JCT

THE JOURNAL OF CURRICULUM

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Cover Painting by 'Juan Gris: *Landscape at Ceret*

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W. P.

Essays

FOUR CURRICULUM THEORISTS: A CRITIQUE IN THE LIGHT OF MARTIN BUBER'S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Paul R. Feinberg
Hebrew Union College
Jewish Insitute of Religion
Jerusalem
Israel

Most traditional curriculum theory is based upon subject matter content and a means-ends system of knowledge inquiry. There are some theorists, however, who are attempting to reconceptualize curriculum by focusing on the link of the theorist. This paper attempts to show the substantial contribution that Martin Buber's concept of Dailogue makes to the work of four theorists: James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and William Pinar. Through the format of a symposium, the writer has attempted to elucidate some of the similarities and differences in their respective approaches towards a more humane curriculum.

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nomenologically derived aspect of the process of knowing. Greene emphasizes aesthetics as a key way of stimulatiing "wide-awakeness," that is, intellectual and moral self-criticism.

Pinar provides the theorist with a methodology called "currere," which facilitates critical self-reflection to clarify personal and professional values. One priority for engaging in any knowledge inquiry is having a keen awareness of one's life history.

Buber and the curricularists address two questions: First, which processes lead to self-awareness of the values that give direction to one's life and educational work? The curricularists stress critical introspectiveness, while Buber argues that values are more readily identified and expressed in the course of intense interpersonal relationship.

Second, what is the nature of the teacher-student relationship? The reconceptualists argue for more mutuality than Buber is willing to ascribe to these educational relationships. Moreover, Buber's vaulted estimation of the teacher causes the theorists concern about the possibility of exploitation.

This paper attempts no *final* synthesis. The writer has shown how Buber's expression of Dialogue and Relationship contributes to the renewed efforts of those presently reconceptualizing curriculum theory.

Returning the Person to Curriculum:
Four Curriculum Thinkers in Relation to Martin Buber

Purpose

This study will analyze four contemporary curriculum thinkers in relation to the educational views of Martin Buber. The reconceptualists theorists are James Macdonald. Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and William Pinar. These four persons are commonly concerned with how knowledge is communicated in education. While they offer different points of view, they all address the problem of rational discourse, the spoken metaphor, aesthetics, and intuition as ways of implementing communication through the curriculum.

The specific purpose of this study is to examine the

ulum criticism and to link this perspective with the above four reconceptualists.

This study also will investigate the possibility of dialogue as a means of discovering more about ourselves in relationship to our larger worlds. The dialogue facilitates encounters among one another and heightens anticipation of discovery within nature.

Dialogue in education implies the possibility of the experience of transcendence. It is one facet of consciousness which is nurtured by human experience, but refers to a limitless passing beyond any material condition or conception. Most importantly, within the act of dialogue, two persons learn to mutually enlarge and refine the scope of their inquiry into new sources of knowledge. The capacity to reach towards another human being is evidence of a degree of transcendence. Certain types of curricular discourse focus on dialogue as a means of freeing the cognitive and affective faculties. While those who reconceptualize the curriculum hesitate to speak of cause and effect, they put value on self-knowledge that surfaces somewhere in the process. For Buber, however, all worthwhile learning is in relationship. "Self-knowledge" is misleading, and even is an obstacle.

Knowledge comes from a variety of sources. We have seen, for example, that though society builds schools, it still educates the young through family, ritual, or training. As society becomes more complex, however, schools become increasingly important. As the frontiers of knowledge and learning expand, the young are motivated to obtain more formal education through the schools. The curriculum of this institution provides a framework for organizing the skills and rituals that the society wants to renew and pass on to the future generations.

This study will also examine some of the critiques of traditional notions of schooling in light of reconceptualization and Martin Buber. The traditional curriculum theoreticians talk a great deal about the problems of returning the person to curriculum, that is, of making the education of all students more humane. However, a good deal of this well-intentioned, principled talk is ill conceived. Educators

are still unduly influenced by the behavioral, scientific and technological modes of inquiry. These modes of thought and action are not always conducive for humane relationships between learner and teacher. They reflect a means-ends rationale that calls for manipulation of variables designed to arrive at a desired end. A cause and effect interaction is assumed, which is the antithesis of the curricular priorities of the reconceptualists. The reconceptualists approach curriculum as an act of critical self-reflection on personal and social issues in relation to particular social content being investigated. This study will locate the resources for implementing a more fully human, personal educational process.

The Significance of This Study

This study shows the ways in which Martin Buber's philosophy coincides with some of the contentions of the reconceptualists; differences are also shown: to the author's best knowledge, no other study has shown this relationship. The study will attempt to show the liabilities of theorizing based on empirical and behavioral models. Moreover, reconceptualization claims to be able to show the diminishing returns of technology applied to make education, specifically learning, "efficient."

Proposals for changed conceptions do not take place in a vacuum or on an ad hoc basis. Those who are reconceptualizing the field of curriculum proceed with a historical perspective. There is an on-going inquiry into the theories and practices that characterize earlier generations of curricular specialists. For example, reconceptualists point out that Ralph Tyler proposed a rationale for theorizing over thirty years ago. His rationale consisted of certain inputs and outputs; curriculum resulted from rational deliberation about means and ends. Current theorists are not unaware of Tyler's search for values, or advice sought from subject matter professionals. But with this in mind, reconceptualists suggest that Tyler's concern for the full person is restricted by certain narrow focuses: Tyler does not adequately show an appreciation of the fact that the students and teacher

approach the curriculum with biases and idiosyncracies. These are also important "inputs" that the Tyler rationale does not adequately consider, but should. The whole student is a fully feeling creature, not an abstraction. It is a "real" person one encounters in a classroom.

The significant contributions of reconceptual theorists go beyond historical critique. They offer what William Pinar has called a "post-critical" response. It is based on a variety of social and intellectual traditions: phenomenology, existentialism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, and Eastern philosophies such as Zen.

These traditions do not contain panaceas; curriculum theorists cannot simply be scholars of these disciplines but must be scholars in the use of the traditions as well. The traditions are sources and sensitizers; they provide us with intellectual, psychological, and spiritual stimulations--"grist for the mill." These traditions, spiritual and intellectual, provoke a new basis for ideas and sensations of our very own. We investigate them in order to re-think and re-feel our assumptions about the political, economic, and social milieu we inhabit. The real significance of the four curricularists and Martin Buber is that they help us to articulate frustration with behavioral or scientific patterns of learning; they then offer a person-centered approach to learning as opposed to a subject-centered approach.

What distinguishes this research is the breadth and depth of reconceptualist inquiry in relation to Martin Buber. Having critically examined historical precedents in curriculum writing, one recognizes a variety of as yet untapped energies: psychological, spiritual, aesthetic, and intellectual. As human beings we function most fully when we accept that the sources of our being are rooted in two worlds: the objective world of what is seen and heard, tasted, felt, and the spiritualist, intuitive world of the unseen. Through language we communicate to one another these objective and intuitive worlds.

This study provides new insights into the limitations, successes and possibilities of language for curricular discourse. The reconceptualists alert us to the fact that modes of communication, in this case language, reflect basic

interests that humans share. The empirical and behavioral models geared to means and ends have certainly affected our schools. Now, however, the reconceptualists and Buber suggest a pursuit of knowledge nurtured from a variety of interests. The aesthetic and ethical are two basic human interests that get little explicit consideration through our present curricula. But this condition is liable to change once we squarely face the falsely assumed dichotomy between the objective and the spiritual elements of human existence. This study seeks to locate and describe the possibility of unity between the objective and spiritual worlds.

Terminology and Delimitations

This study focuses on four curricular theorists, from among those identified with reconceptualization. The selection was based on similarities and interrelationships with regard to ideology, social-political concern, aesthetic and personal modes of communication. The study develops a comprehensive, critical, and descriptive analysis of their major works. Their views will be compared and contrasted with Buber's contentions about education through dialogue. An imaginary symposium has been "convened" in which these five persons address themselves to two major issues in curriculum: What is the role of subject matter content and process as alternative foci for the curriculum. Also, what function does the teacher serve? What is the nature of student-teacher relationships?

This research is not geared to providing any readymade, field-tested curricula. Rather, one is called upon to re-think personal values, interests, and tacit knowledge. The theorist provides the educator with the sources by which an evaluation can be made.

The work of the four theorists who provoke us to rethink values and strategies does not allow facile labeling. Educators have not agreed upon an all-inclusive definition of reconceptualization. Generally the term refers to a variety of non-behavioral, non-empirical critiques and suggestions for new

curricular directions which are highly personalized; the student functions as an emotional and spiritual as well as intellectual creature.

Martin Buber's formulation of the dialogical principal substantiates and expands some of these critiques and new directions. His philosophy recognizes and articulates the polarity of our world and seeks to make connections. The core of his philosophical stance is a search for unity: between two persons, between a person and nature, and between a person (as matter and spirit) and Spirit. (This is defined as the process leading to I-Thou.) It is this search for unity which will be explored in the writings of the four curricularists.

Models and Critiques
Introduction

This section is subdivided into three parts. It begins as an historical overview of the curriculum field. A critical analysis will then describe the state of much of the field today. Because so much of curriculum is rationally and technologically oriented, emphasis is given to traditional notions of science and its applications. The third section is devoted to a newer group of theorists, identified as reconceptualists, for whom traditional social science paradigms are inappropriate for an expanded person-centered model of curriculum theorizing. The last part of the chapter will cite some of their perspectives and points of departure as an introduction to the work of four representative writers.

Much of what will be said about the early foundations and figures of the field applies to the contemporary scene. Mazza's doctoral research substantiates that "scientific curriculum-making initiated a technological model for the curriculum field that has become the dominant tradition throughout its roughly sixty year history, despite the existence of other approaches to curriculum."[1] Schubert's historical treatment of curriculum for the last eighty years also concurs that recipe-orientations were the norm "... despite admonitions by such writers as Bode, Rugg, and

Hopkins to engage in serious and complex discourse about assumptions that undergird alternative positions on major curriculum questions."[2]

The small minority who opt for a reconceptualization of the field grew up in these earlier traditions. Their observations, then, are based on both historical and ideological consideration of the status quo. A separate presentation of four curriculum theorists will provide a necessary link between the main emphases of the contemporary field and the contributions of Martin Buber.

Some Historical Antecedents and Directions in Knowledge Organization

American social and intellectual tradition is rooted in challenges to the status quo, increased movement of the common person up the social ladder with more open educational opportunity than was available in Europe. The scientific advances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were soon joined to the cause of social improvement. One of the great pre-Civil War leaders of public schooling, Horace Mann, had nurtured and propogated the ideal of the school as an instrument of universal progress. Cremin has stated: "Mann understood well the relationship between freedom, self government, and universal education. Like Jefferson he believed that freedom could rest secure only as free men had the knowledge to make intelligent decisions."[3]

Efforts to scientifically organize and systematize knowledge were boosted by Darwin's explorations and biological classifications. His work in the sciences had direct implications for the fields of sociology and education. Evolution theorized how the species came to be; new data allowed the researcher to hypothesize in which directions it ought to travel in order to develop its talents, thus surviving and advancing.

Herbert Spencer, who published his theory of evolution before Darwin, felt that the survival of the species hinged on the proper synthesis of knowledge around key social processes. Spencer scientifically organized his structure around a series of activities ranging from self-preservation to those engaged in as part of leisure. [4]

Classical liberals like Darwin and Spencer and progressives like Mann utilized and advanced the methods of empirical science. For example, in 1892 a muckraking journalist, pediatrician Joseph Rice, wrote about the disorganized public school system, professionally mismanaged and politically tainted. [5] The ignorance of new scientific methodologies on the part of the professional educator convinced Rice to expand his journalistic broadsides and organizational activity. Progressive education demanded clarity of purpose, substantiated by well-articulated methods and rationally designed means for evaluation. Rugg goes on to document how empirically oriented studies of time efficiency, standardization of subjects, and formal discipline--as opposed to vivid understanding--dominated curriculum work in the latter part of the nineteenth century. [6]

One outcome of the joining of new scientific methodologies and progressive social concerns was the formation of educational commisions to rationally organize the schools. The National Education Association appointed committees to derive principles that would guide and structure secondary and elementary education. Their efforts certainly shaped the slope of curricular work for decades with a means-ends orientation.

Kliebard finds a landmark in publication of the NEA's *Seven Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education*.[7] The seven principles were geared to identifying the social requirements of American youth, the basic skills, activities, and conditions of life for progress in the American democratic milieu. Harris had originally spoken of education as a process of elevating the neophyte member into the species:[8] Dewey later restated this need, in the context of a pronounced faith in democratic ideals for creating the proper environment: "...there is the necessity that the immature members be not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, but that they be initiated into the interests, purposes, information, skill and practices of the mature members...edu-

cation and education alone spans the gap." [9]

Franklin Bobbit theorized about curriculum as a series of variables made up of ends and means. It is likely that his perspective developed from the original Latin meaning of the word curriculum, a race course or race.[10] In other words, it was a setting, a place of events which must be experienced in a certain order to provide a foundation for functioning in adult life. He suggested the analogy of a process whose starting and finishing points were unequivocably delineated.

William Kilpatrick spoke of "purposeful activity: the complete act...a mind-set-to-an-end (which) implies consciousness besides."[11]   Here was a thorough implementation of the ideal of selective readiness through a project method. Experts outside the school were consulted to determine the most fitting exercises based on a thorough analysis of society's needs.

Kilpatrick was one of a group of progressive educators who joined together at Teachers College of Columbia University to pursue education and social justice. The work of other progressives like George Counts, John Childs, John Dewey and Harold Rugg reflected America's growing infatuation with scientific methodologies and provided meaningful qualifications in the name of humane purpose.

Rugg followed Dewey in articulating education's reforming task of reconstructing experience. However, Dewey opted for a more open-ended approach: "The criterion for all educational and public endeavor was growth; it has no end beyond itself."[12]

Rugg took issue with what he deemed to be the excessive open-endedness of Dewey's approach. The latter's instrumentalism lacked a cohesive framework. Rugg identified crucial problems, organizing academic materials into thoroughly integrated courses, rather than separate subjects. One observer has commented on his approach, saying, "Rugg's method seems an eminently sensible one for achieving his desired objectives, namely to alert students to the fact that all is not well in the social order and to start them thinking critically about possible improvements."[13]

George Counts also advocated active intervention in the educational process in order to redress social inequities within the larger society. Goals were vague, haphazardly set, individually oriented. A more systematic set of inputs by knowledgeable authorities was required. He became very frustrated with "...social platitudes coined in the days of agrarian culture...[14] and agitated for a centralized, active implementation of some of these ideals, for instance, democracy and worthy citizenship. Indoctrination of rugged individualism, for example, would not suffice. American society had to be reformed.

> ...a society which is dominated less by the thought of an individual advancement and more by certain far-reaching purposes and plans for social construction might find a firmer and more steadfast mentality desirable...Americans...are becoming completely victimized and molded by the mechanics of industrialism.[15]

Education had to be purposeful, which implied a substantial guidance from informed, technically and humanely concerned persons. The school, however, was but one of a variety of influential institutions for helping to reconstruct a new society based on social welfare. A certain amount of ideological imposition would be expected in implementing this new role for the school. Social science techniques would render the techniques for ascertaining the best solutions to problems besetting a depression era America. Science afforded a rationally based means of living within rather than at the mercy of the forces of nature and society.

Whitehead, while acknowledging the creative impulse of the young, argued that organized thought determines organized action. "Logic, properly used, does not shackle thought.   It gives freedom, and above all boldness."[16] Science, moreover, provides the necessary framework and method of inquiry for linking our logical thought and ordinary everyday sensibilities.   Knowledge improves

experience as the result of interaction between person and environment. According to Whitehead, ignorance is bondage to that environment. Knowledge has practical utility, and via scientifically based experimentalism, will assure and insure opportunity to make the most constructive choices.

The dominant educational philosophy of the 1930s owed much to Dewey, though others such as John Childs, gave ample expression too. Childs based much of his theory on American pragmatism, and the ability to identify reasonable humane alternatives in any given situation "Even the principles and the 'laws' of science are subject to this continuing test, for ultimate authority rests not with particular findings...but rather with the empirical and cooperative procedures by which meanings are formulated, clarified and tested."[17]

As a result of the Great Depression, Childs' critical approach had sufficient opportunity to be developed in a plan called the Eight Year Study. The principles of problem solving were to be implemented in a coordinated fashion by all teachers in a school, while a total of thirty secondary schools experimentally redesigned their curricula. College entrance for those participating was to be directly related to the project. Detailed coordinated planning and evaluation had determined that "the curriculum is now seen as the total experience with which the school deals in educating young people."[18]

The Eight Year Study was perhaps the most prominent national project of the post-World War I era. As the sponsoring agency, the Progressive Education Association felt that an experimental basis for the curriculum could only be effected through cooperation between the university and secondary school. The PEA received the consent of thirty high schools and over three hundred colleges to experiment with a variety of curricular options with regard to content and organization of material. The stated purpose was to enable greater awareness for understanding the social and scientific aspects of the world into which secondary students were graduating. In an attempt to stimulate self-direction and bring youth's concerns closer to real life, a variety of approaches were experimentally devised. There were, for

example, core curricula--a broad fields organization of subjects. The study set a precedent not only for institutionalized reforms but also for their scientific systematic evaluations.

During World War II the needs of student and society were investigated and listed as a basis for curriculum reform in *Education for All American Youth*.[19] The needs were based on purposes that included practical knowledge of the economic system. This led to efficient work, health improvement, realizing the significance of the family, good use of leisure time, and aesthetic, rational, and ethical appreciations.   Additionally, the report of the Harvard Committee on the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society,[20] chaired by James Conant, advocated extensive exposure to great themes in the humanities through a comprehensive interdependent curriculum.   Conant hoped that the renewed search for relevance (for society and youth) would not result in mere training as opposed to education. Competence, termed "back to basics" in the 1980s, needed qualification: for what purpose?   One response might be: the fully functioning, affectively and cognitively motivated student is the foremost reason for a school's existence. Moreover, Conant's recommendation for the comprehensive high school   strengthened the contentions of those who argued for a greater democratizing function of secondary education.

There were a number of attempts to help the teacher systematically guide such a comprehensive education. Selecting and organizing objectives and content, identification of activity and means of evaluation reflect the prominent technological bias of the society in the late 1940s and today. Tyler's syllabus provided an underlying philosophy for his rationale, organized around four key questions.[21] He asked about the purposes of the school, the experiences needed to assure their attainment, their appropriate organization, and means of evaluation for verifying the degree of systematic interaction. The attempt to introduce rational, logical sequence to order the educational process reflected the efforts of earlier progressive thinking. By making such basic but profound

all encompassing inquiries, Tyler hoped to account for all the variables involved in developing a systematic relevant curriculum. Taba assumes a certain logical order, too, in which decisions are made; she proceeds with her own seven steps "to make sure that all relevant considerations are brought to bear on these decisions.' [22] The system--involving diagnosis of needs, setting forth of ensuing objectives, content, experiences, and evaluations--is highly rational and purposefully comprehensive. Learning could be structured once one knew the reasons for which certain knowledge was to be pursued.

It was clear that as the country approached and passed into the era of Sputnik, more structured models for knowledge organization and curriculum design appeared at all levels from primary to college. Inquiry discovery methods, equated with induction, spurred new interest in disciplinarity. Separate bodies of knowledge could be integrated by unifying reconceptions, though Schwab offered one caveat: "there are no data from which to conclude decisively that eventually all the disciplines will become or should become one."[23]

The era was inundated with new proposals for science and mathematics educational reform. Empirical and logical, these disciplines could provide the model for all learning areas. Youngsters would inquire into the structures of their subjects, as if they were scientists, uncovering and discovering new relationships among variables. The challenge to America's pride as the intellectual scientific giant was now met with a reemphasis on technical skills. Bruner, a renowned psychologist, led a seminar on curriculum at Woods Hole which was dominated by mathematics and science people. Bruner, in offering a "spiraling curriculum," suggested that each subject had a structure, the inner workings of which could be grasped by rational inquiry and experimentation. Such knowledge would facilitate a general transfer of new information, thereby increasing in a "spiraling" fashion the level of a student's comprehension.[24]

Behavioral Objectives and Evaluation

Not only was there a structure to each subject or dis-

cipline, but the learning process itself could also be similarly analyzed. Bloom systematized levels of performance in a taxonomy of intended behaviors.[25] He also recognized that the actual performance of a task at a later period in one's life may differ from observed skills at the end of a learning period. Moreover, one key ingredient is his expressed neutrality in designing this taxonomy. According to Bloom, "It is outside the scope of the task we set ourselves to properly treat the matter of determining the appropriate value to be placed on the different degrees of achievement of the objectives of instruction."[26] Bloom's cognitive taxonomy, consisting of a six-step hierarchy ranging from knowledge to evaluation, is paralleled by a five-point classification of affective processes, ranging from receiving to value characterization.

Mauritz Johnson argued that the essence of curriculum is recognizable objectives. The curriculum prescribes that instruction should result in attainable learning products.[27] It is concerned with ends, that which shall be learned.

In recent years educators have seriously expanded behaviorally oriented curriculum writing in the context of back-to-basics. Ornstein has cited Gallup Polls of Phi Delta Kappa from 1975 to 1979 that substantiate the high priority the public gives to this concept. [28]

Nevertheless, the term "basics" in and of itself tells little since there are basics that far outreach a simplistic recounting of the three R's. Ben Brodinsky does find from his observation that testing, accountability, and minimal competencies are increasingly associated with the basics. However, selecting a representative sample of widely-held responses to the "basics question," Brodinsky uncovers a myth about "basics." "Back to basics? Look, we're moving *forward* to basics. We're broadening our basics to teach children to think, analyze problems, make wise decisions, develop confidence in themselves. As for the three R's, why return when we've never left them?"[29]

The leading representatives of the behavioral objectives movement are agreed that in and of themselves, such target-setting is no panacea. As with any technique or philosophy,

success depends on underlying influencing motivations. For example, Baker and Popham even speak about the need to "humanize" the use of instructional objectives" by directly involving students in a needs assessment approach.[30]

Plowman accepts the need for accuracy in judgment, difficult to obtain without behavioral guidelines, but he also argues that affective concern rates equally high attention.[31] Comparing the ability to be trustworthy and to add six five-digit numbers, he says,

> Under most circumstances it would seem more important to be honest and reliable, a goal which becomes more meaningful when translated into observable and measureable functions. This translation is necessary if objectives are to be of diagnostic, prescriptive, and evaluative value in directing and assessing learning.[32]

Payne, too, makes it clear that most sophisticated objective setting and evaluation measures may not really reveal the fullest range of interests or values.[33] Moreover, major behaviorists such as Mager[34] and Kibler [35] are concerned with attitudinal value attainments which can be observed by inference. Though the exactitude of cognitive and psychomotor measurement is missing in this affective domain, knowledge is assimilated and utilized in ways noted other than by physical or mechanical performances. Making ethical choices does imply the capability to judge actions based on reflected experiences or applied cognitive knowledge. Krathwohl admits the difficulty of framing objectives and proceeding with evaluation based on the same behavioral categorization of cognitive learning. It seems best to him to account for the affective phenomenon via the "processes of internalization...It has many elements in common with the term socialization." [36]

The setting of objectives requires the design of evaluational methods. Measurement technique is traced to Robert Thorndike, who early in the 1900s convinced educators that human change could efficiently and effectively be measured and evaluated. Moreover, there was a political pride in

national excellence. Following World War II the public demanded an upgrading of all skills and deepening of knowledge on all fronts so that youth could more efficiently compete in the modern world. The Harvard Report reflected this national priority. Curriculum diversity had to be balanced by interdependent studies to strengthen the forces for unity, a dominant national goal.

The evaluation of the nation's schools in the post-World War II era had stimulated greater concern for technology in an increasingly interdependent world. The public became more sensitized to the issue of evaluation in the wake of large expenditures of federal aid to education. The launching of Sputnik in 1957 brought about the National Defense Education Act and the establishment of the National Science Foundation–geared to the acceleration of scientific and technical curriculum development. The large expenditure involved in this new educational competition with the Russians demanded precise evaluation of the programs to see the extent massive reform was realized. Evaluation became an industry within an industry. Educational progress had to be tracked. It was believed that only through systematic evaluation would worthwhile changes be effected in curriculum. Objectives investigation provided the ideal means.

Cronbach speaks of the ideal evaluation of proficiency that goes beyond selected outcomes of a certain curricular focus. Moreover, ratings ought to be made throughout the course sequence.[37] Stake expands Cronbach's distinctions, emphasizing formal objective categories of measurement and explaining the differences between contingency (the relationships among variables such as antecedents, transactions, and outcomes) and consequence (the degree to which the intended antecedents, transactions, and outcomes come to pass). Informal subjective measures do not adequately provide for the priorities of Stake–rational judgments and descriptions.[38]

Stufflebeam has attempted to provide a total evaluation model. He bases his argument on distinct types of decision-making settings, processes and types of evaluation.[39] Stufflebeam's contribution is quite useful for the

practitioner in that there is cyclical feedback. Continuous information is provided the decision maker.

These various evaluation strategies are integrally involved with the taxonomies of learning objectives. The ability to construct systematic designs such as Bloom's taxonomy implies that knowledge can be organized around structures logically and rationally identified. From its inception the curriculum field has attempted to clarify the nature and organization of knowledge of cultural inheritance. It has focused on the relationship between that knowledge and ways of knowing. Scientific discovery has been integral to a vast array of changes in the field of curriculum. Bronowski suggests why:

> The purpose of science is to describe the world in an orderly scheme or language which will help us look ahead...The order is what we find to work, conveniently and instructively. It is not something we stipulate; it is not something we can dogmatize about. It is what we find; it is what we find useful.[40]

Evaluation as a sub-field of curriculum has developed out of a need for exact measurement. Nevertheless, the issue of ascertaining the results of certain ways of inquiry is not completely resolved in favor of logical positivistic models. As this study will show in an analysis of The State of the Field, there are also strong humanistic considerations to creating a course of study and its method of evaluation. There is more discussion about the place of inspiration, personal knowing, and transcendence in curriculum.

Science is a multi-faceted phenomenon. One must keep this in mind in designing any evaluational measure. "We are a scientific civilization," declared Jacob Bronowski. "That means a civilization in which knowledge and its integrity are curcial. Science is only a Latin word for knowledge...Knowledge is our destiny."[41]

The State of the Field
Introduction

The historical inquiry into the scope of the curriculum

field since the turn of the twentieth century should provide a satisfactory perspective for viewing the present day scene. A logical positivistic scientific rationale had prescribed the dominant approach to curriculum then and persists to this day. The first part of this analysis of the state of the field will focus on contemporary critiques of a situation already known to exist. It is basically a reiteration of the theme already noted and personalities already cited although from a sharpened point of view.

This dominant tradition, nevertheless, is confronted by rejuvenated concern for the student-as-person, a chief participant in curriculum making. The reconceptualists have based their challenge of a variety of intellectual, psychological, and spiritual traditions. They have sought to expand the bounds of scientific theory related to knowing.

Following a brief delineation of the contemporary field, the study will proceed with some notions about the expanded boundaries of science. Based on this one key rationale of the newer theorists, the inquiry will lead into a formal introduction to reconceptualization of curriculum studies.

The Scientific-Technocratic Orientation

In attempting to counter the argument that the curriculum field has been nonhistorical, Kliebard has attempted to give us necessary orientation for the present.

> The production model and the utilitarian criterion applied to all school subjects over the past half century will constitute our fundamental frame of reference. The coming of modern technology, rather than freeing us from the earlier formulations, has served instead only to reinforce or restrict them further. The task of the next fifty years in the curriculum field is essentially one of developing alternatives.[42]

Authorities use various yardsticks for measuring the scope and depth of the field. What all seem to have in

common is that the vast majority of curriculum workers have a utilitarian bias reinforced explicitly or implicitly by technical orientation. This focus will be evident in the analyses of the field by two noted theorists.

Macdonald suggests three recognizable groups performing curriculum work today: 1) those for whom theory prescribes and guides; 2) those for whom it serves to empirically validate identifiable variables; and 3) those for whom it serves as criticism.[43]

William Pinar delineates the field in another fashion:

> 1) traditionalists, (who) have tended to be concerned about principles guiding curriculum;...2) conceptual-empiricists argue that their research functions to serve school practitioners. By creating a science of curriculum, the traditional aspiration of the field can be realized...;3) reconceptualists (according to Macdonald) "look upon their task of theorizing as a creative intellectual endeavor...a more playful, free floating process is called for by the state of the art."[44]

The Traditional Field of Curriculum

Macdonald and Pinar are apparently in agreement that the foremost function of theory in the curriculum field today is to provide a rational framework for determining goals, means, and ends. In this case it refers to the day to day learning going on in a school. Pinar's designation of "traditionalists" will henceforth be used: he cites several for us: Taba; the Tanners; Saylor and Alexander; McNeil; Zais; Smith, Stanley, and Shores; and Stratemeyer.[45]

The traditionalists have really not been theoretical in the technical sense of the word. Those such as Tyler have exemplified the outside expert syndrome. While research is not foreign to their preparation, their major task is providing a framework or theme helping to unite disparate elements that the practitioners try to organize. The traditionalists work could either be knowledge-or process-oriented.

The practical utilitarian bent today can be explained by the progressive origins of the field. We recall an earlier inquiry by Kliebard that revealed "a drive toward a supremely

functional curriculum largely oriented toward socially useful knowledge and skills." [46] While investigations and surveys such as the Eight Year Study were implemented under the guise of scientific objectivity, much traditionalist effort was weighted to a conscious liberal change in the social order. The influx of large numbers of immigrants had necessitated massive alterations in the ways academic and economic priorities were set and evaluations carried out in America's schools. Concern for the immigrant student has been replaced today by concern for the new immigrant to the cities, the disadvantaged and bilingual students. Tyler's rational deliberation was extended by Goodlad and Richter, though values for them are more than mere screens as they are for Tyler;[47] they are initial points of departure in determining to what extent society, learner, and subject matter are sources of curriculum.

The Tyler Rationale hinges on its delineation of objectives. But here evaluation links up ends and means in in a rather mechanical fashion, according to Kliebard, the manipulation of learning opportunities to reach certain end experiences may not show full appreciation for a student's human capability.[48]

Designs, on the other hand, clearly have the purpose to guide or prescribe certain optimally perceived values. Such an approach ought to more fully develop this human valuing capability. Whether dealing with subject matter, social phenomena, or people, the designs selected will reflect the problems of practical decision-making in the school and society at large.[49] Ornstein's recent survey of the field has identified various value approaches according to one of two categories: emphasis on subject or emphasis on student.[50] Designs are value statements which have appeared in a variety of forms throughout the history of the curriculum movement. Today, however, only the subject design is prominent; the core, fusion, correlation, and broad fields forms having become passe.

The logical sequencing of knowledge in the general subject curriculum was not deemed an adequate approach in a sophisticated world. More synthesis among areas of knowledge was demanded.[51] The correlation, fusion and

broad fields approaches of the 1930s and 1940s reflected the specialized viewpoints on knowledge and knowing. But sophisticated curriculum conceptualizations did not necessarily meet the criteria of relevance. The core curriculum was, however, geared to social and personal relevance. Two variations emerged from the Progressive era--the open core and the closed or preplanned core. As a curriculum which stressed common learnings and specific problem solvings, the core--especially the open variety--gave a great deal of latitude to student initiative and personal concern. But the increased emphasis on disciplinarity and the decline of the Progressive influence upon curriculum in the 1950s minimized the prerogatives gained by open-minded inquiry to personal-social problems. Nevertheless, the spirit of the core has had its impact on humanistic education and its development at least in one area--that of reconceptualism.

In humanistic education the accent is on affect and valuation. Here educators have made a serious attempt at a comprehensive vision of a unity of knowledge and personal knowing. Having traced the origins of humanistic education, Patterson finds a classical definition, set two hundred years ago, applicable to our setting

> (1) The purpose of education is to develop the potentials--all the potentials--of man as a whole; (2) the essential method for achieving this is the providing of a good human relationships between the teacher and student--or as Pestalozzi put it, a love relationship.[52]

Becker and Pritzkau have developed separate humanistic models drawn from a discipline's orientation.[53] Scientific questions are related to social issues as human beings attempt to survive in a technological environment. Moral and theological discourse help relate personal inquiries into the meaning of life.

Weinstein and Fantini have attempted to integrate a variety of knowledge sources under the rubric of humanistic inquiry. They present a curricular model based on three tiers. The first is an information and skills retrieval base (social studies, language, disciplines--it is cognitively

oriented); second, the personal discover base; and third, the group-personal interaction tier.

> We regard cognition and affect as complementary, not contradictory forces. They have not played balanced roles in education because affect has received such meager recognition, experimentation and practice... Affect can serve not only to revivify elements of the old subject matter but also, and primarily, to open vistas for new subject matter. [54]

What is there to expect from humanisitc designs of the future? Pratt distinguishes needs from events or interests as the major component for the curriculum designer. Based on Maslow's taxonomy (physiological need, need for safety, social needs, need for esteem, need for self-actualization), Pratt suggests, "The basic principle of curriculum development remains: *all valid curricula help people to meet their significant needs; all other curricula are a waste of time.*"[55]

The traditionalist realm is wide ranging, seemingly without any but the broadest common designations. Pinar examines the work of many traditionalists, including Tyler, Saylor, Alexander, and the Tanners, along with humanistic educators and finds, "What they do share is an interest in working with school people, with revising the curriculum of schools. Their writing tends to be journalistic, necessarily so, in order to be readily accessible to a constituency seeking quick answers to practical problems."[56]

It is debatable whether or not humanists and other traditionalists are seeking "quick" answers. What can be said is that they provide practitioners with a variety of suggestions for cognitively and affectively maximizing student inquiry techniques. Traditionalists are directly interested in students and teachers.

The Scientific Field of Curriculum

Macdonald introduces"...a second camp of ofttimes younger (and far fewer theorizers (who are) committed to a

more conventional concept of scientific theory...primarily conceptual in nature, (whereby) research would be utilized for empirical validation of curriculum variables and relationships,....."[57]

George Beauchamp has been identified as a major conceptual-empiricist. [58] The curriculum field, as far as he is concerned, is based in the university in whatever departments address themselves to curriculum issues. In his view there seems little qualitative difference between trained curriculum workers from a traditionalist orientation and the psychometricians who are invited to make technical analyses of certain data. While he argues for more clearly defined notions of who plans and develops curriculum, his bias is certainly with trained social scientists. Following this inclination, Pinar criticizes conceptual empiricists whose increasingly refined methodologies and sustained "cumulative" research would like to "bring about a science of human behavior." [59]

Social science and technological applications of empirical research have provided models found to be quite efficient by some theorists. Briggs' approach sounds as if it were derived from a very effective engineering component. While he speaks of a neutral or value free instructional systems design, the language employed seems clearly to be biased: "(A) 'system' in the present context, is an integrated plan of operation of all components (sub-systems) of a system, designed to solve a problem or meet a need....Objectives, methods, and evaluations should be designed to be mutually supportive." [60]

There is a tacit understanding on the part of most curricularist today that guidance and controlled planning fit the current needs of the field. Since curriculum came into being as a self-conscious endeavor with Bobbit's *The Curriculum*, the field has been enamored of the technical theorizing. As Beauchamp has observed, the field has adapted and adopted from other sources. "When scholars have lacked experience in theory development in a field of endeavor, it has been customary for them to look to the patterns set by those who have been successful and to use those patterns as paradigms for beginning efforts." [61]

Saylor and Alexander have tacitly acceded to the tech-

nical pattern setting of which Beauchamp speaks. While they present an overview of many theories, past and present, their suggestions for a "good" curriculum plan reveal a technical bias. There are preset comprehensive goals, learning opportunities that range from lesser to greater, dependent to independent. A plan like this seems to reveal a rather closed process. Feedback is invited from students, the community is to be brought in on the decision-making process, and individualized flexibility is possible. Nevertheless, a plan, as a blueprint, is rather well delineated, controlling and determining outcomes. Saylor and Alexander summarize their approach to planning in terms of ends and means, in the flow of activities or procedures from beginning to end.[62]

Pratt has assimilated a technological orientation that also reflects a commitment to idealism. He strongly believes that engineering design skills can be applied by humane, enlightened educators to maximize learning. He suggests, "Increased effectiveness is likely to be a result of the cumulation of a repertoire of principles and strategies that constitute an applied science or technology of education." [63]

Posner and Rudnitsky have prepared a text which gives practical expression to this notion of curriculum based upon applied science and a technology of education.[64] They integrated the selection of intended learning results with educational goals. The authors constructed a blueprint that linearly takes the student from the course planner's values (in terms of learner, society, and subject matter) to actual learning outcomes. Their approach is basically a matter of means, systematically analyzed with regard to original aims, that will result in specific outcomes.

By the latter part of the 1970s, Pratt and Posner and Rudnitsky notwithstanding, most curricularists seemed less imbued with emulating technological models. There was still much effort at generating more sophisticated statistical methodologies, but more expansive views were adopted. Schubert reports that curricular books "tended to be more situational, analytic, and interpretive than behaviorist. They tended more toward the conceptual and/or prescriptive than empirical and experimental, although some embraced both." [65]

The evaluation subfield, itself research oriented, contributed more than strict empirical guidelines. Some evaluators had grown in the humanistic influences but still appreciated systems; they were also familiar with intuitive, personalist dimensions of curriculum that needed to be studied. Schubert cites Eisner and Hamilton--among others-- as exemplifying this expanded, deepened use of science, technology, and the arts. "They offer modes of illumination of curricular phenomena that go beyond...*the numbers game* by examining methods that are naturalistic, literary, and artistic; thus providing...*qualitative evaluation*."[66]

"Curriculum design...must be guided by a vision of humanity and its future."

The scientific orientation, however, can provide more than simply technological expertise. Science is only a method to help clarify thinking, to facilitate practical applications drawn from a variety of data sources. The most effective designs in curriculum will be drawn from the social and pure sciences and from administrative and human values. Pratt, a designer with a real appreciation for scientific applications, however, points to a larger task for technology:

> Technology is value free; it can determine the speed with which we move but cannot determine the path we take. While good will without technique is powerless, technique without good will is sinister. Curriculum design uses technology but must be guided by a vision of humanity and its future. [67]

Walker offers a similar view. He does not seem to be an orthodox social scientist. But he does accept some degree of the faith in applying research technique to curriculum problems. He disdains "the image of the technician at the control panel directing the whole operation."[68] Nevertheless, the place of logical positivistic science is assured in

some measure, he contends, when its ideals are integrated in a comprehensive fashion: "To reject the possibility is to close off a vital avenue of understanding for all educators." [69]

The resultant knowledge from positivistic inquiry can help build a curriculum based on clarity, precision, order-- or so the argument goes. We learn from those who have been identified with the conceptual-empirical school that there is uncertainty everywhere. Posner and Strike admit. "We have very little information, based on hard data, regarding the consequences of alternative content sequences and will need a good deal more research before we are able to satisfactorily suggest how content *should* be sequenced."[70]

Under the circumstances one might begin to shy away from curricular recommendations based on positivistic scientific findings. We have known for a long time that one can prove almost anything with statistical verifications. Science may guarantee systematic data computation, but educators and the public must bear in mind,

> ...that producing data is a human process. Like any human process, it does not exist in isolation, nor is it controlled by formulas. It affects and is affected by the context in which counting occurs... How do I go about counting handicapped teachers? I sent out a memo to the teachers asking them to report if they wanted to be listed. I know that one is on the list who only has a sinus condition. [71]

Measurement, it would seem from the above example, is a phenomenon that requires qualification: "for what purpose, to what end?" Basically curriculum theory, technically understood, must allow the fullest use of the best available resources: thinking, feeling, moving human beings. Means-ends procedures in and of themselves are likely to be counterproductive without a thorough evaluation of people who are involved in planning. The interface of imprecise or subjective elements with the objectively planned curriculum is more enlightening.

Reid points out how the whole picture ought to be

examined:

>...the more we insist that curriculum planning is rational and not political, and the more we emphasize aims at the expense of constraints, the more certain we make it that the end of our endeavors will bear little resemblance to the high hopes with which we began. ...For the value laden aspects will always be there, whether we recognize them or not. [72]

In other words, we continue to recall Bronowski's dictum: science is simply a Latin word for knowledge. We know with our heads we are homo sapiens, "knowing persons." But there are an infinite variety of ways for knowing our world. Those who would reconceptualize curriculum writing argue for expanded models for inquiry. The ensuing discussion reflects an overview study of those antecedents contributing to reconceptualist curriculum theory.

The Reconceptualization of the Curriculum: Some Antecedents

Three scholars have recently studied and critiqued the antecedents, ideology, and applicability of reconceptualist writing. Huber has focused on the intellectual roots of the American antinomian tradition in presenting specific theoretical arguments for heightened consciousness. [73] Mazza has examined newer theoretical critiques of the traditionalist literature to observe how alternative intellectual, political, psychological, aesthetic, and ethical frames of reference affect reflections about and discourse on the curriculum. [74] Finally, Schubert has provided a chronological listing as well as an interpretive and contextual analysis of the texts that have appeared in the curriculum field. His inquiry and summary analysis of reconceptual developments in the latter part of the 1970s has been particularly helpful. [75]

The present study views reconceptualist roots in three areas. These theorists (1) are skeptical about the dominant social science or logical positivist manner of knowing or verification of knowledge--they are open to a variety of inquiry methods; (2) share a belief with the humanists in holistic ways of knowing--their larger perspective is furnished by third force psychologists such as Maslow and Rogers; and (3) focus on the phenomenon of inner-consciousness, centering on intuitive, mystical, religious ways of knowing. These three areas are examined below.

(1) Skepticism About Current States of Knowing

Science assists us to describe the world and guides our deliberations over how to act in it. We devise a variety of conceptual systems to make sense of the data that our intellects and emotions assimilate. Roszak observes, "The scientific mind begins in the spirit of the Cartesian zero, with the doubling away of all inherited knowledge in favor of an entirely new *method* of knowing....A man is a scientist not because of what he sees, but because of *how* he sees it." [76]

Data that come from any of the senses are liable to continual critique, conceptualization, refinement, and possibly inclusion into reconceptualizations. One advanced method of conceptualization is termed paradigms. According to Kuhn they are universally recognized scientific achievements that for a time delineate broad problems and solutions to a community of practitioners. [77]

Kuhn claims that economically, technologically advanced societies perpetuate a certain paradigm for knowing. But as any paradigm, it is only temporally viable and may shift as new knowledge and ways of knowing become available. In our era, the social science paradigm has dominated. But there is a conflict when theorists, under the guise of scientific certainty and objectivity, offer the social science paradigm as the only way to observe and measure reality.

Scientific significance, according to reconceptualists, is not to be derived from any monolithic system of inquiry. There are multiple ways of knowing the world and understanding ourselves. Polanyi identifies two main categories: explicit knowledge of observables, or logic; and tacit knowing, that is, reflected notion and intuitions.

Tacit knowing appears to be a doing of our own, lacking the public, objective character of explicit knowledge ...tacit knowing is in fact the dominant principle of all knowledge, and its rejection would, therefore, automatically involve the rejection of any knowledge whatever.[78]

In other words, Polanyi is reaffirming the personal and immediate involvement of the individual in any act of cognition. Since by current biological and metaphysical standards, human beings are finite creatures, their involvement in knowing is subject to error. Certainty can never be obtained since knowing is subject to error. Certainty can never be obtained since knowing is always mediated by subjective screenings of meaning or interpretation. Neither "right" nor "wrong" in the conventional sense, Polanyi's approach sets the stage for widening the discussion about what and how one knows.

(2) *Humanistic Education, Values, and Third Force Psychology*

Humanistic educational designs have been discussed earlier. At this point we reiterate and detail a bit more of how the goal of a dynamic, holistic personal process fits into the reconceptualist critique. To begin with, one can find that humanistic psychology has been a response to the kind of harsh world described by Patterson, "individualization and depersonalization had become apparent in society, as a trend supported and fostered by the applications of behaviorism. The newer focus...is upon the person and his total experiencing." [79]

The totally experiencing person is that creature possessing cognitive, affective, and psycho-motor capabilities--all of which are, ideally, integrated in a fully functional manner. The process of integrating the cognitive and affective means of inquiring into the environment is termed "confluent." The major task for confluent curricular specialists, like Brown, is to provide opportunities for choice among intellec-

tual, intuitive, esthetic ways of knowing and valuing.[80]

There is great difficulty in developing values in a world of "future shock" where matters occur so quickly that the knowledge systems and learning techniques of one generation are obsolete in the next. Assuming that we base knowledgeable, ethical choices in learned and reflected experience, it is increasingly difficult to choose at all because of the multitude of experiences life provides. Toffler, a decade ago, detailed how our high technological society suffers, metaphorically, from a peculiar ailment called progeria--death from old age before one's time. His book, *Future Shock*, described how these societies experience supernormal rates of change--for which they are unprepared.[81]

Today, the reconceptualists argue, it is of very little benefit to speak of instilled or inculcated values as if there is a means-end, input-output system. While choices can be coerced or controlled in order to obtain certain rewards within school, family, or peer circles, free valuing cannot. It is a process which, when functioning well, is based firmly on personal appraisals. Self-questioning and the legitimacy of conflict in making decisions are part of the approach developed by Raths and others. They have devised a series of strategies, not as a panacea for the problem of choosing in a world of accelerated change, but as a means for facilitating self-clarification.

...if children--or adults, for that matter--are to develop values, they must develop them out of personal choices ...(which) must involve alternatives which (1) include ones that are prized by the chooser; (2) have meaning to the chooser, as when the consequences of each are clearly understood; and (3) are freely available for selection.[82]

Confluency and personal value clarification in humanistic education are derived from what Maslow identifies as "third force" psychology.[83] In response to the insufficiency of behavioral or Freudian approaches, the third force psychologist argues that there is little gained from focusing on unconscious motives or mechanistic processes as a way of deriving meaning. Achievements in personal growth may

still only be momentary; over a period of time, however, as psychic and physical deficiencies are satisfied and defenses strengthened, there are occasions of insight, awe, and mystery which he designated as peak experiences. The task of the instructor or facilitator and the student is to locate these moments through the full range of cognitively and affectively-based knowing. The peak experiences which may occur are part of self-actualization, or becoming fully human. It is "the development of the fullest height that the human species can stand up to or that the particular individual can come to. In a less technical way, it is helping the person to become the best he is able to become."[84]

There is a certain amount of risk taking that goes along with this process. The third force movement asserts that each person has a great deal of potential autonomy; the actualization of it may bring an awareness bearing joy or pain of discovery. But that is the full act of growth; to reiterate, holism--that is, self-integration and assimilation of all possible means--is the ideal. "The plea of the humanist for education is not that we give up behavioral approaches, but that we realistically recognize their assets and liabilities, and therefore use them in proper balance with the humanistic aspects of the problem."[85]

Educators cannot--in advance--automatically determine goals and objectives, however well-researched the "needs" of the student are--and assure lasting personal meaning. No method or perspective will guarantee this, but the humanistic applications of third force psychology provide the greatest possibility. Rogers shares some useful insight from the counseling field that shows the necessity for flexibility and openness: "One cannot teach another.....The most one person can do to further it (knowledge of feeling emotion in another is to create certain conditions which make this kind of learning possible. It cannot be compelled."[86]

In this regard critics of more scientific and traditionally oriented curricula have noted a disproportionate emphasis on "compelling," extrinsically prescribed goals. True human responses to the search for meaningfulness of life and for purpose are not determined by authorities outside the student. The school may demand behavioral responses

Ultimately, however, it is the student-as-person who will ascribe and appropriate significance to any act of learning. The teacher facilitates rather than inculcates. Morris states the task well:

> The teacher's role would be to quicken the child's awareness of his own consciousness as pure intentionality, to start him out on the project of defining his own meaning in the world and hence of creating meanings in the world...The point is that he (the child) is the author of them (the meanings)...even if they happen to coincide with other people's.[87]

Curriculum writing in this vein is personalist and subjective, existentialist, whatever the cognitive needs are determined to be. American existentialists have supported a Third Force movement in speaking of the human being as having an essential self, an intrinsic self. [88] Through the free choices that one makes, one continually "uncovers" or self-actualizes. Choices are nurtured through innerness or consciousness. These data are equally important to the reconceptualists.

(3) *Innerness, Intuition, and Mystical Knowing*

There is another aspect of a holistic mode of knowing. Its origin and expression is in what Jaynes calls consciousness. It is the phenomenon of the mind perceiving a sense world of objects and then reflecting upon itself. "It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analogue "I" that can observe that space and move metaphorically in it." [89]

Certain educational theorists appreciate these contentions as they try to design new opportunities for knowledge inquiring. The reconceptualists, advocating multiple ways of knowing, draw on the research from psychologies of consciousness; Robert Ornstein is an example.

> Education consists predominantly of readin', 'ritin', and 'rithmetic,   and we are taught precious little

about our emotions, our bodies, our intuitive capabilities. A strict emphasis on verbal intellectual knowledge has screened out much of what is or could be legitimate...the existence of 'nonordinary realities' is not studied because they do not fit into the dominant paradigm. [90]

The reconceptualizing curricularists are opposed to a predominant reliance on verbal intellectual knowledge. They extend new possibilities of perceiving and understanding the world in their views of the student-as-a-total person. Each creature possesses a variety of faculties for perceiving, rationalizing, and feeling.

According to earliest physiological research, these multiple ways of knowing can be subsumed under two main rubrics. Hippocrates recognized the dual nature of the human brain. The "active" left brain is responsible for analysis and logic and verbal skills; the right hemisphere, passively functioning, is related to spatial, aesthetic, physical dimensions of knowing. Deikman evaluates the balance between these two modes of consciousness in terms of our personal and communal welfare.

> The action mode has ruled our individual lives and national policies, and the I-It relationship that has provided the base for technical mastery is now the primary obstacle to saving our race...The receptive mode...the I-Thou relationship—exists and it may be needed to provide the experimental base for the values and the world view now needed so desperately by our society as a whole. [91]

Receptivity is heightened by a number of techniques, one of which is Transcendental Meditation. Phenix can speak about "Transcendence and the Curriculum" as a disciplined way of secularly reviving our intuitive reflections in a unified fashion. [92] Furthermore, the art of transcendental meditation can enable one to inquire deeply into as yet unknown energy sources. Curricularists who take this spiritual introspection seriously believe that new ways of

knowing the self and the outer world will contribute to one's total growth.

The emphasis on innerness has come about as a reaction to the perceived inordinate focus on outerness. What is out-there can be sensed; there is certainty, or at least we think so, though Roszak has contended that there is at best a *myth* of objective consciousness. He is denigrating the near-exclusive reliance on this manner of knowing. In an attempt to refine perception, interpersonal relationships may also be altered for the good. In other words, there is a strong ethical component in this source of reconceptualization. Knowledge potential is as broad and deep as the highly rational, highly idiosyncratic nature of the particular human being in question. There is more to knowledge and knowing than empirically or even logically verifiable propositions. Roszak suggests a shift in emphasis. "The only way we shall ever recapture the sort of knowledge Lao-Tzu referred to in his dictum 'those who know do not speak' is by subordinating the question 'how shall we know?' to the more existentially vital question, how shall we live?" [93]

Sometimes adults shape their world out of an intellectual sophistication, mistaking maturity and technical expertise for the fullest possible knowing. While mental ability and certain experiences do provide practical tools for managing in the world, other latent capabilities are equally important. Intuition, in particular, is one other source for knowing, a manner of inquiry into the natural and social order. But intuition is not nearly as prized as rational empirical knowing. Intuition lacks a certain objectivity valued in Western society. But it is, nevertheless, real, vividly nurtured by imaginative perspectives. The reconceptualists certainly do not ignore the need for engineers, doctors, and lawyers to rationally preplan certain technical courses of action; however, they would give at least equal attention to the spontaneous, intuitive, imaginative realm of thought. There is a freshness in this approach often characteristically seen in the lives of children. Samples observed, "It led Robert Oppenheimer to remark, "I could solve my most complex problems in physics if I had not given up the ways of thinking common to children at play." [94]

We live in a quandry over the need to organize our experience according to preplanned routines and to simply "experience" with the minimum of structure. The conflict is readily acknowledged in the curriculum field, where effectiveness and efficiency are often stressed in behavioral terms. Reconceptual theorists are forcefully challenging this notion.

Critical Reconceptualization
of the Curriculum

Schubert credits Schwab with initiating what came to be an unusually insightful way of talking about curriculum;[95] and his approach was later built upon, expanded, and complemented by the reconceptualists. Schwab addressed himself to the practical in contradistinction to the theoretic orientation characteristic of the social sciences. Schubert summarizes:

> The method of inquiry of the theoretic paradigm is induction, assuming the possibility of objectivity and the virtual absence of a Heisenbergian uncertainty principle. On the contrary, the practical assumptions hold that illuminating insight stems from interaction with problematic areas rather than induction upon them....(The method) acknowledges the need to see an interdependence of causal factors that are not generalizable but are necessary knowledge for promoting an end of decision and action that rectifies specific problems.[96]

Curriculum in this sense is seen less as an imposed plan and more as the occurrence of certain interactions. The key factors in this interaction process are the material content of a lesson; the identities of those studying and teaching; the bureaucratic, technical, and pedagogic decisions that affect knowledge inquiry and sharing; and the personal exchanges of all those situated within the physical milieu. Within that milieu, opportunities for reconceptualization occur. Benham recently has offered a restatement of the

phenomena involved.

> Reconceptualization, then, aims at altering one's conceptualizations, quite literally; one's ways of looking at things, at life: at oneself, which involves consciousness and leads to the existentialist position; or at the forms of social organization, which involves political action and leads to the structuralist position...or a combination of the two.[97]

Expanded notions of inner consciousness, humanistic and existentialist ideas (cited above) have provided reconceptualization with certain foci. Bernstein also provides insights that have helped the reconceptualists to formulate their views.

> The most important feature in the restructuring of social and political theory has been the reassertion of the necessity and legitimacy of the critical function of theory...We are coming to realize that human rationality cannot be limited to technical and instrumental reasons...(there is) practical discourse in which human beings try not simply to manipulate and control one another, but to understand one another genuinely and work together toward practical--not technical--ends.[98]

The critic here cannot be content with pointing out the superficial structural problems of an institution such as the school or the way in which people interact or fail to interact as individuals. Criticism, to accomplish its purpose, ought to go beyond speculating about the ideal notion of society or personhood. In other words, criticism is not only the mode of communication of the critic, but is also a source of personal transformation. The critic's task is far more than identifying the contours of the field. He must discover his own biases and hesitations. In short, self-knowledge emerges in the act of criticism. According to Pinar,

> Fundamental to our view is the sense that curriculum research must emancipate the researcher if it is to

authentically offer such a possibility to others...Our aspiration is to gain increasing access to that which is conditioned, allow it to surface, to be released or permitted to remain (in either case in consciousness), hence open to the conscious intentions of the individual. [99]

The reconceptualists attempt to convince others that assumptions about the ordinary world of power, persons, and possibilities are just that: only *assumptions.* There is a world of inquiry and sources of inspiration that transcend the taken-for-granted daily milieu. Persons who are fully alert--aesthetically, intellectually, and spiritually--can locate that world, with its possibilities and limitations. Reconceptualist curricular theory aims to draw one into that world through what Maxine Greene calls wide-awakeness.[100]

Paulo Freire established a remarkable model for reawakened, conscious, determined,informed action. Called "praxis," it relates to the approaches advocated by the critical theorists of the 1970's. Among other things, he stresses the dynamic aspect of language, more from a political than an aesthetic point of view. He tells us that the radical interaction of the two dimensions of the spoken word, action and reflection, result in the act of dialogue as a human phenomenon. "Thus to speak a true word is to transform the world."[101] And yet the power of language is finite, especially when it comes to definition.

Kliebard presents a picture of an uncritical, unreflective acceptance of the behavioral-managerial-technocratic orientation in curriculum writing. The curriculum as a model of utilitarian efficiency and consensus is the object of change. Huebner emphasizes a concern with language usage in discussing these same areas: he tries to stress the ethical and aesthetic   modes against the   technical and controlling mode [102] Language is more than communication. It is the shape of our world. In fact, it is the moral means of making this world. With Kliebard's research at hand, Pinar suggests a rather dismal picture. "The ideal of education evaporates; a residue of schooling, training for profitable existence in a capitalistic economic order, remains." [103]

It is very difficult to offer any precise definition of reconceptualization. It is processes that heightens individual consciousness of self and society and the dynamic dialectic between the two. Pinar tells us what is going on rather than assigning limits or labels to the behaviors described. He points to Apple's ideology and social critique of hegemony, the all-encompassing domination of physical life and consciousness.

> The control of schools, knowledge and every day life can be, and is, more subtle (than determination) for it takes in even seemingly inconsequential moments. The control is vested in the constitutive principles, codes, and especially the commonsense consciousness and practices underlying our lives, as well as by overt division and manipulation.[104]

In other words, Apple is referring to the ways in which meaning is conveyed through the structures in society. The political, socio-economic relationships, sexual and racial attitudes, the means of material production, and the value system that pervades it are *all* critical to any view of curriculum. Apple has tried to highlight the relationship between what he perceives to be economic and cultural domination. The school, through its mores, its bureaucracy, its intellectual commitments to avoid conflict, is the chief vehicle of this domination.

What can be done? Others are not very optimistic about reform, however high -minded, sincere, and authentic the propagators are. True, humanistic education offers many possibilities to those who are relatively self-confident, at ease, secure. But radical attention to fundamental social, political, economic inequities is needed. Bateman says, "...tinkering with the surface of things or treating symptoms of deep underlying causes will not make much difference. Integration, decentralization...none of these liberal answers will contribute much to the pedagogy of liberation."[105]

Reconceptualization is *not* a liberal answer. It begins as a critique of the field. It comes from many diverse authorities; in fact, what seems to unite the critics most is that to

which they are opposed. More than mere opposition, however, must occur if the kind of transformation spoken of by Freire is to occur. Pinar, therefore, presents a sequel to curriculum criticizing: the post-critical stage. "The heritage, attacked and discredited, now begins to give way to an affirmative new conceptual order."[106]

The reconceptualization of the curriculum has incorporated intellectual traditions not normally thought to be part of North American curriculum thought. Radical forms of social inquiry and innovative departures (for schools in the United States) have drawn from Marxism, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and existentialism. The question is one of obtaining meaning, of creating meaning, of interpreting the ordinary and seen, the unseen, and idiosyncratic in human encounter. This, too, is knowledge of a most important sort. These Continential intellectual traditions help to bring knowledge and the acts of knowing together. The approach rests heavily on the interpretive method. Van Manen's review of reconceptualist literature is instructive in this matter.

> The interpretative method belongs to a different world of science indeed. Phenomenology and hermeneutics...are more closely aligned to (but not the same as) philosophy and the arts than to strict science and statistics...From the point of view of phenomenological pedagogy, the child's potential for growth is always seen as open--subject to personal experiences, pursuits, choices, relevancies and commitments...they conceive of facticity only as *the occasion for, not as the causality of*, human behavior.[107]

This interpretive mood has helped bring about a renewal of curriculum theory. There are a multiplicity of suppositions as to what is and what is not curriculum theory. Part of the problem is based on the various definitions and delimitations of the word "curriculum" and the word "theory."[108] According to McCory, frustration mounts because scholars are in search of either ideal pre-

scriptions or descriptions.

Schwab, too, is impatient with the misguided approaches to achieving clarity in the field. He claims that there has been a renewal of curriculum theory simply because the older theoretical holdings--based upon empirical design or prescriptive norms--are not appropriate to discourse. Schwab's restatement of the theoretical ironically comes in terms of what he calls the practical and the eclectic,

> ...the arts by which unsystematic, uneasy, but usable focus on a body of problems is effected among diverse theories, each relevant to the problems in a different way...It is the discipline concerned with choice and action, in contrast with theoretic, which is concerned with knowledge. [109]

The approach is neither deductive nor inductive. It is an indictment against the perceived abstraction of set principles or of generalization. It calls for the curricularist to face real people in real action situations.

Huebner echoed Schwab's announcement that the field was moribund, overburdened from many diverse interests.

> It (the field) did not die because it depended on theory rather than practice, although its sickness might have been diagnosed sooner if there had been greater correspondence between its rhetoric and its performance. It died because the increasing diversity of interest it tried to carry during those hundred years could no longer be held together by a single focus...Our work is identifying educational content and finding ways to make it available to young people.[110]

Content of the curriculum is related to culture. Huebner feels that more precise usage of language helps clarify what part of the culture is potentially emancipating and which part is restraining.

Much of the discourse in the curriculum field is located within the empirical-technological analytic tradition. Van Manen, echoing Schwab, disdains the emphasis on the practical that emanates from such a means-end orientation.

Practicality, or simply getting the job done, is insufficient. The reconceptualization of curriculum studies stresses practicality not as effective control but as effective communication between persons. Interpretive meanings are crucial. "From the perspective of hermeneutics there are no such things as stimuli, responses, or measurable behaviors; instead there are encounters, life-worlds, and meanings which invite investigations. The focus is on actions, not behaviors."[111] These actions refer to what real persons try to do, how they reflect, the manner in which they participate in one another's feelings and thoughts. There are rich experiences to be elicited if teacher and student feel free to *share*. Will the teacher be *open*, or just an impartial observer monitoring streams of consciousness flowing through the class? There is a method, however, that helps elucidate these feelings. The way is via autobiography, through a process that Pinar has conceptualized as *currere*.[112]

Schubert and Lopez relate steps taken with students in a Chicago barrio and those in a graduate course to create curriculum. The researchers' findings substantiated the concern that whatever action is undertaken, it should "(1) build upon students' pasts; (2) enable them to imaginatively project futures to which they can aspire; (3) magnify the bewildering swarm that is their present; and (4) help students create a synthesis of these three great episodes of living."[113]

The full environment is there to help develop and elicit the point of contact between student and student, student and teacher. The Schuberts experimented with a variety of means for helping students identify the realities in their environment, that of the children and of the graduate student. In the final analysis, it is the total environment in which the reconceptualist tries to situate the curriculum.

Renewing Curriculum Theory: A Conclusion

Whether one works out of the personal setting or the social orbit of interaction, a formulated goal could be lifted from an Association for Superivison and Curriculum Development publication, *To Nurture Humaneness*. This book documented an increasingly growing list of person-centered approaches with the seemingly common thread: "A concern

with the learner as a human being rather than simply an organism and as a whole person rather than simply a disembodied intellect or a respository of cognitive processes."[114]

Education is what a person can become individually, personally, and as a member of a community. As one comes to grips with the power of imagination he can personally engage in an active dialogue with literature, history, or science. These are no longer contents to be simple mastered, but sources for stimulating the total student.

The task is now to arrive at a curriculum design that allows for the individual's maximum dialogue with himself, the text or the art form. "But most curriculum theorizing has been characterized by abstraction severed from its concrete ground."[115]   But even while the reconceptualists themselves talk of heightened consciousness, Mazza observes that a great deal more needs to be done to sharpen the conceptual tools to take action. Otherwise they will not meet their challenge. [116] More is needed if curriculum structures are to allow individuals to become persons, that is, human beings who do not act in a detached, objective way toward other human beings but are immediately involved with those about them. Much of the social science research has come to indicate a belief that

...to focus on what is common means ignoring what is not. While in natural science such a view is evidently necessary, in the human life sciences it is misleading. With Kierkegaard, I acknowledge that human life manifest itself in individuals. Groups,' for example, is a concept we invent for intellectual economy and convenience, to enable us to refer to similarities among individuals. [117]

Pinar's philosophical orientation is consistent with the methodology he adopts in setting out the tasks that the theorist must do. It is a common enterprise, with an openness to the skills and talents of all who will join in. Keeping in mind that one is dealing with an evolutionary phenomenon leads to an appreciation of his inaugural call to all concerned.

As curricularists we must address ourselves to the historically-established concerns of the curriculum field. We must continue to address ourselves to our contemporaries in the field: to traditionalists and conceptual empiricists. We must explicate the nature of our efforts, and at the same time attempt to offer our work in a way which will permit others--not yet on the scene-- to make syntheses of reconceptualized curriculum and traditional and conceptual-empirical theory.[118]

An ancient rabbinic source has given us a rationale for our efforts: "Yours is not the task to complete the work, neither, however, are you allowed to desist from it altogether. The day is short."[119] So shall we make beginnings, using our forebears, yet always mindful of the tentativeness of their findings and ours. With this in mind, let us now turn to four leading reconceptualists; they are James Macdonald, Dwayne Huebner, Maxine Greene, and William Pinar.

Bringing Knowledge, Knowing, and Knower Together:
The Reconceptualization of James B. Macdonald

Introduction

The curriculum field originated, as we have seen above, through the efforts of progressive-minded educators to make schooling a relevant activity. The unprecedented needs of American school children in the latter part of the nineteenth century demanded radical departures. Educators attempted to ascertain exactly which needs had to be met and then organized knowledge into proper curricular frameworks. Scientific discovery and skillful applications encouraged some educators to try systematically to build a new social order. The optimism that imbued school people then is renewed in our day. Friedenberg's credo clearly speaks to us:

The highest function of education, I would maintain, is to help people understand the meaning of their lives

and to relate to them more fully. Education increases the range and complexity of relationships that make sense to us to which we can contribute and on which we can bring to bear competent ethical and practical judgment.[1]

To a large extent much of the effort to these ends has grown out of empirical research and technically oriented designs. The type of decision-making found in the Tyler Rationale and behavioral taxonomies, however, does not satisfy those who would reconceptualize the field. Their goal is to expand the type of curricular discourse that focuses on personal and social values. The student assumes the responsibility of being a critic and self-critic, in the larger social milieu, and as a partner in dialogue.

Macdonald says that such critical study ought to focus on the functions that curriculum serves; for example, what are the psychological, political, and ethical implications of the theorist's choice of design or of specific materials. Such choices, he argues, grow out of various cognitive human interests; for the purpose of understanding how choices are made, they cannot be detached from the personally held meaning structure of the theorist. The work of curricularists reflect basic inclinations towards social control, consensus, or personal liberation. These interests are manifested in curricular decisions involving interpersonal relationships among students and teachers, selection of materials and the creation of educative settings.

Macdonald's attempts to reconceptualize the act of knowing in the context of the curriculum reflects two major priorities:

One has been expressed in a desire to construct intellectually satisfying conceptual maps of the human condition which were educationally meaningful and personally satisfying. The second has been expressed in a utopian hope that somehow people could improve the quality of their existence, specifically through educational processes and generally through broader social policy.[2]

The reconceptualists, and James Macdonald in particular, are not detached observers. They contend that neither a broad study of the field nor discussion of decision making is maximally valuable unless there is an on-going effort at personal integration with content. The theorist's work in this regard is a model for student activity in whatever course of knowledge inquiry he or she has undertaken.

The reconceptualists are committed to expanding curriculum discourse to include more than technical issues such as grouping, distribution and use of materials, and accountability for fulfilling standardized tasks. A larger issue requires attention. How does one achieve a good society; also, in what ways does a person act in such a community? What are the types of moral relationships that emerge within and outside the school? Such questions are not answerable merely by the accumulation of information or an exposure to the methodologies of knowledge acquisition. Whitehead's insight relates to the priorities Macdonald has established.

> What I am anxious to impress on you is that though knowledge is one chief aim of intellectual education, there is another ingredient, vaguer but greater, and more dominating in its importance. The ancients called it wisdom.   You cannot be wise without some basis of knowledge; but you can easily acquire knowledge and remain bare of wisdom. [3]

The Quality of School Life

Critics like Macdonald argue that there is little quality in school life today. The search for knowledge or wisdom is hampered by the absence of human relationships within the structures of mass education. The predicament of education today reflects conditions in the larger society that have affected our consciousness of what is normal or acceptable. There is a strong inclination to problem solving based on technological methodologies, bureaucratic organization, and a consumer-oriented ethic. [4] Macdonald argues that although "vision" and "transcendence have been basically ignored, they are necesary and legitimate notions for the curriculum.

Moreover, it seems that for many people the purpose of the school is more school, leading to credentials that alone maintain status, influence, power. The school's purpose, according to reconceptualists, should enable a broad set of human capacities to develop, leading to critically aware, critically *functioning* persons. However, traditional curriculum work has been geared to guiding principles, prescriptive actions based upon rationally derived values. Macdonald's theorizing attempts to grasp the relationship between what students perceive as happening on a day to day basis and what institutions acknowledge to be their essential purpose. Another way of inquiring into the quality of school life is to ask,

> ...in whose interest is the activity of the school? (This) presents contradictions when the form and quality of work, power, and language create conflicts between the everyday living interests of those experiencing the activity, and other explicit or implicit external agencies imposing school activity in the service of their own interests. [5]

Macdonald agrees that language expresses one's notion of what the world is or should *be*. It is valuative, though this function is often hidden by claims of alleged objectivity. In the contemporary school setting, linguistic communication through curriculum is frequently based on utilitarian needs. Students are often asked simply to describe the visible characteristics of their worlds in terms of clearly stated causes and effects. Achievement in the areas of history and social studies is geared to lower level cognitive processes of learning.   Language usage, however, should reflect a greater concern for aesthetic and moral metaphors in helping the student to derive meaning. [6] Opportunities should be expanded to allow self-critical expressions as students enter the curricular process as autobiographic persons. One's past and present--and imagined future--have a great deal to do with perceived personal significance of arts, humanities, or sciences. The connection between one's personal commitment and bodies of knowledge should

explicated, as a way of improving the quality of school life.

The quality of school life, however, will not be altered simply by achieving a "new consciousness" of contradiction, discrepancies, or awareness of the school which Macdonald calls a "double agent."[7] Neither will innovative action in the absence of critical thought by the theorist avail. The quality of school life will improve only when people learn to evaluate how personally held values affect and derive from norms in the larger society--and then to act on these new recognitions. Macdonald's career provides us an important insight. He "...spent ten years in empirical research and technical development work in which he claims he was enamored with taxonomies (and) general systems theory and technical schemes such as the Tyler Rationale..."[8] Macdonald expresses the importance of bridging the gap between value perception and technical action.

Underlying continuing self-scrutiny and professional self-judgments is his credo, *"that all curriculum talk and work is value based. Further examination of much of our curricular talk and work often reveals a failure to clearly identify and relate values to work in progress."* [9]

He challenges us to be honest, morally forthright about the knowledge inquiry approaches we advocate. Curriculum work requires a strong degree of self-honesty. Macdonald urges other theorists to locate and clarify those values that underly their professional actions to bring about the "good life." He enables others to try to narrow the discrepancies between what one believes, what one says, and, ultimately, what one does.

Knowledge and Decision-Making

The fundamental reality upon which curriculum is built is the real concerns and aspirations of people. Macdonald refers to this as an ontological focus, which enables him to ask a crucial question: What is or is not learned; what can or cannot be learned; and why? The response is obviously not made in a vacuum but in the realm of the ordinary experiences in the larger world. The political, economic, and social relationships that are identifiable outside the school

school can be appreciated: administration, planning, instruction, characteristics of staff and students. The behaviors and interactions observed allow one to talk about curriculum in terms of rationales: the technical, scientific, political, aesthetic, and ethical.[10] Theorists do not create learning environments arbitrarily. Action ensues from knowledge inquiry based upon more than objectivistic empirical analytic means. Summarizing the writing of Habermas,[11] Macdonald cites the limitation of monologic and hermeneutic understanding of meaning. He says, "The trouble with both modes is that they have divorced themselves from self-reflection; for objectivism deludes the knower by projecting an image of a self-subsistent world of facts structured in lawlike manner; and thus conceals the a priori constitutions of these facts."[12]

Macdonald appreciates the perspective self-reflection provides for identifying the sources of different curricular value patterns. He proposes three human interests: control, consensus, and emancipation; understanding them is derived from self-reflection.[13] By control he means the decision-making orientation implicit in scientific-rationalistic methodology. Consensus refers to a practically cognitive means-ends agreement about which knowledge is of most worth and which curricular designs should follow. Emancipation or liberation results from a critically cognitive orientation.

Macdonald recommends more attention be given to the third mode, the emancipatory and liberational. In terms of curriculum, management by objectives--obtained from experts or consensually--does not begin to engage the full human capacities for creative, imaginative actions. On this point Macdonald draws from Piaget and James. The latter two argued that knowing, reason, and reality were known primarily in the act of doing. Of the two, Macdonald says,

Neither man begins with knowledge as a primary starting point, but with   pure experiences   (James)

are frequently confused and used interchangeably. They are qualitatively different in his approach to knowledge inquiry.

Macdonald cites Piaget, Dewey, Erickson, Bruner, and Kohlberg as examples of developmental social construction of reality--that have exempted the person from the process.

> ...from Locke to the present day, abstract individualism presupposes a picture of civil society, where members are independent centers of consciousness and possess non-context-dependent centers of consciousness and possess non-context-dependent interests, wants, natures, purposes, needs, etc...Concrete individualism conceives of the individual as a *person*, an agent of choice--a source of (yet to be discovered) intentional purposes, capable of valuing (yet to be discovered) activities and involvements and capable of (yet to be discovered) forms of self development. [19]

In arguing against abstract theorizing, Macdonald attempts to translate theory into "practical" deliberation and common sense decision-making. In other words, value inquiry requires one to note what is crucial in the process and what is peripheral. Equal weight is not given to all judgments. We are all aware, to begin with, that while society makes rules for itself, not all advances and norms are of the same import. For example, Macdonald distinguishes in a school setting between preference rules, e.g., hall privileges, and constitutive rules, e.g., forbidding cheating. Preference rules and constitutive rules are also found in society as a whole: military service, dress codes, pre-marital and extra-marital sex, a college education, and "basic" education for example. One needs to delineate differences and similarities in order to know what one really must do to translate value judgment into action. The student cannot assimilate all rules as important. "Relevancy" might be judged by the student on the basis of the interchange between preference and constitutive rules.

Socio-drama or autobiography are two means of eliciting our responses: do the questions embodying curriculum design reflect preference rules or constitutive rules? The clarifying

process is crucial if we are to really understand the values that affect our selection, interpretation, and organization of content and means of inquiry. "This kind of reflective activity also has the merit of completing the human response to liberation by a momentary and sometimes tentative but real dissolution of the subject-object distinction so prevalent and humanely damaging in Western Civilization."[20] In other words, this very human dimension of self-reflection strengthens the battle against means-ends curriculum work.

From Consciousness to Spirit: Centering as the Aim of Education

Macdonald has already provided us with a transcendental developmental model for curriculum. The aim of this ideology is centering, allowing the person to fully maximize all human capacities. This is done through pattern making, playing, meditative thinking, imagining, the aesthetic principle, physical education, and educating for perception.[21]

Here he is cultivating the meaning of the unseen. It is a proper antidote to the utilitarian, rational business-like verbal approaches to the traditional curriculum. Furthermore, centering is a healing therapy, bridging the mind-body separation. We are biological entities with spiritual aspirations. Centering, as an aim of education, has a definite religious dimension according to a recent reviewer.

> Macdonald's appreciation of the potential of our religious traditions to provide an adequate framework for contemporary education is a needed corrective to the historical myopia of those religious educators who, in their search for identity, focus their attention exclusively on the frameworks of a Kohlberg or the rationales of a Tyler.[22]

The religious perspective simultaneously adds a broadening dimension to curriculum work--can anything ever be known completely--and a unique expansiveness. Phenix speaks of the transcendent urge as that which resists the urge toward any "fixed content of knowledge, beliefs or skills that

the learner is meant to acquire."[23] Macdonald disdains the instrumental, the thing-a-fication of a life of holistic knowing. He does not ignore science but rather scientism. Science is part of a whole universe, all of which will never be known, none of which should ever be ignored. It is in this mood Macdonald suggests that

> The act of theorizing is an act of faith, a religious act. It is the expression of belief, and as William James clearly expounds in *The Will to Believe*, belief necessitates an act of the moral will based on faith. Curriculum theorizing is a prayerful act. It is an expression of the humanistic vision in life.[24]

Theorizing, critical reflection, and praxis require the joint participation of student and teacher. An act of faith, by Macdonald's definition, is not carried forth in solitude. One locates that point in which self realization illumines—while personally relating to another creature. Curricular content, explicitly formulated as bodies of information, facts and figures, may facilitate the approach of centering. He would agree that "hard data" situates one in the world. The teacher can serve as an authentic model of how a person can allow the world to talk through him, not for him.

Value, Language and Curriculum:
The Reconceptualization of Dwayne Huebner

Introduction

Dwayne Huebner asks curricularists to consider the way they use language in their work. He asserts that the language used in educational endeavors reflects the various value systems to which theorists and practitioners lay claim. Like Macdonald, above, he believes that curricularists are often unconscious of the value frameworks and language usage they implement in their work. Huebner points out how we confuse alleged statements of fact with value judgments; some observers consider this to be practicing philosophical analysis.   These values and value judgments and

interests do not exist in a vacuum but are manifested in human relationships. Huebner is very concerned that curriculum both mirror and help create caring, loving, open relationships.   One task of philosophy is to help clarify our language usages. There is a moral quality to being precise. In simple terms, people ought to know what they mean and mean what they say. Educators need to be particularly sensitive to this issue of clarity in language since the cognitive, affective, and physical growth of a creature is at stake.

Open communication is hampered by the inclination to control and manipulate people.   Huebner suggests that schools exist as political insitutions whose major category of "goods and services" is power.   Power itself is neutral; however, it is often exercised by curricularists, practitioners and administrators to limit creative expression and personal inquiries.   One example is predetermined expectations for the student, translated into goals, objectives, and specific learning activities.   This approach is characteristic of the traditionalists whose guiding principles for curriculum construction were based on assumptions about learning, the needs of society or the pupil.   The real problem is that guidance may easily be synonymous with governance, and that is a political issue!

Huebner suggests alternative ways of understanding what is curriculum. Of the various value systems or rationales that structure curriculum writing, Huebner identifies the aesthetic and ethical modes as most important. For him the educative environment is a place of more than physical structures, and tools of the trade—texts, professional apparatus, supplies. The educative environment, in its broadest sense, is where the means of inquiry and discovered knowledge draw out the student's response-ability. It is a place for trying to reconcile order and chaos in an aesthetic sense by personalizing the implications of both. By realizing how states of being exist in one's own life, it may be easier to deal with their conditions in the world at large.

The attempt to find beauty and integrity in the widest range of forms and sources of knowledge is an aesthetic and ethical issue. It has a significant ethical dimension.

Huebner advocates that persons in the educative environment seek to restore a wholeness to their lives. Much of the dissension that exists in the world is a result of incomplete attentiveness. Listening is an art form to be nurtured and helps transform detached individuals into relating persons.

Huebner mentions that conversation is both the content as well as a process that builds relationships. Within the educative environment, concentration makes persons aware of one another as temporal creatures. Conversation implies that two persons actively listen, speak less, and so care for one another more. For him, temporality is related to an appreciation of the present moment with its possibilities for such heightened communication.

The traditional language of learning--goals, objectives, scope, sequence, and activity--are not wrong, only insufficient. Science affords school persons an opportunity to inquire, to test, to establish controlled experiments about human behavior. But there is a question of value that goes beyond the knowledge the scientific method can uncover.

Value Systems and Language Usages

Huebner continues Macdonald's argument against a perceived uncritical accpetance of technological rationality. The need for clarity of predetermined goals and effective evaluation of carefully delineated learning activities occupies the traditionalists and conceptual empiricists to a large extent. However, for the reconceptualists, curriculum writing should be comprehended from a larger perspective.

Huebner agrees with Macdonald that the characteristic language of the traditionalist literature (and all curriculum writing) reflects basic human interests. Through the reconceptualists' critical theoretical concern with language, one can indentify and articulate these interests which result in the formation of special value systems. In short, as theorists, we reconsider options as choosing, self-reflective creatures. The task of the curriculum theorist

> ...is to lay bare the structure of his being-in-the-world and to articulate this structure through the language

and environmental forms that he creates....Theorists should call attention to the tools used for the shaping (of the world) in order that the world being shaped can be more beautiful and just. [1]

Huebner's early professional orientation was instrumental, in a negative way, in guiding him towards a so-called "uncovering" function in his work. From a background in positivistic science he moved into teaching philosophy and religion. Alienated from a goals-objectives perspective in traditional educative environments, he sought alternatives. Contact with varying theological and philosophical traditions brought him new awareness. He thus formed the basis for an expanded methodology for comprehending varying curriculum rationales and language usage. He wondered, "How could one plan educational futures via behavior objectives when the mystical literature emphasized the present moment and the need to let the future care for itself?" [2]

Huebner is concerned with the processes that mark inner change and transformation. But such an approach does not lead to an ego-centered retreat from the affairs of the day to day world. For Huebner, consciousness implies a strong, social commitment. In other words, "This requires awareness that the concern for the possibilities of the individual without equal concern for the social-political-economic condition within which we all live is hollow and meaningless."[3]

Huebner and other reconceptualists have tried to identify the value systems that motivate alternative curricular efforts in the classroom. This has heightened our awareness of the possibilities and constraints of the major rationales evident in curriculum writing today. In a recent study of reconceptualization, Mazza identified Huebner as a leader in this critical movement.

The thrust of the aesthetic/philosophic critique is the concern for the intrinsic nature and quality of the educational experience, apart from its utilitarian function for the achievement of goals. The original outline of this critique was forged by Dwayne Huebner in his

opposition to the centrality of the category of objectives and learning in curriculum theory.[4]

Huebner has a multifaceted background. His methodology has been framed by technical training and a predilection to humanistic education. We shall now examine some of the content of his theoretical position.

He speaks of five value systems that curricularists try to identify and/or develop. He labels these as technical, political, scientific, aesthetic, and ethical.[5] At this point in time, while all five are crucial to the valuing process, the technical, political, and scientific rationales are dominant. The technical orientation grows from the society's need to remain industrially and economically viable, thus hopefully assuring a guarantee for the physical welfare of its citizens. Of necessity there is a means-ends approach where objectives, activities, and evaluations are clearly delineated. He finds that the discourse systems of psychology and sociology legitimize the "analysis of the individual in the present or future social order...in terms of concepts, skills, attitudes or other behavioral terms."[6]

Second, he admits that political power is not unimportant in the curriculum enterprise. Politics is the art of influence. Yet in the process of acquiring needed resources for allocation, and the placement of professionals to carry out duties, power may become a manipulatory end-in-itself.

Third, knowledge holds a great deal of power that can be elicited by scientific activity in the form of experimental design. Posing certain hypotheses, the theorist may discover why students react emotionally or physiologically in a given set of circumstances.

Finally, there are aesthetic and ethical value systems, helping us grasp what is going on in the classroom and larger society. One observes how both of these rationales can symbolize a search for wholeness, unity. They supply the moral question, "Why," in regard to the functioning of the first three utilitarian-like value systems. Huebner views the larger picture: "Indeed, the insignificance and inferior quality of much teaching today may be a result of attempts to maximize only the technical and political

and perhaps scientific values without adequate attention to the esthetic and ethical values."[7]

Both rationales are concerned with the qualitative interaction of a person with the environment. That environment is created through efforts to derive meaning from symbolic representation of reality. People share the ability to see patterns, to express themselves in metaphor, and to act on the basis of that knowledge. Common to both rationales is an avoidance of the ends-means patterning in curriculum where "use" of individuals as *things* disrupts the natural harmony of life. Huebner says it thusly: "The intent throughout classroom activity is not a search for preconceived ends but a search for beauty, for integrity and form and the peace which accompanies them, and for truth as life as unveiled through the acting and speaking of the participants."[8]

Although there are commonalities between the two rationales, each has its own characteristics. Art is the act of transforming chaos to order, the unformed to form, dissonance to harmony. Though each expression is grasped through the subjective perception of the artist, a basic truth is conveyed: one's intelligence, emotions, and spirit join together as meaning emerges through contact with an artifact. Whereas technology symbolizes humankind's domination of the world, aesthetic knowledge seeks for integration of the world with all one's faculties. Science enables us to analyze constituent parts of the whole; art aids us to appreciate that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The aesthetic rationale of curriculum is inextricably related to the ethical realm. In both instances, a tension can be felt: limit versus extension, material versus spiritual, the articulate versus the ineffable. Huebner suggests that in confronting an artifact or another creature one is immediately impressed with the particular aspects, the details of what the senses say is there. Nevertheless, the existing object or individual is there, too, as a *whole*, despite the imperfections in human perception. The artist, the student, the one who is wide-awake (in Greene's terms), senses the possibility of gradually making whole that which is separate and detached. As one focuses on the existing but elusive

sense of wholeness in the object of the world, a parallel awareness of an inner personal unity is manifest.

The teacher recognizes this situation well. He or she has been where the student now stands, and, in fact, continues to sense these apparently irreconcilable tensions. The teacher nurtures that educative environment in which personal awareness of these tensions is the first step of human maturity. In a self-reflective way the student is aided to realize his own potentiality through the act of wisdom. "This is the unique function of the teacher, the human aspect of the specific educational environment, who shares the rhythms of continuity and change, of necessity and freedom, with his students." [9]

The teacher assumes a tremendous responsibility in the presence of students. The ethical rationality of educational activity is nurtured by the teacher who accepts certain key concepts as integral to classroom endeavors. They are response-ability, conversation, promise, and forgiveness. [10]

Imaginative expression of meaning is most significant when shared with another person in the act of conversation. The disciplines are one way we order, analyze, and synthesize the elements of the world. They are one vehicle of our response-ability. The knowledge that one derives from disciplined inquiry can be brought forth as an expression of promise between student and educator. There is joy in study, in uncovering meaning that builds a new future. But the power to influence, to facilitate, to draw out, is complemented by a weakness. The educator is not infallible but is subject to pride, faulty judgment, misinformation. The promise of new knowing is accompanied by readiness to forgive others and oneself for errors committed in common classroom endeavors.

From an aesthetic and ethical perspective one proceeds with an idealized version of wholeness. The type of dual dialectic espoused by Macdonald begins to enable one to see the sources of imperfection in this vision. Critical methodologies inform educators and students alike of the distortions of human relationships and the failure of language usage to express promise and forgiveness. Identifying his methodology as dialectical, Huebner means "...seeing the part in terms of the totality, the present in terms of the past and the future, and recognize that contradictions are also a mode of relationship which offer as much understanding of the present moment as cause and effect relationships" [11]

The methodology emerges from consciousness. It is a mode of knowing one's self-reflective autobiography in the context of one's lived in community. He makes a distinction between teachers who are "individuals"--those who live apart and contemplate only their own needs and aspirations--and teachers who are "persons"--those who see themselves taking part in the larger totality made up of adults and children. Huebner advocates the ethical and aesthetic rationales in order that the manipulation and exploitation can be recognized for what they are: a blatant system of means-ends. In the ideal system persons would be viewed as ends in themselves.

Language Usage

Curricularists' use of language reflects value systems selected by the theorist. Huebner suggests that theorists ought to be much more self-conscious about their forms of discourse since language is often adapted uncritically from other disciplines and misused in the school.

> But the unique characteristic of the curricularist is that he is a human being: able to be caught in someone else's web (of language), able to make his own, but more significantly, able to stand back and behold its beauty and form, to study is structure and function, and to generate new web-like patterns. [12]

Huebner points out that we use (or misuse) language in multitude of ways--to describe, to explain, to control, predict, or manipulate, rationalize, legitimize, or to seek affiliation. [13] At the outset, he makes us aware that there is no single way of discoursing about curricular happenings. Curriculum specialists, teachers, administrators, radical critics, and students utilize language according to their immediate operating contexts and motivating interests (see Macdonald). Several examples should suffice to indicate

the pitfalls of uncritical talk or possibilities for innovative conversation.

We describe routines in the class, and expectations for grading, as well as school policy. Nevertheless, as Huebner points out, description is used not only for material relations or bureaucratic operations but also for one's fears or dreams via poetry and other literary sources. In other words, the theorist should be aware that students' needs for self-expression cannot be limited to the conventional prose of "short answer essay" if creative classroom activity is to be appreciated in the widest possible way.

Turning to the language of affiliation, one sees how the framing of behavioral and cognitive objectives and evaluations reflects the curricularist's attraction to scholars and empirical scientists with whom they wish to be identified.

For example, as curricularists adopt and adapt language from other disciplines, such as psychology, there are certain limitations. "Learning" is a term used to cover many phenomena that can be watched, measured, and evaluated in a clinic, laboratory, or classroom. But learning in that sense is not necessarily an accurate phrase to express the whole experience of the person. Knowledge inquiry and self-reflection may include a great deal more. "When...learning is pulled out of psychological discourse and used in another realm, such as curriculum, the scientific checks are not always brought with it. A word or expression current in curricular discourse may be no longer viable in the parent discourse system." [14] For example, "Basics": the term at one time had conjured up an image of the three Rs. Today the three Rs may well be relevance, response-ability, and reciprocalness with meanings that transcend mere mechanical skills.

Language as a Source of Educative Environments

Huebner reminds us how Dewey suggested the construction of an environment that would educate. For example, scientific research in industry and the military result in a systems approach to learning, while stimulus and response studies often come up with recommendations for the school's efficiency and effectiveness. Curricularists are asked by critics such as Huebner to develop language that will help shape an environment that goes beyond the graphic, material designs brought on by science and technology, however efficient. Perspectives provided by Third force psychology, phenomenology, and mysticism have moved theorists such as Huebner to engage the aesthetic and ethical as key rationales for critiquing designs. But more than rationality and technique are involved. In other words, there are more than "inputs" and "outcomes" involved for the theorist who speaks in terms of vision, transcendence, and personal meaning.

"Making knowledge available...is also an existential and political matter."

The theorist is sensitive to creating those opportunities within the curriculum for ethical and aesthetic value judgments. Bureaucratic organization may thwart the nurturing of environments receptive to these rationales, but people like Huebner are optimistic that situations can be created which will evoke personal responses, thus shifting some of the traditional expectations of what education can provide. Huebner states that "...the educational question 'what can and should young people learn,' can become 'how can knowledge be made accessible for use by people with diverse characteristics?'" [15]

In this sense curriculum is what develops in the process of self-reflective, critical inquiry of the sources, regardless of content. Making knowledge available, however, is not simply a pedagogical act. It is also an existential and political matter. The theorist may be unable to make the widest sources of knowledge available to another because he himself is not open. He is blocked in intellectual and emotional development. Therefore, academic decisions about how to go about designing an environment for others are not clearly made. In the discussion of Freire, above, it was shown how an incapacity to reflect on the nature of

our speech reduces our power to act to influence others. Similarly, the power to influence others is political and exemplifies the degree of one's ethical concerns for another. In an unreflective state,"...we justify (the) abridgement of the rights of the young by talk of protecting them, (but) we are perhaps more likely to do it because we want to take our adult world for granted, and not have it brought into question by the young."[16]

Temporality

The world is not to be taken for granted. We have already critiqued value systems and language usages, lest they not be viewed and used uncritically. But we have not elucidated the real underlying problem. That problem is basically one of time, of prescriptions of change, and the ability to structure or control it, first in our own lives and in those of others. Huebner says that this is related to temporality, or the existential nature of man, especially now in a rapidly changing age.

We have noted how Toffler's *Future Shock* documented the unbelievable pace of change, leaving us unprepared and detached. Goals, purposes, and objectives are ways of preparing the student for achievement in the future based on the best of past heritage. However, Huebner goes on, the ability to state the purposes of the school neglects the real flux world in which the student lives. Furthermore,

> By their very nature, goals, objectives, and purposes become statements of a desired future--a tomorrow. The present creeps in the teaching. It is when the educator must deal with the student that he seemingly drops the concern for the past or for the future and focuses upon the present.[17]

Criticizing the language of learning (goals, etc.) is not simply a matter of changing the forms of discourse. Altered behavior is not the primary focus for measuring success or failure of a curriculum. More is entailed. Huebner introduces the notion of man as an autobiographical creature, a theme

more fully developed by Pinar. Behavioral and cognitive changes, geared to the attainment of some postulated future good--to count by tens, to recite the Presidents by heart, etc.--are rooted in a certain time and place. Temporality implies that life's meaning is to be grasped in much wider terms.

> A man's life cannot be described by what he is or what he does at a given time. His life is a complete something, capable of description only when the moments from beginning to end are unified by death. ...Might it not be possible, then, that insights into curriculum planning for the individual are to be sought in the discipline of biography, as well as within the discipline of psychology?[18]

Everything is geared to maximizing the student's ability to confront his future and/or reclaim his past in relational proximity to others. Huebner does not ignore rational empirical sources for this task. A scientific rationality has been shown to be one of the legitimate ways of examining curricular activity. Science, like knowledge, is neutral. It depends upon its technological applications as to what ethical judgment will be made. In this regard Huebner says, "By using learning theory to build educational environments we make it possible for the teacher to enter into significant dialogue with the student as human being, not simply learner. This is the basis for my original distinction between learning and education."[19]

For example, programmed reading units can expedite the advancement of children with special difficulties. Statistical analysis of test results can reveal the significance of certain aspects of group or individual learning process. Huebner simply argues that the assumption underlying the scientific method and technological applications is not always apt. The self-critical introspective person, in the process of reflection, can create knowledge. Such personal knowledge exists although neither science nor technology can verify it.

The Moral Aspects of Language

Huebner is manifestly concerned about the moral aspects of our communication in school places. The institution does need certain structures that require measurement in terms of scores, groups norms, cost effective scheduling of personnel. But if this is the primary thrust of language usage, how can one find out whether detached, compliant, "achieving" learners have gained the power to intuitively value their education--as persons. The society gears us to think about mastery and competence as rungs on a ladder that somehow leads us to the vague goal of success. But there are other kinds of talk that should be taking place.

First it is necessary for educators and administrators to try to draw students, parents, and community leaders into conversation. It is through this kind of communication that the aesthetic and ethical rationales, earlier discussed, will emerge as primary value systems. Huebner asks that we disabuse ourselves of the illusion that certainty in educational practice is assured by our objective, systematic methods of testing, measurement, and management. A focus on the aesthetic and ethical concern of the school will allow alternative views of success to be legitimated. Through the art of conversation one might come to appreciate how openness that leads to a certain vulnerability, is, in fact, the source of great strength. Greene and Pinar speak a great deal of how our structure of knowledge and methods of inquiry ought to allow for more personalist expressions of doubt, paradox, and conflict. The norm of consensus, political or otherwise, may not allow for a true articulation of beliefs or desire for action.

Huebner draws on Paul Tillich and Paul Ricouer, a noted French philosopher, to put these questions of strength and fallibility, . doubt and certainty into perspective for the school situation. Technical competency, skills and traditions need preservation; we are obligated to increase their accessibility, for a contemporary nation must have the widest range of talent from which to draw to insure creativity and viability. "But having them does not entail

imposing them."[20]

Huebner illustrates a related problem stemming from a misunderstanding about how certain assumed values make us competent.

> Conformity, loss of aspiration, and hiding feelings are not a sign of personal strength. They are a sign of inadequate social structures. The reason that teachers do not know what to do when they recognize these weaknesses, mistakes and embarrassment on tapes of their teaching is that they do not work in a social context that recognizes that doubt and fallibility as essential--to maintain one's humaneness and essential as a source of continued growth and development.[21]

Huebner's great contribution is helping us reevaluate what are the strengths and weaknesses in the value systems we implement through our educative environments. We know that we invoke a political rationality when we decide what aspects of our heritage are to be represented in our classrooms. The choice of content leads to decisions of how to create that educative place which reflects the technical values of utility and efficiency. But that technical role ought not to be seen as the fundamental concern of education, though it may be the educator's main concern for training. "He forgets that the basic quality of education is its moral character that the function of a fabricated environment is to enable men to be more human, and that even fabricated conditions can be subservient to man, symbolic of his spirit, and tuned to his transcending qualities."[22]

Assisting the reader to focus on alternative interpretations of environment, Huebner has still been criticized by White for not providing adequate practical suggestions. It is a question of what one means by "practice." White is bothered by the beautiful descriptive talk about the moment of "vision" when the "evolving, emergent educatee meshes with the historically developing society in a hermeneutical classroom activity."[23]

Although White the practitioner is bothered by the flights of Huebner the theorist, it does not mean that there is not

applicability elsewhere. Huebner explicitly has said that skills and techniques must be made accessible--only not be imposed. That is, the real world of the school is made up of two facets. There are instances where certain structural requirements of the school must be met--organizational groupings and evaluations of students--and there are instances where knowledge is presented, but not as the only symbol system for deriving meaning in life. Huebner has reminded us of some questions to ask about the relationship between the two and that *is* practical advice.

As Postman and Weingartner indicated more than a decade ago, "teaching is a subversive activity." It can undermine neat political assumptions about the ideals of democracy, the neat assumptions we make about the infallibility of science to provide unqualified ease and comfort, and the assumptions we make about the worlds we use to describe what we do. It can question the power relationships that distinguish the classroom, or any other client-manager type of organization. It can undermine our own self-image as purveyors of means-ends, cause-effect techniques. But then all of this requires a self-honesty about what *we* want to be and do, vis-a-vis our students. Huebner forces the question when he asserts that we must hear what we say, and say what we hear. Any curricular endeavor is ideally predicated on this issue.

Consciousness, The Aesthetic and The Curriculum: The Reconceptualization of Maxine Greene

Introduction

The reconceptualists have consistently suggested that curriculum be conceived from the perspective of heightened consciousness or critical awareness. They have argued for the use of phenomenology, critical theory, politics, theology, and language analysis. They contend that the malaise pervading our knowledge-rich, power-dominant society demands a radical response from the schools. One could say that the reconceptualists thus far cited have tried to legitimate the

kinds of critical inquiry that challenge scientific cause and effect and technologically organized knowledge. The curricular orientations of the traditionalists and conceptual empiricists have been found wanting as ways of dealing with depersonalization and alienation.

In this context, we are drawn to the works of Maxine Greene. She is preoccupied with teaching people to be self-reflective and critically aware of the relationship among thought, feeling, and behavior. Implicit in her writings is a feeling that unity among these three dimensions is no longer perceived. Considered by many observers to be an existentialist philosopher or theorist, Greene urges us to personalize our investigations into various knowledge sources and the value positions we take. Greene and others argue that this situation has developed from educators who, in Huebner's words, have given primary attention to the technical and scientific domains of curriculum.

> Along with other existential thinkers in the twentieth century America, she (Greene) takes a stand against the unexamined assumptions of a society steeped in positivist thinking and social self-righteousness....And within society, oppressive social institutions perpetuate that single view of reality by discouraging consciousness.[1]

Kliebard, Macdonald, and Pinar have all identified this positivism in the practical means-ends application of technically and scientifically based curriculum making. Rational input/output systems have been the convenient symbol utilized by administrators in their bureaucratic guidance of practitioners in their work.[2] It is necessary to redress the imbalance; rationality is not enough.

The reconceptualists, including Greene, would persuade us to open our eyes to what Alfred Schutz calls "multiple realities." Greene, herself much influenced by Schutz, has aesthetically related this issue to education:

> The curriculum, as I see it, may be regarded as a number of provinces of meaning, each associated with the kinds of experiences available to young people of different

ages, with different biographies,...Our concern in teaching, it seems to me, is to enable our students to interpret these experiences, to acquaint them with and free them to reflect on the range of cognitive styles.[3]

Some Critical Concerns of Maxine Greene

Greene does not consider herself a theorist but rather as one who engages in or "does" philosophy; she specifically wishes to avoid the reconceptualist designation.[4] Frankly, given the wide-ranging philosophic, literary, aesthetic, critical,and historical dimensions constituting reconceptualist approaches, her caveat is more academic than real. We certainly honor her opinion; nevertheless, her philosophic position substantiates the rationale offered by critically, morally, and ethically concerned reconceptualists.

As a philosopher, Greene does not expect each teacher or student to eclectically devise some sort of all-encompassing system by which to derive meaning from life. Each encounter with texts and companions can evoke a unique response in the teacher or student. "The teacher has to decide what makes sense for him. The decision is, after all, the object of 'doing philosophy' : to find aperatures in the wall of what is taken for granted; to pierce the webs of obscurity ..." [5]

Greene asks the student to inquire into the tacitly held value systems by which we live through everyday activity. For example, what are our attitudes toward our work; how and why do we relate in certain ways to family members, companions, colleagues, and strangers? By "doing philosophy" one removes questions such as the "value" and the "purpose of life" from the universal or abstract realm of discourse to the concrete person.

Greene argues that art draws us out of our regimented, objectified existences. Literature, works of art, music, and dance can involve one as more than a mere observer or perceiver. Art motivates us to return to our homes, our leisure, and our work places more sensitive to the problems, the satisfactions, and the aspirations of the people we meet. It seeks to make the fragmented perceptions of life more whole.

A concern with indivisibility–and with the difficulty of encountering another as a person–is what leads me to turn to literature and the arts as a means of making understanding possible, not so much as an understanding of the idea of mankind, as some prefer, but for a sense of ourselves.[6]

One emerges from detached contemplation and self-reflection to *act* in the world. Janet Miller observes a strong social component in Greene's doing of philosophy:

...encounters with works of imaginative and art enable us to break with the mundane and to come in contact with ourselves, and that the more fully engaged we are in the human community, the more 'richly individual we become' and the more we are able to take action upon the world in order to effect change.[7]

Greene prefers to classify herself as a philosopher of the arts and not as a curricularist, or in particular as a reconceptualist.[8] The fact is that the arts do provide certain language usages that expand discourse for imaginatively dealing with personal valuing necessary in curriculum study. Through the imagination, art helps articulate the struggle between fixity and the status quo and the intellectual and social challenges of each new generation' ..."imagination cannot alter or distort reality. It can, however, impart value and significance; it can create new integral wholes; it can overcome man's alienation from his world." [9]

Art can give the opportunity to realize that the "reach can be beyond the grasp." Art is a change agent, a catalyst helping us to see within and beyond our ordinary everyday sights. Werner Haftmann has put Greene's approach into a large perspective, observing a transition from aesthetic passivity to dynamic expression: "...the traditional approach to art was based on the concept that reality was something out there to be conquered; in contrast the modern view of reality... is one which is created within man." [10]

For example, the writer is only tangentially interested in "the jungle" as one moves into *The Heart of Darkness*.

The reality of such a place, however, is uniquely perceived through the self-reflections of the reader. The meaning of the Congo transcends geography.

Imagination does not mean folly. Imaging is a way of looking in upon oneself. It was originally the antithesis of imitating what was perceived from the sense world. It signified the spark of creativity, uniqueness. The imagination demonstrates the power of one kind of discourse. The conversations of scholars debating the authenticity or meaning of historical documents and the implications of empirical data signify another way of speaking about reality. Here the focus of knowing is objectified, beyond the knower. Greene says, "In contrast to the transparencies of discursive literature, the language of imaginative literature is like a mirror. The reader does not look through it to referents in the external world. He finds pointers to the interior silence, the original self."[11]

The critically aware, socially conscious, contemplative person attempts to retrieve the elusive original self. Just as the artist makes his subjectivity the essence of a creative work, so the perceiver encounters the aesthetic object and refines it in terms of *his* consciousness.

Consciousness and Its Moral Implications

Greene argues that works of art are reflections of the designer's human experience and not simply manifestations of technical expertise. Moreover, it is the artist's way to try to come to grips with the existential dilemmas of life. The artist makes a conscious effort to articulate his visions and express frustrations within the finite, imperfect world he inhabits and creates. Therefore, it is in terms of one's own consciousness that aesthetic forms are perceived. The reader needs to be open to a variety of clues as he moves through the text. Greene says, "*His* subjectivity is the substance of the literary object; but if he is to perceive the identity emerging through the enactments of the book, he must subordinate his own personality, as he brackets out his everyday 'natural world.'[12]

Greene directs our attention to Kafka's *Amerika* in

order to show how the aesthetic mode can induce the process –this subjectivity, this phenomenon–of self-consciousness. A young immigrant arrives at these shores bewildered and dislocated. He cannot grasp the meaning of social conventions or the role models of those about him. Clinging to a box of childhood memorabilia, he is incapable yet of focusing, of initiating the kinds of responses that would help him to determine his environment rather than being determined by it. As a result of certain traumatic events, the young man becomes wide-awake; he is aware of the need not only to break with the past but to positively act to build a new future.

Greene draws an analogy to the curriculum in which prescribed knowledge is reflected in the structured institutions that the young immigrant unpreparedly had to encounter. She says:

> I have suggested that the individual, in our case, the student, will only be in a position to learn when he is committed to act upon his world. If he is content to admire it or simply accept it as given, if he is incapable of breaking with egocentrism, he will remain alienated from himself and his own possibilities ... [13]

Greene's experience at the university makes her familiar with vast numbers of students who are, as she says, "effectively domesticated." Despite the fact that they are reticent about the possibilities for consciousness, a teacher must find those relevent themes that will draw the separated individuals together as dialoguing persons. But the "subject matter" doesn't matter.

> Whatever it turns out to be, it may be well to locate it in some outer horizon for a while, to be examined after inner horizons are explored. If inner horizons are not explored...there will be little possibility of discovering the causes of existing reality and the ways in which, in individual life histories, it came to be.[14]

Before teacher and students encounter one another in this joint search for meaning the teacher h...

agenda with which to deal. Greene believes that new teachers must find ways to nurture self-consciousness as a way of engaging themselves and others in a self-initiated process of perspective knowing.

> Too frequently, students arrive at teachers colleges with fantasy...stemming from a childhood notion of what a teacher represents....The process of becoming conscious of self as historical being may be very painful, but to teach people in a radical fashion is to awaken them to as much of the problematic as possible.[15]

Janet Miller, one of her reviewers, was led to a bracketing-inducing consciousness as a woman. Miller was astonished, she says, by what she had taken for granted and as absolute in comprehending her own life. "How reluctant I am at times to let go of the security that others' definitions provide. The pain is necessary, however, if I am to participate in the remaking of a world constituted by my own vision."[16]

Miller has attempted to retrieve those episodes that seem to have unwittingly shaped her previous world. She epitomizes the ideal of the teacher-as-model, trying to locate inner meaning in herself before projecting this vision on to another person. She has recalled her past, thereby loosening the psychological barriers that restricted her merging consciousness. This process is one of the key elements in reconceptualization—awareness of one's autobiography.

Greene believes that this process of becoming self-aware has significant humanizing implications. Autobiography is not merely an ego-gratifying exercise in narration. The truly wide-awake teacher cannot be cloistered "into himself," Greene cautions, "We are all aware that consciousness does not mean mere innerness or introspection....It refers, in fact, to the multiple ways in which the individual comes in touch with objects, events, and other human beings."[17] Thus a conscious person is more likely to be open to others. But being open to the inquiries of others and to share one's deepest concerns, aspiration, biases, or fears, leaves one quite vulnerable. For some, to be uncovered is to be un-guarded. Greene tells us of one defense mechanism again-

vulnerability. "Lecturers seem to presuppose a 'man within man' where they describe a good teacher as infinitely controlled and accommodating...His personal (feelings or) biography is overlooked.'[18]

Consciousness is the process as well as the phenomenon of liberation. The teacher and student ask questions of one another, thus transcending the factual or procedural approches in a given discipline. Freire referred to such emancipation as praxis. Problems of life, of economies, of politics, have a personal dimension else they are not truly problems. And any action undertaken to respond to these problems is continually reflected upon, lest behavior be action for its own sake. Greene offers a prescription.

> Working in a dialogical relation with students, the teacher must try to move himself and them to ask the kinds of worthwhile questions that lead to disclosure and engage individuals in praxis................Somehow, the struggle to master the cognitive strucures composing curriculum must be made continuous with the quest for meaning.... [19]

Aesthetic Inquiry

Huebner has observed that the aesthetic rationale is highly undervalued as a means of expanding the meaning of whatever knowledge we are pursuing. Feelings of confidence, exhiliration, jealousy, hatred are sometimes only freed in our consciousness through the catalytic efforts of a piece of art or literature. Greene puts it still another way:

> ...in the aesthetic experience the mundane world must be bracketed out or in a sense distanced, so that the reader, listener, beholder, can enter the aesthetic space in which the work of art appears. Captain Ahab's manic search for the white whale cannot be checked in any history of the whaling industries.[20]

Aesthetic discourse in the curriculum provides the student with the opportunity to create metaphors, facilitating inquiry

into the degree of correspondence between an artifact and day to day existence.

Melville intends for us to recreate Ahab's preoccupation with the white whale in terms of our own consciousness of daily events. One critic, however, has found Greene's use of literature to accomplish wide-awakeness problematic. Pagano observed,

> She sounds dangerously like our old elementary school teachers. Literature *'discloses to us modern aspects of our own lived worlds'* .... Surely there is something more valuable contained in the aesthetic experience than the opportunity provided for entering into vicarious experience for 'broadening one's horizons.' [21]

Greene might say that her work is dedicated to human symbol making. Literature enables her to be an active agent in creating personal meaning.

Through curriculum we continually ask questions, disclose meaning, and go beyond the everyday. Greene has not sided with the romantic critics, such as Holt, Illich, and Neill, who view the needs and wants of the individual as sacrosanct, incapable of realization within the restrictive structures of society. She agrees that we can go about our "symbolic ordering" within the very tension that is created as a result of the on-going conflict between the individual and the civilization. As long as one is willing to "try and defy determinism...to break with the crowd," then compromises within the status quo are inevitable, even acceptable.[22] The tension is not reducible. Greene writes:

> Education, because it is takes place at the intersection where the demands for social order and the demands for autonomy conflict, must proceed through nd by means of the tension. Teachers, whose risks and failures are functions of the uncertainty, can only try to enable students to understand how the social reality affects them,..how they can take action to transform.[23]

Conclusion: A Prescription for Action

curriculum work. For the reconceptualists it signifies a grasping of "multiple perspectives and need for choice."[24] Choice implies alternative action. But Greene is not interested in abstract notions of right and wrong. She advocates new ways of creating opportunities for human justice.

One of Greene's critics perceives a kind of relativism he says mitigates her claim that the teacher is a leader of those who seek just alternatives. The perceived absence of guidelines for selecting any one philosophical tradition weakens her claim to activism; Rainsberry states, "By reducing the problem of value choice to a relativistic level, Greene misses one crucial point: value choices are not made in isolation, but rather depend on a constant dialogue within a community." [25]

There is a social context, however, to both aesthetic and philosophical work. Emphasis on radical teaching and accompanying radical criticism squarely places her within a community aiming for justice. It may well be an imperfect community as far as the alienating structure of the school is concerned. It may be a community in which there are no guarantees of the transformation of social reality. But it is a community, nevertheless, where the radical educator is committed--in Freire's terms--to think and work, not without, nor for, but *with* the people. Greene writes: "...it is a luxury, not a waste, for us to go off in search of alternative communities. Manipulations have to be dealt with inside the institutions that exist...Above all, cynicism and hopelessness must be overcome through serious work in the midst of the system..." [26]

Greene does not relegate all philosophic clarification of values and purposes to the school. While she is dedicated to inquiring into the predicament of the individual, this solitary creature does inhabit a larger world than the classroom. The individual lives within institutions that must be improved, not hopelessly ignored.

> ...I have suggested that educational philosophers may have a role to play in criticizing and clarifying what is happening (taxes, employment, educational expendi-

tures, inflation). It seems to me that our focus ought to be the political arguments taking place when educational policy is made.[27]

Greene is committed to action intentioned by thought and to thought which is realized through action. This dynamic, i.e., critical reflection upon which action is based, was Freire's methodology with Brazilian peasants; it helps loosen awareness of the relationship between power, knowledge, and human interests. For Greene, praxis ideally leads to an overcoming of social domination and self-alienation; in such acts a community-in-formation emerges.

It reminds this author of a tale from Jewish folklore. Two men, eaching having lost his way chanced to meet in a forest. Spying the other, each was elated, hoping that his new-found companion would know the way out. To no avail. But there was reason to rejoice. Said one to the other, "For certain I know that the way I have come will not lead us out. But together, friend, we can find the way." Ideally, our curricular inquiries will prove as fruitful.

Life History as Curriculum: The Reconceptualization of William Pinar

Introduction

Pinar's curriculum theory focuses upon the individual in relation to cultural shifts in the last two decades that have produced new sources of alienation: economic destabilization, social and racial conflict, and bureaucratization of public life.

Pinar has been sensitive to this state of affairs from his earliest days as an undergraduate in the 1960's. The war, urban riots, and politics of the "new left" affected him deeply. He expressed the need to emancipate the so-called intellectually dulled child he found to be emotionally repressed, psychosocially immature, and morally under developed, who had been constrained by the dominant mode of schooling. [1] Pinar's goal was to synthesize the knowledge he had derived from these new left sources as well as from psychoanalysis, educational theory, and American and

found influence of Paul Klohr and Donald Bateman as major intellectual mentors. Huebner and Greene, too, helped to develop his perspectives.

Teaching in a Long Island suburb, Pinar's insights sharpened as he watched the process of his students' writing. After designing a psychoanalytically based humanities curriculum at Ohio State University for his Ph.D., he went to Rochester and attempted to expand his familiarity with meditation, phenomenology, and curriculum. Pinar admitted his need for growth in the kind of setting provided by the university. His task was to sensitize others to the significant difference between training--acquiring information that allows for credentialing--and education--allowing the data of training to alter one's total cognitive, affective, psychomotor condition. [2]

Within this social context he extrapolated from the experience of new left thinkers of the 1960's generation in the United States to give currency to the work of Paulo Freire in Brazil. The latter's theme of limit situations and critical consciousness helped articulate what people like Pinar had been feeling. Benham points out that Freire, in his work with Brazilian peasants, demonstrated an

> ...effective method of combining cognitive skill-building with political and personal consciousness-raising--a synthesis that contained the essence of reconceptualist theory...Thus, he had shown that the theory need not always precede practice, although practice must be grounded in theory. [3]

Macdonald and Huebner, and to an extent Greene, have also developed a cohesive focus based on Freire and the radicalized social and political thought of the last two decades. In the same way that Pinar had opted for the university to pursue curricular, pedagogical, and hence moral concerns of human relationship, reconceptualists have not discarded the schools, imperfectly structured as they are.

Pinar's Major Themes and Methodology

Huber has pointed out that the locus of his orientation

derives from a combination of personal and professional backgrounds. "A shift from teacher-centered or material-centered curriculum to a person-centered focus or inner experience in education is a part of what Pinar considers a new conceptualization in the curriculum."[4]

This perspective grows out of an understanding of the shift in the nature of the culture we now inhabit. The present historical period represents the concluding material-istic stage in an industrial age. It has been a time marked by consciousness of objects, performance objectives, and be-havioral psychology. Now a new era is beginning; it mirrors an increased concern with processes and human relationships.

What we are seeing is a person-centered curriculum theor-izing that begins with the researcher. Pinar argues that the functioning theorists, or practitioners, must first and fore-most come to grips with their own biases, valuing process, and personal behavior. Prior to intervening in the lived worlds of others, one must squarely face how individual expression of a theory is rooted in one's own life history. Such a self-critical awareness is brought on through the process of "wide awakeness," or, according to Greene, by bracketing.

Education may ensue only in the wake of this type of penetrating self-analysis. And, following Pinar, one sees curriculum actually occuring between the unique self-conscious person and the subject matter studied. Such an approach can neither be suggested nor stimulated until the theorist takes the first steps to deal with his or her own alienation. Pinar says, "The self-estranged researcher is unlikely to do research of another character. If he is dis-sociated from his experience, unaware of how, when and why he learned what he learns...then necessarily he must project his naivete onto whatever he studies."[5]

Ross Mooney, writing from a reconceptualist vantage point, considers there to have been an undue bias toward the empirical, linear, objective dimension of Western thought; therefore, most research is from what he calls a consumer's point of view. The theorists simply take in data and restate the data without really producing anything new. It is com-posèd of "impersonal *truths which exist on their own*

account independent of me...not to be concerned with what is "good", only with what is "true"...I am to depend on logic and testable demonstration, not on feelings and imag-ination."[6]

Mooney does talk in aesthetic, personalist terms of the antithesis to this approach as the optimal condition of research. Like Pinar's contention: the curriculum at large, and research in particular, ought to be seen as a person-centered phenomenon. "Research is an operation by which I am trying to become a better self-teacher so that my ex-perience can say more things to me, give me more to think about and feel."[7]

All of this discourse about person-centered curriculum, research and teaching can be subsumed under the category of *life history* and *biography*. In this regard Pinar's views are reminiscent of Huebner's position that education be considered the concern for the way the biography of the person confronts the developing history of the community. The individual must make active choices. For example, the community requires schools to "produce;" the school acts as an assembly line. Will the theorist intuit these values in designing performance-based frameworks, or does a basic uneasiness about such apparently mechanistic approaches alert him to search for people-centered alternatives?

Moreover, does one's biographical consciousness rooted in reminiscences of personal school-based catastrophes or exhilarations guide investigation of options for writing curriculum? Finally, each school person must ultimately face the inquiring student's puzzlement or attack: "What do *you* really *believe* is right?" Here is the moral dimension of curriculum work! Madeleine Grumet says,

> We propose to employ theory of autobiography and autobiographic writings to help teachers examine the ways in which they have moved within conventional forms in the expression of their own authentic state-ments...Thus we would work to speak with teachers about schooling, not as a static system of signs, but as a language that they simultaneously live, maintain, and transform.[8]

This requires one to recall a past phenomenologically and

psychoanalytically and then to project a future while situating these impressions and expressions in a certain cultural and political context.[9] In short, while all of these remarks seem explicitly geared to the instructor, they ultimately ought to be integrated into conversations between student and teacher. The student needs a model of clarity, self-honesty, and creativity. This will be found within the reconceptualizing teacher.

Curriculum Criticizing and the Postcritical [10]

One problem with curriculum today can be understood by discussing the research issues of "quality" versus "quantity" in terms of particular understanding and general understanding, respectively.[11] Pinar is concerned with the problem of qualitative research. He suggests that we understand curriculum in a general or particular way. Do we focus, as the traditionalists do, on goals, objectives, designs that call for certain learning activities in the Tyler or Taba mode, or do we focus primarily on the person—that unique, functioning student who has certain relationships with the teacher and other students? Pinar and the other reconceptualists tell us that to the degree we focus on the particular, our research is qualitative.

There is an imbalance in the curriculum, weighted to the "general" category, concerned with guiding principles or frameworks for categorizing and quantifying. While some external control is obviously necessary, the problems arise in not being able to differentiate between the times when the ethical or aesthetic response is needed and the times when the logical, rational response is needed. For example, how does one react to or analyze a particular work of art from a logical historical point of view or art appreciation. As Pinar adds,

> The more exclusively one relies upon rules of conduct-
> such as objectives for one's class to achieve—the more
> frozen becomes the situation...In a discipline's effort
> to achieve objective knowledge it has absolutized the
> relative, atemporalized, and historical, and rational-
> ized the political status quo.[12]

The argument against inappropriate or excess reliance on "general understanding" in quantitative research can apply also to theorizing. Cremin and Kliebard have pointed out how the conventional view of curriculum theory is rooted in the technical, managerial origins of the field. Theory was a guide to practice, a way of "staking out the field" with observable markers to inform the practitioner of directions to choose, of optimal behaviors, materials, and content.

Pinar suggests "caring" is a relevant part of the curriculum process. It serves as an antidote for the unhealthy effects of the objectification of curriculum. He addresses this issue in responding to Nel Noddings' "Caring."[13] Pinar observes that caring is an emotionally based state of receptivity to another creature, that evolves from giving special attention to inner relms of meaning often dulled by attention to persons as "things." Society exerts a major influence in the latter direction. Pinar, drawing from Sartre and Freire, explains the institution's functions as those of caretaking, feeding, taming, or domesticating. Teacher and schools do not facilitate inquiry nor engage in this process except in the most routine matter-of-fact way. Rather, they encourage the following:

> Hypertrophy or Atrophy of Fantasy Life....Dependence
> and Arrested Development of Autonomy...Thwarting
> of Affiliative Needs....Estrangement from Self and Its
> Effect upon the Process of Individuation...Alienation
> from Personal Reality due to Impersonality of School-
> ing Groups...[14]

Pinar addresses himself to modes of consciousness, to the realm of within-ness as a way of combatting these forms of illness. As a point of departure, he offers some alternative notions about theory that go beyond the instrumentalism of earliest curricular thought.

Toward an Expanded Notion of Theorizing

The reconceptualists recognize that a person's imagination is a treasure trove of resources for emotional growth. It stimulates cognitive and affective creativity for dealing with

one's traumas and enriching one's satisfactions.   These more personalist, subjective, lighter possibilities for dealing with curriculum and/or theory were characterized by Macdonald as "playful" and "freefloating."[15]

Pinar traces the recent developments of this newer mode of conceptualizing from the 1930's when Boyde Bode commissioned his student, Harold Alberty, to try to cultivate a more humanistic curriculum field. Klohr succeeded in reconceiving a more self-critical theory, one concerned less with efficient management guidelines and more with transformative visions.   In 1947, at the University of Chicago, Herrick and Tyler spoke of theory which would critically uncover human relationships between issues and supporting frameworks as well as projecting future ways of dealing with problems that emanate from the relationships.   Applied to today, one might ask, how does one facilitate "personal growth" in the bureaucratic morass of sprawling school systems?   Why are the arts or the aesthetic the first area to be eliminated when funds are curtailed?

These questions are asked by those who are very much a part of the community. The self-reflecting person knows that one's personal feelings and unconscious desires do not emanate from a vacuum. Each human being is in part determined by the political, economic, religious dimensions of a particular environment.   The goal is to understand the structure of all the elements in the cultural milieu in conjunction with the biographic dimension of the concrete, particular person. Pinar is almost fixated on the life history of the person in the realm of both life and history of the individual and the community. There is a real "I" in the process, which is sometimes lost. Particularly among intellectuals there is a tendency to immediately abstract from the concrete situation and begin analysis. One's effort is always to return to "the things themselves." [16]

The theory he is driving at does not overly emphasize either the individual person or the society: both are important. The theory is rooted in the life history of the individual, his self-knowledge and idiosyncratic characteristics but this person lives within the structural world of political and social intercourse. It is with one's similarly-searching

contemporaries that the link is made between the temporal, linear world of duration and continuity and the realm of infinite possibility, or what others term "transcendence." In a personal vein Pinar shares an impression. "By working to improve the ontological quality of my own life, I am at the same time working for improvement of the ontological and hence political quality of my contemporaries' lives."[17]

Methodology

Our educational experience is thwarted by a continual reminder of our finitude. We are limited creatures whose span of existence may be cut short without warning. The harder we try to wrest some measure of outer security through physical manipulation or intellectual pursuits, the more likely there is to be disappointment. The world is a given with its possibilities and liabilities. Pinar's approach to education simply accepts this matter-of-fact description of reality, including the fallibility of rational persons and our inevitable biological deaths.

Reconceptualization does attempt to situate the theorist in the middle of this *lived-world* that is neither adversary nor ally in any absolutist sense. One questions whether institutionalized schooling provides the student with enough chance to reflect, fantasize, and invent responses to the dilemmas posed above. The ability to manipulate the scientific method or to comprehend an historical critique and master related historical facts does not assure the student of the kind of intellectual and emotional growth that the curriculum ought to provide. Pinar strongly contends that once we in the school free ourselves from reliance on equating knowledge only with stimulus and response or management-by-objectives, our deepest Selves will emerge. He does not tell us whether we then go around in a state of perpetual awareness or consciousness, as if on a continual high. He simply says there are messages that well up from within.

There is trustable knowledge that we can gain of our motives, our priorities--shall we read? what shall we do with our leisure? do spiritual matters have me? or, am I afraid

of either asserting acclaim or registering complaint?   Our newly discovered views are, of course, subject to misreading, but that possibility attained in the honest "bracketing" marks the fullest degree of one's humanity, errors and all. "It may be likely that we can achieve only a more-or-less correct identification, but identification must be attempted. By focusing one's attentiveness inward, the long slow process of access to the *lebenswelt* begins, offering the hope of finally transcending it."[18] *Intuition* is that deep kind of knowing that informs one of the reasons for being afraid— of a new grade in school, a pending geographic move, or going out on one's first date. Huebner, through his criti- que of language, has helped to sensitize us to nuances within language, and the more sensitive one becomes to language usage, the more sensitive one's intuition becomes.

Pinar's recourse to etymologies is helpful again.   He alleges that true understanding far exceeds the codes, graphs, or memorized   geographic locales.   Understanding—in the sense of the original meaning of theory as contemplation—is not, for example, an abstract notion of goodness, harm, or even peace.   Understanding emerges through a person fully in touch with reality, conceived originally by the term *physis*. "Physis are understood by the Greeks derived from lived experience, not from the abstracted generalization associated with natural studies like physics."[19]

Lived experience is that accumulated knowledge that one can self-critically retrieve in order to make a value judgment.   Pinar and Greene in particular feel that life- experience can be "tapped" most readily by a confrontation with a text.   There is a special relationship that inheres in the coming together of artifact, instructor, and environ- ment. Through the following approach we learn *not* what that relationship *is*, but what it *can* be.

First one reads a text.   Later one inquires into the language through note taking.   The meaning in the text evolves in the reader's perception like the responses to a Rorschach inkblot, conjuring up images of familiar and un- familiar sensations.[20]   Whereas Greene stresses the conscious- ness-raising function of literature in our educational lives, Pinar addresses the situation historically: "Autobiographic

description and analysis offers the curriculum field a point of view it simply has not had.   In the literature we have no concrete descriptions of an individual's experience of texts, teachers, students."[21]

Autobiography challenges the view that human develop- ment is increasingly vertical, that in terms of human meaning, greater is better than less.   Autobiography is an associative technique that is firmly wedded to the given educational experience of the person and initially derives from it.

Phenomenology and existentialism are keys to the inquiry method provided by autobiographical reference.   Grumet tells us succinctly, "As phenomenology repudiated psychol- ogism and empiricism, as existentialism repudiated idealism, *currere* repudiates behaviorism and technocracy." [22] The method of currere helps us to elucidate personal perspectives that grow out of our experience with a literary piece.

As an example of currere in operation, let us follow Pinar's analysis of Kafka's *The Trial*, focusing on the person of Joseph K.   Kafka's man Joseph is unreflective, sees only meaning in surface orders of things, and depends on technical rationality alone.   In fact, the more bogged down he becomes in personal misadventures, the less adept his psycho-social orientation is for lifting him.   Joseph K. is arrested, his psychic-social growth stilted.   Pinar allows the text to be a catalytic agent.

One first reads the text carefully, engaging in textual analysis.   Second, one places the piece in a literary and in- tellectual historical context.   The personal responses of the reader then follow.   That latter move in itself is designated the educational significance and prepares the ground for the fourth and most important stage, the reader's personal con- text. [23]

This context requires one to address personal recollec- tions and the relationship between self and others in a given field of study; also, one notes the various configur- ations of those impressions that inform the subject how he has come to know, argue, and discourse.   Here Pinar is referring to one's personal intellectual development, social environment, colleagues, and family.

Pinar has adapted the method of currere to his own life.

The approach is both painful and rewarding. [24] He discovers sources of psychosocial alienation as well as physical self-neglect. These disrupting awarenesses ultimately contain the seeds of new growth. His candor and self-honesty make him even more trustworthy in his advocacy of currere in the school setting.

Implications

Frankly, those intent on reconceptualization have not operationalized their concerns. Will there be suitable time and space for theorist to engage in metaphor-making, and environment construction based on non-controlling use of language and material? One observer makes a similar point.

> But the efforts of reconceptualizing the field of curriculum inquiry have not produced, as yet, a significant body of literature that is practical in a pragmatic or didactic sense of the term. There is not enough as of yet that actually shows us how you do something like phenomenological analysis or how you work for curriculum change in a critical theory sense. [25]

Pinar related that, to the best of his knowledge, there is no school presently implementing a reconceptualized curriculum.   He implied that it is still in the building-clarifying stage. [26]

Curricularists who are sympathetically inclined to reconceptualization are frustrated even while they are stimulated by its methodology.   There are those who attend curriculum symposia that can excite the imagination, thus opening new possibilities for students and teachers to grow beyond the opportunities provided by the traditional models.   Consciousness and transcendence as "content" for the type of curriculum theorizing is an enchanting prospect, but,

> While it is very exciting to speculate about the possibilities of developing higher consciousness through curriculum, the teachers and curriculum specialist in the small group kept returning to the practical.

In a word, back home awaited pupils to teach and teachers to prepare, and the higher speculations contained in the conference papers neglected such everyday realities? [27]

Such skepticism is helpful. It alerts us to the unfinished business "back home," and *this* type of theorizing does not suggest prepackaged learning units. But in such uncertainty there is a direct benefit. We have a need to master a whole new vocabulary of personal meanings. We come aware of how little we yet know about ourselves in the process of studying and teaching. If classrooms, however, will continue to be only arenas for implementing technically, mechanically designed systems, this bit of autobiographic awareness is not germane beyond creating an innocuously nice atmosphere. But if we are engaged in study with our students, rather than teaching subjects to them, such psychological and philosophical inquiry is crucial.

Martin Buber: Restoring Wholeness Through Dialogue

Introduction: Life Is Lived in Meeting

Buber was concerned with the problem of maintaining authentic relationships. The resolution of the problem was not a matter of philosophic speculation; rather it was to be found in a demonstration of personal responsibility. The authentic creature, Buber claimed, is able to make a response through total attentiveness to another person. He spoke of being present before, or turning towards, another creature.

There are obstacles that hinder expressions of response-ability, or turning towards another. The difficulty must be understood in the context of the proliferation of all types of empirical and logical studies of man. The scientific inquiry process is based upon a subject/object distinction. One may, in fact, analyze a person, a place, a thing, or a process in terms of many constituent parts. While such an investigation may bring concrete, quantifiable results, it masks a more fundamental concern—that which Buber calls the wholeness of man. He implicitly means grasping,

...man's special place in the cosmos, his connection with destiny, his relation to the world of things, his understanding of his fellow man, his existence as a being that knows it must die, his attitude in all the ordinary and extraordinary encounters with the mystery with which his life is shot through, and so on--not one of the problems is seriously touched on.[1]

The philosophical disciplines are of little help, too, in solving this problem. Buber argues that the disciplines are weak to the task from two points of view: they may consider man as only "another part" of the universe and neglect his whole nature related to all other life; on the other hand, through its unique focus, a particular discipline may neglect the necessary interconnectedness of all ways of knowing from other fields of study. In the process of coming at either of these two alternative outcomes, the difficulty of authentic interhuman relationship becomes crystalized. Buber states, "...for in every one of those disciplines the possibility of its achieving anything rests precisely on its objectification, on what may be termed its dehumanization.[2]

Buber is here arguing against the way the disciplines and empirical science have seemingly preempted all other ways of knowing. For Buber, life is lived in and through authentic relationship, and not intellectual forms alone. But the basis for choosing such a life today rests on too narrow a foundation. He urges persons to work toward a new integration of vital cognitive and affective powers within the realm of the spirit. While the mind is critical in helping to render the physical environment meaningful and habitable, it is by no means self-sufficient. For Buber, the intellect does not provide a significant explanation for the problem of man. He assigns this integrating role to the spirit. "Spirit, then, is not just one human faculty among others. It is man's totality that has become consciousness, the totality which comprises and integrates all his capacities, powers, generalities, and urges."[3]

One who is wholly self-conscious in this way is actually capable of turning towards another creature in a non-manip-

ative fashion. Through the act of dialogue a person speaks the word Thou.

It must be emphasized that the search for the unifying dimensions of reality can only take place in the presence of others. A narcissistic retreat into one's deepest thoughts or escape into the larger collective of groups does not address the real problem. Moreover, metaphysics, though aiding the process of analysis, still leaves one with an abstract truth. If the wholeness of human beings is at stake, communication must reflect this concern. Buber cites a personal event that influenced the rest of his life. He call this "a conversion."

> I had a visit from an unknown young man, without being there in spirit...I conversed attentively and openly with him--only I omitted to guess the questions which he did not put. Later, not long after, I learned from one of his friends--he himself was no longer alive--the essential content of these questions;...What do we expect when we are in despair and yet go to a man? Surely a presence by means of which we are told that nevertheless there is meaning.[4]

Buber is extremely candid in this self-realization about the need to *make a decision to be* more intensely with others. Again, to emphasize, it is inner knowledge mediated by an urge to know about the world including its quantitative and qualitative dimensions. Buber starts with no logical theorems or empirically verifiable formulae. Knowledge is found in the "meeting" of persons, that is, being together. As he says, "all actual life is encounter."[5] There are no preformed responses from authorities or written works to tell us how to derive the necessary knowledge to prepare for future relationships. People sometimes came to Buber to ask him for an explanation of his approach. He offers some evidence, however, of a very personal sort.

Instead, he turns the question back and asks his interlocuter to search his own life to see whether he can recall any experience in which a facet of nature arrested and engrossed him by the power of its uniqueness

Then and only then can Buber and his questioner talk, and necessarily in philosophical terms of what transpired and of its significance for human existence.

The World at Large: Two Possibilities

One lives in a state of flux according to two basic orientations. Buber describes these as dispositions or attitudes, defining the two-fold possibility of an act of relationship.[7] *I-Thou* is that condition when one partner addresses another with a desire for mutuality, when the focus is not on the particulars or the details in the other's makeup, but rather on his or her wholeness. The other basic expression, *I-It*, is never articulated with this sense of wholeness, but rather is a form of communication that grows out of an inclination to use, to experience, or to manipulate another individual. This expression is the antithesis of that which is whole. *I-It* is the address of a subject to an object, as a thing. Buber suggests that in the choice of attitudes we distinguish our basic temperament, the spirit of our being. He says, "Whoever speaks one of the basic words enters into the word and stands in it."[8]

One's relation to the world is not limited to the sphere of human interchange. There are in fact three spheres: life is lived with nature, with people, and with spiritual beings.[9] Within each of these areas, Buber suggests one can speak what he calls the primary word, *Thou or It*. As an example, he cites how a tree comes into his focus as an object, with all of its particulars; yet simultaneously, by "will and grace...I am drawn into a relation and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me."[10]

The power of exclusiveness allows one to set off all extraneous details of the object, to elevate that which was an It to a Thou. He speaks of this as a basic movement of turning, of being unconditionally present and attentive. Through another recollection he verifies what can be actual, real, immediate, in the life of a human being vis-a-vis an animal. On his grandparents' estate young Buber encountered an old grey horse, in a stirring moment of realiza-

very fresh memory of my hand, I must say that what I experienced in touch with the animal was the Other, the immense otherness of the Other, which, however did not remain strange like the otherness of the ox and ram...."[11]

Common sense, however, dictates that a horse, a tree and a person are not the same in regard to an act of meeting. Buber is not oblivious to the problem of the gradations of mutuality that inhere in the various relationship within the three spheres of life, noted above.[12] But he insists, in regard to the encounter with the tree, that there is a profound experience of joining together.

> The living wholeness and unity of a tree that denies itself to the eye, no matter how keen, of anyone who merely investigates, while it is manifest to those who say You, is present when *they* are present....Our habits of thought make it difficult for us to see that in such cases something is awakened by our attitude and flashes toward us from that which has being.[13]

Buber is present before the tree; he is present before his horse, and certainly he attempts to be present in the immediate realm of relationship with another human being. But he suggests that from the gradations of mutuality one does not infer there is a scale of better to goodness. He says, "To this end, rather, our whole knowledge about the world must cooperate, a knowledge that is ever again renewed through the I-Thou relation, but is not born by it."[14] Buber would argue that life with nature, humans, or spiritual beings is not a matter of either/or, *Thou* or *It*. While rational thought tries to categorize and analyze, he argues against dichotomizing. There is continual tension, as we have seen from Buber's idea of wholeness of life. Life is filled with necessary moments where an *I-It* attitude is more likely to prevail and other possibilities where wholeness, spoken through *I-Thou*, will emerge. The relational event--being present-- reflects a possibility for more of the same--though it can never be planned--or its antithesis when consciousness and objectification takes over. One moves back and forth between the apparent satisfaction and

security of the *It* world and what he calls "pure present." He advises us, "And in all seriousness of truth listen: Without It a human being cannot live. But whoever lives only with that is not human." [15]

What is crucial to see is that the two attitudes are not unique to certain persons or situations. In other worlds, there are not two types of individuals but two poles within each of us. *I-Thou* and *I-It* are not exhaustive alternatives.

> I by no means hold human "inner life" in general, and within it human thinking in particular, to be exclusively composed of occurrences of the one and the other kinds....In the one moment he is over against another as such, sees him present and relates to him thus. In the other moment he sees everything collected round him and from time to time singles out, observes, explores, applies, uses. Both these moments are included in the dynamic of lived life. [16]

Buber argues that one accept the reality of this dialectic --the movement back and forth of Thou and It--as the only way of surviving in the world. While organizations may only know the person as a specimen or cog, and our feelings may be directed erotically onto an object of desire, there is the equally strong capacity to step out of what seems to be an "unlimited sway of causality." The institutions do not breed evil, any more than matters of the flesh are evil compared with the soul. Evil, says Buber, inheres in the absence of recognizing that there is a difference in the two states of being, and consequently not trying to alter the balance through actualizing one's living potential for *I-Thou* attitude. The process requires a choice within the realm of interpersonal connections or the larger community, "and if there were a devil he would not be the one who decided against God but he that in all eternity did not decide." [17]

Dialogue: Limitations and Possibilities

Buber does not provide a blueprint for decision-making. He allows a general basis for choice: alternatives are drawn from one's own sensing of the attitudes demonstrated in the

Dialogue encompasses the possibility that human beings act in a reciprocal manner with one another and the rest of nature. The major obstacle is one's inability to distinguish true being from appearance, essence from form. But an awareness of the obstacles brings about the bright flash of realization of what *can* occur, the awareness that there is a difference between the "is" and the "ought." Maurice Friedman, Buber's biographer and synthesizer, addresses the issue as a dialectic of essence versus image.

> The essence man looks at the other as one to whom he gives himself. His glance is spontaneous and unaffected. He is not influenced by the desire to make himself understood, but he has no thought for the conception of himself that he might awaken in the beholder. The image man, in contrast, is primarily concerned with what the other thinks of him...There is, in addition, a third realm of 'genuine appearance' in which a young person imitates a heroic model...[18]

Buber observes gradations in the way one lives and relates within the world; and he makes certain judgments as to what is more or less authentic. Nevertheless, the person himself is the final arbiter of insights and prodding to act differently. Buber watches others carefully, which may be ultimately the clearest way of knowing *oneself*. He tells us that there are those who go through life observing, looking on, or becoming aware.[19] He refers here to those people who analyze others for details but miss character, those who let an object freely "happen to (them)" as in the perception of an art object, and finally those who elicit our response, who neither objectify nor desire objectification. One might say we engage in degrees of relating to another, ranging from mere detailing and record keeping to direct address.

The limitations of daily life hamper the realization of the last possibility. Buber refers to these limitations at one point as the crises of the modern world. He remarks how the human soul is paralyzed from the deceptive tactics people engage in to mask debilitating, alienating lonesomeness. Bustling activity does not hide a fundamental emptiness,

a realization that the most vaulted expectations for human improvement are not realizable under the present circumstances. In the realms of technology, economy, and politics, one can detect the failure of the human soul.[20] Machines no longer serve man but have appended man to them; the means of production and equitable distribution of resources are not based on cooperation but manipulation; the desire to influence others has meant self-aggrandizement of the powerful at the expense of all others.

Buber's social commentary grows out of a perception of the two great illnesses of our time: the urge for unmitigated individualism and the drive toward collectivism. Both conditions abstract, depersonalize, and contribute to the alienation of each creature--from his essential self and from others towards whom he ought to be present. "The individual is a fact of existence in so far as he steps into a living relation with other individuals. The aggregate is a fact of existence in so far as it is built up of living units of relation. The fundamental fact of human existence is man with man." [21]

The more one goes toward the extreme of either individualism or collectivity, the less possibility there is for essential person-hood. One can be alone, living in solitude either as a hermit or as part of the larger social network of family, business, school. Kierkegaard embraces this solitude, renouncing the world of men and women, as the only way of resisting evil and meeting God. Buber inveighs against such a view, arguing that only in "meeting" others can one counter loneliness, can one find "himself" or "herself," his or her essential self, not mere appearance. The Single One, for Buber, lives with an autobiographical awareness that includes the possibility of relational events with other One, for Buber, lives with an autobiographical awareness form It into Thou. There is a spiritual presence, God, the midst of individuals who encounter one another. While Kierkegaard, in his zeal for God, admits the cessation of common ties with other men and women, Buber argues otherwise:

> The Single One is the man for whom the reality of relation with God as an exclusive relation includes

and encompasses the possibility of relation with all otherness, and for whom the whole body politic, the reservoir of otherness, offers just enough otherness for him to pass his life with it. [22]

Beginning to Dialogue

Buber accepts the ordinary world, recognizing its limitations as a reservoir of I-It, but proclaims the opportunity for I-Thou. This attitude of I-Thou, however, becomes lost as the person becomes more and more aware of and even attuned to self-isolation. Retreating from unqualified perceptions of others into the realms of indirect formal address, one increases "distance." The conceptualization of this phenomenon, "distance" and "relation," helps describe the interplay between the two-fold way of knowing the world, I-It and I-Thou.

Buber admits that we periodically turn away from moments of "pure present" in the world, from the sparks of realization that emanate from "meeting" in order to comprehend the world--its parts or the sum of its parts. The setting of the world at a distance, however, expresses a critical antecedent to the act of relating. One steps back and appreciates that other creatures exist independently round about him. One grasps the world in its particularity. The act of distancing in a sense is a neutral move, for it can become a condition for either I-Thou or I-It. As he says, the first movement (distancing) relies on perceptions of mutually existent creatures in an even and fundamental way.

> But the second movement (relating) puts them into mutual relation with me which happens from time to time and by no means in an even way...Here and now for the first time does the other become a self for me, and the making independent of his being which was carried out in the first movement of distancing is shown in a new highly pregnant sense as a presupposition--a presupposition of the 'become a self for me' [23]

within it are two degrees of objectifying: one causes us to perceive others as objects, the other leads us to manipulate and exploit them.

Objective perceptions of others take place in the social realm. Yet the mere fact of being within a group, even one joined out of a sense of sympathetic solidarity, does not assure an existential, personal relationship will be forthcoming. For example, Buber was once part of a group demonstration. Though joined in common cause, he had only a superficial relationship with the people on his right and left. Suddenly his eyes met those of a man sitting at a distance, observing the event. In the spontaneous moment of meeting, he derived a greater effect of *wholeness* and *oneness* than was provided by his group marching in solidarity.[24]

For Buber the fundamental act of human living is the realm of the between,[25] of the interhuman, which focuses upon the duality of "being" and "seeming," the latter referring to a feeling of being.[26] Somehow it is in this sphere of the between that the real significance of dialogue is noted. And in a larger sense, the reconciliation of these polarities contribute to an interpretation of the problem of man, the essential dilemma to which Buber's philosophic anthropology addresses itself.

There is little doubt for Buber that neither the quality of beingness or seemingness, spontaneity, openness, and the desire to be present before another--is exclusively essential to one type of person. We can only speak in terms of which one predominates in each individual. Each person has the capacity, the tendency, to base a realtionship with another on appearances or images rather than to live through a direct and authentic wholeness. There is no content involved, no product that can be analyzed to determine some measure of success in the battle to be whole and to meet another as a whole being. Conversation--which is *not* mere talk or what he calls speechifying--is one way to establish a meeting with the other person.[27]

The decision is not how to *make* the world but rather how to *be* with others in it. Ideally, the educator exemplifies the importance of *being* with another. One is less present before another when there is more concern about imposing

oneself or one's values or in merely conveying information than when one is intent upon helping another to "unfold."[28] He believes thoroughly that within each person is the potentiality of articulating this dimension of the primal word, *Thou.*

In a conversation with Buber, Carl Rogers told of his own notion of acceptance. Buber replied,

> Confirming means first of all, accepting the whole potentiality of the other and making even a decisive difference in his potentiality, and of course we can be mistaken again and again in this, but it's just a chance between human beings. I can recognize in him, know in him, more or less, the person he has been....*created* to become....I confirm him, in myself, and then in him, in relation to this potentiality that is meant by him, and it can now be developed, it can evolve, it can answer the reality of life.[29]

Rogers said he agreed with this view. Buber's example of husband and wife suggests a similar openness that somehow links a past and future in the moment of presentness. Moreover, the act of gaining confirmation conveys a tremendous source of confidence that one can work towards personal redemption, namely, wholeness.

Ultimately, according to Buber, the occasion for establishing a relationship with another person presupposes the possibility of having an *I-Thou* relationship with God. The relationship with God does not require one to deny the world of sense and matter. Of course, one detaches from "experiencing and utilizing" things and turns inward as a step towards purification. But such a movement cannot be carried out at the expense of human relationship. It is egotistical to retreat into the "enjoyment of the configuration of one's own soul--that is the spirit's lapse into mere spirituality."[30] And mere spirituality does not speak to the wholeness that is central in his approach. Reason is also involved. Reason is not incidental, but occupies an important realm in man's *relationship* with others, too.

Buber: On Education

Buber rebelled against education-by-indoctrination, forced-feeding of clever maxims. Buber's on-going dialogue with Hassidism helped to chart his way. Here is one of the tales:

> Rabbi Moshe Hayyim Efraim, the Baal Shem's grandson told: 'I heard this from my grandfather: Once a fiddler played so sweetly that all who heard him began to dance, and whoever came near enough to hear joined in the dance. Then a deaf man who knew nothing of music happened along, and to him all he saw seemed the action of madmen--senseless and in bad taste.' [31]

Unfortunately, in the current vernacular we hear much of role-models. But role seems by definition to convey outward behavior which is to be emulated. With his story, Buber is expressing his own frustration with those who can only perceive outward manifestation of certain actions. There is more to action than behavior. Trust, confidence, affection--relationship may grow through perceived gestures and movements. Or, in other words, one searches for receptivity to *wholeness*, both within oneself and locating it in another.

Education, Buber posited, must be viewed as only another manifestation of the basic relation of man to man. The primary human arrangement, however, is based on power; might coerces right. There are severe forms of exploitation, economic, social, and political. But Buber has hopes that by speaking the primary word, *I-Thou*, a new ethos and new commitment will arise to challenge the old relationships. He suggests an approach by saying,

> ...not your It, your Thou is what is essential, though not surveyable. It is infinite in its possibilities, which nonetheless remain peculiar to it, possibilities given to you not for utilization but for opening up and redemption, all of them to each of you...Education arises, no longer subservient to the political relation,

willing to melt down and to transform the political human realm, decisive without haste, ready to serve without fanaticism, prepared to wait and yet beginning...[32]

Here is Buber's authentic commitment to the possibility of change. It is a steadfast hope, expressed through the Hebrew word, Emunah--faith. Education will accomplish this task to the extent a person chooses to turn towards, rather than manipulate or experience, another.

Some Underlying Ideals

Two major Jewish ideals are manifest in Buber's educational discourse: Hassidut and Halutziut. Translated the former means a religious way of living that does not separate the pieces of matter from the moments of spirit. It points to that kind of person who is aware of the gap between distancing and relating, and manifests a sense of a "notyet-ness." The Halutz is the pioneer, the farmer in Israel, who has reclaimed the land, in whose absence the home-less Jewish people would still be without a center. Nevertheless, "National ideology, the *spirit* of nationalism, is fruitful just so long as it does not make the nation an end in itself ...(When the nation does become an end in itself,) it annuls its own right to live, it grows sterile."[34]

The Hassid touches the world-as-it-is and reaches beyond his grasp. The Halutz, similarly, in an earthy fashion accepts the material and focuses on its transormation. From the example of the Hassid and the Halutz, one learns how to live in the world comprised of neither pure "meeting" nor pure "distance." But it is the Hassid who teaches the difference between the two aspects of life.

Admittedly, the ideal of the *Hassid*--which Buber feels has dissipated because of the decline of authentic orthodoxy and the Halutz, starts with the world of *here-and now*. It is the bubbling, pulsating, limiting life known to finite creatures. It is material existence that allows for actualization of man's potential to grow into a more moral creature.

Speaking the primary word *I-Thou* marks a beginning. Though Buber talks as if these are separate individual types, one could imagine that Hassid and Halutz represent varying dynamic aspects within each person's character.

Buber informally synthesizes the Hassid and the Halutz. The Halutz realizes and follows the teachings of the Hassid. The words of the Hassid are translated daily into everyday actions—human renewal in work, with family and leisure—that have a new spiritual dimension. Buber argues that neither the land alone for the Halutz nor pure spirituality for the Hassid is sufficient. Yet, neither is denied an important part in creating a religious existence. Similarly, Buber would not deny the importance of the concrete aspects of education—texts, buildings, materials, organizational procedures. Nevertheless, he returns to the emphasis on speaking the primary word of relationship, I-Thou.

And who will take the lead in this task of speaking primary words? Buber is unclear. Will it be a leadership by an elite?[35] All can aspire to become a "great character"; none is prevented from the possibility of becoming one but not everyone will reach this status. The exceptional "great character," bears an inner unity, as a model and guide, and not as a repository of maxims.

> That is, not only what the great character does, and how he does it, but what approaches him, what occurs to him, that to which he reacts, has an inner unity ...the unity of destiny cannot be exactly demonstrated; it is metaphysical postulate, or better still, a religious hope.[36]

This is meaningful as long as we accept Buber's approach as an ideal to be realized by some, not all. Nevertheless, though not all will be perceived as "great characters," the effort needs to be made by all. Inspiring young generations with a vision that brings finite material and finite spiritual universes together is the charge laid upon this generation of educators.

> This generation must be taught to despise the infallible self-assurance which says: 'I am well prepared.

Nothing can change me fundamentally and transform the world before my eyes...This generation must be made receptive for the Unforeseen which upsets all logical arrangements.[37]

In short, the young must be taught by their teachers to be wiser, more humane, more receptive to, and more able to cope with change than those who teach them.

The Teacher

The teacher is a model, a "madreech," or a guide along the way . The teacher engenders confidence and self-confidence by the way he or she is "present." All other characteristics flow from these designations. The teacher draws out the student's capabilities. He or she attempts to "lift" persons up through education, and not to compel them to react from propaganda. Buber, himself, was a masterful teacher, keenly concerned in deed, not simply a pronounced creed. Hodes' testimony is significant: "He looked for faces that were struggling for form and shape. Then he helped them achieve identity. And those whom he taught in this way, through the power of his person, not by preaching but through answering concrete questions, became his pupils during his life and after his life."[38]

The teacher nurtures and responds to two major instincts: the ego's desire to originate and the self's need for communion within a larger whole. The teacher is alert to the related tendencies toward spontaneity and constraint. The instructor is not a disinterested party to the educational enterprise. Hence, he senses the pupils' frustration with complete independence or freedom to experience whatever they want and with compulsion that is the demand to fulfill only another person's expectation.

The teacher can act this way because he knows what it is to experience "the other side" by virtue of having been in any given situation the student now faces. The teacher appreciates the fact that the student can gain confidence in the pedagogue, trust and esteem him greatly; there is, however, no way for the pupil to be present in the experiences of the teacher.

The writer recalls a story from an anonymous source: a devoted student sought further wisdom beyond what his saintly teacher could provide. The latter sent him to a distant village to study for six months with a revered sage. Upon returning the young student was inundated by his peers with inquiries about the newly gained wisdom. What meaning lay behind these holy words; what significance was there to the sacred symbols of faith? No response was forthcoming. Finally one cynic from the rear of the room called out, "So what *did* you learn?" "I learned," said the lad, "how the tzadik (righteous one) ties his shoes." Buber would say that it is always in being oriented "towards" another that any values are taught. Buber "...perceives the personality as a harmony of voices which together form the totality of being human. One of the leading voices in this harmony is the faculty of creativity and origination... The basic need is to do, not to have." [39]

And so it is with being in the presence of a great one or teacher who facilitates and engenders one's inclination "to be." The ordinary is suffused with the transcendent. In ordinary parlance we would say, "It's just good being around him or her." Moreover, communication is evaluated as much by what is not said as by what is said.

> ...the master remains the model for the teacher. For if the educator of our day has to act consciously, he must nevertheless do it 'as though he did not.' That raising of the finger, that questioning glance, are his genuine doing. Through him the selection of the effective world reaches the pupil. He fails the recipient when he presents this selection to him with a gesture of interference....Interference divides this soul in his care into an obedient part and rebellious part. But a hidden influence proceeding from his integrity has an integrating force. [40]

Buber does not give us a blueprint, explicating his prescription: that when one acts consciously, one does so *though he did not.* He tells us that the educator awakens the pain of loneliness and separateness. But that, too, is

a real part of life. One who cannot address pain as well as pleasure is as inauthentic as one who fails to realize that the primary attitude towards another may include both *I-Thou* and *I-It.* Awareness of both aspects constitutes part of the process of becoming genuine. It takes courage to face the reality that also includes the possibility of being present. The teacher faces a real challenge. Buber says, "But, you say, he (your student) lacks the courage. How does one educate for courage? Through nourishing trust. How does one nourish trust? Through one's own trustworthiness." [41]

The teacher has another task which is to appreciate two major instincts in the person before him. There is the instinct of origination, that which prompts a person to shape and control material; it grows in solitude, in the absence of mutuality. Contrary to or complementary with origination is the instinct for communion. This affiliative yearning longs "for the world to become present to us as a person ...which chooses and recognizes us as we do it, which is confirmed in us as we in it." [42] Buber speaks of the confidence one derives from the realizations of this instinct. It is a quiet confirmation that persons can be with one another without the inclination to "use" or "enjoy" another individual through exploitation.

Both instincts--origination and communion--represent a creative force, a spontaneity that is characteristic of life. Buber sees it moving one outward and inward, simultaneously. The instincts are in continual tension.

The student carries on his knowledge inquiry in a state of freedom throughout the day to day activities that might include field trips, independent research, and examinations. But freedom is not the essential element in Buber's approach. Buber views the student as a chrysalis ready for transformation. But he makes clear that this urge for independence --the instinct for origination--provides

> ...a footbridge, not a dwelling place....Freedom in education is the possibility of communion; it cannot be dispensed with and it cannot be made use of in itself; without it nothing succeeds, but neither does

anything succeed by means of it: it is the run before the jump, the tuning of the violin....[43]

The teacher continually reevaluates how to act toward the student who demonstrates the urge for origination and the inclination towards communism. There are no formulae. It is not simply a matter of being in charge. One critic has said, "For he (Buber) places educational authority on a ground which is not merely consistent with freedom but also the necessary condition...Moreover, he appears to find the secret in a peculiar and paradoxical blend of self-suppression and self assertion in the teacher."[44] This is to say, Buber feels that the truly wise teacher, assuming authority based on knowledge and experience in the classroom, can best understand the student's personal needs. The teacher experiences these needs and "pulls back," allowing the pupil to realize his own potential. The teacher provides opportunities but cannot guarantee outcomes.

The educator today must engage in a similar risk and give up some authority and desire to control the student. Buber warns that control can occur in disguised ways. It may come about with a showering of affection on a student but only as a way of "making him or her over" as if he or she were an object. The student still is perceived as simply a ward of the teacher, who (the teacher) only images an openness, a desire for unity, an unqualified show of affection. The educator must neither coerce by power nor constrain by showering an overabundance of affection. He or she guides, evokes, elicits, uncovers, with one goal in mind: that his or her presence—turning towards the other—will enable a similar attitude in the student. The point is to be able to see "the subjective justification of the opposite point of view."[45] The realization of this condition points towards a not-yet-full mutuality:

> There is an elemental experience which shatters at least the assurance of the erotic as well as the cratetic (sic) man, but sometimes does more, forcing its way at white-heat into the heart of the instinct and remolding it. A reversal of the single instinct takes place

which does not eliminate it but reverses its system of direction...I call it experiencing the other side.[46]

But there is a qualification. Inclusion is not, ironically, all-inclusive. In an educational milieu, the teacher can go all the way with an ascetic, unerotic, holistic disposition to new knowledge and its critique. But not the student. Turning again to Buber, we see, "The educator stands at both ends of the common situation, the pupil only at one end. In the moment when the pupil is able to throw himself across and experience from over there, the educative relation would be burst asunder, or change into friendship."[47]

There is nothing wrong with friendship! Buber only makes the point that reciprocity, at least, is not always possible. Buber states that the student is incapable of fully gaining access into the world of the teacher. The other side is still beyond.

Of course, the teacher does all that is possible to evoke and engender communion, a relationship that refines the primal urge of origination. But the goal of an *I-Thou* is not presumed. It is not bilateral and would not occur. That is what he found to be real, and he stood by his actual experience. According to one critic, "He did not argue from theory to life. Rather he tried to derive plausible intellectual structures for what life revealed when approached in openness."[48]

In connection with the discussion of the teacher, one must consider the education of character. The education of character is part of philosophical anthropology, the means of addressing the problem of man, or healing through wholeness, as Buber has already discussed this. Educating character has a universal importance. While the concrete subjects of a curriculum are important, the character that emerges as a student commences, transcends all else. Character allows for future growth, redefinitions, synthesis. One scholar has observed:

> Thus, personality is a completion, a given...The teacher may cultivate and enhance it, but the major energies in

education must be directed at something more essential: at character education... character is task. It is a leap to what lies ahead. It is the link between a particular individual personality and the consequences of his actions and attitudes.[49]

Buber contributes an illustration of character education. As a novice teacher approached his geography class, he was greeted by a bit of indifference, some rowdiness, and the anticipated weightiness of ordinary subject matter. Following a simple question by the teacher, however, one student responded by telling a story. Buber was enthusiastic about the student's transformation.

> Quite unmistakably he had only in this moment made up his mind to talk about it. In the meantime his face has changed. It is no longer quite as chaotic as before. And the class has fallen silent. They all listen. The class, too, is no longer a chaos. Something has happened. The young teacher has started from above.[50]

Education of character presupposes a mutual confidence, not necessarily explicit agreement. This confidence emanates as relationship and grows out of the urge of origination. The desire for communion is revealed through the knowing expression of the teacher. The teacher, too, can learn from the student, although the former may be manifestly more learned. Buber allows this to pass also as a dialogical relationship though complete reciprocity may not exist.

Subject Matter

Buber was not a curriculum specialist. The classical explanation of curriculum as a "course run" would find no favorable response with him. He did, however, appreciate the need for structure, having taught and administered schools for youth and adults. Knowledge might be organized in some systematic fashion as "subjects," but the decisions as to *what* should be taught were not as important as

with whom and in which way knowledge was shared. Subject matter for him was a given, to which the teacher--infused with certain ideals and dreams--related indirectly. The teacher proceeds to teach students, not subject "material," though it is obviously part of the process.

> Buber does not reject skills, tradition, and ideals by any means, but he sees them as aspects of existence which can challenge man to develop, not just intellectually, but wholly and thus in terms of his uniqueness as man ....(S)ubject matter for Buber is the concreteness of life selectively made available by the teacher and which the student not only encounters but also uses as a medium through which he encounters or meets the teacher himself.[51]

There is, however, a single instance in which Buber digresses from this general disposition toward content and sounds remarkably like a classical curricularist. In one publication Buber traces the scope and sequence, at three levels, of a composition course.[52] Here he envisions communication that begins with storytelling, moves to note taking or record keeping, finally comes to a rendering of thought in lucid exact terms. It seems ironic for Buber to have presented a "system" in light of his aversion to systematic approaches. But, life is sometimes paradoxical!
He advocated that more had to be done than skimming information from sources or memorizing formulae and theorems. The finest texts, the most colorful, ingeniously documented resources are not self-sufficient to the educational goal he envisioned. Herein lies an insight into another dimension of this complex problem of appropriate subject matter of education. As an example, let us examine the activity of reading and the interpretation of a text.

Since both interpreter and author are men, interpretation must include an understanding of the preinterpretation of the interpreter and the world view of the writer. Summing up, we may say that the dialogical principle applied to reading means that, in addition to

all the objective philogical machinery, one must bring to the interpretive task an understanding of man, including that of the specific You who wrote, together with a will to relate to the writer just as though he stood here before me.[53]

We are speaking here of biography and self-reflection as a significant element.[54] The curriculum, the content of the educational process, is incomplete--whatever its nature--unless the person, as teacher, allows his life history to be shared with his students. The teacher may be the master of the text and the subject area; the theorist may guide the instructor with a means/ends rationale that is technically adequate but allows for no possibility for relationship as Buber has discussed it. The teacher who adopts such a technological rationale for dealing with his students is perceived as anything but the great character.

> ...they (the students) have seen the un-persons we have become by virtue of our learning...Worse, how many a man who teaches about society, politics, human behavior or personal values has ruled out of bounds the questions that a troubled world surrounds us with. By contrast, whenever we encounter a man whose discipline, no matter how technical, has somehow become the medium of his self-expression, we are deeply moved.[55]

Buber admits his fallibility, his limitations. His personal recollections enable us to see a man who has tried to make dialogue a loving process. Although he may succeed or fail, his strength is shown by his attempts in full view.

> ...I have occasionally described my standpoint to my friend as the 'narrow ridge.' I wanted by this to express that I did not rest on the broad upland of a system that includes a series of sure statements about the absolute, but on a narrow rocky ridge between the gulfs where there is no sureness of expressible knowledge but the certainty of meeting what remains undisclosed.[56]

The narrow ridge is a metaphorical landmark, directly related to another geographical figure of speech: the line of demarcation. It is continually there, day in and day out, as we try to reconcile the paradoxical situation before us: the primal urge of origination and communion, distancing and relation; the line of demarcation is the boundary between the limitlessness of the search and the limitations indigenous to the inquirer.

> ...the emphasis is given to the situation in which a certain man is posited at a certain time and place, with predetermined, though not foreseeable possibilities and limitations of realization of certain values--commandments. This situation is sent by God and happens to man. He should accept it not passively, but actively, just by finding his 'Line of Demarcation.'[57]

Somewhere between the certainties and uncertainties of living Buber trusts that we shall find a place to live, to teach, to know, through the desire for the shared dreams and the reciprocal actions. This is part of his life of dialogue.

Perhaps the actions of two children on a playground best summarize Buber's ideas. The two children were jostling and bouncing one another with sudden ups and downs on a see-saw. After a while, either from fatigue or boredom with this type of play, they settled down to a less exuberant type of play. They geared themselves to try to stay on the see-saw as long as possible by maintaining a symmetry of motion and balance. There was a true demonstration of purpose. In order to succeed at their revised game, each had to simultaneously anticipate the moves of the other and be ready for the unexpected--if their shared play were to continue. Certainly each was keenly aware of the other's physical capability. But beyond this, one noted a joining of wills, of spirit, of purpose. Even if these children were not conscious of this, it seemed part of the underlying meaning of the event. Two single, isolated individuals lived the possibility of momentarily becoming one, even while remaining self-conscious creatures in their own right.

The Meaning of Curriculum: A Symposium

(The Investigator; *Moderator:* Martin Buber, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; *Participants:* James Macdonald, University of North Carolina, Greensboro; Dwayne Huebner, Teachers College, Columbia University; Maxine Greene, Teachers College, Columbia University; and William Pinar, University of Rochester, New York.)

The Investigator:

It is a pleasure to welcome you to this specially convened symposium under the auspices of the Department of Curriculum and Instruction, the School of Education, Loyola University of Chicago. The theme is "The Meaning of Curriculum: Issues and Questions." The participants will be asked to address their attention to two major questions about curriculum: identifying the values that motivate our work and identifying the nature of the student-teacher relationship. The discussion will proceed with a statement of the common concerns that have initially brought these scholars together. In the second part of the symposium the participants will refine the distinctions between them. In this regard they will be asked to argue their position in the context of varying approaches to a high school level course based on Hassidic literature. And now, without further ado, may I present Dr. Martin Buber.

Martin Buber:

Thank you all for agreeing to share your perspectives on the meaning of curriculum. In our academic work we are all conscious that scholarly inquiry can lead to abstraction and objectification. In the most human of all the disciplines --education--we have encountered an increasing tendency towards "facticity": that education has largely come to mean the acquisition of large blocks of information that can be systematically quantified and analyzed. At this moment we are conscious of how this situation has a strong bearing on depersonalized human relationships within and outside

of the school. People are so frequently valued in terms of how much knowledge they can assimilate for rational application to problems; while technology has solved so many problems by utilizing the scientific method, other skills are necessary for building interpersonal relationships. In your own curricular work you have attempted to show how many educators, with their technological orientations, have ignored the personal, the non-material, and the spiritual realms of knowledge acquisition. It seems to me that one of the ongoing tasks of education, through *acts of relationship*, is to enable students to become aware of values, rationales, or intuitions that incline one toward certain behavior.

James Macdonald:

These motivations you allude to can be termed human interests, which can be thought of as well as moral categories. Curricular work may emerge, for example, out of an inclination to control thought and action, to produce consensus, modify, or wholly allow free choice.

William Pinar:

My own work in phenomenological analysis of personal life history clearly reveals the anguish of self-alienation as the sickness of our students and ourselves. We can nowhere even begin to heal the breaches in our relationships to one another until we grasp the sources of this personal depression: the current malaise in our schools grows from the belief that those in power manipulate those who do not hold power.

Dwayne Huebner:

Dr. Buber, you have identified the I-It as one of the two major types of relationship or expressions between people. However subtle, it is an attitude that grows from one's perception of another human being as a "thing"; my own work in analyzing language has made me realize how little attention we give to aesthetic and ethical modes

of valuing both in theory and application. Indeed, much curricular activity reflects a systems approach whereby goals and objectives and evaluation schemes are preplanned according to certain data about the needs of the society and the student. We may call this curricularizing education, but in reality it is training in the technological sense of input, output. Little attention is given to the realm of intuition; curriculum ought also to anticipate the fears of the one who must organize and assimilate all the new data. The student tends to be manipulated and managed and so later uses the same pattern to get ahead. I recently overheard students emerging from an art history examination ask one another, "How did you do?" Doing, making, assembling, manipulation of facts--all for a grade. Perhaps we need to redefine the humanities.

Maxine Greene:

The sorrow of all this, Dr. Huebner, is that we are really unconscious of how much of what we think of as education becomes in actuality nothing more than training. A major issue before us in this symposium and before teachers and students is how to grapple with the conflicting values that affect theoretical work. Are teachers ready to provide models of critically aware thinkers and feelers? Throughout much of our common endeavors we here have referred to the ideal educated student as the "wide-awake one" who knows how to make connections. The connections of which I speak link our personal experiences--life history is a more useful term of which Dr. Pinar is fond--to the content being studied. In general, a more intensive focus on one's "within" will help engender necessary curricular renewal strategies.

For example, I teach in a very large institution. By definition the university is one all-encompassing entity, the parts of which are all supposed to be intricately related to the whole; but we know what happens in mass gatherings of any kind: the individual, that is, the separate person within, is ignored. I am a part of the machinery of this mass institution with its process of evaluating and credentializing. But I am not ready to succumb to the implicit,

often impersonalizing, bureaucratic demands of such a place. The controlling function of the university is at odds with the self-critical, liberating dimensions of literary study I advocate. Perhaps I am being too psychoanalytic, but I feel that each of us in the university harbors both inclinations. I hope the values of "mega-versity" will not dominate.

Buber:

From our respective backgrounds we have come to similar conclusions about the abstract manipulatory nature of schooling today. The focus of much curriculum work, as you've observed, is concepts, facts, and historical analysis. Today, scientific research provides us with more primary data and critical sources than any previous generation. However, from the earliest grades youngsters are imbued with a primary love and need for information. Customs of quaint communities, the ideas of the famous or infamous historical persons, or the behavior of contemporary people are analyzed and reported on. The abstract nature of this learning process is revealed in the personal distancing, the detachment of the student from the object of inquiry. There is another way of putting the matter: the objectifications of knowledge. Knowledge is valued on the basis of our ability to quantify, to separate into smaller parts, which is then used. The code is simple: the more knowledge, the more credentials, the more material benefits, the more personal professional status. There is a concomitant manipulation of one human being by another within this pathetic situation. Teachers are hard pressed to show results of their efforts while students are anxious to "get ahead." All this means that the act of knowing anything about the past or present--in the arts, humanities, or even the sciences--in little or no way tends to touch the personal world of the student.

As a response Dr. Greene would have all curricularists become more conscious of the manipulatory aspects of such a system and then locate the inner resources we all have for a wide-awake moral critique of the status quo. I think this emphasis is misplaced. Such an emphasis could undoubtedly be construed as a renewal of spirituality, as a way of nulling

the grosser dimensions of materialism, objectifications, and thing-a-fication of life. No, the response to our mailaise is found *not* in the highly personal private realm of consciousness but in what I have called the "inbetween," the relationship between persons.

Macdonald:

You are suggesting a different locus of educational emphasis. The problem, as I see it, is that in the absence of clearly delineated self-knowledge, wide-awakeness as Dr. Greene has pointed to, the possibility of entering non-manipulatory relationships will have little chance of becoming actual. But one of the critical dimensions of dialogue, as I understand it, is having a primary understanding of oneself and of your neighbor.

Buber:

I think we are becoming trapped by the same abstractions that we have criticized in others. We can best delineate our differences by suggesting a specific course of study. Since most of you have used literature as a major focus in your own attempts to reconceptualize the curriculum, I, too, shall use literature. The stories of the Hassidim are as good a place to start as any, though of course, I would recognize the Bible as the greatest source book ever for stories.

Pinar:

You have repeatedly stressed the role of the master, the rebbe. He provides the exemplary model for living. The actual experience of the rebbe becomes an archtype for certain types of leadership in the realm of intense interpersonal relationships. If I can say so, it seems like one models the rebbe in an effort to focus attention on one's own inner world. This can lead to uncovering those intuitions and actual recollections which are connected with earlier personal experiences inside and outside of school. The attempt to locate the genuine self may be nurtured by a continual bouncing back and forth between the reaction

to the folk literature at hand and a phenomenologic, psychoanalytic grasp on one's own life history. I have already argued against those who assert that this is a type of introspectionism that has no place in curriculum. The act of bringing elements of our history to the surface refines the act of self-understanding so necessary to the teacher who yearns for an authentic non-manipulative relationship with the student.

Greene:

I agree that the Hassidic literature of which you are so fond, Dr. Buber, provides us with a certain framework for this personalist, impressionistic probing. One begins with the inspired teacher, who himself has broken with the fixed patterns of manipulatory interpersonal relationships in order to discover the spiritual sources for self-purification; and this process of becoming aware leads to facilitating the improvement of others. This momentary break with the world appears to be similar to what others of us have phenomenologically called bracketing out the taken-for-grantedness of life. Only then can one discover the true origins of perception about the world. These folk tales and legends are textual beacons guiding the teacher through the darkness of self-ignorance that may lead to unconscious explorations of others. The literature helps us to evolve a new curriculum perspective for avoiding enforcement or imposition of ideologies, codes of action.

Buber:

I am afraid that this degree of self-probing--existentially, phenomenologically, almost psychoanalytically, conceived--as potentially very harmful consequences. Indeed, it is not to deny that in each person there is a uniquely flowering soul, our ego, capable of freely reaching out to shape and recreate the world, but this certain identity or individuality, as others might say, is not recovered by peeling away the levels of this worldly experience as one peels away the layers of an onion. Hassidic literature shows that one's

real needs, fears, hopes are recoverd in a visible act of dia-
logue between persons inhabiting and relating to one another
in the midst of the physical world. This is unlike certain
mystics who claim that only after intense self-scrutiny
can one begin to dialogue with the world. The Hassid argues
that dialogue with the world is the prerequisite for authentic
self-knowing. One simple conversation can reveal a great
deal about many hidden elements in one's character.

Rabbi Moshe Loeb of Sason once sat among the farmers
of a small community and overheard the following exchange:

> 'Do you love me'? one asked the other. The neighbor
> answered: 'Of course I do; do I not befriend you in
> every way; have I not spoken with care; yes, I love you.'
> But the first regarded him sadly. 'How', he asked, 'can
> you truly love me when you do not know what hurts
> me'? He who truly loves another knows the ground of
> the other person's being, what his friend is wanting and
> what he himself is and is not contributing towards that
> need.

Huebner:

I am glad that you selected this story. It is an excellent
example of the concerns that ought to motivate curriculum.
Student and teacher join into a relationship, the nature of
which provides a new perspective on how to get along with
persons. Frequently, however, the teacher-student relation-
ship seems only to be an incidental part of the curricula
process. My colleagues agree, moreover, that too often
the student is perceived as a fixed being with no personal
biography needing to be accounted for by the teacher.
The instructor's major task seems to be in implementing
the design and engineering transfer of information to the
neophyte. The reconceptualizers of curriculum urge that
in an era enamored of technological patterning and condi-
tioning that education must nurture the authentic temporal
self of creatures--those who are, in Heidegger's words
"beings-in-the world." I do agree with Dr. Buber that the
amorphous, unique self becomes known through the so-
called natural meeting.

In the tale Dr. Buber narrated, the world-views of the
Rebbe and the student are distinctly manifested. Their
respective hopes can be intuited through the brief exchange.
Introspection is not denied. But the testing ground of any
newly acquired self-knowledge is in the physical act of
joining with another, of turning toward another person in
conversation.

Pinar:

On this note, I recognize that Dr. Huebner has keyed off
one of the major emphases in Professor Buber's interpreta-
tion of the Hassidic motif. The qualification that I wish to
add at this point should not be construed, however, as an
indication that Dr. Buber is "for" knowledge-through-relation-
ship, and the other reconceptualizing curricularists and
I are "for" knowledge through self-scrutiny, alone. A point
of fact: many of my colleagues literally fled the university
in the sixties in search of solitude, through an individualism
that wouldn't be tainted by the corrupting social influences
of this type of mass community. But I remained to study and
teach in this setting, for I keenly subscribe to a need for
building bridges between those with similar and diverse
points of view--social, political, curricular. I say all of this
in view of the fact that my search for a curricular method
is admittedly rooted in Jungian psychoanalysis, the radical
psychiatry of Cooper and Laing, and selected areas of literary
and educational theory. I presume that Dr. Buber finds the
emphases growing from these types of inquiries to be poten-
tially narcissistically overwhelming. But I see no significant
difference between the Hassid's life of joy and personal
fulfillment predicated upon knowing his strengths, weak-
nesses, and inclinations and our own advocacy of an intensive
adherence to one's "within" as a way of rescuing school
experiences for the aware, alert, young person. It's all a
matter of the point at which one starts the inquiry process.
Is it possible, Dr. Buber, that you have not given sufficient
attention to the first part of Hillel's dictum: "If I am not for
myself--who will be for me?"

Buber:

Certainly the Hassidic motif is highly personal and impressionistic. It is patently clear that there is no *we* without an *I*. But the concern that has agonized me is that many educators have inappropriately tried to compensate for the stress on external valuations--for example, by identifying and rating people primarily according to some number system. The new stress seems to be an innerness, the search for the "real me," the "true self," the "person within." I am fearful that this preoccupation with the self, to the exclusion of seeking communion with others, has become an end in itself. It seems ironic that the impersonalizing aspects of technology have evoked this kind of reaction, whereby one who is frustrated, pained, psychically distraught, seeks solace in egoistic centering.

Rev Shneur Zalman was once confronted by his jailer with the following inquiry, "How can we grasp that an all-knowing God would say to Adam, 'Where are you'"? It is not that God doesn't know, but the question points to our own self-ignorance. But lest we ponder the issue as some kind of metaphysical or psychological inquiry, we should recognize that we are, existentially, in a certain place only in regard to where *other persons* are located. How does one neighbor meet and greet a companion. Joseph was found wandering in the field. To the stranger's inquiry as to where he was traveling, Joseph responded: "I'm gone to find my brothers." So they were to be reunited. The act of returning towards his siblings was the way for Joseph to deal with his ambivalances about his relationship to his brothers.

Macdonald:

Elsewhere I have suggested that of the knowledge inquiry models we have, it is the dialogical one out of which curriculum most fully emerges. The curriculum, official notices and manuals notwithstanding, is created in the interchange between the students with a set of lived-in world experiences, the resources brought by the adult monitor, and the adult as a fully functioning person. The course curriculum for "Jewish Arab Conflicts 1900-1948" emerges from documents, shared tensions and anticipations. Of course, how-

ever, the values that the student takes out as his own ultimately develop through an intricate process of self-reflection. It guides one to action based on speculation and back to speculation leading to action. The dialogue is deeply rooted in one's own consciousness.

Buber:

I am aware, Dr. Macdonald, of your own studies of Paulo Freire and the success that he had in implementing a literary program with Brazilian farmers. He attempted to sensitize them to the notions of the controlling, oppressive values that affected their lives. But your advocacy of Freire's approach would dilute the immediate contacts provided by the dialogical relationship as I have tried to exemplify it. One is obviously called upon to use all the senses in recognizing, turning towards and addressing another creature. Comparatively speaking, I have urged that we become more clear about our own intentions, not from free speculation, meditation, or cogitation alone, but out of deep human association. Dictatorships abound, controlling our thought and movement. But our awareness of this stifling of the spirit comes not through freedom alone but communion. In other words we *need* one another in order to benefit from the state of becoming free of external and internal constraints. Life in itself is a kind of game, the rules for which can be learned neither in physical solitude nor via ideological argumentation.

The Hassidim tell how Rabbi Nahum found some disciples of his playing checkers on Chanukah in the House of Study. He overheard them disputing about various aspects of the game. One student claimed that he had a right to move backward whether or not his piece was a king. The companion knew that this was patently absurd and proposed that they ask a neutral third party. At that moment the master appeared. "The rules you argue about are not essential." They were taken aback. "As far as the game itself is concerned, you can consult any authority on this type of play. It's cut and dried. What *is* crucial is what becomes of the two of you together as you engage in the

game. Specifically, you *can* only move one piece, in one
direction, until you've reached your partner's back row.
Then you have more options. The end of the competition
results in one player being declared more skillful than the
other. But the way you play together is infinitely more
crucial than who is the winner. The real moves are made
in the motivation, the attitude, the concern that one person
has for the other despite the ego allurements, and frustra-
tions born of the competitive world in which we all survive."

Dr. Macdonald, it is in the immediate face-to-face
challenges we hurl at one another that we learn most about
ourselves. There is no one person nor dialectic than can
ultimately determine what another person learns of himself
or herself in the act of studying any discipline. The rules
of checkers enable us to play with one another. But we
create new rules–for living–through our play. It is we, you
and I, whose play–that is, life activity–teaches us what we
need to know.

The Investigator:

There is a consensus that the unexamined life is not
worth living. In an impersonalizing technologically mani-
pulating environment–in which the school is still a focal
point–there is the search for the authentic self. Un-
fortunately, the "search for the authentic self" in each of
us almost sounds like jargon. But the psychological popular-
izers make us cynical only about language; the pain of not
knowing which signal we should be attuned to is real. It does
not abate. Part of the problem is in the assembly line
mentality where the specialists work on us and we, in turn,
work on others. Those who would reconceptualize the
curriculum would guide us to think and act more holistically
while recognizing the sources of our values. These theorists
have laid the primary stress upon existential, phenomeno-
logical, and philosophical analysis of personal states of being,
these being a way to educate and become educated more
humanely.

Dr. Buber's central teaching in this context is the dia-
logic essence of the human personality. Deep probing of the

psyche, as a way of eliciting the valued decisions we all
make, is too much akin to the type of spiritual flights of
introspective quiescence that ultimately doom full human
encounter. It is the communal character of one's ex-
perience in the educational act of knowledge acquisition
that Buber unstintingly has upheld. With respect to Pro-
fessor Buber and our other panelists, neither position in
its entirety will conclusively address the problems of curric-
ulum work we initially highlighted. For each human
I-Thou relationship in which we share, we forge a stronger
link to the I-Thou presence in which we sense an absolute
value. For each act of grueling self-analysis we undertake,
theorists argue we are that much closer to the uniting of
mind, body, soul–all of which participate in the act of
knowing the world through the subject matter at hand.
There is a benefit that accrues to the student who is alert
to the argumentation between both positions. A new
perspective is created, stronger than the separate contribu-
tion provided either by Buber or Reconceptualizing the-
orists.

At this point we enter the second realm of discussion:
the teacher as a model, as a functioning partner in the quest
for dialogical relationship.

Pinar:

Dr. Buber, each of us at our respective universities is
really concerned with more than cloistered ivory tower
research. It is crucial to be with other human beings
through joint inquiry into one field of knowledge or
another. Institutions of higher learning can provide ex-
cellent opportunities for wisdom to be shared amongst
the generations. Our respective commitments to the class-
room obviously reveal how seriously we take our privileges
and responsibility towards those who form the life blood
of the university, that is, the students. There is a kind of
consensus among those who reconceptualize curriculum
theory, that it no longer is adequate to be a repository of
knowledge, teaching subjects. The teacher must first thor-
oughly be committed to teaching persons. This is the only

real way through which we can address the psychic dissolution which one brings to such a high pressured environment.

Macdonald:

Hopefully, the teacher can help the student via his or her own experience of living through the tensions of simultaneously wanting to separate from, and be part of, the group. And Dr. Buber has clearly shown us that an inclination towards either of these extremes can become an evil. As I see it, the teacher of education attempts to maintain critical awareness of his own impulses and actions so that he does not succumb to the temptation easily available to the teacher, of moving to one extreme or the other.

Buber:

The teacher acts to bridge his chasm by virtue of experience, perspective, an in-depth sensing of how one can turn towards, and be present before, another human being. The teacher must be an exemplar of mutuality as the key antidote to that inclination we all have to use, manipulate, to treat others as things.

One finds the following tale from Hindu literature. The gods and demons were once engaged in a contest. "To whom shall we offer our sacrifices? They (demons) placed all their offerings in their own mouths....Parajapti, the primal spirit, (then) bestowed himself upon the gods.

The ideal essence of each person is rooted in the act of turning away from egoistic solitude, and *towards* another creature. We have identified this movement as communion. The teacher is the awakener of this possibility for sharing.

Greene:

I perceive a paradox. How can the teacher be the ideal exemplar of mutuality, of sharing, when in fact there is not parity? You have said that in an educational relationship the teacher can know the soul of the student,

but the student neither can nor should be able to know the world of the teacher. Only when the educational relationship evolves to friendship can this full mutuality ever exist. I do not understand.

Huebner:

Professor Buber, I believe that your distinction between relationship that is educational and friendship seriously detracts from the dialogical priorities you have originally set. If we curricularists are to learn from you, Dr. Buber, our first task is to comprehend the apparent contradiction evident in these two categories of meeting.

Buber:

In an educational venture there are certain objective aspects that cannot be compromised. The teacher by his or her status, orientation, and dispositions sees beyond the horizon in a way not allowed to the student. You cannot change nor do I think you want to change the nature of the communication that exists between these two parties in an educational venture. For an illustration: you do not expect the doctor the come to the patient for healing. There is an objective condition between them that cannot be altered. All I can add is that the great source of influence that the teacher holds vis-a-vis the student is humbling! A doctor is forever learning medicine since he is not privy to absolute knowledge about the unfathomable mysteries of the human body. By definition the healer knows what he can and cannot accomplish with the acquired and endowed skills at hand.

The Hassidim held their Zaddick in the highest esteem as one who uniquely understood himself and his fellow creatures. Yet the more wisdom he had, resulting from being able to unite material and spiritual realms in his life, the more he held back from imposing himself. There were, of course, perversions of this model, but the model is, nevertheless, firm and decent. Because of the high calling of the human being, each of us struggles upward and on-

ward to be the measure of all things. The teacher thus, as a part of the whole of the species, assumes a strategic high point among the disciples. But the higher the stature, the greater the humility. Through the literature we learn:

Rabbi Abraham said, "We say in our prayers, 'Every stone shall bow before you.' When man reaches the highest rung, when he reaches his full stature, only then does he become truly humble in his own eyes and knows what it is to bow before you."

The instructor may well represent a much higher rung than the student in the scope of knowing; but before his own conscience and the presence of God, the teacher realizes his own limitations and ceases any inclination to control or arbitrarily decide what is best. This, of course, is an ideal, but I feel that it is vital in our day to formulate ideals and to strive to attain them.

Macdonald:

There is a tremendous responsibility placed upon you, teacher. Professor Buber, I guess I am cynical after all of these years; many assume the mantle of leadership as they aspire towards articulating what you would call "absolute value." The teacher might act arbitrarily; in the process of selecting the effective world—i.e., the subjects, etc.— he might be imposing and propagandizing his own will.

Buber:

Professor Macdonald, you are not the first educator who has been skeptical about ascribing this disposition to the teacher. Theoreticians and instructional leaders have, in the process of intellectualizing and psychoanalyzing the act of teaching, recognized their positions to be vulnerable. You yourself, have suggested a dual dialectic between outer and inner worlds by which the teacher continually checks his own valuations of ideas and people. If he is clear thinking he will be able to see the correspondence between what he says and does in the community and what truth he actually nurtures in his soul. Yes, Dr. Macdonald, it is a com-

mendable system for bringing a fresh honesty, an openness to the classroom. But you question my attitude to the teacher out of the same skepticism you apparently hold over your own position.

You see, it should be clear by now that I oppose systems of any sort; especially those that emerge from intricate intellectual and psychic networks. I do not believe we contradict our estimation of the act of dialogue as the highest work of the human being when we simultaneously focus upon the teacher's great calling and superior presence before the student. The authentic person who would teach fully grasps the absolute nature of the dialogical relationshp and would do nothing to compromise the integrity of the student. And the moments of dialogue need not even involve words .

There is a tale of a young Hassid who, having exhausted his teacher's great store of knowledge, was sent to another village. There he found a famous rebbe, a teacher in the fullest sense of the word. He spent six months in the presence of this master. Upon return to his home village, all his peers and mentor inundated him with questions: What had he discovered? His answer: I learned how the rebbe ties his shoes!

From this story one gathers that it is in the day-to-day conduct—exemplified almost tongue-in-cheek by the act of shoe tying—that the most profound values are perceived and acted upon.

Pinar:

I appreciate your wider view—

Buber:

I prefer to think of this as deeper *and* wider.

Pinar:

—of the educational experience. You do, however, seem to be a purist, Professor Buber. You bemoan the fact that

there are no longer any great visions infusing the act of teach-
ing with meaning, yes, you have said elsewhere "eternal
meaning." You have accused contemporary pedagogues
of being enamored of either the funnel or pump ideology,
the student as only a passive receptacle of the wisdom of
the ages, of the total source of all wisdom that simply needs
to be "pumped out." But you invalidate the methods of
some of the reconceptualizing theorists as much too intellec-
tual and psychological for achieving a high level of honesty
and communion in the educational setting. I'll admit that I
am zealous for the approach I am continually testing and
refining, namely, "currere." It is a way of overcoming
liabilities inherent in a relationship where one partner,

"...all the education worthy of the name is education of character."

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by virtue of age or experience or credentials, is not on the
same level as another.

Greene:

Dr. Pinar sounds like a university professor holding on
for dear life. I am a bit surprised.

Pinar:

Deep down I believe there are great truths in the Hassidic
treasury about human beings come to share knowledge about
their world. Unfortunately, however, the high spiritual
calling of some of the most esteemed leaders was com-
promised by flights of ego leading to manipulation and not
reconciliation. I suppose I would like to depend on some-
thing more than the "immediacy of relation" to recognize
these eternal values which you feel are so far missing in the
perception of our teachers and students.

Buber:

I appreciate your candor, Dr. Pinar. I hope that in these
frank exchanges we have all taken something new into
ourselves as a result of having turned honestly and lovingly
towards one another. Your own work, and that of you
others here, deeply interests me. Beyond the scope of your
research and the breadth of writing about the problems of
living in an I-It world are your personal commitments to help
nurture more humane alternatives.

What I find missing, however, is any kind of stimulating
vision to help focus our fullest energies. And I believe that
occurs because we have basically been doing our work and
living our lives as if there were a dichotomy to be preserved
between the religious and secular spheres of life. This is not
a theological tract, but I'll venture to say that western
man's inclination to compartmentalize the spiritual and
material dimensions of existence has contributed to our
anomie.

I have elsewhere argued that all education worthy of the
name is education of character. The goal of entering into
relationship with another is "character." It is the need,
perceived and nurtured, to accept responsibility for a word,
a gesture, a continuous series of behavior. The Great Char-
acter, though not necessarily a moral genius, takes the whole
world into account when he responds to a question or
addresses another. And the whole world means that through
human dialogue one addresses the Eternal Thou. The
teacher, because he knows the world of the student and his
own world, is best suited for initiating this bridging of the
gap between material and spiritual world within each student.
Humanistic and religious values are interdependent; the
educator who takes both perspectives into his active orien-
tation towards students is complete and mirrors an image of
the Great Character. It is a unifying image that would make
the humanistic endeavors of the reconceptualists more thor-
oughly penetrating.

The Investigator:

I believe that Professor Buber has, in his writings, and
here, today, more sharply articulated the position of the

teacher in the educational relationship. In comparison with the reconceptualizing education, he explicitly verbalizes the great importance and responsibility of the teacher as leader. Thus he is more vulnerable to criticism since his stand for dialogue in an educational relationship and mutuality seem incongruous. The reconceptualists are all actively part of the teaching corps and have legitimately reacted not out of theoretical concern but out of a fear of what they have seen in educational institutions: those who take advantage of others under the guise of "leadership."

Because Buber does not offer us a step-by-step procedure for teaching a course of literature or provide a handbook for rating teacher behavior, he is sometimes difficult to assimilate. Moreover, these curricularists and philosophers before this day only generally addressed the kinds of interhuman dilemmas that Buber focuses on in detail.

The purpose of this symposium has been to alert both groups of thinkers (theorists and Buber) to the concerns they have explicated in their respective endeavors. This investigator believes that the discourse of university curricularists who are drawn towards the act of reconceptualizing can be enriched from greater familiarity with Martin Buber. The synthesis has not yet been made, but the seeds are sown.

Our teachers relate a story of a person born without a soul. This man pleads with God for a soul. One night in a dream, he entered Paradise and saw an emporium that sold a variety of wares. He entered and requested a soul. A heavenly creature placed a seed in his hand. The man cried, "I asked for a soul." "But," the angel said, "here we sell seeds, not souls. It is up to you to nurture that seed till it blossoms into a soul."

A symposium format was selected to effect a synthesis of the reconceptualists and Buber in a "personal" way. The writer has attempted to reflect the imaginative, innovative, playful mood that pervades the works of the reconceptualizing theorists.

Buber was not a curricular theorist, though his views on educational relationships strongly complement those of the four curricularists studied here. Therefore, a new dimension of understanding is added by noting additional points of dissimilarity among some issues. While there are only relative differences, a spirit of controversy pervades this symposium, thus expanding the earlier discussion of the four reconceptualists and Buber.

Specific curriculum issues were selected upon which some or all of the symposium members could respond. The five panelists have made their observations in regard to specific topical questions with which educators will deal between now and the turn of the century.

Renoir: *The Artists Son Drawing*

FOOTNOTES

Chapter 2 - Models and Critiques

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Pretexts

Madeleine R. Grumet, Editor
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Pretext: *Critical Social Psychology* by Philip Wexler.
Routledge and Kegan Paul. Boston, 1983. pp. 190.

CRITICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
A RESPONSE

Edmund V. Sullivan
The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education

The modern definition of the individual as an autonomous
social unit is a product of a consensus achieved by liberal
social thought. In liberal social theory, individuals are seen
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Thus, psychology as a discipline is one of the social em-
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The modern definition of the individual as an autonomous social unit is a product of a consensus achieved by liberal social thought. In liberal social theory, individuals are seen as separate, autonomous monads that are unique unto themselves. Psychologists study individuals and groups as if they were independent of larger social structures. Thus, psychology as a discipline is one of the social embodiments of liberal individualism. Psychology, as a discipline, represents the overarching belief that the study of individual and microsocial units is possible and desirable. To be able to demarcate sociology from psychology represents the belief that the individual can be studied as relatively independent from other social institutional structures.

In *Critical Social Psychology* Philip Wexler sets himself

the task of evaluating the historical developments of modern psychology through a critical analysis of conventional social psychology:

> ...social psychology is part of a wider culture and it plays a social role. Social psychologists appeal to a super ordinate norm, the ideal of scientific autonomy, to justify their experiences and actions as professional and socially neutral. Indeed, professionalism may itself be the new ideology for the mystification and denial of the social character of knowledge. (p. 157)

As a discipline within the social sciences, it is unique for its total lack of a critical perspective (Sullivan, 1984). The depth of scholarship in this book is illustrated by Wexler's ability to weave "critical social theory" into a conversation with the conventional discipline and also suggest new grounds for social psychological inquiry. With that in mind, let me now turn to the content and format of the book.

The book is divided into three parts. Part one is entitled critique. Wexler examines the dissenting critique of mainstream social psychology, (e.g., McGuire, Harre and Secord, Gergen), and notes that by treating conventional social psychology as a "paradigm crisis" of positivism, the dissenters continue, as does the mainstream, to treat social psychology as a contextless apolitical discipline where the only conflict is "paradigm-conflict."

Wexler sets out then to rectify the apolitical analysis of current dissent. Following along the lines of the Frankfort school of critical-social theory, he tries to locate knowledge production as social psychology within historical, political and economic movements within society. In this chapter, an historical relationship is established between corporate capital, general cultural belief and the form and content of professional knowledge. Wexler reviews historical literature from a number of disciplines and leads the reader through a process of thinking which will show that historically, social psychology is a defense against the social knowledge that it systematically ignores. Thus, the total omission within social psychology of an analysis of structured social relations proves to be systematic rather than accidental omission. Although this type of analysis has been done in other disciplines (e.g., sociology, medicine, law, engineering, etc.,) Wexler notes that this type of social critique within social psychology has just begun. May I say parenthetically, that it has "just begun" because this book begins the process within North American social psychology.

Part 2 of this work lays the foundation for a critical social psychology to counteract the systematic methodological omissions mentioned above. In this section, the conventional social psychological professional will have to explore a broad spectrum of political and social theory which may, at the outset, seem alien territory. It is here that the reader must push on to engage a discipline critique which will take him/her beyond "paradigm criticism." This section on theory reveals the range of scholarship of this author. The reader will encounter Marx, Freud, Reich, the reflections of the Frankfort School, current European psychoanalytic critique. In weaving through this complex literature, the author is finally able to raise into full relief the essential features of a new type of critical social psychology. All of the silences of mainstream social psychology are now given voice. Thus, we have the category of class and the contradictions that are produced in "every-day life." We are now talking about a "social psychology" embedded within a production process (i.e., capitalism). Stemming from this connection, categories such as alienation and exploitation are given voice and become an intricate part of the praxis of a new social psychology.

The final section of this book, composed of four chapters, is entitled "Analysis." Wexler ventures that a critical social psychology must consider specific categories of mediation, and this author chooses to focus on the categories of social interaction, self and intimacy. These categories are analyzed in three separate chapters. Wexler's choice of these specific concepts follows from the rationale "that each category represents a phenomenon which is dissolving in every-day life as society polarizes between right and left and liberal hegemony breaks down" (p. 89).

The chapter on interaction is entitled "The End of Social Interaction." In this section Wexler accomplishes a thorough critique of *equity theory* in its reassurance that individuals can achieve happiness by rational calculation. Wexler points out that equity economizes society, while at the same time removing process and production from the analysis of social interaction. He argues that a critical social-psychology would begin with the question of "labour power" and exploitation rather than concepts of behavior and self-concept. Wexler ends this chapter with a tantalizing statement which I wish he had pursued in more detail:

> The task of a critical social psychology is not only to describe generalized production and exploitation, but also to describe the everyday strategies that are being developed by the exploited to counteract the end of social interaction (p. 116.)

The chapter on the category of the self is entitled "The New Self: Breakdown or Breakthrough." In this chapter Wexler leads the reader into an historical understanding of the concept of the self. In contradiction to mainstream psychology where the self is a reified entity (you might say an entity unto itself) Wexler shows how the self in late capitalism is regulated by commodity relations. In our times we have moved into self understanding which sanctifies the *impulse* for purposes of consumption. Wexler contends that "the search for intensified experience which typifies the impulsive self of the late twentieth century is evidence that the need for immediate experiential stimulation and gratification has not been extinguished by commodity relations" (p. 123.)

The fact of the matter is that the commodity form does not rely on the fulfillment of impulse, but rather on its continuous frustration. Wexler shows how modern advertising stimulates frustration rather than fulfillment and makes the connection, at its extremes, between continuing impulse frustration and schizophrenia. The majority of the population is spared this extreme, in Wexler's view, by a numbing of its awareness.

If the self is not a reified entity, then it is historically created in a different manner at different stratas of society. The author shows clearly in this chapter, by example, that the psychological effects of commodification are experienced differently at different points in history and differently among different social classes. A critical social psychology analyzes this historical tendency, but it is Wexler's contention that a critical perspective demands an advocacy of specified class locations. This new form of social psychology must attempt to articulate the unspoken psychology of emergent classes. He refers to the recent pop psychology self-help excursion into close personal interactions (e.g., marriage encounter handbooks, creative divorce, etc.) Wexler casts his critical eye on the role that *intimacy* plays in blunting out social contradictions within the society. He maintains that many real social contradictions, such as class and gender contradictions, are shifted out of concrete institutional contexts and are moved into the personal, private life of intimate personal relationships. Here the personalizing of socially patterned contradictions into privatized dilemmas of intimacy are seen as a method by which the status quo is maintained. This emphasis on the personal, nevertheless, has its two-edged sword. Wexler concludes that "the present dissolution of intimacy (social psychologists, like Minerva's owl, seem always to be spreading their wings at dusk) back into familism, sexism and fundamentalities also opens up the possibility of returning from personalization to social solidarity" (pp. 155-6.)

For those interested in curriculum theory, this book must be placed in an historical context in current curriculum theorizing. Here its location must be seen in the recent line of scholarship starting with Bowles and Gintis, through Apple, Pinar, as well as the current author (I refer to Wexler's previous work, *The Sociology of Education: Beyond Equality*) It also links itself to the critical British sociology in education work of Stuart Hall, Paul Willis, Roger Dale, and others and resonates with the Critical Pedagogy scholarship at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education. What is unique about this work is that it systematically addresses

psychology as a discipline. Since it appears that psychology looms very large in curriculum theorizing, this book should be read because it provides an alternative to the new wave of *cognitive science* theorizing which pretends to be a corrective to *behaviourism*, while harbouring all of behaviourism's ideological blindness (e.g., power relations along class, gender and ethnic lines.) My only wish about Wexler's book is that I would have liked him to have addressed educational issues in more detail. This is not an easy book to read. One of the reasons why it is difficult is because it covers a "critical social theory" literature which will be unfamiliar to most psychologists. A second reason for difficulty is because it is breaking completely new ground for what the scope of a new critical social psychology might be in the future. Difficulty, therefore, should be embraced by the reader for he/she will be introduced to a book with an unusual range and depth of scholarship. The range of scholarship is unusual because this is one of the few books in the discipline of psychology that situates psychology within a "critical theory of society."

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UNCRITICAL CRITICAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Kenneth Carlson
Rutgers University

Wexler's book contains three major assumptions. First, Wexler is convinced that theory can be more than mere speculation and that it can constitute an accurate articulation of an otherwise incoherent social present. (p. 77) Second, Wexler is sure that a theory which does this will inspire resistance to the ideological containment fostered by American culture. (p. 23) Third, Wexler believes that he has framed this kind of powerful theory, using three main themes from social psychology: interaction, the self, and intimacy. Moreover, Wexler believes that he has avoided the failings he finds in the theories of such contemporaries as Armistead, Archibald, and Larsen (p. 22) and such illustrious predecessors as Marx, Freud, and Horkheimer. (p. 69) The failings are, on the one hand, ahistorical in that the theory is not located in an historical context, and, on the other hand, a field dependence which does not transcend the historical context.

Obviously, each of Wexler's assumptions is both true and false. All of the assumptions are the kind to which we say "Yes, but..." What is intriguing about Wexler's book is the extent to which he undermines his own assumptions and falls into the failings he attributes to others. We say yes to Wexler's assumptions when they are first presented, but then his elaboration of these does not elicit further affirmation, only a series of "buts."

Assumption One

The first assumption - that theory can constitute an accurate articulation of reality - is the theology of intel-

psychology as a discipline. Since it appears that psychology looms very large in curriculum theorizing, this book should be read because it provides an alternative to the new wave of *cognitive science* theorizing which pretends to be a corrective to *behaviourism*, while harbouring all of behaviourism's ideological blindness (e.g., power relations along class, gender and ethnic lines.) My only wish about Wexler's book is that I would have liked him to have addressed educational issues in more detail. This is not an easy book to read. One of the reasons why it is difficult is because it covers a "critical social theory" literature which will be unfamiliar to most psychologists. A second reason for difficulty is because it is breaking completely new ground for what the scope of a new critical social psychology might be in the future. Difficulty, therefore, should be embraced by the reader for he/she will be introduced to a book with an unusual range and depth of scholarship. The range of scholarship is unusual because this is one of the few books in the discipline of psychology that situates psychology within a "critical theory of society."

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Assumption One

The first assumption - that theory can constitute an accurate articulation of reality - is the theology of intel-

lectuals. The theory which actually provides this articulation is the Holy Grail for which intellectuals search, convinced, of course, that it is there to be found. Alas, there are no Holy Grail theories, only a pile of dixie cups littered about the intellectual landscape. The cups are certainly capable of holding liquid; the problem is that they don't hold much and it's usually water. Either they contain a very small amount of reality, which is passed off as the whole or the essence, or else they contain the all-encompassing truism which has the intellectual nutritive value of water. Most often it's both: a gross oversimplification illustrated with examples that only serve to evoke in the reader a lot of counter examples.

Wexler is especially guilty of the sweeping generalization *sans* illustration. It's as though he knew he was writing for an audience who shared his perceptions and so persuasion would be superfluous; assertion would suffice. And yet he says in condemnation of equity theory that this theory empties interaction of any specific content and provides only an opaque and universal sounding theory. (p. 97) He also insists that "a *specific* description of the historically *specific* contradictions of the formation and disintegration of the *particular* mediating or relational process for a *given* society must be worked out." (pp. 78-79) (Emphasis mine to illustrate Wexler's penchant for prolixity.) Wexler is as sensitive as C. Wright Mills (1959) was to the hollowness of grand theories, but he repeatedly slips into that kind of theorizing himself. And unlike Daniel Bell (1976) who can come up with both grand and grandly opposing theories to capture the contradictoriness of our culture, Wexler is too determinedly Marxist to interpret history from varying perspectives. His is the old Procrustean bed of Marxism into which everything can be fitted given enough interpretive imagination.

Wexler's theory, then, ends up being just another dixie cup theory - one to which we assent as being sometimes true and one from which we demur as being the whole or essential truth of our times. Human nature and American culture are both too complex to be summarized in a simple theory. It is naive for any social scientist to think otherwise,

and it is overweening for one to think that he has espied that which has eluded everyone else.

Assumption Two

The second assumption - that theory can inspire resistance to the ideological containment of American culture - is, of course, a prediction. Here again, however, experience to date does not provide much warrant for the assumption. Where theory has been associated with revolution (the most dramatic form of resistance,) it is impossible to know how much of the revolution was due to the theory and how much was caused by objective pressures which finally burst the bonds of convention. The fact that Marxism has become the state faith in several countries says no more about the potency or compellingness of that theory than does the fact that capitalism and fascism have been the state faiths in other countries; these facts do not elevate those theories to the level of irresistibility. Theory serves more of a *post hoc* explanatory function than a causative role.

History abhors ideological vacuums, and when one faith is falling into disfavor whatever faith is waiting in the wings stands a pretty good chance of being ushered to center stage. If two or more fledgling faiths are positioned to contend for center stage, the victor will be the one whose adherents have been more politically skillful, not necessarily the one which more accurately depicts objective circumstances or plumbs better the human heart. Socialist theory has never become a state faith in the United States, but the reasons for this failure (Laslett & Lipset, 1974) are not related to any descriptive or ethical inadequacy of socialist theory. Conversely, had socialism come to prevail over capitalism, the reasons would have been equally unrelated to the scientific or moral appeal of socialism.

For a theory to have the transformative power that Wexler thinks is possible, two conditions would appear to be necessary. First, the theory would have to be couched in simple and startling terms. Abstruse theories are not comprehensible to most people, and the few people who do have the ability and make the effort to understand them

are not likely to be the politically engaged type. They are more likely to be coddled and comfortable university professors for whom revolt can be provoked only by the imminent abolition of honoraria, royalties, or sabbaticals. The Michael Harringtons and Stanley Aronowitzes are truly exceptional.

The second condition is that there be few or no competing theories. If the choice is between Adam Smith and Karl Marx, the contrast can be drawn starkly and the choosers will not be confused by complexity and nuance. However, if the choice is between Smith, Marx, Keynes, Parsons, Sowell, and Thurow, the choice becomes geometrically more difficult, and most of the few who are conversant with this theoretical cacophony are still in a state of suspended judgment when they enter the state of suspended animation. They can get away with this permanent procrastination because the practical choices they are forced to make, say between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, can be made on the basis of narrow, short-term considerations. (It is worth noting that the Carter-Reagan election was an unusually clear ideological contest, not the kind that the American two-party system typically offers as seen in the recent contest between Waffling Wally and Reined-In Ronnie.)

There is no social science theory today that is so simple and startling that it commands the active assent of large numbers of people. Instead, there is a welter of theories, the detritus of academe and the careers being made therein. To be near this Tower of Babble helps one acquire an appreciation for scholarly ingenuity, but the dissonance can be intellectually immobilizing, and perhaps this paralysis is the inevitable end-state for intellectuals. At any rate, lacking a clearly superior alternative to the *status quo*, it makes more sense to acquiesce in the general system and work toward obviously warranted adjustments than to repudiate it all because it falls short of utopia. Since I never would have uttered such resignation at age thirty, one can infer that the intervening seventeen years have engendered in me wisdom or wariness or both.

Assumption Three

This is Wexler's assumption that he has provided at least the outline of a theory that will yield significant resistance to the present economic and political arrangements of America. This would be a monumental task for anyone, and Wexler reveals too many disqualifications to be the one to pull it off. To begin with, he insults potential allies into defensive postures by imputing to them a purblindness from which he implicitly and arrogantly exempts himself. He claims to see things so much more clearly than others, even though he seems to see the current American economic drama almost entirely through the eyes of Castells (1980), to whose eyewitness report Wexler gives great credence. (pp. 34, 78, 102, 144, 159) Castells sees crisis and Wexler is willing to take his word for it, probably because there's no point in writing an exhortation to resistance if things are going well. Wexler reminds one of the radicals who welcomed the elections of Nixon and Reagan because these portended such calamity for America that the millenium could not be far behind. Wexler argues that we are in a crisis situation and that this situation will condition people to heed his alarms. Granting that Wexler wrote his book before the economic upturn, he still inflated a crisis that was, in reality, too minor to be a launching pad for revolution. Ten percent unemployment means ninety percent employed at higher real wages because of the lower costs which follow upon increased unemployment. The Federal budget deficit is so huge that it defies comprehension, and the collapse to which it is supposed to be leading is still a projection. People don't rebel against projections, nor do ninety percent get agitated into action over the penuriousness of ten percent whose plight can be attributed so facilely to temporary economic dislocation or to character defects.

I think of myself as a socialist who is in basic agreement with Wexler. However, I have assigned as required reading in courses I teach, books by the Friedmans (1980), Gilder (1981), Hayek (1944), Kristol (1978), Nozick (1974), and Simon (1978). This was done to balance such required books as those by Bowles and Gintis (1976), deLeone

1979), Harrington (1970), Jencks (1972). Lowi (1969), Ryan (1981), Silverman and Yanowitch (1974), and Thurow (1980). The purpose for the balancing was not to create the confusing babble mentioned earlier but to challenge what would otherwise be cheap prejudices. Hayek especially would seem to give pause to socialists who, enamored of their rhetorical nostrums, have avoided asking themselves hard questions. It is not at all evident that Wexler has tempered his position through consideration of such contrary ideas, but perhaps I just begrudge him his certitude.

In his chapters on interaction, the self, and intimacy, Wexler suggests that the real crisis is one of the spirit. There is certainly plenty of evidence of spiritual dissatisfaction in America. Indeed, satisfaction of the spirit is one of our great growth industries. However, it is like the resort industry - one which caters to people who are already pretty well off but would like to be continuously euphoric. Identity crises, ennui, languor, malaise are illnesses of the affluent. They may even help to persuade us that because we are not all that happy, we are not oppressing the poor all that much.

Wexler, like R. D. Laing (1968) before him, finds one form of spiritual sickness to be salubrious, and that form is schizophrenia. The schizophrenic is "the bourgeois self in dissolution" (p. 120), really just a chap who looks unflinchingly at the schizophrenic structure of capitalist society. The so-called sane folks are those who have numbed their awareness to this reality. (p. 124) Or is it that there are some few sturdy souls who can stare into the abyss, recognize it for what it is, and still not go mad? If so, we then have a hagiologic hierarchy: sturdy souls and schizophrenics, beneath whom are all us numbies.

People are full of contradictions and cultures are full of cross currents, and for Wexler to elevate those who crumble before these inexorabilities to the status of seer is perverse. For him to suggest further that schizophrenics constitute the vanguard of the revolution is nonsense.

To bring this essay to conclusion, I will illustrate one more aspect of Wexler's book that will keep it from having the effect he anticipates. The book is full of obfuscation. Wexler seems to be intent on never using a two-syllable word where a four-syllable word will do, and never using one

adjective or adverb where a bunch of them can be strung together. For example, arrest becomes "arrestation" (p. 70) and problem becomes "problematic" (p. 74) and segments of the population become "social segments of the population" (p. 125.)

At points Wexler's style is mind-bogglingly redundant. He refers to "the centrality of exploitation as the central category" (p. 163) and to "the perceptual acceptance of the commodity appearance" (p. 122.) He is also capable of rapid fire self-contradiction. On a single page (121) he can complain that under capitalism product is confused with process and then go on to lament the fact that product is separate from process. On page 135 he characterizes the new class as being field independent, but on the next page he says they are field dependent.

Thus there is a problem with both the substance and style of the book; however, it may be the latter that causes the former to appear weaker than, in fact, it is.

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bilities for Economic Change. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Debra Swoboda
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Numerous critics have pointed out that the social sciences
provide technocratic knowledge for societal-management.
Other radical critiques argue that social theory is ideological
in nature, that it describes a passive individual overwhelmed
by social forces. Philip Wexler's recent book, *Critical Social*
Psychology, demonstrates that social psychology reproduces
both knowledge and the occlusion of knowledge. Social
psychology is not just a reflection of rules of common
sense or a model of abstracted social self. *Critical Social*
Psychology reveals social psychology as more than ideology
because it points to contradictory patterns in social relations.
Wexler describes psychology's liberal characterization of
social alienation and its attempted masking of exploitation.
He goes on, however, to also turn social psychology on its
head. He proposes a new model, a critical social psychology
that unmasks the reification of social domination and in
turn promotes social change. Last but not least, *Critical*
Social Psychology uses an understanding of modern social
contradictions to illustrate the larger cultural legitimation
crisis in modern capitalism.

Perhaps the most important argument in the book for
social theorists is Wexler's analysis of reification in social
psychology. Traditional social psychology functions to
deny cultural contradictions and falsify historical change.
Reading the content of social psychological studies critically,
however, also allows understanding of social-structural
limit-situations. Social psychology both ideologically paints
contradictions in social relations and contains the possibility
for an alternative discourse of ideology critique:

Laing, R. D. **The Politics of Experience.** New York: Ballantine, 1968.

Laslett, John & Lipset, Seymour Martin (eds.). **Failure of a Dream? Essays in the History of American Socialism.** New York:Anchor Books, 1974.

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

Debra Swoboda
State University of New York at Stony Brook

Numerous critics have pointed out that the social sciences provide technocratic knowledge for societal-management. Other radical critiques argue that social theory is ideological in nature, that it describes a passive individual overwhelmed by social forces. Philip Wexler's recent book, *Critical Social Psychology*, demonstrates that social psychology reproduces both knowledge and the occlusion of knowledge. Social psychology is not just a reflection of rules of common sense or a model of abstracted social self. *Critical Social Psychology* reveals social psychology as more than ideology because it points to contradictory patterns in social relations. Wexler describes psychology's liberal characterization of social alienation and its attempted masking of exploitation. He goes on, however, to also turn social psychology on its head. He proposes a new model, a critical social psychology that unmasks the reification of social domination and in turn promotes social change. Last but not least, *Critical Social Psychology* uses an understanding of modern social contradictions to illustrate the larger cultural legitimation crisis in modern capitalism.

Perhaps the most important argument in the book for social theorists is Wexler's analysis of reification in social psychology. Traditional social psychology functions to deny cultural contradictions and falsify historical change. Reading the content of social psychological studies critically, however, also allows understanding of social-structural limit-situations. Social psychology both ideologically paints contradictions in social relations and contains the possibility for an alternative discourse of ideology critique:

...social psychology can be described as a series of methods for the occlusion of knowledge of the social formation and of the relation of the individual to that formation. ...it selectively reinforces popular methods of social ignorance production--a production which, when it fails, exposes the individual to the experience of autobiographically encoded social structural contradictions. (p. 47)

Wexler argues that traditional social psychological theory is a reformulation of relations of cultural domination. A critical social psychology, though, can be developed to explore the production and often contradictory reproduction of social relations of intimacy and self-definition. In this way, *Critical Social Psychology* supplies tools for reading interpersonal management theories as reflections of increasingly exposed commodified social relations under capitalism. Critiques of social psychological studies of intimacy also reveal how social needs are constrained and redirected by the marketplace.

Traditional social psychology minimizes power differences, misinterprets cultural experience, and covers up class distinctions. Thus, an important task for any social theorist is to generate dynamic categories for ideology critique. In underscoring the power of capital to reach increasingly into our lives, Wexler expands the Marxist categories of class consciousness and commodification in an analysis of reified social experience. He does this, however, only after showing the limitations of reductionistic Marxism. Similarly, he reproves the Frankfurt School of social psychology for failing to concretize the mediations in individual-structural relations. Wexler argues that the relations of production are mirrored in psychic structure by developing an analysis of self-commodification. *Critical Social Psychology* thus proposes a more thorough analysis of the categories of production, lived experience and class. The book outlines these three dimensions of a critical social psychology as tools to better understand psychological reification and to more accurately understand contradictions in modern social relations.

Wexler's analysis of self-commodification is especially insightful in terms of understanding intimacy. He points out that increasing commodification produces a new self--one seeking differentiation but ever more deregulated from meaning--certainty. Social psychology describes a self that is more field-dependent, impulsive and sensory hungry in its search for social grounding. At the same time, it characterizes how social intimacy becomes more difficult to realize. Wexler analyzes numerous studies on intimacy to demonstrate the reproduction of possessive individualism and "end of social interaction." A critical social psychology, he argues, must do more, however, than deconstruct such new patterns of social interaction. It must point to the knowledge of social formations occluded and develop avenues for social change.

Traditional social psychology supplies methods for developing techniques for increasing self-commodification. Many psychological studies can be read as blueprints for making oneself more marketable (i.e. likeable, attractive, conforming.) Social psychology is a field at the heart of the problem of commodification because, as Wexler argues, knowledge of social formations is hidden in the process. Yet, Wexler does not elaborate the concrete techniques that social psychology has contributed to mass culture. More research is needed on the consequences of commodified social relations, especially in the interface of psychological theory and mass market pop psychology. What are some of the ways that this technical dimension of social psychology has been appropriated by small groups with religious or therapeutic purposes? How is social psychology used in the classroom or business seminar to develop personality characteristics of the corporate individual? If social change is to be formulated, social psychology's techniques for cultural defense must be critiqued in real life experience. Wexler's new paradigm must be taken as a starting point for such work.

The increasing self-commodification that *Critical Social Psychology* points to, whether or not concretely elaborated, reveals a larger cultural legitimation crisis in capitalism. The contradictions in social relations that Wexler examines ex-

pose the breakup of liberal culture and the increasing intrusion of the marketplace into social life. Social psychology mirrors how one increasingly perceives oneself as an object of exchange value. Interaction is described as a relationship of equity, intimacy as a relationship of commodification. Such a shift in social organization, whose contradictions and common sense messages are reflected in social psychology, signals more than increasing domination. Wexler argues that a critical reading of social psychology also reveals the potential for larger political discontent. It is the job of critical social psychology to target these structural tendencies and develop avenues for social mobilization.

The legitimation crisis in the very nature of self-definition has implications for educators as well as social theorists. The book is an important work for developing critical education methods because it lays the groundwork for pinpointing cultural and economic contradictions in knowledge production. For example, Wexler reproves social psychology for not accounting for the active subject as the object of social study. Understanding the student as an active participant is necessary for developing emancipatory models of education. As another example, Wexler shows that the psychology of the individual (and hence his/her education) is culturally and politically bound to class relations of production. Perhaps this explains why one's self-worth is more and more linked to one's educational marketability in the world. In the last few years, corporations have sought inroads to educational curriculum through the development of technical computer skill training and business management programs. Only through dynamic critique of such learning-commodification can educators pedagogically interpret and circumvent the constriction of social consciousness in their students. *Critical Social Psychology* presents some of the tools needed for such a critique.

Wexler argues that social psychology must move from cultural domination to exposition of social intimacy, from cultural containment to political mobilization. The development of a critical social psychology is in and of itself a political struggle because it unravels the parameters of social constrictions and deconstructs the liberal ideology of neutrality. Moreover, a critical social psychology requires theory which can discern and facilitate social change movements. *Critical Social Psychology* argues that we must circumvent the liberal rhetoric of psychology through astute social vision and a commitment to social change. If Wexler is correct, the facilitation of praxis in a critical social psychology is essential to this process.

POLITICAL NOTES & NOTICES

Michael S. Littleford and Jim Whitt, Editors
Auburn University

The addition of an explicitly political section to *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* is, among other things, an attempt to revive on a larger and more elaborate scale, the spirit of social justice and democracy which characterized that small group of educators who created and maintained *The Social Frontier/Frontiers of Democracy Journal* from 1934-43. The various Editors and members of the Board of Contributing Editors of this journal were overtly political in their call for the professionalization of America's educators toward the end of acquiring the power to influence positive developments toward social, economic, and political democracy. Like their contemporaries, the physical scientists of the early decades of the twentieth century who experienced the collapse of the certainties of Newtonian mechanics and its alleged "impartial observer," the Frontiersmen knew that value neutrality was impossible in human inquiry and other affairs. The brute fact of this impossibility requires a fundamental choice by each educator: 1. Either one must give up the aspiration of professionalism and stand honestly as a public servant with a mediocre salary serving loyally both democrats and fascists alike—depending, of course, upon which way the political winds are blowing or: 2. One must be political in the sense that Harold Rugg, George Counts, Charles Beard, Ruth Benedict, Jesse Newlon, Lewis Mumford, Roger Baldwin, and many others were who became associated with *The Social Frontier/Frontiers of Democracy* group in the critical period of the Great Depression. In the words of the first editor, George S. Counts, *The Social Frontier:*

regards education as an aspect of culture in process of evolution. It therefore has no desire to promote a restricted and technical professionalism. Rather does it address itself to the task of considering the broad role of education in advancing the welfare and interests of the great masses of people who do the work of society—those who labor on farms and ships and in the mines, shops, and factories of the world...To enable the school to participate in raising the level of American life *the educational profession must win meaningful academic freedom, not merely the freedom for individuals to teach this or that, but the freedom of the teaching profession to utilize education in shaping the society of tomorrow.* (italics mine, *The Social Frontier,* Vol. I, No. I, October, 1934, pps. 4-5.)

In order to achieve such power and solidarity today, cooperative and creative acts—from lobbying through professional and other associations to guerilla theater in the streets, from mass protests and subversions of death-oriented power structures to small group and individual expressions of protest in every day life—must be constantly engaged in.

Our situation is, of course, more serious in most ways than was that which faced the Frontiersmen. They accurately perceived all of the threatening trends, but at that time chemical warefare was in its infancy, problems of ecology and overpopulation less imediately threatening, and a great many persons seemed to be working hard to solve the problems of gender and minority group discrimination. Today with overkill, a world population of around four billion and growing, and with such events as bombings of abortion clinics at the same time already born people starve daily, we are literally "up against our last wall."

In an effort to create the climate for dialogue concerning political actions and issues we, the editors, offer the following paper for consideration. This paper is presented as a call for direct action within the ranks of the education profession toward the rekindling of the spirit of social and cultural

transformation.   The paper provides a centering point, "Radical-Organic America," around which educators can focus their actions and ideas concerning this vital task.

The paper assumes that as teachers and educational theorists educated in traditional settings, many of us are sadly lacking in the skills necessary to inspire each other and our students to new vistas and visions of democratic community.   It points to the need for a therapeutic element which will activate the will to freedom within the educational ranks which is so fundamentally necessary for the creation and maintenance of a democratic social order.   The call is for engagement in direct political action as a major aspect of this therapeutic element.   The therapeutic activity is necessary and involves the need for action over and above the need for individual self enlightenment which characterized much of the efforts of educators during the 1970's.   In these times, the propensity to direct political action should be the outcome of any fruitful self search.

In future issues we will feature not only editorials and academic/political issues, but also profiles of imaginative social/political actors past and present, specific news and suggestions for direct actions concerning relevant and critical political/educational issues (e.g., the recent erosions of reproductive freedoms and other civil liberties), historical events which illuminate our current situation, brief pieces by well known political figures who exemplify some of the characteristics of Radical-Organic America (e.g., Helen Caldicott, Jesse Jackson, George McMillan, Petra Kelly), and suggestions for imaginative strategies and techniques of social actions.   Suggestions and reactions from our readers are welcome.

Michael Littleford
Jim Whitt
Auburn University
Auburn, Alabama 36849

THESE DAYS

I ask myself these days about those who have lost their vision,

How do they pass the time of day?

I cannot imagine! I cannot imagine!

When I try dark nausea fills my Soul.

It is not mine! Is it theirs?

I ask myself these days about those who have sold out on their commitment to Freedom, Love, and Peace,

How are they motivated to do anything?

Why do they bother to rise in the morning?

I cannot imagine! I cannot imagine!

When I try a great fatigue attacks my Spirit,

It is not mine! Is it theirs?

by Michael Littleford,
September 7, 1984

Michael Littleford
Auburn University

Last year I wrote a paper, "Curriculum Theory and the Three Americas," in which I presented a tentative, heuristic model of "fascist," "liberal-optimistic," and "radical-organic" Americas. The nature of the first America is made obvious by its name, which calls up images of Dr. Shockley, Jesse Helms, Joseph McCarthy, the Klan, the Salem witch trials, and the Daughters of the American Revolution. The nature of the second America is optimistic and rationalistic with an emphasis on a naturalistic theory of democracy and already existing democratic forms. In spite of the ever-present fascist side of our psyches and our body politic, liberal-optimistic America tacitly assumes civil rights and responsibilities to be guaranteed by the natural order.[1] Along with this factually incorrect theory, a second false assumption is that adequate democratic social forms and characters have been created and are securely in operation.

From the perspective of radical-organic America, such assumptions are dangerous both because they are factually incorrect and because they ignore the *temporary* nature of all social forms. As A. N. Whitehead, one of the prophets of radical-organic America, once said, "...you cannot permanently enclose the same life in the same mould."[2] This same idea has been expressed in many ways by wise artists and thinkers. For example, the contemporary Canadian poet, Leonard Cohen says in one of his poem-songs,"Let's sing another song, boys, this one has grown old and bitter."[3]

Nature guarantees nothing except opportunities *and* obstacles. Even if it were true that our relations and institutional patterns were predominantly democratic, this would not spare us the agony of realizing that all new human creations are temporary. Sooner or later they become limiting and ineffective.[4] The decline and death of our present

patterns and relations is inevitable not just once, but many times.   Hence, from the perspective of radical-organic America, the image, not the concept, is the key to epistemology and the foundation of all human symbolic processes. Poetic, rather than rational, processes are the fundamental or primary basis of human minding.   Rational concepts arise out of this poetic matrix. Imagination, as an independent forming power of the human psyche, is the key to epistemology.[5]

Traditional theories of knowing which make the concept primary suggest a solidity both to the human and natural world which is illusory according to 20th century natural science.   Conceptual epistemologies fit with a Newtonian mentality, but the security of this solidity must be sacrificed by those who would travel with Heisenberg, Schrodinger, and other post-mechanical natural scientists.[6]

As a way of beginning to develop some of the practical implications of the above model, it is well to note that the origins of radical-organic America extend far back into history to the earliest roots of pre-Platonic Western Civilization in India. The philosophy of the possibility of a radically creative human nature was expressed poetically in the Rg Vedic hymns.[7]   For the Rg Vedic seers every theoretical construct of humans can and should be falsified through human trancendence. The seers were aware of our role in structuring our experiences and of the cultural implications of this necessity. From their view all were welcome to participate in the creation of structures except the counterparts of our fascist America. All who held that their structures, their voices, their perspectives, their songs, were superior over others and/or permanent were ostracized from society and referred to by one word: *Inhuman*. Such dogmatic, stagnant, and necrophillic persons were considered to have commited the one unpardonable sin: an attempt to reduce the multiplicity of voices to one loud, dogmatic one. The "inhumans" refused the regular and essential sacrifice (i.e., the sacrifice of particular structures and perspectives so that new ones could emerge and persons could live in a balance of continuity and innovation.)

It is well to examine the wisdom of these seers as we

consider the propensity of the liberal-optimistic parts of our own psyches and social structures to have a false and dangerous tolerance for tyrants and bullies--for those who refuse to commit the act of sacrifice and who thus stifle and cover up emergent possibilities, truth, and growth. One of our "liberal-optimistic" habits which reveals our misplaced tolerance is that we say in too many situations, "Oh well, he/she meant well;" or "she/he was only doing what she/he thought was right." One fiesty old schoolmaster in a recent drama on public television gave a radical-organic response to a similar comment when he said, "That could be said of a lot of men who have more power than sense."[8]   We need to reconstruct these habits/world views which lead us to excuse tyrannical acts and structures.

From the perspective of radical-organic America, we have little reason, but much propensity, to cling to all of our current stale forms. We have pressing reasons to break through our paralysis and to act directly to challenge these and to create more adequate ones in their stead. After all, current forms have brought us to a point where all of us are lucky we were not nuked yesterday or last week, three years ago, or ten years ago. This is to mention only one of the most extreme and dangerous possible consequences of our current patterns and structures.

The duty to act directly is clearly upon us. One of its major facets, as suggested by the Rg Vedic material, involves examining the current bases of authority within the institutions of which we are a part. We are also obliged to challenge that authority anytime we find it arbitrary, coercive, dishonest, or illegitimate for any reason. We cannot ignore the question of coercive force and power. As Bruce Raup et al. explain in their *The Improvment of Practical Intelligence: The Central Task of Education:*

> ...What we are to do about those with whom we can find no adequate community of purpose upon which to build a cooperative policy or program is a confronting problem today, and, perhaps, in some degree, will always be. Our answer must be that we shall employ such force as we possess-economic, political,

intellectual, and physical-to prevent coercion to deeply unacceptable ends, at the same time we ceaselessly strive to induce voluntary common action. We may hope that as coercive and rigid purposes fail of realization, they will eventually give way to other purposes that may be realized. It is toward success at this point that we propose the importance of striving toward the formation of common goals....[9]

Moreover, we are obliged not only to challenge authority, but to do so with an imaginative flair which communicates to the deeper structures of people's psyches--as did Jesse Jackson when he traveled to Syria, Libya, Cuba, and Helen Caldicott as she created the idea of political action based on the notion of "Babies Against the Pentagon." The latter will involve flooding the congressional chambers with many tiny tots. This attitude of equality of responsibility for imaginative creations must be sharply distinguished from the attitude of those pretenders who make a great show of admiring Jackson, Caldicott, and others like them. This covering worshipful attitude is a drain on them. In reality, you literally "suck" their energies when you do his. You can only confirm such courageous persons by joining them in the risks, challenges, dangers, and joys of challenging and castrating degenerate authority.

If we are not willing to take direct action *now*, we might as well quit our theoretical work. Academic work divorced from political acts has become, in the words of Macbeth, "A tale told by an idiot full of sound and fury, signifying nothing"; or as Bob Dylan has expressed in his song, "Tombstone Blues," "your useless and pointless knowledge."[10]

Indeed, I would go farther than Macbeth or Bob Dylan by asserting that our theoretical knowledge in isolation is positively harmful and a major source of our paralysis today. Not, of course, because it is bad in itself, *but because it has not been connected nor is it now connected with any serious effort to develop democratic characters or communities.* I will say more about this central theme later, but first I will give a small demonstration of the inadequacy of our

most basic aspect of democratic society–The Bill of Rights. The following is a summary of how the potential for democratic association and other aspects of our lives have been declining while we have all been working diligently at our university jobs. The following civil liberties losses happened because we as persons and groups have lacked the democratic character/community context which would have made it *imperative* to act in a whole-hearted way to stop the fascist trends which so often get started in critical times.

The first amendment (self expression) rights of lower income groups has been drastically curtailed. For example, the Supreme Court upheld a ban on placing election posters on utility poles. That could have affected my spouse and I last March as we busily nailed Gary Hart posters to utility poles in the frantic days before Super-Tuesday in Alabama. People had Jackson, Mondale, and Glenn posters on utility poles also. It did, in fact, affect our whole community during the fall campaign. Our city officials decided political posters on utility poles were "unsightly." One wonders what beauty they perceive in a utility pole. The High Court also reversed a lower court decision permitting homeless persons to conduct "sleep-ins" in Lafayette Park to demonstrate their plight. Potentially every person in the U. S. has had her/his freedom of movement restricted by decisions concerning travel to Cuba and potentially other countries as well. Not only that, but our daughters can look forward to the fact that colleges and universities can chop themselves into bits in order to legitmately perpetrate sex discrimination. Our children (as juveniles) can be held in detention prior to a hearing on extremely flimsy evidence and data. Police can legitimately search our houses with an illegal search warrant provided that a magistrate (rather than a law officer) *with good intentions* issued the faulty warrant. Police are also allowed to spy on you legally while trespassing on your land. The FBI can keep track of you better than ever if you are merely considered "suspicious." Anyone who is naive enough to think this agency only spies on "crooks" had better think again. They investigated Albert Einstein for twenty-three years![11] The Miranda decision has been undermined, as has the Fifth Amendment (in the selective

service case); private diaries can be summoned for court evidence; and public defenders are subject to only the loosest and lowest standards. Also, we not only are executing many persons in various states more easily, but also judges are allowed to impose the death penalty even after a jury recommends a life sentence. Our rights to privacy and protection against arbitrary police authority have been drastically curtailed.

Sadly, this is not all. Somehow nativity scenes have become "secular" and therefore not a violation of the separation of church and state even when paid for out of tax funds. Voting rights have become unimportant, and disability claims are subject to long waits regardless of the financial desperation of the clients. Finally, federal courts have been made less accessible to citizens.[12] This is to mention only some of the inroads made in the past 12 to 14 months. In the future if authority is not challenged and direct action taken quickly, we can look forward to a Supreme Court picked because of its ideological belief in the persecution of women (some version of "keep 'em barefoot and pregnant" or virginal).

Some people, it seems, need to be hit in the head with a sledge hammer to perceive that we are in a slow (or maybe not too slow) drift now toward a thoroughly fascist society. Our current state of fragmentation, cynicism, confusion, and paralysis invites the cancerous growth and produces a situation in which few seem to grasp the implications of the drift and other sinister developments which threaten to maim and destroy any semblance of democratic association.

Our theoretical work, our spiritual commitment to education, and the loving care we try to lavish on our students has not helped much, if at all. Hence, direct action has got to mean more than going to your class, the faculty meeting, or even the Curriculum Theory Conference and discussing the problems. At the very least, it requires the willingness to commit civil and/or social disobedience in the face of arbitrary, coercive, and degenerate authority wherever such authority is encountered–at school, at home, at work, in politics, in clubs and whether the persons challenged be spouses, principals, deans, school board members, senators,

college or company presidents. A path of direct actions requires us to join and support organizations which share the attitude of "Challenge Authority," e.g., the American Civil Liberties Union, Resist, the Freeze Movement, the Women's Party for Peace, the Rainbow Coalition, militant environment groups...

Our deficient democratic characters blind us from the truth that no body ever got very far by sitting around politely trying to convince tyrants and others with rigid authoritarian personalities that the democratic ends we want to realize are "really in their interests." That may be true in the long run, but at that moment it is factually incorrect. I would go so far to say that it is our liberal-optimistic fantasy. Since many of us lack the essential elements of a strong democratic character, *which implies imperatives toward action,* we develop a false tolerance for tyrants/fascists as we become increasingly cynical in the face of their antics.[13] The attempt to achieve ends by cynically appeasing and cajoling tyrants leads straight to the inhuman path of whacking and dumping on subordinates out of the frustration which results in attempting to deal rationally with those who exercise irrational power over you.

By contrast, the path of direct action and the duty to challenge authoritarian structures means that you are obliged to interact democratically with students and peers rather than dumping misplaced hostilities on them. You are, of course, obliged to do the same with authority figures. If they respond with authoritarian games, let them have it with "both barrels." If you are reasonably successful in challenging that authority, go at them again. In other words, there are some instances, such as when dealing with tyrants, when you should definitely kick your enemey when he/she is down.

People who are predominately authoritarian in the strictures of their psyches and social relationships know only two modes–attack and retreat. I learned this lesson the hard way in connection with various Deans, Generals, Senators, pulp wood company owners, and other tyrants I have dealt with in recent years.[14]

The challenging of arbitrary and entrenched authority,

besides performing necessary social acts, can also be therapeutic to the individual performing them especially if he/she has, like many of us, previously allowed him/herself to be coerced into tolerating/participating in deeply unacceptable social and professional practices and ends. Certainly, conceiving and working toward a realistic social vision is a first step in achieving the dynamic integration of personality so lacking by many educators today, and it can also be a first step for educators in being able to structure such an experience for their students. Confirming degenerate authority stands in the way of this integration and makes us ill, however secure we may be in our fringe benefits and retirement plans. These actions are in the end as suicidal as feeding the growth of a cancer which will soon devour us. The salvation lies at least in part in defiant acts. Walt Whitman expressed it well: "How beggarly appear arguments before a defiant deed."[15]

These direct and courageous acts and challenges are perhaps the major means we adults have of developing the thoroughly democratic character that our education did not provide. We need to re-orient our work to focus squarely in this direction. When we shift focus we realize that we should be ashamed. We are *far behind* some of our intellectual and spiritual predecessors. This is especially true of the marvelous intellectual and spiritual work which grew out of the group of persons who created and sustained the *Social Frontier/Frontiers of Democracy (1934-43).* Compared with many of these thinkers our political analysis is insipid, our social vision anemic, and our courage sadly lacking. Many of us have yet to learn what George Counts, Kenneth Benne, Harold Rugg, Bruce Raup, John Dewey, and many lesser known persons knew and attempted to practice decades ago. If you think educational theorists today surpass these people--if you think their ideas have been integrated into our education and society-then you need to think again. You are dead wrong. Raup et al.'s *The Improvement of Practical Intellgience* is extremely threatening to many of my colleagues in education, as is Benne's *Education for Tragedy* and Count's *Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order.*[16] These people were intensely con-

cerned with the development of democratic character and community. They did not let any difficulty or risk cover over that interest. They knew then as we know now, that formal education, for the most part, is deficient in developing democratic characters/communities. They also knew they were victims of this inadequacy, and that they had some catching up to do before they could begin to really stop the cycle of underdevelopment. They set out to work on ascending scales of excellence toward the ideal democratic characters/communities. This means they were thoroughly committed in every situation to work toward an uncoerced community of consensus and persuasion. It also means that, while they and others committed to democratic methods do not expect complete perfection, they cannot rest easy when democratic principles are being violated anywhere and cannot tolerate coercion or manipulation toward deeply unacceptable ends (even by a majority vote.) Nor can they tolerate false "agreements" based on the need to hurry up, put on a front, etc. These undemocratic paths are all involved in the sorry situation described by Raup et al. at the beginning the *The Improvement of Practical Intelligence* which refers to the failure of our conversations to affect reconstruction and integration of diverse individual and group social orientations:

> In concrete situations of conflict, we do not realize that our differences actually reach back to differences in our very characters and outlooks, and not merely to the problem at hand. We talk on the surface about the immediate problem, but we do not really affect each other. We do not touch or modify each others' fundamental disposition, social orientations, modes of thought." (Raup et al.) [17]

The above suggests that we lack the most elementary democratic skills and face the task of developing them now as adults.* We will be ill equipped to achieve anything of value

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*Some of us in the "countercultural" generation did practice

as long as we are always complying or defying, scheming and compromising, submitting and dominating instead of reconstructing social characters/communities and releasing whole-hearted community based actions. Fact-gathering obsessions have paralyzed us for essentially normative tasks--*many of which are those involved in the process of education.*

No fact-gathering can deal with the fact of conflicting perspectives, and that is one important reason we continue to suffer from depression, unemployment, alienating work, hypertension, etc. in spite of the facts that we lack neither the know-how or material wealth to rid ourselves of these problems. Democratic personalities/communities find it imperative to act on these problems, but the difficulty is that there are too few of us. [18]

Our paralysis is easy to rationalize except that it assumes we are immortal when in fact our lives are passing by rapidly. They are done too soon at least. We are here now; this is our only life to take auspicious action toward democratic character and community. Regardless of the risks, we can only behave *democratically in our own historical situation.* Since both character and community require reconstruction, we need a synthesis of a therapeutic orientation based on social/political demands, and a social reconstructive orientation based on the awareness of the need for healthy personalities to build new structures. The building of a democratic personality involves activating the will to freedom. In our time this often (maybe almost always) means a theraputic aspect.

At present, the necessity of therapy seems to be at an all time high. As I write this in mid-September, 1984, all

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while participating in a teachers' strike under the threat of being fired, while taking over and holding a university administration building. I experienced the former. The latter is documented in Charles Hampden-Turner's *Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1971.) Have we forgotten? Or have most of us brave souls finally taken a non-academic path?

around me I discern pathological cravings for a "strong leader," and the illusory notion that Ronald Reagan is this leader. By contrast, Walter Mondale's comparative openness and commitment to democratic consensus appears through this pathology as "weak." This is a dangerous situation reminiscent of pre-Nazi Germany. Moreover, although self change is necessary, it is not enough. Contrary to the myth perpetrated by many who were no doubt weary of the activism of the 1960's, change the world much by changing our inner world. Even altering your external daily habits makes slight difference unless you also achieve solidarity with your comrades and actually do political work with them. Your and your friends' psyches may be better and that, of course, is all to the good, but the institutional structures you thought you overcame will still be alive and well, when you are dead and rotten. In short, many outstanding and evolved individuals do not in themselves add up to the human solidarity needed to resist the mad patterns of authority and practice in our institutions today. In conclusion I quote once more America's epic poet as the best expression of the need for human solidarity and action in times of great crises and opportunity. In the words of Walt Whitman:

Have the past struggles succeeded?
What has succeeded? yourself? your nation? Nature?
Now understand me well, it is provided in the essence of things that from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth something to make a greater struggle necessary.

My call is the call of battle, I nourish active rebellion,
He going with me must go well arm'd
He going with me goes often with spare diet, poverty, angry enemies, desertions.

Allons! The road is before us!
It is safe--I have tried it--my own feet have tried it well--be not detain'd!

Let the paper remain on the desk unwritten, and the book on the shelf unopen'd!
Let the tools remain in the workshop! Let the money remain unearn'd!
Let the school stand! Mind not the cry of the teacher!
Let preacher preach in his pulpit! Let the lawyer plead in the court, and the judge expound the law.

Comerado, I give you my hand!
I give you my love more precious than money,
I give you myself before preaching or law;
Will you give me yourself? Will you come travel with me?
Shall we stick by each other as long as we live? [19]

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FOOTNOTES

1. Bruce Raup, George Axtelle, Kenneth Benne. and B. Othanel Smith, **The Improvement of Practical Intelligence: The Central Task of Education** (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University), 1950, p. 128; Kenneth Benne. **Education for Tragedy: Essay in Disenchanged Hope for Modern Man** (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press), 1967, pp. 37-67; Michael S. Littleford, "Curriculum Theorizing and the Possibilities and Conditions for Social Action Toward Democratic Community and Education," **Journal of Curriculum Theorizing** (Summer, 1982), pp. 144-152.

2. Alfred N. Whitehead, **Science and the Modern World** (New York: The Free Press), 1953, p. 188.

3. Leonard Cohen, "Sing Another Song, Boys" on **Songs of Love and Hate**, Columbia Records.

4. To quote Isaiah Berlin:

The history of thought and culture is, as Hegel showed with great brilliance, a changing pattern of great liberating ideas which inevitably turn into suffocating straightjackets, and so stimulate their own destruction by new emancipating, and at the same time, enslaving conceptions. The first step to understanding of

that dominate and penetrate their thought and actions. Like all attempts to make men aware of the categoreis in which they think, it is a difficult and sometimes painful activity, likely to produce deeply disquieting results. The second task is to analyze the model itself, and this commits the analyst to accepting or modifying or rejecting it, and in the last case, to providing a more adequate one in its stead. (In "Does Political Theory Still Exist?" **Philosophy, Politics, and Society** (Second Series), Eds. Peter Laslett and W. B. Runciman (New York: Macmillan), 1956, p. 19.)

5. Eighteenth Century Italian philosopher, Giambattista Vico, first elaborated an epistemology based upon the image as primary and the concept as secondary. See Vico's magnus opus, **The New Science of Giambattista Vico**, trans. Thomas Bergin and Max H. Fisch (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), 1948. For a recent scholarly work elaborating these Vichian ideas see Donald Verene, **Vico's Science of the Imagination** (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981. No modern philosopher has developed the poetic basis of mind as thoroughly as Vico. However, many of them, such as Dewey and Whitehead, have done detailed analysis showing that concepts are secondary in the act of knowing which begins in the total response of the organism in the thick of concrete experience. In addition, some psychoanalytic thinkers (e.g., Carl Jung) and educationists (e.g., Harold Rugg) have picked up on this theme in their writings in the modern age. For an elaboration of relevant aspects of Jung's thought see James Hillman, **Re-visioning Psychology** (New York: Harper & Row., 1975.) To examine Harold Rugg's ideas on an imaginative or poetic basis for epistemology, see his **The Teacher of Teachers: Frontier of Theory and Practice in Teacher Education** (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers), 1952, and **Imagination** (New York: Harper & Row , 1963)

6. (1) Capra, **The Tao of Physics**; (2) Whitehead, **Science and the Modern World**; (3) Gary Zukov, **The Dancing Wuli Masters: An Overview of the New Physics** (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc. 1979), and (4) Werner Heisenberg, **Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science** (New York: Harper and Row Pub. , 1958.)

7. Antonio T. de Nicolas, **Meditations Through the Rg Veda: Four Dimensional Man** (Boulder: Shambala , 1978.)

8. The drama was a thirteen week series based upon Delderfield work, **To Serve Them all of Our Days**. The story takes place in the middle status English "public" school during the years between the two world wars.

9. Raup, et. al., Op. Cit. p. 231. In this quote the question of violence is raised in a very apt way. It opens the way for clarification. Often and at many levels when a tyrant has/is coercing an oppressed person(s) into submitting to "deeply unacceptable ends," s/he attempts to project "violence' on the victim if the latter does not submit. Actually the violence began with the coercion; it can only be stopped when the victim no longer permits the possessive/dominating act. Put more graphically, if you have your foot on my neck and I throw your foot off, that is *not* violence initiated by me, but by you. To project that violence on the victim is to commit an act of massive reification.

For an intelligent and sensitive discussion of the use and abuse of power/force, see Saul Alinsky's **Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals** (New York: Random House,) 1971. Alinsky clarified my thinking on an important idea. He said that the quote, which many of us think of as beginning with "Power corrupts...," actually reads, "Power *tends* to corrupt, absolute power corrupts absolutely." Following this line of thought, if a group of persons with democratic personality structures can by the power and force of their solidarity and numbers remove a tyrant, they should by all means do so, even if they have to drag him/her out and restrain him/her until s/he reconstructs his/her pathological authoritarian personality and social orientation.

10. Bob Dylan, "Tombstone Blues," on **Highway 61 Revisited, Columbia Records, 1965.**

11. The Atlanta Constitution, April 13, 1983.

12. The preceding is a summary of an article, "Reagan's Rule Secrecy and Surveillance Threaten Our Political Liberty," in **Civil Liberties,** Number 350, Summer, 1984, pp. 1-5.

13. I am reminded here of an amusing incident involving a close friend and colleague in my department. My friend is in statistical research and computers. During the academic year 1982-83 other department members in this area were having terminals installed in their offices. However, my friend, in spite of heavy responsibilities which required such equipment and his high level of competence, was denied his request to receive a terminal in his office. My friend approached the Associate Dean of Education for an explanation. The latter told him that he was denied a terminal *because he questioned the opinions and policies of his department chairperson!* I think the associate dean

forgot his civics lessons concerning our First Amendment rights. He offered my friend some "friendly" advice that my friend stop doing this if he wanted a terminal. My friend told him thanks for the advice, but that he could not take it. Then he confronted the Associate Dean with the question, "What are the objective criteria for obtaining the terminal?" The Associate Dean looked at him in mild shock and said, "We haven't talked about that." The implication of his remark must have dawned on the Associate Dean (or more likely on those responsible for the decision in the first place--the latter is guilty of cynicism but not tyranny.) Within a few days my friend had his terminal in his office. One can only hope that my friend's acts and their consequences helped cure the heavy cynicism unwittingly revealed by the Associate Dean.

14. For example, during the school year 1981-82 I was promoted to the rank of full professor. The dean of my school and my department head opposed the promotion. The Dean went twice in person to the Tenure and Promotion Committee. He and the head both wrote letters against me. Their unsuccessful efforts were rationalized by them as being because of "deficiency in public service" activities. Actually, the public service section of my promotion papers was not only quite full, but the term is only vaguely explained in the *Faculty Handbook*. In addition, it is not an extremely important aspect of receiving promotion to full professor at my university. Neither of them could or would explain their objections in writing, but when the head was pushed, he admitted that he meant, "public service to him." After receiving the promotion, I took every opportunity to embarrass the Dean in connection with the fact that he had opposed my promotion on grounds he could not articulate. After I managed to "bootleg" this into a letter to the Vice President for Academic Affairs, the Dean called me in for a "talk." He said he really did not know what public service is, and suggested perhaps I could tell him! He prefaced this with a pitiful statement saying he could not stand anymore conflict with me. After I nearly fainted at his gall, he switched strategies and indicated that it was because I had not served on any committees in the School of Education recently. I forgave him with this explanation. This was a terrible mistake. I should have kept after him. It was incredibly stupid and naive of me to accept his reason of "service on school committees" especially when he said it right after admitting he did not know what public service is! Tyranny is as much manipulation as coercion. In addition, he has a lot of authority over who gets on

those school committees. He has never asked me to be on one though I requested an appointment after this meeting. I accepted an "acceptable" pseudo reason instead of the real one--resentment toward me because I challenged and expressed opposition to some of his decisions, e.g., hiring an incompetent person and forcing him on a large minority (later a majority) in my department. The person in question is the most incompetent academician I have ever known. For example, he told classes such things as, "The Sophists are disciples of Plato; and Mississippi was the last state to adopt *compensatory* education in the second decade of the twentieth century. After I "forgave" him, he proceeded to work squarely against my welfare and interests by supporting a degenerate graduate proposal developed by some of the department members aimed at producing "scholars of statistical methodology" almost completely devoid of any theoretical work. This is to mention only one of its flaws, the proposal entirely ignored modern natural science and philosophy with respect to the insights of the latter into paradigms and the need to be conscious of these.

15. Walt Whitman, "Sign of the Broadaxe," in **Walt Whitman Complete Poetry and Selected Prose**, ed. James E. Miller (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), 1959.

16. Raup et al., **Op. Cit.**; George S. Counts, **Dare the Schools Build A New Social Order?** (New York: Arno Press), 1969.

17. Raup, et al., **Op. Cit.**, pp. 13-14.

18. The following article from August 3, 1983, *Columbus Ledger (GA)* contains encouraging examples of "democrats" in action. Father Roy received a prison term of eighteen months for his troubles. Father Larry and Linda received a term of fifteen months each. Roy got an extra three months for a trumped up false charge claiming he struck a Puerto Rican Sargent while sixty feet up in a pine tree holding a tape recorder around eleven p.m. All three were charged with trespassing on a military reservation and impersonating army officers. This was not strictly true of Linda since she is (was) a warrant officer in the reserves. The article entitled, "Priests, Woman Forced From Benning Tree," reads as follows:

> Two Catholic priests and a woman Army reservist Tuesday night were forced from perches in a towering tree at Fort Benning from where they had broadcast a 30-minute peace message to Salvadoran troops as military police watched from below.

When they were finally dragged to the ground, the Rev. Roy Bourgeois, the Rev. Larry Rosebaugh and Army Reserve Warrant Officer Linda Ventimiglia were arrested for the third time in 11 days for criminal trespassing at Benning, post spokesman John Gause said. The three protesters, arrested for trespassing and impersonating officers July 30 and again July 31, dressed in Army officer uniforms and made their way through the woods off U. S. 280 at 10:30 p.m. to the barracks where 525 Salvadoran troops are training, Bourgeois said.

Using three-climber shoes and a rope ladder, they climbed about 60 feet up a 100-foot-tall pine about 60 yards from the Salvadorans' barracks and used a high-powered portable stereo to broadcast the taped eight-minute final homily of the Rev. Oscar Romero, a Catholic archbishop killed in El Salvador in March 1980, Bourgeois said.

Minutes after the tape started, about 15 military police and guard dogs surrounded the tree, but because the protesters refused to climb down, Bourgeois said he was able to play the tape for about 30 minutes. On the tape Romero pleaded in Spanish with the Salvadoran soldiers to "lay down your arms and stop killing your brothers and sisters," Bourgeois said. At the end of the tape, Bourgeois said he hollered to the Salvadorans to stop training and to telephone "Padre Roy or Padre Larry" to seek asylum with Concerned Citizens for Latin America, a local human rights group.

One MP shouted he would shoot the protesters down from the tree if he had to, Bourgeois said.

The MPs finally climbed the tree at about 11 p.m. and forced the three down, Bourgeois said.

19.Whitman, "Song of the Open Road,"**Op. Cit.**

Deterrence...Destiny?

Deterrence...Doctrine
Deterrence...Delusion
Deterrence...Dangerous
Deterrence...Distortion
Deterrence...Domination
Deterrence...Disproportion
Deterrence...Detriment
Deterrence...Debasement
Deterrence...Disbelief
Deterrence...Despair
Deterrence...Decadence
Deterrence...Depravity
Deterrence...Despotism
Deterrence...Deplorable
Deterrence...Decline
Deterrence...Disharmony
Deterrence...Devastation
Deterrence...Disease
Deterrence...Defilement
Deterrence...Disintegration
Deterrence...Dispeople
Deterrence...Desolation
Deterrence...Dispassionate
Deterrence...Disposition
Deterrence...Deployment
Deterrence...Discord
Deterrence...Disfigurement
Deterrence...Dishonest
Deterrence...Disinheritance
Deterrence...Diabolicalness
Deterrence...Disposition
Deterrence...Detestable
Deterrence...Debauchery
Deterrence...Deficit
Deterrence...Demented
Deterrence...Deterioration
Deterrence...Deception
Deterrence...Demoniac
Deterrence...Darkness
Deterrence...Disaster
Deterrence...Doom

Peace...Promise!

Peace...Perpetuity
Peace...Pursuit
Peace...Possible
Peace...Paradigm
Peace...Path
Peace...Province
Peace...Pioneer
Peace...Pilgrim
Peace...Poise
Peace...Planet
Peace...People
Peace...Plea
Peace...Pragmatism
Peace...Perspective
Peace...Pardons
Peace...Pastoral
Peace...Peter
Peace...Passion
Peace...Precious
Peace...Parent
Peace...Persuasion
Peace...Prayer
Peace...Principle
Peace...Purpose
Peace...Pulse
Peace...Praxis
Peace...Parable
Peace...Patriot
Peace...Potential
Peace...Perennial
Peace...Prophecy
Peace...Precedence
Peace...Paul
Peace...Persuasion
Peace...Paramount
Peace...Purushottama
Peace...Procreation
Peace...Prelude
Peace...Protagonist
Peace...Parusia

Bruegel: Detail from *The Triumph of Death*

Letters

Tom Kelly, John Carroll University and
James Sears, University of South Carolina, editors

A Matter of Broad Shoulders

Dear Editors,

   In the course of the eulogistic responses to James Macdonald's death, I was particularly struck by Professor Apple's image of us, as reconceptualists, "standing on the shoulders" of those great individuals, such as Macdonald, who have gone before us. At one point Professor Apple even used the terminology "standing on the broad shoulders." This brought to mind the many fine men who have shaped the reconceptualist tradition--and, indeed, a large percentage have been men. My only regret on this occasion was that the feminine images did not flood our hearts and minds and pepper our vocabulary. Understandably, they do not at this point in our history and as Maxine Greene suggests, we as women almost always find ourselves functioning within the discourse of man. It seems to me so important that in the spirit of reconceiving our worlds we make an effort to broaden the boundaries of our conversation. This calls for women to labor to understand and describe their own realities or, as Virginia Woolf advises when speaking about women writers in *A Room of One's Own*, "...it is much more important to be oneself than anything else." While it may have been easier "to be oneself" during the time of which Ms. Woolf is writing--that is, the gender roles were clear--there were other monumental obstacles for women such as no privacy, no income, no formal education. Today, I would suggest that we, as women, face another type of difficulty and that is deciphering what, indeed, women's reality is in our culture. As one who was groomed by the patriarchy in a spasm of liberal generosity, my reality as a woman is not always clear to me. I often think it will take a Damascus road miracle for the scales to flake from my eyes so that I can see with undistorted vision what is truly feminine in myself. At this point, however, I do

by I am increasingly afflicted with quivering knees and my
facility for acrobatic feats "on the shoulders" is diminish-
ing.

Jansje D. Carey
Colgate-Rochester Divinity School

*   *   *   *   *   *   *

All Saints 1984

On Finding the Phoenix

Dear Jim Macdonald,

I first learned of your passing by way of a phone call from
Ira Weingarten in Santa Barbara.   We lamented as we re-
flected.   We spoke of your trials so nobly endured...the phy-
sical pain so prominent during those last months of your
earthian tenure.
the dialysis...continuous
the sorrow of subjecting self
to the pain of its purification
blood.
As a nurse, I knew all too well this pain from patients
remembered their wounds
dressed and redressed
assurances offered
condolences given.

Ira wanted me to be sure to tell Bill.
I did...he knew
we bowed our heads
as prayer for you,

As prayer Jim,
but also as incense of Thanksgiving...
that your life had meaning.
that your death had Resurrection.

"Jimmy we hardly knew ye..."
I never ever met you really.
Although I had looked forward to meeting you at last year's
Bergamo. We all regretted that you could not attend. In
conversation about you then, Dan Marshall had said you
thought Bill was the contemporary
voice of a John Dewey...
I beamed with pride.
also awe.

So even though I never met you, Jim...
nor shook your hand
nor dressed your wounds...
I really have felt that I know you...
through the spirit
through the air, like breath...
for your words have inspired my dream...
your poetics as pathway...assisting transcendence.

And so I offer these thoughts to you,
this eventide
this Feast Day of All Saints...
for we have shared our Hallowed-eve
grave-brave
death-ash-over
and now
transfiguration
For you have found your wings
through Phoenix Phaith
and you are in the repose of your soul.
and it is in honour of you
and the kaleidescope of your caring that
I lay these thoughts which I am about to share
before you.

Teacher
and apple of our eye
we are your last leaf
and we will be true to you...
Hoping that you will remember

to cast a ray of your sun from your
Macdonald Mountain..
that we who hear will know
and act.

The first time I ever knew you occurred in the words
"Utopian Impulse."
It was fall semester last year.
I had spied a book on Bill's shelf which he let me borrow.
"Curriculum Theorizing" it said in orange letters on a flesh
face...
"William Pinar, editor"
It was the first time text
had been authored by one of my professors. I was quite
breathless! Bill's meekness made my discovery even more
meaningful. I flew from his office to find a perch. I fanned
through the pages, catching phrases here and there. "Curric-
ulum" was such new meaning for me! Suddenly the words
"Utopian Impulse" flashed by. I back-tracked trying to find
the page.
"Who said that?" I wondered.
Ah! there it was...
page 4 James B. Macdonald (in italics)
"developmental work. That it met a need for me that par-
alled some educational needs, there can be no doubt." you
said. "But life seems to move in circles and somewhere
from my past the utopian impulse, perhaps best experienced
and late expressed in terms of justice, equality, fairness,
etc., pressed into my professional consciousness. At this
point education became a moral enterprise rather than
simply a set of technical problems to be solved within a
satisfying conceptual scheme. And with this shift a concern
for quality became a dimension that was not the same as,
though still related to, the quantity of problems "solved,"
or outputs measured." page 4

Ah, the impulse!
So that's what it is...

I heard Thoreau encouraging us to advance in the direction
of our dreams in the phrase and also my parental urging to
never be afraid of a logical contradiction.

The words "justice, equality, fairness" had been pressed
into my development and were now emerging through my
'professional consciousness.'   Health care has lacked a
necessary relationship with the whole. Perhaps this con-
sciousness was never more apparent than when I designed the
internship for my Masters' completion with the intent of
looking at "deviants" within a prison environment. Such
concepts had particular application.
In the jail, I was intent on applying fundamental counsel-
ing principles in an unorthodox setting. The Rogerian 'un-
conditional positive regard' had remained tidy in its un-
disturbed upper crust relevance. I was busy citing the penal
population as the *Dirty Petticoat of Education* and that
such population merely reflects the impotence of "fancied"
educational effectiveness. Principled application was needed.
I had raised some eyebrows, gotten some grief and even a
few pats on the back. So you see, when you spoke of educa-
tion as moral enterprise, I could not agree more. I would
add however, that curriculum is currency.

It is clear to me now," you said, "that when we speak of
education, we speak in the context of a microscopic para-
digm of a macroscopic human condition, a paradigm that
holds all of the complexities in microcosm of the larger
condition."

This made profound sense!   My insistence of holistic
Theory as just beginning to find its voice and the construct/
concept I had resorted to was "atom as inscape of the world"

and then lastly Jim as your conclusion, you spoke of an
"article of faith," analogous to John Dewey's comment
that educational philosophy was the essence of all phil-
osophy because it was the "study of how to have a world."
"Curriculum theory is in this light," you asserted, "might
be said to be the essence of educational theory because

it is the study of how to have a learning environment."

Amen. Amen. Amen!
Jim, you have said what needs to be said...
and realized in our world today.
For we are a world in *Crisis*!!!
Our planetary preservation is at stake.
We teeter, tenuously
on a balance of terror called deterrence.

Deterrence ideology is the biggest, fattest lie that has ever
been imposed on a civilization. Some say, it is the ultimate
manifestation of patriarchy; the lust for power gone astray...
but this is no time for casting blame.
In many respects, we all must share in the accomplice role of
this Despotism.

Deterrence is the ultimate misinformation of the ages. It
has exploited and imported and exported our propensity
for *Fear*.
It has counterfeited the covenant of our Nation...
"In God We Trust"
It has put us deeper and darker into the dank of the cave.
It has insisted that the "Family of Man" is myth.
It is deceitful.
It is demented.
It is demonic.
It views life through a sinister, jaundiced eye, insisting that
it is the only secure way to peace.
But alas! such pentagon peace
is a paltry peace...
a pirate's peace.
a proud peace...swollen with conceit.
Ruthlessly, it thirsts for blood.
Its money is tainted and rotten.
The odour of such death fouls the air
necrosis is everywhere.
the sediment of such sin
has encrusted our minds and infected our thinking.
Our love, lobotomized

and turned to leather.
the harvest of hatred
suspicion
fattens our gluttony.
Delectable, such bones of death.

But fear is only phantom...
fabrication.
Its tapestry, travesty
a strange weave of church and state
donned by the emperors of earth.
Their "peace" procession
needs the light of love...
the child within us to simply proclaim:
"The emperors are not wearing any clothes."

Not fear, faith America!
and as Educators...and in your honour Jim...
we must begin patterning peace.
and how does one begin?
"through love" is the answer.

Love is the most fundamental of all law.
It is the most potent force.
It never ends.
It is understanding and kind and conscious and compre-
hensive.
It seeks the Whole and realizes the interrelatedness of all.
It recognizes the Body and Mind through the Spirit.
It invests no time in the allegiance of alienation.

So this is the challenge for Americans of the 20th Century
age of Nuclear Weaponry...the overcoming of ignorance with
the lamp of love.
The dissolve of an idiot's ideology, signifying nothing.
And remembering our Yankee ingenuity, as our heritage
claims, we will find a way and as *Reconceptualists* we must
lead the adventure.

It is at this point Jim that your "poetics" come to mind for

in order for us to realize the
perspective of peace
We must first understand how we gain entry to the Wholistic
trinity
of Body, Mind and Spirit.
We enter...through the Spirit, like breath.
We leave our earthly, narcissistic self behind.
Blessed...We embrace Beauty.
The key is self-surrender,
Death to the Self.
and it is out of such ash
that we ascend...
leaving the cave behind...
the deformities of deterrence.

Arts alchemy is both our antidote and ally and will show us
the pathway of peace.
and the pathway of peace is paved with the truth of know-
ledge which spirals upward in the quest for wisdom.
fear flees
hatred cowers.

and so tonight we ask God to shed
His grace on U.S.
that we might crown Thy Good
with Brotherhood, Universal
as it should.

if you could help us out Jim, we sure would be grateful...
Beam us up.

this comes with love,

bernadette curran
University of Rochester

SCHOLARSHIP

Books are quiet guards:
Half man and half nature,
Page after page guarding fragments
of pain and thorns, relief and leaves,
roots and courage, beauty and berried branches.

Echoed in the air of tribal traditions
Or etched in stone,
The petroglyph points the way
To another valley, another gathering
of people:
Quietly sharing their ideas
As they share their food.

Excitedly we first entrusted
the sounds and images/voice and vision
into brittle symbols, then print;
Print pressed into soaked and compressed sheaves.

We re-work thoughts
and re-arrange memories
To illuminate meaning - the scholar's offering
to the world.
Books are quiet guards.

Dances, cadences;
The moon and the silvered lake
If they have a voice
They have no ear...Nature
doesn't hear what she has heard.

The moon and the silvered lake
If they have a voice
They have no ear...Nature
doesn't hear what she has heard.
Who hears the splash and slap
on wet rippled sand,
together with a loon's submersion
"plunk" now thrilling cry

breaking into early morning mist
over the water?
Not now "Who hears?" but
Who hears that hearing?

The scholar
must be capable of more
than reflex arc reactions.
Scholars hear their hearing
In a grander sense then
two mirrors facing one another.
Trains of thought
Coupling, mirrors/ideas
"plunk" submersion...now thrilling cry.
Books are quiet guards.

Why do scholars fail
to believe they contribute to society?
Are they ashamed
of the working-man's lunchbox?
Reading books, lifting weights
what for?

Thoughts afire
like flames naturally point
in special directions - flames!
tugging and pulling at shadows
to drag them into their quivering,
transforming glitter?
Tongues of flames gobbling shadows
Just as the scholar's mind pulls,

tugs and gobbles words to
save some of life's meaning,
and perhaps point the way.
Books are quiet guards.

*Sun, puppy-dogs tails, mud, ice etc.:
the makings of one teacher.*

Why would a boy who in grade one
played hookey become a teacher?
        Early spring days
        Cause more than sap to rise -
        A thinly-iced, muddy pool
        seemed like a lake on that
        sunny afternoon,
        And I tried to walk away
        from it...
        I tried a little, but noticed
        the sun glazing crazily all over
        the unbroken surface.

Oh! how impossible to go to school -
There is a raft! (construction pallet)
Pushing it out of the muck, the noisy
muck, sucking splintered ice into
chocolate milk pools around my boots;
Now, so much of that afternoon was
to pass in balancing. Standing
for I don't remember how many
different characters - pirates, acrobats,
my older brother.

        But mainly balancing almost falling.
        That was one key:
        Almost, and then successfully not falling.
        And another key: the quiet, the
        brisk wind, the red hands and cheeks,
        the feeling of being at peace and
        part of the blue, windy sky.

I don't think I knew that it was very wrong to play hookey. But I never told anyone and nobody ever asked me where I was that afternoon.

<div align="right">Roger Neil</div>

DANCE

1. COOL August days with charging wooly clouds and sharp blue sky - all the air above whirling around to the scrunch of leaves and brittle-jointed twigs.
My leather-bound feet snapping twigs,
I dance,
with eyes set on neutral,
richocheting from blue sky to
the rich crumpled pictures
of leaves underfoot.

2. Our empty driveway was packed mud, and used to catch puddles of water
after a summy downpour.
Clear puddles with beautiful twisting worms
Scintillating, turning colour too.
How is it that sticks appear
to children without looking?
And I gently break the puddle's
surface to make a "worm road," but he keeps floating
until he flops over my stick
and is carried deflated to the grass. Suddenly breathing deeply I look up and jump over every puddle
I see...High High, Long, short-twisting-around steps.

3. What will happen if I just let go completely?
I fall out of the tree and break my arm.

<div align="right">Roger Neil</div>

Bergamo, 1984. The presentation of the first annual James B. Macdonald Prize to Professor Susan W. Stinson, right. Mrs. James B. (Susan) Macdonald, left. Janet Miller, Chairwoman of the Macdonald Prize Committee and *JCT* Managing Editor, front. William Pinar, *JCT* editor, back. Photographer: Paul Shaker.

James B. Macdonald Prize

James B. Macdonald died November 21, 1983. To honor his immense contribution to curriculum studies, the editors of *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* have established the James B. Macdonald Prize, to be awarded to the writer of the essay which exemplifies best some aspect of Macdonald's work.

To qualify, the writer must present the submitted essay at the October 16-19, 1985 Bergamo Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice. Just before intermission of the Friday concert, a plaque and a check of at least $1,000 will be presented to the writer of the essay the Committee has judged at best exemplifying some aspect of Macdonald contribution.

Those interested should submit their papers by August 15, 1985, in triplicate to:

Dr. Janet L. Miller, Chair
Macdonald Prize Committee
St. John's University
School of Education and Human Services
Jamaica, N.Y. 11439

T. Aoki Award

Professor T. Aoki, Chair, Department of Secondary Education, Faculty of Education, The University of Alberta in Edmonton, retires spring 1985.

To honor Professor Aoki's distinguished contribution to the field of curriculum studies, the editors of *The Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* have established the "T. Aoki Award," a cash award of at least $1,000 to be given each autumn to the writer of the essay which exemplifies best some aspect of Professor Aoki's work.

To be eligible, the essay might amplify or extend a theoretical point which Aoki has made; or, it might analyze and otherwise discuss any of the curriculum projects on which he worked in British Columbia and Alberta, or it might attempt to assess the significance of his theoretical work upon curriculum studies in Canada and/or the U.S., or it might portray his pedagogical work through narrative and personal reminiscence.

The paper must be presented at the October 16-19, 1985 Bergamo Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice, to be held at the Bergamo Conference Center, Dayton, Ohio, U.S.A. The recipient of the Award will be announced just before intermission of the Friday evening concert. A plaque and a cash award of $1,000 will be presented to the recipient at that time. The essay will be published in *JCT*.

Submit your paper by July 15, 1985 to:

Dr. Terry Carson, Chair
Aoki Award Committee
Faculty of Education
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2G5
Canada

The Bergamo Conference on Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice

The Bergamo Conference will be held October 16-19, 1985, again at the Bergamo Conference Center, 4435 E. Patterson Road, Dayton, Ohio, 45430, U.S.A. This comfortable yet inexpensive conference facility rests on 250 acres of wooded and open land. It is easily accessible by car from most points in the mid-east and mid-west regions, and from other points in North America via the close-by Dayton International Airport.

Presentations of various sorts, including panels, workshops media events, and paper readings are invited from university scholars, teacher educators, curriculum administrators, and classroom teachers. To submit your presentation proposal, send a one-page abstract by April 15, 1985 to:

The Editors, JCT
53 Falstaff Road
Rochester, New York 14609
U.S.A.

The following persons have generously contributed to the following Funds:

**Janet Callahan, New York City, JCT Fund
Carol Clifford, New York City, JCT Fund
Paul R. Klohr, Columbus Ohio, JCT Fund**

Invest in Your Profession

Invest in your profession by making a tax deductible contribution to the Corporation for Curriculum Research. This not-for-profit corporation provides independent, private support for the advancement of curriculum theory and practice. Why not reduce your income tax liability and invest in your profession? Make out your check to the Corporation for Curriculum Research; indicate in your note to which of the following funds your gift should be applied.

JCT Fund: an endowment to ensure regular publication of the *Journal of Curriculum Theorizing* during periods of subscription fluctuation.

Research Fund: an endowment from which research and study grants will be made to elementary and secondary teachers, curriculum administrators, and university scholars. First awards to be made for summer 1986.

Fund for the Institute for Advanced Curriculum Studies: an endowment for non-teaching Research Institute to be inaugurated at the turn of the century.

James B. Macdonald Fund: an endowment for the Macdonald Prize, a cash Prize to be given each year at the Conference, in honor of the late curriculum theorist's important work.

T. Aoki Fund: an endowment for the Aoki Award, a cash Award to be given each year at the Conference in honor of the distinguished Canadian educator's work.

**The editors
gratefully acknowledge
the support
of these institutions:**

**St. John's University
University of Dayton
Bowling Green State University (Ohio)
University of Lethbridge (Alberta, Canada)
University of Rochester**

On Friday afternoon

November 2nd, 1984...

....collegues and friends of James B. Macdonald gathered in the Assembly Room of the Bergamo Conference Center in Dayton, Ohio, to commemorate him. The tapes of those commemorative speeches -- by Michael Apple, Madeleine Grumet, Dwayne Huebner, Alex Milnar, William Pinar, Bernard Spodek, introduced by Bernice Wolfson -- are available from *JCT*. Send your check for $10 (for 2 tapes) to *JCT*, 53 Falstaff Road, Rochester, New York 14609.

The University of Alberta

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