and universities, and move immediately to assist small high schools through their formative period. [Barnhardt, et. al., 1979]

The report, which was issued in 1979, has provided a basis for curricular design and development. Several of the recommendations involving the selection of personnel, in-service training of teachers, informational networks, and university and state resource development have been implemented. However, many of the recommendations involving curricular design have achieved limited acceptance.

Rural Alaska confronts curricular developers with complex issues which perhaps have never been faced. Many aspects of the design process are repetitious of other states and communities but the combination of factors compounded by the geographic, economic, social, and cultural uniqueness of the state presents an exceptional challenge. An opportunity exists to draw from the most recent and significant research, curricular theory and operational structures in the construction of theoretical foundations and models of program implementation for the schools of rural Alaska. As the *Small High School Report* has illustrated, primary attention needs to be directed toward the implementation of instructional planning and development. Not specific to Alaska is the gap between the theory and practice of curricular development. The nature of rural Alaska demands that for "formal" education to achieve an opportunity for successful implementation, the communities must be involved. The degree to which public schooling can succeed is contingent upon a creative strategy of program development being instituted which involves the local participants, acknowledges and realistically addresses the uniqueness of the area, and is truly responsive to the needs of the community.

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JURIDICAL SUBJECTIVISM AND JURIDICAL EQUIVOCATION IN THE BAKKE DECISION

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Social Atomism

Justice Powell's controlling opinion in the Regents of *The University of California v Allan Bakke* supported Allan Bakke's contention that both Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the existence of the University of California, Davis, Task Force Program, the so-called Special Admissions Program.

Justice Powell, in his decisive opinion, held that the individual was triumphant over the social group. This introduction of social atomism is highlighted in the following quoted passage:

> The Special Admissions Program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status. The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.[1]

Mr. Justice Powell's requirement for Constitutional color-

blindness presupposes a society in which equality has *already* been attained and racism has been overcome. In such a society it would be entirely appropriate to discuss individual rights, for the only group which could possibly exist would be the society as a whole, the whole people or all individuals. Likewise in such a society, a *Bakke* - type case would probably not occur. That is because in a society in which discrimination against groups (for example, racism against the Black people in the contemporary and past United States) had ceased would also be a society in which there was necessary medical care for all the people and in which the physicians and medical personnel as a whole would amply and equally reflect the presence of humanity of all skin colors and both of its sexes. Powell's opinion, thus constituting a majority on this point of individual triumph over group interests and supporting Constitutional color-blindness, also included Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rhenquist. As authority, this quintet embedded Constitutional color-blindness in the legislative *intent* or *subjective intent* of the framers of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The statute provides that:

> No person in the United States shall, on the grounds of race, color or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.[2]

Looking at the language of the statute itself, the Justices argued that a result contrary to their conception of color-blindness could only occur if the wording of the statute "misstates the actual intent of the Congress that enacted the statute."[3] After a discussion of the fears of opponents to the 1964 Civil Rights Act that overcoming discrimination might actually mean "mandating racial quotas and racially balanced colleges and universities,"[4] Steven, et. al. turned to the supporters of this legislation who alleged that these fears on the part of segregationist-interpositionists such as Representative Abernathy and Senators Ervin, Gore and Eastland were unfounded. The Court tells us that the "proponents of the legislation gave repeated assurances that the act would be color blind in its application."[5]

Surely, this is an irony -- on the one hand there is a group opposing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and on the other hand, there is a group that supported the legislation but allayed the fears of its opponents. Among the Act's proponents were Senators Proxmire, Pastore, Javits, Humphrey and Kennedy. Senator Humphrey was the Act's floor manager and went to some lengths to reassure his segregationist colleagues.

> The word "discrimination" has been used in many a court case -- what it really means in the bill is the distinction in the treatment given to different individuals because of their different race, religion or national origin. The answer to the question "what was meant by discrimination" is that if race is not a factor we don't have to worry about discrimination because of race. The Internal Revenue Code does not provide that colored people do not have to pay taxes or that they can pay their taxes six months later than everyone else.[6] If we started to treat Americans as Americans not as fat ones, short ones, tall ones, brown ones, green ones, yellow ones or white ones, but as Americans -- if we did that we would not need to worry about discrimination.[7]

Formal equality of this sort is anticipated by one year in the combined efforts of Professor Nathan Glazer and Dr. Daniel Patrick Moynihan. In *Beyond the Melting Pot,* they state that "The Negro is only an American and nothing else -- he has no values and culture to guard and protect."[8]

Professor Glazer, as paraphrased by Edward Fort, Chancellor of the University of Wisconsin, Center campus, went on to argue that "Redress for past discrimination is a dangerous principle and that once a nation has done all it can to establish a full status of ethnic equality for all, the nation has done all that justice demands in the multi-group society."[9] Such a conception of "nation" is a reassertion of the theory of appropriative alienation -- that is, it is a recognition of the alienation of the people to the state -- in this case Glazer's metaphoric "nation." While sentiments of abstract or formal equality appear noble indeed, they are usually or most often expressed in the face of or while ignoring substantive inequality. Interestingly, a further refer-

ence to Senator Humphrey's stewardship of Title VI reveals his own awareness of substantive inequality. "As I have said, the Bill has a single purpose; that purpose is to give fellow citizens, *Negroes*, the same rights and opportunities that white people take for granted. This is no more than what the Constitution guarantees."[10] (emphasis added)

From Senator Humphrey's remarks, however, Justice Powell concludes that Title VI bestows *formal* equality only. Indeed, he argues that in view of its "clear legislative intent" it must be held to "proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment."[11] Furthermore, as has already been suggested of his thought, for Powell, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is organized around the protection of *abstract* or *formal* individual rights. Hence, he implicitly reasserts substantive inequality by ignoring the very point raised in Senator Humphrey's comments (above) in discussing the protection of Black Americans. The outcome is the express assertion of color-blind *formal* equality as the lynch pin of his opinion.

Below are some instances of Mr. Justice Powell's juridical affair with abstract individual rights.

> 1) The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to persons. Its language is explicit: No state shall deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. It is settled beyond question that the rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. They are personal rights.
>
> 2) Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups. If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classification based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions and opinions are based upon personal rights rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group, then Constitutional standards may be applied consistently.

> 3) We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of a relatively victimized group at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations.[12]

In the concluding portions of his opinion, Powell refers to his favored Harvard College admissions plan as "the kind of program that treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process."[13] This approach is distinguished by the jurist from the "petitioner's preferential program" which is said to be fatally flawed in its "disregard of individual rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." However, the Special Admissions program did not disregard individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. On the contrary, and consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Special Admissions program focused on concrete and determinate, not abstract and formal, individuals. This is reflected in American Constitutional development. Indeed, as Professor Mitchell Franklin says:

> As the texts of the Constitution reflect each other, all of them should be studied in their relationships. This is fundamental. Nevertheless, what is called the Constitution of the United States is in reality three constitutions -- each of which states in legal formulations the outcome of vital historical changes in American social history. This means that all Constitutional texts may be overcome or subordinated by later Constituional texts unless they strengthen or deepen the force of the new Constitutional provisions."[14]

The Fourteenth Amendment

Some sense of this historical development is unwittingly caught in Justice Powell's comment that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was "virtually strangled in its infancy by post Civil War reactionism."[15] Yet, he ignores this point after having just stated it. Indeed, by asserting that such reactionism had been overcome, the jurist is enabled to write that by the time that the Equal Protection Clause had become viable "it was no longer

possible to peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of any one racial minority."[16]

While this may be said formalistically in the abstract, there are the particular experiences of the Black people in the United States which did and still do require concrete historical applications of the Fourteenth Amendment.

At this point, Powell and history part company. In his view, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's implementation, it could not still be linked to the concrete "struggle for equality of any one racial minority." [17] (There is of course the bitter sidelight that the Equal Protection Clause did not even become viable in the *sole* defense of Black Americans, for whom specifically, the Civil War Amendments were passed.) The Court argues that during the "dormant" period of the Equal Protection Clause the "United States had become a nation of minorities." [18] This is an interesting thought.

To suggest that there is no majority implies that all groups are competing minority groups. Such a model may be said to be a market analogy organized around basic ideas of harmony of individual interest raised to the level of harmony of interest groups. This conception is characteristic of mainstream or official sociology.

Powell makes use of this interest group analysis. (It is almost an echo of Pound's theory of "balancing the interests.") Restating its argument, the Court commented that the "white majority itself is composed of various minority groups most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals." [19] Such formalistic equality of victimization may be said to attempt a liquidation of the claim of a minority of color to its own defense against racism.

This implicit declaration of "official discrimination" (i.e., "at the hands of the State") both asserts and denies the questions of power in society. Power is asserted by calling upon the State as discriminator. It is denied if all groups are viewed as equally competing minorities.

The claim that "various minority groups," comprising the "white majority," have all experienced prior State discrimination and private discrimination strives through a

formula of "equality of experienced discrimination" to extinguish special claims of Black America which are linked to its own concrete historical experience. Hence, an arbitrary juridical injection of market analogies is said to be the equalizing serum that infuses America with everyone's and every group's hard times in order to deny the harder times of one group.

Juridical Equivocation

It is now possible to see the juridical approach of Powell as characterized by simultaneous recognition of the particular, past historical conditions of Black America and of the expanded application of the Fourteenth Amendment in general as strategy of legal displacement, shifting, shuffling, or verstellung. No inter-connected social whole or totality is recognized. Justice Powell's juridical subjectivism demands instead a social dualism and engineers judicial decision on the basis of arbitrary subjective options or "choices." This juridical method of shifting is captured in Powell's double holding for the Court that:

> 1) So much of the judgement of the California Court as holds petitioner's Special Admissions programs unlawful and directs that respondent be admitted to the medical school must be affirmed.
>
> 2) The portion of the Court's judgement enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admissions process must be reversed. [20]

Such an approach accords with the activity and attitude of legal theorists, justices, segregationist-interpositionists, and the general class interest disapproving of the unanimous Supreme Court decision in *Brown v Board of Education, Topeka, Kansas.* There is resentment that in *Brown* the:

> Supreme Court accepted its responsibility ... without equivocation or without formulating at the same time an escape route from its immediate integrationist position such as is required by the method of American legal pragmatism and of American legal realism.[21]

Professor Franklin, recognizing the persistence of racist social forces in America, says:

other legal critics of the Warren Supreme Court wish more or less to repair the road to reunion of Northern and Southern white social forces at the expense of the Negro people which *Brown* had closed. [22]

Facist, racist forces are disturbed because the Supreme Court in *Brown* avoided the method of what Hegel called verstellung or displacement. This is the method of "shifting or shuffling" by which the Court would proceed, "by fixing definitely one moment, passing thence immediately over to another and doing away with the first," to use the critical language of Hegel. But, "as soon as it has now set up the second moment, it also shifts this again, and really makes the opposite its essential element."[23]

Hegel's point is that it is not merely the jurist's assertion of one moment, his shifting to its opposite, hence negating the first, and finally returning to reassert the first. Hegel suggests that actually in this way, the jurist demonstrates that he really holds *neither one of these two moments in earnest.* Something else (e.g., racism) is held in earnest. To illustrate, a schematization of the Court's two-part opinion in *Bakke* will be helpful.

I. *First moment.* So much of the judgement of the California Court as holds petitioner's special admissions program unlawful and directs that respondent be admitted to the medical school must be affirmed.

-but-

II. *Second moment.* The portion of the Court's judgement enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admissions program must be reversed.

-but-

III. *Third moment.* Privileged quotas (i.e. special admissions) for minorities are declared unconstitutional while race *may* be considered in the admissions process. However, since the inclusion of race as an admissions factor is voluntary and non-governmentally enforced, minority admissions depend solely upon the subjective good will or "noblesse oblige" of admission officers. And, since race is accorded a voluntaristic and conditional status (it *may* be a factor), it also *may not* be

a factor. Therefore, neither I nor II (above) are held in earnest. What is earnestly held in this decision is that the presence or absence of minorities in higher education becomes a function of subjectivity, not objective social conditions and objective social history. Thus it can be said, that the *Bakke* decision veers the historical equivocation of human emancipation in the United States into the emancipation of equivocation on the same question.

Recognizing this shifting, displacement or verstellung method in the *Bakke* decision, and likewise recognizing that most American legal theorists and scholars are unfamiliar with bourgeois subjectivism as ambiguity, equivocation, hypocrisy, it is not surprising that Harry Lowington, Dean of the Yale University Law school, said that "The *Bakke* decision resolves nothing, absolutely nothing. I don't even know what the decision is -- I think inevitably there will be further litigation." [24] Yet, it may be said that *Bakke* is both an artful and unconstitutional dodge to the right.

Professor Mitchell Franklin points to the deterrorizing activism of the Warren Court in *Brown* which the Burger Court attempts to overcome in *Bakke* by its reassertion of unconstitutionality in command. This Thermidorian Reaction of the Burger Court may be shown to be in violation of the American Constitution. With Justice Powell, it rests on his misrepresentation of the Fourteenth Amendment as having achieved equal application to a transparent people comprised of abstract and formal individuals.

The Explosive and Democratic Force of the American Constitution

Here it is necessary to speak of what Professor Franklin calls the "Third Constitution," the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.[25] As has already been mentioned, the interconnected character of the American Constitution reflects historical development in the United States, and "old constitutional texts may be overcome or subordinated by later constitutional texts unless they strengthen or deepen the force of the new constitutional provisions."[26]

The Civil War Amendments are the legal or superstructural recognition of the defeat of slavery and states-rights interposition in war:

> By abolishing slavery, the Thirteenth Amendment literally deprived the slave holders of recognition as a social force. The Fourteenth Amendment creates an unbreakable barrier against the pretentions of contemporary segregationist interpositionists, under the new social and legal conditions created by the ending of slavery. It excludes armed nullification such as had been attempted in Arkansas. More explicitly, the Fourteenth Amendment is not only a criticism of the social and legal theory of the slave holders, but it formulates the principles which overcome the legality direct or indirect of American racism [and sexism]. The Fourteenth Amendment accomplishes its goal by *Cassation* –it breaks the power of the particular states over the citizens of the particular states, for it declares the citizens of the particular states also to be citizens of the United States. By instituting national citizenship, by consecrating immediate relations between the United States and the American people, it refutes the position of Calhoun and of the contemporary segregationists who believe that there "is indeed no such community politically speaking as the people of the United States as constituting one people or nation taken together as a whole to form a community of states united by political compact."[27]

So that this discussion of the infaming, terroristic and hence, unconstitutional activism of the Burger Court in *Bakke* may be most clearly developed, it is necessary here to restate, a) a portion of the Fifth Amendment, b) the entire Ninth Amendment, and c) the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment.

> a) *Fifth Amendment.* No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.
>
> b) *Ninth Amendment.* The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

c) *Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment.* All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.

Turning to the Fifth Amendment, it is seen that it forbids the sovereign to infame the people in any romanist or feudal sense. Mass infamy, for example of women as witches as well as the noncriminal infamy of witches by exile, is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. This overcoming of feudal infamy is recognized in two ways; first, the American Revolution was not simply a war of national liberation allowing the independent reproduction of the possibility of English feudal relations on American soil. This radical break binds us to the fact that the American Constitution is a *revolutionary* document, not a simple transcription of borrowed English common law caprice. Indeed, the Constitution is "influenced by bourgeoisified Roman law ideas of the enlightenment."[28] The "We the People" of the Constitution is the first restatement as law of the Declaration's recognition of the people's right to infame the sovereign *when the sovereign is other than the people.* This refers to the people's right to alienate the appropriative alienation of a State which alienates them. The Declaration of Independence captures this with its infaming or public reprobation of George III.

Infamy

Secondly, we must discuss what this "infamy" is. Infamy or Romanist *infamia* refers to the State's degradation of individuals or groups and their public reprobation for certain activities, ways of life, shameful conduct and/or criminal charges brought or proven. Infamy is paralleled to and may be accompanied by diminution or "impairment of the legal personality itself."[29] This given in the Romanist conception

of impairment as capitus deminutio. This reduction of the legal person or personality or "capit" may be partial as in capitus deminutio media (where loss of citizenship may be accomplished by exile, as in *The Man Without a Country*) or complete as in capitus deminutio maxima, where slavery *and* deprivation of freedom accompany loss of citizenship (as in the historical experience of most of the Black people in the United States until Emancipation).

> However, the Roman feudal and colonial idea of infamia is excluded by the Bill of Rights, that is, by the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution of the United States which initiated our Second Constitution in 1789. The infaming of Americans who fear that they may be infamed because of accusations of Communism, thus becoming subject to the effects of infamy, may therefore be criticized or condemned as unconstitutional. [30]

Since feudal infamy is overcome in the revolutionary character of the Constitution, infamy is given a new, more restrictive form and content. This is compatible with the recognition that the people cannot infame itself. That is, the people cannot mediate itself to itself, and yet remain apart from itself. That would be a reassertion of external mediation, a realienation of the people to the State (necessarily a recognition of the class character of the society.)

So long, therefore, as one section of the people can be infamed by another, or so long as congressional, executive, or judicial mass infamy is possible, and practiced, it must be acknowledged that certain social forces within the State have veered the overcoming of license of tyranny into the tyranny of license. Nevertheless, when in force the Fifth Amendment narrows infamy to the conviction of a particular individual for a particular crime which itself must be an infaming or capital crime. This requires Constitutional safeguards in the activity of two juries, a majority indictment of a grand jury, and a unanimous verdict of a petit or trial jury, thus further narrowing possible realms of application of Constitutional infamy on procedural grounds.

As has been said, the applicable section of the Fifth Amendment reads, ... "No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a present-

ment or indictment of a grand jury." Hence, there can be no mass infamy, no national and public degradation, no mass impairment of the legal personality, no mass secular excommunication, no mass civil death. Therefore, the activites of Senator Joseph McCarthy, The House Committee on Un-American Activities, the work of the Dies Committee, the Rapp-Coudert Hearings, the Smith Act Trials, the Palmer Raids and all loyalty oaths, as well as the various "anti-Communist" pronouncements of Richard M. Nixon and Dwight David Eisenhower are then immediately seen as instances of mass congressional, executive, legislative, judicial and administrative infamy, all of which are reprobated by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, all of which are, therefore, unconstitutional. (I am developing here the argument that the Court's opinion in *Bakke* is infaming -- it infames the Black people in the United States, the Puerto Rican people, the Chicano people, Native Americans and all women.)

As mentioned above, capitus deminutio is related to the concept of infamy and when citizenship is denied a people or removed from a group of people as in capitus deminutio media and "when enslavement or deprivation of freedom is added to such loss of citizenship ... it is capitus deminutio maxima, virtually civil death."[31] And, as has been said, it is within this condition of virtual civil death that the Black people survived until the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. (It is also possible to argue that the Fifth Amendment, since it is addressed to *persons* not citizens, immediately overcomes slavery as unconstitutional mass infamy, as well. In practice, however, that possibility had been narcotized until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.)

The 1950's and the general history of American anti-Communism tell us that the Fifth Amendment is still narcotized. Indeed, systematic red-baiting, anti-Communism, racism and sexism in American life acknowledge the sleep of the Fifth Amendment and the fact that the Constitution is not enforced (again revealing the class-riven character of this society.)

The American Nation -- Consecrated by the Fourteenth Amendment

Having established the constitutional limits on infamy, it is now necessary to pass onto the Fourteenth Amendment which establishes the American nation and finally, the State of the Whole People. Section I of the Amendment reads:

> All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the law.

Regardless of the argument which may be developed to show that the Fifth Amendment immediately forbade slavery as mass infamy of persons, *apart from whether or not these persons are citizens,* the Thirteenth Amendment forbade slavery, and the Fourteenth declared, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States to be citizens of the United States." (Of course, were the Constitution enforced, the Nineteenth Amendment for women's suffrage and the decision in *Brown v Board of Education*, as well as the present struggle for the Equal Rights Amendment might well have been unnecessary. That it has not been consistently in force is again reflected in the *Bakke* decision.)

Ninth Amendment as Constitutional Method

Some discussion of constitutional method is necessary here. As soon as the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, the Ninth Amendment, guaranteeing that the "enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people," secured Fourteenth Amendment rights to all person. Thus, as American citizens, the Black people had secured to them a positive national right which surpassed or overcame negating states-

rightist, segregationist interposition. The constitutional method for accomplishing this is specified in Article IV, Section IV, (wherein the central power guarantees a republican form of government to the states) and the Ninth Amendment.

The Ninth Amendment as Constitutional method does not look back to feudal England to discover other rights retained by the people. On the contrary. These "other rights" are such rights as are historically inclusive of those gained subsequent to and including the first eight amendments, as well. This relates to the already mentioned "radical break" characteristic of the American revolution. The rights retained by the people through the Ninth Amendment are not pre-existing English feudal rights. They are rights developed on *the revolutionary basis* of American society and its objective social history. These rights, then, are protected from denial or disparagement by the Ninth Amendment. Hence, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may not, as in the outcome of the Court's opinion in *Bakke,* be used to reinstitute the mass infamy of the Black people.

Constitutional Opposition to Bakke

In the preceeding pages, I have developed the Constitutional argument which reveals the infaming, terroristic and unconstitutional character of the Burger majority's activism in the *Bakke* case. This is given in Justice Powell's opinion in *Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke.* To summarize:

1) The Fifth Amendment forbids mass infamy, generally, as a negative right and protection of the people from the State in such a matter. Roman, feudal or colonial *infamia* is expelled from the United States Constitution by the first ten amendments and infamy is reconstituted on a restricted, criminal law basis by the Fifth Amendment. That this reprobation of mass infamy or recognition of the peoples' right to infame the sovereign when the sovereign is other than the people, (i.e. is an external mediation of them to themselves, is a realienation of

the people to the State) is and has been congressionally, juridically, and executively violated in a systematic fashion is an immediate recognition of a class-riven society. The people are sundered from themselves by social forces other than themselves.

2) As soon as the Fourteenth Amendment is passed, it is secured to the people and justified by the Constitutional method of the Ninth Amendment and by Article IV, Section IV.

3) Likewise, the Ninth Amendment also secures the Fifth Amendment to all Americans: Southern legislation requiring the registration of the membership of Negro organizations presupposes the infamy, the civic disgrace or degradation of the Negro people. The registration is the brand, stain or mark of infamy. Registration or disclosure is a modern star of David; it is the contemporary stocks. But the Fifth Amendment condemns mass, in this situation, racial infamy. Such infamy creates inequality. Thus, the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment reciprocally reflect each other. Both of them exclude the alienating or estranging force of governmental infamy.[32]

4) The Fifth Amendment forbids mass racial infamy.

Conclusion

It can now be realized that the interconnections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments also forbid the mass infamies of anti-Communism, racism, anti-Semitism, sexism, anti-homosexuality, anti-handicapism, ageism, and anti-ethnicism. By supporting one white male in a "reverse discrimination" suit, the Burger majority re-introduces the mass infamy of the Black people, and potentially, the mass infamy of all women. But, it is said naively, Justice Powell has left the door open. Race *may* be a factor in admissions decisions.

However, by virtue of the juridical method of equivocation, Powell actually leaves admissions up to the subjectivity of college administrators. And, the report on *Bakke* of the American Council on Education--Association of Ameri-

can Law Schools[33] suggests how administrators might proceed with their decisions, while "protecting" themselves from individual suits. The point is that human emancipation in the United States has been a history of the equivocation of emancipation. As had earlier been said, the Court's decision emancipates equivocation for all higher education. This is what must be understood about the *Bakke* decision. There is no saving character at all in that "race *may* be considered a factor" in the admissions process. Actually, *Bakke* is worse than *Plessy v Ferguson*. Where *Plessy* articulated a racist rule of "separate but equal," the structured racism of *Bakke* is a falling away, even from *Plessy*. This is so because where "race *may* be considered a factor" in admissions, it also *may not* be a factor (at all).

In the summer of 1978, the 186,000 members of District 31, United Steel Workers of America (USWA) condemned the *Bakke* decision. District 65, USWA, did the same.[34]

This article has suggested that the unconstitutionality of the racist *Bakke* decision is organized around market analogies, abstract or formal equality, ahistoricism, social atomism and juridical equivocation and juridical subjectivism. We have also seen how the explosive texts of the American Constitution are powerful weapons in the preservation and expansion of democratic rights. Finally, we have briefly noted that popular sentiment within the American labor movement strives in the democratic direction consecrated by the texts of the American Constitution. It is implied that the movement of multi-racial American labor and its putting forward of the American Constitution as a weapon in the struggle for democracy is required today.

* * *

Endnotes

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5. Ibid.
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8. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the Melting Pot (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 318.
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12. Ibid., at 289 and 299.
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32. Mitchell Franklin, op.cit., "The Relation of the Fifth, Ninth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Third Constitution," p. 182.
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EXPERIMENTAL EIDETICS AS A WAY OF ENTERING CURRICULUM LANGUAGE FROM THE GROUND UP

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It has been fourteen years since Schwab (1969), in his declaration of the curriculum field as moribund, argued for a return to the practical. By the practical, as we all know by now, he did not mean "the curbstone practicality of the mediocre administrator and the man on the street," the nuts and bolts technical know-how of mindless practice. Rather he claimed to mean, "a complex discipline .. concerned with choice and action." To ground this discipline, he argued, what is wanted is "a totally new and extensive pattern of *empirical* study of classroom life as a basis for beginning to know what we are doing, what we are not doing, and to what effect." This in turn, he suggested, is an effort which requires new mechanisms of empirical investigation, new methods of "reportage" and "a new class of educational researchers."

To search for "a basis for beginning to know what we are doing" is no easy task, though one easily trivialized. Nevertheless Schwab was correct, I believe, in calling for some form of inquiry which takes with an urgent seriousness what is going on in schools and classrooms today. Some form of insight into the concreteness and mundaneness of life in those places (mundane in the sense of being in the world) is a completely necessary predicate to anything

else we might want to say and do in a grand manner about curriculum, or even about schools and education in general.

This is not to say we have not had some good descriptions of life in schools. Philip Jackson (1968), Smith and Geoffrey (1967), and much of the burgeoning "new ethnography" material (a la Spradley and McCurdy) displays a definite sensitivity to life situations. But in the end, these leave one somehow unsatisfied, largely perhaps because of our cultural confusion between the empirical and the objective, and a deep-seated reluctance to ask about the ontological meaning of our actions. Objective knowledge is a knowledge of which we can be certain in spite of ourselves, which is a way of showing the "out of our mind-ness" of it. Most of the descriptive studies to date have lacked power, perhaps because they have concentrated too closely on the search for outward certainties such as behavior rules, with little attention to the deep intersubjectivity of everything we do as human beings. Also, they tend to be politically somnolent.

But that does not mean to say our investigations cannot be *empirical* as Schwab would want, for to be empirical (coming from the Greek word for "experience," *empeira)* means strictly, to claim one's experience, through observation and sense data, as the basis of knowledge. And that is a completely different matter from some form of "out-there" objectivism. Observation involves the eye, which means empirical research becomes a question of which eye one uses, the inner, the outer, the transcendental third, or a dynamic reciprocity among the three. Or again, empirical research involves interpretation of sense data, so we might ask which part of the anatomy is to be acknowledged as capable of receiving it – the brain, the heart, or say, the stomach. Empirical research has to do with the whole person standing in the whole of life trying to make sense of his/her experience of it all in its wholeness. I think this was Heidegger's fundamental breatkthrough, in his assertion that we stand in Being itself. That is, we find ourselves in the midst of all there is, so that any claims to truth or knowledge can never be more than partial, incomplete, but in the very same instant, uniquely expressive of that which is all in all. Anything we do or say – in curriculum or otherwise -- is utterly

unwrenchable from that seamlessness which by its very nature makes our sense of partiality, specificity, and proud individuality possible. Heidegger was led to this after many years as a student of Husserl. Husserl spent his whole life trying to work out the foundation of an empirical science.

But this leads us to the curriculum question. If we are going to talk about the curriculum enterprise as being grounded in a full sense of the empirical, we need to be clear about some possibilities which potentially shut off the part-whole dialectic. Curriculum, whatever it might be, is at least woven into that seamlessness of which we spoke. As is the case with so many fields today, however, to be known as a specialist in something seems to be more important, more convenient, comfortable, prestigious, etc., than to have a sense of the fullness of things. For a sense of life's fullness can only render one eternally discomforted, restless in the knowledge that our knowledge claims are more in the way of "pointing to" something rather than dogmatic decrees. The British theologian E. J. Bicknel (1961) suggests it is a matter of whether one thinks of truth as something that grows incrementally for storage and later use, or whether it is something already "there" or "here" so to speak, for us to grow into. In a sense, that latter view makes one more open to the world, less defensive of those "truths" that often later turn out to be terrible prejudices.

This is not to argue for a return to gross relativism, which is a form of tyranny of the worst order, but rather searching for a way of preserving what Paul Ricoeur (1973) calls the "living circle" lying at the heart of understanding ourselves in the world. In a critique of critical philosophy, Ricoeur argues that that form of theorizing about social change posits the necessity of radically breaking with the established arrangement of things, so distasteful and riddled with distortion is it. While we may want to affirm the kinds of analysis Michael Apple (1979) makes, for example, about curriculum and ideology, and the structures of injustice that schools help to perpetuate, at the same time there may be a danger in getting carried away in a torrent of theorizing about the world's ills in such a way that we lose a sense of the day-to-day consciousness of people (including teachers) in their

daily lives. Merleau-Ponty (in O'Neill, 1970) warns us about becoming "masters of suspicion." "The root of injustice," says Gadamer (1978) following Aristotle, "is not moral error but blindness." As educators then, our concern is blindness, lack of vision; and there is an innocence in blindness, at the same time as it is always innocence in and of a situation. As educators, we act in the belief that shown in the right way, educated in the best sense, the average person can be made to see his situation, and in seeing, choose a better way. For that to be possible means a keen attention to the fundamental concrete details of day-to-day events, and an ability to show clearly the dynamic interrelatedness and working out of our oppressions. Such a showing requires a certain power of understanding and interpretation rooted in a love and care for people in their situatedness. Goethe said, "We only understand what we love (in Palmer 1972). One might say that an education of ourselves and others into the madness of our times must at least be an act of love. We love in order to understand, and we understand in order to be free. But that means developing insight into how "where we're at" has seeped into our very bones.

And that is not simply a private enterprise, in an individual sense or even private in an isolated cultural sense. The move by certain reconceptualist curriculum thinkers to get in touch with the "Self" in the curriculum and school world (Pinar, 1975: 384-484), through biographical and autobiographical descriptions along psychoanalytic lines, is helpful for revealing the sorts of personal struggles many of us face. But one can detect a certain despair in their efforts, a despair rooted in what might be described as a profoundly subtle yet chronic dependence on a listener. In other words, there might be something wonderfully cathartic about private and public spillings of the guts, but in the end, who cares? That is, for our groanings to have any redemptive possibility, it matters a great deal whether or not someone is listening. And then the quality and character of the listener become important. Is she or he someone who seems to have the intelligence and sensitivity to understand what it is we are talking about? In their listening, are they experienced (*empeira ... empeiros*) through suffering, as Aeschylus told us

was the only authentic experience; for if not, how will they understand our pains? And when we do find someone who really seems to have the ability to listen to us, we then do not have the sense it is a doctor-patient, therapist-client, expert-ignoramus type of affair. It is more like a dialogue between friends who share in an understanding of a common world. The point is then, not whether we should be open about ourselves or the "Self," but whether our opening is an act of listening to the experience of others, to the experience of the world; whether it is a making of ourselves available to dialogue. As the American Trappist Thomas Merton (1962) once remarked, "If I give you my truth but fail to receive your truth in return, there can be no truth between us."

This discussion began with an attending to Schwab's appeal for a new way of being empirical in our research into curriculum and life in classrooms. This paper has been called "Experimental Eidetics as a Way of Entering Curriculum Language from the Ground Up" for the specific purpose of trying to link everything that has been said so far with insights central to phenomenology and hermeneutics.

The notion of *eidos* comes from Plato and was taken up by Husserl in the nineteenth century as a way of naming that which is present behind appearances, yet which gives appearances their uniqueness, vividness and detail. One can see the relationship between Husserl's eidetics and Plato's ideal forms. Husserl, living in the full blush of Kantian idealism, looked for the possibility of identifying the *universal* structures of subjective experience as a way of grounding a new empirical eidetic science. I think that most would agree, including Husserl himself, that he largely foundered in his search for absolute universals, largely due to his idealist roots, and also because he worked in an isolated German culture before the fully social origination of knowledge had been worked out, and before his student Heidegger had shown how our language itself expresses the underlying ontology of our lives. Husserl also had no nose for the dialectic. Nevertheless, the fundamental insight of Husserl and phenomenology in general remains valid, namely that we have to see the immediate things of the world as somehow

uniquely expressive of something which makes them possible, rather than as things final and discrete in their own right.

There are a number of other developments in the history of phenomenology and hermeneutics which warrant note here before proceeding to the main thrust of this paper. In his search for eidetic forms, Husserl was led to posit the existence of a transcendental ego, a kind of psychic purity, or pure consciousness which amounted to a separated-off, distilled apprehension of the essential structures of concrete experience. His wish to preserve a sense of the possibility of pure consciousness led to all sorts of philosophical difficulties, most notably what some have called the problem of other minds (Ryle: 1949). As a consequence, Alfred Schutz, one of his later students, forsook any interest in the problem of transcendence, and attempted to work phenomenologically for a revealing of the essential structures of social experience simply as they presented themselves at hand, in specific situations. In Schutz then, there is no question of those structures speaking beyond themselves, or of saying something about Being itself. In Schutz there is no ontology, only description and a search for ground structures. Ethnomethodology through Goffman (1959) and Garfinkel (1974), etc., is a spinoff from this, namely a search for the rules that govern people's behavior in specific situations. But it is precisely for these reasons that reading Schutz eventually becomes dissatisfying and the work of ethnomethodologists (to say nothing of ethnographers) leaves one disenchanted. It is because without an ontology, or a telos, the work is powerless to speak beyond itself, beyond the immediate situation or context. The case studies may be interesting, particularly if well written, but in the end, one is left with the question "so what?" Schutz's *On Phenomenology and Social Relations* has a certain eloquence of style, but also an absence of vitality. Goffman's essays become examples of a sort of intellectual imperialism, as he attempts to reduce all our actions to some form of rule adherence or rule governance. Heidegger on the other hand, in keeping to the forefront the ontological foundations of experience, keeps open the possibility of seeing deep messages in everything we do and say, that our very language tells us who and what we

are.

Heidegger's student, Gadamer (1965; 1979), takes up this view of language and experience but puts greater emphasis on their historical nature. For Gadamer, our fundamental historicality, expressed in language, must be understood before we can be capable of understanding ourselves in the present. But such understanding of ourselves as historical actors is an essentially dialectical affair, in which a sense of the past, present and future are in constant dialogue. So that when I look at a classroom situation, I do not simply see it as "present": I see it as "presently" expressing its history while at the same time as embodying within itself a sense of hope for the future. So a teacher does not just use a curriculum because it reaches him or her out of past deliberations by curriculum experts. She uses it also as expressive of broad cultural hope for the nation's young, and the nation's future.

When we speak of the future, and of hope, then we can speak also of their frustration. That is, what structures, attitudes, procedures in a classroom situation cut off a people's sense of possibility? Gadamer argues (1979) that hope and possibility are shut off when historically derived ideas and ideals are severed from the essential creativity of their originating roots. That is, when we take the offering of the past as fixed fact, then we lose the power of learning from it in any creative way. And in losing that power, we lose the ability of seeing ourselves as potentially shaping the future, of hearing the message of destiny, as Heidegger would say. If we take the language of curriculum experts, child study people, educational planners, etc., as brute data, rather than as historically constituted interpretations, then we lock ourselves and our children into a cultural box in which there can be no conversation, no dialogue, no debate; only a mindless, ritual acting out of the working of other people's minds. And that is a form of madness.

And so what is being proposed here is a way of describing everyday school situations in a manner that takes seriously the basic insight of phenomenology and hermeneutics, in the hope of being able to show the working out of our lives and their oppressions in their concreteness. A key phrase

of Husserl's was "to the things themselves." That is, if we want to know what is going on in classrooms, we can have direct access to the life there through our empirical senses, through our experience. But also, what we see and experience there has an eidetic quality – it speaks of something else. Heidegger says it speaks of us, of what we are as human beings. And that speaking comes through our language. Our language, says Gadamer, not only tells us what we are, it tells us what we were and what we hope to become. What follows is an attempt to describe in the language of everyday, common school experience, the events of one elementary Social Studies class, in a fairly typical North American school. After this has been done, an analysis of the language will be attempted in an effort to show the depth and implication of what we say about ourselves in a very taken-for-granted way.

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Miss Brown's grade five class, division two at E. Y. Bassett Elementary School in Riverview, British Columbia, has Social Studies after lunch every Tuesday and Thursday. The district had received word the previous summer from the Provincial Ministry of Education that a new unit on U.S. - Canada relations was available and recommended as a curriculum package for classroom use that year. Miss Brown planned to start using it that afternoon.

The kit had been prepared over the course of five years' deliberation between U.S. and Canadian curriculum experts and was hailed by school authorities north and south of the border as an excellent piece of work. It had been piloted in carefully sampled schools in both countries, checked and adjusted for readability at the grade five level, and praised for its innovative use of a variety of student activities, such as simulation games, slides, film strips, tapes, as well as pupil workbooks. Developing the unit had been a vastly expensive operation, far in excess of original budgeting, what with consultants' fees, travel and accommodation expenses for staff, meetings and the costs involved in employing the latest media technology. However, most were agreed that it had been a worthwhile investment for fostering Canada - U.S. understanding, and Miss Brown told her principal she was looking forward to incorporating it into her overall social studies program.

At 12:30 she sat in the school staff room finishing her nicely prepared salad lunch over a cup of coffee, and eyed the clock to see if there was time for a quick cigarette before going back to the classroom to get the introductory materials laid out for the children's return from the playground. It had been a rough morning during the math and language lessons because Sean, her "behaviour problem," had been

particularly disruptive. He admitted his older brother had taken him the night before to a concert of the Sex Pistols, a punk rock group on a North American tour. Feeling emboldened perhaps by the Pistols' brazenness, Sean had announced in a loud voice to the whole class "I don't give a — about math," and proceeded to provoke others toward a similar opinion. Miss Brown, known for her coolness, had been able to calm Sean down so that the class was able to get on with its work reasonably well, but the incident had taken its toll emotionally. Under her breath she cursed, or was it pitied, Sean's home situation – his father turned to drink after being laid off at the fish-packing plant, his mother was never home, too many kids, poor nutrition, health habits, etc. Really, she thought, with a background like that, Sean's behaviour was perfectly understandable.

She finished her cigarette, exchanged a joke with Bill M., the congenial vice-principal, and walked down the hall to her classroom. In preparation for the new unit, she had come into the school on the weekend to set up her room with relevant materials gleaned over the last month or so. Maps of North America were on the walls; pictures of Disneyland she had taken when visiting there with her boyfriend the previous summer; a newspaper picture of Prime Minister Trudeau and President Reagan shaking hands; a large model of the space shuttle; and several pictures of football and hockey players "to illustrate how professional athletes often play across national boundaries." Learning centres were set up according to such topics as History, Industry, Natural Resources, etc. so that children could move from one centre to another at their own pace. All the "hands on" materials Miss Brown had kept safe in the cupboard that morning, so she brought these out now – tape recorders, projectors, models, games etc.

The bell rang sharply at 1:00 p.m. Within minutes the whole building shook with the ploughing-in of the nation's youth. The tall with the short, the freckled and fair, the lean and the obese, the sad with the carefree, all streaming inside from outside, from the ground of play to their places of work. The sheer power of their presence, the heavy gasping for breath after an hour's bounding, the nostril-piercing sweat, the unashamed animation of voice, whether in wrath or glee – all these things never failed to precipitate a surge of feeling in Miss Brown which she could never quite identify, so deep was it. Very occasionally she resented it as an intrusion on the serenity of her own inner life, but more often than not, that moment of the children pouring into the school filled her with the most profound exhilaration. It was like the unfolding of a strange mysterious promise. Indeed, too, she had often remarked to herself how it was that stepping inside the school gates at 8:15 every morning, and seeing the children playing – girls hopscotch, boys football or fighting – hearing the shrieks and yells of which only an unadulterated consciousness is capable, and responding to children's honest inquiries about the day – stepping into all this every day seemed to bring a certain shedding of care, a kind of ritual cleansing from the burden of adult ratiocinations about the world.

Problems with her boyfriend (they had been living together for over a year now, but he was having trouble making the permanent commitment she wanted), memories of her father wasting away from lung cancer (he still chain-smoked with the proclamation that he had the constitutional right to do with his life what he chose), financial worries (would one ever be able to afford a house of one's own in this day and age?) – all these things seemed to fade when by their very presence the children demanded her attention.

At 1:15 most were in their places or at least struggling to be obedient to their drilled sense of place. The array of new equipment in the room, however, called forth the inquisitive propensities of many beyond the bounds of conscionable restraint. The room was soon filled with wild ejaculations: "Oh wow!" "Neat-o!" "Hey Bill, look at this!" said Peter to his friend, fiendishly attacking the tape-recorder in the "Natural Resources" section. Beth and Wendy were vigourously poring over one of the games on display and scheming as to how they could "work together" given the change for doing a project or such. When Miss Brown came in from the cloak room after sorting out Sandy's problems with lunch money (he had been tested to be borderline retarded) she saw the certain dishevelment of order and clapped her hands loudly. The clap was enough to signal in the children's minds the return to clear authority (they knew her well) and, somewhat sheepishly, they returned to their seats. The teacher gave a quick reiteration of the ground rules of behaviour in her room: return to desks immediately after lunch; no touching of displays, projects, etc. unless given permission; only whispering until teacher comes in, and then no talking whatsoever unless otherwise instructed.

For the introductory lesson, she planned to present a general overview of the unit, explaining how to use the centres, discussing some of the major issues and events in Canada - U.S. relations (disputes over fishing rights, the auto-pact, the building of the St. Lawrence seaway, etc. - all in simplified terms of course) and points of similarity and difference between the two countries. Time permitting, the students could design their own workbook covers.

As Michael sat in his seat waiting to begin, it might be said somehow that he was both in and out of the situation at the same time. He certainly was "present" there in the room, having answered as much at the post-lunch roll call. And he felt a definite curiosity about the new displays, with their inherent suggestion of something new. As he pondered these things though, it was amazing how easily his mind drifted directly from them to other aspects of his own perhaps more immediate concern. For example, a glance at the poster of the Montreal Canadiens hockey team brought on a flood of memories and associations about his own world of hockey: rinks and skates; hotdogs with mustard; crowds; roars; and those many 5:00 a.m. drives with his father to hockey practice on dark street-silent Saturday mornings at twenty below zero. That simple quick-thought of his father in turn brought other thoughts. Would his father be home today from Mon-

treal where he had been on business? I wonder what we're having for supper? I hope Billy (his preschool brother) hasn't been messing with my new X-15 Starfighter model – if he has I'm going to cream him when I get home. And as he thought about the X-15 Starfighter, his eye caught the model of the space-shuttle Miss Brown had so carefully placed on the side counter of the classroom, and suddenly he was "back" in his seat in division two, waiting for the class to begin.

He looked at his teacher and, as on so many occasions in the recent past, was somehow captured by her, carried, as it were, out of the situation. Perhaps it was the way she was dressed. She was wearing what he regarded as his favorite clothes for her, a grey-blue plaid skirt and scarlet tunic, which he noticed she wore every ten days. Or perhaps it was how, when she brushed by him during the spelling test, her hushed fragrance wrought a certain stirring in him, a stirring which, so little understood, so magical, rendered him incapable of hearing the word she had just announced, so that he had to ask her to repeat it. All these things were quite beyond him, but on his last report card, she had noted a need for him to improve his listening skills.

So he sat in his seat in the third row, third from the front, and heard the object of his fantasy clapping her hands again, with the words "I'm waiting ... I'm waiting ... I'm waiting for all eyes to be looking my way. Michael Callahan, I wish you would give me your attention!" The remark took Michael by surprise, stunned by the paradox of being totally transfixed by the very one to accuse him of inattention.

He became aware of the lesson beginning. Miss Brown was standing at the front holding up a large map he recognized to be of North America. Priding herself on her questioning technique, (it's important to draw on the knowledge the children already possess, she remembers one of her university instructors as saying) she proceeded by asking if anyone could come up and indicate the borderline between Canada and the United States. Linda did so with ease. This was followed by "How many people have been to the States?" Over half the class raised, flicked and strained their arms in affirmation, and this opened the way for half a dozen or so personal anecdotes about experiences in that country. Jimmy was particularly proud of the bead-belt which he had purchased on last summer's vacation to an uncle in Phoenix. He was able to come to the front, twist his backside into the entire class's full purview, and reveal ARIZONA emblazoned there on his singularly generous girth. Miss Brown smiled to herself, then invited Jimmy to tell everyone "what it's like" in America's largest desert state, as she (erroneously) assumed it to be.

After these informal exchanges, the class was briefly told of the new Social Studies unit they were beginning that day. There were a few somewhat bemused expressions of pleasure, one or two "Yay's!" a seeming general mild acceptance, and of course Sean, who, Miss Brown noticed, was almost ready to blurt out triumphantly, in the context of a Social Studies class, his recently-tried expletive. This she was able to defuse with "and of course, Sean, I think you'll really

enjoy this!"

After clearing up some basic definitions (Helen, well into puberty, wasn't sure what "natural resources" were), and explaining the use of the centres (you could work alone or in pairs), the class dispersed to allocated places. This was not without some jockeying and jostling, for inevitably certain centres had more initial appeal for certain people than others. Basil, for example, the bespectacled resident electronics whiz, dove instinctively for the project involving the use of the class computer terminal. Heather, aesthetically refined, wanted to work with the glossy "magazines," as she called them. But things did settle down eventually, and Miss Brown was pleased with the enthusiasm and intensity of the students' participation. This was the observation she highlighted most strenuously on the evaluation form the curriculum committee later asked her to fill out. As for the quality of the children's work, it was pretty much as expected: that is, the good students did well, the average students did average-ly, and the poor ones did poorly. But after all, as Mr. Johnston, the principal said, "The main thing about Social Studies is that it should be enjoyed."

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When we take this description as a whole we see the interweaving of many elements which play back and forth against one another as the "day" unfolds. The attempt here will be to look closely at that unfolding to see what might be said about curriculum as a classroom reality.

But first let us examine some issues of context. The opening sentence looks innocuous enough, even thoroughly typical: "Miss Brown's grade five class, division two at E.Y. Bassett Elementary School in Riverview, British Columbia, has Social Studies after lunch every Tuesday and Thursday." When we unpack the sentence, however, we see a whole world present, that is a world organized for particular people, and against which any pronouncements about curriculum change, educational policy, social reform, etc., must define themselves. Any thoughts and plans about the state of affairs being different, must taken account of what is the case for millions of adults and children across the land.

What are the situational givens shown here? One is that this is a classroom in a place called a school, where it is assumed by way of legal statute, that children will attend. It's a place where those children are heavily graded. Grade five is only one of twelve possibilities in their schooling lives and then there are sub-sets of each grade, called divisions, of which there could be any number. In the sentence, no

particular rationale is given for the "levelling"; it's simply taken for granted as being a feature of school life, just what goes on in the school is assumed to be elementary in some sort of way, as opposed to "high" or "secondary".

Also, we see that the school is named after a person, E.Y. Bassett, just as thousands are named after some prominent community, state, provincial, national or international figure. This is an important feature, for in attaching the name of an important person to a school, so we impute to the institution an importance we can in the end, only assume it to have. But tying it to an important person makes the school seem important also. Just *how* it is important is a matter of debate.

Similarly the names we put on schools tell us a great deal about what we expect from them, particularly by the community in which they are located. For example, one can easily imagine a school named "Martin Luther King Jr." in Watts, Los Angeles, or Selma, Alabama. On the other hand, it would be unthinkable (although in some ways perhaps, not a bad idea) to have a school named "Fidel Castro High" in Washington, D.C. Gadamer (1979) suggests that the only way to know a prejudice is to have it provoked into showing itself. An excellent way of provoking our deep prejudices might be to try putting some different names on our schools.

Another thing we see in the first sentence is that Social Studies is a subject time-tabled for after lunch, every Tuesday and Thursday. There is certainly nothing unusual in that, for most elementary schools. There is, however, something singularly ironic about the term "Social Studies" as a formal curriculum feature. It is almost as if the "Social" is some discrete phenomenon that one can observe, analyse, "know about" without necessarily living it. Or, one might say, it seems odd that it should be necessary to make a special provision to study the "Social" in so far as we "live" it unavoidably, inevitably, twenty-four hours a day. We cannot be anything but social. Perhaps that's why we merely "give it a nod" curricularly (although a very expensive nod) by tucking it in to the time-table only twice a week and after lunch at that, when everyone is drowsy after a meal and an hour's play.

And yet, placing it in the time-table in the way we do

reveals a certain naivety in our own understanding of the meaning of *social*. For us, it's a sort of congenial (remember Bill M., the vice-principal, p. 82, l. 14,) enjoyable affair. As Mr. Johnston, the principal said "The main thing about Social Studies is that it should be enjoyed." (p. 85, l. 18) One would never, however, hear educational planners in Third World countries, or in China or Cuba make a statement like that, because for them studying the Social is a crucial enterprise, absolutely vital to fostering their nationally emergent identity on the world scene. When one is rising from a long history of ignominy and oppression, Social Studies is not something you simply "fit in somehow" on Tuesday and Thursday afternoons. A culture secure in its social dominance, however, becomes lazy in its social sense, and takes its social arrangements for granted. In our culture, Social Studies always comes after Mathematics in elementary time-tables because in a technological society, mathematics is regarded as one of the "Basics", whereas to cultivate a sense of social understanding is a frill.

Following this we see how new curriculum comes into a school situation. It is the work of "experts", sanctioned by provincial (state or even federal) authorities, and "packaged" for classroom use. The school district "receives word" from the authorities of its existence, and makes the appropriate recommendations for use. Apart from occasional locally generated curriculum projects, implementation of our curriculum is almost always a top-down experience starting from experts presumed to know best. Little account is given to local situations because that is not the main interest. Centrally developed curriculum implies an assumption that it is possible to shape local learning, opinion, attitude, etc. from centrally generated policy. That is an assumption.

The new curriculum is legitimated on the basis of appeals to formal kinds of testing procedures which experts and authorities, being publically sanctioned in their expertise and authority, can use to put to rest any possible fears about the curriculum's efficacy, usefulness, strength. For example, this particular package has been "piloted", "checked and adjusted for readability" and made carefully "innovative". All these criteria may or may not have anything to do with

Miss Brown's class, but that is beside the point. It may be assumed that it is the teacher's job to make the curriculum "work" in the local situation, whatever that might mean.

Curriculum development is a "vastly expensive operation" (p. 81, l. 13) but again easily rationalized as a "worthwhile investment". But the quickness of the rationalization may tell us something about certain unquestioned faiths we project onto our curriculum efforts. In this case, the intent is to "foster U. S. - Canadian understanding", which sounds laudable, but one wonders if all the formal curriculum development effort really does what is intended. That is, without unpacking the meaning of "understanding" in a critical hermeneutic sense, the fruit of the exercise seems more in the nature of a masking of fundamental realities. Children "learn about" the "States" or Canada but they do not necessarily get to see the deep structures of U. S. - Canada relations which impinge on the inner fabric of their lives.

So, for example, let us look at Sean, the class behavior problem (p. 81, bottom of page). Miss Brown rationalizes his misbehavior as a product of a poor home situation. This interpretation reflects the kind of psychologistic determinism which is taught in Canadian teacher-training institutions using U. S. psychology texts. This prevents Miss Brown from seeing that Sean's father "turning to drink after being laid off at the fish-packing plant" is a reflection of U. S. - Canadian relations in a very profound way. The fish-packing plant, although in Canada, is U. S. owned, and production is subject to the marketing whims of U. S. executives. Sean's father, in being laid off work, is a victim of circumstances over which neither he, nor local Canadian municipal governments have any control. His turning to drink leads to a compounding of family social problems initiated by a particular set of politico-economic structural arrangements which themselves should be brought to question and judgement before any judgement is made about Sean as a "behavior problem" in grade five.

This imbuing of daily life with the political and economic realities of U. S. - Canada relations reaches right into the school staffroom with our pretty teacher eating her salad lunch. Her prettiness reflects all that passes for "looking good" on American television programs broad-

cast in Canada--from the Farrah haircut to the wet-your-whistle lip gloss. Her salad lunch is made with lettuce from California, cultivated by Mexican cheap-labour. She buys her produce in a grocery chain store owned by U. S. interests in which all profits over and above local expenses leave Canada for the pockets of U. S. entrepreneurs.

But the infusion of Canadian culture with assumptions shared by our southern neighbours goes even deeper; deeper than the scientization of the mind noticeable in Michael as he fantasizes about his X-15 starfighter (p. 83, last paragraph) and the space shuttle. We see it in Miss Brown's personal problems, with which she probably copes fairly well by most standards. C. Wright Mills (1964) makes the distinction, while at the same time drawing a relationship, between personal troubles and public issues. The former are those that individuals have in an idiosyncratic sort of way. But when more and more people begin to share the same problems, then what was once simply a"personal trouble" becomes a "public issue". At the moment. Miss Brown regards her troubles as simply personal, but it may be that they are more in the nature of public issues, because in a sense, they all reduce to certain assumptions about a concern for human rights.

Without doubt the question of human rights is a preoccupation which engages us all with great tenacity. We are all concerned about our rights these days, and we want to be sure nobody is violating them. We hold our freedoms dear, the freedom to do, say, and think what we want. And so we shall, or so we think. But the end result of our fierce, proud, sanctification of personal rights may be to witness our own gradual cultural suicide. For love of one another cannot be built on justification of the self and the appeal to rights. Is it not ironic that Miss Brown's father is dying of smoking-induced lung-cancer while proclaiming his right to live as he chooses? Similarly, as a person about Miss Brown's age, I can identify with the problem she has with her boyfriend and his difficulty in making a permanent commitment. We have the freedom to "live together" these days without too much social and public embarrassment or censure. But somehow our ability to love deeply is being strangulated by an inability to give of ourselves.

Usually we interpret our relationship breakdowns as having something to do with personal "incompatibilities" and we go on to say that we respect each other's right to go a separate way. But what can we do to ensure going a way *together*?

Another one of our teacher's worries, that we can touch on briefly, is financial. We are all worried about inflation, and the social problems it is causing are now becoming more and more apparent. We hope "the government" with its access to the best economic counsel, will be able to "solve the inflation problem". But we do not see that inflation is a consequence issuing from our most sacred assumptions about free enterprise, consumerism, capital expansion, and so on. Our whole sense of life is inflated; and no government reorganization or change of presidents is, in itself, going to solve anything. The best we can hope for is a leader who can inspire us to change our way of thinking, but in a political system where leaders are elected by influenced choice, and on promises of giving people what they want, there is little room for optimism.

So we see then that a curriculum unit which presents itself as fostering understanding in U. S. - Canada relations may not in fact deal with what is fundamental to that issue. In fact, through the opportunity it provides for the celebration of "casual knowledge" (talking about Disneyland, family trips to Arizona, space shuttles, etc.) - some of it erroneous (p. 84, 8 from bottom) - it may only serve to hide the deep structures which undergird all that we, in a shared sense, take for granted. Indeed, the very way in which the curriculum material is presented, with the latest technological wizardry, simulation games etc. may tell us more about what is really going on the curriculum implementation than the up-front formal curricularized knowledge pumped through the process. We see (p. 85 top) that as far as the children are concerned, what excites them are the new process of knowledge--computers, glossy magazines, etc.--rather than a fundamental coming to grips with the kind of thinking that can change a life. But this, too, is easily rationalized away, which speaks perhaps of the essential social control interest in classroom life. What pleases Miss Brown is the "enthusiasm and intensity of the students' participation" (p. 85, l.11) and this is what she

highlights on the curriculum evaluation form. In other words the assumption is that it does not really matter *what* we do as long as we can do it with enthusiasm and intensity. For when children exhibit those qualities, we seldom have classroom discipline problems. But it still leaves open the question as to whether *what* we do is worthwhile, valuable or good. That question requires great thought, perspicacity, and wisdom, qualities glossed over when information and knowledge are seen simply in "process" terms. Information processing may signal in our culture what Horkeimer and Adorno (1973) have described as "the death of thought".

This leads us to a discussion of the nature of pedagogy and its relationship to curriculum activity as described so far.

The notion of curriculum development and implementation must be understood as something that takes place on many levels and in different ways. There is a dialectical inner and outer quality to curriculum. The formal procedures are clear, as we have shown; however what transpires between teacher and student is much more complex. For one thing, both teacher and student bring their complete personalities, their total world-experience to every situation, which includes their inner and outer lives. Miss Brown has a public self which she presents to the class, not only through her speech, her mannerisms, and her formal declarations about curriculum content and knowledge-to-be-learned. At the same time she has a powerful inner life which implicates itself in her public actions. She has her personal troubles which the children may or may not know about, but which the children, simply by being what they are, help to alleviate or push off. This is a common experience of teachers, as Jackson (1968) has shown. Children as children serve to alleviate the burdens of the adult world for adults, and that alleviation in turn motivates adults, and in this case teachers, to "love kids" all the more and to try to do well by them. The frequent sense of irony and humour that children bring to the adult world is also noteworthy in this respect.

So too do children have simultaneously and dialectically, public and private lives. Curriculum implementation, indeed teaching in general, is usually thought of as predominantly a public one-way affair. That is, there is knowledge-to-be-learned, there is a teacher to teach it, and there

are students to learn it. There are many and various teaching skills, strategies etc. for getting publically sanctioned knowledge across to children, or "into" them. But children have private inner lives, too, as well as public ones, and much grief in schools ensues from little acknowledgement of this deep inner world of children. Michael, as we saw, is accused of inattention to the teacher at the same moment as he is giving her his utmost attention (p. 84, second paragraph) although in a different way than she was expecting. Similarly, Miss Brown notes on his report card that he needs to improve his listening skills, particularly in spelling, when we all know that there is absolutely nothing wrong with his listening or his hearing. He is, at times, only "hearing" different aspects of experience than the one being formally transacted at the moment.

We might note, too, some aspects of the process of Michael's learning about his world; some aspects of his emerging cognition. Again, it is an inner/outer, dialectical, or we might say after Ricoeur and Gadamer, a hermeneutically circular process. Michael sits in the class waiting for formal things to begin. He sees the public, tangible artifacts displayed in the classroom which in turn immediately spark off associations with his own private experience. He "fantasizes" about this world, and then is brought back to the public situation by a coincidental catching of his eye by another classroom artifact, whcih is representative of part of the teacher's formal pedagogic program. Such a "catching" brings him into a new readiness, a new openness and receptivity to possible transpirations. This process should suggest something to us as educators, namely the importance of giving children imaginative space for their own reflection about what is going on in their lives, in the classroom or otherwise. Often we are too anxious to "get through the curriculum" to give children time to live out the inward/outward dimensions of their sense-making.

Finally, some consideration of page eighty-four, second full paragraph may reveal important insight into the teacher's typical role as pedagogue. Some questions may also emerge. To gain the class's attention, she stands at the front and claps her hands with the words "I'm waiting...I'm waiting ...I'm waiting for all eyes to be looking my way." Even taken at face value, the words have a certain power. This teacher

like many, is one who waits for children. Not only that, she waits for them to be looking her way. We know that, literally, to educate means to lead, from the Latin *educare*, and that leading implies a certain showing of a way. So in one sense, we might commend Miss Brown for her insistence that children look her way so that she might lead them, that she might educate them. But the question arises, what is she leading them into? What is the nature of that way she is showing them? Without doubt, she would rate as a good teacher on any current scale. She gets along well with staff, she willingly and positively accepts new curricular mandates; children find her attractive; she appreciates humour in the classroom while at the same time knowing how to creatively handle potential discipline problems and she works hard, even coming to school on weekends to prepare and organize her materials.

And yet, perhaps it is precisely for these qualities that she is limited as an educator, namely that because on any current scale she would rate as "excellent". That is, she is a perfect, embodied reflection of the culture of which she is a part--right down to her nicely prepared salad lunch, her vivacious congeniality, and her problems with her boyfriend. There is absolutely no sense in which one could have confidence in saying that she understands the culture of which she is a part, that she understands it from underneath, so to speak. That is, she is "in" it so profoundly, that the only way she could be described as one who waits for and leads children, is as one who totally accepts the world as she has received it and waits to lead children into the same. She waits for all the children's eyes to be looking her way, but where do *her* eyes look? Behind her eyes is a mind framed and fastened into a particular way of seeing. But what is the nature of her vision? Does she look at her world as one with strictly local, regional, or even national parameters, or does she look beyond it. Has she herself been educated--even with four years of university training--in any sense that gives her the ability to see the deep structures of her life, to stand apart from her "givens", to stand in such a way as to be able to lead people, her students, to think about what they are about? These are important questions that seem to strike at the point of Schwab's appeal for "a basis for beginning to know what we are doing."

The analysis undertaken in the previous section does not exhaust what could be raised about the seemingly innocent description of the Grade five Social Studies class. But in making an appeal to the eidetic as a way of entering the language embodied in that description, an important question concerns what makes such a form of research possible. How can others "do it" is a frequent query, and the response must be that what is required is not a series of steps to be followed so much as a new way of "positioning" oneself as a researcher. A new way of "being with" the world of the classroom, might be a way Heidegger would put it. Is there a way of being with that world more intimately that we may show it more fully?

The linking of intimacy with the power to show is not accidental, for central to the historical interest of phenomenology and hermeneutics is the question of how as modes of scientific inquiry, they can push off those objectivist research traditions which are seen as fundamentally contributive to the alienations of modern "knowing". They both attempt to restore the "human juice" (Barritt et.al. 1979) to any accounts of human situations. The appeal on the one hand is to an acceptance of "the things themselves" as they present themselves first-hand to the experience of the researcher, and further, there is an attempt to reveal how the past and future are always immenent within any present moment.

When a researcher approaches a Grade Five Social Studies class from these perspectives, he recognizes how, in a very deep sense, he "belongs" to the situation in a human way. One of the early theorizers of hermeneutic method, Freiderich Schleiermacher, argued that the only reason contemporary interpreters could make sense of ancient texts was because they shared a common humanity with those who wrote the original words (Dilthey 1900). This may sound trite, but no less profound when applied to what is being proposed here, namely that the only thing which makes possible an understanding of Grade Five Social Studies class for a contemporary researcher is that he or she shares a common humanity with all those engaged in the intricate entrails of the classroom situation. He or she shares with all the children, the teacher, the curriculum planners, the administrators, and the policy politicians a common blood and bond which allows an insight into what is happening.

But for this insight to come to light, the researcher must own himself as being one with his people and their situatedness, knowing full well that he is not far from them? that what they face he faces too; what they suffer is part of his own pain, and that in their joy he too rejoices. Heidegger says that what inspires this is a "caring care" (German *Sorge*) which makes the hermeneutic act an act of "shepherding", such that the one who takes upon himself the task of reconciling the world to itself is a "Shepherd of Being" (in Steiner, 1981).

This research then, contrary to any positivistic, objectivist tradition, involves an intimate relations, a form of articulating fellowship, which enables the researcher (the term soon begins to jar) to describe the world of the classroom in its fullness, to show that the curriculum enterprise, at bottom, is not simply a technical, up-front, visible,manipulative enterprise performed by experts, be they teachers, planners, or politicians. Rather, all those manifest activities are eidetic: they are visible expressions of an invisible life which makes them possible. Making articulate that invisible life is the poetic art of phenomenological description. Showing the involvement of that life within the fabric of the total human drama in all its historic, political and personal complexity is the hermeneutic challenge. An attention to the eidetic quality of our life together is an attempt to bring into the centre of our research conversation everything that we are, as a way of reconciling in the present moment our ends with our beginnings. Where will such a conversation "get us"? In a sense it will not "get us" anywhere, but it may help to bring us to where we are already.

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CENSORSHIP, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER

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I am deeply appreciative that the Alabama Education Association and the Alabama Association of Colleges of Teacher Education have seen fit to sponsor a conference which includes a serious consideration of academic freedom and the problem of censorship. I am honored to have been invited to speak on these issues. I am convinced that there are no more important issues facing the profession today. Among other things, the large quantity of the censorship cases in the last six to eight years points to this conclusion. Beginning in 1977-78, we were faced with more incidents of attempted and/or successful censorship nationwide than anytime in the past twenty five years. Ninety percent of these incidents involved schools. Sometimes books and other materials were burned and destroyed; and in the case which might be said to mark the beginning of the latest wave of censorship (Kanawha County, West Virginia), physical violence and injury of persons and property were involved.

I wish to make it clear from the beginning that I do not consider it my task today to present the pro's and con's of academic freedom versus censorship. From my experience as an educator in public schools and higher education, and as a scholar in the cultural foundations of education, I have concluded that there is little if anything positive to say about censorship, *provided one remains loyal to the tenants of a democratic society*. Censorship, in the words of Edward Jenkinson, an authority on the latest wave of banning attempts, "is the tool of tyrannous societies."[1] In addition, not only is censorship the tool of tyrants, but it is generally stupid because it leads to unproductive and bizarre consequences not only for the victims, but also for the perpetrators of censorship. In a majority of cases,

truly hard core pornography remains unscathed, yet classical literary works are removed from schools--John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath*, Richard Wright's *Native Son*, Mark Twain's *Huckleberry Finn*, J. D. Salinger's *Catcher In The Rye*, and Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter* to mention only a few. Even more paradoxically, attempts at censoring books, films, and other curriculum materials generally lead to an exaggerated interest in the forbidden material, as many of us know from our childhood and teenage days of reading the "juicy" parts of such victims of censorship as *Lady Chatterley's Lover, Fanny Hill, Love Without Fear, God's Little Acre, Peyton Place, and Forever Amber.*

Moreover, these consequences are merely the minor and short term ones. More seriously, this latest wave of censorship is likely, if it continues to succeed, to create a level of ignorance which threatens the bare survival (not to mention the possibility of development to higher levels) of any form of a democratic social order. Too often we commit the fallacy of assuming that we have achieved and are practicing the American Dream of a democratic society, when we have yet to achieve that goal except at a very minimal and unstable level. [2] Academic freedom in education is a necessary condition for any further positive development toward more democratic relations and institutions. Only with such freedom can we even begin to correct the errors, distortions and outright lies that the public receives from a media largely controlled by the concentrated economic power of huge corporations. As John Dewey said several decades ago in his column in *The Social Frontier*:

> Today freedom of teaching and learning is imperatively necessary for that kind of intelligent citizenship that is genuinely free to take part in social reconstruction without which democracy will die...Since freedom of mind and freedom of expression are the root of all freedom, to deny freedom in education is a crime against democracy. It is a social issue and does not just concern the teacher as an individual.[3]

In short, the respect, preservation, and appreciation of civil liberties, intelligent participation in political affairs, mutually growth producing relationships with others, and other essentials of a democratic way of life demand a level of consciousness and intellect which go far beyond the

pollyanna simplemindedness which is characteristic of the mentality of most of the current censors. They are motivated by a fear of free discussion, of controversy, and of honest examination of issues. They wish to protect students from the complex, conflictful, and desperately problematic reality--social, political, economic, personal--of modern society and times.

This attempt to evade problems through censorship is not new but, in fact, calls for us to re-examine an era in the past when a courageous and imaginative group of educators fought to establish academic freedom for public school teachers and children in the interest of preserving, improving, and remaking our democratic heritage. This group of educators were those who founded the outstanding journal *Social Frontier/Frontiers of Democracy* at Teachers College during the Depression. They included such persons as John Dewey, George S. Counts, W. H. Kilpatrick, Harold Rugg, Charles Beard, Lewis Mumford, Ruth Benedict, and Roger Baldwin. This journal is worth reading for both inspirational and intellectual purposes for anyone interested in fighting the censors.[4] Among other things, this group with the support of others, fought hard against the censorship of Harold Rugg's realistic social studies textbooks in a wave of censorship similar to the one we face today. On the one hand, there were sincere, but confused and fearful people like one lady, Mrs. Elwood J. Turner, corresponding secretary of the Daughters of Colonial Wars in Philadelphia, who said of Rugg's texts:

> "They try to give the child an unbiased viewpoint instead of teaching real Americanism. All of the old histories taught my country right or wrong. That's the point of view we want our children to adopt. We cannot afford to let them make up their own minds."[5]

Such fearful attitudes aid and abet the more cynical type of censor: powerful, greedy, and wealthy propagandists who are motivated mainly to preserve their own interest, power, and status.[6] Today the same roles are being played respectively by some of the blue collar workers of America and more powerful persons such as the Ronald Reagans, the Fob James, the Mel Gablers, Jerry Falwell, and Senator Jeremiah Denton.

These attempts to restirct academic freedom to continue Dewey's line of thought:

> show a lack of faith in intelligence and results in youth being incapable of intelligently facing the realities of our social, political, and economic life.[7]

This attitude is clearly anti-survival. It is a denial of realities we all face sometimes daily. In a world of dangerous technology, fouled up personal and social relationships, and so forth, and we cannot have any semblance of a quality of life or perhaps even survive, unless we face the grimy and unpleasant aspects of our society and world. To quote Dewey for a final time:

> Without the freedom to explore the forces at work in society and the means by which they may be directed, the habits of intelligent action that are necessary to the orderly development of society cannot be created. This leaves open recourse to violence.[8]

Thus, we cannot afford to allow any angry and frustrated group of people to turn the schools into their shrunken image, but must preserve and protect those teachers (and materials) who without fear examine the problems of our society realistically. We cannot afford, for example, to deny the reality of adult mistakes and weaknesses when the problems of spouse and child abuse threaten to overwhelm us. Nor can we afford to hide the questionable and downright immoral things done by important public officials, both military and civilian. That is, we need to allow fullblown investigations by our school children of Watergate, Vietnam, blatant violations of civil liberties in this country, the outright persecution and jailing (or deportation) of creative dissenters, the undermining of popular democratic governments in third world countries, and so forth.[9] In order to come to terms with ourselves and grow and develop both as individuals and as groups/cultures/nations, we must recover our shadowy repressed and suppressed past as well as celebrate our positive achievements. We must own up to our past "sins" so we do not continue to repeat these mistakes and allow the past to control us inadvertently. We cannot, for example, afford to censor the appropriate apology of a white man in one of the censored texts in which referring to white racism he says, "I apologize for the meanness and stupidity of my race."[10]

Nor do we have anything to gain by covering up the truth of historical events and personages. In order to reduce

history to their own shrunken image many of these censors wish to tell lies about the founding fathers of our American Revolution, Constitution and Bill of Rights. For example, many of them continue to insist that the United States was founded upon Christian (and by implication, fundamentalist) principles. Yet, a modicum of research will reveal that among the thinkers and leaders of the American Revolution, practicing Christians were rare; and that George Washington said, "The government of the United States is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion." Men like Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin, and James Madison were deists holding that God stepped out of the scene shortly after getting the universe started, pausing just long enough to lay down Newton's laws of nature.[11] Jefferson, for example, sometimes needled Christian dinner guests with attacks on the character of Jesus, and was famous for such quotes as, "In every country and in every age the priest has been hostile to liberty. He is always in alliance with the despot, abetting his abuses in return for protection in his own." Nor did these attitudes stop with the original founding fathers. Abe Lincoln is quoted to have said late in his life, "My earlier views of the unsoundness of the Christian scheme of salvation and the human origin of the Scriptures have become clearer and stronger with advancing years and I see no reason for thinking I shall ever change them." When these facts are considered those who claim America to be a fundamentalist Christian country are "radicals" who wish to depart from the philosophy and activities of our great political founding fathers; and who deny the reality of known facts about them.[12]

A final example deals with a double denial of reality. I am referring to the much mystified "Back to the Basics Movement" which is closely tied up with the dominant mentality of the current censors. Many of them are very anxious to return to the study of traditional grammar, (underline the noun once, the verb twice, circle the pronouns, etc.), and they want everyone to collude in the falsehood that this is an academically valuable activity. First, this position denies many decades of research pointing to a neutral and at times even a negative relationship between teaching traditional grammar and skill in writing and speaking. Second, it is a way of avoiding confrontation with socially critical and realistic literature.[13]

All of the above imply, in addition, that the current mentality of the censors includes a view of children and adolescents as *property* (the same as slaves)–objectified beings who are given this slave status by God. As one rightwing, moral majority group proclaimed, "We have been endowed with certain inalienable rights by our creator *over* our children and must insist that the schools and legislatures recognize and *insure* those rights."[14] (italics mine.)

However, let it be recognized by all who are interested in fighting censorship, that while most recent and past attempts at censorship have come from overtly authoritarian rightwing groups, certain so-called liberal groups have also been engaging in it at least since the 1960's. There is always the danger of covert tyranny among "liberals" who have an axe to grind for the "oppressed," perhaps because the liberals have not dealt with their own unemancipated state.[15] At any rate, certain groups opposing racism, sexism, or both have been involved in attempting to thwart academic freedom in the name of "freedom." The National Organization of Women was successful in censoring materials in Montgomery County, Maryland. The Multi-Cultural Non-Sexist Advisory Council of Cedar Rapids, Iowa was so successful that it aroused the adamant opposition of the Iowa Civil Liberties Union against "liberal " censorship. The ICU issued the following statement:

> Our schools of all places, should be the last places to deal with bad ideas by sweeping them under the rug. If any of these books have archaic concepts or bad ideas, they should be singled out for classroom discussion, not hidden away. These books are a reflection of a society which has been and continues to be racist and sexist in many subtle and not so subtle ways. The problem is not cured by removing books from the library.[16]

Other liberal censors include Parents Who Care, Citizens United for Responsible Education, and Council on Interracial Books for Children. Some of the groups concerned about racism have tragically and ignorantly succeeded in removing *Huckleberry Finn* from some schools.

My conclusion from all of this is that we must fight the censors of the left and the right. The question then becomes, but how? The answer is in many ways at many different levels. Some of these many ways are the substance of the

rest of this address.

One major line of attack must be to increase the commitment, courage, vision, and stamina of each individual educator through qualitative improvements and quantitative lengthening of teacher-preparation programs. Both the general and professional education of teachers should be geared to teach the prospective and in-service educator that when she/he fights against censorship and for academic freedom, he/she is doing more than fighting for and justifying her/his professional autonomy and the student's right to read, to know, and to have access to varying points of view. [17] In addition, he/she is fighting for the very survival of the American democratic tradition against a slow and steady progress toward a *1984/Brave New World* slave/totalitarian society. In an age of science and advanced technology, some form of developed democratic community may well be the only alternative to a fascist and fuedal social-industrial arrangement. [18]

This sense of commitment even beyond professionalism and client interest is necessary if one is to maintain the strength, courage, and vision to continously stand for democracy in these matters. This implies that teacher-education must broaden its focus (and increase its length) to include not only sustained attention to child and adolescent development, but also to adult development; that is, to the self, spiritual, or ethical development of the educators themselves. The nature of this ethical and spiritual education must include an integrated and interdisciplinary framework of academic knowledge which can be focused upon the ethical import of the concrete/practical situations.[19]

A major end-in-view of such a fusion of theory and practice would be to stimulate the ethical and spiritual development of each individual so that they would be willing to stand alone on their own spiritual resources, if necessary, to defend the cause of academic freedom for public school educators and pupils. Such a level of ethical individualism–which is synonomous for many philosophers and students of human society with being "professional" [20] means that a person has achieved and gone beyond the dull-minded conventional morality which see ethical behavior as identical to conforming to the rules and structures of the dominant social and cultural group (from the perspective of conven-

tional morality, it was ethical to be a Nazi in German during the 1930's and early 40's).[21]

By contrast, the ethical individual or truly professional educator is capable of seeing social institutions, artifacts, and practices as human creations, some of which promote growth and educative experience and need to be conserved and retained; and some of which restrict the growth of the human spirit and intellect and need to be resisted, destructured and transcended by new growth producing structures and practices. Educators with such expanded consciousness will realize that even though there are risks involved in defending academic freedom including loss of job and even injury and death, none of these threatened losses are as serious as the loss which comes with the capitulations to tyranny--*The loss of soul.*

Let there be no mistake that I am asserting the desirability of teachers who insist upon the freedom to teach the truth about our society and in fact any human society--they and all of their parts are finite human creations. It is neither responsible nor truthful to teach the sacredness, immutability, and total goodness of a social order which has brought Watergate, Vietnam, overkill, hundreds of thousands of battered children, Three Mile Island, poor mental and physical health on the part of many, and so forth. A more honest approach would present this order as a phenomenon which has a beginning in time, a life span which includes a death or ending, and *both* good and bad features.[22] To teach the basic soundness of our social order without the proper criticism is to teach falsehoods, injustice, violence, and suicide.

Such an ethical orientation is not going to be built by the current structures of teacher education, which like state departments of education and many other educational agencies and organizations, are far too much animated by the atomistic and reductionistic assumptions of the mechanical world view. This view of the world was the basis of 18th and 19th century natural science, but has been rejected by natural science in the 20th century because nature has revealed herself to be too complex and dynamic to be explained mechanically.[23] Such an emphasis requires too much of the prospective and in-service educators time to be spent in doing such mechanical acts as writing behavioral

objectives, fulfilling externally prescribed teacher competencies, writing lesson plans, learning how to make up objective tests, how to grade according to the normal curve, how to appreciate the virtues of the only kind of research acceptable to the mechanical mind (statistical), taking multiple choice tests including the "exit exam," and so forth. By contrast, too little of the education of the educator is spent on such activities as raising and researching ethical questions, examining the writings and lives of ethically developed individuals (e.g., Ghandi), learning historical and philosophical methods of inquiry, and inquiring into the development of a man as a being capable of transcendent spiritual and moral growth.

Nor is such a level of ethical development encouraged by the current structure of the public schools themselves, a second area of attention if we are to effectively challenge the censors and maintain a climate of academic freedom in the schools. Currently, in addition to censors outside of the educational system, we have serious restraints upon teacher autonomy coming from the arbitrary actions of school administrators at all levels--school, city, county, state, and nation. This capacity for internal censorship is related to the historical development of school organization as a bureaucratic structure. [24] Since the beginning of the 20th century, extensive documentation shows that the schools have been largely owned and controlled by business and industry. The administration of the public schools was formed according to the mass production efficiency system of big business, another form of the mechanical world view embodied in our schools. [25] This began with the literal application of Frederick W. Taylor's system of "scientific management" to the organization of the public schools in the first decades of the twentieth century. This system involves complete prescription in relation to the tasks of the teacher and leaves no place for teaching as an art. Subjects are treated mechanically and separately. Loads are much too heavy to encourage a vital teacher who is energetic enough to experiment and grow.[26] Moreover, the classroom teachers are reduced to a subordinate enforcers and implementers of rules, policies, and programs decided upon by others. One willing to be such a low level bureaucratic functionary is hardly the type of person who is likely to have a passionate commitment to academic freedom. That we have many such committed teachers is nothing short of a miracle and

more than we deserve.

Moreover, the superordinate-subordinate relationship of administrator and classroom teacher along with the former's ties with school boards frequently puts the school administrator on the side of the censor against the teacher. This sometimes has very embarrassing results for the profession. In the Parducci case here in Montgomery (1970), certain administrators were in agreement that Kurt Vonnegut's *Welcome to the Monkey House* should be censored on the grounds that it advocated free sex and killing the elderly. The court, however, corrected this grossly distorted and ignorant interpretation by correctly denying that Vonnegut advocated either of those things, and by correctly asserting that he was concerned instead with satirizing and calling attention to the depersonalization of individual human beings in modern mass society. [27] Something similar happened in Dade County, Florida in the early 1960's, concerning Orwell's *1984* and Huxley's *Brave New World*, but tragically this time no court corrected the misinterpretations. The ignorance concerning these books reached all the way to the United States Commissioner of Education. [28]

I concluded from all of this that if academic freedom is to prevail teachers and their organizations need to push for a different organizational structure (e.g., hospital) in the schools. They also need to discourage the machine operator style of teacher who capitulates so easily to external authority and standardization, and who would make academic freedom a waste even if it were made available as a gift. The mechanical nature of much of teacher education and the subordinate status of the classroom staff result in too many educators who seem to feel little responsibility for the deeper social consequences of their acts and none toward preserving and reconstructing the American democratic heritage. Unwittingly they accept the ethically deficient status of mere hired men and women, who regard themselves as passive instruments in the hands of social forces--"Society," "The Local Community," the "Public," and the "State." [29]

In addition, our teacher education, both university and in-service programs, must be consciously designed to expand and heighten the educator's consciousness beyond the above designated level. We must teach each of them (and ourselves not to fear the label "radical", but to realize that this

is often a term projected on thé creative spirits of history, i.e., those who have had the courage to dissent and to break with the herd. Such individuals are not really bad company once one overcomes one's fear--Jesus Christ, Socrates, William Blake, Henry David Thoreau, Walt Whitman, Eugene Debs, Emma Goldman, Ghandi, George Counts, Harold Rugg, John Dewey, Pete Seeger, Ralph Nader, Helen Caldicott, et.al.

All of this is not to say that ethical individuals encouraged by changed structures in professional and public education are the only prerequisites for a successful stand against the censors. After all, courageous and visionary, yet finite individuals, can only stand so much pressure, hindrance, and violence from the fascist currents of censorship. A strong professional organization, which is militantly committed to standing behind every member whose autonomy and integrity are genuinely threatened, is absolutely necessary. Moreover, these professional organizations must not be afraid to use our legal system. Primarily, though not entirely, the courts have been the friends of academic freedom, not only for the college professor as researcher, but for public school teachers and pupils also. Many judges and other constitutional authorities have provided us with sound arguments for our cause. The weight of things leaves no doubt that the First Amendment embraces the student right to know and teacher right to teach.[30] Primarily, the courts have said that it is not proper to restrict academic freedom because materials, ideas, books, and so forth might be offensive to parents or to powerful and/or disgruntled groups; or because someone does not want students to know about the grimy and unpleasant aspects of historical or present social reality. It is only proper if the materials are not appropriate for the maturity level of the pupils or completely irrelevant to the subjects being taught; or if there is an actual disruption of the educative process or a clear and present danger to health and safety.

On the other hand, some judges and lawyers have condescendingly spoken out against academic freedom for public school teachers (as opposed to university professors, for which they affirm it), on the basis that public school teachers do not have the independent tradition, the intellectual

qualifications and often the experience and maturity necessary for academic freedom. These critics see public schools as existing to merely transmit basic information and values by established techniques toward the end of indoctrinating the pupil into the mores of the surrounding community (as though there was in existence a unified community!). The "market place" (or free exchange) model of ideas is rejected for a traditional value inculcation model.

These arguments are philosophically defunct, even wrong, because, among other things, they are based upon a false view of society as a monolith involving a true consensus and of knowledge and values as fixed and finished.[31] They also demean the professional autonomy and creativity of educators. Above all, this position has fundamentally undemocratic implications. Promoters of the inculcations model do not want teachers to promote critical thinking or to critically examine human creations, but only to inculcate and improve the extant.

Some legal authorities assert to the contrary that the restriction of opportunity in the public schools for involvement in an open forum of free exchange of ideas would clearly foster an unacceptable elitism. Among other things it fails to complete the development of those not going on to college. This is contrary to our constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity. Effective citizenship in a participatory democracy must not be dependent upon advance toward college degrees. It is inappropriate to reserve academic freedom only for higher education. This was the decision in Bob Cary et al., vs. the Board of Education of the Adams-Arapohoe School District.[32]

The judge in this case went even further in refuting the traditional transmission model. He said he could not accept the proposition that teachers are "essentially extension of their employers." If teachers must follow the wishes of the majority as reflected by the school board and authorities and serve as role models for these authorities, the result would be a tyranny contrary to the Constitution?[33] He seems to agree that "scared hired hands cannot prepare citizens to practice democracy." Again, the weight of things says students have the right to be exposed to a wide variety of written materials some of which may be offensive to some members of the community. Books may not be censored merely because they present ideas and life styles

different from and even dispised by parents and others in the community.

All of this says that we need to be eternally vigilant of those degenerate elements in our society who currently wish to destroy and undermine the integrity and democratic influence of our judiciary system. In the 1982 Congressional session there were many bills (sponsored by Senator Jessie Helms, et al.) which aimed at stripping the powers of our court system. These efforts, in all likelihood, will continue in the future.[34] Educators would do well to take a strong political stand against such anti-democratic action.

Yet to rely upon the formalities of court decisions alone has not been enough. Even when courts have ruled for us in one case, for example, Parducci vs. Rutland, within a few years or even months another locality has defied these decisions and set policies contrary to them in the extreme. For example, some school districts have set policies which allow anything to be censored that could be considered offensive to the "general public;" or have censored material in response to one angry person who has not even read the "objectionable" material. [35] In some cases the materials are even the same as those the court has ruled on previously. For example, as suggested above, Vonnegut's *Welcome To The Monkey House* has been attacked many times since the Parducci case. It is discouraging but we must face the fact that achieving and maintaining academic freedom is a continuous struggle. If we do not participate in this struggle we will see the more courageous and energetic of our numbers picked off by rich, reactionary, and selfish persons (who know what they want to maintain) and the frustrated elements of the lower middle class who are not sure why they are so angry at educators and schools. We will see our "profession gradually degraded and forced into a more service position."[36]

Hence, in addition to legal remedies, we need extensive networks of communication so that we can conduct massive public information campaigns and defend communities under attack. In addition, we need to confront and to really communicate with those who wish to censor us. We need to understand who they are. We need to be respectful and yet firm in defense of democratic ideals. Immediately, we need to develop ways to approach these persons with sufficient firmness (i.e., not give into the

authoritarian structures in the censors' personalities and groups), and respect and humility (i.e., not give into our own fascist and authoritarian tendencies.). This is no easy task. Certainly, we can admit that our society is in a mess without accepting more than our share of the blame (we are all responsible), and with a firm insistence that the schools do not cause societies, nor can they alone solve them. Rather, the school's problems are society's problems in microcosm. Each cultural institution reflects and is implicated in these social problems. Eventually through this communication we must make an attempt to educate the censors to the social functions of academic freedom, and not let them escape the truth of its vital connection to the foundations of our country, the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. However, in order to really begin effective communication, we must identify our "enemy" and through doing this we can also identify more long term strategies based not only on a criticism of our censors, but also a criticism of ourselves.

Who then are these censors? We have indicated that they fall into two groups...rich, powerful, greedy, and cynical propagandists who have a real interest in maintaining ignorance of social realities in order to maintain their control and status; and mainly working class people of middle America who are frustrated and confused by today's world. Many of the latter went to academically poor and completely segregated high schools. In an increasingly pluralistic world, they tend to regard their fundamentalist religious outlook and its accompanying morality as the only valid perspective. Many of them are threatened by the civil rights movements of blacks, women, and gays. Many were the victims of that very censored and fascistic period of the 1950's, and did not have opportunities to be liberated by any form of higher education or life experience. They tend to be threatened anytime the schools go beyond the limitations they grew up with. Many of them live dull and meaningless lives, and censorship activities provide purpose and significance. Nevertheless, we must ask, before we so readily condemn and as a precondition for communication, is there any truth in their actions and criticisms? Are there elements that we should acknowledge? If so, what are their nature?

To address this question one must begin with the core of the "right wing" charges against educators. A major

charge of the censors is that we are anti-God folks who practice a religion called "secular humanism." This charge, when fully unpacked, is full of errors, lies, and distortion, but it does contain a kernel of partial truth which we need to carefully consider. Technically and on the surface, the censors have simply made a gross error in confusing "humanism" as an educational ideology expounded by Carl Rogers, et al., and "secular humanism" as a theological trend of thought originating with the Unitarian pastor, W. Dietrich. However, with the predominance of the mechanical world view in public education in the twentieth century, we have tended to deny all of the reality except for its quantifiable aspects. In doing so we have embraced a rather crass secularism in which the ethical, spiritual, imaginative, and intuitive aspects of human consciousness and nature have been denied any importance at all or reduced to secondary phenomena which are "merely in the mind." [37]These dimensions must take a backseat to mechanical activities such as behavioral modification, writing behavioral objectives, endless rounds of standardized testing, puzzle solving with statistical research, etc. The assumptions underlying the notion of accountability in the 1970's and 80's are completely mechanical in the sense indicated above. [38]These assumptions have reduced the rational to mere calculative operations.

This means we have left ourselves wide open to the fundamentalist absolutists. We have allowed them to steal our ethical and spiritual language; and at times they use it well against us to express profound truths whether or not they apprehend their deepest meanings. For example, one censor reported in Jenkinson's book said, "Intellect without ethical character is dangerous." Who can deny that? Many of Hitler's most faithful security police workers in the holocaust had Ph.D's in philosophy, theology, mathematics. [39]

Hence, to really face our censors, we need to examine our own penchant to embrace mechanical ideologies in light of a third tradition which says that neither secularism in its crass mechanical sense nor fundamentalist religion with its fascist and censoring drive, are an adequate foundation for American democracy and education. This third tradition is found among many western thinkers who have

opposed the mechanical view of nature and the human body underlying the philosophy of the 18th century Enlightenment. There is no time to list even a fraction of these thinkers and their works, but I would be happy to develop a bibliography if there is sufficient demand.[40] Today I will deal briefly with only two groups of thinkers in this third tradition, the first of which are eighteenth and nineteenth century romantic poets (mainly European, but also including the poet-seer of American democracy, Walt Whitman). Another of these poets the Englishman, William Blake, clearly illustrates the antipathy of our third position toward both fundamentalist, authoritarian, and repressive religions of all sorts and secularism of the mechanical variety. The first denies the human body; the second, the human soul.

In his"Marriage of Heaven and Hell," Blake reveals himself to be the enemy of all religions based upon repressive fear and hatred of the body which he considers to be divine in the unrepressed state. Among other things he declares:

> All Bibles or sacred codes have been the causes of the following errors:
> 1. That man has two real existing principles: viz: a Body and a Soul.
> 2. That Energy, call'd Evil, is alone from the Body; and that Reason called Good, is alone from the Soul.
> 3. That God will torment Man in Eternity for following his energies.
>
> But the following Contraries to these are True:
> 1. Man has no body distinct from his Soul; for that call'd Body is a portion of the Soul discern'd by the five Senses, the chief inlets of Soul in this age.
> 2. Energy is the only life and is from the Body; and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of Energy.
> 3. Energy is Eternal Delight.[41]

He also says in this same work: "He who desires and acts not breeds pestilence;" "Prisons are built with the stones of Law, Brothels with the bricks of religion."[42] These are hardly comforting words for Falwell, Phyllis Shaffly, B. James, the Mel Gablers or Senator Denton.

Nevertheless, throughout Blake's works, mechanical-secular philosophy is exposed as limiting, unsatisfying, and

downright dangerous to the human spirit and human society. His mythical character, "Urizen" (your reason), is the devil or satan when separated from the feeling, sensuous, intuitive, and spiritual aspects of human consciousness and personality. Moreover, Blake asks that God will spare us from the "Single Vision and Newton's Sleep" which is the outcome of mechanical and secular philosophy. On the contrary, when Urizen personifying the intellect is integrated with those aspects of human consciousness which mechanical philosophers deny, he becomes the "Prince of Light."[43] This group of poets anticipated the outstanding western scientists (Werner Heisenberg, Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, Erwin Schrodinger, et al.) who created modern atomic and subatomic physics in the first several decades of the 20th century. Their discoveries and insights had the profound effect of making natural science research and thought shift from the narrow Newtonian-mechanical world picture to an organic view of reality. This organic world view transcends and goes beyond the crass mechanical secularism of earlier western science and the static and repressive religious structures of the modern fundamentalist outlook. The physicists themselves and other scholars of science have characterized their paradigm as similar to that of both eastern and western mystics. [45] Modern physics embraces a view of the world which includes the spiritual, ethical, and intuitive as fundamental aspects, but not in the degenerate and static forms of the fundamentalist.[46] Rather, reality consists of dynamic, fluid processes akin to mystical experience.

The limited truth in the censor's philosophy and the linking of this to the wider truth of the third tradition can be used to shed further light on the nature of our lower-middle class censor especially as he/she is related to social conditions that we as educators might address. One thing is perfectly evident. The censor is primarily America's "common man;" the one whose life was supposed to have been enriched and enobled, according to the American dream. This means that the dream is in deep trouble. Perhaps, if we are not too cynical, too morally and spiritually bankrupt, too disappointed in trying to realize our ideals, we need to think of reconstituting that dream so that our common man grows into Walt Whitman's democratic person, and not into a fascist. As George Counts said a

few decades ago in his small, but provocative book, *Dare The Schools Build A New Social Order?* without this dream and a real commitment to it, America's spirit will flee, and "she will be known merely as the richest and most powerful nation." [47] In short, he implies that if we lose our honest and revolutionary commitment to democracy, we have little left other than a weary mechanical materialism. We are left with no soul, no spirit.

Counts and other *Frontiersman* did not hesitate to face the fact that fascism could become a real problem in this country if we did not reconstruct our social order. The common man during the depression was also frustrated and angry; and these educators saw clearly the danger of fascist currents in our society which many of us have a hard time admitting today. To quote Counts again:

> The hypocrisy which is so characteristic of our public the fairly obvious fact that America is the scene of two opposing forces. On the one side is the democratic tradition inherited from the past; on the other is a system of (social and*) economic arrangements which increasingly partakes of the nature of industrial feudalism. Both of these forces cannot survive; one or the other must give way. [48] (*my addition).

These educators say clearly that if things were merely allowed to drift, as we have been allowing them to do in the 1970's, democracy might not be the outcome. They assumed, and the latest wave of censorship confirms them, that our earlier success with democracy was largely the happy accident of abundant land and resources. Now with these gone, we must consciously reconstruct this democratic heritage for a more complex, technical society, and this reconstruction is primarily an educational process and task. Hence, once again we are faced with the need for many ethically developed, energetic, and courageous educators who are committed to the reconstruction of American society toward democratic community in the modern age.

In this struggle, we cannot, indeed we must not, lose for if we do we will be forced to lie to our students. As Kenneth Donelson, a colleague in English education so aptly says, "The young are not fooled by adult reticence about the hard facts of life. Our only acceptable approach to them must be to refuse to gloss over the wrong we know exists, or else

it will repeat itself, increase and afterwards our pupils will not forgive us what we forgave."[49] Even more seriously, our democratic heritage could be lost forever. Nevertheless, let us keep our faith and hope that even in the apparent twilight of democracy, it hardly seems possible that the citizens of America will permit government of the people, by the people, and for the people to perish from the earth, and that education can play an important role in this reconstructive preservation. It is true that we have done little historically to challenge existing miseducative and growth thwarting social structures, yet that does not mean that it is impossible for education to become now and in the future an effective instrument in social reconstruction toward a more democratic, abundant, secure society–*but not without academic freedom*. Let it be said of us in Alabama, that while others talked of liberty, they struggled that it might survive.

* * *

FOOTNOTES

[1]Edward B. Jenkinson. *Censors in the Classroom:The Mind Benders* (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois Press), 1979. p.xix.

[2] Among others, the poet–seer of American democracy, Walt Whitman, and its major philosopher, John Dewey, constantly remind us in their writings that democracy on any scale at all is an anticipated, not a realized condition. The deeper structures of democratic social order and personalities have yet to be developed. In "Democratic Vistas" Whitman says: "Did you, too, O friend, suppose democracy was only for elections, for politics, and for a party name? I say democracy is only of use there that it may pass on and come to its flower and fruits in manners, in the highest forms of interaction between men and their beliefs--in religion, literature, colleges, and schools–democracy in all public and private life, and in the army and navy. I have intimated that as a paramount scheme, it has yet few or no full realizers and believers..."

"I submit, therefore, that the fruition of democracy, on aught like a grand scale, resides together in the future..."(pp. 474-475).

"For not only is it not enough that the new blood, new frame of democracy should be vivified and held together merely by political means, superficial suffrage, legislation, etc., but it is clear to me that unless it goes deeper, gets at least as firm and warm a hold in men's heart, emotions, and beliefs, as in their days, feudalism and ecclesiasticism, and inaugurates its own perennial sources, welling from the center forever its strength will be defective, its growth doubtful, and its main charm wanting. I suggest, therefore, the possibility, should some two or three really original American poets (perhaps artists or lecturers) arise...they would give more compaction and more moral identity (the quality most needed today) to these States, than all its Constitutions, legislative and judicial ties, and all its hitherto political, warlike, or materialistic experiences (p. 459).

Walt Whitman, "Democratic Vistas," in James E. Miller. *Complete Poetry and Selected Prose By Walt Whitman* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), pps. 455-501.

Dewey deals with the incomplete development of democratic social structures and personalities in America in several major works. See, for example, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: Gateway Books), 1946. Specifically, in this work Dewey states the conditions necessary for movement toward a more democratic social order and persons: "The prime condition of a democratically organized public is a kind of knowledge and insight which does not exist yet." p. 166) This knowledge is dependent upon the absence of censorship with respect to inquiry into social institutions and conditions and the dissimination of results. This, according to Dewey, will require some healing as "There is a social pathology which works powerfully against effective inquiry into social institutions and conditions." (p. 170). This pathology includes control of the dissemination of results by "those who have something at stake in having a lie believed..."(p. 171)

Dewey says we must also free the *artist* to present the results of this inquiry. This means that Dewey, along with Whitman, sees the deeper structures of democracy to depend upon the non-rational aspects of the human personality feeling, intuition, imagination. In confirming Whitman's insistence on the importance of the artist in democratic

community, Dewey says: "Men's conscious life of opinion and judgment often proceeds on a superficial and trivial plane. But their lives reach a deeper level. The function of art has always been to break through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness...Artists have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in itself that is new, but the kindling of it by emotion, perception, and appreciation."

In sum, democratic community depends upon: "The highest and most difficult kind of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, vivid, and responsive art of communication" which "must take possession of the physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breath life into it." (p. 184).

Finally, Whitman and Dewey have many intellectual children, grandchildren, great-grandchildren who have carried on this concern for continuously developing toward democratic community–George Counts, Harold Rugg, Lewis Mumford, Theordore Rosak, Rosemary Reuther, to name only a few.

[3]John Dewey. "The Social Significance of Academic Freedom". *Social Frontier* (March, 1936) p. 165.

[4] *The Social Frontier/Frontiers of Democracy* was published from 1934-43. It is still in print and can be obtained from Arton Publishing Company in five volumes for $180.

[5]Alonzo F. Myers. "The Attack On the Rugg Books." *Frontiers of Democracy* (October, 1940), p. 17.

[6]For example, what follows are portions of a letter written by Henry Bing, a wealthy business man, to an old schoolmate, Frederick Redefer who was at that time executive secretary of the Progressive Education Association. Bing's letter was in response to Redefer's inquiry into Bing and his associates' negative attitudes toward educational reform. The entire letter was published in *Frontiers of Democracy* (May, 1940), pps.240-41. Among the relevant portions: "Our program is simple and direct: We are attacking all educational expenditures, and the progressive education movement in particular..."

What we dislike most in education today is its expansions to serve all the children of all the people. We would like to turn the calendar back to the good old days when youngsters at fourteen went out to work. The public schools tax money did not have to support them then and taxpayers saved a nice

pile of do-re-mi. If the schools return to the three R's and a straight academic curriculum, many youths today who could not possibly fit into such a program will drop out. We feel that this is the place to concentrate our efforts! We will attack the *new* ideas and the *new* practices.

In the name of "good education" we will advocate a return to the essentials, a study of the lasting books. Such a plan will make us popular with the public for on this point both public and the profession have an achilles heel. You know the teachers really like the fundamentals. That has been their training. When they teach the classics they are "scholars"; this gives them their recognition, their security and a position which they believe elevates them above the massess. On the other hand, what appeals more to the general public then the "essentials," and the fundamentals? After all, the classics were the educational diet of our great men of the past! You must admit that it is only a small group of radicals who want to consider the individual and his needs and who wants a broadened curriculum to serve all the children. Such fol-de-rol can easily be eliminated under the battle cry of "essentials." If we can return our schools to the simple academic studies, we will automatically eliminate the large percentage of boys and girls who are not interested and not able to profit by studying such remote stuff. This, we feel, is one way to keep education from expanding and to keep taxes down.

Our attack will be directed against " progressive education" because as a label it covers anything we don't like. We can state that in progressive schools children do not learn. We can state that they teach spelling by relay-race methods. We can attack consumer education and the study of social problems. We are working to eliminate Ruggs books as ultra-radical and advocate returning to the essentials of history, geography and civics. We can blame the increase in crime on progressive education. We can claim that the Youth Congress is a result of progressive schools. We can shout about the lack of discipline in progressive schools. We don't need to define our terms. Good as well as bad practices may all go when the public is aroused. Frankly we don't much care so long as our taxes are reduced.

We will concentrate our efforts on the centers of the progressive movement in education. What wouldn't we give to control such a nationally known center of progressive

education as Teachers College! And if we could turn a few of the famous demonstration schools where teachers and superintendents get some of these new ideas into conservative centers or demonstrations of "terminal education," our cause would be won! It would pay us to endow Lincoln if we could make it conservative. *Progressive education, aside from meeting the needs of all the children, results in too many inquiring minds and too many questions are not good for people.* (italics mine)

It is almost too obvious to mention the similarity between Bing's ideas and the "back-to-the-Basics" movement supported by Senator Jeremiah Denton and other lesser known of the current censors.

[7] Dewey, OP. CIT., p. 165.

[8] IBID., p. 166.

[9] With respect to these issues, the least well known may well be the undermining of popular governments by agents of the United States government. This has been going on since the early 1950's, especially in Latin America. The latest and perhaps most tragic was the role of Nixon, Kissinger, and the CIA in helping to topple the Allende government in Chile. See, for example, Seymour M. Hersh. "The Price of Power: Kissinger, Nixon, and Chile." *The Atlantic* (December, 1982, pps. 31-58. These activities are partially motivated by pressures from American corporations who resist any changes, however good for the natives, that might reduce their profits or freedom of action in the foreign country. This writer has personally interviewed natives of Chile who went through the awful transition as members of university faculties. Their experiences of the transition was that of going from a climate of open inquiry and discussion to that of having secret policemen sitting in their classrooms.

[10] Jenkinson, OP. CIT., p. 152

[11] Barbara Ehrenreich. "U. S. Patriots Without God on Their Side." *Mother Jones* (February/March, 1981), p. 35-40. Henry B. Parkes. *The American Experience* (New York: Vintage Books, 1947.

[12] It should be remembered that our founding fathers, unlike the majority of Americans at the time, were deeply influenced by the rationalistic and deistic religious outlook of the Eighteenth century Enlightment. This philosophy in turn was the product of thinkers (e.g., Voltaire, Locke) who were thoroughly horrified by the violence of religious wars and conflicts which occurred in the few centuries just prior to the establishment of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of the United States. This violence occurred in all segments of Christianity, i.e., within the Catholic Church, between Protestants and Catholics and with Protestant sects. For example, with respect to the latter, Calvinism "promoted an attitude of extreme militancy and aggressiveness. It divided mankind into two groups, the elect and the damned. Those who had faith in God, who sincerely endeavored to obey the moral rules that God had established, and who were accepted into the Calvinist Church, might feel assured of their own election, and could rely upon God for guidance and protection. The rest of mankind were among the damned. It was the duty of the elect to impose their way of life upon the rest of the human race, if necessary by force, and to see to it that the will of God was obeyed. Calvinism thus led to civil war and revolution, and was the spearhead of the advance of the middle class to political power, in several European countries." Parkes, OP.CIT., p. 67.

The Calvinist view of life "inevitably led to self-righteousness and to intolerance. The Puritans were convinced that they knew the will of God and that it was their duty to carry it into effect, if necessary by the use of coercion." IBID p. 72.

As is well known, religious violence and persecution within Calvinist groups had even erupted in Colonial America and involved the witch trials in New England. The persons who adhered to the Enlightenment point of view feared what they considered to be the narrow view and the excess of conviction of fundamentalist religions. See, for example, John Locke. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: World Publishing), 1964, pps. 427-8. The founding fathers were deeply concerned with a separation of church and state in order to prevent fundamentalist groups from imposing their views on others and so many

religions (Christian and non-Christian) could live in reasonable harmony on American soil.

[13] Lee Burress. "A Brief Report of the 1977 NCTE Censorship Survey" in James E. Davis. *Dealing with Censorship* (Urbana, Illinois: National Council of Teachers of English), 1979, p. 23.

[14] Jenkinson, OP.CIT., p. 49.

[15] The tendency for oppressed and oppressive behaviors to be two sides of the same unemancipated human psyche is dealt with at length by Paulo Freire in his work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Seabury Press), 1970; and earlier by G. Hegel in *The Phenomenology of Mind* (New York: Harper & Row), 1967. If you allow yourself to be oppressed by others, you will probably oppress others given certain conditions. A truly emancipated human realizes that both dominance and submission are dehumanizing and has moved beyond either mastery or slavery.

[16] Jenkinson. OP CIT., p. 158.

[17] This is not in any way intended to demean these important specific goals, but simply to say that there are broader concerns which include them.

[18] The point that there are two major "American" personalities, social trends, etc.--one tending toward democracy and the other still firmly entrenched in a psychology of dominance--has been made by many of the group of writers and thinkers who have stressed that a democratic society is as yet an anticipated and possible rather than a realized condition. See, for example, George S. Counts, *Dare The Schools Build A New Social Order?* (New York: Arno Press), 1969, pps. 48-49.

[19] The most inclusive and integrated framework developed thus far is Giorgio Tagliacozzo's "Tree of Knowledge." This tree, based upon the thought of the eighteenth century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico, includes all forms of human knowledge and expression (science, art, religion, myth, etc.) in their historical development, present status, and relationships with each other. For descriptions of the tree, see Giorgio Tagliacozzo. "General Education as Unity of Knowledge: A Theory Based Upon Vichian Principles."

Social Research (Winter, 1976), pps. 768-796; and Michael S. Littleford. "Vico and Curriculum Studies." *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (Summer, 1979), pps. 54-64.

[20] See, for example, R. H. Tawney. *The Acquisitive Society*. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company), 1920. Commenting on Tawney, educator Frank Blackington ("The Profession," an unpublished position paper) says that his work implies that the essential dimension of a real profession is ethical behavior with respect to a necessary social function. Commitment to this social purpose rather than to immediate self interest or conformity to external pressure (in the form of other people's self interest, etc.) is the primary motivation of professional behavior. This requires an ethical individual whose moral decisions are based upon universal principles or universal identification with all human beings (e.g., each human is an end in herself/himself and not a means for the ends of others) and not merely upon the rules and mores of any particular cultural group/society. This developmental distinction, among others, is made in Kohlberg's scheme of moral development which includes: l. pre-conventional morality; might is right, an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, you scratch my back/I ll scratch yours; 2. conventional morality based upon the desire of the approval of primary "others," e.g., parents, peers, teachers, or a more or less absolute loyalty to a particular society. The latter can be described as a "law and order" or "my country/society/group right or wrong" orientation; and 3) post-conventional morality which includes what we are calling ethical behavior for professionals. In the latter, there are two stages, the first of which is a realization of the relativity of one's own particular culture, group, or society. That is, a person realizes there are many ways of organizing society and being human: and that these patterns are created by human choice and action. Social contract theory is sort of a metaphor for this level of ethical development. Finally, if the development continues, one comes to have an ethical identification with all of mankind (perhaps all living things) and a commitment to treat each being as an end in him/herself. See, Lawrence Kohlberg, "Development As the Aim of Education." *Harvard Educational Review* (November, 1972), pps. 449-496; and "From Is To Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy

and Get Away With It In the Study of Moral Development," in Theodore Mischell, ed. *Cognitive Development and Epistemology*. (New York: Academic Press), 1971, pps. 151-235.

Freire, OP CIT., also suggests the validity of the above ideas and deals more deeply with the ethical development of the total person. Kohlberg rather onesidedly dwells on the cognitive dimensions of moral development at the expense of the non-cognitive, e.g., intuition, emotion, imagination, empathy. In particular, Freire stresses the ethically developed person's greater capacities for openness in dialogue and greater effectiveness in transforming reality toward a more just and loving human world.

Finally, Eric Neuman, drawing upon insights from Jungian psychology and elsewhere, suggests that the higher levels of ethical development depend upon development toward psychological wholeness (or what Jung called individuation) rather than the onesided consciousness which the old Judeo-Christian ethic, based upon the repression of important aspects of self, tends to produce. Such a repressive approach to ethical education suppresses human evil, rather than allowing the developing individual to become conscious of and deal with his own evil. This suppression or repression results in a "shadow" personality which is unclaimed by the conscious self and projected upon others. In contrast to this, Neuman advocates a process or developmental position. The individual must work through his own basic moral problem before he is in a position to play a responsible part in a collective. See Eric Neuman, *Depth Psychology and A New Ethic*. (New York: Harper), 1969. Neuman's et al., position suggests the need for extensive opportunities in professional education to confront ethical dilemmas, to acquire self knowledge (especially knowledge of one's non-cognitive aspects), for discussions relating to the relationship between self reflection and social action, etc. In short, this approach means the "endeavor to bring the conscious and unconscious into responsible relation."IBID. p. 15.

21 Obviously, one of the major problems with the old repressive and absolutist morality (e.g., my country, group, society, right or wrong) is that individuals at this level are too frequently willing to commit atrocious acts against other persons, animals, resources, etc., if the group as a whole approves or is involved in the atrocities. This is what Neuman means by the collective projection of shadow

personalities such as that involved in the Nazi holocaust, lynchings in the old South, and so forth. In short, dull minded/conventional morality has a nasty fascist shadow. Neuman, a near victim of the Nazi's, might remind us that Adolph Eichman was, after all, a good bureaucrat or organization man.

[22] Vico, OP CIT., was the first of a steady line of thinkers whose social theories (in contrast to more mechanical and linear ones) stress the self created nature of human institution, knowledge, and personalities, their emergent and developmental nature (i.e., they are born, mature, run-down, die); and the need for periodic recreations and renewals. Among the more famous quotes from Vico's *New Science* is: "But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, he alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or civil world, which, since men made it, men could come to know." pps. 52-3, No.331.

For more modern statement of this Vichian position see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman. *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich), 1970, pps. 414-438. Berger points out that "reification" or the failure to recognize the human creation of the human world is "natural" in the sense that we are all born helpless and in need of nurturance from the social world. Given this fact, the social world has a certain brute facticity and development of consciousness is required to transcend this "natural fallacy." Berger gives a complete definition of reification and points to its consequences in the following quote: "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly suprahuman terms. Another way of saying this is that reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human

products– such as facts of nature, results of cosmic law, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. The reified world, is by definition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced by man as a strange facticity, an *opus alienum* over which he has no control rather than as the *opus proprium* of his own productive activity." (p. 89).

[23] See, for example, Werner Heisenberg. *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science* (New York: Harper and Row), 1958; Fritjof Capra. *The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism* (Berkeley: Shambala Publishers, 1975; Gart Zukav. *The Dancing Wuli Masters: An Overview of the New Physics* (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc.,) 1979.

[24] For an excellent anthropological study of some of the relevant concrete consequences of educational bureaucracy, see Elizabeth Eddy. *Becoming a Teacher: The Passage to Professional Status* (New York: Teachers College Press), 1969.

[25] See, for example, Raymond E. Callahan. *Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces That Have Shaped the Administration of the Schools* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1962; Arthur G. Wirth. *Education in the Technological Society: The Vocational-Liberal Controversy in the Early Twentieth Century* (Scranton, PA: Intext Educational Publishers), 1972; Sheila Harty. *Hucksters in the Classroom: A Review of Industry Propaganda in the Schools* (Washington, D. C.: Center for the Study of Responsibe Law), 1979. This careful and thorough document was the winner of the 1980 George Orwell Award.

[26] Research confirming the phenomena of teacher "burnout" is now extensive in the educational literature. A recent book (originally a doctoral dissertation) was written by an Auburn graduate on whose doctoral committee this writer served. See Ray V. D'Arienzo, et al., *Stress in Teaching* (Washington, D. C.: University Press of America,

Inc.), 1982. D'Arienzo's book contains a review of the existing research on this topic. Given the increasing evidence concerning massive fatigue, depression, and ill-health among committed veteran educators, Dr. Walter Harris' condescending remarks at the Summit Conferences denying this phenomena were insensitive and insulting to public school teachers. Harris' attitudes and remarks, e.g., "There aren't enough teachers on fire for many to burn out," are all too typical of the denial and mystification of important educational phenomena by administrators who rarely, if ever, enter a classroom. Dr. Harris was the presenter in the third general session: "Testing: Its Relationship to Quality Education".

[27] Jenkinson, OP. CIT., p. 147; Louis Fischer and David Schimmel. *The Civil Rights of Teachers* (New York: Harper and Row, publishers), 1973, pps. 37-39.

[28] Callahan, OP. CIT., p. 254.

[29] For a discussion of the ethical deficiency of mere conformity to the social norm, etc., see footnotes 20 and 21.

[30] Jenkinson, OP.CIT., p. 155.;

31 This pretense of consensus is an additional example of unrealistic attitudes which work against human well being and survival. Since the beginning of the industrial and urban revolutions in the United States, one of our most serious problems has been fragmentation at many levels. Even those accepting the reality of the ever dynamic, conflictful, and unfinished nature of human culture and personality have been alarmed at the extreme lack of consensus and stability in our society; and even beyond that the seeming inability to engage in authentic dialogue whereby our differences might be understood and transformed into a more harmonious human world. The need for methods for reaching consensus in an ongoing way was a major concern of the founders of the area of foundations of education. See, for example, E. Bruce Raup, et al., *The Improvement of Practical Intelligence* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University), 1950.

[32] Jenkinson, OP CIT., p. 145.

33 IBID., p. 146.

34 This writer attended an American Civil Liberties Union Lobbying Workshop at the University of Alabama in Birming-

ham, Sunday, November 14, 1982. At the workshop she learned that during the last congressional year, forty separate bills emerged which aimed at undermining our federal court system. Fortunately, none of them passed, but ACLU personnel are of the opinion that preserving the integrity of the federal courts is now a problem. Should any such laws pass in the future, the courts could be stripped of effectiveness because their decisions could be reversed without constitutional amendments.

[35] Jenkinson, OP. CIT., p. 37.

[36] George Counts. "Shall Teachers Be Free." *The Social Frontier* (March, 1936), p. 164. In light of the quantity of censorship cases and other examples of interference with teacher autonomy, these words are still most pertinent to the situation of the average public school teacher.

[37] This reduction of the qualitative in education to the "merely subjective" is a form of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities which is a key component of the mechanical philosophy of Newtonian science and other aspects of Enlightenment thinking. It was endorsed by mechanistic thinkers as dissimilar as John Locke and Rene Descartes. Locke was an empiricist who believed that all knowledge comes to us externally via the senses, and that until acted upon by these external influences the mind is blank and passive. Descartes was a rationalist who held that knowledge comes from the application of abstract, mathematical formulas and proofs to physical reality, and that the mind is innately structured with such ideas. In essence, the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities says that the quantitative, measureable, and analyzable aspects of reality, e.g., number, size, motion, acceleration, shape, constitute the primary aspects of reality. They are "objectively there" regardless of the presence of a human observer. In contrast, those aspects of reality which are qualitative and do not lend themselves to measurement, e.g., values, purposes, colors, odors, feelings, are secondary phenomena which have no existence in nature apart from the human perceiver.

This static separation of "subjective" and "objective"

has been discredited and rejected by Modern Natural science, social criticism, and philosophy. The new physics (Capra. OP. CIT.; Heisenberg, OP. CIT.; Zukav, OP.CIT.) rests upon the premises that the observer and the observed are inextricably linked and that nature includes the non-ordinary, the mysterious, and the unpredictable. When these developments are considered, educational research operates according to the paradigm of a *defunct* physics. For a treatment of this doctrine from the perspective of social criticism and historical research, see Lewis Mumford. OP. CIT., Ch. 3; and Theodore Roszak. *Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society.* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co. Inc.,) 1973, Part II, pps. 101-249. For critical and in-depth philosophical treatments of the doctrine see Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press), 1978; and John Dewey, *Experience and Nature.* (New York: Dover Publications), 1958.

[38] For a socio-philosophical criticism of these assumptions, see Martin Levitt. "The Ideology of Accountability." *Educational Studies* (Fall, 1972), pps. 133-140.

[39] Nora Levin, *The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry 1933-45* (New York: Schocken Book), 1955, p. 55.

[40] Giambattista Vico, who is also mentioned in footnote 22 as the first of a line of social thinkers stressing the self created nature of the human world and human nature, was also the first to seriously challenge the mechanistic theories of Descartes, et al., especially in relation to their application to human community and behavior. See, for example, Giambattista Vico. "On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians Taken From the Origin of the Latin Language," in Leon Pompa, editor. *Vico Selected Writings* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 1982, pps. 49-77.

[41] William Blake. "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," in Geoffery Keynes, editor. *Blake Complete Writings* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1969, p. 49.

[42] IBID p. 151.

[43] Roszak, OP. CIT., p. 275

[44] Capra, OP. CIT.,; Zukav, OP. CIT.

[45] IBID.; Preston Harold. *The Shining Stranger: An Unorthodox Interpretation of Jesus and His Mission* (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company), 1973.

[46] In particular, a fluid and interconnected (organic) view of reality means that static devices such as the words of the fundamentalists and the statistical tools of the mechanist are forever inadequate to fully describe and capture the ultimately real. This means universal or first principles can exist, but require eternal effort on the part of humans to, however inadequately, express them to fellow humans who have not yet directly (meditatively) perceived them. Such is the position of Alfred N. Whitehead, OP. CIT., p. 4. After affirming the existence in reality (as distinguised from our verbal and mathematical descriptions of it), Whitehead asserts: "Philosophers can never hope finally to formulate these metaphysical first principles. Weakness of insight and deficiencies of language stand in the way inexorably. Words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and however such elements of language be stabilized as technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap.

There is no first principle which is in itself unknowable, not to be captured by a flash of insight. But, putting aside the difficulties of language, deficiency in imaginative penetration forbids progress in any form other than that of an asymptotic approach to a scheme of principles, only definable in terms of the ideal which they should satisfy."

In addition, the whole of general semantics, an interdisciplinary field founded by Alfred Korzyski, is based upon the above premises. The major assumptions of general semantics are reflected in a phrase coined by Korzybski, "The map is not the territory." For more elaboration of the field see, A. Korzybski. *Science and Sanity* (Lakeville, Connecticut: International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company), 1958; J. Samuel Bois. *The Art of Awareness: A Textbook on General Semantics and Epistemics* (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Co., Pub.), 1973.

[47] Counts. *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?* p. 40.

[48] I added the word "social" to Count's quote because although he is not Marxian, his thinking did lean in the direction of the primacy of economic factors in the reform of education and society and toward an acceptance of the need for huge, centralized economic structures. Although his analysis and elaboration of the conflicting forces in American society is still on target, recent thought and developments have revealed both the insufficiency of reform based upon the primacy of economic factors and the questionable value of massive economic structures. A relatively long period of economic security for many Americans has revealed that economic security in itself does not make humans unselfish, more creative, more cooperative, etc. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for movement toward democratic society. Psychological transformation, spiritual development, democratic community require psychological and social developments in addition to economic re-structuring. Many factors must be worked on simultaneously for genuine progress to be made. Hence, contemporary educators with Count's socially reconstructive spirit now focus upon methods of personal liberation, acquiring self knowledge through self reflection, growth through specially structured social interactions, etc., in addition to economic reform. See, for example, James R. Whitt. "Self Reflection, Social Action, and Curriculum Theory, Part I. *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (Winter, 1981), pps. 202-210; Michael S. Littleford. "Self Reflection, Social Action, and Curriculum Theory. Part II. *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* (Winter, 1981), pps. 211-222. See also, William Pinar. editor; *Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Co.), 1974.

In addition, since Counts was writing during the Depression years, bigness itself has become a dehumanizing problem for many of his intellectual descendants. Hence, although in spirit these thinkers are close to Counts, the letter of their message is somewhat different. See, for example, Theodore Roszak. *Person/Planet: The Creative Disintegration of Industrial Society* (Garden City, N.Y : Doubleday) 1979; E. F. Schumacher. *Small is Beautiful: Economics As If People Mattered* (New York: Harper & Row Publ.), 1973.

[49] Kenneth L. Donelson. "Censorship in the 1970's Some Ways to Handle It When It Comes (And It Will)" in James Davis, ed. OP' CIT" p. 167.

THE HOLOGRAPHIC PARADIGM AND POSTCRITICAL RECONCEPTUALIST CURRICULUM THEORY

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Over the past several years the field of curriculum has been revitalized by the multiple perspectives brought to it by a diverse body of literature which has become known as reconceptualist curriculum theory. The various conceptual and methodological approaches which have emerged from this literature have provided new vistas in the curriculum field and have offered possible ways of breaking through the limits imposed by traditional curriculum theory.

The tone set by a 1979 Tanner and Tanner article comes to mind as characteristic of the criticism of the new theory which those who are rooted in tradition bring forth. Their stance toward the new and unfamiliar is quite understandable. Those individuals who have developed the reconceptualist literature have taken a creative stance toward the curriculum field. Creators in any field threaten the established order as they set forth on their personal thrust into the exploration of their own understanding. As a result, creators in a field arouse fear of the unfamiliar and the unknown in those who cling to the traditional.

The barriers to the development of a creative stance toward life and knowledge are many; the one most frequently cited is fear. Therefore, it is quite understandable that a central issue in the literature on the development of creativity has been the problem of fear of the unfamiliar and the unknown. A creative approach requires overcoming fear and taking a risk. It is much safer, and certainly less lonely, to embrace the traditional, the accepted, the "proven", than to venture forth into the unknown and the undefined.

The Tanner and Tanner article can provide us with a beginning point for our discussion because I find within it a basic attitude toward creativity with which I have had to confront myself, my students, my teaching colleagues and those in the curriculum field. I do not want to become involved in a criticism of specific details of the article since it would be counter to what I would like to discuss with you. As I pause and reflect upon the article, it is not so much the stated content but the hidden content that I want to call to your attention. When I think of the "tone" or form through which the content has been conveyed and view it as the content, or "hidden content," I begin to "see" something quite different. What begins to emerge is the concept of fear. A fear which, as I have just remarked, is quite understandable. I must acknowledge a certain sense of fear within myself as I am speaking with you. However, if I am to grow and develop in new and different dimensions, I must take the opporutnity which this situation presents and risk presenting *my* ideas, *my* conceptions and *my* thoughts as a means of creating a situation which could provide the opportunity for dialogue and the sharing of vantage points on *our* lived-worlds.

A creative approach to life and knowledge involves breaking away from the familiar, moving into the realm of the new - - the creation of novelty. But novelty alone is not sufficient to define creativity or a creative act. As Stein (1974) has stated in his review of literature on creativity:

> Various approaches agree that the resultant of the creative process is something novel. The novelty that is produced is of some significance, for novelty in some insignificant detail, while no doubt of worth, does not merit being called creative. The novel result is also useful, tenable, or satisfying or adaptive. For the result to be called creative, it needs also to represent a 'leap.' to use a spatial analogy, the novelty that has been achieved must not be a mere 'step' away from that which has existed but a 'good distance' away. The final novel product that is called creative changes the course of future actions and behavior. It alters our way of looking at things and it opens up new vistas that stimulate still further creativity (p. 15)

The "leap" which reconceptualist curriculum theory

has made shatters the traditional view of curriculum as is evidenced by the very fact that Tanner and Tanner, find it necessary to defend their position. What they seem to miss is that those individuals who are working in what Pinar (1975, pp. 209-211) has called the postcritical category are not concerned with "novelty in some insignificant detail," nor are they concerned with adapting to the environment of the traditional curriculum field, nor are they concerned with criticism. The postcritical reconceptualist is not interested in re-working traditional concepts, that is, in researching and criticizing existing concepts of curriculum. As Karl Pribram (1971) has pointed out:

> Critical analysis is fun and can be useful, but any single critical analysis is always incomplete. The richness of the whole issue is never truly apprehended, only glimpsed from now one, now another aspect. (p. 382)

The individuals who are developing the postcritical reconceptualist literature are involved in the development of new vistas; they are attempting to alter the way in which we might view the curriculum field - - attempting to open up still further ways of developing creativity in individuals as they explore and gain control over their lived-worlds. The postcritical reconceptualist is concerned with presenting alternative views to the traditional view of curriculum. In so doing, he is taking a creative stance himself as he attempts to provide the opportunity for others to experience their own creativity. When Pinar (1975, p. 211), in his early work, suggested that Francine Shuchat-Shaw's concept of congruence might, "become a major reconceptualist focus," he was making a forecast which seems to characterize the current state of the reconceptualist development.

The psychologist, Mel Marshak, has written the following about creative people:

> Creative people do not survive by adapting to their environments but by transcending them. They achieve this by abrogating material laws--the so-called hard lumps of reality out there - - and tune in to what is essentially true, i. e. that all is a bubble blown out of 'empty space welded on to empty time,' and beyond this there are the operations of mind itself - - the oscillations and reverberations that represent the laws of life and order in the universe. (1973, p. 78)

Each of us in some manner constructs the world around

us: we see the world through the filters of our own minds. The world appears differently to each of us because of the various structures which we impose upon it. As Marshak has stated, we create the laws of life and order in the universe through the operations of our mind.

The traditional curriculum theorist presents a viewpoint which is devoid of the role of mind in the creation of theory. The traditional theorist speaks of curriculum theory in such a manner that one is led to believe that the "laws" of curriculum lie outside of the individual who communicates them. They seem to speak as if the theorist is only making clear that which already exists outside of his own experience in the world and over which he has no control. The traditional theorist speaks as if curriculum theory has no relations to himself, as if he had no role in the decision as to what forms the basis of curriculum – as if he accepts certain laws as givens. The reconceptualist curriculum theorist speaks from a very different vantage point and because of this his views may not appear to be theory, nor part of a movement, nor of significance to those resistant to a creative stance. As Marshall McLuhan has noted, most people prefer to live in the immediate past, while artists (I would say creative people) prefer to live in the present. That is not to say that creative people do not value history, rather it is to say that they are not concerned about endless criticism over past definitions. History can provide an important means whereby we can examine our thoughts and ideas; it can be one means whereby we develop our consciousness. However, a creative stance strives toward and accepts new definitions. I see the postcritical reconceptualist in the process of redefining our concept of what constitutes curriculum theory – or, at the very least, offering new possibilities.

I would like to turn to an examination of what I see as the nature of the postcritical reconceptualist theory. While there have been various papers on reconceptualist curriculum theory, there still seems to be a mystery for many as to what the nature of the theory is and how it can be put into practice. In one sense, I might appear to be in the process of going backward since I have previously written about the application of reconceptualist curriculum theory to faculty development programs in the visual arts (Padgham,

1979). However, for those of us in the visual arts, theory frequently comes as a result of practice. I have found that postcritical reconceptualist theory has helped me "see" what I had been doing before my contact with the literature.

In order to discuss the nature of postcritical reconceptualist curriculum theory I believe it is necessary to present it in terms of analogical thinking and try to lay before you the correspondences which I have found in literature from another field.

Karl Pribram, a neuropsychologist, has become influential in assisting me to develop my thoughts and understandings of postcritical reconceptualist curriculum concepts. Therefore, I would like to share those aspects of Pribram's research and conceptualization which have been most useful to me.

Pribram asserts that the operations of the mind are best viewed from the biologist's view which he calls constructional realism. He explains it as follows:

> In a sense the biologist view is a form of constructional realism. Biological rather than physicalistic, however, it encompasses a constructional phenomenology – images have structure; they are made by a complex brain process; they are not the givens of existential awareness. (1971, p. 384)

He develops this point of view further:

> To man's view of himself the Biologist position has at least this much to offer. The mystery of man is biological and shared with other complex organizations which are never comprehended in their totality but only in piecemeal. Man's brain is so constructed that piece by piece he apprehends the whole through the operations of coding and recoding. Languages, verbal (linguistic) and nonverbal (cultural), are constituted of these pieces. When, because of linguistic and cultural affluence, the means ends reversal occurs, these languages begin to live lives of their own. Thus complexity is compounded and the original organization can easily be lost sight of. Biological processes have, however, built-in renewal mechanisms. When the linguistic and culturla structures become too cumbersome or conflict with each other, they are often degraded, pruned back to their more essential roots. Clearer vision is then attained of the

> basic organization which gave rise to the process originally; historical comparison can be made between the primitive and the sophisticated version of the language or culture. (1971, p. 384)

These passages have been most helpful for me in coming to my own understanding of the development of the curriculum field. It appears to me that the development of the post-critical reconceptualist literature has been in response to what Pribram has termed "linguistic and cultural affluence" within the development of curriculum literature. Reading traditional curriculum theory has led me to believe that the "means-ends reversal" which Pribram states causes languages to begin to "live lives of their own" and which leads to complexity wherein "the original organization can easily be lost sight of" has occurred in the curriculum field. When I read traditional curriculum literature, I have a sense of what Pribram was talking about when he stated that, "When the linguistic and cultural structures become too cumbersome or conflict with each other, they are often degraded, pruned back to the essential roots." The development of post-critical reconceptualist literature appears to be an attempt to prune back the literature in the curriculum field to its more essential roots; it appears to be an attempt to gain a clearer vision of some very basic questions which traditional curriculum theory has lost sight of.

In a sense the postcritical literature is a call for "back to basics." Not to the muddled "basics" which have invaded our educational curriculums today, rather it appears to be a clarion call to what might be termed the primitive. By this, I mean a call to deal with questions such as, What is the source, purpose and function of knowledge and how do these relate to those individuals who find themselves involved in an educational experience? When viewed from this vantage point, postcritical reconceptualist curriculum literature is very closely related to some of the most creative and exciting theoretical research being done in the field of brain research today.

In a recent interview with Daniel Goleman, Pribram (1979) discussed his conceptions and their utility in developing a different view of reality. He refers to the concept as a non-lens concept. This conception of reality which is based on a very carefully controlled and documented laboratory

experiments in the field of neuropsychology has provided me with the opportunity to begin to find new and various ways in which the postcritical reconceptualist attitude might be brought to bear on my daily life within the classroom.

Before discussing the Goleman interview with Pribram, it is necessary to briefly outline some basic concepts about a hologram and how it differs from a photograph.

> Most of us are familiar with the image generating aspects of optical systems. A camera records on photographic film placed *at* the image plane a copy of the light intensities reflected from the objects within the camera's visual field. Each point on the film stores information which arrives from a corresponding point in the visual field, and thus the film's record "looks like" the visual field. Recently studies have been made of the properties of records made on film which is placed somewhere *in front of* the image plane (e.g., in the focal plane) of an optical system. When properly exposed by a coherent light source such a film record constitutes an *optical filter* in which information from each point of the visual field is stored throughout the filter itself. (Pribram, 1971, p. 145)
>
> There are some other considerations which must be brought out regarding the nature of the filter.
>
> These filters display a number of remarkable characteristics. As we have all experienced, when a film does not lie exactly in the image plane of a camera, the image becomes blurred, boundaries become less sharp, contrast is less marked. In an optical filter the information is distributed so that the stored image does not resemble visual image at all. The optical filter is a record of the wave patterns emitted or reflected from an object. "Such a record can be thought of as 'freezing' the wave pattern; the pattern remains frozen until such time as one chooses to reactivate the process, whereupon the waves are 'read out' of the recording medium" (Leith and Upatnicks, 1965). Thus when transilluminated by a coherent light source, an optical filter reconstructs the wavefronts of light which were present when the exposure was made. As a result, a virtual image of the visual field can be seen by looking towards the filter. This virtual image appears exactly as did the visual scene during the exposure, complete and in three dimensions. In

> essence, all the information describing the visual field and from which an image of the visual field can be reconstructed, is contained in the filter. (Pribram, pp. 145-147)

Thinking about postcritical reconceptualist curriculum theory and traditional curriculum theory in terms of the hologram and the photograph reveals some interesting insights about the nature of postcritical reconceptualist theory.

First, consider the difference between the photographic image stored on film and the image stored on the holographic optical filter. As Pribram has pointed out, "The film's record 'looks like' the visual field," while, "in an optical filter the information is distributed so that the stored image does not resemble the visual image at all." The surface of traditional curriculum theory may look as if it deals with the educational experience much as the record on film may look like the visual field, however, as the literature on the "hidden curriculum" has demonstrated, that which exists is quite different from that which appears to exist. Turning to the optical filter on which the information is stored for the hologram, we find that "the stored image does not resemble the visual image at all." For those individuals bound to tradition, postcritical reconceptualist curriculum theory may not appear to resemble curriculum theory at all – they expect to find that which looks like that with which they are familiar. Instead, they find a record of the "wave patterns emitted or reflected," in the case of much of the postcritical reconceptualist literature one finds the wave patterns emitted or reflected from past educational experiences. What is perhaps even more interesting is the fact that the wave pattern remains "frozen until such time as one chooses to reactivate the process." I am immediately reminded of the process of currere and the role it plays in reconceptualist curriculum theory (See Pinar and Grumet, 1976, Chapter 4).

A second difference between the photographic image stored on film and the image stored on the holographic optical filter is also important to point out. As Pribram has noted above, in the film storage system the information is stored point for point – thus when you look at a negative, (while light intensities are reversed) you see a look alike for the original visual field. As a result, if you divide the image

in quadrants and cut out a quadrant from the storage system (the negative) and then try to reproduce the image (make a print) you will end up with only three quarters of the original image. In the holographic image storage system (the optical filter), however, we find a very different result if we divide the filter into quadrants, take away one quadrant from the storage system (the optical filter) and reproduce the image, we end up with the entire image. Pribram has explained it in this manner-

> All holograms have some interesting properties in common which make them potentially important in understanding brain function. First ., the information about a point in the original image is distributed throughout the hologram, making the record resistant to damage. Each small part of the hologram contains information from the entire original image and therefore can reproduce it. (1971, pp. 150-151)

A comparison of traditional curriculum theory and post-critical reconceptualist curriculum theory reveals an interesting analogy. Traditional theory is centered around a point for point concept, i.e., the educational experience is broken down into compartmentalized units which are discussed independent of the individual who is at the center of the experience. Reconceptualist curriculum theory is centered in self, each part contains the whole. To put it another way by substituting a few words in Pribram's description quoted above, "In essence, all the information describing the *theory* and from which a *concept* of the *theory* can be reconstructed, is contained in the *self* (italics indicate words changed)."

Having briefly discussed the nature of a holographic image and the process of recording information to produce the holographic image, I would like to return to Pribram's non-lens concept and its analagous relationship to the post-critical reconceptualist position on curriculum theory. In the Goleman interview, Pribram (1979, p. 3) explained that during the past half-century we have come to view reality in a very different manner. He credits the physicist, David Bohm, with putting the most effort in to coming at a new conception of reality from the point of view of physics. He points out that Bohm brought to our attention the fact that since the invention of the microscope and the telescope we have looked at the micro- and macro- universe

through lenses which in turn have affected the way in which we have developed our conceptual models in physics and biology. When Goleman asked Pribram what was limiting about a lens, he responded:

> A lens objectifies. Scientists are always trying to be objective, to work with *objects* and *particles* and *things*. But in quantum physics, particles don't act only like objects, they also behave as if they were wave forms. David Bohm has been suggesting that these wave forms may compose hologram like organizations he calls the 'implicate order.' That is a very different way of looking at the universe from the lens-defined world view, different from the 'objective' approach, which Bohm refers to as the 'explicate order.' If psychology is to understand the conditions that produce the world of appearances, it must look to the thinking of physicists like Bohm. (Pribram, 1979, p. 83)

When asked why man perceives reality as objects and not wave forms, Pribram explained that all of our senses are lens systems of one sort or another. We see the world of appearances because of the way in which our senses and brains are structured. However, Pribram points out that the world of appearances, while a real world, is not the only order of reality. He states:

> It isn't that the world of appearances is wrong; it isn't that there *aren't* objectives out there, at one level of reality. It's that if you penetrate through and look at the universe with a non-lens system, in this case a holographic system, you arrive at a different view, a different reality. And that other reality can explain things that have hitherto remained inexplicable scientifically.
> Pribram, 1979, p. 83)

The postcritical reconceptualist view of curriculum offers us much the same non-lens viewpoint. It isn't that the world of curriculum theory can not be perceived on the level which Tanner and Tanner and others perceive it -- it isn't wrong from the postcritical reconceptualist view. It is, as Pribram has pointed out, when a non-lens system is used for viewing --in this case a non-traditional theory -- you arrive at a different point of view, a different reality.

Tanner and Tanner (p. 9) state that reconceptualism (sic) "favors mystical illumination ('heightened consciousness') over reason, and is therefore not curriculum knowledge

but a promiscuous enthusiasm for whatever advertises itself as counter to our culture." From the lens system of traditional curriculum theory their conclusion might be a proper conclusion. However, from a non-lens system, in this case the postcritical viewpoint of reconceptualist curriculum theory, heightened consciousness is a way of explaining a different reality. Pribram's neuro-psychological research into the functioning of the brain has led to this conclusion:

> As a way of looking at consciousness, holographic theory is much closer to mystical and Eastern Philosophy. It will take a while for people to become comfortable with an order of reality other than the world of appearances. But it seems to me that some of the mystical experiences people have described for millennia begin to make some scientific sense. They bespeak the possibility of tapping into that order of reality that is *behind* the world of appearances. I have no personal experience with that, but when I read some descriptions of mystical experiences, I wonder if somehow those people haven't hit upon a mechanism that lets them tap into the implicate order. (Pribram, 1979, pp. 83, 84)

Pribram proposes that attention is his best hunch as a means to the other domains of consciousness. He explains that in his research he has come to the conclusion that frequency, which deals with the density of occurrences only, might be the best way of dealing with the concept of attention. When viewed from that vantage point, time and space are collapesed and everything happens at one time. When asked if density was not a quality of space, he replied that would be fine if there was such a thing as space. We only speak in such a manner because, "we don't know how to talk in anything but space-time coordinates" (Pribram, 1979, p. 84). Pribram suggests that just because we "read out what is happening into a variety of coordinates of which space and time are the most helpful in bringing us into the ordinary domain of appearances" (1979, p. 84) it does not mean that space and time are the basic units of reality.

Postcritical reconceptualist curriculum theory is based on a similar approach. When speaking of curriculum theory from this vantage point, the theorist accepts a different reality. For this reason, the theorist is not concerned with those elements which one would find discussed in a traditional approach; nor can he criticize those factors, for to do so would mean that he had to use the structural language

of the traditionalist which would determine the conclusions. The postcritical reconceptualist must attempt to speak in such a manner that he "acknowledges the collapse of space-time coordinates."

For this reason, his ideas may appear to be "mystical illumination." As Pribram has stated, it may be quite some time before people are comfortable with a different view of reality.

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Pretext: An essay review of *The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a Literary Genre.* Edited by Barbara Johnson. *Yale French Studies,* No. 63, 1982. (252 pages).

The Anti-Pedagogical Pedagogues

Wendy Deutelbaum, Harvard University
Adalaide Morris, The University of Iowa

After its title, *The Pedagogical Imperative: Teaching as a Literary Genre,* the first thing one sees in picking up Number 63 of *Yale French Studies* is its cover picture. It is a scene in which a foppishly dressed, seated pedagogue delivers an imperative to the docile young woman who stands modestly before him. "Here," he says, pointing to his forehead, the seat of his knowledge, "look at me here, during this session." Our gaze looks there, too, then follows the curve of the illustration leading from the forehead down the shoulder to the clutter on the pedagogue's lap: a book, a black hat, and a gloriously extended phallic feather. The purpose of the essays in this collection is to analyze what is represented here, the traditionally mystified relationship between pedagogy and power, between the pedagogue's forehead and his phallus.

What is the connection between this witty illustration and the volume's ponderous title? The pedagogical imperative is that which the art, practice, or profession of teaching exhorts, a directive specified by the subtitle, "Teaching as a Literary Genre." The concept of literariness signals a context of contemporary French critical thought that for

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some twenty years now has sought to understand the nature of language and its precarious and problematic relationship to what we call "reality." To talk about the literariness of any verbal event, including teaching, is to challenge the assumption that it produces an awareness of how things "really are," of the actual nature of the world or experience. When the pedagogue points to his forehead, he would have us believe that it bulges with truth, logic, and substance. When the cover illustration and the essays point to the phallic feather, they call attention to the pretense and the purpose of his claim. According to these theorists, teaching, like literature, is not about the transmission of knowledge or the representation of facts. Just as literature is not a reliable source of information about anything but its own language, so they argue, pedagogy has only its own dynamic to teach us.

The fifteen essays are divided into three sections: The Lesson of Teaching, What Does A Teacher Want?, and Textual Pedagogy. The lesson of teaching, which all the sections propound, is that we must become pupils of our own process; without this self-reflexive awareness, pedagogy becomes pedagogery, an exercise in repression, scapegoating, mystification, and exploitation. The first two essays are carefully chosen examples of the two main critical practices of the volume: the deconstructionist position, developed by Jacques Derrida and imported by literary theorists at Yale, Johns Hopkins, and Cornell and the psychoanalytic perspective emerging from the radical re-reading of Freud by Jacques Lacan.

The heroes of the first section are the pedagogues who fear neither their ignorance nor their drive to theorize. This position leads to seemingly paradoxical stances. For Paul de Man in "The Resistance to Theory," it is imperative to theorize the impossibility of theory; for Shoshana Felman in "Psychoanalysis and Education: Teaching Terminable and Interminable," it is imperative to teach the impossibility of teaching. The section's villains are, on the one hand, those who flee theory in empiricism or naive pragmatism and, on the other, those who flee ignorance in a desire, like Hegel's, to totalize, exhaust, and finally master all knowledge. By contrast, de Man embraces that in theory which resists totalization, while Felman watches Socrates, Freud, and

and Lacan learn from the very places where interpretation is resisted. What these thinkers seek is what Barbara Johnson, in a later essay, calls positive ignorance: "the pursuit of what is forever in the act of escaping, the inhabiting of that space where knowledge becomes the obstacle to knowing" (p. 182).

The first essays have a freshness, power, and sweep which set both the terms and the standard for the collection. The next three essays turn their sights on the liberal ideology of academic neutrality, on a Cornell English Department pamphlet denouncing plagiarism, and on the teaching experience of a philosophy professor at Vincennes. Narrower, more concrete, more anguished, these essays ask how we can support our positions as radicals and activists in the university. How we can stop scapegoating our students and our texts, and how, in Jean-Francois Lyotard's repeated refrain, we can "go there, without knowing where" (p.75).

"What Does A Teacher Want?", the second section asks. Whatever positive motives we may attribute to the first section's anti-pedagogical pedagogues, the answer offered by the essayists of section two is resolutely negative. With the exception of a transitional essay on Barthes, himself an anti-pedagogue, each of these essays triumphantly points to what the pedagogue has under his hat, book, and feather: the will to mastery, power, order, authority, appropriation, dominance, and possession. These villanous pedagogues are the central characters in texts by Rousseau, de Sade, Maupassant and Laclos, texts which themselves, as these good deconstructionist analyses indicate, undress their pretenders. The three finest essays of this section, those by Joan de Jean, Jane Gallop, and Angela Moger, each privileges that which disrupts the pedagogue's monologue. Joan de Jean finds salvation in the "clinamen," the force of deviation and unbalancing that inheres in students' resistance and questioning; Jane Gallop, with her characteristically self-reflexive swerve, exalts the "disorderly specific" which eludes her systematizing discourse, just as the stubborn body eludes the Sadean preceptor's will to categorize. Angela Moger's essary on Maupassant's "Une Ruse" brilliantly traces the thread which connects narrative seduction and pedagogy. The accomplished storyteller, the clever lover, and the good teacher know that their status endures

by means of perpetually renewed postponement. "If the immediate goal of teaching is the satisfaction of the quest for knowledge," Moger concludes, "it can also be said that its fundamental goal is the denial of that satisfaction in favor of the renewal of questing itself" (p. 136).

Section three, "Textual Pedagogy," completes the summetrical design of five essays per section. While the section break would seem to promise new ground, the analyses of Moliere's*School for Wives,* Diderot's *Encyclopedia,* Balzac's novels of education, Flaubert's *Bouvard and Pecuchet,* and Nietzsche's lectures *On the Future of Our Educational Institutions* repeat the critical gestures and restate the conclusions of the previous section. Again we face the pedagogue's desire to keep his wards in ignorance to totalize all knowledge, and to mystify the structures of his domination; again we find him the unwitting accomplice of the State's mechanisms of control. Nietzsche, who with Derrida stands sentinel over the end of the volume provides a final devastating formula: "One speaking mount, with many ears, and half as many writing hands. . .there you have the university culture-machine in action" (pp. 248-9).

Two excellent essays in this section, Richard Terdiman's Marxist "Structures of Initiation: On Semiotic Education and Its Contradictions in Balzac" and Barbara Johnson's feminist "Teaching Ignorance: L'Ecole Des Femmes " break out of this repetitive critique. If many of the essays in this volume are composed by pedagogues who seem to exempt themselves from their critique of pedagogy, the strength of Terdiman's argument is its willingness to analyze the historical conditions that have produced the contemporary crisis of comprehension and representation so central to this volume. The paradigms of the *roman d'education,* formulated during the early 19th century rise of the middle class, he argues, "can help to explain the patterns we have internalized in our own initiation to the modern *regime de sens,* which have borne within them the ideological envelopment that makes our thought question its ability to grasp its own material referent, and at times induces it to accept only its own incapacity as object" (p. 224). That Terdiman's turgid prose replicates the opaque, mediated, unimaginative relations he would expose only reinforces his contention that he is not exempt from the historical conditions that have produced modern critical texts. Terdiman's hope for

change comes from a dialectical faith that when the pendulum has completed its arc a new progressive energy will be released.

Like Terdiman, Johnson asks the unsettling question, to what structure of authority does the critique of authority belong? Where Terdiman points to capitalist contradictions, Johnson draws our attention to the masculinist tradition that has banished woman from Western pedagogical discourse. By this Johnson means not that real flesh-and-blood women have been excluded as students and teachers,but that our culture's pedagogical paradigms have privileged the single authoritarian teacher. It is one of the virtues of Johnson's essay that she removes us from the smothering disciple couple the other essayists posit and suggests instead that the student can and should learn from the contradictions between many teachers. This plurality of voices, which displaces the one-ness of individual mastery, would constitute "a feminization of authority" (p. 181), a discipline whose exemplar was Socrates, the original teacher of unknowing and self-subversion.

Anyone ensnarled in the intellectual and professional tangles which these essays attempt to unravel will be grateful for their provocative applications of contemporary critical practice to pedagogical issues. Nevertheless, certain elements of this critique are disquieting. To define teaching as a literary genre is to make pedagogy available to deconstructionist practices, which more often than not de-historicize and de-politicize the discussion and which in turn invite their own deconstruction. It would be easy enough to show how all these essays privilege the excessive, the disorderly and the disruptive, how their unanimity replicates the very monotony, coherence and systematization they decry in rationalist discourse, and how this critique propels its subversive practitioners into greater professional prestige. The jargon of a private clique consciousness most evident in the poorer essays in this volume blocks access to a large audience and sustains a small stable orthodoxy which uses the same master concepts to unlock the same traditional canon. None of the voices they seek to learn from inhabit the margins these essayists glorify; Freud, Lacan, Nietzsche, Derrida, Rousseau, Flaubert, de Sade and the rest all speak from the land of the majority. "Professionalism," as Julia

Kristeva has noted, never is as strong as when it is denounced by its professors.

If our tone sounds sharp it is because as teachers, scholars and feminists we share the essayists' beneficent motive not to abuse and exploit. It seems that the only outlet for this motive, however, is the negative hermeneutics of current critical practices. What do we do for our students? We disabuse them: take away their illusions, make them sceptical of our mastery and their discipleship, and decipher texts which validate this point of view. No doubt the wry self-awareness of this severe pedagogy is salutory, but is it sufficient? The redemptive forces of the "clinamen," of a dialectical return to the progressive, and, most promisingly, of the editor's vision of a plurality of contending voices move toward a positive hermeneutics, one that might support the humanitarian desires which fuel this volume. The picture on the cover is by now all too familiar, as are the techniques by which we critique it. This collection's analyses of authority, seduction, resistance, desire, and mystification are a necessary first step. What we need now are illustrations of mutual exchange and genuine negotiation, a new kind of pedagogical imperative.

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Pretext: An essay review of Kevin Harris, *Teachers and Classes; a Marxist Analysis.* London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982. (173 pages).

OF CAPITAL, LABOR, AND TEACHERS

Dennis Carlson
Rutgers University

Over the past decade neo-marxian research in education has been greatly influenced by a structuralist model of social and economic reproduction that makes sense of schooling in terms of its functions in the reproduction of capitalist social relations and ideological hegemony. This reproductive function is performed through the form and content of the curriculum, the technical organization of the instructional process, the authority structure of the classroom, the sorting,

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selecting, and credentialing of students, and in numerous other ways as teachers and students go about their "business" within an organized field of everyday action and production within the school. The problem with this model of schooling, as has been well noted by now, [1] is that it boxes us into a deterministic and narrow-sighted corner; we see only the smooth and uniform reproduction of social formations and transmission of hegemonic consciousness. We gain little understanding of the dynamics of cultural reproduction, or of the active, contested nature of social structures and their historical development. And as a result, the effect of a strict structuralist formulation of advanced capitalism is to confirm pessimism about the likelihood or possibility of transformative social change.

In the attempt to overcome some of these limitations a number of structuralists, perhaps most notably Poulantzas[2] and Carchedi,[3] have begun to reemphasize the centrality of class conflict, and the positioning of class actors according to their interests in the evolving but irreconcilable struggle between capital and labor. Kevin Harris, an Australian sociologist and philosopher of education, is among the first to bring this type of structural class analysis to bear on educational issues, in this case the allegiances of teachers. His book, *Teachers and Class: A Marxist Analysis* presents an important line of inquiry; its recognition that we must go beyond a one-sided reproductive model to one that is more dialectical and dynamic, is absolutely essential in marxist research in education. My concern, however, is that Harris does not take us far enough in this direction, and the restrictions that he observes seem to be due to inherent deterministic tendencies in the structuralist model that are not easily eliminated.

Before proceeding, we need to understand a bit more about the concept of class and class struggle, for theoretic confusion is endemic in the field and has much to do with the problems that ultimately confront Harris in his treatment of teachers. Part of the problem is that Marx himself used class to describe both an economic category and an historical phenomenon that "makes" itself in overthrowing capit-

alism.[4] In *Capital*, Marx focuses upon the mode of production in developing a pure or abstract economic model of class, one based on the distinction between *productive* and *unproductive* labor. The working class is engaged in labor directly necessary in the production of commodities and services, and it generates the surplus value appropriated by capital as profit. Capital, the other major class, is unproductive economically and lives off the surplus value generated by the working class. But else where Marx is clear to point out that an abstract economic class is not a real historical class. A class *in-itself* is defined by its objective relations to the production process, while a class for-itself is constituted politically as it "finds" and expresses itself.

The structuralist model of class employed by Harris tends to follow Marx's pure or abstract economic model although, following Poulantzas, it accepts an additional criterion beyond location within the *technical* division of labor, namely, location within the *social* division of labor. Relations in the social division of labor are ideological and political rather than merely economic. The working class functions as a pool of exploitable labor, and capital and its agents function in the control of workers and the maintenance of hegemonic relations of domination. Analysis of class actors is thus based on two distinctions: their productive or unproductive role in the generation of surplus value and their social *function* within the overall capital accumulation process, as those who must be dominated and oppressed, and those who must do the controlling and socializing.

This is where the structuralist analysis of class "revises" Marx in one other important way that is crucial to Harris' argument about the position of teachers in the class struggle. It suggests that in advanced or monopoly capitalism a "new" class is called into being to perform an essential role in the mediation of conflict between capital and labor. Poulantzas writes of the "new petit bourgeoisie", Carchedi of the "new middle class" and the Ehrenreiches of a managerial class" (PMC)[5] We will use Carcjedo's term, since Harris does, but all of these terms are made to represent a

similar phenomenon. The new middle class may be seen as emerging out of an extensive reorganization of social relations both at the workplace and more broadly in American culture near the turn of the twentieth century, during what is commonly called the progressive era. At the point of production this reorganization was carried out through the rationalization and fragmentation of work, the separation of conception from execution, the atomization of workers, and the adoption of new human relations perspectives on worker control.[6] On the broader cultural and political plane it was carried out through the increasing intervention of the State and its various agencies, in the legitimation and subsidization of the interests of capital as the general interests of all. Theorists of the new middle class argue that those salaried workers and professional employees who have developed out of this reorganization of capitalist relations represent a distinct class. Its members do not own the means of production, nor experience significant control over the conditions of their labor. Yet they experience more job security and are economically more privileged than the working class. Functionally they serve as agents of capital in the control of labor. The point here is that this "class" of workers is not depicted as the product of some "neutral" or inevitable social process of bureaucratization and modernization, as it has been portrayed in non-marxist structural-functionalism, but as part and parcel of the dynamics of the class struggle and the imperatives of control.

Harris treats teachers as members of this new middle class and therefore argues that their role is primarily reproductive, to control students and to socialize them into patterns of domination and into forms and structures of alienated labor. He writes: "Teachers are the effective agents in schools...Their political function qua teachers, then, parallels the political function of schooling...just as schooling is a direct form of political control over children, teaching is a direct political struggle with children, especially working-class children" (90). Teachers could make the claim that they are productive laborers because the cognitive and

technical skills they transmit to the young increase their ability to generate surplus value in the production sphere once they leave school and become workers. But Harris concludes that this is a weak position to sustain empirically, and that if teachers once may have transmitted more "productive" knowledge to students, schooling is more and more about control and less and less about skills training in advanced capitalism.[7] Thus, teachers must face the fact that they are reproductive rather than productive workers under the present system. This "fact" however, needs to be questioned and qualified somewhat. For while it is insightful in some ways to recognize that teachers and students are not free agents in the classroom, and that the conflicts that disrupt their everyday relations cannot be made to disappear through fresh commitments and ideals alone, or through newer and better approaches to "classroom management" and "human relations", it is also overly simplistic to relegate reachers (or students for that matter) to a determined function. Harris is certainly aware of this problem and makes efforts to overcome it by suggesting some concrete ways teachers might "work within the system" and "behind the backs" of administrators to help students demystify classroom structures, processes, forms and ideologies. But the force of the structuralist model of class dominates, and practical strategies come to be defined by their limitations. One is left with the unsettling sense that teachers must remain class enemies of their students until a more fundamental social transformation can be brought about. Though accurate as description, this view is also stultifying and misleading if it is treated as a guideline for political action, and it has the effect of discouraging all attempts by teachers and students to build upon their substantial common interests.

I will return to this point again; but we now need to examine the other half of Harris' analysis of teachers, which is somewhat more encouraging for teachers, but which likewise falls victim to structural problems. This has to do with his application to teachers of Carchedi's theoretical description of the proletarianization of new middle class,

a process which brings it increasingly into line with the economic position as well as class function of the "collective laborer". To Carchedi the collective laborer is the new working class, no longer the individual producer of a commodity but a specialized and interchangeable unit within a highly fragmented and collectivized division of labor, stripped of skills, with only its general mental and physical labor to sell.[8] There is good evidence to support the notion that teachers are being proletarianized, and these trends are particularly evident in present times of fiscal crisis and retrenchment on the part of industry and the State.[9] During the past decade teachers' course loads and class sizes have been steadily increased, "breaks" and planning periods have been reduced or eliminated from the school day, more and more curricula have become administratively dictated and technologically predetermined, and job security has declined along with real wages. Concurrently, "classroom management" skills rather than specific subject matter knowledge or pedagogic understanding of the learning process is emphasized in teacher training. Teachers' always-tenuous claims to possession of a complex and essential body of knowledge and skills related to children and the learning process may be increasingly hard to sustain in the years ahead. Harris observes: "The proletarianized teacher will control children more and instruct them less" (73). Finally, teacher proletarianization is linked to the "accountability" and (more recently) "merit pay" movements, which represent for teachers the same production pressure and the same incentive system used effectively in industry to control and divide workers.

Harris concludes from this two-sided structuralist portrayal of teachers, first in terms of their reproductive function and second in terms of their proletarianization as collective labor, that they occupy an "objectively" contradictory and politically unpredictable position in the class struggle. They simultaneously share interests and antagonisms with the working class and with capital. On the one side, they are aligned politically and ideologically with

capital in carrying out their everyday responsibilities as bearers of domination over future workers, and they cannot change this "fact". On the other side of the class calculus, they are increasingly aligned with organized labor in expressing their economic interests; and even though the trade union model may continue to dominate, economic interests cannot help but be translated into political interests in some form.

We gain some essential understandings about teachers and teaching that concern the plight of critically-minded teachers within today's system of schooling and the difficulties involved in building alliances between teachers and other groups, both inside and outside the school, for transformative change. But having acknowledged this, significant problems remain in Harris' analysis of teachers that are finally related to the validity and utility of approaching class analysis from an over-riding structuralist perspective. Generality and abstraction are substituted for detail and specificity, categories for lived experience. The so-called "new middle class", for example is a conflated category that is made to include occupational groups as disparate as managers, engineers, shopfloor supervisors; social workers, and public school teachers. While all of these groups do share some things in common, we over-simplify a complex phenomenon by squeezing them together and making them serve a common function within a structuralist model of society.

Furthermore, the categorical distinction between productive labor (which is valorized and restricted to the "true" working class) and reproductive or unproductive labor (which is involved in the maintenance of capitalist hegemony) is a rather artificial and not particularly useful one, at least when we examine "real" labor and "real" workers. Harris, employing Poulantzas' distinction between productive and reproductive functions, limits the working class to those engaged in direct commodity production in factories, which ironically ends up making the working class a minority class in advanced capitalism.[10] This is obviously a gross narrowing and objectification of the concept of productive labor, certainly beyond what Marx intended. In most of his writings he considered all workers who helped

capitalists realize a return on their investment as productive, whether they were involved in production directly, or in distribution, maintenance, accounting, or supervision and control. Conversely, we must also remember that even productive factory workers are not exempted from their role in the reproduction of capitalist relations, since in their everyday adaptations to the technical and social division of labor they act to reproduce relations of domination and subordination just as surely as they collectively produce surplus value. As Wright comments: "Production and reproduction are not separate tasks to be assigned to different specialists; they are one and the same task, assigned to all...To produce is to reproduce."[11]

Finally, workers of all types do more than produce surplus value and reproduce capitalist hegemony. They develop concrete adaptations, resistances, and complex work cultures that are an important dimension of their class identities. It is not enough to acknowledge, as Harris does, that classes are 'lived' and are indeterminate phenomena that cannot be understood apart from their real-life meanings and the concrete fields of action they organize when this rhetoric is followed by an analysis that structurally abstracts actors' positions and overdetermines their possibilities for progressive action and alliance-building. This abstracting of a complex historical situation means, as well, that we overlook the specific relationships between class oppression and identity and other dominant forms of social oppression and identity. In America, sexism and racism are linked to class in complex manners, so that in schools, for example, patriarchal relations typically exist between male administrators and female teachers and racist relations prevail between the "white institution" of the school and black inner-city communities. Before class can be made a more powerful axis for political alliance and struggle we need to know much more about how it is mediated through these other social divisions. The research task, in this case, is to reveal the ways in which the American working class can reclaim its history and "make" its future in a deliberate manner, by overcoming the differences that divide oppressed

groups and by developing a political program based on common interest in a socialist alternative to captialism.

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References

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7. Harris relies on Ivar Berg here *(Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and on the presumption that if de-skilling of the work force continues teachers will be called upon to transmit fewer skills to most young people, even if "gifted" and "accelerated" students may still receive rigorous scientific

and technical instruction.
8. Carchedi, p. 56.
9. J. O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (N. Y. : St. Martin's Press, 1973); and E. Mandel, *Late Capitalism* (London: New Left Books, 1975).
10. As E. Wright as shown, if we adhered to Poulantzas' definition of the working class it would comprise approximately 20 percent of the American labor force. Wright, "Class boundaries in advanced capitalist societies," *New Left Review* (No. 98, 1976), pp. 21-22.
11. E. Wright, "Intellectuals and the class structure of capitalist society," in P. Walker, ed., *Between Labor and Capital* (Boston: South End Press, 1979), p. 201.

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